Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A study in imperialism

by Edward Mead Earle

Nationalism and Militarism Triumph at Constantinople

The outbreak of the Great War precipitated a serious political crisis at Constantinople. Decisions of the utmost moment to the future of the Ottoman Empire had to be taken. Chief among these was the choice between neutrality and entry into the war in coöperation with the Central Powers. Pacifists and Entente sympathizers, of whom Djavid Bey was perhaps the foremost, counseled non-intervention in the struggle. Militarists and Germanophiles, headed by Enver Pasha, the distinguished Minister of War, advocated early and complete observance of the alliance with Germany, which called for active military measures against the Entente. In support of the pacifists were the great mass of the people, overburdened with taxes, worn out with military service, and weary of the sacrifices occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars. In support of the militarists were German economic power, German military prestige, and the powerful emotion of Turkish nationalism.

The case of the pacifists, like that of their opponents, was based frankly upon national self-interest. A great European war seemed to them to offer an unprecedented opportunity for setting Ottoman affairs in order without the perennial menace of foreign interference. Ottoman neutrality would be solicited by some of the belligerents, Ottoman intervention by others; during the war, however, no nation could afford to bully Turkey. By clever diplomatic bargaining economic and political privileges of the greatest importance might be obtained—the Capitulations, for example, might be abolished. Neutral Turkey might grow prosperous by a thriving commerce with the belligerents. After the peace both victor and vanquished would be too exhausted to think of aggression against a revivified Ottoman Empire. To remain neutral was to assure peace, security, and prosperity. To intervene was to invite defeat and dismemberment.

Militarists, however, appraised the situation differently. National honor demanded that Turkey go to the assistance of her allies. But, more than that, national security demanded the decisive defeat of the Entente Powers. As contrasted with the firm friendship of Germany for Turkey, it was pointed out, there was the traditional policy of Russia to dismember the Ottoman Empire and of France and Great Britain to infringe upon Ottoman sovereignty whenever opportunity presented itself. A victorious Russia would certainly appropriate Constantinople, and as “compensations” France would take Syria and England Mesopotamia. By closing the Dardanelles and declaring war, Turkey could deal Russian economic and military power a blow from which the empire of the Tsars might never recover. By associating herself with the seemingly irresistible military forces of Germany, Turkey might once and for all eliminate Russia—the feared and hated enemy of both Turks and Germans—from Near Eastern affairs. In addition, British security in Egypt might be shaken, and the French colonial empire in North Africa might be menaced by a Pan-Islamic revival. In these circumstances the war might be for Turkey a war of liberation, from which only the craven-hearted would shrink.

For a time, however, practical considerations led to the maintenance of Ottoman neutrality. “To Germany the ‘sphere of influence’ in Turkey was of far greater economic and political importance than all her ‘colonies’ in Africa and in the South Seas put together. The latter, under the German flag, were an obvious and quick prey to Great Britain’s naval superiority, but so long as Turkey remained out of the war the German sphere of influence in Anatolia and Mesopotamia was protected by the neutral Crescent flag. As soon as Turkey entered the war, however, Great Britain’s naval superiority could be brought to bear upon Germany’s interests in the Near East as well as upon her interests in Africa and Oceanica. If German imperialists were devoted to a Berlin-to-Bagdad Mittel-Europa project, there were British imperialists whose hearts and minds were set upon a Suez-to-Singapore South-Asia project. The Ottoman Empire occupied a strategic position in both schemes. A neutral Turkey, on the whole, was favorable to German imperialism. A Turkey in armed alliance with Germany presented a splendid opportunity for British imperialism.”[1]

Turkish mobilization, furthermore, was a tediously slow process. The construction of the Bagdad Railway, as we have seen, had not been completed before the outbreak of the Great War.[2] There were wide gaps in northern Mesopotamia and in the Amanus mountains which made difficult the transportation of troops for the defence of Irak, an attack on the Suez, an offensive in the Caucasus, or the fortification of the Dardanelles. The entry of Turkey into the war before the completion of mobilization would have been of no material advantage to Germany and would almost certainly have brought disaster to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while the war went well for Germany on the French and Russian fronts, German influence at Constantinople was more concerned with creating sentiment for war and with speeding up mobilization than with encouraging premature intervention. After the Teutonic defeats at the Marne and in Galicia, however, active Turkish support was needed for the purpose of menacing Russian security in the Caucasus and British security in Egypt, as well as for bolstering up German morale. During the latter part of September and the month of October, Marshal Liman von Sanders, Baron von Wangenheim, the commanders of the Goeben and the Breslau, and other German influences at Constantinople exerted the strongest possible pressure on the Ottoman Government to bring Turkey into the war on the side of her Teutonic allies.

On October 31, 1914, the Turkish Government took the fatal step of precipitating war with the Entente Powers, after Enver Pasha, Minister of War, and Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, were satisfied that Ottoman preparations were sufficiently advanced to warrant the beginning of hostilities. The outcome of the Bagdad Railway concession of 1903 was the entry of Turkey into the War of 1914![3]

Discouraged by their failure to maintain the peace, and fearful of impending disaster to their country, Djavid Bey and three other members of the Ottoman ministry resigned their posts. There were other indications, also, that intelligent public opinion at Constantinople was not whole-hearted in support of war. But the nationalists—playing upon the “traditional enmity” toward Russia—had their way, and with an outburst of patriotic fervor Turkey began hostilities. In a proclamation to the army and navy the Sultan affirmed that the war was being waged for the defence of the Caliphate and the “emancipation” of the Fatherland: “During the last three hundred years,” he said, “the Russian Empire has caused our country to suffer many losses in territory. And when we finally arose to a sentiment of awakening and regeneration which was to increase our national welfare and our power, the Russian Empire made every effort to destroy our attempts, either with war or with numerous machinations and intrigues. Russia, England, and France never for a moment ceased harboring ill-will against our Caliphate, to which millions of Mussulmans, suffering under the tyranny of foreign domination, are religiously and wholeheartedly devoted. And it was always these powers that started every misfortune that came upon us. Therefore, in this mighty struggle which we are undertaking, we once and for all will put an end to the attacks made from one side against the Caliphate and from the other against the existence of our country.”[4]

Turcophiles in Germany were enthusiastic over Ottoman participation in the Great War. The Turkish military contribution to a Teutonic victory might not be decisive, but neither would it be insignificant. And German coöperation in Ottoman military ventures would certainly strengthen German economic penetration in the Near East, even though Turkish arms might not drive Britain out of Egypt or Russia out of the Caucasus. “Over there in Turkey,” wrote Dr. Ernest Jäckh, “stretch Anatolia and Mesopotamia—Anatolia, the ‘land of sunrise,’ Mesopotamia, an ancient paradise. Let these names be to us a symbol. May this world war bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and the paradise of a new era. May it confer upon a strengthened Turkey and a greater Germany the blessings of fruitful Turco-Teutonic cooperation in peace after victorious Turco-Teutonic collaboration in war.”[5]