FOOTNOTES
[1] Dill, Roman Society, p. 340.
[2] ‘omnis natura habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur’ Cic. N. D. ii 22, 57. ‘est tuae prudentiae sequi eius auctoritatem, cuius sectam atque imperium secutus es’ ad Fam. xiii 4, 2. ‘The sense of the word has been obscured by a false popular etymology which has connected the word with the Latin secare ‘to cut,’ Skeat, Etymological Dictionary, p. 537.
[4] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius N. A. vi (vii) 14, 10.
[5] For a full account of his life and teaching see Schmekel, Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, pp. 1-9.
[6] Strabo xiv 5, 16.
[7] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 51.
[8] ‘discipulus Antipatri Panaetius’ Cic. Div. i 3, 6.
[9] ‘credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum appellat’ Tusc. disp. i 32, 79.
[10] Fin. iv 28, 79.
[11] ‘tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit’ ib.
[12] ἦν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης, ἀ[λλὰ κ]αὶ παρ[ενέδ]ωκε τῶν Ζηνων[είω]ν τι δι[ὰ τὴ]ν Ἀκαδημίαν καὶ [τὸν Περίπ]ατον. Ind. Herc. col. 61, quoted by Schmekel, p. 379.
[13] ‘quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera, tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere’ Cic. Rep. i 10, 15.
[14] ‘ain’ tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista [de optima republica] tractata sunt? non sane, nisi a [Diogene Stoico] et postea a Panaetio’ Leg. iii 6, 14.
[15] See below, § [310], note 52.
[16] ‘[accepi] Publi Africani in legatione illa nobili Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse’ Cic. Ac. ii 2, 5.
[17] This date is determined on circumstantial evidence by Schmekel, pp. 2, 3.
[18] ‘Scylax Halicarnasseus, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia, idemque in regenda sua civitate princeps’ Cic. Div. ii 42, 88.
[19] ‘omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupidinem; in qua excellere pulchrum putamus; labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus’ Off. i 6, 18; ‘cum sit is [Panaetius], qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri, neque decessione peiorem’ ib. iii 3, 12.
[20] ‘quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent’ Off. iii 3, 13.
[21] ‘Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet ... nusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem’ Fin. iv 9, 23; see however below, § [322], note 132.
[22] See below, ch. xiii.
[23] ‘cuius [veri investigationis] studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe, multique dantur ad studia reditus’ Cic. Off. i 6, 19.
[24] He was however a skilled grammarian; see Schmekel, p. 207.
[25] He wrote a book ‘on providence’; how far he or Posidonius is Cicero’s authority for the treatment of the subject in Nat. de. ii has been much disputed; on this point see Schmekel, p. 8, n. 4.
[26] ‘id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret’ Cic. N. D. ii 46, 118.
[27] Schmekel, p. 309, and below, § [211].
[28] Παναίτιος πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὑτῷ τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 36 (Diels).
[29] Schmekel, p. 309.
[30] ‘vim esse divinandi [Panaetius] dubitare se dixit’ Cic. Div. i 3, 6.
[31] He came from Apamea in Syria, but is often described as ‘of Rhodes,’ as the latter part of his life was spent there.
[32] Schmekel, pp. 9, 10.
[33] ib. p. 428.
[34] Reid, Cic. Acad. Introd. p. 5.
[35] Cic. Tusc. disp. ii 25, 61.
[36] N. D. i 44, 123; ii 34, 88.
[37] ‘ecce Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his qui plurimum philosophiae contulerunt’ Sen. Ep. 90, 20.
[39] Also the de Divinatione and the first half of Tusc. disp. i; Schmekel, p. 98, etc.
[40] ‘de divinatione libros edidit ... quinque noster Posidonius’ Cic. Div. i 3, 6.
[41] ‘animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt, disiunguntque se a societate divina, vinclis corporis impediti’ ib. 49, 110.
[42] ‘deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum’ ib. 49, 111.
[44] ὁ Ποσειδώνιος [τὸ τέλος εἶναι εἶπε] τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν Clem. Strom. ii p. 416 B (Schmekel, p. 270); see also below, § [321], note 125.
[45] Schmekel, p. 62.
[47] Diog. L. vii 90; Schmekel, pp. 291, 292.
[48] Diog. L. vii 127.
[49] Schmekel, p. 294.
[51] ‘plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum; sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere? in utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate officium dirigit magis quam humanitate’ Cic. Off. iii 23, 89.
[52] ib. 23, 90.
[53] ‘nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, | quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes’ Hor. Ep. i 1, 14 and 15.
[54] ‘qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum’ Cic. Ac. ii 22, 69; cf. de Or. i 11, 45.
[55] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 52 (Schmekel, p. 16); but see Pauly-Wissowa s. v.
[56] i.e. the earlier part of the first century B.C.
[57] Diog. L. vii 34.
[58] ‘mihi nimis videtur submisisse temporibus se Athenodorus, nimis cito refugisse’ Sen. Dial. ix 4, i.
[59] ‘apud Athenodorum inveni:—tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum cum eo perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis palam’ Ep. 10, 5. But it is possible that the quotations are from the younger Athenodorus.
[60] Cic. Off. ii 24, 86; but some think that Cato’s friend was an earlier Antipater.
[61] Plutarch, Cato minor 65-67 and 69.
[62] Reid, Academics, p. 2.
[63] ‘Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit tot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo?’ Cic. Ac. ii 36, 115.
[64] ad Att. ii 20, 6.
[65] Tusc. disp. v 39, 113.
[66] vii 1, 2, 24 and 28.
[67] ‘verba haec Hieroclis Stoici, viri sancti et gravis: ἡδονὴ τέλος, πόρνης δόγμα· οὐκ ἔστιν πρόνοια, οὐδὲ πόρνης δόγμα’ A. Gellius, N. A. ix 5, 8.
[68] For a fair-minded estimate of Cicero’s services to philosophy see Reid, Academics of Cicero, pp. 10-28.
[69] See next section.
[70] ‘de tertio [cum utile et honestum inter se pugnare videantur] nihil scripsit [Panaetius]. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi, et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi, ut ad me τὰ κεφάλαια mitteret’ Cic. ad Att. xvi 11, 4. ‘Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere; misit enim satis bellum ὑπόμνημα’ ib. 14, 4.
[71] He was head of the Academy at Athens, where Cicero heard him in the year 79-78 B.C., and was patronized by Lucullus.
[72] ‘eadem dicit quae Stoici’ Cic. Ac. ii 22, 69. ‘erat, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus’ ib. 42, 132. See further J. S. Reid, Academics of Cicero, Introd. pp. 15-19, and notes to Ac. ii 39, 123 and 40, 126.
[73] ‘Brutus tuus, auctore Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc [sc. nihil esse, nisi virtutem, bonum]’ Tusc. disp. v 8, 21. ‘si addubitas, ad Brutum transeamus, est enim is quoque Antiochius’ ad Att. xiii 25, 3. See also below, § [432].
[74] ‘tu nihil errabis, si paulo diligentius (ut quid sit εὐγένεια, quid ἐξοχή intelligas), Athenodorus Sandonis filius quid de his rebus dicat, attenderis’ ad Fam. iii 7, 5.
[75] For the identification of the writer Didymus with Areius the ‘philosophus’ of Augustus, see Diels, Proleg. pp. 80-88.
[76] ‘[Augustus] eruditione etiam varia repletus per Arei philosophi filiorumque eius Dionysi et Nicanoris contubernium’ Suet. Aug. 89.
[77] Sat. ii 6, 73-76.
[78] Sen. Dial. vi 4 and 5; see below, § [377].
[79] ‘Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen’ Hor. Ep. i 12, 20; ‘insanis et tu, stultique prope omnes, | si quid Stertinius veri crepat’ Sat. ii 3, 32 and 33.
[80] Teuffel, Röm. Lit. 250, 4.
[81] ‘ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes’ Hor. Sat. i 1, 120 and 121.
[82] Teuffel, as above, 3.
[83] Hor. Sat. ii 3.
[84] Hor. Ep. i 1, 108.
[85] ‘sublimem altioremque humano fastigio [Attalum] credidi’ Sen. Ep. 108, 13.
[86] Sen. Ep. 108, 14-16.
[87] ib. 110, 14-20.
[88] ‘Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat; malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in deliciis habeat’ ib. 67, 15.
[89] Sen. Rhet. Suas. 2, 12.
[90] ‘teneros tu suscipis annos | Socratico, Cornute, sinu ... tecum etenim longos memini consumere soles, | et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes. | unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo, | atque verecunda laxamus seria mensa. | ... nescio quod certe est, quod me tibi temperat, astrum’ Pers. Sat. v 36-51.
[92] Sen. Ep. 108, 17.
[93] ib. 13-23.
[94] ‘sapientem esse me dico? minime’ Dial. xii 5, 2; ‘multum ab homine tolerabili, nedum a perfecto, absum’ Ep. 57, 3; ‘ego in alto vitiorum omnium sum’ Dial. vii 17, 4.
[95] ‘si respublica corruptior est quam ut adiuvari possit, ... non nitetur sapiens in supervacuum’ ib. viii 3, 3.
[96] ‘in hoc me recondidi et fores clusi, ut prodesse pluribus possem. posterorum negotium ago. illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse, conscribo. salutares admonitiones litteris mando, esse illas efficaces in meis ulceribus expertus. rectum iter, quod sero cognovi et lassus errando, aliis monstro’ Ep. 8, 1 to 3.
[97] ‘cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius vulgaria videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique impetu sint aut levi et causidicali argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et plebeia’ A. Gellius, N. A. xii 2, 1.
[98] Quint. Inst. Orat. x 1, 125-158.
[99] ‘potioribus praeferri non sinebam’ ib. 126.
[100] ‘tum autem hic solus fere in manibus adulescentium fuit’ ib. 125.
[101] ‘eandem sententiam miliens alio atque alio amictu indutam referunt’ Fronto, p. 157.
[102] How capable Seneca was of continuous exposition we may gather from his excellent discussion of the ‘causes’ of Aristotle and Plato, in Epistle 65: see below.
[103] ‘non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis Chrysippive committere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum sententiam’ Sen. Dial. viii 3, 1; ‘nostram [opinionem] accipe. nostram autem cum dico, non adligo me ad unum aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus. est et mihi censendi ius’ ib. vii 3, 2.
[104] ‘si omnia argumenta ad obrussam coeperimus exigere, silentium indicetur; pauca enim admodum sunt sine adversario’ Sen. N. Q. iv 5, 1.
[105] ‘non tempero mihi, quominus omnes nostrorum ineptias proferam’ ib. iv 6, 1.
[106] See the notes to § [177].
[107] ‘si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus, inter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore loco homines videntem, ex aequo deos, non subibit te eius veneratio?... non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare’ Ep. 41, 4 and 5.
[108] See below, § [209], note 112.
[109] ‘idem facit sapiens; nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens, ne cavere videatur’ Ep. 14, 8; ‘circumspiciendum ergo nobis est, quomodo a vulgo tuti esse possimus’ ib. 9.
[110] A. Gellius, N. A. v 1, 3 and 4.
[111] Epict. Disc. iii 23, 29.
[112] Stob. iii 1, 48.
[113] ib. 5, 21.
[114] Specimens are given below, especially in ch. xv.
[115] Tac. Ann. xiv 59; Henderson, Nero, p. 143.
[116] Tac. Ann. xv 71.
[117] Hist. iii 81.
[118] ‘reipublicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci’ ib. 86.
[120] Disc. iii 15, 8; Manual 29.
[121] Pliny, Ep. i 10.
[122] ‘quid nostra memoria Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus? quid horum magister Musonius? nonne summa facundia praediti, neque minus sapientiae quam eloquentiae gloria incluti extiterunt?’ Fronto, Ep. ad Aur. i 1 (Naber, p. 115).
[123] See Leben und Werke Dion’s von Prusa, by H. von Arnim. Berlin, 1898.
[125] See the story of Epicharis in connexion with the conspiracy of Piso, in Tac. Ann. xv 57.
[126] Epict. Disc. ii 12, 17 to 25.
[127] ‘plerosque istos, qui philosophari viderentur, philosophos esse eiuscemodi “ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν”; id significat “factis procul, verbis tenus” A. Gellius, N. A. xvii 19, 1.
[128] ib. xv 11, 4 and 5.
[129] Epict. Disc. i 7, 32 and 33.
[130] M. Aurelius, To himself, i 7 (Rendall’s translation).
[131] To himself, v 10.
[132] ib. vii 9.
[133] ib. iv 3.
[134] M. Aurelius, To himself, vi 10.
[135] ib. vi 44.
[136] See further, §§ [457] and [458].
[137] M. Aurelius, To himself, xii 28.
[138] ib. iv 49.
[139] Epict. Disc. iii 24, 93 and 94.
[140] M. Aurelius, To himself, iv 14.
[141] ib. vi 24.
[142] ib. ix 3.
[143] ib. xi 3.
[144] ib. v 33.
[145] Rendall, M. Aurelius, Introd. p. cxii.
[146] ib. cxv.
CHAPTER VI.
OF REASON AND SPEECH.
Parts of philosophy.
143. The history of Greek philosophy, even before the time of Zeno, leads naturally to its division into the three parts of logic, physics, and ethics[1]. The Ionic philosophers had chiefly occupied themselves with the nature and history of the universe, that is, with the problems of physics. The sophists were greatly concerned with questions as to the validity of human knowledge, that is, with logic. Socrates shared this interest, but attached greater importance to the discussion of moral activities, that is, to ethics. It is however not clear when a formal division into these three parts was first made. Cicero attributes it to the immediate followers of Plato in the Academic school; others assign it definitely to Xenocrates[2]. The Peripatetics and Stoics both adopted the division, but whereas the former assigned to Logic an inferior position, making it an introduction to philosophy, the Stoics insist that it is a part of philosophy itself[3]; and that of the three parts it comes first in the order of study, ‘as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure[4].’ It must not however be thought that the three parts of philosophy can be separately treated, for they are intertwined[5]; so that in treating of Logic we shall constantly have need to assume a general knowledge of Stoic views both on physics and ethics. Logic is subdivided into ‘dialectic,’ which deals with reasoning, and ‘rhetoric,’ the art of speech. The relation between reason and speech was in ancient times, as now, a matter of perplexity; but it may be taken as a fundamental position of Stoicism that the two should always be in agreement.
Knowledge is attainable.
144. Stoicism, as one of the positive and dogmatic schools, assumes that knowledge is attainable. Since this is the very point on which Socrates never reached assurance, except on the one particular that he himself knew nothing, it was a matter of primary importance to the Stoics to make good this position; more especially since they held (this time in agreement with Socrates) that virtue is but another form of knowledge. Yet the Stoics could not agree with the Cynics, that true knowledge can be imparted without a study of its method[6]. Knowledge is, in their view, a high privilege derived by man from his divine ancestry, and shared by him with the deity alone; and the whole duty of man may be summed up by saying that he should keep upright his reason[7]. They therefore devoted themselves with special zeal to this part of philosophy[8], and were accordingly nicknamed ‘the dialecticians[9].’ Their aim in this was solely the ascertainment and imparting of truth; but the common view that their style was in consequence harsh and repellent will be found to need considerable qualification[10].
Are the senses true?
145. The chief argument for the certainty of knowledge is that we assume as much in the practical affairs of life[11]; and (as we have already seen) Aristo found it ridiculous that his Academic neighbour should not even know who he was[12]. Against it is the fact that men frequently disagree even as to what they see, and commonly distinguish between what is known to them and what ‘seems’ to be this or that. Hence Epictetus well defines the function of dialectic as
‘a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; a condemnation and distrust of that which only seems, and some kind of investigation of that which seems, as to whether it rightly seems: and the discovery of some rule (κανών)[13].’
Of all kinds of knowledge that which comes through the senses appears to the ordinary man most worthy of confidence, and of the five senses that of sight seems to the philosopher the most divine[14]. In consequence, the whole controversy hinges on the question whether the eyes can be trusted. The positivist argues that the evidence of sight is so plain and unmistakeable that man, if he had the choice, could wish for no better informant. The sceptic replies that nevertheless, if a straight oar be placed partly in the water, it appears to the eyes to be bent; and that the feathers on a dove’s neck, though really alike, appear to the eyes as many-coloured[15]. To deal with such questions we must examine closely the nature of sensation.
Process of sensation.
146. The Stoics fancifully derive the word αἴσθησις (‘sensation’) from εἴσθεσις (‘storage’); it is therefore, strictly speaking, the process by which the mind is stored[16]; but it is also, from an opposite point of view, the process by which the mind reaches out towards an external object[17]. From the object (αἰσθητόν) proceed waves which strike upon the sense-organ (αἰσθητήριον); this impact is called a ‘sensation’ in a narrower sense. At the same time there proceeds from the mind (which is the ruling part or ‘principate’ of the soul), a ‘spirit’ or thrill which goes out to meet this impact; and this spirit and its operation are also called ‘sensation[18].’ As a result of the contact of these two waves, and simultaneously with it, there is produced in the soul an effect like the imprint of a seal[19], and this imprint is the φαντασία or ‘mind-picture.’ That the process may be sound, it is necessary that the intellect be in a healthy state, and further that the organ of sense be healthy, the object really there, and the place and the manner in accord[20]. But we must carefully distinguish between the single sensation and the mind-picture. A flash of light, a cry, a touch, a smell, a thrill of pleasure or pain, is always that which the senses declare it to be[21]; here there is no possibility of error; so understood ‘the sensations are always true[22].’ But if we go in each case a step further; if we say ‘that is white,’ ‘this is sweet,’ ‘this is musical,’ ‘this is fragrant,’ ‘that is rough,’ we are now dealing with mind-pictures, not with ‘sensations’ in the strict sense[23]. And as to the mind-pictures we agree with the Academics that things are not always what they seem; ‘of the mind-pictures some are true, some are false[24].’
The criterion of clearness.
147. In order then that we may distinguish the true mind-picture from the false, we have need of a ‘rule’ (κανών) or ‘criterion’ (κριτήριον). The true mind-picture is a stirring of the soul, which reveals both what is taking place in the soul and the object which has caused this: just as light reveals both itself and the objects that lie within its range[25]. On the other hand the false mind-picture is an empty twitching of a soul which is not in a healthy condition[26]; no real object corresponds to it, but to that which appears to be an object corresponding to it we give the name ‘phantasm[27].’ When Orestes thinks he sees the Furies leaping upon him, though his sister assures him that in real truth he sees nothing, the vision of the Furies is a phantasm. The appearances of dreams are equally phantasms[28]. Now a true mind-picture differs from that of a phantasm by being clearer; or, in other words, the distinctive note of a true mind-picture is its ‘clearness’ (ἐνάργεια, perspicuitas)[29]. Clearness then is a quality which attaches itself to a true vision in a way in which it can never attach itself to a work of phantasy[30]. To this clearness the mind cannot but bow[31]; it is therefore (so far as our study has proceeded) the criterion of truth[32].
Assent.
148. The mind-picture as such is not within a man’s control; but it rests with him to decide whether he will give it his ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις, adsensio or adsensus)[33]. This assent is therefore an act of the soul, in its capacity as will; and can only be rightly exercised by a soul properly strung, that is, possessed of due tension. Assent wrongly given leads to ‘opinion’ (δόξα, opinio), and all wrong assent is error or ‘sin’ (ἁμαρτία, peccatum). This error may take place in two directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (προπίπτειν), giving assent to a picture which is not really clear; or by feebleness of will, which leads to assent in a false direction (διαψεύδεσθαι)[34]. Even haste however is a form of weakness, so that we may say that all opining is a weak form of assent[35]. To ensure a right assent due attention should be given to each of its parts; it includes (i) the intention of mastering the object (πρόθεσις); (ii) careful attention directed to the object, or ‘application’ (ἐπιβολή); and (iii) assent in the narrower sense[36]. Apart from assent, three courses remain open: these are (i) ‘quiescence’ (ἡσυχάζειν, quiescere): (ii) ‘suspense of judgment’ (ἐπέχειν, adsensum sustinere), which is a settled quiescence; and (iii) negation[37].
Comprehension.
149. Close upon assent follows ‘comprehension’ (κατάληψις, comprehensio): this is the ratification of the assent given, the fixing irrevocably in the mind of the picture approved. This picture now becomes a ‘comprehension-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), and as such a unit of knowledge. We may understand thereby that the mind has grasped the external object[38], and this is the plain meaning of Zeno’s simile; or we may say that the object has gained a hold upon the mind, and has left its stamp upon it. Both interpretations are consistent with Stoic doctrine: but the former view, which represents the soul as active and masterful, undoubtedly expresses the more adequately the meaning of the school[39]. From this mutual grasp there follows an important physical deduction. Since only like can grasp like, the soul must be like the object, and the popular dualism of mind and matter is (to this extent) at an end[40]. Still this likeness is not complete; and the soul in sensation does not grasp the object from every point of view, but only so far as its own nature permits in each case[41]. For this reason the trained observer and the artist grasp far more of the object than the ordinary man[42].
From sensation to reason.
150. The soul, having grasped single mind-pictures, retains its hold upon them by memory[43]; the frequent exercise of which keeps each picture fresh and complete[44]. As the air, when an orchestra is performing, receives the impression of many sounds at the same time, and yet retains the distinctive tone of each[45], so the soul by concurrent alterations of its texture preserves its hold on the separate pictures it has once grasped. Fresh operations of soul now supervene. First, from the comparison of many like pictures, comes ‘experience’ (ἐμπειρία, experientia)[46]; out of other comparisons, ‘similitude’ (ὁμοιότης), as ‘Socrates’ from his portrait; and ‘analogy’ (ἀναλογία, proportio), as ‘the centre of the earth’ from that of other spheres; ‘transference’ (μετάθεσις, translatio), as ‘eyes in the heart’; ‘composition’ (σύνθεσις, compositio), as ‘a Hippocentaur’; ‘opposition’ (ἐναντίωσις, transitio), as ‘death’ from life; ‘deprivation’ (κατὰ στέρησιν), as ‘a cripple[47].’ All these are based on the general principle of likeness and unlikeness, and may be summed up under the general heading of ‘reason’s work of comparison’ (collatio rationis)[48], or shortly, of reason (λόγος)[49]. Sensation shews us the present only; but reason brings the past and the future within our view, and points out to us the workings of cause and effect[50].
Perceptions and Conceptions.
151. With the mind-pictures (φαντασίαι, visa) which are derived from sensation we may now contrast the ‘notions’ (ἔννοιαι, notiones or intellegentiae) which are derived from the combination of sensation and reasoning; the former correspond generally to ‘perceptions,’ the latter to ‘conceptions’ in the language of modern philosophy[51]. But each of the Stoic terms is also used in a wider sense which includes the other. The sensory pictures are inscribed upon the mind as upon a blank sheet from birth upwards; in this sense they may well be called ‘entries on the mind’ (ἔννοια from ἐν νῷ)[52]. On the other hand the conceptions may be called ‘rational mind-pictures’[53]; quite as much as the sensory mind-pictures they need the prudent assent of the will before they become ‘comprehensions,’ when they are once more units capable of entering into further combinations and becoming part of scientific knowledge. If then for the sake of clearness we use the modern terms, we may say that perceptions correspond generally to individual objects which have a real existence, whilst conceptions correspond to classes of things, which (according to the Stoics) have no real existence in themselves, but only a sort of existence in our minds. Thus the ‘ideas’ of Plato are all conceptions, subjectively but not objectively existent[54]. So far as our study has gone, all conceptions are based on perceptions: therefore all the elements of knowledge either come from sense and experience solely, or from sense and experience combined with reasoning[55]; and the most important reasoning process is that comparison of like perceptions which in this philosophy takes the place of induction[56].
Preconceptions.
152. But even if all ‘conceptions’ are ultimately derived from ‘perceptions,’ it does not follow that in each particular case the mind commences de novo to collect and shape its material. On the contrary, it is clear that not only all practical life, but also all philosophy, takes for granted a great many matters which are either allowed by general consent, or at least assumed by the thinker; and these matters are mostly of the nature of class-conceptions. If it is stated that ‘the consul entered Rome in a chariot drawn by four horses,’ we assume that the ideas expressed by ‘consul,’ ‘chariot,’ ‘four,’ ‘horses,’ are matters of general consent, and we may go on to assume that the person of the consul and the locality called ‘Rome’ are also already known to the speaker and his hearers. The general term in the post-Aristotelian writers for such legitimate assumptions is ‘preconception’ (πρόληψις, anticipatio or praesumptio). The precise meaning of this term (of which the invention is ascribed to Epicurus[57]) appears not to be always the same. Most commonly the ‘preconception’ is a general term or conception, and therefore to the Stoics it is one variety of the ἔννοια; it is ‘a mental shaping, in accordance with man’s nature, of things general’[58]. All such preconceptions are foreshadowings of truth, especially in so far as they correspond to the common judgment of mankind[59]; and the art of life consists in correctly applying these presumptions to the particular circumstances with which each individual man has to deal[60]. If the preconceptions are rightly applied, they become clearer by use, and thus attain the rank of true knowledge by a process of development or ‘unravelling’ (enodatio)[61].
As to the nature of a preconception, there is a great difference between Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus identifies all the terms ‘preconception,’ ‘comprehension,’ ‘right opinion,’ ‘conception,’ and ‘general notion,’ and maintains that each of these is nothing but memory of a sensation frequently repeated[62]; the Stoics however hold that preconceptions are established by the mind[63], and (so far as they are common to all men) by the universal reason. This difference is fundamental. Epicurus, as a materialist in the modern sense, explains perception as a bodily function, and ‘conceptions’ of every kind as mere echoes of such bodily functions. The Stoics on the other hand recognise at each stage the activity of mind, and this in increasing degree as we proceed to the higher levels of thought.
Notions of inner growth.
153. We now approach the most critical point in the Stoic theory of knowledge. Is it possible for man to possess knowledge which is not derived, either directly or indirectly, through the organs of sense? Such a question cannot be answered by any appeal to single Stoic texts; it needs an appreciation of the whole philosophic outlook, and upon it depend the most vital principles of the system. Let us then first consider, on the supposition that such knowledge exists, what its nature is, what its content, and how it is attained by individual men. Knowledge cut off from the sense-organs is cut off from all human individuality; it is therefore the expression of the common reason (κοινὸς λόγος), and its parts are ‘common notions’ (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι or προλήψεις), shared by gods and men, but by men only so far as they are partakers of the divine nature. The principal content of such knowledge is also clear; it includes the conception of what is morally good, and the beliefs that gods exist and that the world is governed by their providence[64]. Lastly, as of all general conceptions, the rudiments or rough outlines only of these beliefs are inborn in men, by virtue of their divine ancestry; whence they are called ‘innate notions’ (ἔμφυτοι ἔννοιαι, insitae notiones)[65]. These notions in their full development are not attainable by children at all, nor by men till they attain to reason, that is, till they become wise men[66].
‘Proofs’ of inborn notions.
154. The Stoics are naturally reluctant to admit that doctrines which it is impious to deny are nevertheless unattainable except by perfect wisdom; but their whole system points inevitably to this conclusion. But there are intermediate stages between the rough inborn outlines of these truths and their ripe completeness. As man grows in reason, he becomes increasingly able to appreciate contributory truths, derived from the combination of perception and reasoning, that is, by processes such as ‘analogy’ and ‘comparison,’ which point in the direction of the supreme beliefs. In this sense, and (it is here suggested) in this sense only, can there be ‘proofs’ (ἀποδείξεις) of these[67]. Only in the crowning moment of that probation which is described later on, at the moment of conversion, these truths finally flash forth, stirred up indeed by secondary evidence, but really rooted in the man’s deepest nature[68]; they then reveal themselves to the soul with an illuminating power which is all their own, but which carries with it the most complete conviction. Ordinary men must meanwhile somehow make shift with reflections or pale copies of this knowledge, to which however the name of common or inborn notions can also be applied.
The inward touch.
155. The list of ‘common notions’ is doubtless not limited to the high philosophical principles which we have mentioned; for instance it must include such mathematical principles as ‘two and two make four,’ ‘a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,’ ‘a three-sided figure has three angles,’ and so forth. With these however we have little direct concern. Of more interest to us is another kind of perception[69] recognised by the Stoics as well as by other schools of philosophy, that called the ‘inward touch’ (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[70]. By this the soul becomes aware of its own workings, most obviously of its pleasure and pain. The doctrine of the ‘inward touch’ is of great philosophical importance, for it breaks down the dualism of subject and object, the barrier between the knowing and the known. Since these are the same in the specific cases named, the door is open to the conclusion that everywhere there is a kinship between the two, and that without this knowledge would be without firm foundation. By this kinship we may also explain the fact that direct communications are made by the deity to man, as by dreams, oracles and augury[71].
Knowledge; the parts and the whole.
156. Thus it appears that the elements of knowledge, according to the Stoics, are sensations, perceptions, conceptions or notions, and general or inborn notions. As in the other parts of the Stoic philosophy, we shall regard this fourfold division as indicating generally the ground covered, and not as setting up definite lines of demarcation. The same material may be analyzed from other points of view, as for instance in the study of words, in which we shall find a division into objects, statements, conditional statements, and syllogisms. The elements may also be combined in various ways. A combination or ‘system’ (σύστημα) which is directed towards a useful or pleasurable object, such as music or grammar, is called an ‘art’ (τέχνη, ars)[72]; and arts are attainable by ordinary men. The wise man, on the other hand, is not necessarily acquainted with the several arts; his practice is to ‘keep quiet’ when matters are discussed which require such special knowledge. The combination of all knowledge in one all-embracing system is ‘science’ (ἐπιστήμη, scientia); the only science in the full sense is philosophy[73]; and in this system no part can be at variance with any other part[74]. The elements of knowledge also acquire the character of science, when they are found to be parts of this compacted system, and therefore incapable of coming into conflict with any other part[75]; and in particular we find the term ‘science’ predicated of comprehensions which are firmly established and cannot be refuted by any argument[76]. In the language of Zeno’s simile, over the closed fist that grasps the object is placed the other hand, keeping it with firmness and assurance in its place[77]; or, to use a comparison first suggested in ridicule of Stoicism, but which by the progress of architectural skill has since then been made less damaging, science is like a firm and immoveable building constructed upon a shifting foundation[78]. Finally ordinary men can reach comprehension, but only the wise man can attain to science[79].
The criterion reviewed.
157. We revert to the difficult problem of the criterion of truth, that is, the discovery of a rule by which the true can separated from the false. Our authorities differ greatly as to what the Stoic criterion is; and this vacillation must have placed the Stoics at a great disadvantage in their controversy with the Academics, who maintain that there is no criterion. The most usual statement is that the ‘comprehensive mind-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) is the criterion; this view is expressly attributed to Chrysippus, Antipater, and Apollodorus[80]. As we have seen, the meaning of this is that a true mind-picture can be distinguished from one that is false by the note of clearness, and this general doctrine can be traced back to Zeno[81]. It appears at first sight to provide a criterion which can be applied by the percipient at the moment when it is needed, and it was doubtless intended to be a practical tool in this sense; but under the pressure of criticism the Stoics were frequently compelled to modify it. They could not but admit that in the case of dreams and drunken visions it is only at a later moment that the lack of clearness can be appreciated[82]; whereas on the other hand a picture may be perfectly clear, and yet the percipient, because of some prepossession, may not realize this. Such was the case when Hercules brought Alcestis from the world below; her husband Admetus received a true mind-picture of her, but put no confidence in it, because he knew her to be dead. It follows that no mind-picture can be implicitly trusted for itself; for our sense organs may be clouded, or our previous experience in conflict with it. If the Academics urged that the sure note of clearness is not to be found in the senses[83], the Stoics admitted as much when they now said that a true comprehensive picture must come from a real object[84], when they added the words that ‘no objection must arise[85]’; thus really admitting that it must be not only persuasive, but also such as no reasoning process can shake, and such as has been examined from all sides[86]. Thus they shifted the centre of certainty from the single comprehension to the general field of science; they still held to it in theory, but no longer maintained its practical application. For this too they had the authority of the older masters. For we learn on the authority of Posidonius that ‘some of the older Stoics’ held the true criterion to be ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος)[87], and this is equivalent to saying that only the deity and the wise man possess the secret[88]. In a loose sense any important part of the Stoic theory of reason may be said to be a criterion; thus Chrysippus again said that ‘the criteria are sensation and preconception,’ and Boethus set up many criteria, as mind, sense, science, and (in practical matters) appetite[89].
General consent.
158. Seeing that the full assurance of truth is not at every moment attainable, it is necessary to be contented from time to time with something less complete. Amongst such tests the ‘general consent of mankind’ plays an important part, especially in connexion with the dogma ‘that gods exist.’ We may indeed well believe that this criterion was not originally suggested by revolutionary philosophers, but rather by conservative advocates of an established religion; and therefore we are not surprised to see it emphasized first by Posidonius and afterwards by Seneca[90]. General consent is however by itself no proof of truth, but at most an indication of the presence of a ‘common notion’ in its rough shape. If however we see that the ‘common notion’ grows stronger and more clear every day, and if it is the more firmly held as men approach the standard of wisdom, it becomes a strong support[91].
Probability the guide of life.
159. From a very early period, as we have already indicated, Stoic teachers accepted probability as the guide of life in its details, being perhaps aided by the happy ambiguity of the expression ‘reasonableness’ (τὸ εὔλογον), which suggests formally the pursuit of reason, but in practice is a justification of every course of which a plausible defence can be brought forward. Ptolemy Philopator, we are told, jestingly put wax fruit before Sphaerus at his table, and when Sphaerus tried to eat it cried out that he was giving his assent to a false mind-picture. Sphaerus replied that he had not assented to the picture ‘this is fruit,’ but only to the picture ‘this is probably fruit[92].’ Antipater of Tarsus, when he explained that the very essence of virtue lay in the choice of natural ends upon probable grounds[93], was felt to be giving way to Carneades[94]. Panaetius justified the maintaining of that which is plausible by the advocate, and Cicero, whose own conscience was not at ease in the matter, was glad enough to quote so respectable an authority on his own behalf[95]. In the Roman imperial period a growing spirit of humility and pessimism led to a general disparagement of human knowledge, centring in attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses. So Seneca speaks of the ‘usual weakness’ of the sense of sight[96], and Marcus Aurelius feels that ‘the organs of sense are dim and easily imposed upon[97].’ The older Stoics had admitted the frequent errors of the senses[98], but they had been confident they could surmount this difficulty. Their latest disciples had lost the courage to do this, and in consequence the practice of ‘suspension of judgment,’ which before had been the exception[99], became with them the rule. Nevertheless Epictetus, who alone amongst these later Stoics was an ardent student of dialectics, held fast to the main principle that certainty is attainable. ‘How indeed’ he said ‘perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain, for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty[100].’
Grammar.
160. Having now dealt with the theory of knowledge, we may consider briefly the subordinate sciences (or rather ‘arts’) of Grammar, Logic (in the narrower sense), and Style. Here we may leave the technical divisions and subdivisions of the Stoics; for these matters are substantially independent of the main lines upon which the ancient philosophies parted company, and have for us only a secondary and historical interest. The Stoics distinguish five parts of speech: ‘name’ (ὄνομα, nomen), as ‘Diogenes’; ‘class-name’ (προσηγορία, appellatio), as ‘man, horse’[101]; ‘verb’ (ῥῆμα, verbum); ‘conjunction’ (σύνδεσμος, coniunctio); and ‘article’ (ἄρθρον, articulus). The last they define naïvely as a little word which is all ending, and serves to distinguish the cases and numbers[102]. To the list of the parts of speech Antipater added the ‘mixed part’ or participle (μεσότης). The noun has four cases (πτώσεις), the ‘upright case’ (πτῶσις εὐθεῖα, casus rectus; this is of course a contradiction in terms); and the ‘oblique’ cases (πλάγιαι), that is the ‘class’ case (γενική), the ‘dative’ (δοτική), and the ‘effect’ case (αἰτιατική). The ῥῆμα or verb is identical with the κατηγόρημα or ‘predicate,’ and may take the ‘active’ form (ὀρθά), the ‘passive’ (ὕπτια), or the ‘neuter’ (οὐδέτερα); some verbs also express action and reaction, and are called ‘reflexive’ (ἀντιπεπονθότα). The Stoics also distinguished the tenses. Time (χρόνος) being of three kinds, past (παρῳχημένος), present (ἐνεστώς), and future (μέλλων), we have the following tenses which are ‘definite’ (ὡρισμένοι): the ‘present imperfect’ (ἐνεστὼς ἀτελής), the ‘past imperfect’ (παρῳχημένος ἀτελής), the ‘present perfect’ (ἐνεστὼς τέλειος), and the ‘past perfect’ (παρῳχημένος τέλειος); in addition to these we have the ‘indefinite’ tenses, the future (μέλλων), and the past indefinite, called simply indefinite (ἀόριστος)[103].
Theories of speech.
161. So far we find in the Stoic system the general framework of the grammar of the period, much of it adapted with modifications from Aristotle. In some other details points of real grammatical or philosophical interest are raised. Such is the controversy between ‘anomaly,’ the recognition of the individuality of each word in its flexion, and ‘analogy,’ in which the validity of the rules of declension and conjugation is insisted upon. Two Stoic masters, Chrysippus and Crates of Mallos, took up the cause of ‘anomaly[104].’ Further the Stoics held that all correct language exists by nature (φύσει), and not by convention (θέσει), as Aristotle had maintained; the elements of language being imitations of natural sounds[105]. Further, they held that the natural relation between ‘things’ (σημαινόμενα, significata) and the words that express them (σημαίνοντα, significantia) can frequently be determined by etymology; for instance φωνή ‘voice’ is φῶς νοῦ ‘the mind’s lamp,’ αἰών ‘age’ is ἀεὶ ὄν ‘enduring for ever[106].’ Like Heraclitus and Aristotle, the Stoics distinguished between ‘thought’ (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, ratio) and ‘speech’ (λόγος προφορικός, oratio), which the Greek word λόγος tends to confuse[107]; thought is immaterial, but speech, as consisting of air in motion, is body[108]. Young children and animals do not possess real speech, but only ‘a sort of speech[109].’
Propositions and Syllogisms.
162. Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes, syllogisms, and so forth[110]; there is therefore no clear line drawn between what we call syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have a complete combination of words expressing that which must either be false or true, as ‘Hannibal was a Carthaginian,’ ‘Scipio destroyed Numantia,’ we call it a ‘statement’ or ‘proposition’ (ἀξίωμα)[111]; for phrases of all kinds we have the more general term ‘phrase’ (λεκτόν, id quod dicitur)[112]. Of special interest is the conditional sentence (συνημμένον), which has two parts, the conditional clause (ἡγούμενον) and the contingent clause (λῆγον). The conditional or leading clause always contains a sign (σημεῖον), by means of which we reach proof: thus in saying ‘if it is day, it is light’ we mean that ‘day’ is a sign of light. Proof is ‘speech on every subject gathering what is less clear from that which is more clear[113].’ Its most important form is the syllogism, of which Chrysippus recognises five forms:
- (i) if A, then B; but A, therefore B.
- (ii) if A, then B; but not B, therefore not A.
- (iii) not A and B together; but A, therefore not B.
- (iv) either A or B; but A, therefore not B.
- (v) either A or B; but not A, therefore B[114].
All these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, and developments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics who were before all things makers of books[115]. Examples of Stoic syllogisms have been given above[116].
Fallacies.
163. Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is the enticing subject of the ‘resolution of fallacies’ (σοφισμάτων λύσις), which the Megarians had brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject the Stoics gave much attention[117]. The most famous fallacy is that of the ‘heap’ (σωρίτης, acervus); ‘if two are few, so are three; if three, then four; and so forth.’ In this Chrysippus took a special interest[118]; his reply was to keep still[119]. Another is the ‘liar’ (ψευδόμενος, mentiens); ‘when a man says “I lie,” does he lie or not? if he lies, he speaks the truth; if he speaks the truth, he lies[120].’ On this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, which Epictetus thought not worth reading[121]. Seneca gives us examples of other fallacies, which also are verbal quibbles[122]. Of an altogether different kind are those problems in which the question of determinism as opposed to moral choice is involved. Such is the ‘reaper,’ which maintains ‘either you will reap or you will not reap; it is not correct to say “perhaps you will reap.”’ Such again is the ‘master-argument’ of Diodorus the Megarian, directly aimed against every moral philosophy[123]. These difficulties we shall discuss later as touching the supreme problems which are presented to the human reason[124].
Definition.
164. The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises at first sight to be a guide to truth and a way of escape from error, but experience shews it nevertheless to be barren. It has however an advantage in securing a careful statement of teaching, and for this purpose was much used by Zeno and Chrysippus. The later members of the school realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by the practice of careful definition (ὅρος, definitio). Antipater thus defined definition itself: ‘definition is an expression which elaborates in detail without falling short or going too far[125].’ He and all other Stoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the most important terms used in the system, such as God, fate, providence, the supreme good, virtue, and so forth; and these are of great value in giving precision to their doctrine.
Style.
165. In considering Style we first notice the distinction between dialectic in the narrower sense, in which statements are made in the shortest and most precise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded at length[126]. Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the open palm[127]. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric, and it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their teaching, chiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the Stoics introduced, as προηγμένα, κοσμόπολις[128]. But it is exactly in these new-fangled words that we observe one of the chief aims of the Stoic theory of style, namely the use of words which precisely and exclusively correspond to the objects described (κυριολογία, proprietas verborum), and which therefore lead up to transparent clearness of speech (σαφήνεια, pellucida oratio)[129]. To this clearness the study of grammar is contributory; ‘barbarisms’ (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be avoided, with proper help from the doctrines of ‘anomaly’ and ‘analogy’; for the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively true. Equally important is the avoidance of ‘solecisms,’ or faults in syntax. In this way a pure use of language (Ἑλληνισμός, Latinitas) is attained; this is largely based upon the example of older writers, such as Homer in Greek, and Cato the elder in Latin[130], but not to such an extent as to employ words not commonly intelligible. But little more is needed; the Stoic will say what he has to say with ‘brevity’ (συντομία, brevitas); the graces of style will be represented by ‘becomingness’ (πρέπον, decorum) and ‘neatness’ (κατασκευή), the latter including euphony. These virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is neither more nor less than speaking truthfully[131]; for the Stoic needs only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse him or to excite his emotions[132]. Style has three varieties, according as it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or in praise of goodness and good men[133]; in the last there was no doubt greater room allowed for that expansiveness of speech which the Stoics specially designated as ‘rhetoric.’
The Stoic orator.
166. The ‘Stoic style’ was a severe intellectual and moral discipline. The speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing from his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency; he could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their indignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before his eyes the example of Socrates’ defence before the Athenian jury and its result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and rather rugged speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the circumstances demanded[134]. Even the Stoics of the transition period, in spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquirements, made this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had himself done much to elaborate the theory of style, was noted as a quiet and self-restrained speaker[135]. The influence of Panaetius may be traced in his friend Lucilius, who in his book on style is never tired of ridiculing the artifices of rhetoricians. Then followed a succession of these reserved speakers, which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of Utica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them all[136].
It is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the Stoic style. It must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus are not readable; but on the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus were all writers or speakers of great attractiveness[137].
Paradox.
167. In connexion with style we may call attention to the important function of paradoxes (παράδοξα, inopinata), that is, propositions contrary to common opinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common opinion, they must necessarily include many paradoxes[138]. The chief Stoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from the Cynic school, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates[139]: and Cicero devotes a special work to their defence. He includes the following: (i) that only what is honourable is good; (ii) that virtue is sufficient for happiness; (iii) that right actions and offences are equal; (iv) that all foolish men are mad; (v) that the wise man alone is free and every foolish man a slave; (vi) that the wise man alone is rich. These of course include the very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics; and the form is calculated to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge defiantly its cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social position usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state their teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should hardly be necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in itself, but each needs to be interpreted according to the principles of the school which propounds it. In proportion as the doctrines of any school win general recognition, its paradoxes tend to find ready acceptance, and may ultimately become truisms[140].
The treatment of myths as allegories[141] may also be considered as the use of a kind of paradox; this we shall find it most convenient to discuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature of the gods.
Dangers of logic.
168. The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repulsive; when progress has been made in it, it seems illuminating; in the end it becomes so alluring, that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost for ever in its mazes[142]. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline upon their pupils; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the exception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn their hearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that many logical inquiries have nothing to do with real life[143]; and that the older Stoics had wasted much time over them[144]; Epictetus complains that his hearers never get beyond the resolving of syllogisms[145], and M. Aurelius thanks the gods that he never wasted his time in this way[146].
Stoic and Academic logic.
169. It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from his teacher Antiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was no original system, but only a modification of the views of the old Academy[147]. Such a conclusion seems partly due to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had largely borrowed from the Academic system in detail; and partly to the overlooking by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between the two schools. Plato is speculative, Zeno positive; Plato plays with a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks the mind high, Zeno the will; Plato bases his system on the general concept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It would seem that no contrast could be more complete. Nor does Zeno’s theory agree with that of Epicurus. Both indeed are positive teachers, and hold that the senses are messengers of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno goes on. We have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of the senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to learn that the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules them as a monarch by divine right, coordinating the messages they bring, shaping them according to its own creative capacity, even adding to them from the material it has derived from its source. The Stoic theory is in fact a bold survey of the results of the reflection of the human mind upon its own operations; it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good deal of overlapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical objections it is of course unable to give answers which are logically satisfactory; but its general position proved acceptable to men who sought in philosophy a guide to practical life.
Questions of temperament.
170. In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which characterizes the first century B.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the end the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called ‘old Academy’ founded by Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason but also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in the education of children; and even at the present day the theory of knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that of the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and resolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character. But it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain roughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to that whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic shape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which most Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the other hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both sides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme assertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of the two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long since learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are incapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate the one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has its appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in matters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side.