FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic. Fin. iv 2, 4.
[2] Sext. math. vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).
[3] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon. ad Anal. pr. f. 4a; Stein, Psychologie ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.
[4] Epict. Disc. i 17, 6.
[5] Diog. L. vii 40.
[6] ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.
[7] τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict. Disc. iv 8, 12.
[8] ‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug. Civ. De. viii 7.
[9] Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 66.
[10] See below, §§ [164], [165].
[11] ‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt funditus’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 31.
[13] Epict. Disc. ii 11, 13.
[14] ‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc. in Tim. 266 (Arnim ii 863).
[15] Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[16] Arnim ii 458.
[17] ‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and sensation as automatic.
[18] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.
[19] Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’ (ἀλλοίωσις) Sext. math. vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic. de Fato 19, 43.
[20] Sext. math. vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[21] ‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ ib.
[22] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët. plac. iv 9, 4; ‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[23] ‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus’ ib. 7, 21.
[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët. plac. iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic. N. D. i 25, 70.
[25] φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν Aët. plac. iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext. math. vii 426.
[26] διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtius plac. iv 12, 4.
[27] ib. 12, 5.
[28] φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους Diog. L. vii 50.
[29] ‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41; cf. § [105].
[30] On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged; see above, § [84].
[31] ‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic. Ac. ii 12, 38.
[32] ‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ ib. 14, 45.
[33] ‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic. Fat. 19, 43; ‘adsensio non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ ib. 18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 40.
[34] διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. Sto. rep. 47, 10.
[35] ‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41; so Sext. math. vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).
[36] Epict. Disc. i 21, 2.
[37] ib. i 18, 1; Sext. math. vii 416.
[38] ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem. nat. hom. vii p. 175 M (Stein, Psych. ii 135).
[39] Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno] comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41. See further Stein, Psych. ii 174, and R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 71.
[40] This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’s Timaeus: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp. math. vii 93. See also below, § [266].
[41] ‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 42.
[42] Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 20.
[43] μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext. math. vii 373 (Arnim i 64); ‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30.
[44] ‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen. Ben. iii 2, 3.
[45] So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. math. vii 231.
[46] ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν Aët. plac. iv 11, 2.
[47] Diog. L. vii 52.
[48] The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 33.
[49] Diog. L. vii 52.
[50] ‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic. Off. i 4, 11.
[51] So Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 79.
[52] ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët. plac. iv 11, 1. The metaphor of the tabula rasa can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining impressions. See Stein, Psych. ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.
[53] τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.
[54] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët. plac. i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.
[55] πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext. math. viii 56 (Arnim ii 88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.
[56] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30.
[57] Cic. N. D. i 17, 44.
[58] ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54; ‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic. Top. 7, 31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest’ Ac. ii 7, 21. See also Aët. plac. iv 11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must not be called πρόληψις.
[59] ‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 8. See also below, § [158].
[60] ‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things conformably with nature’ Epict. Disc. i 2, 6.
[61] See Cic. Top. above, note 58.
[62] Diog. L. x 33.
[63] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two terms see Prof. Reid’s note.
[64] See notes to the next section.
[65] ‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit [qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic. Leg. i 9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ ib. i 10, 30; ‘As to good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?’ Epict. Disc. ii 11, 3.
[66] ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët. plac. iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ ib. v 23, 1.
[67] ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen. Ep. 120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ ib. 66, 35.
[68] φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.
[69] For the classification as a sensation see above, § [146].
[70] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’ προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët. plac. iv 8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’: φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλεῖται Sext. math. vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 110.
[71] ‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur, quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic. Ac. ii 15, 47.
[72] Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’ N. D. ii 59, 148.
[73] Arnim ii 95.
[74] πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict. Disc. i 22, 1.
[75] εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).
[76] ‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic. Ac. ii 8, 23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ ib. i 11, 41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ ib. ii 37, 119.
[78] Plut. comm. not. 47, 4.
[79] Sext. math. vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem’ Cic. Ac. ii 47, 145.
[80] Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.
[81] See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, § [84].
[82] ‘omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa cogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per insaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus [ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro gessimus’ Cic. Ac. ii 17, 51.
[83] ‘[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam’ ib. ii 32, 103; ‘dicunt [Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri’ ib. 11, 33.
[84] κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος Diog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: ‘visum [Zeno ita definiit] ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum’ Cic. Ac. ii 24, 77.
[85] οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα Sext. math. vii 253.
[86] φαντασία πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη Sext. math. vii 181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).
[87] Diog. L. vii 54 (see § [80], note 68).
[88] ‘posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere’ Cic. Ac. ii 21, 67.
[89] Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 70.
[90] ‘multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum’ Sen. Ep. 117, 6.
[91] ‘opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat’ Cic. N. D. ii 2, 5.
[92] Diog. L. vii 177.
[93] οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Plut. comm. not. 27, 9.
[94] ἐκεῖνον [τὸν Ἀντίπατρον] ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον, εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρεσιλογίας ib. 27, 15.
[95] ‘iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam verisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio’ Cic. Off. ii 14, 51.
[96] ‘visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus’ Sen. N. Q. i 2, 3.
[97] To himself, v 33.
[98] See above, §§ [146], [147].
[99] ‘sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem’ Cic. Ac. ii 17, 53.
[100] Epict. Disc. i 27, 17.
[101] The distinction between ‘name’ and ‘class-name’ was due to Chrysippus: see Sandys, Classical Scholarship, i p. 144.
[102] Diog. L. vii 58.
[103] For these and further particulars see Sandys, Classical Scholarship, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt, Stoicorum Grammatica, pp. 18 sqq.
[104] ‘Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo, qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίας III libros, contra analogiam atque Aristarchum est nixus’ Varro L. L. ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).
[105] Orig. cont. Celsum i 24 (Arnim ii 146).
[106] Varr. L. L. vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).
[107] See Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle’s distinction is between τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγον and τὸν ἔξω λόγον.
[108] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’ A. Gellius, N. A. v 15, 6.
[109] ‘hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut loqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari, verba non esse verba’ Varro L. L. vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).
[110] Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.
[111] Varro translates this by ‘proloquium’ (Gell. N. A. xvi 8, 8), Cicero provisionally by ‘pronuntiatum’ (Tusc. disp. i 7, 14).
[112] A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ‘complete in itself’ (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές) A. Gellius N. A. xvi 8, 4.
[113] Diog. L. vii 45.
[114] ib. 80 and 81.
[115] ‘ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur’ Cic. Top. 14, 57.
[117] ἔλυε δὲ [Ζήνων] σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς Plut. Sto. rep. 8, 2.
[118] ‘inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi’ Pers. Sat. vi 80.
[119] ‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere’ Cic. Ac. ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext. math. vii 416.
[120] ‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?’ Cic. Ac. ii 29, 95.
[121] Epict. Disc. ii 17, 34.
[122] ‘mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit ... o pueriles ineptias!’ Sen. Ep. 48, 6 and 7; ‘quod non perdidisti, habes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes’ ib. 49, 8.
[123] Epict. Disc. ii 19, 1 sqq.
[124] See below, §§ [220], [221].
[125] Diog. L. vii 60.
[126] ‘omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικήν, illam ῥητορικήν placuit vocari’ Sen. Ep. 89, 17.
[127] Cic. Orator 32, 113.
[128] ‘scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut si quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo modo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata’ Cic. Fin. iv 3, 7.
[129] Diog. L. vii 59.
[130] ‘uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi’ Front. et Aur. Ep. ii 13.
[131] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν Anon. ad Herm. Rhet. Gr. vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; ‘[Stoicis] hanc habeo gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt’ Cic. de Or. iii 18, 65.
[132] ‘fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur’ Quint. Inst. or. v Prooem.
[133] Diog. L. vii 42.
[134] ‘orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum; sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit’ Cic. de Or. iii 18, 66.
[135] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius, N. A. vi 14, 10.
[136] See below, chap. xvi.
[137] See Smiley, Latinitas and Ἑλληνισμός.
[138] ‘Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason’ Epict. Disc. iv 1, 173; ‘where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?’ ib. i 25, 33.
[139] ‘ista παράδοξα quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica’ Cic. Parad. Prooem. 4.
[140] ‘nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile’ Cic. Parad. Prooem. 3; ‘Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam mirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo’ Sen. Ep. 87, 1.
[141] Zeller, Stoics etc., pp. 354-370.
[142] A. Gellius, N. A. xvi 8, 16 and 17.
[143] ‘quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra vitam iacent’ Sen. Ben. vi 1, 1.
[144] ‘multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae disputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent’ Ep. 45, 5.
[145] ‘We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism’ Epict. Disc. iv 4, 14.
[146] ‘Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation’ M. Aurelius To himself i 17.
[147] ‘verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam [Stoicorum rationem]’ Cic. Ac. i 12, 43.
[148] ‘tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur, simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et statuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum’ Sen. Ep. 115, 8. This tone is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates. A modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: ‘all the nastiness and stupidity which you call science and art’ (Count Leo Tolstoy in the Westminster Gazette, Sept. 3, 1910).
CHAPTER VII.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS.
Physics.
171. Under the general heading of Physics the ancients included a number of subjects which in modern times form independent branches of philosophy. Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper and Theology[1]. Here it will be convenient to make a larger number of subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the Foundations of Physics, generally called (after Aristotle’s treatise) ‘Metaphysics’; (ii) Physics proper, that is, the account of the Universe and its history; (iii) the final problems involved in the history of the Universe, such as its government by Divine Providence, the Existence of Evil, Free-will, and Chance; (iv) the problems of Religion, such as the existence of gods, their number, character, and claims on mankind; and (v) the nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology and Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, treated by the Stoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. According to Stoic principles these subjects cannot be separated one from the other, or from the other parts of philosophy; and therefore in treating each one we shall, as before, assume a general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid great stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for a scientific rule of human conduct; and some of them (beginning with Chrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity of the study of Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of philosophy as the highest and last of its three principal divisions[2]. We shall however, in accordance with a view more generally held, reserve the last place for Ethics[3].
Fundamental Conceptions.
172. To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, it appeared that a single bold intuition was enough, or almost enough, to discover a sufficient foundation upon which to construct a reasoned account of all things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a foundation one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But as soon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as ‘elements’ existing side by side, it became necessary to dig deeper, so as to secure a foundation for these as well. Thus Democritus resolved all four into ‘atoms’ and ‘void’; his theory was taken over by Epicurus, and remains to this day not only the most popular solution of the problem, but also that which (till quite recently) was tacitly assumed as the basis of all scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on different lines, began his account of the universe with ‘mind’ on the one hand and a primal conglomerate ‘matter’ on the other; a doctrine evidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, and still the basis of all transcendental philosophy and established religious conceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather an ‘active’ and a ‘passive’ principle, force which works and matter upon which it works. Besides these conceptions many others need to be considered, which if not absolutely fundamental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in all philosophical schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body, God, the universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the original inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes into a general study of fundamental conceptions; and it is at this stage that it is taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, which adds to the list certain conceptions on which it lays a special stress and to which it gives a characteristic colour; such are those of ‘body,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘tone.’
The Stoic monism.
173. The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the language of other schools or of popular speculation does not necessarily imply that this language is an adequate statement of their doctrine; and we frequently[4] find that the discussion of particular problems seems to be based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated to monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed the sharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external object of perception (αἰσθητόν, ὑπάρχον); nevertheless mind and object are ultimately declared to be akin[5]. So in particular the popular dualism of ‘soul’ and ‘body’ is often accepted by the Stoics, and yet as steadily superseded by the paradox that ‘soul is body.’ The reason given for this is that ‘body is that which acts and is acted upon[6]’; and this statement in the end overrides the Aristotelian distinction of force and matter, active principle and passive principle. ‘Body,’ as conceived by the Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning of the universe; it contains within itself the capacity of action, and nothing but ‘body’ has this capacity. Body, and nothing but body, exists in the true sense; that certain other things have a quasi-existence (as we shall see later in this chapter) is an embarrassment which only brings into clearer relief this distinctive feature of the system. The Stoic ‘body,’ though it is also called ‘matter’ (ὕλη, materia), must not be confused with the ‘matter’ of modern philosophy, which has derived from Aristotle the implication of passivity[7]; much more closely it corresponds with the ‘stuff’ by which modern monistic philosophers denote the substratum of mind and body alike. To call the Stoics ‘materialists’ will generally prove misleading; it is the Epicurean system, to which the Stoics were sharply opposed, which (as we have seen)[8] corresponds to modern materialism.
The nature of ‘body.’
174. The conception of ‘body’ therefore replaces in the Stoic system the various elements which the Ionic philosophers assumed as the basis of the universe, and combines both parts of such dualistic elements as were assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it is the foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very various shapes. In logic we have met with it under the name of the ‘substratum’ (τὸ ὑπάρχον, id quod est)[9], but it none the less includes the ‘subject’ or feeling and reasoning mind. In the universe as a whole it is ‘essence’ (οὐσία, essentia); in its parts it is ‘matter’ (ὕλη, silva)[10]; but it also appears, possessed of intelligence, as the deity[11], and again is identified with ‘breath’ or ‘spirit[12],’ and through this with the human soul[13]. Even in ethics it has its place; for all causes are bodily, and not least ‘the good’ and the respective virtues, all of which are bodies, for they act upon body[14]; similarly the emotions such as anger and melancholy, are of the nature of body[15].
Motion, space and time.
175. The Stoic ‘body’ in all its transformations is active and alert. It contains in itself the principle or power of movement; for though we observe that one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be the case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had movement of itself[16]. As to the nature of the primal movement, the Stoics agree with Anaximenes that it may be described as alternate rarefaction and condensation. Rarefaction is a wave or ‘spirit’ spreading from the centre to the extremities; condensation is a contrary movement from the extremities to the centre[17]. The extension of body is ‘space,’ which therefore does not exist of itself, but only as a function of body[18]. Where there is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only the ‘boundless void’ beyond the universe[19]; of this we cannot say that it ‘exists’; rather it ‘not exists.’ Time also does not exist of itself, but only in the movement of body[20]. Neither space nor time existed before the universe, but have been all along bound up with it[21].
Body comprises life and thought.
176. In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast between the Stoic conception of ‘body’ and the Epicurean ‘atom.’ The atom is extremely small and entirely unchangeable; ‘body’ is immensely large and in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void; but ‘body’ spreads continuously throughout the entire universe; it can never be torn apart or show a gap[22]. Atoms move downwards in parallel straight lines; ‘body’ moves from the centre to the circumference, and thence returns to the centre. Two atoms can never occupy the same space; but ‘body’ everywhere moves through body, penetrating it and combining with it throughout its whole extent[23]. The atom is a convenient hypothesis within the range of modern physical and chemical science; the conception of ‘body’ gains force as we enter the region of biology. For life also is a movement which proceeds from a warm centre (and warmth is body rarefied), and extends towards a circumference which is in comparison gross and cold[24]. Going further, we find that ‘body’ and its functions are so interpreted as to provide a key to the activities of the human reason and will.
Tone or tension.
177. To the central conception of body are attached in the Stoic system various supplementary conceptions, which serve to bring into clearer view its nature and powers. Of these the most characteristic is that of ‘tone’ or ‘strain’ (τόνος, intentio). This term appears originally to have expressed muscular activity[25], and was next used by the Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the true end of life; ‘no labour,’ said Diogenes, ‘is noble, unless its end is tone of soul[26].’ Although we cannot trace the term ‘tone’ directly to Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation of the soul, substantially agreeing with later writers who call it a ‘relaxation of the sensory tone around the soul[27].’ With Cleanthes the word becomes fairly common, first in the ethical application, in which ‘tone’ is ‘a shock of fire, which if it be strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil its duties is called strength and force[28],’ and then in physics to explain the unceasing activity of the universe[29], personified by Hercules in Stoic allegorical theology[30]. In later writers tone becomes constantly associated with the ‘spirit’ or ‘thrill’ which explains both the unity and the movement of all things[31], so that ‘tone of spirit’ or ‘thrill-tone’ (πνευματικὸς τόνος, intentio spiritus) explains to us the operations of body and mind alike[32].
The seed power.
178. Body however is not only active but creative; there is inherent in it a power, which is that of the ‘seed’ (σπέρμα, semen), and which is most conspicuously illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It is the characteristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a great plan, and that this plan never changes[33]. This plan or purpose is named by the Stoics its ‘reason’ or ‘word’ (λόγος), and at this point Stoicism incorporates the doctrine of the ‘Word’ or universal reason with which it became acquainted through Heraclitus. The ‘Word’ or ‘seed-power’ (λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe is one; it is the primal fire in its work of creation; it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter into the things that are to be[34]; it is wisdom which plies matter as it will[35]. But there are also in individual objects, animate and inanimate, indestructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed alike in growth, procreation, and purpose[36]; these seed-powers are, as it were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, everywhere shaping, peopling, designing, multiplying; they are activities of fiery spirit working through tension[37] in its highest development. But the seed-power of the universe comprehends in itself all the individual seed-powers; they are begotten of it, and shall in the end return to it. Thus in the whole work of creation and re-absorption[38] we see the work of one Zeus, one divine Word, one all-pervading spirit[39].
Cause.
179. Closely akin to the theory of ‘seed-powers’ and the Word is that of ‘cause’ (αἰτία, causa). Aristotle had already explained this term in connexion with cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe may come into being, three ‘causes’ are required; matter, without which nothing can be made; a workman, to make things; and the form or shape, which is imposed on every work as on a statue. To these may be added a fourth cause, the purpose of the work. Thus to produce a statue we need the bronze, the artist, the design, and the fee. Grammatically these causes may be expressed by the help of prepositions, as the ex quo, a quo, in quo and propter quod[40]. To this theory of multiple causes the Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single ‘first cause,’ the maker of the universe. This first cause can be none other than the primal creative fire in a new aspect; equally it is the creative Word.
It seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca on this point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his powers in continuous exposition:
The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker. Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. ‘The first cause,’ he says, ‘is the material itself, for without it nothing can be made. The second cause is the maker. The third is the design, which is impressed on every single work as on a statue;’ this Aristotle calls the εἶδος. I will now explain what he means.
The bronze is the first cause of a statue; for it could never have been made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought into shape. The second cause is the sculptor; for the bronze could never have been brought into the shape of a statue without the artist’s touch. The third cause is the design; for the statue would not be called the ‘javelin-man’ or the ‘crowned king’ had not such a design been impressed upon it.
There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose? It is that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the aim that he had in view. It may have been money, if he intended to sell it; or glory, if he wished to make himself a name; or religious feeling, if he proposed to present it to a temple. That for the sake of which a thing is done is therefore also a cause; for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes to omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been made.
Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes; but we maintain that the list is either too long or too short.
If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would never have been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is too short. We ought to reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be made without time. We ought to reckon space as a cause; for if there is no room for a thing to be made, it will certainly not be made. Movement too should be placed in the list; for without movement nothing can be produced or destroyed; without movement there can be neither art nor change.
We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must be single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what that cause is, and reply that it is the creative reason, the deity. The various causes in the list that has been made are not a series of independent causes, but are all variations of a single cause, namely ‘the maker[41].’
Causation and free-will.
180. Although the ‘first cause’ and the ‘Word’ are thus formally identified, their associations in connexion with cosmogony are very different. For whereas the ‘Word’ suggests reason and purpose, and leads up to the dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the term ‘cause’ suggests the linking of cause and effect by an unending chain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves no room for effort or hope. These terms therefore point to the supreme problems of Fate and divine Purpose, Determinism and Free-will, and as such will be discussed in a later chapter[42]. Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics not only accept, but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points of view, and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an ultimate reconciliation; and that the importance attached to the doctrine of a ‘single and general cause’ by no means excludes a multiplicity of individual causes depending upon it, and capable of classification according to their relative importance[43].
The categories.
181. Thus the conception of ‘body,’ so simple to the plain man, becomes to the philosopher manifold and intricate. Its interpretation is to some extent brought into harmony with common speech through the doctrine of the ‘categories’ based upon Aristotle’s teaching[44]. But whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the various but independent classes of existences, the Stoics considered the different aspects in which the one primary body might be studied. The first two categories, those of ‘substance’ (ὑποκείμενον) and of ‘quality’ (ποιόν), agree with those of Aristotle[45], and clearly correspond to the grammatical categories of noun and adjective. The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχον), as ‘lying down’ or ‘standing[46].’ The fourth is that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί πως ἔχον), as ‘right’ and ‘left,’ ‘son’ and ‘father[47].’ Some of the categories are further subdivided[48]; but enough is here stated to shew the object of the analysis, which in practice may have been useful in securing some completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions. Of ‘substances’ the Stoics, like others, say that they ‘exist,’ and are ‘bodies’; of qualities they boldly say the same[49]. But they do not consistently apply the same terms to disposition and relative position; in this direction they are at last led, like other philosophers, to speak of things which ‘do not exist.’ They could not take the modern view that all such discussions are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is possible, because they believed that there was a natural harmony between words and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined to follow their analysis into its manifold details[50].
Substance.
182. The analysis of the first two categories, those of Substance and Quality, leads us at once to the profoundest problems of Metaphysics; and even if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and resolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive and Adjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with all our habits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect from the Stoics perfectly clear and consistent language on this point; they absorb into their system much from popular philosophy, and much from the teaching of Aristotle in particular. The view which is distinctively Stoic is that Substance and Quality are both body[51], but in two different aspects. The terms ‘body’ and ‘substance’ refer to the same reality, but do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the very word ‘substance’ (οὐσία) suggests existence, the Stoics are drawn also to speak of ‘substance without quality’ (ἄποιος οὐσία), and seem to identify it with a dead ‘matter’ (ὕλη), or ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον), as though life must be introduced into it from without[52]. This is practically the view of Aristotle, embodied in the phrase ‘matter without quality is potentially body’[53]; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a dualistic explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable with the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must therefore be understood with reservations. It may often seem that the three terms ‘body,’ ‘substance,’ ‘matter,’ are practically interchangeable, but they are of different rank. For body exists eternally of itself; whereas substance and matter, except when loosely used as equivalents of body, do not exist of themselves, but substance always in association with quality[54], and matter always in association with force. Further we may distinguish between ‘substance’ in general, or ‘first matter,’ which is a ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον) to the universe, and the ‘matter’ of particular things[55]. The former never grows greater or less, the latter may alter in either direction[56].
Quality.
183. Quality (ποιότης, τὸ ποιόν, qualitas) constitutes the second category. It is defined by the Stoics as a difference in a substance which cannot be detached from that substance, but makes it ‘such and such,’ as for instance ‘sweet,’ ‘round,’ ‘red,’ ‘hot[57].’ Qualities, say the Stoics, are bodies[58]. This paradoxical statement may be understood in two ways; first, in that qualities do not exist independently, but are aspects of ‘body’ which possesses quality; secondly, in that qualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may consider it evidence of the second point of view that language describes the qualities by nouns, as ‘sweetness,’ ‘rotundity,’ ‘redness,’ ‘heat’; and indeed it is not so long since our own chemists described heat as a ‘substance’ under the name of ‘caloric.’ This point of view is carried to an extreme when the Stoics say ‘qualities are substances,’ thus throwing the first two categories into one[59]. Much stronger is the tendency towards Aristotle’s views, so that as substance becomes identified with dead matter, quality is explained as the movement, tension, or current which endows it with life. Hence the Stoics say ‘the movement of rarefaction is the cause of quality[60]’; ‘matter is a dull substratum, qualities are spirits and air-like tensions[61]’; ‘quality is a spirit in a certain disposition[62]’; ‘the air-current which keeps each thing together is the cause of its quality[63].’ All these expressions must however be interpreted in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we notice that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and particular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the ‘generically qualified’ (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the ‘individually qualified’ (ἰδίως ποιόν); for instance, heat in the universe and heat in particular objects[64].
Disposition.
184. The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχοντα, res quodammodo se habens). It differs from quality in its variableness; for a brave man is always brave, and fire is always hot; but a man is sometimes standing, sometimes lying; fire is sometimes lambent, sometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond generally to the συμβεβηκότα (coniuncta) of Epicurus, in that they can never be separated from a body[65]; and dispositions rather with the συμπτώματα (eventa), which come and go[66]. The third category appears to be used by the Stoics in a very wide sense, and to correspond to several of the categories of Aristotle[67]. Disposition is attached to quality as quality is attached to substance[68]; and though dispositions are not expressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as the terms in the Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies in particular aspects.
In the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as defined above appears to be replaced in Greek by the term ἕξις. But this term is used in two different senses. In the first place it is the movement of rarefaction and condensation, by which a spirit or thrill passes from the centre of an object to the extremities, and returns from the extremities to the centre[69]; in this sense it is translated in Latin by unitas, and takes bodily form as an air-current[70]. This force, when it requires a further motive power in the direction of development, becomes the principle of growth (φύσις, natura), and is displayed not only in the vegetable world, but also in animals, as in particular in the hair and nails[71]. Growth when it takes to itself the further powers of sensation and impulse becomes soul (ψυχή, anima), and is the distinctive mark of the animal world[72].
In a rather different sense ἕξις or temporary condition is contrasted with διάθεσις or ‘permanent disposition.’ In this sense the virtues are permanent dispositions of the soul, because virtue is unchanging; the arts are temporary conditions. The virtues belong to the wise man only, the arts to the ordinary man. This distinction however does not hold its ground in the Roman period, the word habitus (representing ἕξις), our ‘habit,’ being used in both senses[73]. The virtues are bodies, being dispositions of the soul which is bodily[74].
Relative position.
185. The fourth category, that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί πως ἔχον) appears to be of less importance than the others[75]. Its characteristic is that it may disappear without altering that to which it belongs. Thus that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by the disappearance of that which was on its left; a father may cease to be such on the death of his son[76]. It seems difficult to describe the fourth category as one consisting of ‘body,’ but at least it is a function of body. Also it does not appear that ‘relative position’ can be predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar to individual objects, but works towards their combination in a larger whole. The fourth category has an important application in practical ethics in the doctrine of daily duties, for these are largely determined by the relative positions (σχέσεις) of the parties concerned: such are the duties of a king to his people, a father to his son, a slave to his master[77].
Combination.
186. Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, we proceed to consider their combination. In ordinary experience we meet with three kinds of combination; juxtaposition (παράθεσις), as in a mixture of various kinds of grain; mixture (μῖξις), when solid bodies are interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (κρᾶσις), when fluids are interfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture (σύγχυσις), when each of the two bodies fused disappears[78]. Of these the second in its most completed form (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, universa fusio) is of high importance. For in this way we find that soul is fused with body[79], quality with substance[80], light with air[81], God with the universe[82]. Aristotle admits that there is this mixture between substance and qualities; but as both of these are to the Stoics bodies, and so too are the members of the other pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine must be summed up in the paradox ‘body moves through body[83].’ This also follows from the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the universe. Correspondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects and mixtures completes the whole (ὅλον), which is identical with the ‘world-order’ or ‘universe’ (κόσμος)[84]. It seems likely that this important conception had been reached in very early times by the Chaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded by Pythagoras[85], had been taken up by Socrates[86] and the Sophists[87], and was in Stoic times generally accepted both in popular philosophy and in scientific investigation.
Quiddities.
187. Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided by a determined monism. Body is; that which is not body is not. Yet in the end the Stoics feel compelled to speak of certain things which are not body (ἀσώματα, incorporalia). In the first instance there is the void beyond the universe[88]. It is possible to dispute as to whether void may more correctly be said to exist or not to exist; but at least it is a part of nature[89], and we need some term like ‘the all’ (τὸ πᾶν) to include both the universe and the void beyond[90]. Next we have to deal with statements (λεκτά), and mental conceptions of every kind, which stand as a class in contrast with the real objects to which they may or may not respectively correspond[91]. Lastly, the Stoics included space and time, which they had previously explained as functions of body, in the list of things not bodily[92]. Having thus reached the two main classes of ‘bodies,’ and ‘things not bodily,’ the monistic principle can only be saved by creating a supreme class to include both. Let this then be called the existent (τὸ ὄν, quod est)[93], or, if it be objected that things incorporeal do not exist[94], we may use the name ‘quiddities’ (τινά, quid)[95]. In this way the monistic theory, though a little damaged in vitality, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use of words can help.
Statements.
188. The language of the Stoics with regard to the phenomena of speech and thought is not always easy to follow, and perhaps not altogether consistent. On the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning power, they desire to include its operations in that which is real and bodily. Thus the ‘mind-pictures’ and indeed all mental conceptions are bodily and even ‘animal,’ in the sense that they are operations of body[96]; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art are all bodies in the sense that they are dispositions of the soul, which is bodily[97]. But ‘phrases’ (λεκτά) are definitely incorporeal, and with them appear to be ranked all mental conceptions and general ideas; about these there is a question, not merely whether they exist or not, but whether they may even be classed in the most general class of all as ‘quiddities[98].’ Nor can we call general conceptions true or false[99]; though of some of them, as of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are formed by false mental processes[100]. Finally statements are either true or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion therefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, which may be real or ‘existent,’ and the predication which may be ‘true’; and the attempt to unite these two conceptions is not persisted in[101].
Force and matter.
189. Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic standard, they make frequent use of dualistic statements, some of which we have already noticed. The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from the standpoint of ethics[102]; and we meet in all the Stoic writers, and often in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism of force and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and passive principles. ‘Zeno’ (we are told) ‘laid down that there are two principles in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is matter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity within it[103].’ So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus taught[104]; and in the Roman period Seneca regarded this as a well-understood dogma of the whole school[105]. But even if direct evidence were lacking, the whole bearing of the philosophy would shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an ultimate monism. God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one apart from the other[106]. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives a proof; matter could never have held together, without some force to bind it; nor force without matter[107]. We must not therefore be led by the term ‘principles’ (ἀρχαί, principia) to think of force and matter in any other way than as two aspects of primary body, separable as mental conceptions, inseparable as physical realities. The interpretation is essentially the same, whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe, matter and cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has been already discussed with some fulness under these separate headings.
The elements.
190. The position of the four ‘elements’ (στοιχεῖα, elementa) is similar; these are in the Stoic philosophy subdivisions of the two principles just discussed. For fire and air are of the nature of cause and movement; water and earth of receptivity and passivity[108]. Body is therefore made up of the four elements mixed[109], or perhaps rather of the elementary qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they represent[110]. The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been taught before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician, and by Aristotle[111]; the list of the four elements is traced back to Empedocles. For Aristotle’s ‘fifth element’ Zeno found no use[112].
Conclusion.
191. Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates with which the Stoics approach the problems of physics. It is not necessary for our purpose to compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a value on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder of the Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the Stoics have perfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or have even produced an orderly and rounded scheme. But at least it seems clear that their work shews intellectual power, and that speculation is not necessarily less profound because it is pursued with a practical aim[113]. The founders of the Stoic philosophy had a wide reach; they took all knowledge to be their province; and they worked persistently towards the harmonization of all its parts.