FOOTNOTES
[1] Diog. L. vii 41.
[2] Arnim ii 42 and 44.
[3] Diog. L. vii 40.
[4] Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, § [35], note 22.
[5] See above, §§ [149], [153].
[6] ‘[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura], quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 39; ‘cui tanta vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et iubeat, corpus est’ Sen. Ep. 106, 9.
[9] See above, § [157], note 84.
[10] ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι Clem. Alex. Strom. ii p. 436 (Arnim ii 359); διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ [τῇ ὕλῃ] Plot. Enn. ii 4, 1 (Arnim ii 320). οὐσία in this sense is also called πρώτη ὕλη, see § [182], note 52.
[11] τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν ... ποιοῦντες Plut. comm. not. 48, 2.
[12] ‘vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior est’ Sen. Ep. 50, 6.
[13] ‘et hoc [animus] corpus est’ ib. 106, 4.
[14] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ Aët. plac. i 11, 5; ‘placet nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse’ Sen. Ep. 117, 2; ‘quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit, corpus est’ ib. 106, 4.
[15] ‘non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira, amor, tristitia. si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem. quid ergo? tam manifestas notas corpori credis imprimi nisi a corpore?’ ib. 106, 5.
[16] ‘dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit mobile ex semet’ Sen. N. Q. ii 8; ‘is ardor, qui est mundi, non agitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte [movetur]’ Cic. N. D. ii 11, 31.
[17] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ... κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν (sc. πυκνωτικὴν) ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 74; ‘tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium’ Censorinus de die nat. p. 75 (Zeller, p. 128).
[18] τόπον δ’ εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος Ar. Did. fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503).
[19] κενὸν μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον δὲ Sext. math. x. 3 (Arnim ii 505); τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ’ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι Ar. Did. (as note 18).
[20] Χρύσιππος διάστημα [τὸν χρόνον εἶπε] τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 88 l (Arnim ii 510); οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν [χρόνου οὐσίαν] αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν Aët. plac. i 22, 7.
[21] χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου ἀλλ’ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἢ μετ’ αὐτόν Philo de mundi op. § [26] (Arnim ii 511).
[22] The question is thus stated by Seneca: ‘[quaeramus] continua sit omnis et plena materia ... an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit’ Sen. Dial. viii 4, 2; and answered as follows ‘nihil usquam inane est’ N. Q. iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 and ii 425.
[23] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Hipp. Phil. 21 (Arnim ii 469).
[24] ‘animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio’ Cic. Tusc. disp. i 18, 42. The principle is however not carried out in the Stoic universe, in which the heat resides in the periphery, and the central earth is cold.
[25] νέων τι δρᾶν μὲν εὐτονώτεραι χέρες Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31 (Arnim i 514); ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νευροῖς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστί Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.
[26] Epict. Fr. 57.
[28] ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ... εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος Plut. Sto. rep. 7, 4.
[29] Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησι ... τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία τόνον μὴ παύεσθαι Stob. i 17, 3.
[30] Ἡρακλῆς δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ’ ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ κραταιά ἐστι Cornutus 31.
[31] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 8.
[32] ‘quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio?’ ib. ii 6, 6; ‘quid cursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt? hic facit vim nervis, velocitatem currentibus’ ib. ii 6, 4.
[33] καταβληθὲν τὸ σπέρμα ἀναπληροῖ τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους καὶ ἐπισπᾶται τὴν παρακειμένην ὕλην καὶ διαμορφοῖ Simpl. Ar. cat. Ο γ β.
[34] οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον [τὸν Δία] σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ... εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν Diog. L. vii 136; τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν ib. 134.
[35] ‘ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. Ep. 65, 2. Cf. Tert. Apol. 21.
[36] ἀφθάρτους [τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους] ἐποίησαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς Proclus in Parm. iv 135. See further Stein, Psychologie der Stoa, i p. 49; Heinze, Lehre vom Logos, pp. 107-127.
[37] ‘The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first momentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs of future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of realisation, change, and phenomenal succession.’ M. Aurelius, To himself ix 1.
[38] ‘ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc. τὸν λόγον] toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγων] singula proprie figurantem’ Sen. Ep. 90, 29. See also the interpretation of the picture of Samos, § [254], note 83.
[39] ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου Athen. Supp. 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45).
[41] Sen. Ep. 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12.
[42] See below, ch. ix.
[43] ‘causarum enim,’ inquit [Chrysippus], ‘aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae’ Cic. de Fato 18, 41.
[45] οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ ... ποιοῦνται τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα Simpl. Arist. cat. f 16 Δ (Arnim ii 369).
[46] Plotinus Ennead. vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[47] Simpl. Arist. cat. f 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[48] For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100.
[50] For the position of ‘things not existent’ in the Stoic system see further below, § [187].
[51] σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία Diog. L. vii 150; ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι Stob. i 11, 5 c.
[52] οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται Diog. L. vii 150; ὕλην, σῶμα ὥς φασιν οὖσαν Plot. Enn. ii p. 114 (Arnim ii 375).
[53] ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει σῶμα Ἀριστοτέλης φησί Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[54] See Plutarch, comm. not. 50, 6.
[55] ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον πᾶσιν ἡ πρώτη ὕλη, τισὶ δὲ ὑποκείμενον γιγνομένοις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηγορουμένοις ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Dexippus Arist. cat. p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[56] Diog. L. vii 150.
[57] Simplic. Arist. cat. p. 57 Ε (Arnim ii 378).
[58] ὁ περὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων λόγος καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἁπάντων, ἅ φασιν εἶναι Στωϊκῶν παῖδες σώματα Galen qual. incorp. 1 xix, p. 463 K (Arnim ii 377).
[59] τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι Plut. comm. not. 50, 1.
[60] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ κίνησιν [τὴν μανωτικήν see above, note 17] τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 68 Ε (Arnim ii 452).
[61] τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 4.
[62] ἀναιροῖτο ἂν τὸ τὴν ποιότητα εἶναι πνεῦμά πως ἔχον Alex. Aph. Arist. Top. iv p. 181 (Arnim ii 379).
[63] τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστι Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 2.
[64] Zeller, pp. 103-107.
[65] ‘pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquaï, | tactus corporibus cunctis’ Lucr. R. N. i 454, 455.
[66] ‘servitium contra, paupertas, divitiaeque, | ... cetera quorum | adventu manet incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare’ ib. 456-9.
[67] εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399).
[68] τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δὲ πὼς ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιὰ Plot. Enn. vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[69] ἡ δὲ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό Philo quod deus, § [35] (Arnim ii 458).
[70] οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναι [Χρύσιππός] φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 2; ‘esse autem unitatem in aere vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent. quid est enim aliud quod teneret illa, quam spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 6, 6.
[71] ἡ δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά. καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δέ ἐστιν ἐοικότα φυτοῖς, ὄνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἕξις ἤδη κινουμένη Philo Leg. Alleg. ii § [22] (Arnim ii 458).
[72] ψυχὴ δέ ἐστι φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν. αὔτη κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν ib.
[73] ‘voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; habitus porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit’ Sen. Ep. 95, 57.
[74] ‘virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens’ ib. 113, 2.
[75] ‘Relative position’ must be distinguished from ‘correlation’ (πρός τι). Such terms as ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter,’ ‘living’ and ‘dead’ are said to be correlated. Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[76] Simpl. as in last note.
[78] So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. de mixt. p. 216, 14 Br. (Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: ‘quaedam continua esse corpora, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem; quaedam ex distantibus, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus’ Sen. Ep. 102, 6.
[79] οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ... διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας, ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Simpl. Arist. phys. p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467).
[80] Arnim ii 411 and 467.
[81] τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρύσιππος κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει Alex. Aph. de mixt. p. 216, 14 (Arnim ii 473).
[82] ‘Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos’ Tertull. adv. Hermog. 44; and see below, § [207].
[83] Note 2 above.
[84] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον Achill. Is. 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).
[85] See Rendall, M. Aurelius Introd. p. xxix.
[86] ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων Xen. Mem. iv 3, 13.
[87] ib. i 1, 11.
[89] ‘in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[90] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον· πᾶν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Achill. Isag. 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).
[91] Sen. as above.
[92] τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἴδη καταριθμοῦνται, ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον Sext. math. x 218 (Arnim ii 331).
[93] ‘etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia, quid ergo erit ex quo haec deducantur? illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, “quod est”’ Sen. Ep. 58, 11.
[94] οἱ Στωϊκοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον Sext. math. viii 258.
[95] ἐκεῖνοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] νομοθετήσαντες αὑτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι ... τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι, κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἀσωμάτων Alex. Aphr. Arist. Top. iv p. 155 (Arnim ii 329); ‘primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur “quid”’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[96] ‘animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur; sequitur ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt’ Sen. Ep. 113, 3 and 9 (Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking).
[97] ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε Sext. math. vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129).
[98] τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels).
[99] οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι] Sext. math. vii 246.
[100] ‘haec ... quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[101] οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον· οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὄντα δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι Plut. comm. not. 30, 12.
[103] δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, κ.τ.λ. Diog. L. vii 134.
[104] ib.; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην Sext. math. ix 11 (Arnim ii 301).
[105] ‘dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. Ep. 65, 2; ‘universa ex materia et ex deo constant. deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei’ ib. 23.
[106] ἄλλων δὲ καὶ ποιητικὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἀπολειπόντων, ἀχώριστον δὲ ταύτην τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Syrianus Arist. met. (Arnim ii 308). ‘Stoici naturam in duas partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. in illa prima esse vim sentiendi, in hac materiam; nec alterum sine altero [esse] posse’ Lact. Div. inst. vii 3.
[107] ‘neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine ulla materia’ Cic. Ac. i 6, 24.
[108] Arnim ii 418; ‘e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram’ Cic. Ac. i 7, 26.
[109] κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γινομένου τοῦ σώματος Justin de res. 6 (Arnim ii 414).
[110] ὅσα τοίνυν σώματα πρῶτον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει ποιότητας, ἐκεῖνα στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς σαρκός· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ Galen const. art. med. i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405).
[111] Galen meth. med. i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411).
[113] Cf. Mahaffy’s Greek Life and Thought; ‘it is quite wrong to suppose that these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with practical life, despised or avoided speculation. Their philosophical theories demand hard reading and hard thinking’ p. 137.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE UNIVERSE.
Study of the heavens.
192. In including in their system the study of the physical universe the Stoics broke daringly with Socrates and his faithful followers the Cynics. These had joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced[1] in ridiculing those whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst they saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned them more closely. But it was not for nothing that the most highly civilised nations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and Babylonians, had studied the starry heavens, mapped out the constellations, measured the paths of the wandering stars, predicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the seasons, and the winds; with the result that their successors defied the common opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold inhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk with their feet turned up towards ours[2]. All this body of knowledge, called generically the knowledge of the sky (though it included the whole physical geography of the earth), had impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed that as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was elevated and made ampler and nobler[3], leaving behind it the petty contentions and rivalries of common life; and further that true knowledge had surely been reached, when the positions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses of sun and moon could be predicted so long before with unfailing accuracy. These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were fully shared by the Stoics. ‘Is not the sun,’ says Seneca, ‘worthy of our gaze, the moon of our regard? When the sky displays its fires at night, and countless stars flash forth, who is not absorbed in contemplation of them? They glide past in their company, concealing swift motion under the outward appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of a few of them, but the greater number are beyond our ken. Their dignity fills all our thoughts[4].’ In the golden age which preceded our iron civilisation ‘men lay at nights in the open fields, and watched the glorious spectacle of the heavens. It was their delight to note the stars that sank in one quarter and rose in another. The universe swept round them, performing its magnificent task in silence[5].’ ‘Their order never changes, spring and autumn, winter and summer succeed according to fixed laws[6].’ And in the same tone writes the Stoic poet: ‘unshaken the lights of heaven ever move onwards in their proper orbit[7].’ The emotion roused in the Stoic by the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that expressed in Judaic poetry by the ‘Song of the Three Holy Children[8],’ and in more modern times by Addison’s famous hymn[9].
The world-order.
193. The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in the general opinion of intelligent men, to show the existence of a ‘world-order’ or ‘universe[10].’ The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics from Heraclitus, who had declared that ‘neither god nor man created this world-order,’ as in their ethics from Diogenes, the ‘citizen of the universe[11].’ They therefore needed only to adjust an established notion to their own physical postulates. We observe at once that the very conception of an ordered whole differentiates that whole from the absolute totality of all things. The universe is indeed on the one hand identified with the substance of all things (οὐσία τῶν ὅλων), but only as a thing made individual by the possession of quality (ἰδίως ποιόν)[12], and necessarily one[13]. It is self-created; and it may therefore be identified with its creator, the deity[14]; it also includes all that is bodily[15]; but outside there remains the boundless void[16]. It is therefore defined by Chrysippus as ‘the combination of heaven and earth and all natures that are in them,’ or alternatively as ‘the combination of gods and men and all that is created for their sake[17].’
Its position.
194. The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that of a continuous body, having a definite outline, and stationed in the boundless void. That the universe has shape the Stoics deduce from its having ‘nature’ (φύσις), that is, the principle of growth, displayed in the symmetry of its parts[18]; and its shape is the perfect shape of a sphere[19]. Within this sphere all things tend towards the middle[20]; and we use the terms ‘down’ meaning ‘towards the middle,’ and ‘up’ meaning thereby from the middle[21]. The Peripatetics are therefore needlessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down, if it stands in the void; for, first, there is no ‘up’ or ‘down’ outside the universe; and, secondly, the universe possesses ‘unity’ (ἕξις)[22] which keeps it together[23]. And here we see the folly of Epicurus, who says that the atoms move downwards from eternity in the boundless void; for there is no such thing as ‘downwards’ in that which is unlimited[24]. Further, the universe is divided into two parts, the earth (with the water and the air surrounding it) which is stable in the middle, and the sky or aether which revolves around it[25].
The heliocentric theory.
195. Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to make two assertions on questions of scientific fact, in which they opposed the best scientific opinion of their own time. For many authorities held that the earth revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky was only apparent. Such were Hicetas of Syracuse[26], a Pythagorean philosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by Theophrastus, and later Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Heraclides of Pontus[27]. From the point of view of astronomical science this view seemed well worthy of consideration, as Seneca in particular emphasizes[28]. Other astronomers had gone further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that the earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated that Plato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had wrongly placed the earth in the centre of the universe; and the heliocentric view was put forward tentatively by Aristarchus of Samos, and positively by the astronomer Seleucus, in connexion with the theory of the earth’s rotation[29]. For this Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have put Aristarchus on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb ‘the hearth of the universe[30].’ This outburst of persecuting zeal, anticipating so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective in preventing the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great astronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoretically possible[31]; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an orrery, shewing the motion of all the planets[32], he must have been aware of its superior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed it vigorously on theological grounds, and perhaps more than any other man was responsible for its being pushed aside for some 1500 years[33]. The precise ground of the objection is not made very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive rather than reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun, whom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the universe; but that the earth should be reckoned merely as one of his attendant planets was humiliating to human self-esteem, and jeopardised the doctrine of Providence, in accordance with which the universe was created for the happiness of gods and men only.
The elements.
196. Having determined that the earth is the centre of the universe, and the sun above it, the way is clear to incorporate in the system the doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα, naturae)[34], which probably had its origin in a cruder form of physical speculation than the doctrine of the heavenly bodies. As we have seen above[35], the elements are not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate position between the two principles of the active and the passive on the one hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the other. Earth is the lowest of the elements, and also the grossest; above it is placed water, then air, then fire; and these are in constant interchange, earth turning to water, this into air, and this into aether, and so again in return. By this interchange the unity of the universe is maintained[36]. The transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but gradual; the lowest part of the aether is akin to air[37]; it is therefore of no great importance whether we speak with Heraclitus of three elements, or with Empedocles of four. The two grosser elements, earth and water, tend by nature downwards and are passive; air and fire tend upwards and are active[38]. Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element as the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance[39].
Fire and breath.
197. Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are the source of all life[40]. Thus the elemental and primary fire stands in contrast with the fire of domestic use; the one creates and nourishes, the other destroys[41]. It follows that fire, though it is one of the four elements, has from its divine nature a primacy amongst the elements[42], which corresponds to its lofty position in the universe[43]; and the other elements in turn all contain some proportion of fire. Thus although air has cold and darkness as primary and essential qualities[44], nevertheless it cannot exist without some share of warmth[45]. Hence air also may be associated with life, and it is possible to retain the popular term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, spiritus) for the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic philosophy we seldom hear again of air in connexion with coldness; and between the ‘warm breath’ (anima inflammata) and the primary fire there is hardly a distinction; we may even say that ‘spirit’ has the highest possible tension[46].
God in the stone.
198. Air on its downward path changes to water. This change is described as due to loss of heat[47], and yet water too has some heat and vitality[48]. Even earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements, contains a share of the divine heat; otherwise it could not feed living plants and animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed the sun and stars[49]. Thus we may say even of a stone that it has a part of the divinity in it[50]. Here then we see the reverse side of the so-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, and that the soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the damp and cold element, and earth, the dry and cold element, are both penetrated by the divinity, by the creative fire without the operation of which both would fall in an instant into nothingness[51].
The heavenly bodies.
199. We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. These are set in spheres of various diameter, all alike revolving around the earth. The succession we find described in Plato’s Timaeus[52]; the moon is nearest to the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by Aristotle and after him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to Aratus and Chrysippus[53]. A tradition derived from Chaldaean sources gave a different order, setting Venus and Mercury nearer to the earth than the sun; and this order was accepted by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and Posidonius, the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore further from the sun, than Mercury[54]. The moon, like the earth, obtains her light from the sun, being crescent-shaped when nearest to him, full-orbed when furthest away. Her distance from the earth is two million stadia (250,000 miles); when she lies between the earth and the sun she eclipses his light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly away from the sun she is herself eclipsed[55]. Her phases are explained by her position relative to the sun[56]. The sun is 60 millions of miles from the earth[57]; his diameter is 37½ times as large as that of the earth[58]; he appears larger when on the horizon because his rays are refracted through the thick atmosphere[59]. The planets, whether they revolve round the earth or the sun, are falsely called ‘wandering stars,’ since their orbits have been fixed from all eternity[60]. The fixed stars revolve round the earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared with it, is merely the central point[61]. All the heavenly bodies are, like the earth, of spherical form[62]. Finally Seneca, in advance of the school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the celestial world[62a].
Cruder theories.
200. Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with the best astronomical teaching of their time, they combined with it many views based on much cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to suggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth[63]; and it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but also the heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations from the Ocean[64]. Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed the astronomers with suspicion. He alone regarded the moon not as a sphere, but as a hemisphere with the flat side turned towards us[65]; the stars he considered to be conical[66]. These views, very probably derived from Heraclitus, seem to point to the conception of the sky or aether as a single fixed fiery sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from the surrounding element by containing more closely packed masses of fiery matter[67]; a conception which harmonizes far more closely with the Stoic theory of the elements than the doctrines which are astronomically more correct. Cleanthes also explained that the sun could not venture to travel beyond his solstitial positions, lest he should be out of reach of his terrestrial food[68]. And Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun keeps within the ‘torrid zone’ of the sky, because beneath it flows the Ocean, from which the sun sucks up his nutriment[69].
Deity of the stars.
201. From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the element of fire the Stoics draw the conclusion that they are animated, reasoning, self-determined, and divine; in short, that they are gods[70]. This godhead pertains particularly to the sun[71]. Of this doctrine Cleanthes is especially the upholder[72], deeming that the sun is the ruling power in the universe, as reason in man[73]. It is not clear whether the Stoics derived their theory of the divinity of the heavenly bodies from logical deduction, or whether they were here incorporating some Eastern worship. In favour of the latter point of view is the consideration that at this time the association of Mithra with the sun was probably making some progress in the Persian religion, and that the popular names of the seven days of the week, following the names of the sun, moon, and five planets, must have been already current.
Deity of the universe.
202. But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed by the paradox that the universe itself is a rational animal, possessed of free-will and divine. This is the teaching of all the masters of the school, beginning with Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow logically from two principles, the first that the universe possesses a unity, the second that the whole is greater than its parts. ‘There cannot be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient[74].’ ‘The rational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe is rational[75].’ ‘The universe is one[76]’; we must not therefore think of it as of an army or a family, which comes into a kind of existence merely through the juxtaposition of its members. By the same reasoning the universe possesses divinity[77]. Upon this favourite Stoic text is based the frequent assertion of modern commentators that the philosophy is pantheistic[78]; but the more central position of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the universe as a man’s soul to his body[79], and the universe is therefore no more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is expressed with great clearness by Varro, who says: ‘As a man is called wise, being wise in mind, though he consists of mind and body; so the world is called God from its soul, though it consists of soul and body[80].’ The Stoics are however in strong conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who hold that the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind are developments from matter. ‘Nothing that is without mind can generate that which possesses mind,’ says Cicero’s Stoic[81], in full opposition to modern popular theories of evolution. Further, just as it may be questioned in the case of man whether the soul is situated in the head or in the heart, so in the case of the universe we may doubt whether its soul, or rather its ‘principate,’ is in the sun, as Cleanthes held[82], or in the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain[83], or in the aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught[84].
The earth’s inhabitants.
203. In the study of the universe we are not called upon merely to consider the earth as a member of the celestial company; we have to contemplate it as the home of beings of various ranks, which also display to us the principle of orderly arrangement. Preëminent amongst the inhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by being the sole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition owns all those capacities which are shewn in beings of lower rank. The nature of man constitutes so large a part of philosophy that we must reserve its full consideration for a special chapter[85]; and must restrict ourselves here to treating of lower beings, which fall into the three orders of animals, plants, and inanimate beings. But since each of the higher orders possesses all the properties of every order that stands lower, the study of the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of human nature. The number and classification of these orders are not to be treated mechanically. From one point of view gods and men form one class, the rational, as opposed to every kind of non-rational being. On the other hand, from the standpoint with which we are rather concerned at this moment, gods, men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of animate beings, below which stand the plants, and lower still things without life. Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul; the two lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower in degree. The general term which includes soul in the animal and that which corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless bodies is ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα); soul therefore is the highest type of ‘spirit.’
The animals have not reason
204. To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the faculty of reason; and this position must have seemed to them self-evident, since the same word Logos expresses in the Greek both reason and speech. In the Latin the point was no longer so clear; still the words ‘ratio’ and ‘oratio,’ if not identical, appeared to be connected by a natural association. Since the animals then are necessarily unreasoning, those acts of animals which appear to show reason must be explained in some other way. A dog pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be admitted that in a way the dog recognises that ‘this scent is the sign of the wild animal[86]’; still he is incapable of expressing this belief in the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is disposed of in a more summary way; this animal shows a ‘restless helplessness,’ climbing up and down straws in meaningless industry; many men however are no wiser[87]. For their young the animals have a certain feeling, yet their grief at losing them is comparatively short-lived[88]. In spite, however, of these limitations the animal world is one part of the wonders of nature, and is deserving of our admiration; all animals have strong affection for their young so long as these need their protection[89], and the dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence and for his loyalty towards his master[90].
but a sort of reason.
205. To define more accurately the nature of animals we must to some extent anticipate the discussion of human nature in a later chapter, which follows the same general lines: for in every point the animals are like men, but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason[91]; by soul we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent movement[92]. In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling part[93]. Their power of observation enables them to distinguish what is healthful to them from that which is injurious; their power of movement shapes itself into pursuit of the healthful and avoidance of the injurious[94]. They possess also properties which resemble the human feelings, such as anger, confidence, hope, fear; but they do not in a strict sense possess the same feelings as men[95]. As they cannot attain to virtue, neither can they fall into vice[96].
Plant life.
206. From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem to have soul, because they live and die[97]; yet they have not soul in any strict sense of the word. It will therefore be better not to use this word, but to speak of the ‘growth-power’ (φύσις)[98]. The governing part is situated in the root[99]. The growth of plants both in size and in strength is very remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find themselves place in crevices, attain such power that they split huge rocks and destroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is meant by tone or tension; for it is a spirit which starts from the governing part (the root) and spreads to the trunk and branches, conveying a force equally strong to construct and to destroy[100]. From another point of view we may say that the seed contains the Logos or law of the fully developed plant, for under no possible circumstances can any other plant grow from that seed except the plant of its kind[101].
Cohesion.
207. Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as stones[102]. Yet even these have a property which corresponds to soul, and which keeps them together in a particular outward form or shape; this property we call ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις, unitas)[103]; like soul itself, it is a spirit pervading the whole[104], and again it is the Logos of the whole. An external force cannot impart this unity: so that the water contained in a glass is not an ‘inanimate object’ in this sense[105]. In this lowest grade of ‘spirit’ we read in Stoicism the antithesis of the materialism of Epicurus, who postulates for his ‘atoms’ the fundamental property of indivisibility, and can only account for the coherence of the bodies formed from them by supplying them with an elaborate system of ‘hooks and eyes,’ which was a frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus makes the indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and from it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical combination; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great whole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual shedding of primitive force. God is in fact in the stone by virtue of his power of universal penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων)[106].
Gradations of spirit.
208. No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades of spirit without also possessing all the lower. Stones therefore have cohesion, plants growth and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion; for these are not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but appearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. Man clearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape; there does not however seem to be any part of him which has merely cohesion. But in the bones, the nails, and the hair are found growth and cohesion only, and these parts grow as the plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are sensation, as well as growth and cohesion; that is, there is soul in the sense in which the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only which in man possesses soul in the highest grade[107].
The conflagration.
209. This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and adaptation, in spite of its apparent equipoise and its essential divinity, is destined to perish. ‘Where the parts are perishable, so is the whole; but the parts of the universe are perishable, for they change one into another; therefore the universe is perishable[108].’ Possibly this syllogism would not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not long before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final conflagration, familiar to us from its description in the ‘second epistle of Peter[109].’ According to this theory, the interchange of the elements already described[110] is not evenly balanced, but the upward movement is slightly in excess. In the course of long ages, therefore, all the water will have been converted into air and fire, and the universe will become hot with flame[111]. Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted for want of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their vitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers will cease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be swallowed up, star will collide with star. All living things will die, and even the souls of the blest and the gods themselves will once more be absorbed in the fire, which will thus regain its primitive and essential unity[112]. Yet we may not say that the universe dies, for it does not suffer the separation of soul from body[113].
Is the universe perishable?
210. In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration the Stoics were called upon to take sides upon the favourite philosophic problem whether the universe is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold, or imperishable, as the Peripatetics say[114]. In replying to this question, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the authority of Heraclitus[115]. The word universe is used in two senses: there is an eternal universe (namely that already described as the universal substance made individual by the possession of quality[116]), which persists throughout an unending series of creations and conflagrations[117]. In another sense the universe, considered in relation to its present ordering, is perishable[118]. Just in the same way the word ‘city’ is used in two senses; and that which is a community of citizens may endure, even though the collection of temples and houses also called the ‘city’ is destroyed by fire[119].
Dissentient Stoics.
211. The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained by all Stoic teachers with equal conviction. Zeno treated it with fulness in his book ‘on the universe[120]’; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that the whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that from which, as from a seed, it has sprung[121]. In the transition period, owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, and the critical acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned the theory[122]. Posidonius however, though a pupil of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of the doubters[123]), was quite orthodox on this subject; though he pays to his master the tribute of asserting that the universe is the most permanent being imaginable[124], and that its existence will continue through an immense and almost unlimited period of time[125]. In the Roman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, but one that makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with the conflagration there comes to an end the struggle of the evil against the good; and the Deity may at last claim for himself a period of rest, during which he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has passed away[126], and plan for himself a better one to follow[127].
The reconstruction.
212. Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction of the world (παλιγγενεσία, renovatio), which will lead again to a conflagration; the period between one conflagration and the next being termed a ‘great year’ (περίοδος, magnus annus). The conception of the ‘great year’ was borrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans[128], and leads us back ultimately to astronomical calculations; for a great year is the period at the end of which sun, moon and planets all return to their original stations[129]. The phenomena of the sky recur in each new period in the same way as before; and hence we readily infer that all the phenomena of the universe, including the lives of individuals, will recur and take their course again. Although this doctrine appears only slightly connected with the general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it: and Seneca expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when he says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they knew they were so doing[130].
Creation.
213. We have put off till the end of this chapter the discussion of the Stoic theory of Creation, because it is in fact one of the least defined parts of the system. According to the theory of the great year creation is not a single work, but a recurring event; and therefore in one sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end. It would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of view was always present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The question of the beginning of things is of primary importance to every philosophy, and the Stoics approached it from many points of view, popular, scientific, mythological and theological, and gave a number of answers accordingly. To the orthodox Stoic all these answers are ultimately one, though the language in which they are expressed differs greatly; whilst the critic of Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different sources and are fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests four answers to the question ‘Who made the universe?’ It may be an omnipotent deity; or the impersonal Logos; or the divine Spirit working in all things by tension; or (lastly) destiny, that is, the unalterable succession of cause and result[131]. These answers we may examine in order.
The golden age.
214. The view that ‘God made the world’ is that of the theology which was now everywhere becoming popular; and it is usually associated, even when expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before the creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and damp[132]; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and light into the mass: from ‘chaos’ it became ‘cosmos’[133]. This deity is the same that is commonly named Ζεύς[134] or Jove, and is called the ‘father of gods and men.’ The universe so created was at first happy and innocent, as is expressed in the tradition of the Golden Age. Men lived together in societies, willingly obeying the wisest and strongest of their number[135]; none were tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt in natural grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment from tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made progress in the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to make use of metals. These views were especially developed by Posidonius, who believed that in the Mysians of his day, who lived on milk and honey, and abstained from flesh-meat, he could still trace the manners of this happy epoch[136]. It seems probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the Pythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, which has become familiar to us in turn through the version given by Ovid in his Metamorphoses[137].
Older stoic theory.
215. These conceptions however are only familiar in the later forms of Stoicism. The teaching of the founders of Stoicism is on this matter monistic, and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world was in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator and the material of creation. The process of creation (διακόσμησις) may be regarded as identical with that of the mutation of the elements on the downward path[138]; with the special note that when the stage of water is reached[139] the deity assumes the shape of the seed Logos (σπερματικὸς λόγος)[140], and begets in the first instance the four elements[141]; then, from a combination of these, trees and animals and all other things after their kind[142]. Yet even this statement is simplified if we regard the original fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all things that are to be created[143]. To this is to be added that all this is well ordered, as in a duly constituted state[144]. From this point of view the Cosmos is a Cosmopolis, and we reach the border of the investigations which deal with the moral government of the universe, and the political organization of mankind.
Summary.
216. We may sum up the history of the universe according to the Stoics somewhat in the following way. Body is neither burden on the soul nor its instrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, and life, which are essentially the same. This motion is not entirely that of contraction, or immobility would result; nor entirely that of expansion, else the universe would be scattered into the far distance[145]. One of these motions constantly succeeds the other, as Heraclitus says ‘becoming extinguished by measure, and catching light by measure[146]’; as when a swimmer with all his strength can just hold his own against the force of the stream, or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended in the air[147]. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or tension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the fiery breath begins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction asserts itself, the universe settles down and shrinks; the aether passes into air, and air in its turn to water. All this while tension is slackening, first in the centre, lastly even in the circumference; yet the vital force is not entirely quenched; beneath the covering of the waters lurks the promise of a new world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon the watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements as we know them. On its outer edge where it meets the expansive aether, the water rarefies until the belt of air is formed. All the while the outward and inward movements persist; particles of fire still pass into air, and thence into water and earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water to air, and air to fire (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω). Thus by the interaction of conflicting tendencies an equilibrium (ἰσονομία) is established, and the result is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world[148]. Finally the upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, water becomes absorbed in air and air transformed into fire, once more the conflagration results and all the world passes into the fiery breath from which it came[149].