FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. Par. iii 20.
[2] ‘Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things’ Epict. Disc. ii 17, 10 and 11.
[3] ‘omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures; aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35; ‘est igitur aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio venturi boni’ Tusc. disp. iv 7, 14; ‘hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque’ Verg. Aen. vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii 7, 10 b.
[4] Χρύσιππος ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κενὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τής ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη Galen Hipp. et Plat. v i, p. 429 K; cf. ib. iv p. 387 K (Arnim i 461).
[5] In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one of the virtues; they are ἀφροσύνη (insipientia), ἀδικία (iniustitia), δειλία (ignavia) and ἀκολασία (intemperantia); and each of these is rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all (Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).
[6] This view is summed up in the phrase that ‘the perturbations are κακά, but not κακίαι’ (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the principle that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman writers realized the difficulty in the use of words: ‘morbi autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 13, 29 and 30.
[7] ‘utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant’ Sen. Ep. 116, 1; ‘vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia’ Cic. Off. i 20, 69; ‘contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est’ Sen. Dial. x 10, 1.
[8] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται ὀργή ib. 10 b.
[9] Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: ‘ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest’ Cic. Off. i 38, 136.
[10] ‘[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum in bello fortitudo gerit’ Sen. Dial. iii 7, 1.
[11] ‘“non potest” inquit “fieri” Theophrastus, “ut non vir bonus irascatur malis”’ ib. 14, 1; ‘“quid ergo?” inquit “vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?”’ ib. 12, 1.
[12] ‘stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis’ Sen. Dial. v 3, 1.
[13] ‘abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo’ ib. iii 12, 6.
[14] ‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent non habentur’ ib. 17, 1.
[15] ‘adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio’ ib. 17, 5.
[16] ‘corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine ira’ ib. 15, 1.
[17] ‘[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem’ ib. 11, 5.
[18] ‘nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim perturbat artem’ ib. iv 14, 2 and 3.
[19] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [τοῦ] τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ‘ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a quo te inique putes laesum’ Sen. Dial. iii 2, 4.
[20] ‘ira furor brevis est’ Hor. Ep. i 2, 62; ‘quidam ex sapientibus viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam’ Sen. Dial. iii 1, 2.
[21] ib. 4.
[22] ‘non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus’ ib. 12, 4.
[23] ‘nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit’ ib. v 1, 3.
[24] ‘nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante’ ib. iv 1, 4; ‘nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est’ ib. 3, 4.
[25] ib. 3-5.
[26] ‘maximum remedium irae mora est’ ib. 29, 1; ‘Keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry’ Epict. Disc. ii 18, 12.
[27] ‘pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam laedunt’ Sen. Dial. v 28, 4; ‘contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself’ Bacon, Essay 57.
[28] ‘eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur’ Sen. Dial. 12, 3.
[29] ‘quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum’ ib. iv 36, 1.
[31] ‘percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et excusationem’ ib. 34, 5.
[32] ‘quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam altae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae’ ib. iii 4, 3.
[33] ‘inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam enim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes’ Sen. Dial. 2 and 3.
[34] Defined as ‘atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis’ or ‘inclinatio animi ad asperiora’ Sen. Clem. ii 4, 1 and 3.
[35] ib. i 12, 1.
[36] ‘domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et detestabiles sunt’ ib. 18, 3.
[37] ‘ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus’ ib. 24, 3.
[38] ‘tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat’ ib. 25, 3.
[39] ib. 22, 1.
[40] ‘puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?’ ib. 26, 2.
[41] ‘optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est’ Ben. vii 20, 3.
[42] λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ Stob. ii 7, 10 b; ‘est aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 7, 14.
[44] Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.
[45] ‘nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit’ Sen. Ep. 107, 4; and see further, § [339].
[46] ‘id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam malorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit’ Sen. Dial. i 4, 13.
[47] Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word πόνος, which corresponds equally to dolor and labor in Latin; see Cic. Tusc. disp. ii 15, 35.
[48] ‘tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis quam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine gemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur’ ib. xii 3, 1.
[49] ‘scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho’ Ep. 13, 5.
[50] ‘magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae putaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur’ ib. 76, 34.
[51] ‘quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam’ Hor. Ep. i 1, 43.
[52] ‘virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; | nec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae’ Hor. C. iii 2, 17-20.
[53] ‘Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied: ‘because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a good politician, to his fellow-citizens’ Stob. iv 4, 29.
[54] ‘si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit’ Sen. Dial. viii 8, 3.
[55] ‘si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe’ Ep. 19, 1.
[56] ‘mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et quietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima’ ib. xii 6, 6.
[57] ‘ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt’ Hor. Ep. i 11, 25-27.
[58] Sen. Dial. ix 12-15.
[59] ‘inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere quod agant’ ib. 2, 10.
[60] ‘incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope superabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti’ N. Q. v 18, 6 and 7; ‘non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli’ ib. 16; ‘quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?’ Ep. 53, 1.
[61] N. Q. v 18, 10.
[62] ‘magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita consumitur’ Sen. N. Q. 16.
[63] ‘misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis’ Clem. ii 5, 1.
[64] ‘anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent’ ib.
[65] Epict. Disc. iii 3, 17.
[66] ‘cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva mineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant homines’ Hor. Sat. i 3, 121-124; ‘scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est’ Sen. Clem. ii 5, 2 and 3.
[68] ‘non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret’ Sen. Clem. ii 6, 3.
[69] Epict. Disc. i 11.
[70] ‘ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui sustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum propinquorumque extrema hora deseritur’ Sen. N. Q. iii 18, 6.
[71] Dial. ii 17, 1.
[72] ‘[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces concisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat’ Sen. Dial. ii 17, 3; ‘nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit’ ib. 2.
[73] ‘cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet’ Ep. 63, 3.
[74] Cicero wrote a treatise ‘de Consolatione’ based on this work, but only a few fragments remain. Plutarch’s ‘Consolation’ for Apollonius was drawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).
[75] Cic. Fam. iv 5.
[76] ‘denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium’ ib. 5, 5.
[77] ‘maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se passi sunt omnes omnesque passuri’ Sen. Dial. xi 1, 4. On the other side ‘malevoli solatii est turba miserorum’ ib. vi 12, 5; ‘[cogita] fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere’ ib. xi 5, 4.
[78] ib. 8, 2.
[79] ib. 9, 3; ‘inter felices currit animas’ ib. vi 5, 1.
[80] ib. xi 9, 4; ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ ib. vi 19, 6. See also above, §§ [298], [299].
[81] Sen. Dial. vi 3 to 5; above, § [123].
[82] ‘If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed’ Epict. Manual 3 (after Anaxagoras).
[83] Disc. iv 1, 101.
[84] ‘Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored’ Manual 11.
[85] Disc. iii 24, 27.
[86] ‘illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed cui ista firmitas animi continget?’ Sen. Ep. 63, 1.
[87] ‘inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis, quibus ipsos, videre’ Sen. Ep. 99, 15; cf. Dial. xii 1, 2.
[88] ‘cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis necessitas exprimit’ Ep. 99, 18.
[89] ‘nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus effuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori’ ib. 27.
[90] ‘at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit’ Dial. vi 7, 1.
[91] ‘fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor’ ib. 1, 7.
[92] ‘non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est’ ib.
[93] ‘obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens’ Sen. Dial. ix 2, 11.
[94] ‘difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor castigatorque minorum’ Hor. A. P. 173, 174.
[95] ‘idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse’ Sen. Ben. i 10, 3; ‘cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes’ ib. v 17, 3.
[96] ‘non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt’ ib.
[97] ‘satius est humana vitia placide accipere’ ib. ix 15, 5; ‘omnia vulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur’ ib. 2.
[98] ‘generi humano venia tribuenda est’ ib. iv 10, 2.
[99] ‘hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota’ Ben. i 10, 1.
[100] Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.
[101] ‘ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est’ Sen. Ep. 89, 22. Another form of luxury is in the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: ‘quemadmodum nihil illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos demittunt’ N. Q. iv 13, 10.
[102] See above, § [83], note 82.
[103] See above, § [324], note 155.
[104] καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μὲν [τὸν σοφόν], οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ Diog. L. vii 118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson in Journ. Phil. xxx pp. 221 sqq.
[105] ‘nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat nos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet’ Sen. Dial. ix 17, 8; see further Ep. 83, 14 and 15.
[106] ‘nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam’ Ep. 83, 18; ‘omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent’ ib. 83, 19.
[108] Sen. Ep. 110, 14 and 18.
[109] Xen. Mem. ii 1, 5.
[110] ‘si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram’ Sen. Ben. vii 20, 3. The furthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application of this theory: ‘tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam’ Tac. Ann. xiv 2, 2.
[111] ‘non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe enim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est’ Sen. Ep. 97, 9.
[112] See above, § [306], note 27.
[113] ‘As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures’ Epict. Manual 33, 8.
[114] τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. § [317].
[115] ‘eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: “de sapiente” inquit “videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi”’ Sen. Ep. 116, 5; ‘Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? What then is slavery?’ Epict. Disc. iv 1, 15 and 17.
[116] ‘magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta’ Sen. Dial. ii 6, 7.
[117] Hor. Sat. i 2, 116-119.
[118] See above, § [318], note 104.
[119] ‘Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer’ Epict. Disc. i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were already practised in Seneca’s time; ‘vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus’ Dial. iv 12, 4.
[120] ‘lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus, si quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. Par. iii 1, 20.
[121] ‘When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also increased your incontinence’ Epict. Disc. ii 18, 6.
[122] καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων Diog. L. vii 129.
[123] Stob. iii 6, 23.
[124] ‘idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus’ A. Gellius, N. A. xvii 19, 5.
[125] ‘verba haec duo dicebat: ἀνέχου et ἀπέχου ib. 6.
[126] ‘At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy’ Epict. Disc. iii 12, 12.
[127] ‘id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime profugiamus’ Sen. Ep. 51, 5; ‘ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis’ ib. 69, 3.
[128] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 15-21.
[130] Epict. Disc. ii 18, 24-29.
[131] The terms ‘ruffling’ (levis motus), and ‘commotions’ (emotiones) or ‘perturbations’ (perturbationes) are metaphors taken from the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe bodily ill-health. The English words ‘emotions,’ ‘affections’ have almost entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable as translations. The substitution of ‘commotion’ for ‘emotion’ has already been adopted by Maudsley, Pathology of the Human Mind.
[132] ‘ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba subfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes’ Sen. Dial. iv 2, 1; ‘erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia’ Cic. Leg. i 19, 50. See also the following notes.
[133] ‘si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris obsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus’ Sen. Dial. iv 3, 2; ‘est primus motus non voluntarius quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio’ ib. 4, 1.
[134] ‘prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species’ ib. 3, 5.
[135] ‘[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis carebit’ ib. iii 16, 7; ‘scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse’ ib. xi 18, 5; ‘nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est’ ib. xii 16, 1.
[136] ‘nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit’ ib. i 2, 2; ‘invicti esse possumus, inconcussi non possumus’ N. Q. ii 59, 3.
[137] ‘adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi’ Dial. iv 3, 1; ‘[Zeno] perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam’ Cic. Ac. i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis’ Fin. iii 10, 35.
[138] ‘neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur’ Sen. Dial. iii 8, 2.
[139] ‘perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad omnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? sed illi dicunt πάθος. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35.
[140] ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα Gal. loc. aff. i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a νόσημα is called ἕξις Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘adfectus sunt motus animi improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum’ Sen. Ep. 75, 12; ‘morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius haec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt’ ib. 11.
[141] For the technical terms see above, § [362], note 6.
[142] Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 11, 25.
[143] εἶναι δέ τινα [νοσήματα] κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 11, 27.
[144] ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων Stob. ii 7, 11 g.
[147] ‘cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet’ Cic. Parad. iii 20.
[148] Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who writes ‘the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school, could have no real consciousness of sin’ Philippians, p. 290. It may however be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than by Seneca.
[149] See above, § [362], note 7.
[151] ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων Diog. L. vii 120.
[152] ‘omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit’ Cic. Mur. 29, 61.
[153] ‘parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt’ Cic. Par. iii 20; ‘facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere’ Sen. Dial. iii 7, 2; ‘optimum est ipsis repugnare seminibus’ ib. 8, 1; ‘si das aliquid iuris tristitiae timori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate’ Ep. 85, 11.
[154] Diog. L. vii 121.
[155] ἶσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια Stob. ii 7, 11 l.
[156] ‘stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur ...’ Sen. Ben. iv 27, 1; ‘omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet vitium unum, omnia habet’ ib. v 15, 1.
[157] ‘intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iii 5, 10.
[158] πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους Cleanthes ap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; ‘in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio’ Sen. Ben. vii 19, 5; ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia’ ib. v 25, 6.
[159] ‘satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur, invidiosum est’ Ep. 5, 2.
[160] αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι Diog. L. vii 117.
[161] ‘[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis’ Sen. Dial. vii 5, 1; ‘erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus’ ib. ii 9, 3.
[162] Epict. Disc. ii 8, 29.
[163] ib. iii 13, 11 to 13.
CHAPTER XV.
COUNSELS OF PERFECTION.
Precepts.
395. We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, both in its high philosophic framework and in its more detailed treatment, in which it prescribes what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the soul is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It remains for us to study the application of the system to individual cases, a matter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy as understood at the present day, but is an essential part of the work of churches and social organizations. This department of philosophy was termed by the ancients ‘precepts,’ or (more fully) ‘advice, dissuasion, admonition, exhortation, consolation, warnings, praise, reproof’ and so forth[1]; by some philosophers, as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in contempt, by others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone worthy of pursuit[2]. But the steady conviction of the main body of Stoic teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand[3]; that moral principles have no strength apart from their daily application[4], and that practical suggestions apart from a sound and reasoned system are like leaves cut from the bough, without lasting greenness[5]. Since precepts apply directly to individual persons and particular circumstances, they presuppose some relationship between teacher and hearer[6]; the latter must be either a convert to the school or one who has grown up under its influence. In the Roman period the department of precepts is of increasing importance; we have something to learn from Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material in the lectures (διατριβαί, ‘diatribes’) and letters of Musonius, Seneca, Epictetus and other teachers of the period of the principate.
Training of the young.
396. The ‘precepts’ which we find illustrated by our various authorities are not easily systematized, but they have all the more the charm of personal intimacy; through them we are admitted to the home life of the Stoics. As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic fathers, Stoic teachers, Stoic jurists, address those who came within their influence. Believing every man to have the seed of virtue in him, they had confidence that by their words it would often be stirred to life[7]; and that in other cases, in which the promising shoot had become overshadowed by ignorance or evil habits, it would by the same means begin to grow again[8]. But the full benefits of precepts could only be seen where they fell on well-prepared ground, and formed part of a training extending from infancy to the grave; where the instructor could daily ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This opportunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the young; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted to one period of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a ‘Theory of Education.’ It was under all circumstances guided by the rule of ‘little by little.’ Precepts must be few[9], and must be in themselves easy for the individual to carry out[10]; but by steady practice great things will be accomplished.
The teacher’s example.
397. Since the value of precepts depends on the personal influence of the instructor, it is clear that his example will be of the greatest importance, and we may first ask what the discipline is to which he himself submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advantage, for he lives in the sight of all men; and the Indian, who allows himself to be scorched or burnt to show his contempt for pain, makes a still more forcible appeal[11]. The Stoic does not parade himself in this fashion, but neither does he lock the door of his private life against any who wish to examine it[12]. In the early morning he shakes off sleep, rousing himself to do the day’s work of a man[13]. Having clothed himself, he turns his mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises; he resolves during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to bear cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him[14]. He will then give a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his health[15]; after which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter or summer, a plunge into the cold bath[16]; next comes the slightest of meals[17]; then a short nap or reverie[18]. From this he is aroused by the stir around him, and he then applies himself to the day’s studies, being careful to alternate reading and writing, so that his mind may be neither exhausted by the latter nor relaxed by the former[19]. Later on he will consider his practical duties towards his relatives, his friends, and society in general. He will order his household and settle the disputes of his dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and there in season[20], but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry[21]. He will encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and sharply warn those who are in danger of a fall[22]. He advises a young mother to nurse her child at her own breast; and when he meets with objections, points out the wisdom and propriety of obeying the prescriptions of nature[23]. Returning home, he will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining perhaps in a game of ball; his thoughts however will not always turn on success in the game, but he will consider how many principles in physics and ethics may be illustrated by it[24]. Now that evening comes on, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in the company of one or two favourite pupils[25]. Afterwards comes the temptation to burn the midnight oil in gathering seeds of wisdom for the morrow from the well-thumbed manuscript of Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus[26]. Retiring to his chamber, he will examine his conscience, review the events of the past day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps[27].
The child’s life.
398. With the training of children the Stoic teacher is perhaps not altogether familiar, but he knows its importance[28]; it must be based on simplicity and austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury are most dangerous stimulants to the passions[29]. The child must learn to eat and drink in a mannerly way[30], to refrain from loud talking and laughing[31], to express himself in respectful and graceful words[32]. He must be taught to do right before he can understand the reason why[33], or else by doing wrong he will make it difficult for himself afterwards to do right; he must be ruled until he can rule himself[34]. For this reason we give children proverbs (sententiae) or anecdotes (χρεῖαι) to write out and learn, such as ‘honesty is the best policy’ or ‘Socrates being asked of what city he was ...’; and these short pithy sayings sink deep[35]. But in the school life of children no attempt must be made to grapple with the real problems of life, because these are too hard for them, though parents often forget this objection[36]. Games and amusements may be permitted; for though in discussions on high principle the Stoics may be entirely opposed to ‘relaxation of soul[37],’ yet in practical life they freely admit its importance[38]. All dealings with children should be gentle; the discipline of the rod has long ago been abandoned by all sensible parents and teachers[39].
Harm of soft living.
399. Soft living is at all ages to be avoided[40]. It is in these days a danger to the bodily health; for when a man is accustomed to be protected from a draught by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm by foot-warmers constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even temperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him in danger of his life[41]. Those who envy men who ‘live softly’ forget that their character becomes soft thereby[42]. In particular clothing should not be such as altogether to protect the body from heat in summer, and from cold in winter. It is better to wear one shirt than two, best still to have only a coat. Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go without shoes; for after all to be shod is not very different from being fettered, and runners do not use shoes[43]. So also avoid luxurious furniture; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be made of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold? We eat, drink, and sleep better without these things. In all these matters the Spartans set us a good example; for while disease injures the body only, luxury corrupts both body and soul[44].
Training of girls.
400. Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature teaches us, for we train colts and puppies without any regard for the difference of sex. The true education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and these are the same for men and for women. Women need Wisdom to understand the ordering of a household, Justice to control the servants, Soberness that they may be modest and unselfish. But they also need Courage; in spite of the name ‘manliness’ (ἀνδρεία), this is not a virtue reserved for men. Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts. Females of all kinds fight to defend their young; the Amazons too were good fighters, and it is only for want of practice that women cannot do the same to-day. That men, being the stronger, should do the heavier work, and women the lighter, is an arrangement which is often convenient, but circumstances may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn equally with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low spirits about anything that happens; to avoid grasping habits, to love equality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or woman[45].
Obedience to parents.
401. Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of reason. We do not obey a father who gives orders for the treatment of a sick person contrary to those of the physician; nor one, who being himself ill, demands things that are not good for him; nor one who bids his son steal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful bloom. We do not even obey him when he tells us to spell a word wrongly or strike a false note on the lyre. If your father forbids you to philosophize, show him by your manner of life, by prompt obedience, by good temper, by unselfishness, how good a thing philosophy is. But after all, the command of the universal Father is more urgent upon you; which is, to be just, kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled; above labours and above pleasures; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not assume the outward appearance of a philosopher; for the power of philosophy is in the innermost part of the soul, which the father can no more reach than the tyrant[46].
Example of gladiators and soldiers.
402. The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the vision of virtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; they are like soft cheese which slips away from the hook by which it is taken up[47]. We must therefore put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in which the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent to the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, and the soldier[48]. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try again after each fall[49]; the trained boxer is eager to challenge the most formidable opponent[50]. The gladiator has learnt the lesson that pain is no evil, when he stands up wounded before a sympathetic crowd and makes a sign that it matters nothing[51]. But most of all the soldier’s oath serves as an example, when he pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully all his life: let the young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God as faithfully, to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to obey willingly the command to act or to suffer[52]. Without effort, as Hesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained[53].
The ‘contrary twist.’
403. In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength before they can be rooted out, and it will be well to anticipate this evil by exercising body and soul in advance in a direction contrary to that of the most common temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his precepts an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to bring about a proper standard in practice[54]. Thus since luxury is a chief enemy of virtue, the body should at least occasionally be brought low. A practice approved by the example of eminent men is to mark out from time to time a few days for the exercise of the simple life; during this time life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough dress and all the surroundings of poverty[55]. Since Cynism is a ‘short cut to virtue[56],’ philosophers may well employ the methods of Diogenes for short periods, as a corrective to any tendency to excess; rich people do as much for love of change[57].
Personal appearance.
404. On the question of personal appearance there is much to be said on both sides. Foppishness is a disagreeable vice, and it is contemptible that a young man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total disregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics; ‘it is against nature’ says Seneca ‘to be averse to neatness in appearance[58].’ In these outward matters a sensible man will conform to fashion, nor will he wish to make the name of philosopher still more unpopular than it is[59]. The founders of Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the same dress; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural distinction of the sexes; and to men the beard should be an object of just pride, for it is more becoming than the cock’s comb, or the lion’s mane[60]. This is to the Stoic a point of honour; he should part with his head more readily than with his beard[61]. But the beard may be trimmed; for, as Zeno has observed, nature provides rather against the ‘too little’ than against the ‘too much,’ and reason must come to her help. Women do right to arrange their hair so as to make themselves more beautiful; but for men any kind of artistic hair-dressing is contemptible[62].
Solitude and society.
405. The young should train themselves alternately to bear solitude and to profit by society[63]: since the wise man is never dependent on his friends, though none can take better advantage of them[64]. In living alone a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know his own heart[65]. But solitude must not be a screen for secret vices; a man only uses it rightly when he can without shame picture the whole world watching his hours of privacy[66]. The right choice of friends calls for true wisdom; for the soul cannot but be soiled by bad company[67]. The only true friendship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk[68]; therefore the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are unacquainted[69]. It is well to consider much before choosing a friend, but afterwards to give him implicit trust[70]; for a true friend is a second self[71]. Such friendship can only arise from the desire to love and be loved[72]; those who seek friends for their own advantage, will be abandoned by them in the day of trial[73]. In the companionship of well-chosen friends there grows up the ‘common sense,’ which is an instinctive contact with humanity as a whole, making each man a partner in the thoughts and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal aim of philosophy[74]. But the young philosopher should make no enemies; he should be free from that dislike of others which so often causes a man to be disliked, and should remember that he who is an enemy to-day may be a friend to-morrow[75].
Comradeship in marriage.
406. As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he will turn his mind towards marriage as a political and social duty[76]; but if he is really touched by the divine flame, he will also find in it that enlargement of his own sympathies and opportunities of which the wise man is always glad[77]. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid development of personal sympathy between husband and wife; and though in society girls who attended philosophers’ classes had an ill name as being self-willed and disputatious[78], yet it is from this very circle that the ideal of a perfect harmony of mind and purpose was developed most fully. Musonius often speaks on this subject:
‘Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn together, and to have all things in common, soul, body and property. Unlike the lower animals, which mate at random, man cannot be content without perfect community of thought and mutual affection. Marriage is for health and for sickness alike, and each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not seeking his own advantage, but that of his partner[79].’
‘A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable of hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But the soul is far more important; for as a crooked stick cannot be fitted with one that is straight, so there can be no true agreement except between the good[80].’
Seneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to doubt that his life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic marriages. Thus he excuses himself for taking more thought for his health than a philosopher should, by saying that the happiness of Paulina depends upon it. ‘Her life is wrapped up in mine, for its sake I must take care of my own. What can be more delightful than to be so dear to one’s wife, that for her sake one becomes dearer to himself[81]!’
Celibacy.
407. On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a contrary note, characteristic of his time, and of his bias towards Cynic practice:
‘In the present state of things, which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God? To say nothing of other things, a father must have a heating apparatus for bathing the baby; wool for his wife when she is delivered, oil, a bed, a cup; and so the furniture of the house is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to the public interests,
“The people’s guardian and so full of cares[82]”
whose duty it is to look after others; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his family well, and who does not? Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him[83]!’
To this very definite conception of a celibate order of philosophers, devoting themselves to the good of humanity and entitled thereby to become the rulers of society, Musonius makes the following reply in advance from the true Stoic standpoint:
‘Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates; and who were better philosophers than they? Since marriage is natural, philosophers should set the example of it. Why else did the Creator separate the human race into two divisions, making the honourable parts of the body distinct for each, and implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished them to live together and to propagate the race? He who would destroy marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No relationship is so essential or so intimate; friend does not agree so well with friend, nor does a father feel so keenly separation from his son. And why should a philosopher be different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a hindrance to a philosopher; but by doing his daily duty as a man he will become kindlier in disposition and more social in his thoughts[84].’
Means of livelihood.
408. The head of a household must have a means of living; and therefore the making of money (χρηματισμός, cura rei familiaris) comes within the range of precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means of livelihood; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a king’s minister or general; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting as a magistrate or a judge; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by teaching philosophy to those who are wishing to learn[85]. To each profession there are obvious objections; indeed the sharp critic of Stoicism can see no reason why a wise man, who lacks nothing, should trouble himself about money-making. Each of the three professions named assumes the existence of men willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not easily found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees should be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more reasonable that a student should only pay if he profits by his teaching; but on the other hand no one can absolutely promise to make a man good in a year, and deferred payments are often found unsatisfactory[86]. Under the Roman principate we hear little of the professions connected with public life; but it is clear that the teacher and the physician are held in special regard[87]. Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or the sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer[88]. Yet Chrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said that ‘the wise man will turn three somersaults for a sufficient fee[89]’; and no rule can be laid down except that a man should earn his own living without injuring his neighbour[90]. Agriculture, as a calling favourable both to health of body and to innocence of soul, continued to be praised, but was seldom practised except as an amusement[91].
Kingly duties.
409. For every profession philosophy has appropriate precepts, beginning with the king. There came one day to Musonius a king of Syria, for in those times there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius addressed him thus:
‘You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to protect and benefit your fellow-men; to do that, you must know what is good and what is evil. A king too must understand Justice; for wars and revolts come about because men quarrel about their rights. Also he must show Soberness and Courage, that he may be an example to his subjects[92]. The ancients thought that a king should be a living law (νόμος ἔμψυχος), and an imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.’
The king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any boon he would. ‘Abide by my words,’ said Musonius, ‘that will be the best boon both for me and for you[93].’
Two precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The first, that they should encourage friends who will speak the truth to them. Even Augustus Caesar needed this lesson; bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa and Maecenas, he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they lived[94]. The second, that they should practise clemency, following the example of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence upon which he might have punished his enemies[95]. None does this virtue better become than kings and rulers[96].
Court life.
410. To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to move in the society of the great and the powerful. Epictetus gives us a striking description of the man who desires to be on the list of the ‘Caesaris amici,’ which he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is not such.
‘Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? “Come forward and tell us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend?” Immediately you hear the answer, “Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me; you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth; then come troubles and cares.” “Well, and did you sup with more pleasure, now or before?” Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do anything foolish. As befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar[97].’
It is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough training in philosophy is of really practical value.
‘When you are going in to any great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than that other. He then who sees from above asks you: “In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace?” “That they are things indifferent.” “And the end of life, what is it?” “To follow thee.” “Do you say this now also?” “I do.” Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things: and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things, when he is among men who have not studied them. I imagine that you will have such thoughts as these; “Why do we make such great and so many preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which is named power? All this is nothing[98].”’
Yet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the powerful; he will turn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm[99]. The virtuous affection of caution must be called in to help him, so many are his dangers. An independence of look, a slight raising of the voice, an outspoken expression, an appeal to public opinion, even unsought popularity are enough to excite suspicion[100]. Perhaps after all the poet may be the wisest, who advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it is a place where there is no room for them[101].
Life in the city.
411. A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of city life. Here fashion dictates a round of occupations which are unnatural, but in which men and women are alike absorbed[102]. Half of the morning is absorbed in sleep[103]; then follows the visit to the public shows, which are centres of demoralisation[104], and conversation with numerous friends, each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle[105]. In the clubs all the most worthless members of society foregather[106]. The baths, which were at one time simply constructed, and for the purpose of cleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; and the water is now so hot as to be better fitted for torture than pleasure[107]. For the evening meal there must always be some novelty discovered, even if it is only to begin with the dessert and end with the eggs[108]; even the order of the seasons must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter[109]. Upon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy headache the next morning[110]. From the temptations of such a life the adherent of Stoicism will gladly escape.
Life in the country.
412. A more real happiness is reserved for the man who gives up town life for that of the country. For it is most natural to win sustenance from the earth, which is our common mother, and liberally gives back many times over what is entrusted to her; and it is more healthy to live in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It matters little whether one works on one’s own land or on that of another; for many industrious men have prospered on hired land. There is nothing disgraceful or unbecoming in any of the work of the farm; to plant trees, to reap, to tend the vine, to thrash out the corn, are all liberal occupations. Hesiod the poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him from telling the story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius) perhaps the best of all occupations; for even farm work, if it is exhausting, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body, whereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philosophizing also.
It is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and too refined to live a country life; but philosophy would be well rid of these weaklings. A true lover of philosophy could find no better discipline than to live with some wise and kindly man in the country, associating with him in work and in relaxation, at meals and in sleeping, and so ‘learning goodness,’ as Theognis tells us to do, ‘from the good[111].’
The householder.
413. Within the household the head of it is a little king, and needs to display the kingly virtues of Justice and Soberness. In his dealings with the perverse he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing the truth[112]. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small virtue; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as far as possible to correct his own ways[113]. Punishment must be reserved for extreme cases, and is always to be administered with calmness; it is felt more keenly when it comes from a merciful master[114]. Persistent kindness wins over even bad men[115]. It is further the privilege of the head of a household to distribute kindnesses to those below him. His wealth he must regard as given him in trust; he is only the steward of it, and must neither hoard nor waste; for he must give both a debit and a credit account of all[116]. But if the right use of money causes the possessor anxious thought, no trace of this should appear to others; giving should be without hesitation, and as a delight[117]. The good citizen will pay his taxes with special pleasure, because in his eyes the welfare of the community stands higher than his own or that of his family[118]; but he will not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is in need[119]; and in giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by his manner that he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his fellow-man[120]. In short, he will give as he would like to receive[121], and with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share with another[122].
Treatment of slaves.
414. The good householder will associate on easy terms with his slaves, remembering that they too are men, made of flesh and blood as he is himself[123]. It is however a difficult matter to decide whether a master should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find this a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in its favour[124]. We do not need to inquire into a man’s social position, if his character is attractive[125]. Plato has well said that we cannot find a king who is not descended from a slave, or a slave who is not descended from a king[126]; and in fact many a Roman slave was far better educated than his master[127]. Even if we do not suppose that Seneca’s rule was commonly practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws a pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the master was thus called upon to ignore differences of social position, as much might be expected of the slave. With him it was doubtless an instinct to prize liberty, ‘the power of living as you like,’ as the dearest of possessions. Yet many a slave who won this reward by years of faithful service found that liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in the home where he was valued[128].
Large families.
415. A question of pressing practical importance is that of large families (πολυπαιδία). Statesmen have always considered it best that the homes of citizens should be crowded with children; and for this reason the laws forbid abortion and the hindrance of conception; they demand fines for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large families. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of many children is honoured as he goes about the city, and how charming is the sight of a mother surrounded by a swarm of children[129]! No religious procession is so imposing. For such parents every one feels sympathy, and every one is prepared to cooperate with them[130]. But nowadays even rich parents refuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be the richer. But it is better to have many brothers than few; and a brother is a richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune attracts enemies, but a brother helps to repel them[131].
Comfort in poverty.
416. We have now accompanied the man of mature years in his duties and his temptations: philosophy has also a word to speak with regard to his trials. It is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets of fortune are no real evils; but this doctrine can be supplemented by other consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement by the death of friends and children, we have already spoken; we may now consider two other conditions usually held to be evil, namely poverty and exile. In poverty the first comfort is in the observation that poor men are usually stronger in body than the rich[132], and quite as cheerful in mind[133]. Further the poor are free from many dangers which beset the rich; they can travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the road[134]. Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes to philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor[135]. A poor man is not troubled by insincere friends[136]. In short, poverty is only hard for him who kicks against the pricks[137].
Comfort in exile.
417. The subject of exile has the special interest that in fact so many philosophers endured this evil. To the Stoic there is in principle no such thing as exile, since the whole world is his country; but he does not for this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero was plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but also when he was away from Rome in an honourable position; Seneca at least made the attempt to bear exile more bravely. Is it then so hard to be away from one’s native place? Rome is crowded with strangers, who have come thither for pleasure or profit, study or novelty[138]. True, it is a beautiful town; but there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly, not even this Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men choose it to reside in as a matter of taste[139]. Whole peoples have changed their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of barbarism, and the Macedonian language in India[140]; wherever he conquers the Roman dwells[141]. The exile has everywhere the company of the same stars above[142], of the same conscience within him[143]; even if he is separated from those near and dear to him, it is not for the first time, and he can still live with them in his thoughts and affections.
Old age.
418. Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, wherever a man stands in the order of society, old age comes at last and imperiously stops all ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time of sadness[144]; to associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only because it is paradoxical[145]. Cicero’s work de Senectute shows how old age became attractive according to Roman tradition; Seneca is hardly so successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to effort dies away in old age[146]; but though philosophy forbids idleness, nature cries out for rest. We cannot then approve when old men follow their professional occupations with undiminished zeal[147], and we must highly blame those who cannot quit their pleasures[148]. The great boon which old age brings is leisure; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have longed in vain[149]. This leisure gives the opportunity of making acquaintance with great men through their books, but better still, that of making acquaintance with our own selves.
Musonius’ ‘viaticum.’
419. ‘Give me,’ said one to Musonius, ‘a viaticum for old age.’ He replied as follows:
‘The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and according to nature[150]. Do not grieve because you are cut off from the pleasures of youth; for man is no more born for pleasure than any other animal: indeed man alone is an image of the deity[151], and has like excellences. And do not consider the divine excellences as beyond your reach; for we have no other notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing good men, whom therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has acquired in youth sound principles and systematic training will not be found to complain in old age of the loss of pleasures, of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by friends and acquaintance; he will carry about with him a charm against all these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not been rightly educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser than himself, and listen to his teaching and profit by it. And specially he will ponder over death, how it comes in nature’s course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such thoughts he will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life. But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age; that it does not bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a crowd of rich old men, who are in bad temper and low spirits, and feel deeply aggrieved[152].’
Will-making.
420. When we see death before us there remains a last act to be performed. We look at the wealth which no longer belongs to us, and consider to whom it can most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the position of a judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom and good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around us[153].
Death.
421. For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation; yet when it is no longer a matter of uncertain fear, but close at hand and sure, some last words are to be said. All this is in the course of nature, is according to the will of the Creator.
‘God opens the door and says to you, “Go.” “Go whither?” To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements[154]. What there was in you of fire goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, but all is full of gods and demons[155]. God has invited you; be content when he calls others to the feast in your place.’
The philosopher does not look forward to renewing his personal life, or to meeting again with parent, wife, or child. But death is a release from all his pains and troubles; and he who has striven to live his life well will know how to meet death also at its due time[156]. If it come to him in the shipwreck, he will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena, he will not shrink from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last short crisis he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal lot[157].