FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘omnia ista [monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes, obiurgationes, laudationes] monitionum genera sunt’ Sen. Ep. 94, 39.
[2] ‘eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta ... quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat’ ib. 94, 1 and 2. The Cynics gave exhortations, but without having a system for the purpose. See above, § [52].
[3] ‘Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat’ ib. 95, 65. Cf. Cic. Off. i 3, 7; Sen. Ep. 94, 34.
[4] ‘ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione, ad quam praecepta perducunt’ ib.
[5] ‘quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant; sic ista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae’ Sen. Ep. 95, 59.
[6] See below, § [397], note 21.
[7] Sen. Ep. 94, 29 and 108, 8.
[8] ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et situ, modo officii inscitia’ Ben. v 25, 6.
[9] ‘plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum’ Ben. vii 1, 3; ‘We ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater’ Epict. Disc. i 18, 18.
[10] ‘debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est opprimant onera, quae ferente maiora sunt’ Sen. Dial. ix 6, 4.
[11] Arnim i 241.
[12] ‘sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus’ Sen. Ep. 83, 1.
[13] ‘In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the thought “I am rising for man’s work. Why make a grievance of setting about that for which I was born, and for sake of which I have been brought into the world? Is the end of my existence to lie snug in the blankets and keep warm?”’ M. Aurel. To himself v 1.
[14] ‘I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising his acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him; and while I lived it was my duty to praise God’ Epict. Disc. iii 26, 29 and 30. See also above, § [258].
[15] ‘minimum exercitationi corporis datum’ Sen. Ep. 83, 3.
[16] ‘ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi’ ib. 5.
[17] ‘panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium’ ib. 6.
[18] ‘brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare desiisse. aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor’ ib.
[19] ‘nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus; altera res contristabit, vires exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet’ Sen. Ep. 84, 2.
[20] ‘nulli enim nisi audituro dicendum est’ ib. 29, 1.
[21] ‘[Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios monuerunt. hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum’ ib. 29, 1 and 3.
[22] ‘audebo illi mala sua ostendere’ ib. 4.
[23] A. Gellius, N. A. xii 1. Favorinus, of whom this is related, was not himself a Stoic.
[24] Sen. Ben. ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, 1 to 4.
[25] See above, § [125], note 90.
[26] ‘at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures | fruge Cleanthea’ Pers. Sat. v 62-64; ‘quid est tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas?’ Sen. Ep. 8, 8.
[27] ‘qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam tranquillus, quam altus ac liber!’ Dial. v 36, 2.
[28] ‘plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui’ ib. iv 21, 1.
[29] ‘tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis’ ib. 11; ‘nihil magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda’ ib. 6.
[30] ‘if he ... eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly progresses’ Epict. Disc. i 4, 20 and 21.
[31] ‘veritatis simplex oratio est’ Sen. Ep. 49, 12; ‘Let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few words. Let not your laughter be much’ Epict. Manual 33, 2 and 4.
[32] ‘loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa adicienda—pluris quam putas obligasti’ Sen. Ben. ii 24, 4.
[33] ‘inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire—hoc vitabis, hoc facies’ Ep. 94, 50.
[34] ‘regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere’ ib. 51.
[35] ‘facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa. ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant’ ib. 33, 6 and 7.
[36] ‘He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things; and we ought to use this fact as an argument to parents’ Epict. Disc. i 26, 4 and 5.
[38] ‘lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et temperat’ Sen. Dial. iv 20, 3; ‘danda est animis remissio’ ib. ix 17, 5; ‘mens ad iocos devocanda est’ ib. 4.
[39] Chrysippus had approved of the rod: ‘caedi discentis, quamlibet receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim’ Quint. Inst. Or. i 3, 14. But Seneca writes quite otherwise: ‘uter praeceptor dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit ... an qui monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?’ Clem. i 16, 2 and 3.
[40] ‘fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem’ Sen. Dial. i 4, 9.
[41] ‘quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter fomenta subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet’ ib.
[42] ‘audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus invidetur—molliter vivit hoc dicunt—mollis est’ Ep. 82, 2.
[43] Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius).
[44] ib. 29, 75.
[45] Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123.
[46] Muson. ib. iv 79, 25.
[47] ‘It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold soft cheese with a hook’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 9.
[49] ‘See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they say, wrestle again till you are made strong’ Epict. Disc. iv 9, 15.
[50] ‘[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere’ Sen. Dial. i 2, 3.
[51] ‘[gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat nihil esse et intercedi non patitur’ ib. ii 16, 2.
[52] ‘ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia’ ib. vii 15, 7; Epict. Disc. i 14, 15 and 16.
[53] See above, § [33]; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood: ‘nil sine magno | vita labore dedit mortalibus’ Sat. i 9, 59 and 60.
[54] ‘quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant’ Sen. Ben. vii 22, 1; ‘We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure; I will incline to the contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise’ Epict. Disc. iii 12, 6 and 7.
[55] ‘interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo cibo, dura atque horrida veste, dicas tibi “hoc est quod timebatur?” ... grabatus ille verus sit et sagum et panis durus ac sordidus—hoc triduo ac quatriduo fer’ Sen. Ep. 18, 5 and 7; ‘quod tibi scripsi magnos viros saepe fecisse’ ib. 20, 13.
[56] Diog. L. vii 121.
[57] ‘divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro argentoque fictilibus utantur’ Sen. Dial. xii 12, 3.
[58] ‘contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. Ep. 5, 4; ‘I would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed’ Epict. Disc. iv 11, 25.
[59] ‘asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita. intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat’ Sen. Ep. 5, 2.
[60] ‘We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.... How much more becoming is the beard than the cock’s comb and the lion’s mane! For this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given’ Epict. Disc. i 16, 13 and 14.
[61] ‘Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.’ If I am a philosopher, I answer, ‘I will not shave myself.’ ‘But I will take off your head.’ ‘If that will do you any good, take it off’ Epict. Disc. i 2, 29.
[62] Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius).
[63] ‘miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac frequentia’ Sen. Dial. ix 17, 3.
[64] ‘ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit’ Ep. 9, 5.
[65] ‘proderit per se ipsum secedere; meliores erimus singuli’ Dial. viii 1, 1; ‘A man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For Zeus dwells by himself and is tranquil by himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 13, 6 and 7.
[66] ‘tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico; parietes plerumque circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed ut peccemus occultius’ Sen. Ep. 43, 3.
[67] ‘It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 16, 3.
[68] Diog. L. vii 124.
[69] ‘Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos; nihil est enim virtute amabilius’ Cic. N. D. i 44, 121; so Stob. ii 7 11 i.
[70] ‘post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum’ Sen. Ep. 3, 2.
[71] Ζήνων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος “ἄλλος ἐγώ” ἔφη Diog. L. vii 23.
[72] ‘Hecaton ait; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium: si vis amari, ama’ Sen. Ep. 9, 6; ‘multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt’ ib. 6, 3.
[73] ib. 9, 8.
[74] ‘hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem’ ib. 5, 4; ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ ib. 6, 4.
[75] ‘monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum’ ib. 95, 63.
[77] ‘[sapiens] ducit uxorem se contentus, et liberos tollit se contentus’ Sen. Ep. 9, 17; ‘If indeed you had [this purpose], you would be content in sickness, in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true’ Epict. Disc. iii 5, 18 and 19.
[78] ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126.
[79] Stob. iv 22, 90.
[80] Stob. iv 22, 104.
[81] ‘nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?’ Sen. Ep. 104, 2 and 5.
[82] Hom. Il. ii 25.
[83] Epict. Disc. iii 22, 69 to 75.
[84] Stob. iv 22, 20.
[85] Stob. ii 7, 11 m.
[86] Plut. Sto. rep. 20, 10.
[87] ‘omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas, magna reverentia est’ Sen. Ben. vi 15, 1; ‘ex medico ac praeceptore in amicum transeunt’ ib. 16, 1.
[88] Ep. 88, 18 and 22.
[89] Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 3.
[90] ‘sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est; alteri deripere ius non est’ Cic. Off. iii 10, 42.
[92] So too Epictetus: ‘To whose example should [the many] look except yours [the governors’]?’ Disc. iii 4, 3.
[93] Stob. iv 7, 67.
[94] Sen. Ben. vi 32, 4.
[95] Dial. iv 23, 4.
[96] ‘nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet’ Clem. i 3, 3.
[97] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 46 to 50.
[98] ib. i 30, 1 to 7.
[99] ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. Ep. 14, 7.
[100] Dial. iii 18, 2.
[101] ‘exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non coëunt: semper metuet, quem saeva pudebunt’ Lucan Phars. viii 493 to 495.
[102] Sen. Ep. 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21.
[103] ‘turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die incipit’ ib. 122, 1.
[104] ‘nihil tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo desidere’ ib. 7, 2.
[105] ‘inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit’ ib.
[106] ‘vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit]’ Dial. i 5, 4.
[107] Ep. 86, 9 and 10.
[108] ib. 114, 9.
[109] ib. 122, 8.
[110] ‘oculos hesterna graves crapula’ ib. 122, 2.
[111] Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country life: ‘non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nec frugalitatem docent rura; sed ubi testis et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt, quorum monstrari et conspici fructus est’ Ep. 94, 69.
[112] ‘de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur veri patiens sit’ Dial. v 36, 4.
[113] ‘moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est; flectendus est paucis animus, sui rector optimus’ Ben. v 25, 4.
[114] ‘gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur’ Clem. i 22, 3.
[115] ‘vincit malos pertinax bonitas’ Ben. vii 31, 1.
[116] ‘quid tanquam tuo parcis? procurator es, in depositi causa [divitiae] sunt’ Ben. vi 3, 2; ‘donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos eligens, ut qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse reddendam’ ib. 23, 5.
[117] ‘demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione’ Ben. ii 1, 1.
[118] Cic. Off. i 17, 57.
[119] ‘non desinemus opem ferre etiam inimicis’ Sen. Dial. viii 1, 4.
[120] ‘[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars maior horum qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos adiuvat contingique ab his timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit’ Clem. ii 6, 2.
[121] ‘sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere’ Ben. ii 1, 1.
[122] ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ Ep. 6, 4.
[123] ‘servi sunt? immo homines. servi sunt? immo humiles amici’ ib. 47, 1; ‘animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat paribusque elementis’ Juv. Sat. xiv 16 and 17.
[124] ‘cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem decet. rideo istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare’ Sen. Ep. 47, 1 and 2.
[125] ‘refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status’ Ben. iii 18, 2.
[126] Ep. 44, 4.
[127] ‘[Calvisius Sabinus] magna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum teneret, unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit. magno emisse illum non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos locavit’ Ep. 27, 6.
[128] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 33 to 40.
[129] But hear Epictetus on the other side: ‘Are those men greater benefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons contribute more to the community than Homer?’ Disc. iii 22, 77 and 78.
[130] Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius).
[131] ib. 27, 21.
[133] ‘compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus; saepius pauper et fidelius ridet’ Sen. Ep. 80, 6.
[134] ‘etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est’ ib. 14, 9.
[135] ‘si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis’ ib. 17, 5.
[136] ‘[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis non te, sed aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum amanda paupertas quod, a quibus ameris, ostendet’ ib. 20, 7.
[137] ‘paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti’ ib. 123, 16.
[138] Dial. xii 6, 2.
[139] ‘usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hic quoque locus a patria quosdam abduxerit’ ib. 5.
[140] ib. 7, 1.
[141] ‘ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat’ ib. 7, 7.
[142] ib. 8, 6.
[143] ‘licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre’ ib. 8, 1.
[144] ‘subeunt morbi tristisque senectus’ Verg. G. iii 67 quoted by Sen. Ep. 108, 29.
[145] ‘plena est voluptatis [senectus], si illa scias uti’ Sen. Ep. 12, 4.
[146] ‘nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123; ‘iuvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere’ Sen. Ep. 108, 27.
[147] ‘adeone iuvat occupatum mori?’ Sen. Dial. x 20, 3. He instances an old gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post at that age; but when the time came, he threw his whole household into mourning until he got his work back again.
[148] ‘luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123.
[149] Sen. Dial. x 4, 1 and 2.
[150] τὸ ζῆν ὁδῷ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.
[151] ἄνθρωπος μίμημα θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων (see on hymn of Cleanthes, l. 5, in § [97]).
[152] Stob. Flor. 117, 8 (M).
[153] ‘ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum iudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus; nec quicquam cura sanctiore componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet’ Sen. Ben. iv 11, 5.
[154] ‘reverti unde veneris quid grave est?’ Dial. ix 11, 4.
[155] Epict. Disc. iii 13, 14 and 15; ib. iv 1, 106.
[156] ‘male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori’ Sen. Dial. ix 11, 4; and see above, §§ [298], [299].
[157] ‘quod tam cito fit, timetis diu?’ Sen. Dial. i 6, 9; ‘puto fortiorem eum esse, qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem. mors enim admota etiam imperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia; sic gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et errantem gladium sibi adtemperat’ Ep. 30, 8; ‘the ship is sinking! what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish; for I am not an immortal being’ Epict. Disc. ii 5, 11 to 13.
CHAPTER XVI.
STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE.
Spread of Stoicism.
422. Although up to this point it has been our main purpose to set forth the doctrines of Stoicism, we have seen incidentally that these came to exercise a wide influence in Roman society, and that the later teachers are far less occupied in the attainment of truth than in the right guidance of disciples who lean upon them. In the present chapter we propose to describe more particularly the practical influence of Stoicism. Our information, whether drawn from history or from poetry, refers generally to the upper classes of Roman society; as to the influence of the sect amongst the poor we have no sufficient record. But although it is very generally held that the Stoics made no effort to reach the working classes of Rome, or met with no success in that direction[1], the evidence points rather to an opposite conclusion, at any rate as regards all that development of the system which was coloured by Cynism, the philosophy of the poor[2]. Our actual records are therefore rather of the nature of side-lights upon the system; the main stream of Stoic influence may well have flowed in courses with which we are imperfectly acquainted, and its workings may perhaps come to light first in a period of history which lies beyond our immediate scope.
Conversion direct and indirect.
423. Individual Romans who professed themselves disciples of the Porch owed their allegiance to the sect to two causes, in varying proportion. On the one hand they had attended lectures or private instruction given by eminent Stoic teachers, or had immersed themselves in Stoic literature. This influence was in almost all cases the influence of Greek upon Roman, and the friendship between the Stoic Panaetius and Scipio Aemilianus was the type of all subsequent discipleship. Scipio himself did not perhaps formally become a Stoic, but he introduced into Roman society the atmosphere of Stoicism, known to the Romans as humanitas; this included an aversion to war and civil strife, an eagerness to appreciate the art and literature of Greece, and an admiration for the ideals depicted by Xenophon, of the ruler in Cyrus, and of the citizen in Socrates[3]. All the Stoic nobles of the time of the republic are dominated by these feelings. On the other hand individuals were often attracted by the existence of a society which proclaimed itself independent of the will of rulers, and offered its members mutual support and consolation. Such men were often drawn into Stoicism by the persuasion of friends, without being necessarily well-grounded in philosophical principle; and in this way small groups or cliques might easily be formed in which social prejudice or political bias outweighed the formal doctrine of the school. Such a group was that of the ‘old Romans’ of the first century of the principate; and with the spread of Stoicism this indirect and imperfect method of attachment constantly grows in importance as compared with direct discipleship.
The Scipionic circle.
424. Of the first group of Roman Stoics the most notable was C. Laelius, the intimate friend of Scipio, who became consul in 140 B.C. In his youth he had listened to the teaching of Diogenes of Babylon, in later life he was the friend of Panaetius[4]. He was in his time a notable orator with a quiet flowing style[5]; his manners were cheerful[6], his temper was calm[7]; and, as we have seen[8], he seemed to many the nearest of all the Romans to the ideal of the Stoic sage. He is brought on as the chief speaker in Cicero’s de Amicitia. Another close friend of Africanus was Sp. Mummius, the brother of the conqueror of Achaia; his oratory was marked by the ruggedness characteristic of the Stoic school[9]. Passing mention may be made of L. Furius Philus, consul in 136 B.C., and a member of the same group, though his philosophical views are not known to us[10].
The Gracchan period.
425. From the ‘humane’ movement sprang the Gracchan reforms, which all alike aimed at deposing from power the class to which the reformers by birth belonged. To the temper of mind which made such a desire possible Stoic doctrine had largely contributed. The Greeks had taught their Roman pupils to see in the nascent Roman empire, bearing the watchword of the ‘majesty of the Roman name’ (maiestas nominis Romani), at least an approximation to the ideal Cosmopolis: and many Romans so far responded to this suggestion as to be not unfriendly towards plans for extending their citizenship and equalizing the privileges of those who enjoyed it. C. Blossius of Cumae, a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus, went so far as to instigate Tiberius Gracchus to the schemes which proved his destruction[11]; whilst other Stoics, equally sincere in their aims, disagreed with the violence shown by Tiberius in his choice of method. Amongst the latter was Q. Aelius Tubero, a nephew of Africanus[12], who became consul in 118 B.C. He devoted himself day and night to the study of philosophy[13], and though of no mark as an orator, won himself respect by the strictness and consistency of his life[14]. Panaetius, Posidonius, and Hecato all addressed treatises to him[15]; and he is a leading speaker in Cicero’s Republic.
Laelius to Lucilius.
426. After the fall of the Gracchi the Stoic nobles continued to play distinguished and honourable parts in public life. A family succession was maintained through two daughters of Laelius, so that here we may perhaps recognise the beginning of the deservedly famous ‘Stoic marriages.’ Of the two ladies the elder was married to Q. Mucius Scaevola, known as ‘the augur,’ who was consul in 117 B.C. He was a devoted friend of Panaetius, and famous for his knowledge of civil law[16]. The younger daughter was married to C. Fannius, who obtained some distinction as a historian[17]. In C. Lucilius we find the Latin poet of Stoicism; the views which he expresses in his satires on religion and ethics are in the closest agreement with the teaching of Panaetius[18], and the large circulation of his poems must have diffused them through wide circles[19]. At the same time his attacks on the religious institutions of Numa and his ridicule of his own childish beliefs may well have brought philosophy into ill odour as atheistic and unpatriotic: and we find the statesmen of the next generation specially anxious to avoid any such imputations.
Scaevola ‘the pontifex.’
427. A dominating figure is that of Q. Mucius Scaevola, commonly called ‘the pontifex,’ who was a nephew of his namesake mentioned above, and derived from him his interest in civil law; he was consul in 95 B.C. He overcame the difficulty about the popular religion by distinguishing on Stoic lines three classes of deities, (i) mythical deities, celebrated by the poets with incredible and unworthy narrations[20]; (ii) philosophical deities, better suited for the schools than for the market-place; (iii) civic deities, whose ceremonies it is the duty of state officials to maintain[21], interpreting them so as to agree with the philosophers rather than with the poets[22]. In this spirit he filled the position of chief officer of the state religion. He was however no time-server; for being appointed after his consulship to be governor of Asia, he joined with his former quaestor P. Rutilius Rufus in the design of repressing the extortion of the publicani. A decisive step taken by him was to declare all dishonourable contracts invalid[23]; and more than a generation later his just and sparing administration was gratefully remembered both at Rome and in the provinces[24]. The equites took their revenge not on Scaevola but on Rutilius[25], whom they brought to trial in 92 B.C., when Scaevola pleaded his cause in a simple and dignified way that became a Stoic, but did not exclude some traces of elegance[26]. He is regarded as the father of Roman law, for he was the first to codify it, which he did in eighteen volumes[27]. He also wrote a special work on definitions, which no doubt reflected the interest which the Stoics took in this part of logic.
The Stoic lawyers.
428. It seems beyond dispute that the systematic study of law, which developed in later centuries into the science of Roman jurisprudence, and as such has exercised a weighty influence on the development of Western civilisation, had its beginnings amongst a group of men profoundly influenced by Stoic teaching. It does not therefore follow that the fundamental ideas expressed by such terms as ius gentium, lex naturae, are exclusively Stoic in origin. The former phrase appears to have been in common use at this time to indicate the laws generally in force amongst the peoples that surrounded Rome; the latter is a philosophical term derived from the Greek, denoting an ideal law which ought to exist amongst men everywhere[28]. The principle of obedience to nature is not peculiar to the Stoic philosophy, but belongs to the common substratum of all philosophical thought. It does however seem to be the case that the Stoic theory of the ‘common law’ (κοινὸς νόμος) was in fact the stimulus which enabled the Romans to transform their system of ‘rights,’ gradually throwing over all that was of the nature of mechanical routine or caste privilege, and harmonizing contradictions by the principle of fairness. The successor of Scaevola was C. Aquilius Gallus, praetor in 66 B.C. with Cicero, of whom it is specially noted that he guided his exposition of law by the principle of equity[29]; and after him S. Sulpicius Rufus, the contemporary and intimate friend of Cicero. We do not know that he was a Stoic, but he was a student of dialectic under L. Lucilius Balbus, who as well as his brother belonged to this school[30]; and he followed Stoic principles in studying oratory just enough to make his exposition clear[31]. He was the acknowledged head of his profession, and compiled 180 books on law[32]. In the civil war he took sides with Caesar[33].
Stoics of the Sullan period.
429. Amongst men of high rank definitely pledged to Stoicism in the generation preceding Cicero are further L. Aelius Stilo (circ. 145-75 B.C.)[34], who devoted himself to Roman grammar and antiquities, and was the teacher of both Cicero and Varro; Q. Lucilius Balbus, whose knowledge of this philosophy rivalled that of his Greek teachers[35], and who is the exponent of the Stoic view in Cicero’s de Natura Deorum, the scene of which takes us back to about 76 B.C.; Sextus Pompeius, uncle of Pompey the Great, and distinguished both as a philosopher and as a jurist[36]; and more particularly P. Rutilius Rufus, to whom we have already referred[37]. A pupil and devoted admirer of Panaetius[38], a trained philosopher[39], and a sound lawyer[40], he brought his career at Rome to an abrupt end by his firm resistance to the publicani, as already recounted[41]. With true cosmopolitanism he retired to Smyrna, and accepted the citizenship of that town. His stern principles did not prevent him from saving his life in the massacre ordered by Mithradates, by assuming Greek dress[42]; the massacre itself was the ripe fruit of the abuses which he had endeavoured to repress. He is one of the characters in Cicero’s de Republica.
Cato.
430. Of the Stoics of Cicero’s time the most eminent was M. Porcius Cato (95-48 B.C.). In him Stoicism received a special colouring by association with the traditions of ancient Roman manners. In his early years he became a pupil of Antipater of Tyre[43], and so far adopted the Cynic ideal as to train himself for public life by freely submitting to hunger, cold, and hardship[44]. After a period of service in the army he made a journey to Asia to secure the companionship of Athenodorus the elder[45]. He became a practised speaker; and though he adhered firmly to the Stoic tradition of plain language and short sentences[46], yet could become eloquent on the great themes of his philosophy[47], and could win the approval of the people even for its paradoxes[48]. He was resolutely opposed to bribery and extortion. As quaestor in B.C. 66 he introduced reform into the public finances, and put an end to embezzlements by officials. His popularity became very great, and he was elected tribune of the plebs towards the end of the year 63 B.C., when his voice decided the senators to decree the death of the associates of Catiline. With his subsequent policy Cicero finds fault, because Cato refused to connive at the extortions of the publicani: and from Cicero’s criticisms has arisen the accepted view that Cato was an unpractical statesman. On the other hand it may well be held that if the Roman aristocracy had included more men like Cato, the republic might have been saved: and towards the end of his life Cicero bitterly lamented that he had not sufficiently valued the sincere friendship which Cato offered him[49]. In the year 54 B.C. the candidates for the office of tribune paid him a singular compliment; each deposited with him a large sum of money, which he was to forfeit if in Cato’s opinion he was guilty of bribery[50]. His whole political life was guided by the strictest moral principle[51]; even in so unimportant a matter as Cicero’s request for a triumph he would do nothing to oblige a friend[52]. In private life he attempted to put into practice the principle of the community of women taught in Zeno’s Republic. He had married Marcia, daughter of Philippus, and had three children by her: in 56 B.C. he gave her up to his friend C. Hortensius, whose family was in danger of becoming extinct: finally on the threatening of the civil war in B.C. 50 he took her back to his own home. At a time when the marriage bond was lightly treated by many of his contemporaries he at least rose above petty motives. In the civil war he took sides strongly against Caesar, his old political opponent. His self-sought death after Pharsalia won him a distinction which he had earned better by his life: and the unmeasured praise bestowed upon him a century later is perhaps due more to political bias than to philosophical respect[53]. The few words with which Virgil honours his memory are more effective, when he pictures Cato as chosen to be a judge in the world of the blest[54]. Cato represents the Stoic view as to the summum bonum in Cicero’s de Finibus.
Varro, Brutus and Porcia.
431. Contemporary with Cicero and Cato was M. Terentius Varro (B.C. 116-28). In his public career and political principles he was not unlike Cato; in his literary activity he more resembled Cicero. Both Varro and Cicero were deeply influenced by Stoic teaching, but as they were by no means professed adherents of this philosophy[55], they may be here passed by. In the next generation M. Junius Brutus (85-42 B.C.) concerns us more: for by his marriage with Porcia, Cato’s daughter and an ardent Stoic, he came into a family connexion with the sect, with which his personal views, as we have seen, were not entirely in agreement[56]. Still Brutus was not altogether unfitted to play the part of Cato’s successor; he was no mean orator[57], and wrote more than one philosophical treatise[58]; whilst Cicero dedicated several of his philosophical works to him[59]. But the practical Stoicism of Porcia, who stabbed herself in the thigh to show that she was fit to be trusted with a political secret, shines out more brightly than the speculations of her husband. In her honour Martial has written one of the few epigrams in which he allows himself to be caught in a mood of admiration: yet his story of Porcia’s death must be rejected as unhistorical[60].
Horace.
432. After the death of Brutus Stoicism ceases for a while to play a prominent part in Roman history; but its indirect influence is very marked in the two great poets of the Augustan epoch, Horace and Virgil. Of these Horace is in the main an Epicurean, and as such is quite entitled to use the Stoic paradoxes as matter for ridicule, and even to anticipate dangerous consequences from their practical application[61]. But in fact his works show a constantly increasing appreciation of the ethics of Stoicism. He recognises the high ideals and civic activity of its professors[62], and he draws a noble picture of the Stoic sage, confident in his convictions, and bidding defiance to the crowd and the tyrant alike[63]. Of that practical wisdom and genial criticism which has made Horace the favourite poet of so many men eminent in public life, no small part consists of Stoic principles deftly freed from the paradoxical form in which they were conveyed to professed adherents.
Virgil.
433. With this picture of Stoicism seen from without we must contrast that given us by Virgil, who inherited the Stoic tradition from Aratus[64], his model for the Georgics. Virgil’s mind is penetrated by Stoic feeling, and his works are an interpretation of the universe in the Stoic sense; but like so many of his contemporaries he holds aloof from formal adherence to the sect, and carefully avoids its technical language. Quite possibly too he incorporated in his system elements drawn from other philosophies. In physics he accepts the principle that the fiery aether is the source of all life[65]; it is identical with the divine spirit[66] and the all-informing mind[67]. From this standpoint he is led on to the doctrine of purgatory[68], and from that he looks forward to the time of the conflagration, when all creation will be reconciled by returning to its primitive unity in the primal fire-spirit[69]. Still Virgil’s picture must be regarded rather as an adaptation than as an exposition of Stoicism; it lacks the sharp outlines and the didactic tone of the poetry of Cleanthes or Lucretius, and other interpretations are by no means excluded.
Virgil’s theology.
434. With the problem of the government of the universe Virgil’s mind is occupied throughout the Aeneid. He is constantly weighing the relative importance of the three forces, fate, the gods, and fortune, precisely as the philosophers do. To each of the three he assigns a part in the affairs of men; but that taken by fate is unmistakably predominant. The individual gods have very little importance in the poem; they are to a large extent allegorical figures, representing human instincts and passions; they cannot divert destiny from its path, though with their utmost effort they may slightly delay its work or change its incidence. Above all these little gods Jove towers aloft, a power magnificent and munificent; at his voice the gods shudder and the worlds obey. But the power of Jove rests upon his complete acceptance of the irrevocable decrees of fate[70]. The critic may even describe him as a puppet-king, who wears an outward semblance of royalty, but is really obedient to an incessant interference from a higher authority. Virgil however appears truly to hold the Stoic principle that Fate and Jove are one; he thus takes us at once to the final problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of the conceptions of Law formed on the one hand by observing facts (the modern ‘Laws of Nature’) and on the other hand by recognising the moral instinct (the modern ‘Moral Law’). As we have seen, a reconciliation of these two by logic is intrinsically impossible. Virgil however shows us how they may be in practice reconciled by a certain attitude of mind; and because that attitude is one of resignation to and cooperation with the supreme power, it would seem right to place Virgil by the side of Cleanthes as one of the religious poets of Stoicism.
Virgil’s ethics.
435. Virgil’s conception of ethics is displayed in the character of Aeneas. Much modern criticism revolts against the character of Aeneas exactly as it does against that of Cato, and for the same reason, that it is without sympathy for Stoic ethics. To understand Aeneas we must first picture a man whose whole soul is filled by a reverent regard for destiny and submission to Jove, who represents destiny on its personal side. He can therefore never play the part of the hero in revolt; but at the same time he is human, and liable to those petty weaknesses and aberrations from which even the sage is not exempt. He can hesitate or be hasty, can love or weep; but the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. In a happy phrase Virgil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism:
‘Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down, but in vain[71].’
In contrast to Aeneas stands Dido, intensely human and passionate, and in full rebellion against her destiny. She is to him Eve the temptress, Cleopatra the seducer; but she is not destined to win a final triumph. A modern romance would doubtless have a different ending.
Ovid.
436. Amongst writers who adopted much of the formal teaching of Stoicism without imbibing its spirit we may reckon Ovid (43 B.C.-18 A.D.). Not only does he accept the central idea of Stoicism, that it is the divine fire by virtue of which every man lives and moves[72], but he opens his greatest work by a description of the creation[73] which appears to follow Stoic lines, and in which the erect figure of man is specially recognised as the proof of the preeminence which Providence has assigned to him over all the other works of the Creator[74]. But the tales related in the Metamorphoses show no trace of the serious religious purpose of Virgil; and the society pictured in Ovid’s love poems gives only a caricature of the Stoic doctrines of the community of women, the absence of jealousy, and outspokenness of speech. Finally the plaintive tone of the Tristia shows how little Ovid was in touch with Stoic self-control amidst the buffetings of fortune.
Cremutius Cordus.
437. In the time of the next princeps we first find Stoicism associated with an unsympathetic attitude towards the imperial government. There was nothing in Stoic principles to suggest this opposition. Tiberius himself had listened to the teaching of the Stoic Nestor, and the simplicity of his personal life and the gravity of his manners might well have won him the support of sincere philosophers. But if Stoicism did not create the spirit of opposition, it confirmed it where it already existed. The memory of Cato associated Stoic doctrines with republican views: vague idealisations of Brutus and Cassius suggested the glorification of tyrannicide. Cremutius Cordus (ob. A.D. 25) had offended Seianus by a sarcastic remark: for when Tiberius repaired the theatre of Pompey, and the senate voted that a statue of Seianus should be erected there, Cordus said that this meant really spoiling the theatre[75]. Seianus then dropped a hint to his client Satrius, who accused Cordus before the senate of writing a history in which he highly praised Brutus, and declared Cassius to have been ‘the last of the Romans.’ A word of apology would have saved the life of Cordus; he resolved to die by his own act[76], to the great annoyance of his prosecutors[77]. From this time on suicide became an object of political ambition. The Stoic tradition continued in the family of Cordus, and to his daughter Marcia, as a fellow-member of the sect, Seneca addressed the well-known Consolatio[78]; but the title of ‘old Romans’ describes far better the true leanings of the men of whom Cordus was the forerunner.
Kanus Iulius.
438. In the reign of Gaius (Caligula) we first find philosophers as such exposed to persecution; and we may infer that, like the Jews, they resisted tacitly or openly the claim of the emperor to be worshipped as a god. Iulius Graecinus, according to Seneca, was put to death for no other reason than that he was a better man than a tyrant liked to see alive[79]. Kanus Iulius reproved the emperor to his face, and heard with calmness his own doom pronounced. During the ten days still left to him he went quietly on with his daily occupations; he was engaged in a game of chess when the centurion summoned him. ‘After my death,’ he said to his opponent, ‘do not boast that you won the game.’ His philosopher accompanied him, and inquired how his thoughts were occupied. ‘I propose,’ said Kanus, ‘to observe whether at the last moment the soul is conscious of its departure. Afterwards, if I discover what the condition of departed souls is, I will come back and inform my friends[80].’
Arria the elder.
439. In the reign of Claudius we find Stoics engaged in actual conspiracy against the emperor. The name of Paetus Caecina introduces us to a famous Stoic family, for his wife was Arria the elder. Pliny tells us, on the authority of her granddaughter Fannia, how when her husband and son both fell sick together, and the latter died, she carried out the whole funeral without her husband’s knowledge; and each time that she entered his sick chamber, assumed a cheerful smile and assured him that the boy was much better. Whenever her grief became too strong, she would leave the room for a few minutes to weep, and return once more calm. When Scribonianus in Illyria rebelled against Claudius, Paetus took his side; upon his fall he was brought a prisoner to Rome. Arria was not allowed to accompany him, but she followed him in a fishing boat. She encouraged him to face death by piercing her own breast with a dagger, declaring ‘it doesn’t hurt[81],’ and upon his death she determined not to survive him. Thrasea, her son-in-law, tried to dissuade her. ‘If I were condemned, would you,’ said he, ‘wish your daughter to die with me?’ ‘Yes,’ said Arria, ‘if she had lived with you as long and as happily as I with Paetus.’ Here we have a deliberate justification of the Hindu practice of the Satī.
Seneca.
440. In the reign of Nero the Stoics are still more prominent, and almost always in opposition. Seneca, of course, the emperor’s tutor and minister, is on the government side; and from his life we can draw the truest picture of the imperial civil servant in high office. We shall certainly not expect to find that Seneca illustrated in his own life all the virtues that he preached; on the other hand we shall not readily believe that the ardent disciple of Attalus[82] and affectionate husband of Paulina was a man of dissolute life or of avaricious passions. Simple tastes, an endless capacity for hard work, and scrupulous honesty were the ordinary marks of the Roman official in those days, as they are of members of the Civil Service of India to-day[83]. Seneca is often accused of having been too supple as a minister; but he was carrying out the principles of his sect better by taking an active part in politics than if he had, like many others, held sullenly aloof[84]. He did not indeed imitate Cato or Rutilius Rufus, who had carried firmness of principle to an extent that laid them open to the charge of obstinacy; but in submitting frankly to power greater than his own he still saw to it that his own influence should count towards the better side. For the story of his political career we cannot do better than to refer to the latest historian of his times[85]; of his work as a philosopher, to which he himself attributed the greater importance, a general account has been given above[86] and more particular discussions form the central theme of this book.
Persius and Lucan.
441. From Seneca we pass naturally to some mention of the poets Persius and Lucan. A. Persius Flaccus (34-62 A.D.) became at 16 years of age the pupil and companion of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus: he was also a relative of the Arriae already mentioned. He gives us a charming picture of his teacher’s ways of life, which were doubtless typical[87]: and his summary view of the scope of philosophy well indicates how its proportions had shrunk at this period. Dialectic is not mentioned, and physics has interest only in its bearing upon the position and duty of the individual.
‘Go, study, hapless folk, and learn to know
The end and object of our life—what are we;
The purpose of our being here; the rank
Assigned us at the start, and where and when
The turn is smoothest round the perilous post;
The bounds of wealth; life’s lawful aims; the use
Of hoards of coin new-minted; what the claims
Of fatherland and kinsfolk near and dear;
The will of God concerning thee, and where
Thou standest in the commonwealth of man[88].’
His contemporary M. Annaeus Lucanus (39-65 A.D.), a nephew of Seneca, plunged more deeply both into philosophy and into politics. In both he displayed ardour insufficiently tempered with discretion; he had a far keener sense of his personal grievances than became a Stoic, and was much more of a critic than of a reformer. Yet hardly any writer expresses more forcibly the characteristic doctrines of Stoicism, as they seized the imagination of young Romans of the upper classes. Amongst such doctrines that of the conflagration was clearly prominent.
‘So when this frame of things has been dissolved,
And the world’s many ages have received
Their consummation in one final hour,
Chaos recalled shall gain his utmost seat,
The constellations in confusion dire
Hurled each on each together clash; the stars
Flaming shall fall into the deep; the earth
No longer shall extend her barrier shores,
And fling the waters from her; and the Moon
Shall meet the Sun in fratricidal war[89].’
‘One pyre awaits the Universe; in ruin
’Twill mix with bones of men the heavenly spheres[90].’
Lucan emphasizes the pantheistic interpretation of the divine nature;
‘God is all eye can see or heart can feel[91].’
‘The powers of heaven are round about us all;
And though from out the temple come no voice,
Nought can we do without the will of God[92].’
To the idealized Cato he addresses the noblest praises;
‘For sure a consecrated life is thine,
The laws of heaven thy pattern, God thy guide[93].’
‘See the true Father of his country, worth
The homage of thine altars, Rome; for they
Who swear by him shall never be ashamed.
If e’er the yoke is lifted from thy neck,
Now or hereafter he shall be thy God[94].’
Civil service and ‘old Romans.’
442. The careers of Seneca and Musonius, and the early years of Lucan himself, indicate sufficiently that there was no essential opposition between Stoic principles and the Roman principate; in other words, that Stoics as such were not ‘republicans.’ Rather the contrary; for nearly all the Greek philosophers had been inclined to favour monarchy, and the Stoics had been conspicuous in the desire to abolish the distinctions of birth and class upon which the Roman aristocracy laid so much stress, and which the principate was disposed to ignore. But in fact Stoicism was the common mould in which the educated youth of Rome were shaped at this period; it produced honest, diligent, and simple-minded men, exactly suited to be instruments of the great imperial bureaucracy. Large numbers entered the service of the state, and were heard of no more; such an one (except for Seneca’s incidental account of him) was C. Lucilius, Seneca’s correspondent. The great work of Roman government was carried on in silence, just as that of India in the present day. This silence was probably on the whole beneficial to society, though it was often felt as a constraint by the individual. For this reason and many others there were at Rome (as everywhere and at all times) many able but disappointed men; they became the critics of the government, and from being critics they might at any time become conspirators; but at no period did they seriously aim at restoring the republican system. Their political creed was limited, and did not look beyond the interests of the class from which they sprang. They claimed for members of the senate at Rome their ancient personal privileges, and especially that of libertas, that is, freedom to criticize and even to insult the members of the government; they sang the praises of Cato, celebrated the birthdays of Brutus and Cassius[95], and practised a kind of ‘passive resistance’ based on Oriental methods, by quitting life without hesitation when they were baulked in their immediate wishes by the government. When the administration was carried on decently these men were ridiculous; when from time to time it became a scandal they were heroes.
Republican prejudices.
443. The early years of Nero’s reign show us plainly that true spirit of Stoicism was far more developed on the side of the government than on that of the aristocracy. Nothing distinguishes Seneca more honourably than his humane attitude towards the slave population; and he was chief minister of the princeps when in the year A.D. 61 a ‘notable case[96]’ arose, in which the human rights of slaves were involved. The city prefect, Pedanius Secundus, was killed by one of his slaves. It was contended in the senate that by ancient custom the whole household, old and young, guilty and innocent, must be put to death alike; and this view prevailed and was carried into effect. Public opinion, according to Tacitus[97], was unanimous against such severity; it looked, not unreasonably, to the emperor and his minister to prevent it[97a]. They on the contrary left the decision to the free judgment of the senate. Where now were the men of philosophic principle, of world-wide sympathies, of outspoken utterance? The historian tells us that not one was found in the senate. The honourable men who could defy an emperor’s death-sentence still lacked the courage to speak out against the prejudices of their own class; many indeed uttered exclamations, expressing pity for the women, the young, and the indubitably innocent, and even voted against the executions; but even in so simple a matter there was not a man to follow the lead of Catiline in Cicero’s days, and take up as his own the cause of the oppressed. The leader of the merciless majority was C. Cassius Longinus, a celebrated jurist, and one who regularly celebrated the honours of Cassius the conspirator.
Nero and the Stoics.
444. But although the administration of which Nero was the head was largely manned by professed Stoics, and stood as a whole for the better sympathies of the Roman people, the course of court intrigue brought about a fierce conflict between the government and a growing force of public opinion of which the ‘old Roman’ group of Stoics were sometimes the spokesmen, and at other times the silent representatives. To Nero the consideration of his own safety was predominant over every consideration of justice to individuals, and herein he stood condemned (and knew that it was so) by the judgment of all men of philosophic temper. The first of his victims, and perhaps the most deserving of our admiration, was Rubellius Plautus, accused by Tigellinus because he maintained the irritating cult of the ‘tyrannicides,’ and had joined the disloyal sect of the Stoics[98]. The charge of disloyalty against himself and his companions he disproved; for, advised by his Stoic teachers Coeranus and Musonius, he declined to take part in a rising which might have been successful, and calmly awaited his fate (60 A.D.). In the conspiracy of Piso, which broke out a few years later, Plautus Lateranus is named by the historian as one of the few whose motives were honourable and whose conduct was consistently courageous[99]. The later years of Nero’s reign are illuminated in the pages of Tacitus by the firmness of men like Thrasea Paetus, Paconius Agrippinus, and Barea Soranus, and the heroic devotion of women like the younger Arria, Thrasea’s wife, and Servilia, the daughter of Soranus[100]. In the persecution of this group the modern historian finds extenuating circumstances, but at Rome itself it appeared as though the emperor were engaged in the attempt to extirpate virtue itself[101].
Helvidius Priscus.
445. Upon the fall of Nero the ‘old Romans’ came for a short time into power under the principate of Galba, and amongst others Helvidius Priscus, Thrasea’s son-in-law, returned from exile. From the account of Tacitus he appears to have been a very sincere adherent of the Stoic school.
‘He was not like others who adopt the name of philosopher in order to cloak an idle disposition. He followed those teachers who maintain that only the honourable is good, and only the base is evil; power, nobility, and other things external to the soul being neither good nor evil. He designed so to fortify himself thereby against the blows of fortune that he could play his part in public affairs without flinching[102].’
His first act on returning to Rome was to commence a prosecution of the accuser of Thrasea. The senate was divided in opinion as to the wisdom of this step, and when Helvidius abandoned the suit some praised his charity, whilst others lamented his indecision[103]. He resumed his attempt, as we shall see, at a later time.
His fall.
446. Vespasian was undoubtedly tolerant in his views: his reign began with the restitution of honours to the deceased Galba, and the much-respected Musonius[104] seized the opportunity to attack in the senate P. Egnatius Celer, whose treachery had brought about the fall of Soranus[105], for false evidence. The trial was postponed, but resulted a little later in the condemnation of Celer[106]. Public opinion took the side of Musonius: but the accused found a champion in Demetrius the Cynic philosopher, and at least defended himself with the ability and courage of his sect. Thereupon Helvidius resumed his prosecution of the accuser of Thrasea; but the emperor, now anxious to let bygones be bygones, refused to approve[107]. This second failure appears to have embittered Helvidius: his opposition to Vespasian became open and insulting, and brought about his death[108]. The life of his wife Fannia was worthy of the two Arriae, her grandmother and her mother. Twice she followed her husband into exile; a third time she brought this punishment upon herself, by encouraging his friend Senecio to publish his biography, supplying him with the materials, and openly justifying her action. In her private life she had singular charm and affability; and her death appeared to Pliny to close an era of noble women[109].
Renewal of the Stoic opposition.
447. It seems probable that the Stoic nobles found the low birth of Vespasian as intolerable as the tyranny of Nero; at any rate they soon resumed their attitude of opposition to the government, and the punishment of Helvidius, if intended as a warning, proved rather a provocation. It appears that he and the ‘old Romans’ began a systematic propaganda in favour of what they called ‘democracy[110],’ that is, the government of the Roman empire by the senatorial class; and they probably involved many professed philosophers in this impracticable and reactionary movement. Vespasian resolved on expelling all the philosophers from Rome. From this general sentence the best known of all, Musonius, was excepted[111], and we must infer that he had shown the good sense to keep himself free from political entanglements. In spite of this act of Vespasian, Stoicism continued to gain ground, and during the greater part of the period of the Flavian dynasty met with little interference.
Persecution by Domitian.
448. But towards the end of the reign of Domitian a more violent persecution broke out. Arulenus Rusticus had been tribune of the plebs in 66 A.D., and had then proposed to use his veto in an attempt to save the life of Thrasea Paetus[112]. In 69 A.D. he was praetor, and as such headed an embassy sent by the senate to the soldiers under Petilius Cerealis. On this occasion he was roughly handled and wounded, and barely escaped with his life[113]. After many years of quiet, he was accused in 93 A.D., when Pliny was praetor, of having written and spoken in honour of Thrasea Paetus, Herennius Senecio, and Helvidius Priscus; he was condemned to death and his books were destroyed[114]. Senecio was condemned at the same time for having written the biography of Helvidius Priscus, and for the further offence that since holding the quaestorship he had not become a candidate for any higher office[115]. About the same time were banished Artemidorus, the most single-minded and laborious of philosophers, whom Musonius had selected out of a crowd of competitors as the fittest to claim his daughter in marriage[116]; Junius Mauricus, brother of Arulenus Rusticus, who had joined Musonius in the attempt to secure the punishment of the delatores of Nero’s time[117]; Demetrius, and Epictetus[118]; and further many distinguished ladies, including Arria and her daughter Fannia[119]. But from the time of the death of Domitian in A.D. 96 the imperial government became finally reconciled with Stoicism, which was now the recognised creed of the great majority of the educated classes at Rome, of all ages and ranks. As such it appears in the writings of Juvenal, who not only introduces into serious literature the Stoic principle of ‘straight speaking,’ but actually expounds much of the ethical teaching of Stoicism with more directness and force than any professed adherent of the system.
Stoic reform of law.
449. Stoicism, received into favour in the second century A.D., won new opportunities and was exposed to new dangers. Its greatest achievement lay in the development of Roman law. As we have just seen[120], the ‘old Romans’ of Nero’s day, in spite of their profession of Stoicism, were unbending upholders of the old law, with all its harshness and narrowness; and we have to go back a hundred years to the great lawyers of the times of Sulla and Cicero[121] to meet with men prepared to throw aside old traditions and build anew on the foundations of natural justice. But the larger view had not been lost sight of. It remained as the ideal of the more generous-minded members of the imperial civil service; and in the times of the emperors Antoninus Pius (138-161 A.D.) and Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) it became the starting-point for a new development of Roman law, which is one of the great achievements of Roman history. The most eloquent of the historians of the origins of Christianity thus describes this movement.
‘Le stoïcisme avait [déjà] pénétré le droit romain de ses larges maximes, et en avait fait le droit naturel, le droit philosophique, tel que la raison peut le concevoir pour tous les hommes. Le droit strict cède à l’équité; la douceur l’emporte sur la sévérité; la justice paraît inséparable de la bienfaisance. Les grands jurisconsultes d’Antonin continuèrent la même œuvre. Le dernier [Volusius Moecianus] fut le maître de Marc-Aurèle en fait de jurisprudence, et, à vrai dire, l’œuvre des deux saints empereurs ne saurait être séparée. C’est d’eux que datent la plupart de ces lois humaines et sensées qui fléchirent la rigueur du droit antique et firent, d’une législation primitivement étroite et implacable, un code susceptible d’être adopté par tous les peuples civilisés[122].’
In the legislation of Antoninus and Aurelius the humane and cosmopolitan principles of Stoic politics at last triumph over Roman conservatism. The poor, the sick, the infant, and the famine-stricken are protected. The slave is treated as a human being; to kill him becomes a crime, to injure him a misdemeanour; his family and his property are protected by the tribunals. Slavery in fact is treated as a violation of the rights of nature; manumission is in every way encouraged. The time is within sight when Ulpian will declare that ‘all men, according to natural right, are born free and equal[123].’ This legislation is not entirely the work of professed Stoics; it is nevertheless the offspring of Stoicism.
Repression of zeal.
450. There was in the second century, as there is still, a sharp antagonism between the manners of cultivated society and the ardent profession of intellectual convictions. An anecdote related by Gellius well illustrates the social forces which were now constantly at work to check superfluous enthusiasm.
‘There was with us at table a young student of philosophy who called himself a Stoic, but chiefly distinguished himself by an unwelcome loquacity. He was always bringing up in season and out of season recondite philosophical doctrines, and he looked upon all his neighbours as boors because they were unacquainted with them. His whole talk was strown with mention of syllogisms, fallacies, and the like, such as the “master-argument,” the “quiescent,” and the “heap”; and he thought that he was the only man in the world who could solve them. Further he maintained that he had thoroughly studied the nature of the soul, the growth of virtue, the science of daily duties, and the cure of the weaknesses and diseases of the mind. Finally he considered he had attained to that state of perfect happiness which could be clouded by no disappointment, shaken by no pains of death[124].’
Such a man, we may think, might soon have become an apostle of sincere Stoicism, and might have left us a clear and systematic exposition of Stoic doctrine as refined by five centuries of experience. It was not to be. The polished Herodes Atticus crushed him with a quotation from the discourses of Epictetus. Not many offended in the same way. Even Seneca had been severe on useless study in the regions of history and antiquity[125]; the new philosophers despised the study even of philosophy.
State establishment of philosophy.
451. The Stoicism of the second century is therefore much less sharply defined than that of earlier times. Its doctrines, acquired in childhood, are accepted with ready acquiescence; but they are not accompanied by any firm repudiation of the opposing views of other schools. Once more, as in the time of Augustus, the ‘philosopher’ comes to the front; the particular colour of his philosophy seems of less importance[126]. It is philosophy in general which wins the patronage of the emperors. Nerva allowed the schools of the philosophers to be re-opened; Trajan interested himself in them as providing a useful training for the young. Hadrian went further, and endowed the teachers of philosophy at Rome; Antoninus Pius did the same throughout the provinces. Marcus Aurelius established representatives of each of the philosophic schools at Athens; and amongst later emperors Septimius Severus, aided by his wife Julia Domna, was conspicuous in the same direction. The philosophers, who had firmly resisted persecution, gradually sacrificed their independence under the influence of imperial favour. They still recited the dogmas of their respective founders, but unconsciously they became the partisans of the established forms of government and religion. Yet so gentle was the decay of philosophy that it might be regarded as progress if its true position were not illuminated by the attitude of Marcus Aurelius towards the Christians. For Marcus Aurelius was universally accepted as the most admirable practical representative of philosophy in its full ripeness, and no word of criticism of his policy was uttered by any teacher of Stoicism.
The pagan revival.
452. The decay of precise philosophic thought was accompanied by a strong revival of pagan religious sentiment. The atmosphere in which Marcus Aurelius grew up, and by which his political actions were determined far more than by his philosophic profession, is thus sympathetically described by the latest editor of his Reflections.
‘In house and town, the ancestral Penates of the hearth and the Lares of the streets guarded the intercourse of life; in the individual breast, a ministering Genius shaped his destinies and responded to each mood of melancholy or of mirth. Thus all life lay under the regimen of spiritual powers, to be propitiated or appeased by appointed observances and ritual and forms of prayer. To this punctilious and devout form of Paganism Marcus was inured from childhood; at the vintage festival he took his part in chant and sacrifice; at eight years old he was admitted to the Salian priesthood; “he was observed to perform all his sacerdotal functions with a constancy and exactness unusual at that age; was soon a master of the sacred music; and had all the forms and liturgies by heart.” Our earliest statue depicts him as a youth offering incense; and in his triumphal bas-reliefs he stands before the altar, a robed and sacrificing priest. To him “prayer and sacrifice, and all observances by which we own the presence and nearness of the gods,” are “covenants and sacred ministries” admitting to “intimate communion with the divine[127].”’
The cult thus summarized is not that of the Greek mythology, much less that of the rationalized Stoic theology. It is the primitive ritualism of Italy, still dear to the hearts of the common people, and regaining its hold on the educated in proportion as they spared themselves the effort of individual criticism.
State persecution.
453. It was by no mere accident that Marcus Aurelius became the persecutor of the Christians. He was at heart no successor of the Zeno who held as essential the doctrine of a supreme deity, and absolutely rejected the use of temples and images. In the interval, official Stoicism had learnt first to tolerate superstition with a smile, next to become its advocate; now it was to become a persecutor in its name. Pontius Pilatus is said to have recognised the innocence of the founder of Christianity, and might have protected him had his instructions from Rome allowed him to stretch his authority so far; Gallio[128] was uninterested in the preaching of Paul; but Aurelius was acquainted with the Christian profession and its adherents[129], and opposed it as an obstinate resistance to authority[130]. The popular antipathy to the new religion, and the official distaste for all disturbing novelties, found in him a willing supporter[131]. Thus began a new struggle between the power of the sword and that of inward conviction. Because reason could not support the worship of the pagan deities, violence must do so[132]. It became a triumph of the civil authority and the popular will to extort a word of weakness by two years of persistent torture[133]. No endowed professor or enlightened magistrate raised his voice in protest; and in this feeble acquiescence Stoicism perished.
Revolt of the young Stoics.
454. For the consciences of the young revolted. Trained at home and in school to believe in providence, in duty, and in patient endurance of evil, they instinctively recognised the Socratic force and example not in the magistrate seated in his curule chair, nor in the rustic priest occupied in his obsolete ritual, but in the teacher on the cross and the martyr on the rack[134]. In ever increasing numbers men, who had from their Stoic education imbibed the principles of the unity of the Deity and the freedom of the will, came over to the new society which professed the one without reservation, and displayed the other without flinching. With them they brought in large measure their philosophic habits of thought, and (in far more particulars than is generally recognised) the definite tenets which the Porch had always inculcated. Stoicism began a new history, which is not yet ended, within the Christian church; and we must now attempt to give some account of this aftergrowth of the philosophy.