The origin and development of the moral ideas

by Edward Westermarck

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS

Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind, p. [131].—Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. [131]–133.—Language a rough generaliser, p. [133].—Analysis of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, p. [134].—Of ought and duty, pp. [134]–137.—Of right, as an adjective, pp. [137]–139.—Of right, as a substantive, p. [139] sq.—Of the relations between rights and duties, p. [140] sq.—Of injustice and justice, pp. [141]–145.—Of good, pp. [145]–147.—Of virtue, pp. [147]–149.—Of the relation between virtue and duty, p. [149] sq.—Of merit, p. [150] sq.—Of the relation between merit and duty, p. [151] sq.—The question of the super-obligatory, pp. [152]–154.—The question of the morally indifferent, pp. [154]–157.

[CHAPTER VII]

CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS

How we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large, p. [158].—The close connection between the habitualness and the obligatoriness of custom, p. [159].—Though every public habit is not a custom, involving an obligation, men’s standard of morality is not independent of their practice, p. [159] sq.—The study of moral ideas to a large extent a study of customs, p. [160].—But custom never covers the whole field of morality, and the uncovered space grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. [160] sq.—At the lower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct, p. [161].—Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. [162].—In competition with law custom frequently carries the day, p. [163] sq.—Custom stronger than law and religion combined, p. [164].—The laws themselves command obedience more as customs than as laws, [ibid.]—Many laws were customs before they became laws, p. [165].—The transformation of customs into laws, p. [165] sq.—Laws as expressions of moral ideas, pp. [166]–168.—Punishment and indemnification, p. [168] sq.—Definition of punishment, p. [169] sq.—Savage punishments inflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. [170]–173.—By some person or persons invested with judicial authority, pp. [173]–175.—The development of judicial organisation out of a previous system of lynch-law, p. [175].—Out of a previous system of private revenge, p. [176].—Public indignation displays itself not only in punishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of revenge, p. [176] sq.—The social origin of the lex talionis, pp. [177]–180.—The transition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a central judicial and executive authority, pp. [180]–183.—The jurisdiction of chiefs, p. [183] sq.—The injured party or the accuser acting as executioner, but not as judge, p. [184] sq.—The existence of punishment and judicial organisation among a certain people no exact index to its general state of culture, p. [185].—The supposition that punishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. [185] sq.—Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the lex talionis, pp. [186]–183.—Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic of the public justice of savages, pp. [188]–190. Legislators referring to the deterrent effects of punishment, p. [190] sq.—The practice of punishing criminals in public, p. [191] sq.—The punishment actually inflicted on the criminal in many cases much less severe than the punishment with which the law threatens him, p. [192] sq.—The detection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more uncertain than it is now, p. [193].—The chief explanation of the great severity of certain criminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or both, pp. [193]–198.—Punishment may also be applied as a means of deterring from crime, p. [198] sq.—But the scope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide, p. [199].—The criminal law of a community on the whole a faithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community at large, pp. [199]–201.

[CHAPTER VIII]

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED MORAL JUDGMENTS

Definitions of the term “conduct,” p. [202] sq.—The meaning of the word “act,” p. [203] sq.—The meaning of the word “intention,” p. [204].—There can be only one intention in one act, p. [204] sq. The moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. [205] sq.—A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. [206].—A deliberate wish is a volition, p. [206] sq.—The meaning of the word “motive,” p. [207].—Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation, [ibid.]—The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act, [ibid.]—Even motives which consist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p. [207] sq.—Refutation of Mill’s statement that “the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action,” p. [208] sq.—Moral judgments really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. [209].—Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. [209] sq.—Distinction between forbearances and omissions, p. [210].—Moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to omissions, p. [210] sq.—Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. [211].—Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the “will,” p. [211] sq.—Distinction between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to refrain from doing and willing to do, p. [212].—The “known concomitants of acts,” p. [213].—Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. [213] sq.—The meaning of the term “conduct,” p. [214].—The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person’s will, or character, conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. [214] sq.—Moral judgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. [215] sq.

[CHAPTER IX]

THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS

Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries, pp. [217]–219.—Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. [219]–221.—A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. [221] sq.—Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident, p. [222] sq.—Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing about events without any fault of theirs, pp. [223]–226.—At the earlier stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, pp. [226]–231.—Explanation of all these facts, pp. [231]–237.—The great influence which the outward event exercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. [238]–240.—Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result follows, p. [241].—An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less severely than the accomplished act, p. [241] sq.—Exceptions to this rule, p. [242].—The question, which attempts should be punished, p. [243].—The stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between attempts and acts of preparation, p. [243] sq.—The rule that an outward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. [244] sq.—Exceptions to this rule, p. [245].—Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp. [245]–247.—Moral approval influenced by external events, p. [247].—Owing to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise, p. [247] sq.

[CHAPTER X]

AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

An agent not responsible for anything which he could not be aware of, p. [249].—The irresponsibility of animals, pp. [249]–251.—Resentment towards an animal which has caused some injury, p. [251].—At the lower stages of civilisation animals deliberately treated as responsible beings, [ibid.]—The custom of blood-revenge extended to the animal world, pp. [251]–253.—Animals exposed to regular punishment, pp. [253]–255.—The origin of the mediæval practice of punishing animals, p. [255] sq.—Explanation of the practice of retaliating upon animals, pp. [256]–260.—At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things treated as if they were responsible agents, pp. [260]–262.—Explanation of this, pp. [262]–264.—The total or partial irresponsibility of childhood and early youth, pp. [264]–267.—According to early custom, children sometimes subject to the rule of retaliation, p. [267].—Parents responsible for the deeds of their children, p. [267] sq.—In Europe there has been a tendency to raise the age at which full legal responsibility commences, p. [268] sq.—The irresponsibility of idiots and madmen, p. [269] sq.—Idiots and insane persons objects of religious reverence, p. [270] sq.—Lunatics treated with great severity or punished for their deeds, pp. [271]–274.—Explanation of this, p. [274] sq.—The ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the hands of lawyers, pp. [275]–277.—The total or partial irresponsibility of intoxicated persons, p. [277] sq.—Drunkenness recognised as a ground of extenuation, pp. [278]–280.—Not recognised as a ground of extenuation, p. [280] sq.—Explanation of these facts, p. [281] sq.

[CHAPTER XI]

MOTIVES

Motives considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection, p. [283].—Little consideration for the sense of duty as a motive, [ibid.]—Somewhat greater discrimination shown in regard to motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations, p. [283] sq.—Compulsion as a ground of extenuation, p. [284] sq.—“Compulsion by necessity,” pp. [285]–287.—Self-defence, pp. [288]–290.—Self-redress in the case of adultery, and other survivals of the old system of self-redress, pp. [290]–294.—The moral distinction made between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, on provocation, pp. [294]–297.—Explanation of this distinction, p. [297] sq.—The pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will as a ground of extenuation, p. [298] sq.—That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good not only of moral blame, but of moral praise, pp. [299]–302.

[CHAPTER XII]

FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS— CHARACTER

Why in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments are much more prominent than the positive commandments, p. [303].—The little cognisance which the criminal laws of civilised nations take of forbearances and omissions, p. [303] sq.—The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to positive commandments, p. [304] sq.—Yet the customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive injunctions as well, p. [305].—The unreflecting mind apt to exaggerate the guilt of a person who out of heedlessness or rashness causes harm by a positive act, [ibid.]—Early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event to its source, pp. [305]–307.—But they easily fail to discover where there is guilt or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender’s guilt, p. [307] sq.—The opinion that a person is answerable for all the damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight could have reasonably been expected to look out for it, p. [308] sq.—On the other hand, little or no censure passed on him whose want of foresight or want of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently remote, p. [309] sq.—The moral emotions may as naturally give rise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human conduct, p. [310].—Even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the agent’s will as a whole, p. [310] sq.—The practice of punishing a second or third offence more severely than the first, p. [311] sq.—The more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character which manifests itself in that individual piece of conduct by which the judgment is occasioned, p. [312] sq.—But however superficial it be, it always refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, p. [313].

[CHAPTER XIII]

WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER—MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

Explanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, p. [314].—The correctness of this explanation proved by the circumstance that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments are passed, pp. [314]–319.—Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain, p. [319].—The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. [319] sq.—The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the problem of the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect, p. [320].—The theory according to which responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes, p. [320] sq.—Yet, as a matter of fact, moral indignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and libertarians alike, p. [321] sq.—Explanation of the fallacy which lies at the bottom of the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism, p. [322].—Causation confounded with compulsion, pp. [322]–324.—The difference between fatalism and determinism, pp. [324]–326.—The moral emotions not concerned with the origin of the innate character, p. [326].

[CHAPTER XIV]

PRELIMINARY REMARKS—HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

Necessity of restricting the investigation to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness is concerned, p. [327] sq.—The six groups into which these modes of conduct may be divided, p. [328].—The most sacred duty which we owe to our fellow-creatures generally considered to be regard for their lives, [ibid.]—Among various uncivilised peoples human life said to be held very cheap, p. [328] sq.—Among others homicide or murder said to be hardly known, p. [329] sq.—In other instances homicide expressly said to be regarded as wrong, p. [330] sq.—In every society custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men, p. [331].—Savages distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger, pp. [331]–333.—In various instances, however, the rule, “Thou shalt not kill,” applies even to foreigners, p. [333] sq.—Some uncivilised peoples said to have no wars, p. [334].—Savages’ recognition of intertribal rights in times of peace obvious from certain customs connected with their wars, p. [334] sq.—Savage custom does not always allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare, p. [335] sq.—The readiness with which savages engage in war, p. [337].—The old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains among peoples more advanced in culture, p. [337] sq.—The readiness with which such peoples wage war on foreign nations, and the estimation in which the successful warrior is held, pp. [338]–340.—The life of a guest sacred, p. [340].—The commencement of international hostilities preceded by special ceremonies, [ibid.]—Warfare in some cases condemned, or a distinction made between just and unjust war, pp. [340]–342.—Even in war the killing of an enemy under certain circumstances prohibited, either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion, pp. [342]–344.

[CHAPTER XV]

HOMICIDE IN GENERAL (continued)

Homicide of any kind condemned by the early Christians, p. [345].—Their total condemnation of warfare, p. [345] sq.—This attitude towards war was soon given up, pp. [346]–348.—The feeling that a soldier scarcely could make a good Christian, p. [348].—Penance prescribed for those who had shed blood in war, p. [348] sq.—Wars forbidden by popes, p. [349].—The military Christianity of the Crusades, pp. [348]–352.—Chivalry, pp. [352]–354.—The intimate connection between chivalry and religion displayed in tournaments, p. [354] sq.—The practice of private war, p. [355] sq.—The attitude of the Church towards private war, p. [356].—The Truce of God, p. [357].—The main cause of the abolition of private war was the increase of the authority of emperors or kings, p. [357] sq.—War looked upon as a judgment of God, p. [358].—The attitude adopted by the great Christian congregations towards war one of sympathetic approval, pp. [359]–362.—Religious protests against war, pp. [362]–365.—Freethinkers’ opposition to war, pp. [365]–367.—The idea of a perpetual peace, p. [367].—The awakening spirit of nationalism, and the glorification of war, p. [367] sq.—Arguments against arbitration, p. [368].—The opposition against war rapidly increasing, p. [368] sq.—The prohibition of needless destruction in war, p. [369] sq.—The survival, in modern civilisation, of the old feeling that the life of a foreigner is not equally sacred with that of a countryman, p. [370].—The behaviour of European colonists towards coloured races, p. [370] sq.

[CHAPTER XVI]

HOMICIDE IN GENERAL (concluded)

Sympathetic resentment felt on account of the injury suffered by the victim a potent cause of the condemnation of homicide, p. [372] sq.—No such resentment felt if the victim is a member of another group, p. [373].—Why extra-tribal homicide is approved of, [ibid.]—Superstition an encouragement to extra-tribal homicide, [ibid.]—The expansion of the altruistic sentiment largely explains why the prohibition of homicide has come to embrace more and more comprehensive circles of men, [ibid.]—Homicide viewed as an injury inflicted upon the survivors, p. [373] sq.—Conceived as a breach of the “King’s peace,” p. [374].—Stigmatised as a disturbance of public tranquillity and an outrage on public safety, [ibid.]—Homicide disapproved of because the manslayer gives trouble to his own people, p. [374] sq.—The idea that a manslayer is unclean, pp. [375]–377.—The influence which this idea has exercised on the moral judgment of homicide, p. [377].—The disapproval of the deed easily enhanced by the spiritual danger attending on it, as also by the inconvenient restrictions laid on the tabooed manslayer and the ceremonies of purification to which he is subject, p. [377] sq.—The notion of a persecuting ghost may be replaced by the notion of an avenging god, pp. [378]–380.—The defilement resulting from homicide particularly shunned by gods, p. [380] sq.—Priests forbidden to shed human blood, p. [381] sq.—Reasons for Christianity’s high regard for human life, p. [382].

[CHAPTER XVII]

THE KILLING OF PARENTS, SICK PERSONS, CHILDREN—FETICIDE

Parricide the most aggravated form of murder, pp. [383]–386.—The custom of abandoning or killing parents who are worn out with age or disease, p. [386] sq.—Its causes, pp. [387]–390.—The custom of abandoning or killing persons suffering from some illness, p. [391] sq.—Its causes, p. [392] sq.—The father’s power of life and death over his children, p. [393] sq.—Infanticide among many savage races permitted or even enjoined by custom, pp. [394]–398.—The causes of infanticide, and how it has grown into a regular custom, pp. [398]–402.—Among many savages infanticide said to be unheard of or almost so, p. [402] sq.—The custom of infanticide not a survival of earliest savagery, but seems to have grown up under specific conditions in later stages of development, p. [403].—Savages who disapprove of infanticide, p. [403] sq.—The custom of infanticide in most cases requires that the child should be killed immediately or soon after its birth, p. [404] sq.—Infanticide among semi-civilised or civilised races, pp. [405]–411.—The practice of exposing new-born infants vehemently denounced by the early Fathers of the Church, p. [411].—Christian horror of infanticide, p. [411] sq.—The punishment of infanticide in Christian countries, p. [412] sq.—Feticide among savages, p. [413] sq.—Among more civilised nations, p. [414] sq.—According to Christian views, a form of murder, p. [415] sq.—Distinctions between an embryo informatus and an embryo formatus, p. [416] sq.—Modern legislation and opinion concerning feticide, p. [417].

[CHAPTER XVIII]

THE KILLING OF WOMEN, AND OF SLAVES—THE CRIMINALITY OF HOMICIDE INFLUENCED BY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS

The husband’s power of life and death over his wife among many of the lower races, p. [418] sq.—The right of punishing his wife capitally not universally granted to the husband in uncivilised communities, p. [419].—The husband’s power of life and death among peoples of a higher type, [ibid.]—Uxoricide punished less severely than matricide, p. [419] sq.—The estimate of a woman’s life sometimes lower than that of a man’s, sometimes equal to it, sometimes higher, p. [420] sq.—The master’s power of life and death over his slave, p. [421] sq.—The right, among many savages, of killing his slave at his own discretion expressly denied to the master, p. [422] sq.—The murder of another person’s slave largely regarded as an offence against the property of the owner, but not exclusively looked upon in this light, p. [423].—When the system of blood-money prevails, the price paid for the life of a slave less than that paid for the life of a freeman, [ibid.]—Among the nations of archaic culture, also, the life of a slave held in less estimation than that of a freeman, but not even the master in all circumstances allowed to put his slave to death, pp. [423]–426.—Efforts of the Christian Church to secure the life of the slave against the violence of the master, p. [426].—But neither the ecclesiastical nor the secular legislation gave him the same protection as was bestowed upon the free member of the Church and State, pp. [426]–428.—In modern times, in Christian countries, the life of the negro slave was only inadequately protected by law, p. [428] sq.—Why the life of a slave is held in so little regard, p. [429].—The killing of a freeman by a slave, especially if the victim be his owner, commonly punished more severely than if the same act were done by a free person, p. [429] sq.—In the estimate of life a distinction also made between different classes of freemen, p. [430] sq.—The magnitude of the crime may depend not only on the rank of the victim, but on the rank of the manslayer as well, pp. [431]–433.—Explanation of this influence of class, p. [433].—In progressive societies each member of the society at last admitted to be born with an equal claim to the right to live, [ibid.]

[CHAPTER XIX]

HUMAN SACRIFICE

The prevalence of human sacrifice, pp. [434]–436.—This practice much more frequently found among barbarians and semi-civilised peoples than among genuine savages, p. [436] sq.—Among some peoples it has been noticed to become increasingly prevalent in the course of time, p. [437].—Human sacrifice partly due to the idea that gods have an appetite for human flesh or blood, p. [437] sq.—Sometimes connected with the idea that gods require attendants, p. [438].—Moreover, an angry god may be appeased simply by the death of him or those who aroused his anger, or of some representative of the offending community, or of somebody belonging to the kin of the offender, pp. [438]–440.—Human sacrifice chiefly a method of life-insurance, based on the idea of substitution, p. [440].—Human victims offered in war, before a battle, or during a siege, p. [440] sq.—For the purpose of stopping or preventing epidemics, p. [441] sq.—For the purpose of putting an end to a devastating famine, p. [442] sq.—For the purpose of preventing famine, p. [443] sq.—Criticism of Dr. Frazer’s hypothesis that the human victim who is killed for the purpose of ensuring good crops is regarded as a representative of the corn-spirit and is slain as such, pp. [444]–451.—Human victims offered with a view to getting water, p. [451] sq.—With a view to averting perils arising from the sea or from rivers, pp. [452]–454.—For the purpose of preventing the death of some particular individual, especially a chief or a king, from sickness, old age, or other circumstances, pp. [454]–457.—For the purpose of helping other men into existence, p. [457] sq.—The killing of the first-born child, or the first-born son, p. [458] sq.—Explanation of this practice, pp. [459]–461.—Human sacrifices offered in connection with the foundation of buildings, p. [461] sq.—The building-sacrifice, like other kinds of human sacrifice, probably based on the idea of substitution, pp. [462]–464.—The belief that the soul of the victim is converted into a protecting demon, p. [464] sq.—The human victim regarded as a messenger, p. [465] sq.—Human sacrifice not an act of wanton cruelty, p. [466].—The king or chief sometimes sacrificed, [ibid.]—The victims frequently prisoners of war or other aliens, or slaves, or criminals, pp. [466]–468.—The disappearance of human sacrifice, p. [468].—Human sacrifice condemned, p. [465] sq.—Practices intended to replace it, p. [469].—Human effigies or animals offered instead of men, p. [469] sq.—Human sacrifices succeeded by practices involving the effusion of human blood without loss of life, p. [470].—Bleeding or mutilation practised for the same purpose as human sacrifice, p. [470] sq.—Why the penal sacrifice of offenders has outlived all other forms of human sacrifice, p. [471].—Human beings sacrificed to the dead in order to serve them as slaves, wives, or companions, pp. [472]–474.—This custom dwindling into a survival, p. [475].—The funeral sacrifice of men and animals also seems to involve an intention to vivify the spirits of the deceased with blood, p. [475] sq.—Manslayers killed in order to satisfy their victims’ craving for revenge, p. [476].

[CHAPTER XX]

BLOOD-REVENGE AND COMPENSATION—THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH

The prevalence of the custom of blood-revenge, pp. [477]–479.—Blood-revenge regarded not only as a right, but as a duty, p. [479] sq.—This duty in the first place regarded as a duty to the dead, whose spirit is believed to find no rest after death until the injury has been avenged, p. [481] sq.—Blood-revenge a form of human sacrifice, p. [482].—Blood-revenge also practised on account of the injury inflicted on the survivors, p. [482] sq.—Murder committed within the family or kin left unavenged, p. [483].—The injury inflicted on the relatives of the murdered man suggests not only revenge, but reparation, [ibid.]—The taking of life for life may itself, in a way, serve as compensation, p. [483] sq.—Various methods of compensation, p. [484].—The advantages of the practice of composition, p. [484] sq.—Its disadvantages, p. [485].—The importance of these disadvantages depends on the circumstances in each special case, p. [486] sq.—Among many peoples the rule of revenge strictly followed, and to accept compensation considered disgraceful, p. [487].—The acceptance of compensation does not always mean that the family of the slain altogether renounce their right of revenge, p. [487] sq.—The acceptance of compensation allowed as a justifiable alternative for blood-revenge, or even regarded as the proper method of settling the case, p. [488] sq.—The system of compensation partly due to the pressure of some intervening authority, p. [489] sq.—The adoption of this method for the settling of disputes a sign of weakness, p. [491].—When the central power of jurisdiction is firmly established, the rule of life for life regains its sway, [ibid.]—A person may forfeit his right to live by other crimes besides homicide, p. [491] sq.—Opposition to and arguments against capital punishment, pp. [492]–495.—Modern legislation has undergone a radical change with reference to capital punishment, p. [495].—Arguments against its abolition, p. [495] sq.—The chief motive for retaining it in modern legislation, p. [496].

[CHAPTER XXI]

THE DUEL

Duelling resorted to as a means of bringing to an end hostilities between different groups of people, p. [497] sq.—Duels fought for the purpose of settling disputes between individuals, either by conferring on the victor the right of possessing the object of the strife, or by gratifying a craving for revenge and wiping off the affront, pp. [498]–502.—The circumstances to which these customs are due, p. [503] sq.—The duel as an ordeal or “judgment of God,” p. [504] sq.—The judicial duel fundamentally derived its efficacy as a means of ascertaining the truth from its connection with an oath, p. [505] sq. How it came to be regarded as an appeal to the justice of God, p. [506] sq.—The decline and disappearance of the judicial duel, p. [507].—The modern duel of honour, pp. [507]–509.—Its causes, p. [509].—Arguments adduced in support of it, p. [509] sq.

[CHAPTER XXII]

BODILY INJURIES

In the case of bodily injuries the magnitude of the offence, other things being equal, proportionate to the harm inflicted, pp. [511]–513.—The degree of the offence also depends on the station of the parties concerned, and in some cases the infliction of pain held allowable or even a duty, p. [513].—Children using violence against their parents, [ibid.]—Parents’ right to inflict corporal punishment on their children, p. [513] sq.—The husband’s right to chastise his wife, pp. [514]–516.—The master’s right to inflict corporal punishment on his slave, p. [516] sq.—The maltreatment of another person’s slave regarded as an injury done to the master, rather than to the slave, p. [517].—Slaves severely punished for inflicting bodily injuries on freemen, p. [510].—The penalties or fines for bodily injuries influenced by the class or rank of the parties when both of them are freemen, p. [518] sq.—Distinction between compatriots and aliens with reference to bodily injuries, p. [519].—The infliction of sufferings on vanquished enemies, p. [519] sq.—The right to bodily integrity influenced by religious differences, p. [520]—Forfeited by the commission of a crime, p. [520] sq.—Amputation or mutilation of the offending member has particularly been in vogue among peoples of culture, p. [521] sq.—The disappearance of corporal punishment in Europe, p. [522].—Corporal punishment has been by preference a punishment for poor and common people or slaves, p. [522] sq.—The status of a person influencing his right to bodily integrity with reference to judicial torture, p. [523] sq.—Explanation of the moral notions regarding the infliction of bodily injuries, p. [524].—The notions that an act of bodily violence involves a gross insult, and that corporal punishment disgraces the criminal more than any other form of penalty, p. [524] sq.

[CHAPTER XXIII]

CHARITY AND GENEROSITY

The mother’s duty to rear her children, p. [526].—The husband’s and father’s duty to protect and support his family, pp. [526]–529.—The parents’ duty of taking care of their offspring in the first place based on the sentiment of parental affection, p. [529].—The universality not only of the maternal, but of the paternal, sentiment in mankind, pp. [529]–532.—Marital affection among savages, p. [532].—Explanation of the simplest paternal and marital duties, p. [533]—Children’s duty of supporting their aged parents, pp. [533]–538. The duty of assisting brothers and sisters, p. [538].—Of assisting more distant relatives, pp. [538]–540.—Uncivilised peoples as a rule described as kind towards members of their own community or tribe, enjoin charity between themselves as a duty, and praise generosity as a virtue, pp. [540]–546.—Among many savages the old people, in particular, have a claim to support and assistance, p. [546].—The sick often carefully attended to, pp. [546]–548.—Accounts of uncharitable savages, p. [548] sq.—Among semi-civilised and civilised nations charity universally regarded as a duty, and often strenuously enjoined by their religions, pp. [549]–556.—In the course of progressing civilisation the obligation of assisting the needy has been extended to wider and wider circles of men, pp. [556]–558.—The duty of tending wounded enemies in war, p. [558].—Explanation of the gradual expansion of the duty of charity, p. [559].—This duty in the first place based on the altruistic sentiment, p. [559] sq.—Egoistic motives for the doing of good to fellow-creatures, p. [560].—By niggardliness a person may expose himself to supernatural dangers, pp. [560]–562.—Liberality may entail supernatural reward, p. [562] sq.—The curses and blessings of the poor partly account for the fact that charity has come to be regarded as a religious duty, pp. [563]–565.—The chief cause of the extraordinary stress which the higher religions put on the duty of charity seems to lie in the connection between almsgiving and sacrifice, the poor becoming the natural heirs of the god, p. [565].—Instances of sacrificial food being left for, or distributed among, the poor, p. [565] sq.—Almsgiving itself regarded as a form of sacrifice, or taking the place of it, pp. [566]–569.

[CHAPTER XXIV]

HOSPITALITY

Instances of great kindness displayed by savages towards persons of a foreign race, pp. [570]–572.—Hospitality a universal custom among the lower races and among the peoples of culture at the earlier stages of their civilisation, pp. [572]–574.—The stranger treated with special marks of honour, and enjoying extraordinary privileges as a guest, pp. [574]–576.—Custom may require that hospitality should be shown even to an enemy, p. [576] sq.—To protect a guest looked upon as a most stringent duty, p. [577] sq.—Hospitality in a remarkable degree associated with religion, pp. [578]–580.—The rules of hospitality in the main based on egoistic considerations, p. [581].—The stranger, supposed to bring with him good luck or blessings, pp. [581]–583.—The blessings of a stranger considered exceptionally powerful, p. [583] sq.—The visiting stranger regarded as a potential source of evil, p. [584].—His evil wishes and curses greatly feared, owing partly to his quasi-supernatural character, partly to the close contact in which he comes with the host and his belongings, pp. [584]–590.—Precautions taken against the visiting stranger, pp. [590]–593.—Why no payment is received from a guest, p. [593] sq.—The duty of hospitality limited by time, p. [594] sq.—The cause of this, p. [595] sq.—The decline of hospitality in progressive communities, p. [596].

[CHAPTER XXV]

THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN

The right of personal freedom never absolute, p. [597].—Among some savages a man’s children are in the power of the head of their mother’s family or of their maternal uncle, p. [597] sq.—Among the great bulk of existing savages children are in the power of their father, though he may to some extent have to share his authority with the mother, p. [598] sq.—The extent of the father’s power subject to great variations, p. [599].—Among some savages the father’s authority practically very slight, p. [599] sq.—Other savages by no means deficient in filial piety, p. [600] sq.—The period during which the paternal authority lasts, p. [601] sq.—Old age commands respect and gives authority, pp. [603]–605.—Superiority of age also gives a certain amount of power, p. [605] sq.—The reverence for old age may cease when the grey-head becomes an incumbrance to those around him, and imbecility may put an end to the father’s authority over his family, p. [606] sq.—Paternal, or parental, authority and filial reverence at their height among peoples of archaic culture, pp. [607]–613.—Among these peoples we also meet with reverence for the elder brother, for persons of a superior age generally, and especially for the aged, p. [614] sq.—Decline of the paternal authority in Europe, p. [615] sq.—Christianity not unfavourable to the emancipation of children, though obedience to parents was enjoined as a Christian duty, p. [616] sq.—The Roman notions of paternal rights and filial duties have to some extent survived in Latin countries, p. [617] sq.—Sources of the parental authority, p. [618] sq.—Among savages, in particular, filial regard is largely regard for one’s elders or the aged, p. [619].—Causes of the regard for old age, pp. [619]–621.—The chief cause of the connection between filial submissiveness and religious beliefs the extreme importance attached to parental curses and blessings, pp. [621]–626.—Why the blessings and curses of parents are supposed to possess an unusual power, p. [626] sq.—Explanation of the extraordinary development of the paternal authority in the archaic State, p. [627] sq.—Causes of the downfall of the paternal power, p. [628].

[CHAPTER XXVI]

THE SUBJECTION OF WIVES

Among the lower races the wife frequently said to be the property or slave of her husband, p. [629] sq.—Yet even in such cases custom has not left her entirely destitute of rights, p. [630] sq.—The so-called absolute authority of husbands over their wives not to be taken too literally, p. [631] sq.—The bride-price does not eo ipso confer on the husband absolute rights over her, p. [632] sq.—The hardest drudgeries of life often said to be imposed on the women, p. [633] sq.—In early society each sex has its own pursuits, p. [634].—The rules according to which the various occupations of life are divided between the sexes are on the whole in conformity with the indications given by nature, p. [635] sq.—This division of labour emphasised by custom and superstition, p. [636] sq.—It is apt to mislead the travelling stranger, p. [637].—It gives the wife authority within the circle which is exclusively her own, [ibid.]—Rejection of the broad statement that the lower races in general hold their women in a state of almost complete subjection, pp. [638]–646.—The opinion that a people’s civilisation may be measured by the position held by the women not correct, at least so far as the earlier stages of culture are concerned, p. [646] sq.—The position of woman among the peoples of archaic civilisation, pp. [647]–653.—Christianity tended to narrow the remarkable liberty granted to married women under the Roman Empire, p. [653] sq.—Christian orthodoxy opposed to the doctrine that marriage should be a contract on the footing of perfect equality between husband and wife, p. [654] sq.—Criticism of the hypothesis that the social status of women is connected with the system of tracing descent, p. [655] sq.—The authority of a husband who lives with his wife in the house or community of her father, p. [656] sq.—Wives’ subjection to their husbands in the first place due to the men’s instinctive desire to exert power, and to the natural inferiority of women in such qualities of body and mind as are essential for personal independence, p. [657].—Elements in the sexual impulse which lead to domination on the part of the man and to submission on the part of the woman, p. [657] sq.—But if the man’s domination is carried beyond the limits of female love, the woman feels it as a burden, p. [658] sq.—In extreme cases of oppression, at any rate, the community at large would sympathise with her, and the public resentment against the oppressor would result in customs or laws limiting the husband’s rights, p. [659].—The offended woman may count upon the support of her fellow-sisters, [ibid.]—The children’s affection and regard for their mother gives her power, [ibid.]—The influence which economic conditions exercise on the position of woman, pp. [659]–661.—The status of wives connected with the ideas held about the female sex in general, p. [661].—Woman regarded as intellectually and morally vastly inferior to man, especially among nations more advanced in culture, pp. [661]–663.—Progress in civilisation has exercised an unfavourable influence on the position of woman by widening the gulf between the sexes, p. [663].—Religion has contributed to her degradation by regarding her as unclean, p. [663] sq.—Women excluded from religious worship and sacred functions, pp. [664]–666.—The notion that woman is unclean, however, gives her a secret power over her husband, as women are supposed to be better versed in magic than men, pp. [666]–668.—The curses of women greatly feared, p. [668].—Woman as an asylum, p. [668] sq.—In archaic civilisation the status of married women was affected by the fact that the house-father was invested with some part of the power which formerly belonged to the clan, p. [669].—Causes of the decrease of the husband’s authority over his wife in modern civilisation, [ibid.]

[CHAPTER XXVII]

SLAVERY

Definition of slavery, p. [670] sq.—The distribution of slavery and its causes among savages, pp. [671]–674.—The earliest source of slavery was probably war or conquest, p. [674] sq.—Intra-tribal slavery among savages, p. [675] sq.—The master’s power over his slave among slave-holding savages, pp. [676]–678.—Among the lower races slaves are generally treated kindly, pp. [678]–680.—Intra-tribal slaves, especially such as are born in the house, generally treated better than extra-tribal or purchased slaves, p. [680] sq.—Slavery among the nations of archaic culture, pp. [681]–693.—The attitude of Christianity towards slavery, pp. [693]–700.—The supposed causes of the extinction of slavery in Europe, pp. [697]–701.—The chief cause the transformation of slavery into serfdom, p. [701].—Serfdom only a transitory condition leading up to a state of entire liberty, pp. [701]–703.—The attitude of the Church towards serfdom, p. [703] sq.—The negro slavery in the colonies of European countries and the Southern States of America, and the legislation relating to it, pp. [704]–711.—The support given to it by the clergy, pp. [711]–713.—The want of sympathy for, or positive antipathy to, the coloured race, p. [713] sq.—The opinions regarding slavery and the condition of slaves influenced by altruistic considerations, p. [714] sq.—The condition of slaves influenced by the selfish considerations of their masters, p. [715] sq.