PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE present edition is only a reprint of the first, with a few inaccurate expressions corrected.

E. W.

LONDON,
July, 1912.

[CONTENTS]

[INTRODUCTORY]

The origin of the present investigation, p. [1].—Its subject-matter, p. [1] sq.—Its practical usefulness, p. [2] sq.

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. [4]–6.—The assumed universality or “objectivity” of moral judgments, p. [6] sq.—Theories according to which the moral predicates derive all their import from reason, “theoretical” or “practical,” p. [7] sq.—Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments, no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. [8] sq.—This tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p. [9].—Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of a purely intellectual character, pp. [9]–11.—Differences of an emotional origin, pp. [11]–13.—Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. [13].—The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority ascribed to moral rules, p. [14].—The origin and nature of this authority, pp. [14]–17.—General moral truths non-existent, p. [17] sq.—The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. [18].—The supposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. [18]–20.

[CHAPTER II]

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and approval, p. [21].—The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a sub-species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly emotion, [ibid.]—Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind toward a cause of pain, p. [22] sq.—Dr. Steinmetz’s suggestion that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally “undirected,” pp. [23]–27.—The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this hypothesis, pp. [27]–30.—The collective responsibility usually involved in the institution of the blood-feud, pp. [30]–32.—Explanation of it, pp. [32]–35.—The strong tendency to discrimination which characterises resentment not wholly lost even behind the veil of common responsibility, p. [35] sq.—Revenge among the lower animals, p. [37] sq.—Violation of the “self-feeling” a common incentive to resentment, p. [38] sq.—But the reaction of the wounded “self-feeling” not necessarily, in the first place, concerned with the infliction of pain, p. [39] sq.—Revenge only a link in a chain of emotional phenomena for which “non-moral resentment” may be used as a common name, p. [40].—The origin of these phenomena, pp. [40]–42.—Moral indignation closely connected with anger, p. [42] sq.—Moral indignation, like non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards the cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction sometimes turns against innocent persons, pp. [43]–48.—In their administration of justice gods still more indiscriminate than men, pp. [48]–51.—Reasons for this, p. [51] sq.—Sin looked upon in the light of a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy, pp. [52]–57.—The curse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or destroying anybody to whom it cleaves, p. [57] sq.—The tendency of curses to spread, pp. [58]–60.—Their tendency to contaminate those who derive their origin from the infected individual, p. [60] sq.—The vicarious suffering involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with vicarious expiatory sacrifice, p. [61].—Why scapegoats are sometimes killed, pp. [61]–64.—Why sacrificial victims are sometimes used as scapegoats, p. [64] sq.—Vicarious expiatory sacrifices, pp. [65]–67.—The victim accepted as a substitute on the principle of social solidarity, p. [67] sq.—Expiatory sacrifices offered as ransoms, p. [68] sq.—Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction of penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. [70]–72.

[CHAPTER III]

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (continued)

Whilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent, its aggressive character has become more disguised, p. [73].—Kindness to enemies not a rule in early ethics, p. [73] sq.—At the higher stages of moral development retaliation condemned and forgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty, pp. [74]–77.—The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically opposed to each other, p. [77] sq.—Why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives, p. [78] sq.—The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become more disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays itself, p. [79].—Retributive punishment condemned, and the end of punishment considered to be either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal, or to repress crime by eliminating or secluding him, pp. [79]–81.—Objections to these theories, p. [82] sq.—Facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between the theory of retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. [84]–91.—The aggressive element in moral disapproval has undergone a change which tends to conceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it discharges itself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn against the will rather than against the willer, p. [91] sq.—Yet it is the instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its most important characteristic, p. [92] sq.—Retributive kindly emotion a friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure, p. [93] sq.—Retributive kindly emotion among the lower animals, p. [94].—Its intrinsic object, p. [94] sq.—The want of discrimination which is sometimes found in retributive kindness, p. [95].—Moral approval a kind of retributive kindly emotion, [ibid.]—Moral approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving individuals for the merits of others, pp. [95]–97.—Explanation of this, p. [97] sq.—Protests against the notion of vicarious merit, p. [98] sq.

[CHAPTER IV]

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (concluded)

Refutation of the opinion that moral emotions only arise in consequence of moral judgments, p. [100] sq.—However, moral judgments, being definite expressions of moral emotions, help us to discover the true nature of these emotions, p. [101].—Disinterestedness and apparent impartiality characteristics by which moral indignation and approval are distinguished from other, non-moral, kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion, pp. [101]–104.—Besides, a moral emotion has a certain flavour of generality, p. [104] sq.—The analysis of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this and the two preceding chapters holds true not only of such emotions as we feel on account of the conduct of others, but of such emotions as we feel on account of our own conduct as well, pp. [105]–107.

[CHAPTER V]

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest, p. [108].—Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. [109] sq.—Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions, p. [110] sq.—Sympathetic resentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. [111] sq.—Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. [113] sq.—Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. [114]–116.—Disinterested antipathies, p. [116] sq.—Sympathy springing from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion, p. [117].—Disinterested likings, [ibid.]—Why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions, p. [117] sq.—Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct, p. [118].—Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. [118] sq.—In early society customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. [119].—The characteristics of moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. [120].—Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality, p. [120] sq.—Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a moral rule, p. [121] sq.—As public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. [122].—Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of any special society, p. [122] sq.—Yet they remain to the last public emotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. [123].—Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been the individual’s own conscience, p. [123] sq.—The antiquity of moral resentment, p. [124].—The supposition that remorse is unknown among the lower races contradicted by facts, p. [124] sq.—Criticism of Lord Avebury’s statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in moral feeling, pp. [125]–129.—The antiquity of moral approval, p. [129] sq.