The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

by Edwin A. Pratt

Transvaal Railways and the War

To the foregoing account of the British use of railways for military purposes during the course of the South African War it may be of interest to add a few notes giving the experiences of the Boers, as detailed in a statement on "The Netherlands South African Railway Company and the Transvaal War," drawn up at Pretoria, in April, 1900, by the Secretary of the Company, Mr. Th. Steinnetz, and published in De Ingenieur of July 14 and 21, 1900.[46]

Under the terms of the concession granted to the Netherlands South African Railway Company (otherwise the Nederland Zuid Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij) by the Government of the Transvaal Republic, the latter were, in the event either of war or of danger of war, to have complete control alike over the railway and over everything—and everybody—necessary for its use, subject to certain undertakings as to the payment of compensation to concessionaires. By virtue of these powers the Executive Raad issued a decree on September 13, 1899, establishing Government control over the lines, and stating further:—"With the view of ensuring that proper use can be made of the railway, the whole of the personnel of the company are ... commandeered to do duty on the railways in the functions they now occupy, and they are placed under the orders of the Commandant-General and the war officers indicated by him, or of other officials." The Government, in effect, took possession of all the lines, rolling stock, workshops and other properties of the railway company for the purposes of military transport, and they assumed control over the staff in order to ensure the working, not only of the company's own lines, but, also, of the lines in such portions of British territory as might be occupied by the forces of the Republic.

Against the possibility of an immediate invasion of the Transvaal—"about which," says the statement, "there was much anxiety on account of the armoured trains, which the English advertised so loudly"—precautions were taken by preparing for demolition some of the bridges on the south-eastern section of the company's lines. Guards were, also, stationed at bridges and other important points throughout the Transvaal in order to protect them against attack or interference by "the great number of Anglophiles" assumed to be still in the Republic; but the statement seems to suggest that, as shown by the small number of attempts made in this direction, the British rather neglected their opportunities.

In regard to the transport of Transvaal troops, difficulties arose at the outset owing to the absence of data, even of the vaguest character, as to the numbers of burghers, horses and wagons it would be necessary to convey by train. Consequently, no military time-tables could be drawn up, and the traffic demands were met as best they could be when they were made. No more, however, than eleven trains a day, in each direction, could be run on the south-eastern branch—a single-track line, with stations and crossing places about one hour's journey apart. Concerning the amount of traffic carried, Mr. Steinnetz says:—

The total military traffic to the frontier was not so great as one would expect, in spite of only a portion of the burghers having taken up arms. From various districts the commandos marched mounted, with ox-wagons, to the place of assembly, as had been the custom in the past, although the use of the railway would have saved time and trouble to both horses and men. Yet it was not the first time that the Transvaalers had had the opportunity of learning the use of railways in warfare. At the time of the Jameson Raid and the Magato Campaign full use had been made of them.

Among the railway bridges which the Boers had prepared for destruction, in case of need, was an iron one of 116 ft. span, the blowing up of which would have checked the anticipated British invasion of the Transvaal via Lang's Nek; but the concentration of the British forces at Dundee and Ladysmith allowed the Boers to enter Natal without resistance; and they took over, in sections, the working of the Natal railway in proportion as they advanced. At various stations in northern Natal long platforms had been specially constructed by the British, and other arrangements made, to permit of large movements of troops and especially the detraining of cavalry. These improvements, says Mr. Steinnetz, came in very handy for the Federal Army. The personnel of the lines had "retired in a great hurry," without attempting any demolitions or doing any damage to the lines beyond what could be easily repaired. The Lang's Nek tunnel was "wholly untouched." Mr. Steinnetz continues:—

The Boers themselves, however, through fear of being surprised by armoured trains, and for other reasons, gave the breakdown gangs more work to do. The telegraph line was destroyed by them for long distances, the track was broken up and two bridges were damaged. In order to obstruct the retreat of General Yule from Dundee a bridge of two 30-foot spans on the Dundee branch line was blown up by the Irish Brigade with a dynamite charge in the central pier. The damage done was not very great and was easily repaired. The same ineffective measure was applied with greater success to a similar bridge over a small spruit near Waschbank. But even here the repair was not difficult.

These admissions as to the ease with which the work of destruction could, as a rule, readily be put right again are in full accord with Sir Percy Girouard's report, in dealing with the same subject. It is only fair to accept, in turn, the assertion made by Mr. Steinnetz that the damage which the British did to certain of the railway bridges was "speedily repaired."

Some of the later destruction work carried out by the Boers was of a more serious character. The blowing up of the Tugela bridge at Colenso—a structure consisting of five iron lattice girder spans of 100 ft. each on masonry piles—was entrusted by the Boer military authorities to an inspector of the railway company who had served in the Dutch engineers. It was accomplished by the simultaneous detonation of forty dynamite charges all connected by leads to a Siemens and Halske "exploder," the bridge being "thoroughly demolished." In the destruction of the three-span bridge over the Orange River at Norval's Pont the charge employed consisted of about three and a half chests of dynamite, or 198 lbs. Concerning the general destruction of bridges by which the Boers sought to check pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of Ladysmith, Mr. Steinnitz says:—"There was no lack of explosives, and no need to spare them."

The central workshops of the Netherlands Company were made use of by the Government for the repair of guns, rifles, wagons, etc., and for the manufacture of war material. Four complete ambulance trains were also fitted up there for the use of wounded burghers.

All the traffic on the lines was done on Government orders, and all expenses were charged to them. No private traffic at all was carried. There were, consequently, no railway receipts, and the railway company had no responsibility.