INTRODUCTION.
Having in the Preface stated the plan of this volume, it is incumbent on the Author now to acknowledge, with gratitude, the assistance he has received during its execution. Acting on a suggestion made by one of the reviewers of the first volume, he has noted in the margin the various authorities on which the narrative is based; and, as in many instances these are manuscript letters in the Record Office, he has given the dates of such,—to facilitate access to them by any one anxious to obtain information in detail.
Among those to whom the Author is chiefly indebted, Sir Collingwood Dickson—for the reason stated in the body of the work—stands first. Not only the Author, but the Regiment at large, is indebted to him for the generous confidence with which he entrusted the letters and journals of his distinguished father to the writer of this history. The labours of Captain G. E. W. Malet, R.A.—so visible in the tables at the end of this volume—demand the next place in the Author’s acknowledgment;—and the Reader will be able to judge how great has been the value, to this narrative, of the published writings of Captain H. W. L. Hime, R.A.
Sir J. Bloomfield, Sir E. C. Warde, Sir D. E. Wood, General Burke Cuppage, Major-Generals W. J. Smythe and C. J. B. Riddell, Colonel Lynedoch Gardiner, Major H. Geary, and Lieutenant J. Ritchie, have contributed valuable information connected with the history of the Regiment to which they belong, and have greatly facilitated the Author’s labours. The assistance of Sir Edward Perrott, and of Captain H. W. Gordon, C.B., is also gratefully acknowledged.
To Mr. James Browne, the author of ‘England’s Artillerymen’ a double debt is owing. His labour produced the Index to the first volume; and his published work has been a mine of reference, the value of which became more apparent, the more it was explored. Written without the adventitious aids at the disposal of the custodian of the Regimental Records, it is yet so exhaustive and accurate, that, when admiration of it has ceased, it is only because that feeling has passed into envy.
The admirable Index to the present volume is due to the skill, ability, and industry, eminently possessed by the Assistant-Superintendent in the Record Office, R. H. Murdoch, Esq., R.A. These talents were generously placed at the Author’s disposal, with a view to this work being made as complete as possible.
The conducting a work of this description through the press,—although the last occupation in point of time,—is not the least in point of importance. Careful comparison with the MSS.,—much patient and merely mechanical labour,—and watchfulness, lest errors of style should be overlooked in the anxiety to secure rigid accuracy, or lest the latter should be sacrificed to attempts at literary embellishment,—all these are involved in the process. And all these have been displayed by one who has assisted in this operation,—the Rev. G. Martyn Ritchie, Chaplain to the Forces, whose services the Author acknowledges with gratitude.
Not unfrequently the official letter-books differ from Kane’s List of Officers in the spelling of proper names. Where the correct reading is doubtful, that found in the letter-books is given in the body of the work, and both are given in the Index.
History moves so rapidly, that even while this work has been in the press, a slight alteration in the pay of the non-commissioned officers and men of the Regiment has been made, making the rates given in the following pages as those of the year 1873, accurate only up to the 1st of October in that year. The reader can with ease make the requisite corrections.
HISTORY
OF THE
ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.
CHAPTER I.
Reaction.
Reaction and retrenchment followed the Peace signed at Versailles in 1783; and with them came dullness and despondency in the Regiment. Until 1787, when the state of France caused universal alarm in Europe, and preparations for possible hostilities already commenced in England, the prospects of promotion had been most disheartening. During the American War, a large number of subaltern officers had been appointed by the Generals serving with the English armies, and it was found, in 1783, that in this respect the establishment of the Regiment had been considerably exceeded. With somewhat distorted ideas of justice, it was ruled that the pay of the supernumeraries should be provided by means of stoppages from the officers of all ranks on the proper establishment, and that no new appointments should be made until all the supernumeraries had been absorbed,—an event which did not take place until the 14th February, 1786.
Dullness, therefore, reigned during these years in the Warren at Woolwich,—dullness in the Academy,—dullness in foreign stations, where the detachments were at times forgotten altogether,—and dullness the most stupendous in the offices of His Majesty’s Ordnance.
Uneventful, however, as this period of the Regimental History undoubtedly was, it possesses to the student a peculiar interest. Its domestic details invite attention, as representing the transition stage of the Regiment from a past which had been glorious, to a future which was to be more glorious still,—the last act, so to speak, of a drama in which Artillery meant many things, but rarely implied mobility; and a breathing-time, which admitted of much internal organisation being perfected, which had been forgotten or overlooked in the midst of war.
In the years between 1783 and 1792 there was much to interest, much to amuse, and not a little to cause pain; but the details, although necessary to be told, are wholly domestic.
The strength of the Regiment remained until 1791 at four Service Battalions, each consisting of ten companies, and ten companies of invalids. In March 1791, two additional companies were formed for service in the East Indies, but they belonged to no particular Battalion. The companies, which had been reduced to a minimum in 1783, were raised to a greater establishment in 1787, a year in which recruiting on a considerable scale was ordered, and never was wholly suspended until after Waterloo. The bounty allowed to each R. A. Regl. Orders.recruit was five guineas.[1]
The promotion consequent on the formation of the East India Companies mentioned above was as follows:—1 Major, 3 Captains, 5 Captain-Lieutenants, and 9 First Lieutenants.
Letters to the Master-General, 1783-92.
On the reduction in 1783, all men who were eligible were transferred to the invalids, or to the out-pension list; and men who were not entitled to that privilege, but who were ordered to be discharged on reduction, received donations:—“If M. S. Regl. Orders. going to his home in Ireland, 38 days’ pay; to Scotland, 28 days’ pay; and if to any part of England, 14 days’ pay.”
Prior to the general recruiting in 1787, a special company of artificers was raised—in 1786—for service in Gibraltar. As these men were put under the officers of Engineers, a Royal Warrant was issued on the 25th April, 1787, to define the proper position of that Corps, the name of which was then changed from the Corps of Engineers to the Corps of Royal Engineers. The Warrant said: “Our said Corps of Royal Engineers shall rank in our Army with our Royal Regiment of Artillery; and whenever there shall be an occasion for them to take part with any other Corps of our Army, the post of the Royal Corps of Engineers shall be on the right with the Royal Regiment of Artillery, according to the respective dates and commissions of the officers belonging to the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and the Corps of Royal Engineers.”
The vagueness of this Royal Warrant, and the inconveniences which might arise from it, were not lost upon the officers of the senior Corps, who communicated their opinions to the Master-General through Colonel Macbean, the Commandant at Woolwich. On the 25th October, 1787, the Duke of Richmond, having taken His Majesty’s pleasure, replied: Duke of Richmond to Colonel F. Macbean. I have received the King’s commands to acquaint you that His Majesty only meant the said Warrant to relate to the circumstance when officers have occasion to parade by themselves without their men, for a funeral or any other military purpose; but that the directions contained in the said Warrant are not to be understood to authorize any officer of the Corps of Royal Engineers to take the command of any detachment of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, although he may be senior in rank to the oldest officer of the said detachment, unless such officer of the Corps of Royal Engineers should be the senior officer of the whole Garrison or Command, when, by virtue of his commission, he would of course take the command of the Royal Regiment of Artillery with that of other troops. I am further to signify to you His Majesty’s pleasure, that when any companies or detachments of Royal Military Artificers and Labourers are to take post, it is to be next to the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and upon their left. And the officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers are on such occasions to take post and fall in with such companies or detachments of Royal Military Artificers and Labourers.”
Prior to the raising of this question of precedence between the two Ordnance Corps, the general question of precedence over the rest of the Army had been raised at Gibraltar in 1783, owing to the Governor having directed the Artillery Guards to parade in the centre of the others, on general guard-mounting parades. The commanding officer of Artillery, Major Thomas Davies, having in vain protested, referred the matter to the Master-General, who ordered the four Colonels-Commandant of Battalions to assemble at Woolwich, and report to him on the origin of the privilege claimed and exercised by the Royal Artillery. The result was, that on the 1st July, 1784, the Secretary at War wrote to the War Office, 1/7/84, to Sir G. A. Eliott. Governor of Gibraltar as follows: “The Duke of Richmond having put into my hands your letter to him of the 24th February last, together with the papers it refers to, touching certain claims of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, first stated in a representation of the officer commanding that Corps at Gibraltar; and His Grace having desired me to take the King’s pleasure thereon, I have accordingly had the honour of submitting them to His Majesty, and am commanded to acquaint you, that as the privilege claimed by the Royal Artillery of taking the right upon all parades appears to have been acknowledged and confirmed by a Regulation given out in public orders to the Army by His Royal Highness the late Duke of Cumberland, when Commander-in-Chief; and, as that Regulation hath not yet been cancelled, His Majesty considers the same to be still in force, and is therefore pleased to direct that it shall be adhered to on all occasions, when the compliance with it will not be attended with material injury to the public service.”
Next in importance to these questions of precedence, among the Regimental events contained in the period of which this chapter treats, comes the formation of a Head-quarter office for the Regiment. Prior to 1783, each Battalion was ruled by its own Colonel-Commandant, wherever the companies might be serving; and details, which should have been under the control of the senior Artillery officer on the spot, were regulated from a distance. The Ordnance Office was, in one sense, a Head-quarter office for the Regiment; but a want existed of some one military and regimental channel through which the wants and correspondence of the Battalions might reach the Board. In a letter to Captain Macleod, who was the first to hold this much-needed office, the want was well expressed. “The Officer commanding R. A., Canada, to Captain Macleod, 7 Aug., 1783. officers and men of different Battalions, that generally compose commands of Artillery abroad, make the post of a Brigade-Major obviously useful to prevent a multiplicity of returns to different Battalions, which must often fall short of the information required at home. The enclosed return, for instance, will show that we have officers here without a knowledge of what Battalion they belong to.” The appointment of Captain—afterwards Sir John—Macleod was a very fortunate one. He was styled Brigade-Major, when appointed in 1783; and in 1795 the designation was altered to that of Deputy-Adjutant-General. In 1806 an Assistant-Adjutant-General was added to the office; and in 1859, a Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General. When Captain Macleod was first appointed, he was under the orders of the Commandant of Woolwich Garrison; but in a very short time he made himself so useful to the Master-General and the Board, and was so conversant with all those details which could not possibly be familiar to officers, who were so frequently changed, as the Commandants were in those days, that most of the Regimental correspondence soon passed direct between him and the Board. So delicate a position required great tact, and this quality Captain Macleod eminently possessed. Appearing to act under the orders of the Commandant, and courteously anticipating his wishes, he really was the mouthpiece of the Board in controlling the affairs of the Regiment. His correspondence is a masterpiece of courtesy, skill, and clearness. “The leading feature Memoir of Sir J. Macleod, ‘United Service Journal,’ July 1834. of his character was the confidence he inspired in others, and the unbounded trust they reposed in him; and thus, whether called upon for counsel, or to act under unforeseen or sudden emergencies of service, he was ever ready and prepared to meet its exigencies.... Of every soldier he made himself the friend. To his equals in rank he was a brother; to those beneath him a father in kindness and counsel; and to the private soldiers a benefactor, ever watching over their comfort and their welfare.... Throughout his long career he was never known to act with the slightest approach to severity; and yet he never failed to maintain discipline, to reprove fault, or to check irregularity. He animated zeal, excited energy, and aimed at perfecting discipline by always appealing to the better and nobler feelings that prevail with the soldier’s character.” An office, which, with an ordinary man, would have remained always subordinate, was raised by him so as to be the very centre of the Regimental life; and although there have been times in its history, when the progress and success of the Regiment have been rather in spite, than by means of it, these occasions have been rare; and—as in the case of the commencement of the Peninsular War—were forgotten in the exertions which followed them. In a Regiment so large, and so scattered, the value of some central organization, not merely for routine, but also for maintaining and encouraging esprit de corps, can hardly be overrated.
It has been said that Captain Macleod commenced to hold the new office, as a Brigade-Major. It may be added that the ideas of a Brigade-Major’s position were not exalted. From 1783 to 1790, Captain Macleod conducted all his business in one small room, shared by his clerks, two in number; but in 1790, offices having been provided for the Adjutants of the Battalions, who had hitherto been made to work together, the Brigade-Major was allowed the same privilege, and drew lots with the others—according to custom—for a separate apartment. In a long official correspondence, extending over a long lifetime, the only irritation displayed by Sir John Macleod was at the official delays of the Board for which he laboured. But, even then, his indignation took the form of gentle irony. Whether writing, as he did in the end of the year 1786, requesting that his travelling allowances for 1783 might be sent him with as little delay as possible, or reminding the Board of a demand for stationery sent in many months before, he was never disturbed into strong language. “I hope you will forgive me,” he wrote, To B. of Ordnance, 9 Dec., 1784. with reference to his last-named demand, “for begging you to give orders for its going through the different forms with as much expedition as possible, the stationery of last year being now entirely exhausted.” An amusing instance of his quiet way of answering criticism from underlings at the Ordnance occurred in 1785. Many people who had assisted the troops during the American War came to England, and generally applied for Government assistance. A negro, named James Buchanan, presented himself at the Ordnance, and requested assistance, on the plea that he had been employed during the war as a labourer with one of the companies on service. The case was referred to the Brigade-Major, who replied that no such man was to be found on the rolls of the men so employed. The man, still adhering to his statement, was told to go to Woolwich and endeavour to substantiate it. On doing so, he was at once recognized by Captain Macleod as a man who had done duty with his own company; and he reported accordingly.
The opportunity could not be resisted; and some official of the Board wrote an offensive demand for explanation of the contradictory statements made by the Brigade-Major. With quiet sarcasm, Captain Macleod wrote: “The Board will easily understand my inconsistency in disclaiming one day and acknowledging the next, when I inform them that their petitioner has acquired the name of James Buchanan, by being christened since his arrival in England.”
The dullness at the Board, consequent on the retrenchment which had to be practised, was cheered by the genial kindness of the Master-General, the Duke of Richmond, who displayed the greatest interest in the military branch, down to the humblest individual. To the student it is also varied by exasperating anecdotes, illustrating the perfection of official doubt and criticism. The return from America of the companies, many of whose men had been in prison at various periods during the war, offered admirable opportunities for the practice of virtues which were strongly represented at the Honourable Board. To a man landing at Woolwich, the sympathy of the Ordnance took the doubtful form of a peremptory order to refund, it might be, certain moneys which had been drawn for him while a prisoner of war,—their welcome home was a disallowance. As for the Captains of the returning companies, they were allowed no peace. No consideration was given on account of their men having been scattered over a whole continent; the same minuteness of detail, the same superabundance of vouchers for every charge, was demanded, as if their companies had never left Woolwich Warren. One Captain, unable to give the exact dates and sufficient proofs of the deaths of certain men, who had been killed on distant detachments, was rash enough to question the justice of such a demand, and to point out the difficulties in the way of its compliance. Misguided, miserable man! Little did he know the system of audit, which prevailed in the year of grace 1784. Argument was inadmissible; the full pound of flesh, in the form of vouchers and authorities, was insisted on by the official Shylocks; and if circumstances rendered this an absolute impossibility, their remedy was simple. Of this wretched Ordnance Letter-book, 1784. Captain, we read that “an order was sent to the agent to stop his pay until the sum of 223l. had been paid.”
In the correspondence of the period, this officer’s name does not appear again for some weeks,—but then in a startling manner. In a letter to the Commandant of Woolwich from the Surgeon of the 4th Battalion, we find that the ill-fated Captain “was so violent last night that I had to put a strait waistcoat on him.” Had he received notice of a fresh disallowance from his unfeeling auditors? This, indeed, does not appear; but from the fact that he had been perfectly sane before this correspondence, and recovered his sanity afterwards, it almost appears as if his reason had tottered under the admirable system of audit, which made no allowance, and would listen to no argument.
The consistency of these examiners was as admirable, as their pertinacity or their indifference. They were no less reluctant to part with money except on abundant evidence, than they were determined to have it refunded unless similar evidence could be shown for its retention. From the dull pages of the Brigade-Major’s letter-books we learn of a just and lawful claim made by a gunner on his return from New York. It does not appear that the claim was denied, but the line taken by the suspicious officials was to doubt the man’s identity. The difficulty of proving this may be imagined from what followed. The usual evidence which the man himself could produce was, like his assertion, scornfully rejected. A certificate from an officer under whom he had served, and who was then at Woolwich, was not considered sufficient, even when followed by a second and third of the same description, and from different officers. According to their own documents, the examiners said the man had died in New York; and they would hear of no resurrection. The matter reached the Commandant, who took it up warmly. A little alarmed, but not convinced, the auditors wrote to Bath to ask General Pattison, who had commanded at New York at the date of the man’s supposed death, whether it had not taken place. But they mistook their correspondent. He replied that he had no means of answering their question, but he added, “I should hope that certificates from three respectable officers, accompanied with a recommendation from the Commanding Officer of the Battalion, who I am very confident would not have offered any but on the very surest grounds, will be deemed sufficient vouchers of the poor man’s pretensions.” From the subsequent cessation of the correspondence, it is presumed that the claimant’s identity was at last admitted.
At no period of the Regiment’s history was the paternal rule of the Board more detailed, and more inclusive of the veriest trifles. The incessant references which had to be made by the Commandant, before he could make the slightest change in the Garrison, and the constant petty collisions between the civil and military departments, picture to the student an intolerable régime. Nor was the overbearing of the civilian officials confined to offensive correspondence. A story is handed down of a mighty servant of the Board, rejoicing in the title of “Clerk of the Cheque,” who paid periodical visits to Woolwich, and evinced his scorn for the military branch in every way. On one day, the Commandant had ordered the troops to parade for his inspection; and sentries were placed at various points to keep back the crowd of sightseers, which had assembled. Just as the Commandant came on the ground, a scuffle was observed taking place between a sentry and one of the crowd. The Garrison Sergeant-Major was sent to ascertain the cause; and on his arrival he found the Clerk of the Cheque insisting on his right to ignore any military control. The Sergeant-Major argued, but without success; the intruder said he was Clerk of the Cheque, and demanded admission. From verbal to physical persuasion was the next step; and both the military individuals flung themselves on their civil rival. It was without result; strong in the majesty of his office, the Clerk of the Cheque held his ground. The disturbance at length drew the Commandant himself to the spot, and he took up the discussion; and, like the Sergeant-Major, resorted to the argument of physical force. It was an awful moment; as he reads of it, the student’s blood runs cold; for the battle was now condensed into a fight for the superiority of the civil over the military branch of His Majesty’s Ordnance. And for the moment the Clerk of the Cheque prevailed:—pushing the Commandant on one side, he swaggered across the enclosure. But his triumph was short-lived; the matter was reported to the Master-General, who ordered the offender to proceed to Woolwich and make a public apology. Doubtless, however, he expiated the humiliation by some of the many ways of paper irritation, which he had at his disposal.
The delay in executing repairs and meeting demands was excessive. Twelve months were not considered too long a period to answer a requisition, and much longer was generally taken. A fence happened to require repair in front of the barracks, and its dangerous state was repeatedly pointed out by the Commandant. But not until years had passed and an officer had killed his horse, and broken his own collar-bone, did any steps occur to the Board to remedy it. Even then, while they were brooding, accidents continued, coming to a climax one night, when “the Chaplain, in walking General Cleaveland to B. of Ordnance. home, fell in and broke the principal ligament of his leg.”
A temporary chapel existed in the Warren, and, although the duties of the Chaplains will be discussed hereafter, it may be mentioned, while considering the Board’s delays, that in 1783 the Chaplain applied for “a cushion and furniture for the pulpit, a surplice, Bible and prayer-books, and a few hassocks, those in use having been purchased in 1753.”
1787. Rev. E. Jones to B. of Ordnance.
After patiently waiting for four years, the Chaplain again sent in a demand, stating that it was impossible to use those he had any longer.
The procrastination of the Board led, as may be imagined, to many inconveniences. A company in the Bahamas was ordered to be in readiness to return to England, and no clothing was sent to it for the year 1784, as the Board Colonel Macbean to Master-General, Feb. 9, 1787. promised to make immediate arrangements for its transport; but 1784 passed, and also 1785, and then 1786, and no transport was forthcoming, nor was any clothing sent for these three years.
It is a relief, however, to turn from the Board and its shortcomings, and to study the purely Regimental details of the period. Tame, and uninteresting, as they may appear beside the terrible seedtime in France, where the dragon’s-teeth of discord, licence, and rebellion were being scattered, to bring forth a thirty years’ harvest in Europe of armed men, they cannot be passed by in any work pretending to tell the story of the Regiment. They speak of an interior economy which has utterly disappeared,—of a time which might fitly be called “the age of the Colonels-Commandant.” So completely honorary has that rank now become in the Regiment, that the exercise of one small piece of patronage—the nomination of the Brigade Adjutant and Quartermaster—is the only link which connects those who hold it with the active duties of the Corps.
On the 30th January, 1873, the Colonels-Commandant were invited to leave their retirement, and to meet their brother officers once again at the Regimental mess. This rare réunion formed a marked contrast to the days referred to in this chapter. Then, the Colonels-Commandant of the four Battalions were entitled to live in barracks in the Warren; and an attempt was made to place them on the same roster for duty as the Colonels. Thanks to the conscientious and far-seeing judgment of the officers who then held the rank, this order was cancelled. The following protest, submitted by them to the Master-General, will sufficiently explain the situation:—
Letter to the Master-General, Sept. 1785, from Major-Generals Cleaveland, Pattison, Brome, and Godwin.
“With respect to the proposition of the 1st and 2nd Colonels of the Battalion quartered at Woolwich to take the duty alternately of being always on the spot, and commanding there, we beg leave to say (if by 1st Colonel is meant Colonel-Commandant) that, as General Officers, we are under the necessity of dissenting from it. We wish to look up to your Grace as the guardian and protector, under our gracious Sovereign, of the Corps of Artillery, as well individually as collectively; and, therefore, as this measure would be derogatory thereto, we trust that your Grace, having condescended to ask our opinions, will be pleased to relinquish it. Your Grace is sensible that by the custom of the Army immemorially established, and confirmed by the Royal sanction, Colonels having the rank of General Officers are exempted from being stationary with their Regiments; and that, by a late regulation, even Lieut.-Colonels having the rank of Major-General are not required to be with their Regiments any further than they may judge necessary for becoming responsible for their being in good order and discipline, the care and command devolving upon the Major or senior Captain. However faint, my Lord, our prospects may be of deriving equal advantages with other General Officers, from the rank we have the honour to hold, we have yet every reason to believe and expect that the privileges annexed to it will be equally preserved to us. In the year 1773, the late Master-General was pleased to give an order, which seemed to require the residence of the Colonels-Commandant at Woolwich, whereupon the late Generals Belford and Desaguliers had an audience of His Majesty, and laid at his feet a memorial praying for redress, which His Majesty was graciously pleased to grant.”
Although, however, relieved of a duty beneath their rank, the connection of the Colonels-Commandant with their Battalions remained of the closest description. No officer was allowed to be promoted, under the rank of Field-Officer, without a recommendation from the Colonel-Commandant of the Battalion in which he might be serving; nor was any exchange allowed without the consent of both the Colonels-Commandant concerned. The recruiting, clothing, and discharges of the men were under the same control; and the private affairs of the officers were also frequently the subject of their official consideration. It has been already hinted, at the commencement of this chapter, that for some reasons the period between 1783 and 1792 is a painful one to study. It is impossible to give a sufficient reason; but as to the fact, there is no doubt that there was then a bad spirit among some of the younger officers, which manifested itself not unfrequently in acts of open insubordination. The pages of the Ordnance letter-books of this time bristle with accounts of courts-martial on officers, an occurrence most rare before or since. Nor were they due to any stern, unforgiving discipline, visiting slight offences with heavy punishment. The offences were all of one description,—distinct and grave insubordination. Whether sufficient care had not been taken in the appointment of officers during the American War, or whether this war had engendered among some an unruly, ill-disciplined, and impatient spirit, it is impossible now to say. Nor was tragedy wanting. One case occurred, in 1785, of an officer who had been commissioned in America during the war, and who, on his return to England, had been repeatedly guilty of minor offences. A prolonged absence without leave brought matters to a crisis. He was, after some difficulty, traced to a low lodging-house in London, and, after many unavailing orders to return to Woolwich, was at last brought down by escort. A general court-martial was assembled for his trial at the Horse Guards, where all such courts were then held; and from the official registers it can be traced that he was convicted. Before, however, the sentence was promulgated, we learn from a letter in the Brigade-Major’s correspondence that he was found one morning dead in his room. No explanation is given,—merely a brief report of the occurrence, leaving the reader to his own conjectures as to the manner and the cause.
But, painful as it is to come across such passages, the pain is almost forgotten in the pleasure which the same correspondence affords, when treating of the earnest fatherly interest displayed by the Colonels-Commandant in the young officers under their control. In later days, the life and progress of the Regiment have been, as a rule, in the keeping of its younger members; but, at the time now spoken of, it was emphatically the devotion of the fathers of the Corps, which tided it over the shoals of discontent, stagnation, and despair. A jealous love of their noble traditions animated them; they had all shared the toils and the honours, which had so welded the Regiment into a glorious unity; and they laboured with an unselfish love to inspire the younger members with an esprit, which should make them worthy channels of their own deep feelings.
They expressed in the earnestness of their lives that which was said in words by one of the Colonels-Commandant at the réunion in 1873, mentioned above: “The glory of our Regiment General B. Cuppage. has been in our keeping; but we are now old and passing away, and we commit it to you.” How much of the noble spirit which animated the Corps in the commencement of this century was due to the unwearying teaching of the older officers at the period now treated of can never be told; but the student of the correspondence still preserved cannot but attribute to it an abundant share.
One of the duties always performed at this time by the Field-Officers of the Corps was the testing the value of new inventions. The list of such during this period is long and quaint. The inventors were both professional Artillerymen and amateurs; although it must be confessed that the latter received greater encouragement than the former. It seems hardly credible, but it is a fact, that in the year of grace 1790 the Field-Officers of Artillery were repeatedly assembled to examine into the merits of a 3-pounder leather gun, invented by Sir John Sinclair. Nor were rifled guns unknown at this time. One of the most persistent inventors was a Mr. Wiggins, who produced rifled guns to fire belted spherical shot. He succeeded with the smaller guns, 1 and 9-pounders; but was not successful with the larger. An 18-pounder which he produced before the Board was certainly not a success; for, on firing two rounds with common proof-charge and one shot, “on the second round it burst into a great Inspector of Artillery to Commandant. number of pieces.” Although, however, the Field-Officers were available for this duty, any interference with the manufacturing departments in the Arsenal by the Garrison officials was not allowed nor tolerated. There were repeated attempts made by successive Commandants to assume a control over the Arsenal, but without success.
Another duty which occupied the senior officers at this time was connected with the Regimental Hospital and the medical officers of the Ordnance. Complaints were repeatedly made by the Surgeons, and not without reason; and complaints were often made of them, but generally without cause. The system of making the Surgeon find medicines for the sick, out of a fixed and inadequate money allowance led to much correspondence; and attempts made to extort from the military surgeon any charges made by a civil practitioner for attendance on men on furlough led to very stormy remonstrances. On the other hand, the varying rate of stoppages made from the pay of the sick led to discontent on their part. It was actually proposed by the Board to take away the whole of a man’s pay when in hospital, lest the Captains of Companies should be induced to send men when in debt into hospital, and to appropriate the balance of their pay. This unworthy suspicion was resented by the Colonels-Commandant in the following dignified words: Dated 4 July, 1786. With regard to the temptation which might induce a Captain to send his men to the hospital, and keep them there as long as he could, in order to clear their debts by stoppages—we hope, and, indeed, are confident, that there is no Captain now in the Corps of so illiberal a mind as to be thus unworthily attentive to his own interest in preference to that of His Majesty’s service; and should there ever be hereafter any one of such bad principles, a collusion must take place between him, the Surgeon, and the Soldier, before his base purpose could be accomplished.”
The Regulations for the Ordnance Medical Department were embodied in a distinct form in the years 1786 and 1787, but not without much meeting of committees and examination of witnesses. Much of the labour and expense which fell upon the medical officers at Woolwich were caused by the presence in that Garrison of 150 men of the Invalid Battalion, who were incessantly under treatment. It cannot be said that men were driven out of the service in those days without every endeavour being made to effect a cure. From the lists of men recommended for discharge in the year 1791, which are deposited in the Record Office, we find that one had been “sick in the country for four years;” another suffered from rheumatism, loss of sight and of hearing; another had “an inveterate sore leg of many years’ standing;” another was “insane, and burthensome to the Battalion;” another “hectic, and subject to fits;” another “hurt in the back, and otherwise infirm;” while a very common epithet was “completely worn out.” There were other grounds, however, for discharging men, than mere medical. One man has been handed down as having been discharged because “he was unsightly,” another was “unpromising,” a third “irregular,” while of a fourth the curt characteristic placed against his name is the word “thief.”
History frequently repeats itself in small matters as well as large. The legislation suggested by the present Secretary of State for War, with reference to men who have occasion to go to hospital on account of their own indiscretion, was in force in Canada for many years prior to 1791,—a fine of 10s. 6d. being levied from every Artilleryman in such a position. A commanding officer, however, went to Canada who declined to enforce this fine; and the question as to the origin and duration of the custom was therefore referred to the Commandant at Woolwich. He replied: “From the Brigade-Major I learn the custom has long been abolished in Woolwich, and in other places, as tending to induce the soldier to conceal his complaint, or apply to quacks for a cheaper cure; both of which may be prejudicial to his constitution.”
Whitehall, 23 May, 1786.
The decisions arrived at by the Board in 1786, with reference to the medical officers, may be briefly stated. The principal medical officer at Woolwich was to be called Surgeon-General, and was to receive half-pay of 10s. per diem, while he was to be relieved of the expense of finding any medicines for the hospital. The Surgeon of the Battalion at Woolwich had to provide all the medicines for his Battalion, “excepting bark and wine,” in return for which he was allowed 120l. per annum. The Surgeon of the Battalion detached in England remained at Woolwich with such companies of the Battalion as might be stationed there, providing the medicines required by them, and by the company in Scotland, as well as all the companies of the Battalion when on the line of march,—receiving in return remuneration at the rate of 12l. per company annually. The recruits of the Battalions abroad were also under his care, and he received 12l. annually for each detachment of fifty men, in return for the medicines he had to provide. So far, this Surgeon had little to complain of. But the next burden was always greater than he could bear. He had to take charge of the men of the Invalid Battalion, not merely those at Woolwich, but also those on detachment, furnishing them with medicines, in return for the annual sum of 70l. When one bears in mind that no man entered the Invalid Battalion until he was completely crippled, and that his daily medicine was probably as necessary to him as the air he breathed, the inadequacy of the Surgeon’s remuneration in this item becomes apparent. The Surgeons of the Battalions, to which the companies at Gibraltar and in Canada respectively belonged, went on service with these companies, and received 12l. per annum for each company, in addition to their pay—in return for which they had to provide all medicines “except bark and wine.” The same allowance was paid for detached companies of the various Battalions to the Ordnance Surgeon on the spot. Civil artificers and labourers in the employ of the Ordnance were entitled to medical attendance and medicines, by paying at the rates of one penny and one halfpenny per week throughout the year to the Ordnance medical officer on the station. The rule with regard to officers was worded as follows: “It is expected that the Surgeons of the Artillery and Ordnance at the different places should give their attendance to the military and civil officers without fee; but, with respect to supplying them with medicines, it is recommended to the military and civil officers to subscribe 2 guineas a year each, for which the Surgeon is to supply them with medicines; otherwise they are to pay for such medicines as they use.”
Such were the regulations for the medical officers of the Ordnance,—revealing a system which was faulty and has disappeared, but which it is interesting to reproduce in a history of the Corps. But there were other non-combatants also—no longer represented in the Regiment, but who deserve to be mentioned—the Regimental Chaplains. These gentlemen, at the period treated of, did not belong, as now, to one department for general Army service, but belonged to the various Battalions of the Corps. This, however, did not imply that they did duty with their Battalions; far from it. Excellent men, they drew their pay with a punctuality worthy of all praise, but it was not among their congregations in the Warren, but away in quiet rural rectories—in fat livings which they held. They were pluralists; and they clubbed together to pay a curate in Woolwich to perform their joint duties. It is sad to have to say, also, that they did not pay their substitute very liberally. They paid him each eighteen-pence a day—a sum so inadequate that it drew forth the remonstrances of the Commandant, who wrote to the Master-General that, “considering the Commandant to Master-General, Nov. 14, 1787. reverend gentleman’s constant residence and attendance, his dress and appearance, which are always obliged to be decent, and the disadvantage of having no surplice fees to add to it, it will not permit him even to eat at the mess—the cheapest and best mode of living here.” The sum of two shillings and sixpence a day from each Chaplain was requested for their substitute; such as was given in other Garrisons. It will thus be seen that the system was officially recognised; and, indeed, was but one of the many vicious customs which have disappeared before public opinion. There were certain occasions when the attendance of the Chaplains was insisted upon, although they were few and far between. One such occurred in 1785, when the King announced his intention of coming to Woolwich to review the Regiment. The Chaplains were hurriedly written for, “in order,” wrote the Brigade-Major, “that you may be at Woolwich in proper time to march by with the Regiment.” One of the number replied, that on account of the distance at which he lived, and the fact of his being 86 years of age, he would be unable to attend,—which he greatly regretted, as he would have much liked to march past again before he died. The others obeyed the summons, one only protesting a little on the ground that the Battalion to which he belonged was at that time scattered in the West Indies and Canada. A few years later, in 1792, when a camp was formed at Bagshot, the Chaplains were ordered to attend and encamp with the companies; and from that time their duties ceased, more and more every year, to be so purely honorary as they had been.
Returning now to the combatant part of the Corps, there are certain details connected with the dress of the officers and men, which can hardly fail to be interesting, and which find a natural place in a chapter like this. Owing to a circumstance arising out of the American War, we are fortunately in possession of very circumstantial accounts on this point. After the Convention of Saratoga, many of the officers of Burgoyne’s army remained prisoners of war for nearly three years. On their return to England, they claimed compensation for loss of their equipment, &c., stating their case as follows:—“The subscribers wish to represent the constant and unavoidable loss they sustained in the mode of payment of their subsistence, as the impossibility of supplying the Convention Army with specie laid them under an absolute necessity of drawing their pay at very extravagant rates, being paid by public bills, in the negotiation of which, from the Congress paper currency, they suffered a discount which in the 1st year may be estimated at 20 per cent.... We beg leave to observe that, in conformity to the wishes of the Generals commanding the troops, we were under the necessity of building huts at our own cost and charges, in order to take the more effectual care of the men, to attend to their wants and to alleviate their distresses. Much expense was incurred on this score. We have also to observe that the Congress at different periods obliged us to remove to most of the provinces in America; and in those several marches of at least 1500 miles, it must naturally occur that many and heavy charges were sustained by us. On being exchanged, we were unavoidably obliged to come to New York individually, and there being no public conveyance, we were necessitated to purchase horses, to transport ourselves and baggage, from people who took every advantage of our distresses,” On the claims of officers on this account reaching the Ordnance, the first step was, simply, to refuse to admit them; on their being urged again in stronger terms, the next step was to refer them to some one else to ascertain the truth of the claimants’ statements, it being an official axiom that any one demanding money was probably an impostor, and to be treated accordingly; and, lastly, on being satisfied of the accuracy of the claim, the invariable course was to offer something considerably less than the sum demanded. From a remonstrance made against the offer in this case we learn what was laid down by the Board of Ordnance in the previous year, 28th June, 1782, as the equipment of an Artillery Subaltern, and the cost at which it was to be valued in compensating for its loss by shipwreck, or imprisonment. It was as follows:—
| £ | s. | d. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regimentals.— | 1 | suit of full uniform | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| 1 | frock suit of uniform | 7 | 7 | 0 | |
| 1 | laced hat | 2 | 13 | 0 | |
| 2 | pairs of boots | 3 | 3 | 0 | |
| 1 | regimental great coat | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1 | plain hat | 1 | 1 | 0 | |
| 12 | shirts | 9 | 0 | 0 | |
| 12 | stocks | 2 | 2 | 0 | |
| 12 | pairs of stockings | 3 | 12 | 0 | |
| 6 | linen waistcoats and breeches | 7 | 4 | 0 | |
| 12 | handkerchiefs, at 3s. 6d. | 2 | 2 | 0 | |
| 1 | pair of pistols | 4 | 4 | 0 | |
| 1 | regimental sword, belt, and clasp | 2 | 12 | 6 | |
| 1 | sash | 1 | 11 | 6 | |
| 3 | pairs of shoes | 1 | 4 | 0 | |
| Camp Equipage.— | Bedstead and bedding complete | 12 | 12 | 6 | |
| 1 | pair of canteens | 8 | 8 | 0 | |
| 2 | hair trunks | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1 | case with bottles | 2 | 2 | 0 | |
| 1 | cask with kitchen utensils | 3 | 3 | 0 | |
| Saddle and bridle | 4 | 4 | 0 | ||
| £96 | 17 | 6 | |||
The contents of the knapsack of an Artillery soldier at this time were as follows; the knapsack itself being made of painted canvas:—
4 white shirts.
1 check shirt.
6 false collars.
1 canvas frock.
1 canvas pair of trowsers.
1 leather cap.
2 pairs of shoes.
1 pair of black cloth gaiters.
1 pair of white stockings (thread).
1 powder-bag and puff.
1 razor.
1 shaving-box. 1 pair of shoe brushes.
1 cloth brush.
1 twin screw and worm.
1 brush and pricker.
1 leather stock.
1 rosette.
1 pair of worsted stockings.
3 pairs of Welsh yarn socks.
1 pair of shoe-buckles.
1 pair of knee-buckles.
1 stock buckle.
1 large and 1 small comb.
The annual issues of clothing were settled by the Master-General on 17th March, 1788, to be as follows.
Each sergeant was to receive annually
1 coat.
1 white cloth waistcoat.
1 white cloth breeches.
1 frilled shirt.
1 black leather stock.
1 pair of worsted stockings.
1 gold laced hat.
Black cloth with 3 dozen buttons for a pair of gaiters.
5s. 3d. in lieu of a pair of shoes.
The same articles were supplied to the other ranks, with the exception that while the corporal’s coat had two epaulettes, the bombardier’s had only one; and that the hats of the drummers were plain, instead of gold-laced. The drummers had also fur caps supplied to them when required. In the West Indies the men received white linen waistcoats and breeches, instead of cloth; and wore white gold-laced hats instead of black.
The men of the Invalid Battalion received the same articles as those of the Marching Battalions, with this exception, that their coats were lined with red instead of white, and their waistcoats and breeches, instead of being white, were blue.
So much for the clothing of the Regiment at this time; a few words must now be said as to its drills. And perhaps this can be done most easily by describing a field-day, which took place on the morning of the 9th July, 1788, before the King. On the arrival of His Majesty, a salute of 21 guns, at intervals of 8 seconds, was fired by a company, which immediately afterwards fell in on the left of the line. It was not until the preceding year that the Regiment had Order by Master-General, 4 July, 1787. been ordered to fall in in two ranks, when under arms. The King having ridden down the ranks, the Regiment broke into open column, and marched past in slow and quick time. The line having been reformed, and the Manual Exercise practised, the following marvellous evolutions commenced:—Two rounds were fired from flanks to centre of each Battalion; the line then retired one hundred yards towards the Barracks, and fired two rounds from centre to flanks of each Battalion; and then returned to its former ground. Here it fired two rounds by grand divisions from flanks to centre of each Battalion; then one round by wings of each Battalion; and, finally, each Battalion fired a volley.
Having so rung the changes on small-arm firing, a certain number of the men were detached to man 12 field guns, the line opening to allow these guns to come up. As a contrast to modern Field Battery drill, the solemn orders issued to the officer commanding these guns may be quoted:—“Lieutenant-Colonel Walker will advance towards Woolwich Common with his 12 guns, 4 in front, and in three lines. This column will incline to the right, so that the right-hand gun may be near the right-hand hedge. When they have got about halfway between the front of the Barracks and the sunk fence, the 4 guns in the front line are then to halt, while the 4 guns in the centre line form the left of the front line. The 12 guns then in one line will fire two rounds from flanks to centre, then change their front to the left by wheeling on the centre, and in that position fire two rounds from centre to flanks. The 6 guns on the right will then fall in with the rear of the 2nd Battalion, and the 6 guns on the left will fall in with the rear of the 4th Battalion.”
It requires the reproduction of such elephantine movements as the above, to realise sufficiently the progress made since that time in Field Artillery. This most wooden style of drill was the fashion in England; and we owe the change, which followed to the wars of the French Revolution, which taught that a General, to win battles, must be something more than a drill-sergeant, and that an army must learn not merely to fight, but to move, and to move with rapidity. The only element in the field-day just described which gives the student the slightest relief, is a mention made that the Gentlemen Cadets were employed as Light Infantry towards the end of the day. Of course this was all wrong, and one would rather find that they had been employed on a public occasion like this, as Artillerymen; but it is a relief to read of anything implying rapidity of movement, after the dull, ponderous description of the line moving solemnly backwards and forwards, firing from flanks to centre, and centre to flanks.
To this style of drill our want of success in Flanders, in the campaigns shortly to be described, was mainly due. Our Generals had their brains so saturated with the drill-book, that on active service, if they encountered an enemy who violated its rules, they were utterly nonplussed. Had they won a victory by ignoring the regulations under which they had been so strictly exercised, their satisfaction would have been but a doubtful one. They had yet to learn that although drill and dogged courage are admirable qualities in troops, they will not compensate for the lack of those qualities in a General which are necessary to ensure success.
Only one or two points remain to be noticed. First, the amalgamation of the Royal Irish Artillery was contemplated as early as 1788, although it did not take place until after the Union in 1801. The delay was mainly caused by the protest of the officers of the Royal Artillery, who would have suffered greatly from supersession,—the promotion in the Irish corps having been much more rapid than in that from which it sprang. Amalgamation must always produce this supersession to a certain extent; and the Board listened to the remonstrances, and deferred the incorporation of the Irish Artillery for some years. About the same date that this question was being discussed, a long petition was forwarded from Gibraltar, in which the officers of the Royal Artillery there stationed pointed out how much better the position had become of officers in the Royal Engineers of the same standing as themselves, than their own. The wording of the petition was faulty, and its arguments were unsound; thus giving the Master-General an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to administer a dignified rebuke to the malcontents. On one point, however, he admitted the force of their complaint. The rank of Major had been abolished in the Royal Engineers, its holders being made Lieutenant-Colonels, and thus obtaining a decided advantage over their contemporaries in Duke of Richmond, 10 March, 1788. the Artillery. “This difference,” wrote the Master-General, “and there being no rank of Major, is, I admit, an advantage in point of rank in favour of the Engineers. The reason of the rank of Major being suppressed in the Corps of Engineers was that there were no troops belonging to them to be commanded in Battalions, and therefore there could be no use for an officer of that description.” In the year 1827, the rank of Regimental Major was abolished in the Royal Artillery, its holders being made Lieutenant-Colonels, but with Majors’ pay; and in the year 1872, the rank of Major was substituted for that of First Captain, on account of the responsibility attached to the command of a Battery of Artillery.
It was during this period that a blow was struck at the custom, which had hitherto prevailed, of buying and selling the appointments of Adjutant and Quartermaster. On the Colonel Miller, Pamph., 1868. 24th February, 1783, the Master-General ordered that no such appointment should in future be sold, with this exception, that any officer who then held an appointment which he had obtained by purchase would be allowed to sell it when he relinquished it, but must accept 100l. less than he gave for it; and that his successor must also sell for 100l. less than that purchase-money; and so on until the price should be extinguished. It was ruled, at the same time, that a Captain-Lieutenant, holding an Adjutancy, should vacate it on being promoted to a Company; and that as soon as any “warrant” of a Quartermaster should become vacant without purchase, “some meritorious non-commissioned officer should be recommended for the same.”
A privilege which the Regiment had hitherto enjoyed was abolished, and with good reason, in 1785. Prior to that date no charge was ever made for the subsistence of either officers or men of the Royal Artillery when being conveyed by transports to foreign stations, an exemption which was not accorded to the rest of the army. Doubtless the custom arose from the fact that the Board of Ordnance, which in one capacity governed the Artillery, in another capacity hired the transports; but the case had only to be stated to ensure remedy. On the 27th August, 1785, it was ruled that a “stoppage of 3d. per diem (being the same as is made from the rest of His Majesty’s troops) be made from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Royal Artillery during the time they shall be on board ship.” Doubtless, the same individuals would be glad if, in the year of grace 1873, they could travel on board ship at the rate of 3d. per diem.
Perhaps of all the letters which the student finds in the official correspondence of the period, the following is the most amusing. It ought already to have been mentioned that when the Captain of a Company retired on his pay, awaiting a vacancy in the Invalid Battalion, his Captain-Lieutenant received certain allowances connected with the command of the Company. Apparently, the regulations were not very clear on the subject; or, as is very probable, decisions had been given in individual cases, which had not been promulgated to the Regiment—a pernicious custom which existed in the 18th century, and even since. A Captain William Houghton had retired in this way; and from his retirement the following cry of agony reached the 2 April, 1789. Commandant of his Battalion:—“Ever since the day your goodness was made known to the Regiment in getting me leave of absence to retire from duty till provided with an Invalid Company, I have never had a moment’s peace with my Captains-Lieutenant. Their first claim was for one non-effective—I gave it; the next was for both—I gave them; and was then told they had a right to the 6l. per annum allowed for stationery—this I gave up also. They have now demanded my share of the stock purse, and the 20l. per annum granted by His Majesty’s warrant, 27th July, 1772, to the Captains of Artillery, on account of the slowness of promotion in the Regiment. Had I known these were to be the hard conditions of a little rest before death, it would have been all fair; but in that case I certainly should have remained with my Company, provided I had done duty upon crutches.”
Only one point remains now to be mentioned before turning to the causes which led to sudden augmentations in the Regiment, combined with the commencement of hostilities. On the 26th August, 1792, volunteers were called for from the Companies at Woolwich, to form part of a guard ordered to attend His Excellency Viscount Macartney, who had been appointed Ambassador to the Court of the Emperor of China, and also to act as instructors in gunnery to the troops of that potentate. The strength of the party was as follows:—One sergeant, 3 corporals or bombardiers, 1 drummer, and 15 gunners, under the command of Lieutenant Parish. An advance was made to the detachment of a year’s subsistence to purchase necessaries, and a second suit of clothing was given to the non-commissioned officers and men.
It has been difficult to confine this chapter to these purely domestic, although necessary, details, because, after 1787, the whole firmament of history has been lurid with the events in France, which were ripening into a state of things such as has never been seen before, or since. In 1792 it became apparent that war between England and France was inevitable. Recruiting had been brisk since 1787; in 1790 a free pardon had been offered to all deserters, who should return to their Regiments; in the first month of 1793 an augmentation to the Artillery was authorized, which will form the subject of the next chapter; and in October 1793, the following increase to the establishment was ordered, viz.:—
| 30 | Gentlemen Cadets. | |
| To each of the 40 marchingCompanies of the 4Battalions | 1 | Sergeant. |
| 2 | Bombardiers. | |
| 10 | Second Gunners. | |
| 1 | Sergeant Conductor on Sergeant’s pay. | |
| 10 | Drivers upon Second Gunner’s pay. | |
| To each of the 4 marchingBattalions | 1 | Surgeon’s Mate. |
Every officer, without exception, had been ordered to join in 1792; and, although it was not until the beginning of 1793 that the French Ambassador was dismissed from the Court of St. James’s, it was evident that a sufficient casus belli had been found in the operations of the French army in the Low Countries, and the menace to England implied in France obtaining the control of the River Scheldt.
A sufficient casus belli, it has been said; but the student of history must indeed be blind who fails to see that this was but a secondary reason. A panic had seized upon the most stable European governments, a dread lest the revolutionary principles which animated the French people should spread beyond the confines of France. Nor was their fear without reason. Even England had been penetrated by Republicanism; societies were formed, ostensibly for Parliamentary Reform, and under the title of Friends of the People, which desired undoubtedly the overthrow of the monarchy. An Englishman, the author of ‘The Rights of Man,’ had been elected a member of the Assembly in Paris, on account of his advanced political opinions; and, after his trial for sedition in England, an English mob showed their sympathy by taking the horses out of his advocate’s carriage, and drawing it themselves to his residence. That unfailing barometer of political disturbance—the funds—told also a tale of great uneasiness. ‘Annual Register,’ 1792. The Three per Cents., which stood in January 1792 at 93⅜, fell before December in the same year to 74; and all other Government securities were at a corresponding discount.
The state of France was, indeed, enough to appal the most indifferent. In the powerful language of the chronicler of the French Revolution, France, roused by many causes, Carlyle. faced the world “in that terrible strength of Nature which no man has measured;” and “whatever was cruel in the panic-frenzy of twenty-five million men—whatsoever was great in the simultaneous death-defiance of twenty-five million men—stood there in abrupt contrast, near by one another.” France was now “seeking its wild way through the New, Chaotic—where Force is not yet distinguished into Bidden and Forbidden—but Crime and Virtue welter unseparated, in that domain of what is called the Passions.” ... “The Gospel of Man’s Rights was preached abroad with the fearfullest Devil’s Message of man’s weaknesses and sins;” and a whole nation was drunk with revenge, and terror, and blood.
Penetrating with different effect into every class of men in England, the tale of the French Revolution penetrated even the recesses of the Ordnance. Raising their eyes from ledgers, and gazing across the Channel, even the members of the Honourable Board were moved; and on the first day of the New Year they resolved on a step, which should bring Field Artillery more into accord with the era in the history of war which was now to commence. Nor was it an hour too soon; for in three weeks’ time, on the 21st January, Carlyle. 1793, “there was in the streets of Paris a silence as of the grave—eighty thousand armed men stood ranked, like armed statues of men; cannons bristled, cannoneers with match burning, but no word or movement; it was as a city enchanted into silence and stone: one carriage, with its escort, slowly rumbling towards the Place de la Révolution, the only sound.” The last of the dragon’s teeth was about to be sown, and a crime to be committed which should bind the governments of Europe together against France, as one man: to whom France should answer, Danton. “The coalesced Kings threaten us: we hurl at their feet, as the gage of battle, the Head of a King.”
Of a truth, the Honourable Board had not moved a day too soon. Let us trace in our next chapter the development of that portion of the Corps which dates its origin from that terrible month of January 1793.
CHAPTER II.
The Necessity, Birth, and Progress of the Royal Horse Artillery.
Of all the so-called Battalion Records, which were kept at the various Head-quarter offices at Woolwich up to the year 1859, and the details of which are, at the best, of the most scanty description, perhaps the most meagre and most disappointing are those of the Royal Horse Artillery.
From the well-known esprit of this branch of the service, it might have been expected that its earlier history would have been treated almost with effusion by those in whose custody was a book purporting to contain a record of its services. But it may be said with truth that for one item of information obtained from the written records of this brilliant arm, ten have been obtained from the traditions handed down verbally, and fondly treasured by successive generations of officers; and even a greater part of the required information has been obtained from works of general military history, and from extant official letter-books.
The first section of these old Record Books professes to treat of the circumstances of the original formation of the particular part of the Regiment concerned. In the Records of the Royal Horse Artillery this section is compressed into two lines. “The Royal Horse Artillery was formed as an additional corps to the Regiment of Artillery on the 1st February, 1793.” Remarkable for its brevity, this account of the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery is also remarkable for its inaccuracy. It was not an additional corps to the Royal Artillery, but from the very commencement an essential, integral part of it. The Driver Corps, formed in 1794, was an additional corps to the Royal Artillery; but its officers were, until after Waterloo, drawn from a different source, and its men were never Artillerymen. The Royal Horse Artillery, on the other hand, was invariably officered by the Royal Artillery, and was recruited from its ranks. Of the wisdom, or otherwise, of this policy, it will be necessary to treat hereafter; but of the fact there can be no doubt. Yet again, in the brief record quoted above, are compressed other inaccuracies. The Horse Artillery did not spring into existence, as a corps, on 1st February, 1793, as the words would imply. Two troops were authorised in January of that year, but not for twelve years of straggling augmentations of staff-officers and troops, can it be said to have attained its proper maturity. The earlier wars of the French Revolution were the boyhood of the Royal Horse Artillery, as the Peninsular campaign was its glorious manhood. After Waterloo, until the Crimean War, its history was a blank page.
It is fortunate that an officer of the Regiment has been found, at once so capable and so patient in tracing out the circumstances which impressed on the world the necessity Captain H. W. L. Hime, Royal Artillery. Proceedings R. A. Institution. of this arm, as the author of the papers on ‘The Mobility of Field Artillery, Past and Present.’ According to this writer, England was the last among the leading nations in Europe to adopt the use of Horse Artillery. As early as 1788, the subject had strongly attracted the attention of the Master-General of the Ordnance; but, unfortunately, he referred it to a committee. The period of gestation, so to speak, in committees on military subjects is very great; in this particular instance the winter of 1792 had arrived without any result from their labours.
The introduction of Horse Artillery into the Prussian service dates from 1759; and in 1792 this arm was introduced into the French and Swedish armies. In other European countries improvement had been made in Field Artillery, without, however, adopting the system of mounted detachments; but this latter is the distinctive mark of Horse Artillery. It has been asserted, and on good authority, that Horse Artillery was used in India prior even to its adoption by Frederick the Great—and dating as far back as 1756. If the existence of an Artillery without mobility was sufficient to impress on the authorities in that country a sense of the necessity of some improvements, the argument was not wanting. In an engagement between the English ‘History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan,’ vol. i. pp. 312-368. and French troops near Trichinopoly in 1753, “the English, for more expedition, marched without any field-pieces;” and when the infantry advanced against the French in an action fought shortly afterwards, “the artillery, in the hurry, could not keep up with the battalion.” The advantage of a more mobile artillery must certainly have been apparent after such melancholy exhibitions.
It has already been mentioned in this work that rapidity of movement, more especially under fire, was rendered hopeless by the frequent employment of peasants to act as drivers to the batteries. The formation of the Royal Horse Artillery did not free the Field Batteries from this evil. A quaint circumstance in proof of this is narrated by the Hime. author already mentioned. “In 1798, the Commandant of Woolwich inspected some guns manned by gunners of the 8th Battalion, R.A. The guns were each drawn by three horses in single file, which were driven by contract drivers on foot, hired for the occasion, dressed in white smocks ‘Aide-Mémoire to the Military Sciences,’ art. ‘Ordnance.’ with blue collars and cuffs, and armed with long carter’s whips of the ordinary farm pattern. When this formidable array had been reviewed, the Commandant, General Lloyd, and the Garrison Adjutant, expressed their joint opinion that field artillery movements could not be performed quicker.” The increase of mobility over that old system—of which the above is a real, although, perhaps, exceptional illustration—which followed the introduction of Horse Artillery can best be shown by another and later instance. At the battle of Fuentes d’Onor, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery—now D Battery, B Brigade—was surrounded and cut off by the French cavalry. It was at the time under the command of the 2nd Captain, Norman Ramsay. Gleig. “Guns thus dealt with are almost always lost, and consequently the army ceased to think of Ramsay and his men, except as prisoners. Presently, however, a great commotion was observed among the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point, where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated Napier. some extraordinary occurrence.... Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated; an English shout pealed high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his troop, his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain; the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate career.” Between the crawling peasant-driven team on Woolwich parade, and this glowing description of a Horse Artillery battery but a very few years later, there is a contrast, which shows at a glance the immense stride in the direction of mobility, which had followed the introduction of that branch of the Regiment to whose story this chapter is devoted. Much of this improvement was due to the fostering care of the Master-General, and of the Deputy-Adjutant-General, afterwards Sir John Macleod; much also was due to the encouragement of General Officers, who found to their amazement a force of Artillery, which could conform to their most rapid movements; and not a little was due to the practical school of experience opened in the Peninsula; but, to their honour be it stated, the rapid progress towards the standard of perfection attained by the Royal Horse Artillery was mainly due to the labours, the devotion, of the officers belonging to it, who were inspired by the same esprit and the same conscientious regard for their duties, as have continued to animate the officers of that brilliant arm to this day.
While the Committee, appointed to decide the question of Horse Artillery in connection with our service, was—according to wont—babbling harmlessly and fruitlessly in the fourth year of its existence, a virtual rupture took place between England and France. The Duke of Richmond, then Master-General, immediately took the matter himself in hand; and of three schemes, very dissimilar, over which the Committee had been debating, he selected the following, as the basis of the organization of a troop of Royal Horse Artillery.
| A. | Horses. | B. | Drivers. | C. | Ammunition. | D. | Captains. | E. | Lieuts. |
| F. | N.C.O.’s. | G. | Gunners. | H. | Drummers. | I. | Civil Lists. |
| Detail. | Distribution of detachments. | Remarks. | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G. | H. | I. | ||
| 5½-inch howitzers (2) | 8 | 4 | 160 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 20 | ·· | ·· | 4 men held the horses in action. |
| Waggons (2) | 8 | 4 | ||||||||
| 3-prs. (2) | 8 | 4 | 480 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 20 | ·· | ·· | Ditto |
| Waggons (2) | 8 | 4 | ||||||||
| 6-prs., Col. Williams’ (2) | 4 | 2 | 160 | ·· | 1 | 2 | 20 | ·· | ·· | Ditto. |
| Tumbrils (2) | 4 | 2 | ||||||||
| Horses for detachments | 4 | 2 | 66 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | |
| 2 Sergeants, Sergt.-Major,and Clerk of Stores | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | |
| Drummers to have bugle horns, and act as orderly men. | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | |
| 1 forge cart | 3 | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | |
| 1 waggon for Artificers’ Storest | 3 | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | |
| Officers’ horses not included | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | |
| Civil List. | ||||||||||
| 1 Commissary of horse | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | |
| 2 Conductors of horse | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | |
| 1 Collar-maker | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | |
| 1 Wheeler | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | |
| 1 Blacksmith | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | |
| 1 Farrier | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | |
| Total | 123 | 22 | 800 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 60 | 2 | 7 | |
The formation of the first two troops, A and B, took place at Woolwich, having been ordered in January 1793. The Captains were R. Lawson, afterwards so distinguished in Egypt, and the Brigade-Major of the Regiment, J. Macleod, afterwards Deputy-Adjutant-General. In these—as in the other troops subsequently formed—great care was taken to appoint none but officers of well-known ability. This fact, combined with the permission given to the Horse Artillery to select the best recruits joining the Regiment, had the immediate effect of causing the new branch to be looked on as a corps d’élite: as, indeed, was the case in every other country in Europe, except Austria. Whether this has proved a benefit, or otherwise, to the corps, will hereafter be considered. The esprit generally to be found in a corps d’élite was fanned by other, minor, considerations. It must be remembered that the gunners of Field Artillery, other than Horse Artillery, and of Garrison Artillery, were, and still are, interchangeable. But in the Horse Artillery “the men were magnificently dressed, they were amply paid, and they were not haunted by the constant dread of being suddenly and forcibly torn from the Field Artillery service, which they loved, and thrust into the Garrison Artillery service, Hime. which was strange to them.” Only 4 guns per troop were granted at first; and the establishment consisted, in addition to the officers, of 8 non-commissioned officers, 49 gunners, R. H. A. Records. and 35 drivers. On the formation of C and D Troops, on 1st November, 1793, the armament of each troop was raised to 6 guns, and the establishment per troop was 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 45 drivers, and 187 horses.
The officers appointed to command the new troops were, E. Howorth, afterwards Sir E. Howorth, who subsequently commanded the Artillery at Talavera, Busaco, and Fuentes d’Onor, and J. M. Hadden, who afterwards became Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. The reader will continue to observe the selection always made of able officers to command the troops of Horse Artillery. In 1794, E and F Troops were formed, and the command given respectively to Captain W. Cuppage, an officer who afterwards held for twenty-six years the appointment of Inspector of the Royal Carriage Department, and to Captain J. Butler, an officer who afterwards became Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.
In 1794, the number of guns per troop was augmented to 8; and this remained the establishment until 1804, in which year the number was reduced to 6; at which it continued until the reductions after the battle of Waterloo. In 1794, when the number of guns was raised to 8, the following was the establishment: 15 non-commissioned officers, 97 gunners, 71 drivers, 246 horses per troop. This was reduced in the following year very considerably, and became 15 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 51 drivers, and 170 horses.
The next variation in the establishment was caused by the formation, in Ireland, of G Troop, from detachments serving in that country. The command of the new troop was given to Captain—afterwards Sir—G. B. Fisher, an officer who in 1827 was appointed Commandant of Woolwich. For two years after the formation of G Troop, the establishment of the troops was as follows: 8 guns, 16 non-commissioned officers, 96 gunners, 58 drivers, and 190 horses. An augmentation of 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 gunner per troop took place in 1803.
In 1804, the number of guns per troop having being reduced to 6, H Troop was formed at Woolwich, and the command given to Captain A. Macdonald, a smart officer, who subsequently had the good fortune to command the Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division at Waterloo. On the reduction to 6 guns, the strength of each troop was, 14 non-commissioned officers, 75 gunners, 46 drivers, and 142 horses.
In 1805, an augmentation of four troops took place—I, K, L, and M; and the commands were given respectively to Captain W. Millar, an officer who subsequently became Inspector of Artillery, and Director-General of the Field Train Department; to Captain C. Godfrey, an officer who went on half-pay a few years later, in 1811; to Captain N. Foy, who died in 1817; and to Captain the Hon. W. H. Gardner, who died as a Colonel-Commandant in 1856.
For the few years following this augmentation, the establishment remained virtually the same; but, in January 1813, 194 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were added to act as Rocket Detachments, and also as a depôt to supply the troops on service. A depôt for the Royal Horse Artillery has existed under various names, and in somewhat chequered circumstances. It commenced—as stated above—in 1813; it existed for many years in the form of an Adjutant’s Detachment at Woolwich; in 1859 it was transferred to Canterbury; on a somewhat larger scale it was transferred to Maidstone after the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian Artilleries; for a short time subsequently, the Horse Artillery Batteries at home acted as a depôt for those serving abroad; and, at the date of the publication of this work, the last-mentioned arrangement is supplemented by the existence of two Horse Artillery Batteries in the general depôt for the Regiment.
In 1814, the various Rocket Detachments were combined, those at home becoming the 1st, and those abroad the 2nd, Rocket Troop. The officers appointed to command these were Captain W. G. Elliott, an officer who retired from the Regiment in 1828, and Captain—afterwards Sir—E. C. Whinyates, an officer whose ability, zeal, and services have hardly been surpassed in the Regiment. He ultimately—after a long and active career—became Commandant of Woolwich, where his kindly manners were long remembered. He commanded the Rocket Troop at Waterloo, where he was severely wounded.
Among the many heart-breaking reductions which exasperate the Artillery student, perhaps none are more distressing, than the reduction of the 2nd Rocket Troop in 1816. The 1st Rocket Troop had never been out of England; the 2nd had done good service at Leipsic and Waterloo. Neither of them had had a long existence; but one had had a stirring, glorious history. On the 16th May, 1815, the following order had been issued:—“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to command that the Rocket Troop of Royal Artillery, which was present at the Battle of Leipsic, be permitted to wear the word ‘Leipsic’ on their appointments, in commemoration of their services on that occasion.” And to the same troop the reward fell, given to those who had been at the Battle of Waterloo. Yet, when the pruning-knife came to be used, the troop which had earned these honours was selected for reduction; and, as if adding insult to injury, the word ‘Leipsic’ came actually to be worn by the surviving troop, which had never been on active service at all! On its reduction, the officers of the 2nd Rocket Troop were transferred to the Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers.
Up to this point, we have traced the growth, numerically, of the Royal Horse Artillery. The conclusion of hostilities after Waterloo led to very extensive reductions. In 1816, besides the 2nd Rocket Troop, D, K, L, and M Troops were Vide vol. i. p. 394. reduced, with the consequent changes of designation in the surviving troops. From a total, of all ranks, amounting to 2675, in 1815, and 2621 horses, the Horse Artillery fell in 1816 to 1181 men and 959 horses. Of the six troops in France with the Army of Occupation, the following was the establishment per troop, each troop having 6 guns:—
5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 56 drivers, 168 horses.
The troops on home service were allowed only 4 guns, and an establishment of 5 officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, 56 gunners, 24 drivers, 102 horses.
But this was merely a beginning. In 1819, B and G Troops were reduced; the troops in France were brought on the Home Establishment, and the number of guns per troop reduced to 2. The strength was then 5 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 47 gunners, 18 drivers, 36 horses, per troop; and the total strength of the Royal Horse Artillery did not exceed 616 of all ranks, and 317 horses.[2]
At this miserable establishment the troops remained for some years. In 1828, the two troops on service in Ireland were raised to 4 guns, and remained so; the relieving troops taking over 2 guns, and a suitable proportion of men, from those they relieved. In 1848, all the troops were raised to 4 guns, with the required increase of men and horses; and this lasted until 1852, when each troop was raised to 6 guns, the present establishment.
In 1847, the Rocket Troop became I Troop: and rocket carriages were added to the equipment of the whole.[3]
Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood.
The 4-gun Troops in Ireland had 2 ammunition waggons, 1 forge and 1 store waggon. On the augmentation to 6 guns in 1852, there were allowed to each troop 6 waggons, 1 forge and 1 store waggon, and 1 captain’s cart.
Sir E. C. Warde.
The augmentations after 1847 were due to “the foresight and determination of Lord Hardinge, who was one of the best friends the Corps ever had, being utterly without Reports to House of Commons, and to Lord Panmure, by Sir R. Gardiner, in 1848, 1849, and 1856. jealousy, and fully appreciating the value of an efficient, and of sufficient, artillery.” But he was warmly aided by one within the Corps, whose motives were as single as his arguments were sound, whose voice was ever ready to plead for the corps in which he had spent a long, pure, and illustrious life, Sir Robert Gardiner. Owing to these augmentations, 42 guns of Horse Artillery were available for service R. H. A. Records. in the field in 1854: and the total strength of the Brigade stood at 1175 of all ranks, and 1054 horses.
Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood, K.C.B., Captain Gordon, C.B., and Colonel G. T. Field, R.A.
The following was the establishment of a troop of Horse Artillery when sent on active service to the Crimea in the Spring of 1854:—
| Officers | 6 | ||
| N.-C. Officers | 15 | ||
| Gunners | 80 | ||
| Drivers | 77 | ||
| Trumpeters | 1 | ||
| Farriers | 1 | ||
| Shoeing smiths | 4 | ||
| Collar-makers | 2 | ||
| Wheelers | 2 | ||
| Equipment— | |||
| Light 6-prs. | 4 | ||
| 12-pr. howitzers | 2 | ||
| 6-pr. ammunition waggons | 5 | ||
| 12-pr. howitzers | 4 | ||
| 6-pr. rocket carriage | 1 | ||
| Forge | 1 | ||
| Store-limber waggon | 1 | ||
| Store cart | 1 | ||
| Spare gun carriage | 1 | (not horsed). | |
| Horses— | |||
| Officers | 12 | ||
| Troop | 192 | ||
| Total | 204 | ||
On the 29th November, 1855, the following was laid down as the detail of a troop of Horse Artillery with the army in the Crimea.
| Officers | 6 |
| N.-C. Officers | 20 |
| Gunners | 97 |
| Drivers | 123 |
| Trumpeters | 1 |
| Total | 247 |
| Farriers | 1 |
| Shoeing smiths | 6 |
| Collar-makers | 3 |
| Wheelers | 2 |
| Total | 259 |
| Equipment— | 4 | 9-pr. guns. |
| 2 | 24-pr. howitzers. | |
| 6 | gun ammunition waggons. | |
| 5 | howitzer waggons. | |
| 1 | store-limber waggon. | |
| 1 | spare gun carriage. | |
| 1 | forge. | |
| 1 | rocket carriage. | |
| 1 | store cart. | |
| 1 | medicine cart. | |
| 2 | forge waggons. | |
| 3 | water carts. | |
| Total | 28 | carriages. |
| No. of Horses. | |
|---|---|
| Riding | 92 |
| Draught | 180 |
| Total | 272 |
Of the troops which had been reduced after Waterloo, B was reformed as a reserve half troop in 1855, and completed in the following year: and G and K Troops were reformed in 1857.
The highest point reached between the reductions after Waterloo, and the year 1857, was in February 1856, when the total of all ranks reached 1950, and the number of horses was 1370. The amalgamation of the Royal with the Indian Artilleries brought the strength of Royal Horse Artillery available for service to an unprecedented standard: at the present moment there are in the regiment thirty-one service and two depôt Horse Artillery Batteries. But this chapter relates solely to the old Royal Horse Artillery.
As yet the numerical variations in the Royal Horse Artillery have alone been treated. But there are many other details, mainly of interior economy, which will doubtless be interesting to the modern representatives of the arm, and which may here be briefly stated.
Maj.-Gen. Brome to the Duke of Richmond, 6/9/17.
At first, it was directed that recruits might be taken who were 5 feet 6¾ inches in height: but before six months had passed, the standard was raised, at the urgent request of the Captains, to 5 feet 8 inches. There was often difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of suitable recruits, and even when the troops were complete, it was customary to attach to each, when in the field, a few of the Driver Corps, with Lefroy. additional horses or mules. Extra pay was granted from the first to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and gunners of Horse Artillery.
The exact relative status of the new branch of the service was speedily settled. On 21st February, 1797, the Board of Ordnance granted the same allowance for forage to the officers, as was allowed to officers of Cavalry; and so early had it been decided that the Horse Artillery should take the right of all Cavalry, that, as will be seen by the following letter, the Master-General would not in 1804 allow the point to be disputed.
“Woolwich, June 9, 1804.
“Dear Colonel,
D. A. Gen. R.A., to Colonel Cuppage.
“I submitted to the Master General your letter of the 5th instant, relating to a conversation which took place with General Sir David Dundas, when the Horse Artillery marched past with the Cavalry, on the King’s birthday, in which Sir David, though the Horse Artillery then led, expressed doubts as to the precedence and rank of the Horse Artillery on such future occasions.
“Lord Chatham not being aware upon what circumstances Sir David’s doubts have arisen, and not considering the communication from you in any other light than as a wish to know how far, as commanding officer of Artillery, you are justifiable in making a claim to the right for the Horse Artillery when paraded with Cavalry, his Lordship has desired me simply to say that he considers the privilege so well established by practice, as well as opinion, that he is unwilling to suppose it can be disputed.
“His Majesty has never seen the Horse Artillery in any other place: they were encamped on the right of all the Cavalry (of the Blues) at Windsor: and in all parades of ceremony and honour, placed on the right of the Cavalry.
“I am, dear Colonel,
“Your obedient Servant,
“J. Macleod.”
Both by custom and regulation this precedence continued to belong to the Royal Horse Artillery until July 1869, when it was ordered that the Household Cavalry, when the Sovereign should be present, should have the precedence awarded to a body guard.
It was laid down as a rule, that no officer should be appointed to the Horse Brigade, who had not been on foreign service: but as this rule was occasionally broken, it was decided in July 1805 that any officers who had been appointed to the Horse Artillery, prior to having been on foreign service, should “(to avoid any officers being confined to one species of duty) be liable after three or four years’ service in the Horse Brigade to be exchanged again into the Battalions, so that they may take their share of duty on foreign service, and obtain that experience which is necessary to an Artillery officer, as he advances in the Regiment.” For the information of the general reader it should here be stated, that prior to 1861, when the amalgamation of the Imperial and East India Company’s armies took place, the Royal Horse Artillery never went abroad except on active service. Since 1861, however, India has opened a field of foreign service for this branch of the Regiment: and fifteen batteries of service Horse Artillery are to be found in that country, against sixteen at home.
General Orders and R. H. A. Records, and MS. Notes of General Belson, R.A., 1812.
The changes in the dress of the Horse Artillery may be gathered from the following statistics. An order dated 1st November, 1806, lays down the following rules for the dress of officers:—“Except at dress parades the blue Regimental overalls are to be worn till dinner-time in place of the blue pantaloons, which is to be the afternoon dress when at home. At all parades, whether mounted or dismounted, and during the day, the black velvet stock is to be worn, with an inch of shirt collar over it: no other white to be shown. In the evenings, it is requested that black silk handkerchiefs may be substituted with the same proportion of shirt collar over them. When officers are dressed for a ball, evening party, or dine out, they are to wear the jacket open, white pantaloons, plain white waistcoat (with sash over it), light sword, regulation sword-knot, black belt, with cocked-hat and feather. In common a white leather sword-knot is to be worn. Spurs with horizontal rowels to be worn at all times.”
Prior to 1812, gaiters and knee-boots had been worn: but on the 14th January in that year his Royal Highness the Prince Regent issued the following order:—
“The officers of the Royal Horse Artillery are to wear jackets similar to the private men, with an aiguillette. In parade dress, they are to wear white leather pantaloons, and Hussar boots, with gold binding. On ordinary duties or on march, they are to wear overalls of a colour similar to the private men’s, and a short surtout, which is calculated to be worn likewise as a pelisse on service. When attending a drawing-room or levee, they may appear in long coats, with lappels and aiguillettes, the same as are worn with the jacket, but without lace on the seams: or in the Regimental jacket, as they may prefer. The officers of the Horse Artillery are likewise to wear cocked-hats, with the star loop, with their dress regimentals.”
1823.
By General Order of 5th August, 1823, leather pantaloons and Hessian boots were abolished, blue-grey overalls and Wellington boots being substituted.
1827.
By General Order of 22nd December, 1827, helmets were abolished, and chacos with tassels substituted.
1831.
By General Order of 15th March, 1831, drivers’ jackets were assimilated to those of the gunners.
1831.
By General Order of 20th December, 1831, steel spurs for officers were abolished, and brass spurs substituted.
1834.
By General Order of 26th May, 1834, cross-belts were abolished, and waist-belts substituted.
1837.
In 1837 bearskin busbies were substituted for chacos. The plumes were altered in 1839.
1853.
Sealskin busbies were substituted for bearskin. The officers, however, continued to wear the bearskin until 1855, when the sable busby was adopted. The plume was shortened from 12 to 8 inches.
1854.
The officers’ pelisse was abolished in this year.
1855.
The full-dress jacket was altered by reducing the amount of lace. A cross-belt of gold lace with pouch was instituted for the officers; as also a plain blue stable-jacket in place of the undress frock-coat and red embroidered waistcoat.
1857.
In this year booted leather overalls were instituted; and swan-neck steel spurs for all ranks were substituted for the brass spurs of the officers, and the straight steel spurs of the men.
A more important thing, however, than the dress has been the armament of the Royal Horse Artillery. Its greatest deeds have been wrought with the 6-pounder; but that was not its invariable weapon. Talking merely of the pre-amalgamation days[4]—the days which belong to history instead of to-day, when rifled ordnance was unknown in Horse Artillery—there were even then not unfrequent changes of armament. One troop, as we shall see hereafter, went on service with 12-pounders; on the eve of Waterloo, owing to the want of guns of position, three troops received 9-pounders, instead of the 6-pounders which they had brought from England; and coming to later days, at the commencement of the Crimean War, the two troops, C and I, which first left England were armed with 6-pounders; but, on reaching Varna, C Troop was ordered to exchange them for 9-pounders; and I Troop would have been left behind, for inability to do the same, had it not been that Lord Raglan yielded to the urgent entreaties of its commander, Colonel Maude, to allow it to accompany the expedition.
During the Peninsular Campaign, the armament of a troop was as follows:—2 9-pounders, or 2 heavy 6-pounders; 1 heavy 5½-inch howitzer; 3 light 6-pounders; 6 ammunition Lefroy. waggons; 3 reserve waggons, and 4 other carriages. Compared with the simplicity of modern Horse Artillery armament, the presence of three different guns in the same troop, with the consequent necessity of a variety of ammunition, seems a very complicated and undesirable arrangement. This was frequently felt at the time; and at the change of armament made before Waterloo, a foreshadowing of the modern harmony of weapons might be detected in the arming of I Troop—Bull’s—with 5½-inch howitzers only. And right noble was the service done by that troop on the 18th of June.
During the season of starvation between 1819 and 1848, the guns attached to the skeleton troops were 6-pounders. With the augmentations, a proportion of howitzers made its re-appearance.
The proper armament for Horse Artillery, in the days before the substitution of rifled ordnance put an end to the discussion, was exhaustively treated by Sir Robert Gardiner. His arguments are interesting even at the present day, when the perfection of Field Batteries, and their ability to carry more gunners into action by means of the new-pattern carriage, have combined to make not a few question the necessity of so expensive an arm as Horse Artillery being retained. If we substitute the 9-pounder rifled gun for the old 6-pounder, and the 16-pounder for the old 9-pounder, in Sir Robert’s remarks, we shall find his arguments as applicable Report on the Artillery by Sir R. Gardiner, 31 Mar. 1848. to the later as to the former controversy. “There can be no greater mistake than to put rivalry or comparisons, or to expect the same results from the employment of Horse Artillery as of Brigade (i. e. Field) Artillery. Though one and the same arm, they are equipped and intended for totally distinct purposes. The necessary quick movements of the Horse Artillery could not be attained by 9-pounders; the telling effect of 9-pounders could not be expected from Horse Artillery. One is intended to act with Cavalry, and, from the nature of its equipment and the lightness of its metal, is expected to maintain at all times, and under all circumstances, of bad roads, of rough, hilly, or broken ground, the same pace as Cavalry; and, in short, to bring artillery into action wherever Cavalry can act.... I can name two instances in which, while acting with cavalry, any other than Horse Artillery would have been perfectly useless. One, the affair of Morales, in Spain; the other, the movement from Quatre Bras to the position of Waterloo. Both were specially movements of Horse Artillery, and both tried the wind and speed of our horses. In the latter movement particularly, through a deep cross country, any Artillery differently equipped would have inevitably fallen into the hands of the enemy. In all light movements of the Infantry of an army, Horse Artillery is as indispensably necessary and as exclusively effective, as it is with cavalry. I have myself, in cases of reconnoissance, been withdrawn from the Cavalry for the moment, to cover movements in which heavier Artillery could bear no part.... On the other hand, if Horse Artillery has its distinct advantages over heavier guns, so likewise the latter have their distinct purposes, for which the employment of Horse Artillery would be wholly inapplicable and inadequate.... I have known Brigade Artillery as perfect, in its way, as Horse Artillery; but no more comparison can be drawn between them than between Cavalry and Infantry.”
Then follows a remark, which shows how the writer anticipated the changes which have come, and which have done so much to improve our Field Artillery: “Our present Brigades would be greatly advanced in efficiency if, like the Horse Artillery, or the Brigades with the Duke of Wellington’s army in the Peninsula, they were placed under the command and the responsibility of their captains. They should also, to become effective Field Artillery, be placed on the same footing as the Horse Artillery, for their contingent share in all garrison and general duties. They should march to and from the outposts in relief in the same manner as the Horse Artillery; they should combine, like the Horse Artillery, the knowledge of the duties of Cavalry with those of Artillery. They would thus gradually attain that perfection in their own distinctive service, which I believe to be unequalled in the few skeleton troops we possess of Horse Artillery.”
At the time these words were penned, Field Artillery had reached a point of degradation which had hardly been surpassed even in the old days of peasant drivers. Of the six batteries or brigades nominally at Woolwich, two existed on Sir R. Gardiner’s Report. paper, having neither men nor horses. “Two others,” wrote Sir R. Gardiner, “are so little advanced in their necessary drill and training as to be quite non-effective for the purposes of service, or even the common movements of parade and review. Two only might possibly move without causing interruption or confusion to other troops they might be acting with; but that is as much as can be said of them.... The riding and driving of our Brigade drivers is at this moment very bad. With the exception of the Brigades stationed in Dublin, where they have occasional opportunities of moving with other troops, they are unskilful, and ignorant of Artillery movements; at Woolwich they are employed in carter’s work in the civil departments of the Arsenal; and, of course, as long as such a system is pursued they can never become Artillery drivers.... The Brigades in Ireland are more efficient, and fitted to move with other troops, than the Brigades in England. But it is a delusion to say that England has a Field Artillery. There is not a single 9-pounder horsed in the British service—an astounding fact. Nor will it be believed, except by those who know the truth, that the English army has been for years without Artillery attached either to Cavalry or Infantry, for the common purposes of drill and exercise in their combined movements.”
The progress of Field Artillery to its present excellence may be said to date from 1848. Already, before 1856, the Light Field Artillery had regained what it had lost during the economical era which followed Waterloo; and since 1859, when the new brigade system put an end to the incessant change of batteries from field to garrison service, the progress has been continuous. But this progress would have been impossible had it not been that a standard of Field Artillery excellence had been maintained, even under the most adverse and depressing circumstances, by those unequalled skeleton troops of Horse Artillery, whose officers have, by their influence and exertions, done so much to make what may be called medium Field Artillery the admirable service which it now is. It has been said that the influence of the Horse Artillery, during the period between 1816 and 1848, was injurious to the Field Batteries. If it were so, it was in the most indirect manner possible. Economy in our military administration being peremptorily demanded, the only alternative left to the Board of Ordnance was between a very small force of admirable Field Artillery, and a larger force of batteries starved in equipment and incapable of service in the field. The officers of the Regiment, whose position entitled them to be the advisers of the Board, were undoubtedly men whose sympathies lay with the Horse Artillery, in which they had all served; but they were also men who had seen, during the campaigns in the Peninsula, Belgium, and France, what was possible with a well-equipped Field Artillery of less mobility. In deciding on a small but perfect force, rather than a larger and indifferent one, it must be admitted that they acted wisely. The brilliant Field Artillery of the great war would have otherwise become a mere tradition, whereas, under the system adopted, it remained a reality, a model, and a standard. The adoption of the other alternative would have vitally injured the Horse, without much benefit to the Field Artillery; and it would have rendered the reorganisation of both a more difficult, and a more tardy operation. That the Field Artillery suffered terribly during the period mentioned, is too true; but dispassionate study of the Regimental history proves, not what has often been asserted, that the suffering was due to the blighting influence of a corps d’élite but merely to an unwise, an unprofitable, and a singularly short-sighted economy.[5]
A much larger question arises when the policy of a corps d’élite, as a part of a larger body on which it feeds, has to be considered. No subject has been so fruitful of discussion in the Regiment; and nowhere can a decision be more safely arrived at than in a careful study of the Regimental history. There are strong arguments in favour of, and also against, the policy which has existed since the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery; and the best way of arriving at a conclusion is to state these arguments, and to weigh their respective values.
It has been said that the existence of a corps d’élite produces Trochu. “I’énervation de la masse au profit des groupes.” In Hime. stronger language it has also been said: “The more ruthlessly the system of selection is carried out, the more rapidly do the troops from amongst whom the selection is made lose their self-respect and become at first apathetic, and at last inefficient. The corps d’élite, the insatiable parasite, must degenerate in precisely the same degree as the body which feeds it; and the end is, that in the lapse of a few years the whole edifice crumbles, totters, and falls. When the oak falls, the ivy that killed it must fall too.”
But those who apply such language to the existence, in the Royal Artillery, of a corps d’élite such as the Royal Horse Artillery, forget several important considerations which distinguish it from such a corps as the French Chasseurs à pied, of which it was said that everything that was good, everything that was efficient, everything that was soldierlike in the Infantry of the Line was seized upon with unsparing hands, and remorselessly drafted into it. In the first place, the selection for this branch of the Regiment is only made for the purpose of officering it. The field battery which rejoices in smart non-commissioned officers and men is in no dread of losing them to feed a favoured corps. From the day a recruit joins the Horse Artillery, his efficiency and his education depend on the officers of that arm; and therefore to them is the credit due if their efforts are successful.
There have been occasions when the Horse Artillery was permitted to select from the recruits of the other battalions; but these days have passed away. No service battery of Field or Garrison Artillery has to minister to the wants of our corps d’élite, and therefore the language employed in Hime. another place by the able author quoted above, in reference to the Infantry corps d’élite in our service, is more applicable than that used by him in reference to our Field Artillery: “The recruits are selected with care; but they are selected from society at large, not from regiments of the Line; and the result is that this noble body of men, the Guards, are a source of wholesome emulation, instead of contentious rivalry, to the rest of the army.”
The whole question, therefore, may be condensed into one point—the wisdom or otherwise of officering the Horse Artillery from the Regiment at large. Such petty considerations as higher pay, special privileges, &c., which are apt to embitter the minds of some, must be put aside as unworthy. In a question affecting not merely the Regiment, but our whole military life as well, we cannot be too careful in clearing the ground of all but the purest argument. The opposers of the existing system have always been able to argue with great force, because there are undoubted anomalies, which can easily be described in such a way as to appear ludicrous. As selection for employment in the Horse Brigade has always been conditional on previous zeal and efficiency, it follows that the reward for activity and knowledge in the performance of, it may be, Siege and Garrison Artillery duties, is often employment in a service totally dissimilar. This may be compared with rewarding an Infantry officer for skill in battalion drill, by giving him a troop of Horse! Yet, while admitting the anomaly, it is impossible to suggest a better test, if both branches of the Regiment are to be officered from the same list. The only test of efficiency which can be trusted is efficiency already proved. It must be believed that a man who has been faithful and zealous in one line of duty will display the same zeal and conscience in another; and if selection has to be made,—if there are many candidates for any employment, their previous history, even under very different circumstances, is the best witness for or against them.
But another argument employed against the existing system is, that an officer, who has once served in the more brilliant branch, returns with reluctance, on promotion, to the others, and is restless and dissatisfied until he is reappointed. In other words, that esprit for the particular branch drowns that for the Regiment. History is the best witness here.
Excluding the many living men, who have proved that Horse Artillery service has not affected their Regimental esprit de corps, let us recall the names of the men who have been most distinguished for professional talent of every description since the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery. Sir John Macleod, Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir Alexander Dickson, Sir John May, Sir Robert Gardiner, and Sir E. C. Whinyates, all served in the Horse Artillery, but never allowed themselves to be blinded, by their love of that service, to the interests of the Regiment at large. Their letters, their very lives, are witnesses to their devotion to the whole Corps; and while serving with the Siege or Garrison Artillery, their performance of duty was inspired by the same zeal, as when serving in what may be called the more attractive branch. They all saw and felt that the less showy was the more scientific, that Garrison Artillery was the backbone of the Regiment, and that, under favourable circumstances, it would dwarf, even in popularity, the mounted batteries. The Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns were conducive to the efficiency and popularity of Horse Artillery; but let Siege Artillery have as many years of such service as it went through at Sebastopol, with the mounted batteries acting merely as carriers of ammunition, and its efficiency and popularity would be quite as great.
History therefore does not support the theory that service in the Horse Brigade injures the capacity, or the esprit de corps, of an officer who returns to the other branches. The question at issue therefore condenses itself into a still narrower field; viz., admitting that the present system does not prevent Artillery officers from being generally efficient, would they not be much more efficient if they belonged to Field or Garrison Artillery during their whole career, without the power of interchanging their services? If ability in field battery service were rewarded by appointment to the Horse Artillery, and skill in Garrison Artillery service were rewarded, either by special employment or by appointment to some such corps as was recommended by Sir Robert Gardiner—an Artillery of the Guard—would we not have better officers of each branch than we now have? Logically, there can be but one answer; and were this the only consideration, the argument would terminate in favour of a separation of the officers of the various arms, similar to that already existing between the non-commissioned officers and men. We should then have probably more skilled artillerists, in point of number, in each branch; although perhaps no individual more skilled than those who have appeared under, or in spite of, the anomalous system which has hitherto existed.
But would the Regiment in the end be a gainer by the change? Has not the system of interchange been the best school possible for familiarising the Artillery officer with the duties and movements of other arms, and thus qualifying him for commands in the field? General Foy, in writing of the days when such a thing as a command being given to Foy. a General of Artillery was unknown, owing to jealousy of the Ordnance, said: “On a trop en horreur les avancements hors de la règle pour permettre qu’un artilleur qui se trouverait trop à l’étroit dans son arme s’élançât dans le service général de la ligne. Jamais de l’école de Woolwich ne sortira un Bonaparte.” The days of the Ordnance have passed away: public opinion points more surely every day to the employment of Generals who are not merely soldiers, but scientific soldiers as well; and it would be a suicidal policy which would recommend a change which, if carried out logically, would result in the certainty of admirable officers of high but narrow professional training, and the impossibility of any whose experience of general service would qualify them for a mixed command. The Garrison Artilleryman who in his battery had attained a skill in his particular groove, hitherto but rare, would feel every day his association with the other arms getting less, and his consequent inability to command them getting greater. If this consideration be carefully borne in mind, even those who feel most strongly on the subject—and they are many—will hesitate ere they precipitate a result which would inscribe on the walls of the Academy the dismal prediction, “Jamais de l’école de Woolwich ne sortira un Bonaparte.”
Note.—The extra rate of pay to non-commissioned officers and gunners of the Royal Horse Artillery is based on the following General Order, dated 21 January, 1793:—
“The Master-General directs that an allowance of twopence per day, in addition to their Regimental pay, shall be made to each non-commissioned officer and gunner of the Brigade of Horse Artillery, when and so long as he continues mounted, and having the care and management of an horse, in consideration of the extraordinary and constant attention required of such persons for the due performance of this particular service, which must deprive them of the occasional advantages arising from their being employed in works for which additional pay is given.
“The dismounted non-commissioned officers and gunners of this Brigade not being in the same circumstances, nor deprived of their share in the works, will not be entitled to the said allowance; nor will the drivers of this Brigade, as they are to be enlisted merely for that special service, and will have but little of other duties to learn or perform.”
Note 2.—The style of horse considered suitable for Horse Artillery at first, may be ascertained from the following instructions, dated Woolwich, March 1810:—“The horses to be from four to six years old (when bought), to be short-legged, open-chested, and broad-winded; not to exceed 15 hands 2 inches, nor—four years old—under 15 hands ½ inch; to have good bone and action, the colours to be bay, brown, and dark chestnut.” The price allowed, after a month’s trial, was thirty guineas.
CHAPTER III.
With the Duke of York in Flanders.
The causes of a war are to a certain extent beyond the province of a work which has mainly to deal with Hist. R. A. Chap. i. vol. ii. its history. In the present instance, allusion has already been made to the ostensible reason; but it is very difficult Stephen’s ‘Wars of the French Revolution.’ to arrive at the exact truth. “From the guilt and odium of this new and disastrous conflict the ruling parties in both nations anxiously endeavoured to vindicate themselves.” There is no doubt that in 1792 England threatened to declare war, unless France should renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement; or, in other Ibid. words, “relinquish all her conquests, and confine herself within her own territory.” The answer given by M. Chauvelin to Lord Grenville, on the 13th January, 1793, was: “We will fight the English, whom we esteem, with regret; but we will fight them without fear.” Matters were precipitated by the execution of the French King; and on the 24th January M. Chauvelin received notice to quit England within eight days. Once again the French attempted to pacify the English Government, but without success. They therefore took the initiative—declaring war, in the name of the French Republic, against England and Holland on the 1st February, 1793; and this was followed on the 11th February by a counter-declaration on the part of England.
On the 17th February the French army took the field, resolved to carry the war into Holland; and speedily captured Breda, Klundert, and Gertruydenberg. The siege of Williamstadt was not so successful; and here good service was rendered by the Royal Artillery on board bomb-vessels. Severe reverses having befallen another French army, employed elsewhere in the Low Countries, the whole of the French troops were withdrawn from this first expedition against Holland. Space prevents any description of the operations between the Imperialists and the troops of the Republic—the losses and defeats of the latter under Dumouriez, and his subsequent defection. The movements of the Army under the Duke of York will be all that it is necessary to study, to ascertain the services of the Corps in this war.
MS. Correspondence. Brigade-Major to B. of Ordnance.
Although the main Artillery force for this expedition did not embark until the 10th May, 1793, Woolwich was much disquieted after the end of February with incessant demands for battalion guns and the requisite detachments for the regiments under orders for the Low Countries. In no English war was this pernicious system of battalion guns more systematically urged and practised. Occasionally—as will be seen presently—the guns were brigaded; and during the siege operations, as at Valenciennes, the Artillery did duty by companies: but, as a rule, the guns were attached in pairs to the different battalions. Only one waggon accompanied Ibid. each pair of guns; and the following was the strength of the Artillery detachment: viz., 1 subaltern, 2 non-commissioned officers, 8 gunners, 3 drivers, and 9 horses. The faults of this system have already been alluded to, but are most Captain H. W. L. Hime, R.A., on ‘Mobility of Field Artillery.’ clearly shown in the following words:—“To prevent these guns from impeding the movements of the infantry to whom they belonged, their weight was reduced to an extent which made their fire under the most favourable circumstances all but useless. Secondly, as a matter of fact, they did seriously encumber their infantry. For, infantry compelled to drag guns along with them could not be expected to march, even on smooth and level plains, with the same order and rapidity as infantry who marched free from such an encumbrance; and in a cultivated country, intersected with ditches, hedges, and walls, the guns had to be abandoned altogether. In this latter case they not only failed to fulfil the very object of their existence, but left a gap in the line which, as they were generally placed in the centre of the battalion, might produce fatal consequences. Thirdly, as it was necessary for them to take part in all the manœuvres of the battalion, the necessary time was not afforded to the gunners for placing, loading, or laying their guns carefully. No guns could have been effective under this system, which violated both the fundamental principles of Field Artillery tactics, viz., that the movements of a battery in action should be minimum in number, and should be made at a maximum speed. Fourthly, their constant presence with their infantry led the latter to look upon the guns as necessary to the safety of the battalion, and thus diminished that self-confidence which infantry must possess to be successful. Fifthly, as these guns were practically useless, not only was the money spent on their construction wasted, but the regular columns or trains of Artillery were deprived of a corresponding number of guns, which might have been turned to good account by their own officers. In fine, this bad system weakened the Artillery without strengthening the Infantry, and raised a general prejudice against the use in the field of what was regarded as a complicated and useless mechanism.”
At the special request of the Duke of York, Major—afterwards Sir William—Congreve was appointed to command the Artillery of the expedition. He embarked in May with the main body of his force. A party under the command of Brevet-Major Wright left England earlier in the spring of 1793, to take part in the siege operations with which the English share of the campaign commenced. Its strength and the names of the officers were as follows:—
Ordnance Letter-books and Records of the 1st Battalion.
| Brevet-Major Wright, in command. | |
|---|---|
| Capt.-Lieut. Borthwick. | 3 Sergeants, 7 Corporals, 4 Bombardiers. |
| 1st Lieutenant Thornton. | 5 First Gunners, 94 Second Gunners. |
| 1st Lieutenant Robe. | 2 Drummers. |
| 1st Lieutenant Fenwick. | |
| 1st Lieutenant De Ginkle. | |
| 1st Lieutenant Watson. | |
| 2nd Lieutenant J’ans. | |
| Total of all ranks, 123. | |
Major Wright’s Company, which formed the chief part of this force, was No. 2 Company, 1st Battalion, now B Battery, 1st Brigade.
The main Artillery force, which embarked at Woolwich on the 10th May, 1793, was as follows:—
MS. returns to B. of Ordnance.
| Major W. Congreve, in command. | |
|---|---|
| Captain Trotter. | |
| Captain Wilson. | |
| Captain-Lieutenant Broadbridge. | |
| Captain-Lieutenant Cookson. | |
| First Lieutenant Roberton (Adj.) | |
| First Lieutenant Wilson. | |
| First Lieutenant Hooke. | |
| First Lieutenant Depeyster. | |
| First Lieutenant Bentham. | |
| First Lieutenant Fead. | |
| Second Lieutenant Rudyerd. | |
| Second Lieutenant Downman. | |
| Second Lieutenant Foy. | |
| Second Lieutenant Phillott. | |
| Sergeants | 4 |
| Corporals | 5 |
| Bombardiers | 9 |
| First Gunners | 6 |
| Second Gunners | 192 |
| Drummers | 3 |
| Surgeon, W. Smyth. | |
| Surgeon’s Mate, Hearsley. | |
| Commissary and Paymaster, Captain Williamson. | |
| Commissary of Horse, Mr. Eastaff. | |
| Clerk of Stores, Mr. Meek. | |
| —— | |
| 1 Conductor of Stores. | |
| 3 Wheelers. | |
| 1 Cooper. | |
| 1 Carpenter. | |
| 3 Smiths. | |
| 2 Collar-makers. | |
| 1 Farrier. | |
| 114 Military drivers. | |
| 84 Horses. | |
The total of the military branch, exclusive of the drivers, was 236.
There was also an extraordinary addition to a force proceeding on active service, in the form of 21 women and 23 children.
Yet a third detachment left Woolwich for Flanders, on the 26th August, 1793, as follows:—
Ibid.
| Major Huddlestone, in command. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Captain Laye. | 11 | Non-Commissioned Officers. | |
| Capt.-Lieut. | Boag. | 232 | Gunners. |
| Lieutenant | Lawson. | 3 | Drummers. |
| “ | Geary. | 4 | Waggoners. |
| “ | Shrapnel. | 18 | Women and 7 children. |
| “ | Beevor. | ||
| “ | Lacy. | ||
| “ | Mann. | ||
| “ | Waller. | ||
Various other officers joined the Army during the war, among whom can be traced Lieutenants Schalch, Lefebure, Boger, and Spearman. The force of Royal Artillery in Flanders reached its maximum in February 1794, when it was as follows:—
| 3 | Field Officers. | There were also 224 Gunner-drivers for service with the Field Brigades, the Driver Corps having been formed in 1794 for that purpose, the men being regularly attested soldiers. Hitherto, the Drivers were generally called Waggoners. |
| 7 | Captains. | |
| 14 | Subalterns. | |
| 61 | Non-Commissioned Officers. | |
| 478 | Gunners. |
An additional expedition, under Lord Moira, sailed for the Low Countries during the war; and the Artillery portion of the force comprised a field-officer in command—the 5th Company of the 4th Battalion—now B Battery, 9th Brigade—with MS. Returns to B. O. 110 of all ranks, and also 114 sergeant-conductors and gunner-drivers.
The present designations of five of the companies known to have been with the Duke of York’s force are—
| B Battery, 1st Brigade. | (No. 4 Company, 4th Battalion, which was also present, has since been reduced.) |
| No. 4 Battery, 5th Brigade. | |
| No. 4 Battery, 7th Brigade. | |
| B Battery, 9th Brigade. |
The 6th Company, which was with the Army, cannot be traced with accuracy, but it was probably No. 7 Battery, 2nd Brigade. There were two bomb-vessels, the ‘Terror’ and ‘Vesuvius,’ which did good service, and on board of which were Lieutenants Suckling and Ramsay, 2 non-commissioned officers, 18 gunners, and 2 artificers, of the Royal Artillery.
MS. Returns to B. O.
The total strength of the Regiment at this time was 4857 of all ranks; and its distribution at the end of 1794 was as follows:—
| Home Stations | 6 | Troops of Horse Artillery. |
| Home Stations | 18 | Companies. |
| Colonial Stations | 22 | Companies. |
| Holland | 6 | Companies. |
| Toulon and Corsica | 1 | Companies. |
| Total | 53 | Troops and Companies. |
Vol. i. p. 405.
It will be remembered that the first five companies of a new Battalion, the 5th Battalion, were raised in this year. In this estimate of the strength of the Regiment, the Invalid Kane’s List. Companies are not included. The companies on colonial service included 2 in the East Indies, 7 in Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, 9 in the West Indies, and 4 at Gibraltar.
Returning to the war, it may be observed that it was at the blockade of Condé that the English troops first took the field, forming part of the Allied Army under the Prince de Cobourg. The French suffered reverses at Famars and Quiévrain; but the first occasion on which the Artillery received special mention was on the 8th May, 1793, at St. Amand, when the Brigade of Guards was engaged in support of the Prussians, and contributed greatly to the success of the day. The Battalion guns attached to the Guards on this occasion were of great service, succeeding in silencing the enemy’s artillery, and so breaking his infantry that the charge ultimately made by the Guards was doubly effective. The wording of the letter to the Master-General, in praise of the conduct of the Artillery on this occasion, seems to imply that the guns were brigaded, from the fact of Major Wright’s name being mentioned as in command:—
“Tournay, May 10, 1793.
“My Lord,
“I have the utmost satisfaction in informing your Grace that the zeal and ability of Major Wright and of Lieutenants Watson and Fenwick have done them the highest credit. The guns commanded by these officers were the only ones brought into action. I was myself a witness of the promptitude with which Mr. Watson’s were served, and know that they had great effect.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“James Murray.
“To His Grace the Duke of Richmond, &c. &c.”
On this occasion the French General Dampierre was killed by a cannon-shot from the English batteries. On the following day the enemy was driven from his camp at Famars, and Valenciennes was invested by the Allies. Condé was taken three months after the commencement of the blockade. Valenciennes, having been approached in a methodical manner, according to the strictest rule, did not suffer any serious attack until the forty-first day of the siege. On the 25th July the outworks were taken, mainly through the exertions and gallantry of the English under General Abercromby; and on the following day, in answer to a second summons, the place surrendered to the English and their allies. The Siege Artillery used on this occasion was considerable in quantity, and of its effect the following extract from the Duke of York’s despatch will be the best proof: “The batteries were allotted at different times to be worked by the Royal Artillery, and every commendation is due to Major Congreve and to the officers and men of that Corps, who have upon this occasion fully supported the reputation they have so long enjoyed.” For his services on this occasion Major Congreve received on the 21st August, 1793, the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
One or two minor actions took place before winter put an end to hostilities. At Lincelles, on the 18th August, 1793, the Artillery attached to the Brigade of Guards under General Lake again did good service; and on this occasion the first officer of the Corps who fell during the war lost his life—Lieutenant Depeyster. The official account of this engagement, after lauding the gallantry of the Guards, went on to say: “Equal praise is due to Major Wright and the officers and men of the Royal Artillery attached to the Battalions.”
Ill-success followed. The siege of Dunkirk by the Duke of York proved a failure. He was badly supported by his allies, and received little or no assistance from the navy. He had therefore to retreat—certainly in good order—but leaving behind him 32 heavy guns intended for the siege. At Lannoy, on the 28th October, Lieutenant Thornton of the Royal Artillery, afterwards Sir Charles Thornton, A.D.C. to King William IV., lost an arm. It was by this time apparent to the Allies that the war, so far as they were concerned, must be a purely defensive one; and they found it extremely difficult to hold Austrian Flanders. The darkness of their situation was lit up at the end of October by a successful attack on Marchiennes, made by General Kray under the direction of the Duke of York, in which the enemy lost 12 pieces of cannon, and 2000 killed and wounded. In spite of this success, however, winter came upon the Allies, finding them in a very different frame of mind from that in which they had commenced the campaign. They did not, however, despair, but resolved and prepared to commence with greater vigour than ever the campaign of 1794.
Their united strength on the 16th April amounted to 187,000 men; but it was injudiciously divided into eight columns, to march on different points; the fourth and fifth being under the command of the Duke of York. The object of these two columns was the attack and capture of the village of Vaux, which they undertook, and in which they succeeded on the 17th April, 1794. Major-General Abercromby and Sir William Erskine commanded the columns, and Colonel Congreve in person commanded the Royal Artillery, whose well-directed fire on this day has been acknowledged by all writers. The French lost 30 pieces of Artillery. One of the companies of the Corps received on this day an honour, unprecedented in the previous or subsequent annals of the Regiment.
MS. Records of 4th Battalion.
No. 1 Company, 4th Battalion—now No. 4 Battery, 7th Brigade—attracted the admiration of the Duke of York to such an extent by its gallantry and skill, that he made the whole army form up on the field of battle while this company marched past him. He also published a General Order, saying: “His Royal Highness desires that Captain Boag and Lieutenant Fead of the Royal Artillery (the officers with the company) will accept his thanks for the very spirited and able manner in which they conducted the battery entrusted to their care.” If history is not utterly powerless, the story of the 17th April ought to stir the hearts of this battery, and make every man in its ranks strive to be not unworthy of those, who proved themselves worthy of so rare and honourable a distinction. To be singled out for bravery on a day when all were brave, and to display a spirit and an ability which, amid all the confusion of battle, attracted the observation of a preoccupied commander, surely these are traditions which should fire the most generous emotions, and awaken the most noble resolves. It is in such a belief, and with such a hope as this, that men have been found to record such tales in Regimental records, and that others have been found to transcribe them fondly from faded pages, and give to them a new life and a wider circulation.
Encouraged by the success at Vaux, Landrecies was besieged by the Allies, the English troops covering the operations towards Cambray. Twice between the 23rd and 26th April did the Duke of York’s force defeat the French; and on the 26th it was mainly owing to the well-directed fire of the Royal Artillery, under Colonel Congreve, that the French were dislodged from their position in the village of Troisvilles, with a loss of 35 guns and 300 prisoners. Landrecies surrendered on the 29th April; but this advantage, even when combined with the Duke of York’s successes, did not atone for the severe defeat, which had been experienced on the 26th April by the Allied Army under General Clairfayt at the hands of a French army under General Pichegru. There seems from this time to have been a want of harmony among the Allies. Their armies melted away into more isolated columns every day; and the system of incessant attack, irrespective and regardless of frequent defeat, which was pursued by the French forces, seems to have produced a nervous effect upon their opponents, under which each commander seemed to play, so to speak, for his own hand. The representatives of the old school of war were bewildered by the activity of those of the new. They found themselves fighting, confined by strict and wooden rules, by which their adversaries refused to be bound; and the consequences proved fatal.
The English army continued to achieve minor successes at Lannoy, Roubaix, and Monveaux; but met with a serious reverse on the 18th May, 1794, when Major Wright’s Battery was nearly cut to pieces. The French succeeded in completely surrounding the English, who had actually to effect a retreat through the enemy’s troops, in doing which Major Wright’s battery, now B Battery, 1st Brigade, Royal Artillery, was charged by the French cavalry, and suffered the loss of its commander, 5 men and 31 horses killed, and 2 subalterns, Lieutenants Boger and Downman, 45 men, and 70 horses wounded. In fact, the battery was placed completely hors de combat, as might have been expected when guns were so hampered as to allow a charge of cavalry to be possible. Surrounded as they were on all sides by mingled friends and foes, it was impossible to come into action on the advancing hussars; and the many acts of individual bravery failed to save them from virtual annihilation.
Fortune was more favourable a few days later—on the 22nd May—when the English successfully resisted a general attack of the French under General Pichegru; and their obstinacy on this occasion was the origin of the barbarous order issued by the ruffians who held the reins of government in Paris, forbidding any quarter to be given “to the slaves of King George.” This was nobly answered by the Duke of York, who in a General Order, dated 7th June, 1794, urged his troops to “suspend their indignation, and to remember that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest Gen. Order. gem in a soldier’s character.” In the repulse of the enemy on the 22nd May the conduct of the Artillery was such that “His Royal Highness the commander-in-chief begged to thank Captain Trotter, with the Artillery under his command, for their great display of intrepidity and good conduct, which reflected the greatest honour on themselves, and at the same time was highly instrumental in deciding the important victories of the 22nd.”
From this time, however, the Allies experienced nothing but disaster. The capture of Charleroi and the battle of Fleurus proved the increasing merits of the French army, while the welcome from the Belgian cities, which one after another, including Brussels itself, fell into the hands of the French, proved that the sympathy of the people was much more with them than with the Allies. It is difficult to overrate the value of such sympathy in war.
In the course of these disasters the Duke of York’s communications with Ostend were interrupted, and the English Government, becoming seriously alarmed, fitted out the expedition already referred to, which left Southampton for the Continent, under the command of Lord Moira. After many vicissitudes this second army succeeded in effecting a junction with the Duke of York, after defeating the French at Alost and Malines. The continued advance and repeated attacks made by the French army, compelled the Duke to retire across the Meuse into Holland. The surrender of the frontier fortresses followed; and then, while other French armies were detailed to pursue the Continental part of the Allied forces, Pichegru himself, with a much larger force than that under the command of the Duke of York, resolved to invade Holland, and exterminate the English. From this moment the Duke, being completely outnumbered, was compelled steadily to retire. An action took place on the 15th September, between his advanced guard and the French troops, at Boxtel, the result of which was a further retreat, and the abandonment to their own resources of Bois-le-duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom. The first-named of these places was invested by the French on the 23rd September, 1794, and surrendered on the 10th October. Without waiting to take the other two, and leaving them in his rear, Pichegru, with the energy which characterised the French armies of the Revolution, and with a contempt for the laws of war which paralyzed his opponents, pushed on in pursuit of the English, whose retreat in face of superior numbers was—it must be confessed by every one—very skilfully managed. The Duke of York was in position at Pufflech when the French came up, and on the 19th October, 1794, a severe engagement took place, which ended in the English army being compelled to retire behind the Waal, while the French undertook the siege of various garrisons. On the 28th October, Venloo was taken; followed, on the 5th November, by the capture of Maestricht; and on the same day the siege of Nimeguen was commenced. Here gallant service was rendered by the English, and, among others, General Abercromby was wounded; but the impetuosity of the French was such that the Duke of York, finding his intercourse with the garrison cut off, retired a little farther to take up a fresh position, and, on the 8th November, Nimeguen surrendered. The Duke of York was, for many reasons, anxious to escape an engagement, and he intrenched himself strongly in the lines of Nimeguen. The French commander, however, having received peremptory orders from his Government not to desist hostilities, notwithstanding the lateness of the season, prepared to cross the Waal, but was prevented by the fire of the Allied Artillery. He gave up the idea for the time, and confined himself to making the necessary dispositions for invading Holland in the spring;—no easy task, when one reflects on the facilities with which the whole country could have been flooded. Most fortunately for him an exceptionally severe frost set in, freezing the rivers and canals so that they could support troops and artillery. Hostilities were at once recommenced by the French, and, after taking several strong places in the end of December, fighting in a temperature lower than it had been for thirty years, on the 11th January, 1795, Pichegru, with his whole army, crossed the Waal. In the attempt made by the British to prevent this, considerable loss was met with, and, among others, two subalterns of Artillery, Lieutenants Walker and Legg, were wounded.
From this time commenced a retreat which, for misery, discomfort, and losses, has been compared with the French retreat from Moscow, although on a much smaller scale. The English Government, having resolved on the withdrawal of the army, directed it to retire on Bremen, there to embark for home. This order rendered it necessary for the troops to traverse the district called the Weluwe, a perfect Cust. desert, over which the wind was drifting the snow into almost impassable ridges—where the few scattered villages had been rendered hostile by French emissaries, and where Ibid. “numbers of English soldiers perished through want and weakness, and many were frozen to death.” The hardships borne by the army did not interfere with their discipline; and they were soothed by the sympathy of all classes in England, and ultimately by a hearty welcome home. With the exception of a small force under General Dundas, which remained on the Continent until the following year, the whole army reached England in May 1795. It was on the 8th of that month, that the six companies of Artillery disembarked at Woolwich, from which station they were speedily removed to Chatham and Portsmouth.
The barbarous order given by the French Government with reference to the English soldiers, which has been mentioned above, was almost atoned for by an act of chivalry on the part of the French troops at the end of the campaign. During the retreat of the English, the 87th Regiment had been left as part of the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom. The Dutch Government, dismayed by the continued successes of the French, and urged on by a party in the country, by no means inconsiderable, which sympathised with the Republican cause, came to terms with the French Commander, and consented to the surrender of the various garrisons. Considerable anxiety naturally existed as to the Cust. fate of the 87th Regiment; “but, compromised by the defection of an ally, it was generously permitted by the conquerors to separate itself from the garrison, and to be sent back to England.”
One or two facts remain to be mentioned. It was during this campaign, at the affair at Boxtel, that the Duke of Wellington, then in command of the 33rd Regiment, first was under fire, and displayed the same coolness and intrepidity which afterwards characterised him. It was also during the concluding months of the war—after the resignation of the Stadtholder—that the singular military episode occurred—more singular even than that mentioned in the Vol. i. p. 372. annals of the American War, when a fleet was defeated by a field battery—the capture of a fleet by a charge of cavalry. The Dutch fleet was lying ice-bound at the Helder—the harbour frozen over,—and was in this position captured by a body of Dragoons who had penetrated to that place in relentless pursuit of the French Royalist emigrants, who had fled thither for refuge.
This chapter would hardly be complete without a short notice of an event which occurred at Toulon in 1793, and which deserves special mention, because then for the first time was the Royal Artillery brought face to face with a young French Artillery officer, who was destined to become famous, Napoleon Bonaparte. Toulon was held by the British on behalf of the royal family of France; and part of the force employed was a company of the Royal Artillery from Gibraltar, under Major Koehler, the Captain-Lieutenant of the company. Among his subalterns were Lieutenants Browne. Brady, Lemoine, John Duncan, Newhouse, and Alexander Duncan; and although in December the town had to be evacuated, this was not done until the greatest gallantry had been displayed by the British troops. The loss in the Artillery was very great; and the following order by General Dundas, dated on board the ‘Victory’ on the 21st December, ‘London Gazette,’ 17 Jan. 1794. 1793, speaks well as to their skill:—“Lieutenant-General Dundas reports, that after a most gallant defence of Toulon, he was under the necessity of evacuating it, from the very great superiority of the enemy’s army, and the report of the Engineer and Artillery officers that it had become untenable. After destroying the enemy’s men-of-war and stores in the Dockyard, the army embarked on board our men-of-war. As the security of this operation depended much on the protection afforded from the happy situation of Fort La Malgere, which so effectually commands the neck of the Peninsula, and the judicious use that should be made of its artillery, this important service was allotted to Major Koehler with 200 men, who, after seeing the last man off the shore, and spiking all the guns, effected, from his activity and intelligence, his own retreat without loss. At Fort Mulgrave, Lieutenant Duncan of the Royal Artillery was so essentially useful that to his exertions and abilities that post was much indebted for its preservation for so long a time.”
The officer last mentioned was Lieutenant John Duncan, who was promoted in the following year, and was mentioned as follows for his conduct at the capture of Bastia, in Corsica, the service in which the Toulon garrison was Admiral Lord Hood’s Despatch, ‘London Gazette,’ 10 June, 1794. next engaged:—“I cannot but express in the strongest terms the meritorious conduct of Captain Duncan and Lieutenant Alexander Duncan of the Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant de Butts of the Royal Engineers; but my obligation is particularly great to Captain Duncan, as more zeal, ability, and judgment were never shown by any officer than were displayed by him, and I take the liberty of mentioning him as an officer highly entitled to His Majesty’s notice.” Lieutenant Alexander Duncan, who is also mentioned in this dispatch, afterwards commanded the Royal Artillery during the defence of Cadiz in 1810-12, at the battle of Barossa, and at Seville, at the last-mentioned of which places he was accidentally killed.
During the service in Corsica, which resulted in its surrender by the French, the Royal Artillery did duty with Nelson’s seamen,[6] and received great credit for their exertions at the capture of Bastia and Calvi. A fatal fever played havoc with the men; and it was found necessary to send an additional company from England, which absorbed the remnant of Major Koehler’s. That officer was made Quartermaster-General to the forces in the island on its surrender to the English, and Major Collier was sent to command the Artillery with the title of Inspector of Artillery.
This garrison remained until the evacuation of the island by the English in 1796.
Even thus early, and in spite of much inexperience on the part of their commanders, the French armies of the Revolution had evinced merits, zeal, and courage of no ordinary description. The new system of fighting had already defeated the old; and when organized, as it eventually was, by a master hand, Bonaparte, it was an engine before which the old system, with its pedantry, sluggish precision, and winter-quarters, was sure to go down like a house of cards. Happily for England, there were in her army in Flanders men like Wellington and Abercromby, who could see the faults of the school in which they had been trained, and at the same time not be ashamed to own the superiorities Major C. B. Brackenbury, R.A., at U.S. Institution. which might be possessed by an enemy,—men, in fine, who, while “conservative of glorious traditions, were fearless of all necessary changes—endeavouring to catch the meaning of present progress, or, with prophetic eye, reaching forward to anticipate future developments.”
Without such men, the glorious stories of Egypt and the Peninsula would have been but repetitions of this futile war in Flanders.
CHAPTER IV.
1796 to 1799.
These years represent a period in the history of England of which Englishmen must always be proud. Standing almost alone against the French Republic, before whose victorious armies almost every other nation in Europe succumbed, her Government and people never hesitated to protest, both by word and deed, against the unlawful ambition of the French Directorate. Blinding the French people to a sense of their hardships and their rapidly-increasing debt by the glare of military success, and attributing these same successes to the sudden development of martial spirit and liberty which followed the downfall of the monarchy, the selfish and dishonest leaders of the Republic were enabled not merely to encourage their own army, but to sow doubt and dissension in the ranks of their opponents. By flattering the people they ruled, they were enabled to sin against every rule of good government, and by creating discontent with existing authority among other nations, for which purpose they spared no labour nor expense, they brought France in 1798 to a pinnacle of greatness, to which it had never yet attained. England alone remained to defy them; and to conquer England, either by means of invasion, isolation, or by fomenting rebellion, was their fixed determination. The effect on England of suspended commerce and monetary uncertainty can be realised by the point at which the Three Annual Registers. per Cents. stood during these years. In 1796 they fell to 66; in 1797, to 56½; in 1798, the year of the Irish rebellion, they reached 49⅝; and, after its suppression, they rose again to 55. In 1796 the Bank of England suspended payment; and the discontent of the Navy was such as to render very probable the mutinies, which took place in the following year. The same dissatisfaction prevailed in the Army, although to a less extent; but open expression of it was prevented by the wisdom of the Duke of York in obtaining for the troops an increase of pay, and thus removing the grievance, which provoked the discontent among men, who could barely subsist on the miserable pittance that was allowed them. The Board of Ordnance made a similar increase in the pay of the two Corps under their control; and it may be interesting to state the new rates allowed for the B. O. Warrant, 27 May, 1797. Artillery. The Master-General, Lord Cornwallis, prefaces his Warrant on the subject by reminding the Corps of their former good conduct and high character, to which he had often been a witness on the most arduous occasions, and to which he had often borne the most ample and honourable testimony, when he had had the honour of commanding them. He felt sure, he wrote, that it was not in the power of the most artful traitor to seduce the soldiers of the Royal Artillery from their loyalty and attachment to their King and country; and then he urged them never to prefer unreasonable requests, whose inevitable refusal might produce discontent,—but at the same time to rely upon his readiness to redress any real grievance. The improvement in the pay of the soldier may be briefly summarised from the lengthy verbiage of the Warrant. Up to 1797, in addition to the provision made for his clothing, pension, quarters, and medical assistance,—and also besides his allowance of beer, &c., provided in quarters, and of bread provided at a reduced rate when in camp,—the soldier received a daily sum of 9½d., besides a further daily sum of 2d., which under a previous Warrant had been given in lieu of certain allowances; but, under the new Warrant, an additional sum of 3¾d. was granted, making the daily pay of the soldier 1s. 3¼d. Out of this sum, however, the extra price of the bread and meat ration, which had hitherto been borne by the public, was now to be deducted; and, as this averaged 1¾d., the net increase of pay was 2d. The pay of the various ranks after this Warrant stood as follows, viz.:—
| s. | d. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Sergeant | 2 | 2 | per diem. |
| Corporal | 2 | 0¼ | ” |
| Bombardier | 1 | 10¼ | ” |
| Gunner and Drummer | 1 | 3¼ | ” each. |
In the year 1873, the date of the publication of this volume, the rates of pay for the same ranks in the Corps are as follows, viz.:—
| s. | d. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Sergeant | 3 | 0 | per diem. |
| Corporal | 2 | 4 | ” |
| Bombardier | 2 | 2 | ” |
| Gunner | 1 | 5¼ | ” |
As in 1797 beer was allowed in kind, in addition to the daily pay, the one penny a day subsequently allowed in lieu of it has not been included in the pay of the various ranks in 1873, given above.
The increase of pay produced a feeling of contentment in the whole army; and if sedition had no chance of thriving in the Artillery before, it certainly had none after. An unsuccessful attempt having been made at Woolwich in 1797 to stir up discontent among the men, we gather, from a General Order published shortly afterwards, that the non-commissioned officers and men subscribed a sum of money, which they offered as a reward for the detection of the offenders; and, further, signed voluntarily a paper declaring anew their loyalty to the King and fidelity to the country. This latter step—to modern eyes somewhat superfluous in attested soldiers—was doubtless called forth by certain insults to the King which had been published, and which called forth the indignation of the whole community; and also by the fact that certain soldiers serving in Ireland had been seduced from their colours by the rebels, who, under the name of United Irishmen, were traversing the whole country. The same feeling which prompted this action at Woolwich expressed itself in subscriptions from the Regiment at home and abroad to Mr. Pitt’s Loyalty Loan. It is recorded that the “officers and men of the Royal Artillery at Gibraltar, Martinique, and St. Domingo, having, as tokens of their Cleaveland’s MSS. love and attachment to their King and country, transmitted to England subscriptions, as detailed underneath, the Master-General thought it his duty to lay the same before His Majesty, and to observe to His Majesty how rapidly the spirit, which had so laudably shown itself in the Artillery at home, had spread to the detachments abroad. His Majesty, on receiving the information, was graciously pleased to express his approbation, and to permit the Master-General to communicate the same to the Regiment. B. O. 4 June, 1798. ‘The Master-General, Marquis Cornwallis, has the greatest satisfaction in obeying this His Majesty’s command, and takes the opportunity of congratulating the Royal Regiment of Artillery on that zeal and alacrity, which, in all services and in all climates and countries, have uniformly marked the character of the Corps.’
“Subscriptions from Gibraltar.—Major-General Martin, 100l.; Field Officers and Captains, 30 days’ pay each; subalterns, 14 days’ pay; non-commissioned officers and gunners, 7 days’ pay each.
“From Martinique.—Officers, 30 days’ pay; non-commissioned officers and gunners, 20 days’ pay each.
“From Cape Nicholas Mole.—Officers and men, 10 days’ pay each.”
This feeling of loyalty was general throughout the country, and was in no way affected either by temptation from without, or vapouring sedition within. And to this loyal feeling, and the noble successes of her fleets, did England owe her continued maritime superiority and the salvation of her commerce. Annual Registers. This latter had been steadily increasing; her imports and exports had risen from 27½ millions in 1784, to 49¼ millions in 1796; and, although checked and cramped by French legislation, her fleets kept the markets of the East and West open. It was during this period that the great naval victories of Camperdown and the Nile were gained, and that Nelson’s activity in the Mediterranean insured the capture of Malta and Minorca by England. Nor was any sea without the British flag. In 1799, there were in the Navy no less than 100,000 seamen, besides 20,000 marines; and both in the English seas and in the West Indies bomb-vessels, with artillerymen on board, were numerous. In the East Indies our armies were gaining renown; and in the West Indies hostilities were going on, in which the Royal Artillery took an active part, which resulted in the retention of all the English islands, and the capture from the French of St. Lucia, Martinique, St. Domingo, Trinidad, Guadaloupe, Tobago, and Curacao. The names of some of the officers of the Corps who were present during these operations are given by the author of ‘England’s Artillerymen.’[7] Consisting mainly of naval, or small detached military operations, the wars in the West Indies possess, as a rule, little but local interest. It may be mentioned, however, that they were much more fatal to our troops through the fevers and pestilence which prevailed, than the actual loss in battle.
The Board of Ordnance during this period did much good work in maturing the defences of the country, which were Annual Registers. under its control. In 1797, the cost of the Ordnance was 1,643,056l.; in 1798, 1,303,580l.; in 1799, 1,570,827l.; and Vol. i. p. 405. in 1800, 1,695,956l. In 1795 the Board completed the Fifth Battalion of the Regiment; and in 1799 the Sixth Vol. i. p. 410. Battalion was added. From the very first the Sixth was a most efficient Battalion. It had as a nucleus the two companies known as the East India Detachment; and the Communicated by Sir E. Perrott. remaining companies were composed of trained English and Scotch Militiamen, who were permitted to volunteer for service in the Regiment.
It will thus be seen that, during a critical time, the courage and determination of the people of England and their rulers saved the country from much national hardship and danger. But while thus facing a foreign enemy, another foe appeared in their midst. The student of this chapter in British history finds that it includes the story of the great Irish rebellion of 1798.
If ever the sins of the fathers have been visited on the children, it has happened in the case of England’s connection with Ireland. The fathers ate sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge. If we need a proof of the strength of history as a motive power, we cannot do better than go to Ireland. Here is a brave, a genial, a chivalrous race, shrewd and able in the affairs of life, and yet the mention of injustice done to their forefathers produces to this day such a feeling of indignation and resentment, as blinds them to the fact that the descendants of those whose memory they detest are endeavouring, almost to the opposite extreme, to remove all tokens of former injustice. The history of Ireland, in its relations with England, repeats many familiar truths; it proves that national sins no more go unpunished, than personal; it shows that rebellion without organisation is useless; and it tells most distinctly that reasonable demands have often been refused from want of judgment in the time and manner of urging them. It proves, also, most clearly, yet another point, for which no additional proof is required—that the passions of a people are the very best instrument with which unscrupulous men can work to obtain their own private ends; and that, by stirring these up, they can so blind men to the real goal which it is intended to reach, as actually to make them in time believe their own—possibly legitimate—purpose to be identical with that of their leaders, which, if presented to them in cold blood, would have made them shudder. He who doubts this needs only to study the class of men called the “United Irishmen,” as they were when first organized, and as they became under the manipulation of cunning leaders, and in the face of an imprudent, unreasoning opposition. The Government of England would have yielded much to the quiet reformers, which they were bound to refuse to rebels; and it was this knowledge that made the arch plotters fan discontent into disturbance as quickly as possible, lest, with the satisfaction of just demands and the removal of admitted grievances, the discontent should disappear, and their own vocation with it.
The story of the rebellion in Ireland in 1798 is a sorry one; but it has its place in this history because, at some of the more important engagements between the troops and the rebels, such as those known as the battles of Ross, Now A Battery, A Brigade; B Battery, A Brigade, and C Battery, A Brigade. Wexford, and Vinegar Hill, that portion of the Regiment which had so recently been created—the Royal Horse Artillery—was present. Two guns of A, B, and C Troops respectively were present on these occasions. With the exception of these, and some Battalion gun detachments, the Artillerymen engaged during the rebellion in Ireland belonged to the national Corps—the old Irish Artillery—whose loyalty shone undimmed during that trying time.
Although the story of the rebellion itself needs not to be told here, certain facts connected with the Artillery arrangements will probably be found interesting.
From July 1795, care had been taken to impart some knowledge of Artillery drills to the Infantry regiments in Ireland, the custodians of the battalion guns being required to instruct in each regiment at least 30 rank and file, G. O., 7 July, 1795. under a subaltern and two sergeants. At this date the battalion guns were not brigaded on field-days, as was afterwards done; but always marched past at the head of General Regulations for the march of the army in Ireland, 12 Nov. 1796. the regiments to which they were attached. The ammunition waggons followed the column.
On the 20th February, 1797, battalion guns were issued to the following regiments of Militia, viz., Donegal, Clare, Limerick City, Antrim, Kilkenny, North Mayo, Queen’s County, and Armagh; and one “useful, well-instructed” G. O., 20 Feb. 1797. gunner from the Irish Artillery accompanied each pair of guns, which were “to be worked by soldiers of the “regiments.” This had been approved by the Lord-Lieutenant on the 13th February, and orders had been given for the immediate instruction in Artillery duties of over 300 Militiamen. This confidence in the loyalty of the Irish troops shows that the rebellion had but little real hold in the country, except among those with whom it will ever find a welcome, the ignorant and fanatic.
It had always been a dream of France to annex Ireland, or, failing that, to secure its independence; and the time seemed favourable for the purpose. But, owing to circumstances too long to be narrated here, the practical assistance afforded by the French was almost nothing; and the rebellion, although encouraged by French promises, received in the end but little of French performance. It would really seem, after dispassionate study, that the rebellion, in the absence of the excited opposition of the Orangemen, would never have occurred; that the removal of the disabilities of the Catholics would at first have completely gratified those who, after a time, would accept nothing but national independence; and that such removal would in all probability have been granted, had not the moderate reformers among the United Irishmen unfortunately accepted the leadership of men like Wolfe Tone and others, about whose extreme and impossible views there was no doubt whatever. The feeling of discontent was also increased by the intemperate language of the priests, who, in the heated expressions of their opponents, detected a possible future for their Church, even more gloomy than its existing state; but this last-named reason had less to do with the birth of the rebellion, than the causes already stated. To panic-stricken, and therefore cruel, opposition on the part of the Protestants, and to the association of injudicious leaders with their cause, is the fact due that men, whose claims have been admitted by subsequent legislation to be just, landed in 1798 in a most unfortunate rebellion.
In even the most solemn matters there is often an element of the ludicrous; and one who is acquainted with the national character would not be surprised to find such in an Irish rebellion. The guns which were given to the Irish Militia were not at first horsed; and very great difficulty was experienced in procuring horses for the purpose. The loyal Colonel of the Tipperary Militia, Colonel Bagwell, offered to lend his own horses for the purpose, and his Dated “Royal Hospital,” 25 Feb. 1797. offer was readily accepted. A letter was then sent to the commanding officers of other Militia Regiments, inviting them to follow Colonel Bagwell’s example, and offering, on the part of the Ordnance, to pay for the horses’ forage, &c., during the time they should be employed. With very few exceptions, the invitation was declined, and a further perusal of the official documents suggests a very natural reason for what would at first sight seem somewhat ungracious, if not disloyal. On the 27th February, 1798, a letter was addressed to the officers commanding the various districts in Ireland, pointing out that it had reached the ears of the Commander-in-Chief “that the limbers of the guns attached to battalions are used for market cars, and other conveniences for the officers and women of the regiments, and that the horses are ridden by officers and their servants about the country at all hours.” The knowledge of this by the officers commanding the regiments would naturally make them reluctant to expose their own horses to such treatment; and a result of these irregularities was the change Vol. i. p. 165, ‘Royal Irish Artillery.’ which took place from battalion guns to brigades, already described. It may be here stated that a considerable number of the men of the Irish Artillery were employed in gun-boats in the Shannon and elsewhere during the rebellion.
The detachments of the Royal Artillery, which were present with the battalion guns attached to the regiments from England, were six in number, each detachment consisting of 1 non-commissioned officer and 9 men. The whole were under the command of Captain Henry Geary, assisted by three subalterns. The regiments to which they were attached were the Guards (three Battalions), the Queen’s, 29th, and 100th Regiments. A reinforcement of two companies was asked for by General Lake, but the successes at Wexford rendered it unnecessary to meet his demand.
D. A. General to Lord Cornwallis, 28 June, 1798.
At this time, H.R.H. the Duke of York ordered two 12-pounder guns to be attached to each troop of Horse Artillery, and, as will be seen hereafter, these guns remained part of the armament of the troop of Horse Artillery which formed part of the expedition to the Helder, in 1799. Two guns, from four troops respectively, went to Ireland to assist in quelling the rebellion, but only those belonging to A, B, and C Troops took part in the active operations. The strength of the Horse Artillery sent to Ireland was as follows:—
Embarkation Returns, dated Woolwich, 26 Nov. 1797.
| 2 | Captains. | 2 | Staff-Sergeants. |
| 3 | Subalterns. | 12 | Non-Commissioned Officers. |
| 1 | Assistant-Surgeon. | 92 | Gunners. |
| 51 | Drivers. | ||
| 6 | Artificers. | ||
| 1 | Trumpeter. | ||
| 177 horses (and 13 from Driver Corps). |
| 8 guns. |
| 15 ammunition waggons. |
| N.B.—The guns were two 12-pounders, two 5½-inch howitzers, four 6-pounders. |
The total strength of Horse Artillery left in England was as follows: 968 of all ranks, 920 horses, 42 guns, and 72 waggons.
This included a reserve of 5 guns at Woolwich.
After the rebellion had been quelled, the men of the Royal Artillery, who during the operations had been under the Irish Branch of Ordnance, returned to England; and the following table gives the distribution and strength of the Royal Irish Artillery in the succeeding year. (See pp. 80 and 81.)
Returning to England, the student will find not a few matters of domestic interest which occurred during this period, and which are worthy of being chronicled. A new organisation of the Ordnance Medical Department took place; and on a recommendation of a committee it was i B. O. Proceedings, 5 May, 1797. resolved, on the 5th May, 1797, that, after the 1st July following, the system of obliging surgeons to furnish the medicines for the troops out of a fixed money allowance should cease, and that one of the Ordnance chemists should be appointed Regimental apothecary. An increase of pay was also granted to the medical officers.
| A. | Lieut.-Colonels. | B. | Majors. | C. | Captains. |
| D. | Capt-Lieutenants. | E. | 1st Lieutenants. | F. | 2nd Lieutenants. |
| G. | Staff Sergeants. | H. | Sergeants. | I. | Corporals. |
| J. | Bombardiers. | K. | Drummers. | L. | Gunners. |
| A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G. | H. | I. | J. | K. | L. | Total. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brigades | East | Two at Island Bridge | 1 | ·· | ·· | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 80 | 99 |
| One Naas | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 3 | ·· | 32 | 38 | ||
| One Arklow | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | 2 | ·· | 29 | 35 | ||
| One Wexford | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | 22 | 26 | ||
| North | Two Charlemont | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 3 | ·· | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 73 | 88 | |
| One Belfast | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | 2 | ·· | 36 | 42 | ||
| One Omagh | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | 2 | ·· | 32 | 38 | ||
| One Strabane | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 4 | ·· | ·· | 32 | 38 | ||
| One Coleraine | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | 2 | 32 | 38 | |||
| One Dundalk | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | 2 | ·· | 32 | 38 | ||
| One Enniskillen | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 3 | ·· | 32 | 39 | ||
| South | One Clonme | 1 | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 50 | 61 | |
| Two Cork | 1 | ·· | 1 | 1 | 2 | ·· | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 80 | 97 | ||
| One Bandon | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 32 | 37 | ||
| One Limerick | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 38 | ||
| One Tarbert | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 2 | ·· | 32 | 37 | ||
| One Waterford | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | 2 | ·· | 29 | 35 | ||
| One Kilkenny | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | 1 | 2 | 1 | ·· | 31 | 37 | ||
| West | Two Athlone | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | ·· | 81 | 95 | |
| One Galway | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 39 | ||
| One Carrick-on-Shannon | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 18 | 21 | ||
| One Castle-bar | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | 16 | 19 | ||
| Batteries. | Charlemont | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 12 | 13 | |
| Carrickfergus | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 7 | 9 | ||
| Cromie Head | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | 10 | 12 | ||
| Tanitt | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 9 | 10 | ||
| Cork Harbour | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 78 | 92 | ||
| Charles Fort | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | ·· | ·· | 12 | 15 | ||
| Duncannon | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 9 | 11 | ||
| Bantry | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 2 | 1 | ·· | 16 | 21 | ||
| Tarbert | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | 13 | 14 | ||
| Total | 4 | 2 | 11 | 10 | 26 | 9 | 2 | 25 | 49 | 53 | 8 | 1,031 | 1,232 | ||
| Five Companies in West Indies. | Present | ·· | ·· | 2 | 5 | 7 | ·· | ·· | 4 | 17 | 15 | 9 | 340 | 399 | |
| Sick, leave, &c. | ·· | ·· | 2 | 1 | 2 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 5 | ||
| To return to Ireland | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ||
| Under orders to proceed from Ireland | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 3 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 4 | ||
| Wanting | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2. | ·· | 6 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 75 | 92 | ||
| Total | ·· | ·· | 4 | 7 | 10 | 5 | ·· | 10 | 20 | 20 | 10 | 415 | 501 | ||
| Invalid Company. | On command Duncannon | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | ·· | 10 | 12 | |
| On command Charlemont | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | 4 | 5 | ||
| Sick—absent | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ||
| Employed in the Line | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ||
| Serving in the Militia | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | 2 | ||
| At the Powder-mills | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 2 | 2 | ||
| Totally unfit for any duty | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 22 | 22 | ||
| In and about Head-quarters | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 | ||
| Wanting to complete | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 1 | ||
| Total | ·· | ·· | 1 | ·· | 1 | 1 | ·· | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 43 | 53 | ||
| Joined lately from West Indies, and notincluded in any of above numbers | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 19 | ||
A change was also made in the Paymasters of the Regiment. It will be remembered that Mr. Cox had been appointed Paymaster to the Artillery in 1759. He was Cleaveland’s MSS. succeeded in 1783 by Mr. Adair, who was followed by Messrs. Meyrick. On the 1st July, 1797, the Paymastership Letters from D. A. G. was resumed by Messrs. Cox and Greenwood, and continued in that house (subsequently Messrs. Cox and Co.) until Confirmed by J. C. Woollacott, Esq. abolished on the 30th September, 1858, since which date they have been agents to the Corps.
In 1797 the first Regimental School was established at Woolwich for soldiers’ children. On the 13th August, Captain—afterwards Sir William—Robe recommended its MS. by Sir W. Robe, in R. A. Record Office. formation; and was strongly supported by the Commandant, General Lloyd. A building, then unfinished, and now part of the Horse Artillery Square in Woolwich Barracks, was procured for the purpose; the Duchess of York subscribed 20 guineas for the purchase of books, and this was followed by subscriptions from all the officers at Head-quarters. A sergeant, named Dougherty, was appointed Schoolmaster; and the success of the institution was so great as to induce the Board of Ordnance to undertake its management and support. The first pupil was a difficult, but very creditable subject. He was the son of a gunner in the Invalid Battalion, who lost both his arms when firing the evening gun at an out-station for his father. So remarkable was his progress at school, that it attracted the attention of the military authorities; and this, taken in conjunction with the way in which he had received his injury, obtained for him from the Board a pension for life as a drummer,—although he had never been enlisted as such.
There were a great many officers and men employed in the Bomb service during this time; and as no stoppages were made for rations while the men were employed on board the Ordnance Letter-books, 20 Sept. 1797. vessels, the service was a very popular one. Most of the Bomb vessels were employed in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, and among the West India Islands.
The employment of Artillery officers on the Staff of the Army became more common than it had hitherto been; but, with great short-sightedness, it was discouraged by the Board. It was, indeed, too often made a great favour on the part of the Master-General to allow officers to be so employed. Among the names of officers, who can be traced as having received the requisite permission, are Major James M. Hadden, R.H.A., who was appointed Adjutant-General in Portugal, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, vice Sir J. Erskine, who resigned; Lieutenant-Colonel Koehler, who was selected as Quartermaster-General in the Eastern District; and Captain Duncan, who was employed on the personal staff of H.R.H. the Duke of York. The nucleus of an appointment, which to this day has more of a Regimental than an Army nature, dates from this period. D. A. Gen.’s Correspondence, and Kane’s List. On 9th June, 1797, Lieutenant A. T. Spearman was appointed Garrison Adjutant in Woolwich. On 7th July, 1802, the title of this office was changed to Brigade-Major, the same officer continuing to hold it; and on 1st April, 1873, the title was again altered, the incumbent, Major A. T. G. Pearse, being styled Assistant Adjutant-General of the Woolwich District. The Director-General of Artillery during the period treated of in this chapter was Major-General Duncan Drummond; the Commandants were, successively, Generals Farrington, Congreve, and Lloyd; and General Blomefield was Inspector of Artillery. In 1797 the Committee of Field Officers, which met periodically to consider warlike inventions, received a more permanent form than hitherto, foreshadowing the Ordnance Select Committee which subsequently came into existence,—Captain Maclean being on the 26th February appointed a standing Secretary to the Committee.
On the 25th December, 1798, certain augmentations in the pensions of widows of officers in the Army were granted; and the Board of Ordnance, as was invariably the case—for in such matters the Artillery and Engineers had no cause B. O. Letter, 13 Jan. 1799. for complaint—followed suit. It was decided that widows of officers in the Royal Artillery and Corps of Captain-Commissaries (or Driver Corps) should receive pensions at the following rates:—
| £ | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Widow of | Colonel, or Colonel Commandant | 80 | per annum. |
| ” | Lieutenant-Colonel | 50 | ” |
| ” | Major | 40 | ” |
| ” | Captain and Captain-Lieutenant | 30 | ” |
| ” | First Lieutenant | 26 | ” |
| ” | Second Lieutenant | 20 | ” |
| ” | Chaplain | 20 | ” |
| ” | Surgeon-General | 30 | ” |
| ” | Surgeon | 26 | ” |
| ” | Assistant-Surgeon | 20 | ” |
| ” | Captain-Commissary | 30 | ” |
| ” | Lieutenant-Commissary | 26 | ” |
| ” | Quartermaster | 20 | ” |
These rates, as is well known, have been increased since the Warrant of 1799, although still so inadequate as to render Regimental Provident Funds a necessity; but the reader can hardly fail to be struck with the disadvantage under which the widows of non-combatant officers laboured in old times,—a disadvantage which disappeared with the introduction into the Service of what is known as relative rank—an arrangement which enabled non-combatant officers to acquire by length of service the same privileges, as fell to the lot of their combatant brethren.
A few statistics may be appended here, as very few domestic chapters will be given between 1799 and the date at which this work comes to an end. The strength of the Regiment, at the commencement of the period embraced by this chapter, was as follows:—
Return rendered to H.R.H. the Duke of York, 26 Nov. 1795.
| Royal Horse Artillery | 1,085 | of all ranks. |
| Marching Battalions | 5,560 | ” |
| Invalid Battalion | 505 | ” |
| Corps of Captain-Commissaries | 1,466 | ” |
| Total | 8,616 |
These were distributed as follows:—
| 6 | Troops of Horse Artillery. |
| 52 | Companies of Artillery. |
| 5 | Companies of Driver Corps, or Captain-Commissaries. |
| 11 | Companies of Invalids. |
| 1 | Company of Gentlemen Cadets. |
Kane’s List.
The geographical distribution of the Regiment, as far as the combatant companies were concerned, was as follows,—the year 1797 being selected as a year of comparative peace, between the two Continental Expeditions under the Duke of York:—
| On Home Stations | 29 | Troops and Companies. |
| In Portugal | 1 | Company. |
| In Canadal | 4 | Companies. |
| At Cape of Good Hopel | 2 | Companies. |
| At Gibraltarl | 5 | Companies. |
| In East Indiesl | 2 | Companies (belonging to no Battalions). |
| In Jamaical | 4 | Companies. |
| In Newfoundlandl | 1 | Company. |
| In Nova Scotia and Cape Bretonl | 2 | Companies. |
| In the West Indies (exclusive of Jamaica) | 8 | Companies. |
Of these companies, as has already been stated, many men were employed on board the bomb vessels. The companies stationed at the Cape of Good Hope deserve special notice at this time, as also subsequently did those at Gibraltar, for their loyalty at a time of mutiny among the other forces on D. A. General, R.A., 4 Feb. 1798, and Colonel Cleaveland’s MS. Notes. the station. On the 4th February, 1798, the following letter was published to the Regiment by Colonel Macleod, having been transmitted to him by order of Major-General Dundas, commanding the troops at the Cape of Good Hope, who had in the first instance addressed it to Lieutenant-Colonel Yorke, who commanded the Royal Artillery on that station:—
“Castle of Good Hope,
“15 November, 1797.
“Sir,
“The Corps of Artillery having had the greatest part of the extraordinary duty which the late disturbances on board the fleet have occasioned, as their alacrity in discharging their duty was no less conspicuous than on former occasions, when the Artillery have been called upon to act, I am directed by Major-General Dundas to express his entire approbation of their conduct,—honourable to themselves and to the Service.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “P. Abercrombie,
“Major of Brigade.”
Commendation of loyal conduct in time of civil disturbance is as noble a record to hoard in the story of a regiment, as the chronicle of valour in the field. Military discipline is indeed a miserable weapon, if it is not found true in time of national discontent, as well as in the hour of national danger. The great lesson for a soldier to learn is obedience; and if that obedience is to be conditional on the soldier’s inclination, then the nation which trains an armed force is but cherishing a possible enemy. The lesson of silent obedience is becoming every day more difficult to learn; discipline in civil life is rarer than it was, and impatience of control is almost a popular cry. What a noble mission, then, an army may follow in time of peace! To show that men with skill and power, and with a consciousness of these qualities, can yet subordinate themselves for the good of the commonwealth, instead of the individual, is surely a grand object for an army’s purpose. And in the daily life of such a force a nation might read a lesson, which, if taught from the mouths of rulers or the pulpits of preachers, would fall on deaf, because doubting ears; for a suspicion dogs the heels of the mere speaker, which vanishes before the open and consistent life of the actor.
Yet a few more statistics before the chapter closes. It has been necessary to talk with disparagement of the field brigades, as distinguished from the troops of Horse Artillery in the conclusion of the last century. But if the quality of the Field Artillery was indifferent, its quantity would have B. O. Return to H.R.H. the Duke of York. satisfied an alarmist. On the 19th February, 1798, there were, in England alone, 126 battalion 6-pounder guns, besides brigades and parks of artillery, consisting of 29 12-pounders, 36 long 6-pounders, and 28 5½-inch howitzers. These were distributed in Newcastle, Hull, Woodbridge, Colchester, Warley, Canterbury, Dover, Lewes, Plymouth, and St. Austell; and there was a further reserve at Woolwich of 12 12-pounders, 30 long 6-pounders, 3 8-inch howitzers, 12 5½-inch howitzers, and 30 light 6-pounders.
This seems a formidable force on paper, and it doubtless soothed many a terrified alarmist, and silenced many an honourable member on the Opposition benches. But, alas! both these desirable ends may often be attained by an official return, and yet the evil may not be removed. Had the House demanded that the means of locomotion for this powerful force of artillery should be produced, it is to be feared that the men would have been scarce and the horses scarcer. And yet the official return had its value. The authorities concerned always managed—it may be at great expense—to produce the necessary armament at the eleventh hour; and the balance was merely so much dust thrown in the eyes of honourable members, as a sort of Parliamentary tribute.
Official returns may be misleading, and yet the units of the force to which they relate may be worthy of all praise. Rising from the contemplation of faded pages, and the analysis of the Regimental correspondence between 1796 and 1799, the chronicler feels that there were in the Corps at that time men whose hearts were so engrossed in their work, even in this time of sad rebellion, of national depression, of uninteresting warfare, that they could truly say, with the poet who was to come in later years—and with no exaggeration, but merely in a simple expression of what was uppermost in their daily thoughts—
“I rather dread the loss of use, than fame.”
CHAPTER V.
The Christening of the Chestnut Troop.
The course of our narrative brings us again to the Continent of Europe. In the year 1798, an expedition was ordered from England, with a view to the destruction of the basin, gates, and sluices of the Bruges Canal, and the consequent injury to the internal navigation between Holland, Flanders, and France. The prevention of a meditated invasion of England by the French would, it was hoped, by this means also be ensured. The naval part of the expedition was under the control of Captain Home Popham, while the military force was commanded by General Sir Eyre Coote. Eight companies of the Guards, the 11th Regiment, and the flank companies of the 23rd and 49th Regiments, D.A. Gen.’s Correspondence. constituted the Infantry employed; and the Artillery consisted of two companies attached to a battery of four 6-pounders and three light howitzers. The Artillery officers were Captain W. H. Walker (in command), Captain—afterwards Sir Wiltshire—Wilson, Captain C. Godfrey, Lieutenants Simpson, Hughes, Ilbert, and Holcroft. The guns were carried in different vessels, and landed near Ostend. On the 19th May, at daybreak, the troops disembarked, and commenced destroying the works. In a few hours they undid the labour of five years, besides burning a number of transports, which had been collected for the conveyance of French regiments to England; but this was not effected without considerable loss. When, however, the English force attempted to re-embark, it was found to be impossible, owing to the high wind which prevailed and the heavy sea. It was therefore found necessary, after going through the empty form of summoning the citadel, to encamp for the night on the sands. The English were attacked at daybreak by the enemy in overwhelming numbers; and after a severe action, in which Sir Eyre Coote was wounded, the whole force was compelled to surrender. The conduct of the Artillery was worthy of their comrades in the battle; and their commander, Captain Walker, received wounds from which he died. Of the rest the following official mention was made:—“Captains ‘London Gazette,’ 21 July, 1798. Wilson and Godfrey, and Lieutenants Simpson, Hughes, and Holcroft, all of the same distinguished Corps, after having done everything men could do, spiked their guns and threw them over the banks at the moment the enemy was possessing himself of them. The latter gentleman, Lieutenant Holcroft, when all his men were wounded except one, remained at his gun, doing duty with it to the D. A. Gen., R.A., to Lieut.-Gen. of the Ordnance, 14 Nov. 1798. best of his ability.” From subsequent official correspondence we learn that the following officers were permitted, with their soldier-servants, to return to England on parole, viz., Captain Wilson, Lieutenants Simpson, Hughes, and Holcroft, Captain Godfrey remaining at Lille with the men. From a plaintive letter to the Deputy-Adjutant-General, written by the last-named officer, it would appear that the prisoners were in a very sorry plight; for he implored an advance of pay for all, as they “wanted almost everything sorely.”
Next year an expedition on a larger scale took place, although not much more fortunate. It has an especial interest to the Artilleryman, as being the first expedition in which a general officer of Artillery was considered necessary with the force, on account of the large proportion present belonging to that arm. General Pattison, who had held a command in America, did so as an Army not as an Artillery General; and General Phillips, who also commanded in that war, was merely a regimental field officer, with army rank as General. The expedition to the Helder, in 1799, had a contingent of Artillery, consisting of one troop of Horse Artillery, and eight companies of Marching Artillery, as they were termed. The troop was A, or the Chestnut Troop, commanded by Major Judgson; and although part of it had taken a share in the suppression of the Irish rebellion, this was the first occasion on which any portion of the Royal Horse Artillery proceeded on foreign active service; and, as will appear, the troop had rather a rough Vol. i. p. 378. baptême de feu. General Farrington was selected for the command of Artillery, receiving the following letter from the D. A. Gen.’s Correspondence. Deputy Adjutant-General, on the 8th August, 1799:—“In conversation yesterday with Lord Howe, he observed that if the expedition now embarked was to be followed by the troops and Artillery ordered to be in preparation, he should consider it necessary for them to be accompanied by not only an Artillery officer of experience and abilities, but by one high in rank in the Corps; and under that idea I was desired to address myself to you, to know if your health would admit of his proposing you to the Commander-in-Chief for the command of the whole....” The offer was eagerly accepted by the General, and his appointment was confirmed. He selected Captain—afterwards Sir William—Robe as his Brigade-Major, and Captain Maclean as his Aide-de-Camp.
The expedition was in two divisions: the first, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, going from Southampton, while the second, and main division, was being assembled in Kent. When united, the command-in-chief was to be assumed by the Duke of York. Sir R. Abercromby applied for Lieut.-Colonel—afterwards Sir Francis—Whitworth to command the Artillery of his division, and his request was complied MS. Returns to the Board of Ordnance. with. The following was the strength of General Abercromby’s Artillery, viz.: 1 field officer, 6 captains, 13 subalterns, 2 surgeons, 40 non-commissioned officers, 371 gunners, and 6 drummers. There were also present with him, belonging to the Driver Corps, 1 subaltern, 3 quartermaster commissaries, 15 non-commissioned officers, 152 drivers, 5 artificers, and 200 horses.
The main Artillery force, under General Farrington, which followed that just given, was of considerable strength, including, D. A. Gen. R.A. Correspondence. besides Major Judgson’s Troop, Lieut.-Colonels Smith and Trotter, 9 captains, 14 subalterns, 1 surgeon, 43 non-commissioned officers, 412 gunners, and 8 drummers, besides a detachment of the Driver Corps, consisting of 1 captain, 4 quartermaster-commissaries, 12 non-commissioned officers, 166 drivers, 9 artificers, and 400 horses. The strength of Major Judgson’s Troop was as follows: 2 captains, 3 subalterns, 1 surgeon, 16 non-commissioned officers, 97 gunners, 58 drivers, 7 artificers, and 1 trumpeter; making a total of 185, besides 191 horses.[8] A second troop of Horse *Captain Scott’s Troop, now A Battery, B Brigade. Artillery* was put under orders, but did not embark; and of a further detachment of the Driver Corps, which was held in readiness, consisting of 226 men and 400 horses, about one-half ultimately went, if not more.
The whole Artillery force which it was at first intended should be sent—including the Driver-Corps auxiliaries—amounted to 1857 officers and men and 1344 horses; and of this number certainly 1600 men and 1000 horses accompanied the expedition. Among the names of officers not yet mentioned, who accompanied the Army to the Helder, the letters of the period include the following: Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Terrot, Major Lewis, Captain Mudge, Captain—afterwards Sir Augustus—Frazer, Captain Riou, Captain Nicholls, Captain Ramsey, Captain-Lieutenant Geary, Lieutenant Knox, Lieutenant Morrison, and Assistant-Surgeon Jameson. From other sources we learn that two officers, who subsequently attained great distinction in the Corps, were Memoir of Sir E. C. Whinyates. also present—Sir E. C. Whinyates and Sir John Michell—both officers being then 2nd Lieutenants. Lieutenants Kane’s List. Simpson and Eligée are also known to have been present, Browne’s ‘England’s Artillerymen.’ from the fact that both were among the wounded in the actions which took place. The reason why uncertainty prevails as to the regimental details of the Artillery force on this expedition will appear at the end of this chapter.
It will be readily understood that so large a force was not collected without difficulty. But of the extent of the labour involved no one can adequately judge who has not had access to the official letter-books of the time. The expedition to the Helder proved at once the necessity of a head-quarters staff for the Royal Artillery, and the capacity of the man who had been selected as the first Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Corps. The later campaigns, in whose organization Sir John Macleod had so large a share, were undoubtedly on a grander scale; but it is questionable whether his zeal, tact, and activity were ever so prominent, as in the arrangements for this unfortunate expedition to Holland. He did everything, and made a point of knowing everything, himself: he gave himself no rest until he accomplished his purpose; nor yet did the amount of his official labours interfere with the courtesy to all ranks for which he was so remarkable. A private letter of friendly notice always preceded the order for movement, where such intimation could be given without detriment to the Service; no unnecessary mystery attended his actions: he was almost laboriously anxious to meet the convenience of all concerned, and evinced in his letters a sympathy, such as he could not have surpassed in his dealings with his own relations. His correspondence with the various commanding officers, from under whose control he had to steal detachments to bring the companies for service up to their required strength, is a masterpiece. Never for one moment leaving the line of action which necessity and the Board had imposed on him, he yet seemed to consult and defer to the Generals whose divisions he was weakening, and to obtain by their consent what he really was taking by force. If ever a wrong system, such as the old dual government of the Artillery was, could be made less detestable, it was made so by Colonel Macleod’s tact and courtesy. And it is better that the deformities of a military system should be laid bare in time of peace, than on the eve of war, when the almost inevitable confusion cannot afford to be increased by ill-timed revelations. An indifferent machine well-worked is better than an admirable one whose powers are paralysed by some temporary, but thorough disarrangement. It is not when breakers are ahead, that men speculate on the beauties of their engines: it is then that—be they what they may—they are expected to work to the utmost of their power. In the hands of Colonel Macleod the evils of a wrong system were reduced to a minimum: but the system was a wrong one still.
His exertions to perfect the force which he had to organize were as admirable, as were his endeavours to remove all possible friction. There have been times in our military history, when the great wheel of progress and success has—after much creaking—been set in motion by the untiring exertions of unexpected leaders, or uncomplaining heroism in the ranks, instead of the labours of those on whom the organization of the armies depended. And at such times of unexpected fortune, it has generally been found that the official flies have buzzed most loudly around the revolving wheel, as if they had been the motive power. Not so with Colonel Macleod in 1799. Nothing was beneath his notice; no exertion was spared by him which could ensure the perfection, as well as the harmony, of the machine. The same pages which reveal his consideration for individuals show also his determination to render the Artillery part of the expedition unrivalled: and his difficulties were very great. In the single item of horses, he found an obstacle which bid fair to be insurmountable; for the horses did not exist in the service, and could hardly be bought. Such animals as were procured by scouring the country were in so wretched a condition, that they could barely crawl in harness. So important was every day of decent rations to the sorry brutes, that to every party marching to the port of embarkation—Ramsgate—Colonel Macleod sent orders to shorten the marches, and to delay going on board as long as possible—and D. A. Gen.’s Correspondence. at all hazards, “except,” he wrote, “that of allowing it to be said, ‘We are waiting for the Ordnance.’”
Among other evils was the monotonous cry from distant colonies—not only heard in 1799, nor by one Deputy Adjutant-General—of “More men from England!” Every place was drained of every available man; even the old gunners at the Tower were drafted away, and raw recruits sent in their place: but the colonial wants were not satisfied. Militia regiments, which were embodied, were also sending daily petitions for battalion guns, followed by remonstrances and strongly-worded indignation. And Colonel Macleod, in spite of his personal opinions, was obliged to strain every nerve to meet a wish, which was still supported by our military system. His personal opinions, it has been said,—and truly: for the correspondence of the period reveals the fact that Colonel Macleod had commenced to detest the existing system of battalion guns. He dared not say openly what he thought; but from a private letter written at this time his opinion may be easily learnt. Writing of some detachments which had been collected under an officer’s command, Letter to Colonel—afterwards Sir John—Smith. he said: “I believe they are intended for the battalion guns of the Infantry Brigades, and I had some thoughts of drawing them to Chatham, where I would have them drilled to the duty expected of them—appointing 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 gunners to each 6-pounder, and accustoming them to make use of a horse to advance, instead of drag-rope men—a custom which weakens the battalions they are attached to without aiding the services of the Artillery. For, between you and I, six men are too few to drag guns, and too many to stand with ropes in their hands to be shot at.”
An incident, which occurred at this time, shows that the system of drawing lots was not confined to choice of stations or barracks at home. In a letter to the commanding officer at Newcastle—Colonel Lawson—Colonel Macleod, in calling for one of the companies under his command for service in the expedition, requested him to assemble the Captains, and make them draw lots for the duty.
It was in August 1799 that the force sailed from England; and the student, who has realised the labours of Colonel Macleod, will also be able to conceive the feelings of relief with which he despatched, at 3 A.M. on a day at the beginning of that month, a mounted orderly, to carry the intelligence from Woolwich to the Duke of York at Deal, that the last man and horse of the Artillery had embarked. It will now be necessary to follow the expedition, merely remarking here that the casualties, which speedily occurred, rendered a fresh supply of ammunition and horses necessary before many weeks had passed, and that consequently Colonel Macleod had but a brief respite from his toil.
The expedition to the Helder was intended to effect two things—the capture of the Dutch fleet, which in the hands of the French was an unmistakable danger to England, and a military demonstration in Holland, which should lead to a rising against the Republican Government. In the first of these objects the expedition succeeded; in the second it miserably failed. For an exhibition of fruitless gallantry, it has not been surpassed in the annals of the British Army. But happily it was the closing scene in the drama of military failure, with which the last decade of the eighteenth century was surfeited. With the new century came a spirit in England’s military operations, which made her campaigns by land as glorious as her successes by sea. The wars of the nineteenth century threw into the background the share taken by our armies in the wars of the French Revolution, during the period which preceded the overthrow of the Directorate in France and the virtual assumption of the supreme power by Napoleon in the winter of 1799. But the Regimental historian has to bring even fruitless and unsuccessful wars to light again, in his search for stories of individual gallantry or for the causes of failure.
England’s ally in the expedition to the Helder was Russia. It had been arranged by the two governments that the land forces should comprise a Russian contingent of 17,000 men, and an English army of 13,000. England more than fulfilled her promise: for the actual force sent by her was as much as that promised as the Russian contribution. In addition, England furnished vessels to assist in the transport of the Russian troops from the Baltic, and a powerful fleet, of more than sixty men-of-war, under Admiral Lord Duncan. On the 21st August, 1799, the fleet and transports arrived off the mouth of the Zuyder Zee, and anchored off the Helder: but foul weather prevented a disembarkation until the 27th,—a delay which gave undoubted advantage to the French and Batavian troops. The enemy was at first under the command of General Daendels, but he was almost immediately superseded by General Brune; and the army, which had at first been 10,000 strong, rose in a few weeks to nearly treble that number.
23rd, 27th, 29th, 55th, and 85th Regiments.
Abercromby’s division was the first to land, and after a very severe engagement, in which the Infantry under Generals Sir James Pulteney and Coote behaved most gallantly, the Dutch were driven back, and the English took possession of the Kirkduin, and the fort of the Helder. The Artillery was not landed till after this engagement: nor was the Cust. ground favourable to the use of the Dutch artillery. The fleet was summoned to surrender: and the Dutch Admiral, conscious of a strong spirit of insubordination among his crews, ever since the appearance of the British flag, consented to deliver over his ships, unconditionally; and thus gave over to the English the complete control of the Zuyder Zee. On this taking place, the Dutch troops retired, and took up a position in front of Alkmaar, where they were joined by General Brune and 7000 French. Abercromby occupied the ground vacated by the Dutch, and strengthened it in every way possible, being resolved to await there the arrival of the Duke of York and the Russian contingent. General Brune, however, saw the advantage of an engagement before such a junction could be effected; and therefore on the 10th September he assumed the offensive, but without success,—being totally defeated with a loss of 2000 men. ‘London Gazette,’ 16 Sept. 1799. The Artillery was of great service to Abercromby; and it was in this engagement—known as the action of Zyp—that Lieutenant Simpson was wounded. The French resumed their old position in front of Alkmaar, which they greatly strengthened; and confined their operations to preventing Abercromby from advancing out of the contracted space in which he was situated.
On the 12th September the Russians arrived, and on the day following the Duke of York assumed the command, and resolved on leaving the position where the army had been stationed, and on attacking the enemy with the large force now at his disposal, numbering about 35,000 men. He divided his army into four columns: the right being under General Hermann, and composed entirely of Russians; the second, under General Dundas, consisting partly of British, and partly of Russians; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, with a large proportion of Artillery and Cavalry; and the fourth, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, consisting entirely of British troops; the last being intended to make a détour on the evening of the 18th September—the day before the intended battle—and to turn the enemy’s right flank. The first three columns were ordered to attack simultaneously at break of day on the 19th, moving on different named points. These arrangements, which have been somewhat severely criticised, would doubtless have succeeded, had the Duke’s orders been obeyed; but unfortunately the first, or Russian, column precipitated the engagement by attacking the enemy two or three hours before the other columns were ready to move, and drove the enemy out of the village of Bergen. General Brune brought up his reserve to recover his lost ground, and fell upon the Russian troops when in a state of intoxication from the excesses of which they had been guilty since the capture of the village. A disgraceful scene followed, ending in the tumultuous flight of the Russians with the loss of many prisoners. The Duke of York accompanied the second column, but the retreat of the Russians on his right compelled him to fall back, and to send orders to the third and fourth columns to do the same. Great success had in the meantime attended the efforts of Sir James Pulteney,—the Guards, 17th and 40th Regiments, having greatly distinguished themselves; but, owing to the change given to the whole plan by the mistake and misbehaviour of the first column, when night came the Allies occupied precisely the same ground as they held in the morning. The loss to the English amounted to 500 killed and wounded, and 500 taken prisoners;—and the Russians lost 3000 men; but an equal number of the enemy had been taken prisoners by the Allies. In this engagement, known as the battle of Bergen or Alkmaar, the loss of the Royal Artillery was as follows:—
‘London Gazette,’ 24 Sept. 1799.
First Lieutenant Eligée, wounded and taken prisoner;
Volunteer John Douglass, wounded;
Killed: 5 gunners; 4 gunner-drivers; and 3 additional gunners.
Wounded: 8 gunners; 6 gunner-drivers; and 4 additional gunners.
Missing: 7 gunners, and gunner-drivers.
In the interval between this engagement and the severe battle on the 2nd October,—when the event occurred which gives the title to the present chapter,—both armies were employed in strengthening their positions on shore, in obtaining reinforcements, and in arranging their respective gun-boats in such a way as to obtain from them an enfilade fire, in event of attack. The Duke of York felt the importance of making a final effort, before the season was further advanced: and his dispositions on the 2nd October were much the same as on the 19th September, except that he gave the right column to General Abercromby, whose force consisted of 8000 Infantry and 1000 Cavalry, with Major Judgson’s General Farrington to D. A. G. 17 Sept. 1799. troop of Horse Artillery. The troop was partly armed with 12-pounders,—a very heavy armament for Horse Artillery, and one never again used:—and it seems all the more unsuitable, when we find that the battalion guns, which were merely 6-pounders, were in one instance brigaded into a battery under Captain Frazer,—presenting the anomaly in the army, on this 2nd October, of a light field artillery, intended for rapid movements, being armed with guns of twice the calibre of those used by what should have been the medium field artillery, and only required to accommodate itself to the movements of infantry.
The second column was composed of Russian troops, under Count Essen; the third was under General Dundas; and the fourth under Sir James Pulteney. The main interest attaches to the first column, whose duty it was to keep close to the seashore as far as Egmont-op-Zee, and thence menace the French left and rear. The other columns were to drive back the enemy’s line if possible; and, at all events, so to occupy him as to prevent the left from being strengthened in such a manner as might endanger the success of the first column. The exertions of General Dundas’s brigade were marvellous, and were crowned by success; but they were almost undone by the refusal of the Russians, at a critical moment, to advance against the village of Bergen, which had been laid bare by the retreat of the enemy before the impetuosity of the English troops. This refusal was never forgotten, nor was there from that hour any harmony between the allied troops. Encouraged by the impunity allowed them, the enemy resumed the offensive; but, although unable to drive them farther back, the English succeeded, although with great loss and difficulty, in holding the ground they had taken.
The first column, under General Abercromby, reached Egmont-op-Zee without difficulty; but there it found a large force of all arms, under General Vandamme, drawn up in line of battle. The engagement which followed was prolonged and bloody. Sir Ralph was at last successful; but his advantage was short-lived, for reinforcements arrived from Alkmaar in such numbers that it required all the skill of the English General, and all the undaunted courage of his men, to prevent his left from being broken before night put an end to the engagement. It was at this time that the Chestnut Troop received its baptism of fire. By some oversight on the part of the General, or possibly owing to ignorance as to the powers of this new weapon—Horse Artillery,—Major Judgson’s Troop had been advanced to a dangerous distance, and left with an inadequate escort. General Vandamme observed this, and, placing himself at the head of his Cavalry, swept down upon the guns. The scene which followed was an exciting one. Taken by surprise, the gunners did not lose their presence of mind, but fired into the advancing cavalry until they were in their midst; and then, with any weapons they had, they struggled with the troopers, who, in immense numbers, surrounded them, and sabred them at their guns. According to one Browne. account, two only of the guns were carried off by the Cust. cavalry when they retired; according to another, the whole were captured. Be it as it may, the prize was not left long undisputed, for Lord Paget, placing himself at the head of the 15th Light Dragoons—now the 15th (King’s) Hussars—charged the enemy’s cavalry, pursuing them for over a mile; and, assisted by the explosion of one of the captive limbers, succeeded in recovering all the guns. The story is calculated to create a friendly sympathy between the Chestnut Troop and the gallant Regiment which proved so staunch a godfather to it at this its christening, and is one to be talked over by the camp-fire in days coming on. In the order which was issued after the battle, Major Judgson ‘London Gazette,’ 24 Oct. 1799. received special mention. “In the severe action on this day His Royal Highness expressed his thanks to Lieutenant-Colonels Whitworth and Smith, who commanded the Artillery of reserve, and to Major Judgson, of the Horse Artillery. Captain Nicholls was wounded in this action, and is since dead.”
Although the Allies had not driven the enemy back as far as they had hoped, they nevertheless occupied the ground on which the French General had taken up his position, at the commencement of the battle. The loss to the British was severe, 1300 having been killed and wounded, including 100 officers.
Another attempt was made by the Allies on the 7th October to drive the enemy back, and to escape from the position in which they had been cramped since the commencement of the campaign; but, although they defeated with severe loss the troops to whom they found themselves immediately opposed, the cordon beyond still hopelessly surrounded them. As there was no symptom of a popular rising in the country on their behalf, and as reinforcements were daily reaching the French, the Duke of York decided on opening negotiations with a view to the evacuation of Holland by the Allies. These were ultimately successful; and the only beneficial result of this campaign, which survived the negotiations, was the retention of the Dutch fleet by the English.
The conclusion of the Artillery share in this campaign had an element of the ludicrous in it. In the old letter-books, deposited in the Royal Artillery Record Office, is the following one, showing the pitiable way in which poor General Farrington, who had left with all the pomp and circumstance of war, returned to his home. Writing from To D. A. General, Nov. 3, 1799. Blackheath, he says:—“After a very fatiguing voyage and journey, I am this moment arrived at my own house. Trotter, Smith, Terrott, Robe, Maclean, Lieut. Knox, and Dr. Jameson, came over passengers with me, and will be at Woolwich this night, or to-morrow morning. The want of horses keeps them back, and my anxiety of mind to arrive as early as possible led me to accept a passage in a post-chaise; but I have a melancholy tale to unfold. The ship in which we came passengers, mistaking the entrance into Yarmouth Harbour, ran on the sands, on which she struck with such violence as, with the first shock, to unship her rudder, and stave in her bottom; but, wonderful to tell, after keeping us in a most distressed state for an hour, she passed the sands with 4 feet of water in her hold, and, by the exertion of the boats of the fleet, every soul on board was saved—about 70 in number; and in about half an hour the ship sank in 10 or 11 fathoms of water. The cargo, such as guns, shot, and shells, may be saved; the ammunition, of course, destroyed; and we are all reduced to our ship-dress only; everything else lost. It has been a most providential escape, and sincerely ought we to offer up our prayers for His mercy.
“I am too unwell to wait upon Lord Howe, nor have I things to see him in; but if you could ride over here to-morrow, I will tell you all I can respecting the embarkation of the Artillery horses, &c., for I have not a paper left.”
While sympathising with the ill-fated General, the student cannot refrain from anathematising the blundering pilot, who mistook the entrance to Yarmouth Harbour, and was thus the cause of papers being lost, which would doubtless have been priceless to the compiler of a narrative of the Artillery share in the campaign of 1799.
Return dated Woolwich, 5 Dec. 1799.
The following return of the losses of the Royal Artillery, exclusive of the Driver Corps, in this campaign, was rendered by the Deputy-Adjutant-General to the Board of Ordnance:—
| Killed, and died of their wounds | 25 | of all ranks. |
| Wounded | 21 | ” |
| Prisoners and Missing | 15 | ” |
| Horses sent from England | 910 | |
| Received in Holland from the Commissary-General’s Department | 200 | |
| Total | 1110 | |
| Killed, dead, and left behind | 654 | |
| Returned to England | 456 |
(Signed) J. Macleod,
D.-A.-General.
CHAPTER VI.
Egypt.
The history of the Regiment in 1800 and 1801 has its main interest in the operations of the English Army in Egypt. In these, so glorious in a military point of view, so effective in a national,—for they were the main instrument in bringing about the Peace of Amiens—the Artilleryman finds much to interest him, and much of which he may be justly proud.
It is fortunate for the purpose of this history that the officer who commanded the Artillery in Egypt placed on Brig.-Gen. Lawson’s MSS. on Egypt, deposited in the R. A. Library. record many most interesting details, which the general historian would have certainly overlooked, and whose reproduction in these pages will give a far more graphic sketch of the difficulties which were encountered, than could be given by the most skilful writer who had not himself been an eye-witness. The unpretending account of the means adopted to overcome the difficulties cannot fail also to inspire any officer, who may find himself in a similar position, with a resolution to yield to no obstacles.
The reader will remember that in the year 1800 there was a French army stationed in Egypt, which, although reduced from its original numbers, was yet too strong to be overcome by the Turks. England resolved to reinforce the Turkish army by means of an expedition from England, the military part of which was to be commanded by Sir R. Abercromby; the naval, by Admiral Lord Keith. The Artillery of the Expedition was placed under the command of Colonel Lawson, who, after much importunity, obtained from the Duke of York the rank of Brigadier-General. Officers of his own standing had obtained that rank to command brigades of Infantry on the Expedition; and Colonel Macleod, although, Correspondence of D. A. General, R.A. as he wrote, “bewildered with orders and projects, alterations and inventions,” fought loyally to obtain from the Board a recommendation that the officer commanding the Artillery should receive it also.
Embarkation Return, rendered to B. O. on 9 April, 1800.
The strength of the Royal Artillery ordered to embark for Egypt under General Lawson was as follows:— 1 Field Officer, 7 Captains, 12 Subalterns, 3 Surgeons, 54 Non-Commissioned Officers, 7 Lance N.-C. Officers, 450 Gunners, 9 Drummers, making a total of 543, besides 38 women and 7 children. The civil branch of the Ordnance was represented by 1 paymaster, 1 paymaster’s clerk, 1 commissary of stores, 1 assistant commissary and 4 clerks, 6 conductors of stores, and 19 artificers.
The names of the officers named at first were Colonel Lawson, Captains Thomson, Lemoine, Evans, Meredith, and Miller; Captains-Lieutenant Newhouse and Boger; Lieutenants Raynsford, Munro, Lawson, F. Campbell, Fauquier, Cleaveland, Armstrong, Michell, and Trelawny; and 2nd Lieutenants Kirby, Rook, and Nutt. This force was augmented in the Mediterranean from Minorca and Malta, and received a contingent, which will presently be mentioned, from Lisbon; certain changes, also, were made in it by Report to D. A. Gen. from Gen. Lawson. landing at Gibraltar a company of the 6th Battalion, receiving one of the 5th Battalion in exchange. The battalions actually represented in Egypt were the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th, and the companies, which were present are detailed in the first volume of this work. The 3rd Battalion was at this time mainly stationed in the West Indies.
On the 5th May, 1800, General Lawson reached Portsmouth to take command of the Artillery of the Expedition, which he had been informed was on the point of sailing. He had also been informed that all necessary particulars had been communicated to him by the authorities; but in neither respect was his information correct, and the official fountain of his knowledge was found to have poured forth a somewhat muddy stream. Three weeks elapsed before he sailed—three weeks of wild, hopeless confusion—affairs having been complicated by the Government having decided on a secret expedition elsewhere, the Artillery of which was placed under the orders of Colonel Seward, then in command at Portsmouth. An interchange of companies between his force and that of General Lawson was threatened, and mutual drafts were made, as far as officers and a few men were concerned. Another company, under Major Cookson, who distinguished himself subsequently in Egypt, joined General Lawson at Portsmouth—a fact of which the student first becomes aware by finding a joint letter from the subalterns of the company, petitioning the Board, with considerable presence of mind, for an advance of pay, they “being quite out of cash.” It is presumed that their request was granted, for, Colonel Seward to Colonel Macleod, 25 May, 1800. on the morning of the 25th May, Colonel Seward reported the embarkation of this company “between eleven and twelve o’clock in high spirits.” The whole of General Lawson’s force had sailed by the 3rd June, and reached Gibraltar on the 22nd of the same month. The gallant General’s existence had been embittered during the last few days of his stay in England by the masterly silence, profound as the grave, with which all his inquiries for information, reiterated daily, were received by the Board. The subsequent difficulties which he encountered were mainly due to this triumph of official reticence.
Leaving General Lawson’s force at Gibraltar, let the reader return for a moment to that under Colonel Seward, which was to form part of the Secret Expedition. The Royal Artillery employed consisted of 386 of all ranks, besides that marvellous accompaniment of all expeditions in those days, whether secret or open,—22 women and 11 children. The armament consisted of 16 light 6-pounders. Three companies were taken complete, commanded by Major Embarkation Returns, D. A. General’s Correspondence. Borthwick, Captain Salmon, and Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel Bentham; and the following officers accompanied the force: Captains-Lieutenant S. G. Adye and A. MacDonald; 1st Lieutenants W. R. Carey, E. Curry, T. Masson, R. Carthew, S. Maxwell, D. Campbell, W. Holcombe, and L. Carmichael; 2nd Lieutenants W. Norman Ramsay, W. D. Nicolls, J. Rollo, and H. B. Lane. Major Borthwick was appointed by Colonel Seward Brigade-Major to the Artillery. Besides these three companies, drafts from almost every company in England were taken to complete them to their proper establishment, and to man the battalion guns. This heart-breaking system of robbing one company to feed the wants of another prevailed to a great and continual extent during the earlier part of this century, and its evil results show the vast improvement of the depôt system, which clothes the cadres of dwindling batteries abroad, without taking from those at home the men trained in and for themselves.
Considerable trouble was experienced by Colonel Seward in obtaining the co-operation of commanding officers of regiments in matters relating to the battalion guns; and this expedition acted as another nail, so to speak, in the coffin of that objectionable system. But infinitely greater was the trouble caused by the vacillation and uncertainty of the authorities, who, after the embarkation of the whole force, sent orders for it to disembark and encamp near Southampton, until they could arrive at some decision as to its destination. This afforded an opportunity for clerkdom to run riot. Questions as to ship rations and land rations, ship pay and land pay, poured on the ill-fated captains of companies every day; and seldom did a mail reach them without a disallowance.
At length the expedition set sail (the military part of the force being placed under Sir James Pulteney), and made an attempt on Ferrol, in whose harbour some large men-of-war were lying. The troops landed under a covering fire from the English fleet, and in the skirmish which followed they had Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’ the advantage. But, Sir James Pulteney, becoming alarmed at the strength of the Spanish works, and at the news he received of their preparations, re-embarked the troops the same evening, and sailed for Gibraltar. Here Colonel Seward transferred to Colonel Lawson many of his officers, men, and stores; and with the remainder, and all the sick, he went to Lisbon, whence—pending his return to England—he D. A. General’s Correspondence. wrote the most gloomy letters, that ever crossed the threshold of Colonel Macleod’s office. The transfer of his officers to General Lawson’s command at Gibraltar, and the receipt of others from the companies in garrison, account for the presence in Egypt of many who did not embark with the latter from England, such as Major Sprowle, Captains Duncan and Adye, and Lieutenants D. Campbell, Sturgeon, and Burslem. One of the companies which sailed from B. General Lawson to Colonel Macleod. England with General Lawson was landed at Gibraltar in exchange for Major Sprowle’s; and by this means the glories of Egypt were denied to Captain Meredith and Lieutenants Cleaveland, Michell, and Nutt.
Colonel Cuppage, R.A., to Colonel Macleod, 11 July, 1800.
From Gibraltar General Lawson went to Minorca, which he reached on the 10th July, after a tedious passage of nineteen days. Here he landed his men to await the return of Sir R. Abercromby, who had at first started for Genoa, with all the troops he could collect from Minorca and elsewhere. While on the passage, however, Sir Ralph received a message from the Admiral, Lord Keith, informing him that the Austrians had evacuated Italy. He therefore diverted his course to Leghorn, where he remained a week, and then went on to Malta. When the citadel of Valetta in that island was given up by the French in September, and Malta passed into the hands of the English, General Lawson followed Sir Ralph, and the expedition to Egypt was in that island finally organized.
During this time the English force in the Mediterranean had been increased by the arrival of a body of 4000 men, under Lord Dalhousie, from Belleisle, where they had at first been intended to act. This reinforcement, with others Cust. which followed, brought Sir R. Abercromby’s force up to 17,489 men before it finally left Malta; and an additional force of 6000 men, under Sir David Baird, was expected to meet them from India. The story of the Expedition after leaving Malta will be told in General Lawson’s own words. But, in passing, it may be stated that Minorca was the residence at this time of Colonel Cuppage of the Artillery, whose correspondence with the Deputy Adjutant-General reveals the fact that he was allowed a power over the Royal Artillery in the Mediterranean of a very extensive and unusual description. As a rule, as little power as possible was allowed to commanding officers on out-stations; the movements of officers especially were carefully regulated from England; but Colonel Cuppage evidently had the power, and exercised it, of transferring officers and men from companies, even belonging to different battalions,—of appointing officers to the bomb service in the Mediterranean, and of disembarking others already appointed; and, in a word, of exercising unlimited control over that part of the Regiment which came within the area of his command. This is mentioned because such control, however advisable, was rarely exercised by the Board, which was jealous of anything approaching independence in those under its orders;—and it is impossible to avoid expressing surprise that a system which succeeded so admirably on this occasion did not receive further trial. The fact of Minorca being the residence of the Commanding Officer of Artillery must not be construed as implying that the old Ordnance Establishment and Train, which disappeared with the capitulation of Port Mahon in 1782, had been revived. His residence there was almost accidental, and mainly on account of its convenience,—previous to the capture of Malta,—as a rallying point for the naval and military forces in the Mediterranean.
One instance must be given, before entering upon General Lawson’s narrative, to show how infamously the arrangements of the civil branch of the Ordnance were often conducted, after a campaign had been undertaken, and how scandalously the shortcomings of the civil were left to be expiated by the military branch. These instances will be frequent as this work proceeds, and they are reproduced with a double and deliberate purpose: first, to show under what difficulties our armies obtained their successes; and second, to remind those who are ever ready to criticise the slightest shortcoming of the same description in the present day, that in our older campaigns, whose glories are remembered when their blunders are forgotten, the faults which are deprecated so loudly to-day existed in an appalling degree.
Major Cookson’s company was the first of General Lawson’s force to leave Portsmouth. The earliest report of its movements is a letter written by Major Cookson from the Island of Houat, where he found 132 of the 6th Battalion, making, with his own company, a total force of Artillery amounting to 227 of all ranks. With characteristic energy, he commenced, after landing his company, to improve and strengthen his position. The reader will be good enough to remember that Major Cookson’s company was one of those, on the equipment of which the Board had expended unusual energy; and had felt such confidence in the omniscience of their civil officials, that they would not even reply to the hints and prayers of the officers of Artillery, who were most deeply interested. Doubtless, then, everything will be found as it should be. Yet let us hear what Major Cookson reports: Major Cookson, from I. of Houat, 24 June, 1800. “I have only a moment to tell you how very much distressed I am; and how much the Service is retarded for want of a Clerk of Stores who understands his duty. There is a man here who calls himself Conductor of Stores, but he is very far from being adequate to the situation, being, in the first place, incapable of writing.... I have 16 pieces of ordnance under my charge (10 6-pounders and 6 howitzers), all of which I had to complete to 100 rounds each, on board of the different vessels they were in, and to mount them ready to land in a chasse-marée, which was cut down and prepared for the purpose, and which I got done in two days; since which I have been obliged to land some here, and to put others from the ‘Diadem’ and ‘Inconstant’ on board the ‘John’ ordnance ship, and into boats. Conceive, then, how much I must have been in want of conductors and clerks of stores! On board the ‘John,’ when in a hurry for completing the ammunition, we were much annoyed to find 12-pounder flannel cartridges for the 5½-inch howitzers, and other like mistakes; however, I set the women to work and got over that difficulty and many others.... All the camp equipage for the officers and men whom I brought out is deficient; do, pray, therefore, send me out the camp equipage for my company ... with a hospital and laboratory tent, as soon as you possibly can; as also camp-kettles, canteens, and haversacks. The whole of the men have been uncommonly harassed for some days past.”
This is a charming picture of official foresight, and one which we shall find painted again and again in the succeeding pages of English story. Blind to the fact that the men, who were to use them, were also the best judges of the things required and— “Being too blind to have desire to see,”
the civil branch of the Ordnance too often reasoned à priori—evolved out of its own consciousness certain ill-defined wants, which the troops might possibly have—and, with many blunders and shortcomings, endeavoured to meet them. And then, with monotonous recurrence, came a pitiful struggle to maintain its own dignity in the face of incessant failure.
Major Cookson, from Houat, 1 August, 1800.
That the response to Major Cookson’s appeal was not wholly satisfactory may be gathered from the following extract from a subsequent letter:—“Conceive,” he wrote, “their sending me a common soldiers’ tent for the sick, and five horsemen’s tents without their poles, which to obtain here would be impossible, as all the men-of-war have expended already every inch of wood that could be spared. You will see by the return that we have 50 men ill, and, I am sorry to say, several of them dangerously so.”
It is a relief to turn, now, to the words of a man eminently capable of removing the difficulties with which he was surrounded.
Brig.-Gen. Lawson, R.A., MSS. Narrative in R. A. Library.
“The Expedition, under the orders of Admiral Lord Keith and General Abercromby, proceeded from the Island of Malta on the 21st December, 1800, arrived at Marmorice Bay, in Asia Minor, on the New Year’s Day following, and remained there, waiting the co-operation of the Turks (being the time of their Ramadan), until the 20th February. During this period every measure was taken the situation admitted of to lessen the numerous difficulties expected to be met with in Egypt,—such as a dangerous shore to land upon—a country destitute of wood, water, or roads—where (as the Commander-in-Chief informed the General Officers, assembled by order) nothing was to be looked for but a wild waste of desert, and obstacles which the most unremitting exertions had only a chance of surmounting, independent of a formidable opposition from the French troops.
“Under these ideas, and the battering train (originally designed against Belleisle only) having joined the army very indifferently provided indeed for such an uncommon, arduous enterprise, no time could be lost. All the artificers were landed, and strong working parties sent into the woods to cut down timber for making additional spars, skids, and various-sized rollers, to form gangways for landing the heavy ordnance upon, assisting them over deep sandy beaches, and in crossing the canals formed for conveying the rising waters of the Nile into the towns and cultivated spots of the country.
“The generally acknowledged difficulty of travelling by wheeled carriages in Egypt induced the trial of a number of contrivances to lessen that evil also, the first of which were a kind of litters,... termed ‘horse-barrows.’ No wood growing in this country proper for such purposes, rendered it necessary to dig saw-pits, in order to cut the pine timber into long scantling (16 feet in length, and about 4 inches square), something near the shape of a common hand-barrow, preserving the grain as entire as possible. Two movable cross-bars, which are secured by two small bolts, keep these shafts at a proper interval, to admit a horse at each end between them. Each horse or mule had a small cart saddle with girth, back-band, breastplate, and crupper, and a halter for leading it by. These barrows were particularly useful for narrow paths and the trenches of an attack, or for conveying any individual weight too heavy for a single horse, such as a small piece of ordnance, standing carriage, large casks of provisions, &c. (The powder and ammunition expended at the attack of Aboukir Castle were mostly conveyed from the landing-place to the batteries in this manner.) Besides these single barrows, a design was formed for double ones, consisting of three shafts, to be carried by four horses in pairs; and also others upon a still larger scale for camels, but neither time nor materials admitted of their being put into immediate execution. A very considerable number of carrying-poles, about 9 feet long each, were formed out of the small-sized trees, to which rope-slings were added, for the soldiers to convey kegs of musket-ball cartridges, ammunition-boxes, or royal mortars with.
“A number of horses were purchased at Constantinople on the part of the English Government, and sent to Marmorice, for remounting the Light Dragoons, and those rejected by them were turned over to the Artillery service. Such poor undersized animals as they were rendered it absolutely necessary not only to take the harness entirely to pieces, in order to bring it anything near fitting them, but also to lay aside all the heavy parts, such as neck-collars, chain-traces, curb-bits, &c., and replace them with light leather breast-collars, rope-traces, and pads formed out of the waggon harness, a great part of which, fortunately, was not likely to be otherwise called for.
“About 130 horses being thus completed with harness, some light pieces—guns and howitzers—were landed, and a small park formed, in order to drill them to the draught. Every reform possible was made to lighten the travelling of the ordnance, and it was very much wished to have exchanged the limber-shafts for poles also, on account of their weight, as well as other considerations; but no proper wood could then be procured—even at the Island of Rhodes—for the purpose. The clock-trailed light 6-pounder carriages had ten horses allotted to each for draught; but the framed ones required twelve when going over heavy sand or shingle.
“A few of the most useful horse-artillery manœuvres were also practised here, it being the Commander-in-Chiefs intention to establish some pieces on that principle whenever horses could be procured for it. Drivers were also very much wanted, several of those which came out originally with the battering train having, with their officer, returned, in a very unaccountable manner, from Lisbon to England, after the attempt on Cadiz.
“The following considerations were submitted to the Commander-in-Chief at Marmorice Bay, on 10th Jan., 1801:—
“1st. As the passage of the fleet to the coast of Egypt may probably be short, it is humbly proposed to have the light field-pieces of the first division of troops conveyed from hence on the decks of the ships of war, so as to be at once lowered down altogether into the boats, having their Artillery detachments along with them, without the necessity of any other preparation after coming to anchor.
“2nd. The ordnance ships, in which the other pieces next for landing are aboard, to be conducted and stationed by the agent himself (the masters alone not being sufficient at such a crisis) as near to the shore as safety will admit. And it will be necessary, on account of the crowded manner in which they were loaded in England (being taken upon freight), to have light vessels alongside of them to receive the water-casks, and articles not immediately wanted, in clearing away to those sought for.
“3rd. Small vessels or decked boats, with field ammunition and musket-ball cartridges, will be required (particularly if the coast proves shallow) still nearer in shore, and to be stationed opposite the centre of attack immediately after the landing of the first division of the troops, distinguished by Ordnance Jacks. In order to furnish the most speedy supply possible, a number of hand-carts and carrying-poles may be thrown on shore from these boats, for the soldiers to take off any ammunition wanting, until the horses can be landed.
“4th. The flat boats and launches of the ships of war are wished to be employed in carrying the field ordnance, &c., ashore, instead of transports’ long-boats, which (as was experienced at Cadiz), from their want of hands and general size, are quite inadequate to the business.
“5th. Planks, joined together lengthways by staples and cordage, may be necessary to travel the carriages upon over the heavy sands. The French, it is said, made use of raw hides in passing the deserts with their field-pieces. Perhaps lengths of rope, about 30 feet each, with narrow netting between to receive the wheels upon, might be found as useful, and, in our situation, more readily procured.
“6th. One thousand seamen, provided with drag-ropes or harness, will be required to assist in landing and drawing up the heavy ordnance and stores.
“7th. The mode of advancing into the country will depend upon the means of draught found there; but, at all events, if a strong detachment of seamen can be procured to remain with the Artillery, it will be highly beneficial to service.
“Agreeable to these representations, application was immediately made to Lord Keith, who consented to take aboard each of the line-of-battle ships two field-pieces, which were placed on the poops ready for lowering down into the launches all together. Twenty-five seamen and officers were allotted to each piece, with fifteen of the Artillery. These 350 were all the seamen his Lordship could spare out of the 1000 demanded. Two general rehearsals of landing were then practised: the guns got ashore very readily, and quicker than the troops could leap out of their boats. Each ship-of-war formed its own boat’s gangway; the best of them was made out of the fishing of a mast, which, being hollow, secured the wheels of the carriage from slipping, without side-pieces.”
Alterations made in Carronade Carriages.—“The moving of heavy ordnance over the deserts of Egypt the French thought impracticable, and attempted no larger calibre than 8-pounders or 12-pounders. Something more, however, seemed necessary for us to make trial of against an enemy so much more formidable than any they had had to contend with, independent of the ambition of superior resource. Upon comparing all circumstances together, it appeared likely that whatever works they might have raised in the interior of the country since their possession of it, could not be very solid ones, even if composed of masonry, for want of time to settle and the cement to harden sufficiently in such substances; and earth alone, in this climate, must soon crumble to dust or sand, and easily be destroyed by shells. From these considerations it was concluded that carronades might probably be found sufficiently powerful to breach them in either case at moderate distances, and be easily conveyed by the double horse or camel-barrow across the country if necessary. The circumstance being suggested to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and, at the same time, the means proposed of altering the carriages for this purpose without affecting their sea-service in the smallest degree, His Excellency communicated the idea to Lord Keith, who immediately ordered several of these 24-pounder carriages (though larger ones were wished for) ashore from the ships-of-war, to undergo the necessary alteration. This operation being soon executed, some trials of shot and shells were made there, and afterwards aboard the ‘Foudroyant,’ in presence of the Admiral and the General, and much approved of.”
For the information of the non-professional reader, it may here be mentioned that carronades are far lighter than guns of the same calibre. The details by which General Lawson describes, in his MSS., the modifications made by him to render the carronade-carriages suitable for his purpose, are illustrated by carefully-prepared diagrams, without which the description would hardly be intelligible. It may be stated briefly that, by certain additions to the carriage—which could easily be removed when again wanted on board ship—he produced something akin to the modern dwarf traversing platform, requiring little or no ground platform on which to be traversed. The navy officers who were present at the experiments expressed their opinion that the alteration would be very useful to their service also, for taking up posts occasionally ashore.
The MS. proceeds next to describe the arrangements made by General Lawson.
“Many mistakes, as well as loss of time, happening on service by the ammunition being sent into the field with the waggons accompanying the guns in the same state as lodged in the storehouses; that is, round shot, case shot, cartridges, and small stores, each article in separate packing-boxes, it was thought advisable, especially on this occasion, where the ammunition must be mostly carried on camels’ backs, to complete each individual box with a certain number of rounds (one fourth case), including small stores, and everything necessary to the firing of them. This was effected by only raising the round-shot packing-case about two inches higher, and the addition of a small board as a false bottom, which admitted of stowings as follows, viz., for light 6-pounders, 15 rounds and a extra case-shot; light 12-pounders, 8 rounds; medium 12-pounders, 7 rounds. For the royal howitzer ammunition, it was necessary to have two packing-boxes on this principle, viz., one containing 9 live shells and 1 case-shot; the other with 2 case-shot and all the articles for firing 12 rounds complete. This mode was found extremely useful in the field, and is strongly recommended for all immediate occasions of service, as no possible mistake can then happen, either from ignorance or neglect, in supplying the guns or limber-boxes with the utmost expedition.
“The ammunition for field-service was usually conveyed on camels’ backs, each carrying four of the altered 6-pounder packing-boxes, two on each side, in a sort of netted bag thrown over a pack-saddle; but, useful as these animals are generally for great weights, there are inconveniences attending them in this particular service; viz., when loaded (which, of course, must be daily repeated) they move very slowly, therefore quite unfit for Horse Artillery;—in order to load or unload, they must first be made to kneel down, which in an action they are not always inclined to, and sometimes become very refractory and unmanageable; also, whatever quantity of ammunition is required for the gun must always be taken equally from both sides at the same time, to preserve its equilibrium, &c.
“These reasons determined a trial of light carriages in their stead, first beginning with royal howitzer ammunition, it being the most dangerous and liable to injury. Some of the hand-carts were selected for this purpose, and, in order to travel the better, converted to curricles. The poles were accordingly lengthened, and cross-bars fixed to support them in front of the horses’ collars, much in the same manner as the 3-pounder carriages formerly used in the Horse Artillery, only more simplified. These carriages were drawn by four horses each, and went through all the marches of the army to and from Grand Cairo remarkably well, travelling very rapidly with 48 rounds of the howitzer ammunition completed for immediate service, as already mentioned.”
Light 3-pounder Carriages altered for Cavalry.—“Our Cavalry, from their want of proper horses, being found very unequal to the capitally-mounted French dragoons, it became necessary to aid that defect by the attachment of Artillery. Four light 3-pounders (brought from Malta) were first prepared for this service. Their original mode of travelling with shafts and single line of draught was altered to a double one by cutting off the shafts of the limber at the cross-bar, and introducing a pole instead of them, together with other improvements. (For example, a block of wood was fixed by two bolts to the back of the axletree, and the iron pintail removed from the centre of it to this block to receive the trail of the carriage upon. This was done in order to make room for a 6-pounder ammunition-box, to be fixed crossways in the front. The old side-boxes belonging to the carriage being rejected entirely, their places furnished seats for two gunners. At small expense an ammunition-box, containing 8 rounds, was made to fit in between the cheeks of the gun-carriage, after the French manner. A copper tray or drawer was introduced under one of the gunners’ seats to contain the slowmatch, instead of carrying a lintstock.) Four or six horses, with two drivers (according to the ground), drew the carriage. These pieces were served by four Artillerymen, two on the carriage and two mounted on the off draught-horses. They went through the service to Grand Cairo, and travelled much better than was expected from the lowness of the limber-wheels, which defect there was no remedy for in Egypt.
“Four light 6-pounders upon block-trail carriages, with two royal howitzers, were also equipped (as nearly as the means would admit) for Horse Artillery service. Seven Artillerymen and three drivers, with ten horses, were allotted for the service of each piece, the gunners riding the horses in draught, but the non-commissioned officer mounted single for the purpose of advancing to examine roads, reconnoitring the enemy, &c. These block-trail carriages, from their lightness, short draught, and quick turning, passed over the inundation dykes and desert with great ease, while the framed carriages with more horses were attended with difficulty and delay, and once in the desert, were obliged to be left behind.
“The success of the curricle carts (for field ammunition) induced a trial if something might not be done with the waggons also, hitherto looked upon as out of all question, except the local duties of the park. Some of them were taken to pieces, and all the heaviest parts laid aside—that is, the bolsters, sides, and shafts. The bottoms were then contracted both in length and breadth, so as just to receive nine or ten of the altered packing-cases only. The hoops were lowered, and the painted covers made to fit exactly. Poles were used instead of shafts, and the usual swingle trees reduced fewer in number. The rejected parts being weighed, no less than six hundred pounds appeared saved in the draught by this simple operation, and a larger proportion of ammunition conveyed by it at the same time with less labour. The immense weight and bulk of the platform and devil carriages rendered them totally useless; some of these altered waggons were substituted as a light class of the former kind, by taking away the bottoms entirely, and fixing in their stead a couple of very strong planks to each, with an interval between them resembling the original. These light platform carriages proved very useful in withdrawing the ordnance and stores from our lines across very heavy sands for re-embarkation.”
The next subject treated of in the MS. is “Heavy weights raised without a Gin,” as follows:—
“The two-wheeled trench-cart (of which there were luckily a number on the Expedition) is a most useful little carriage for carrying articles of moderate bulk to a ton in weight; indeed, even so far as 10-inch iron mortar-beds of 23 cwt. were transported in them, but in these cases it was necessary, of course, to make use of a gin also. To obviate this circumstance and render the cart of more independent utility, an inclined plane was attached to the rear of it, and a small windlass fixed in the front, with a rope and iron block hooked to the weight, having rollers to ease the purchase, the weight being thus brought up on the cart by turning the windlass. By this simple means six men were sufficient to mount upon the cart, and deliver at a battery any article the strength of the axletree and wheels could bear, without making the appearance or drawing the attention of the enemy, which such large machines as devil carriages and sling carts constantly do, besides taking into consideration the vast difference, in point of weight, between these carriages in themselves. Another considerable advantage is that this contrivance is only occasionally applied, and the cart may be immediately worked in its original capacity.
Narrow wheels prevented from sinking in the sand.
“It being apprehended that extraordinary heavy weights might cause the low, narrow wheels of the trenched cart to sink so much into the sand as to retard the draught considerably, a contrivance was thought of to prevent this from happening, by occasionally increasing the breadth of the fellies. The staves of casks being strong, and of a favourable shape for the purpose, and still more valuable from their being easily procured at the Commissary-General’s store, it was proposed to cut them into lengths of seven or nine inches each piece, having two small iron staples fixed at an interval, the breadth of the felley. A rope equal in length to the circumference of the wheel is run through each of these lines of staples, secured so as not to slip out, but keep the staves parallel at one inch and a half asunder. They are then applied to the wheels, and fixed by small lashings to the spokes, to keep the whole from any alteration in travelling.”