Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, commanding.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, in immediate charge of the operation.
| Captain Power | Present during the whole operation. | Captain Greene | Belonging to Field Brigades, but occasionally employed. |
| Lieutenant Robe | Captain Dansey | ||
| Lieutenant Pascoe | Captain Gardiner | ||
| Lieutenant Elgee | Lieutenant Monro | ||
| Lieutenant Hough | Lieut. Johnstone |
Captain Blachley, joined 1st October.
Of the Royal Artillery, small in numbers, the casualties were very great in proportion. Fifteen men were killed, and forty wounded, during the siege, and in the operations immediately attending or succeeding it. The officers who were wounded were Colonel Robe, Captains Dansey and Power, Lieutenants Elgee and Johnstone.
After severe loss, a hornwork in front of the castle had been carried by assault on the night of the 19th September, and on the following night a battery for five guns was commenced. This battery was armed on the night of the 22nd with two 18-pounders and three 24-pounder howitzers, in readiness to open on the inner lines, in the event of an assault, which had been determined on for that evening on the outer line, proving successful. At the same time, a second battery for six guns was commenced to fire against the keep of the castle. The assault, which was premature, failed; and its leader was killed. On the night of the 24th, the two 18-pounders were taken out of No. 1 Battery, and drawn along a trench, part of the way towards No. 2, being replaced in the former by howitzers. On the 25th, the five howitzers in No. 1 Battery opened a fire to destroy some palisades, which were used to flank the works of the castle. The fire was not successful; the howitzers were found to be very deficient in precision when firing round shot; and the result was inadequate to the expenditure of ammunition,—141 rounds,—a consideration of some importance under the existing circumstances.[38] Lord Wellington, conscious of the deficiency of his guns, worked now by means of mining; and on the night of the 29th September, a mine was sprung which threw down part of the outer wall. An assault was immediately ordered; but from the darkness of the night the detachment missed its way, and those who were leading—having gained the top of the breach—were driven down again for want of support. The whole, therefore, returned to the trenches.
On the 30th September, the howitzers in No. 1 Battery were of essential service. About 10 A.M. they opened fire, with the addition of a French 6-pounder gun, taken in the hornwork, to demolish a stockade upon the top of a tower in the outer line a little to the enemy’s right of the breach, from which the French with musketry annoyed the English in the sap,—the fire being so close that every man, who exposed himself in the slightest degree, was sure to be hit. The stockade was strengthened by sand-bags, &c., but, after three hours’ firing, it was utterly destroyed. The ammunition expended for this purpose was 136 rounds;—90 24-pounder shot, 40 6-pounder French shot, and 6 5½-inch common shell. It was on this day that Captain Dansey, who had volunteered for service in the trenches, was wounded.
The next episode in the Artillery portion of the siege was the moving the three 18-pounders into a breaching battery so close to the outer wall, that the guns of the upper work could not bear on them. The French commander, Dubreton, lost no time, however, in bringing down a howitzer and a light gun from the upper work, followed by others as quickly as he could; and as the breaching battery was very slight, Napier, and ‘Memoir of Sir Hew Ross.’ the result was serious. “The defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the 18-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split.” A second, stronger, breaching battery was then formed, but the plunging fire from the castle was too severe; the guns which were yet serviceable were therefore removed back to No. 1 Battery, on the hill of San Michael. From this position, on the morning of the 4th October, they opened again on the old breach; and a mine having been exploded with great effect in the same evening, another assault took place,—the fourth during the siege. This was more successful, and a lodgment was effected; but on the following evening, a large body of the enemy charged down upon the guards and workmen, and got possession of the old breach, besides killing and wounding 150 Napier. men, and destroying their works. On the 7th, the besiegers, who had continued their advance, and were now close to the wall, were again charged with fatal effect by the garrison; and the guns from San Michael, although effecting a great breach in the second line, suffered severely from the artillery fire of the enemy,—another 18-pounder losing a trunnion. Guns were, however, too few and too valuable to be considered unserviceable, even after so serious an injury as this; and the ingenuity of Colonel Dickson produced a species of carriage, from which the damaged ordnance could fire with reduced charges. Between the 7th and the 10th October, the San Michael guns continued to make breaches in the works; on the 10th, some ammunition arrived from Santander; on the 18th, another breach was pronounced practicable, and Wellington ordered a fifth assault. This also was unsuccessful; the Allies lost 200 men killed and wounded; and the siege was at length raised—on the 20th—by Lord Wellington, who had received alarming intelligence of the approach of a French army to relieve Burgos, and of the movements of Soult.
The siege of Burgos is a blot on the military reputation of the Duke of Wellington; and revealed an ignorance of what artillery could and could not do, which every now and then Sir Hew Ross to Sir Hew Dalrymple, dated Madrid, 18 Oct. 1812. manifested itself in his military operations. If Sir Hew Ross was correctly informed, the error made by Lord Wellington was almost criminal, as there was no necessity for attempting such a siege with so inadequate a siege-train. “Why he should have undertaken the siege of such a place,” wrote Major Ross from Madrid, “with means so very inadequate appears very extraordinary, especially as there was little or no difficulty in augmenting it to any extent, either from the guns and ammunition found here, or the ships at St. Andero.” That Sir Hew wrote with reason seems all the more probable from the fact that, while the last assault was actually taking place, two 24-pounders sent from Santander by Sir Home Popham had passed Reynosa on Napier. their way to Burgos. But it may be urged that the responsibility of undertaking a siege with insufficient Artillery lay not with the General, but with the Artillery commander. Those who are familiar with the character of the Duke of Wellington, as shown in the various narratives of the Peninsular War, will not make use of this argument. It was not his wont to allow his plans to be altered by the representations of his subordinates, nor was he addicted to the habit of consulting them. Besides, in this particular instance, he officially relieved the Artillery and Engineer officers of the responsibility. “The officers,” he wrote, “at To Lord Bathurst dated Cabeçon, 26 Oct. 1812. the head of the Artillery and Engineer departments, Lieut.-Colonel Robe and Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve Artillery, rendered me every assistance; and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them.” The Duke of Wellington believed in the bayonet beyond any other weapon; and if a legitimate belief became occasionally credulity, it is hardly to be wondered at, when one reflects on the gallantry of the Infantry which it was the Duke’s good fortune to command. What seemed to be impossibilities, when ordered by him, were proved possible in the result; and the consequently increased belief in the power of the bayonet seems but natural. But his creed was supported at a terrible cost. When we find Napier himself,—Wellington’s idolater,—pronouncing his sieges a succession of butcheries, the criticism of a more temperate student may be excused. Doubtless, the want of adequate ordnance was often severely felt by the Duke of Wellington, and compelled him to an exaggerated use of the other arms; but this fact was hardly an excuse for neglecting its employment, when available in sufficient quantities, and obtainable with moderate exertions.
Nor was the fact that he—as he justly complained—never had a proper amount of Artillery with his armies any excuse for his making occasionally but an indifferent use of that which he had. Fortunately, the Duke of Wellington had merely to encounter Napoleon’s Marshals in Spain: had he had to meet their master, it is probable that the creed which he believed and practised might have received some rude assaults. If one could free oneself of all but purely professional considerations, one would wish, for the sake of the student in the art of war, that Napoleon, instead of Marmont and Clausel, had faced Wellington in the campaign of 1812. The result would, doubtless, have been the same; but the ways and means would have been very different. As it happened, Wellington’s sole encounter with Napoleon took place on ground chosen by himself, and under circumstances which yet further assisted his military creed, by testing yet again that which he had so often extravagantly proved, the marvellous endurance, discipline, and courage of the British Infantry.
The results of the mistaken siege of Burgos are curtly described by Sir J. T. Jones, in his ‘Journal of the Sieges in the Peninsula.’ “By its means,” he writes, “a beaten enemy gained time to recruit his forces, concentrate his scattered armies, and regain the ascendancy.” The same author writes, with regard to the service of the Royal Artillery during the siege: “It is a pleasing act of justice to the Artillery officers, employed in this attack, to state that they vied with each other in their exertions and expedients to meet the hourly difficulties they encountered, and that no set of men could possibly have drawn more service than they did from the limited means at their command.”
CHAPTER XX.
Vittoria and San Sebastian.
The threatening appearance of the various French armies in Spain, which compelled Lord Wellington to raise the siege of Burgos, compelled him ultimately to withdraw into Despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated 26 Oct. 1812. Portugal for winter quarters. In leaving Burgos he found the activity of the commanding officers of Artillery very beneficial. It enabled him to carry off all his serviceable guns and stores in a single night; but the absence of cattle prevented his removing the few French guns which he had captured in the storming of the hornwork. During the retreat, the services of the Horse Artillery, under Major Downman, were of a high order, and called forth the commendation of Lord Wellington. The troop which most distinguished itself was Major Bull’s, commanded by Captain Norman Ramsay, Major Bull having been twice wounded,—on one occasion so severely,—when in advance with the Cavalry at Torquemada on the night of the 12th September, 1812,—that he was obliged to be invalided. He does not reappear in the story of his gallant troop until the battle of Waterloo.
The retreat terminated on the 24th November, and the troops went into cantonments, the head-quarters being stationed at Frenada, and the Artillery at Malhada Sourda, three miles distant.
An old friend reappears, in the winter of 1812-13, to the burrower among Artillery records. Captain—now Brevet-Major—Frazer, who last was mentioned in this work in the account of the operations at Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, arrived to take command of Major Bull’s troop during that officer’s absence. His own troop being on home service, he more easily obtained permission to assume this duty. He had not been many weeks in the Peninsula before he received a more important command,—that which had hitherto Sir A. Frazer’s Letters, page 89. been held with such distinction by Major Downman,—the command of the Royal Horse Artillery with Lord Wellington’s armies. Although a reserved man in public, and fond of solitude, he was almost diffuse in his correspondence. Happily for those who have succeeded him in the Corps, his letters from the Peninsula have been collected and published by one who served in his troop for seven years,—General Sir Edward Sabine. These letters, and the unpublished letters of Sir A. Dickson, give together a most graphic picture of the operations of 1813, 1814, and 1815, which cannot but lose by the necessary condensation of the historian.
In the beginning of 1813, Lord Wellington proceeded to Lisbon to make the necessary arrangements for the coming campaign. The intelligence of the French disasters in Russia had reached him; rumours also came that Soult and many of the best troops in the French Peninsular armies had gone to France; and, from his preparations at Lisbon, it is evident that he had already resolved on offensive operations, which should, if possible, have the effect of driving the French out of the Peninsula. That he succeeded is well known to the reader; it remains to single out, in this and the following chapter, some of the more salient points in the campaign.
Colonel Dickson, to D.-A.-G. Lisbon, 16 Jan. 1813.
Colonel Dickson had been ordered to Lisbon, to consult as to some means of making the Portuguese Artillery more available for service than it had as yet been; and while there, he was sent for by Lord Wellington, who had also Ibid. dated Lisbon, 30 Jan. 1813. arrived, and was directed to superintend the equipment of a pontoon train of thirty-four large pontoons, which was to be sent by river to Abrantes, and there handed over to the master-pontonier, for use in the coming operations of the army. This train was destined to be a sore grievance to the Artillery. It had always to be horsed first, even at the expense of the Artillery brigades; and its possible wants in that respect haunted, like a nightmare, the commanding officer of the Corps. At this interview Lord Wellington also expressed considerable anxiety about the brigade of 18-pounder guns, which, he said, he was determined to have early in the field, as the French were understood to be Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 24 Feb. 1813. fortifying positions everywhere. Some new 18-pounders were expected daily from England; and, on their arrival, he desired that they should be sent up the Tagus to Abrantes. This was safely effected; and bullocks were ordered to bring them thence to head-quarters, at Malhada Sourda.
They were ultimately manned by Captain Morrison’s and Captain Glubb’s companies of the Royal Artillery; and the number of carriages in the brigade was no less than 57, viz.:—
Ibid. dated 18 April, 1813.
6 18-pr. guns on travelling carriages. 2 spare carriages. 6 platform waggons. 2 forges. 18 ammunition (limber) waggons. 3 store waggons. 20 bullock carts. N.B.—Ammunition was carried at the rate of 150 rounds per gun.
| 6 | 18-pr. guns on travelling carriages. |
| 2 | spare carriages. |
| 6 | platform waggons. |
| 2 | forges. |
| 18 | ammunition (limber) waggons. |
| 3 | store waggons. |
| 20 | bullock carts. |
The guns, and nine of the ammunition waggons, had horses in addition to their bullocks; the remaining carriages were drawn by bullocks only.
Ibid. dated 24 Feb. 1813.
About the same time as the 18-pounders arrived from England, another troop of Horse Artillery, under the command of Captain Webber Smith, also reached Lisbon. A change in the armament of the troop, from 6-pounders to 9-pounders, was immediately ordered by Lord Wellington,—a change which, on more than one occasion, and in more than one campaign, has been ordered in the armament of the Royal Horse Artillery. At this time, also, a recognition was made by the Portuguese Government of the services of the Artillery,—Colonels Robe and Dickson being made knights of the Tower and Sword.
Ibid. dated 28 March, 1813.
The old difficulty as to horses reappeared in the beginning of 1813. The sickness among these animals during the winter had been excessive; and the difficulty of purchasing any in the country seemed daily to increase. This led to many changes. Among others, Lord Wellington reduced the whole of the Portuguese Artillery for service in the field to three brigades,—one 9-pounder and one 6-pounder brigade to be with Sir Rowland Hill’s force, and one 9-pounder brigade to be attached to the general Artillery reserve of the army. These three were made very efficient by this means, and the purchase of a considerable number of horses avoided.
The campaign of 1813 was distinguished by a feature of considerable importance. Lord Wellington was now Commander-in-Chief of all the Spanish armies, and all necessary correspondence came direct to him, instead of through Cadiz. The assistance of the Spanish regular troops was never of much value, even under the new system, except at the combat of San Marcial and the Bidassoa; but the part taken by the Partidas, or irregular forces, during the campaign was not unimportant, and increased the difficulties of the French troops.
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated Corilhaa, 4 April, 1813.
The French commenced to fall back from Salamanca towards Burgos, and in the beginning of April had not above a thousand men in the former place. At the same time, supplies were arriving from England weekly, and were disembarked in the northern ports of the Peninsula, with a view to the advance of the English army. An organization of the Allied troops was taking place, superior to anything which had yet been witnessed; and the Corps, whose history is treated in these pages, improved with the other arms in this respect. It seems a suitable time to touch on the improvement in the Field Brigades which had already taken place; and, at the risk of wearying the reader, to place before him a specimen of these in the spring of 1813.
The brigade, i.e. battery, which it is proposed to describe belonged to the 10th Battalion, and was commanded by the 2nd Captain, R. M. Cairnes, a gallant officer, who afterwards fell at Waterloo. It was pronounced by various inspecting officers to be the best field brigade with the army; but Captain Cairnes in his correspondence declined to accept this honour, as he considered others equally efficient. It may, therefore, be accepted as a fair type. From a letter written by Captain Cairnes himself, the following particulars Captain Cairnes to Captain Bedingfield dated Penamacor, 4 April, 1813. are obtained; and they exhibit a startling contrast to the oxen-draught brigades of the commencement of the Peninsular War. His system was based on that of the Horse Artillery, now universal in field batteries, in which each officer was wholly and solely responsible to the captain for his division, whether in matters of men or matériel. He declined to allow the officer of the Driver Corps, who commanded the drivers attached to the brigade, to have any control over his men, except as far as their pay and subsistence were concerned; and by thus giving his own officers complete responsibility, he received the reward which such conduct generally ensures, and was able to say, “My subalterns, Raynes, Bridges, James, and Talbot, are all most excellent, full of zeal, activity, and intelligence; they run before me in everything I can desire concerning their respective charges, and are never more happy than when in stables.” The chief difficulty in field brigades had always been in the divided allegiance of the men of the Driver Corps. The solution of this difficulty, which was adopted by Captain Cairnes, gradually obtained favour, and ended in a most natural manner,—the abolition of the Driver Corps and the absorption of the drivers into the Regiment. It took, however, some years to educate the authorities up to this point; and not until 1822 was the corps actually Kane’s List. abolished. Another point in Captain Cairnes’s system to which he attached great importance, and which he said had been generally adopted in the other brigades, was that of having promotion among the non-commissioned officers to go, not by battalion, but by company seniority; and of waiving even the question of seniority in the presence of undoubted superiority. There were faces in Woolwich which grew very long, and fossil old gentlemen whose remaining hairs stood on end, at such a perversion of the old order of things; but Lord Wellington supported the captains of companies in a measure which on service gave them a powerful engine for discipline. So, time after time, does the reader find the real Artillery unit asserting itself.
The artificers with a brigade were 2 wheelers, 2 collar-makers, 1 farrier, 1 jobbing smith, and 4 shoeing smiths. The non-commissioned officers of the Driver Corps attached to a 9-pounder brigade were, 1 staff-sergeant, 2 sergeants, and 6 corporals, one of whom acted as forage sergeant, under the acting storekeeper of the brigade (a company, not driver non-commissioned officer), who, again, was under an assistant commissary-general attached to the brigade (under the immediate orders of the Captain commanding). This officer was responsible for the rations and the supply of corn, for which purpose he had a number of forage mules, at the rate of one mule to two horses.
Sixteen round tents and two horsemen’s tents were carried; and, for the convenience of the artificers, two store waggons accompanied the brigade. The other extra carriages were the forge waggon, spare wheel carriage, and the captain’s cart. The brigade itself consisted of 6 guns and howitzers, 6 ammunition waggons, and 2 reserve ammunition waggons. The proportion of ammunition carried was as follows:—
For each 9-pr. gun: 70 round shot, 34 spherical case, and 12 common case. Total 116 rounds.
For each 5½-in. howitzer: 44 spherical case, 8 common case, and 32 common shell. Total 84 rounds.
In each reserve ammunition waggon there were 57 round shot, 21 spherical case, and 6 common case. Total 84 rounds.
The number of drivers with a brigade was one hundred. Five of the spare carriages were drawn by mules; those being selected which were the least likely to go under fire.
This was altogether a most desirable command for a young 2nd Captain to have on active service; and keenly did Captain Cairnes enjoy it. His dismay may therefore be imagined, on receiving, on the 5th May, 1813, a letter from Colonel Fisher, then commanding the Artillery in the Peninsula, announcing that Lord Wellington had decided to take away the horses of his brigade for the service of the pontoon train, leaving him to the chance of any horses which might hereafter come from Lisbon. He was not allowed any time to brood over his troubles, but was ordered to meet the pontoons at Sabugal in three days’ time, and hand over to the Engineer the whole of his stud. Colonel Fisher’s letter, which was a private communication, sent a few hours in advance of the official order, held out hopes of a speedy restoration (which fortunately took place) of the equipment of his brigade for the field.[39] Captain Cairnes’ reply to this letter was so soldierlike, that it is well worthy Dated 6 May, 1813. of a place in the records of his Corps. “I return you,” he wrote, “my dear Colonel, my sincere thanks for your communication of yesterday’s date, anterior to the arrival of any order, which would, I think, have set me perfectly crazy. As it is, I have read your letter over twenty times, and am yet very unwilling to understand it. Lord Wellington having fixed on this brigade, I trust we shall be entitled to every consideration, when it is recollected that a junior one in all respects is within a league of the same distance from Sabugal as this place. The pain of urging anything prejudicial to my valued friend Parker is superseded by the promise held out to us of a speedy re-equipment.... I know, my dear Colonel, that you cannot avert the blow from us, and that the necessity of the service has forced Lord Wellington to this measure; therefore, however sorely affected and hurt we may now feel, you will assure yourself that the whole shall be given over to the pontoons in as complete and efficient a manner, as if they were going to be put to our own carriages. I am full of dread and alarm that our new equipment of horses and harness will not come up in time to march with the army; and that (without being so extravagantly sanguine or conceited as to build on future successes and good fortune) we shall be too late for the golden opportunity that a few days will probably offer to other brigades.”
This allusion of Captain Cairnes to the other Artillery brigades with Lord Wellington’s army suggests the propriety of placing before the reader their distribution at the opening of the campaign of 1813. This would appear to have been as follows:—
| With 1st Infantry division: | Captain Dubourdieu’s Brigade, R.A. |
| With 2nd Infantry division: | Captain Maxwell’s Brigade, R.A. |
| With 3rd Infantry division: | Captain Douglas’s Brigade, R.A. |
| With 4th Infantry division: | Major Sympher’s K. G. Artillery. |
| With 5th Infantry division: | Captain Brandreth’s Brigade, R.A. |
| With 6th Infantry division: | Major Lawson’s Brigade, R.A. |
| With 7th Infantry division: | Major Gardiner’s Troop, R.H.A. |
| With Light Division: | Major Ross’s Troop, R.H.A. |
| 1st Division of Cavalry: | Major Frazer’s (Bull’s) Troop, R.H.A. |
| 2nd Division of Cavalry: | Captain Beane’s Troop, R.H.A. |
| Reserve | {Captain Webber Smith’s Troop, R.H.A.[40] |
| {Captain Cairnes’ Brigade, R.A. | |
| {Captain J. Parker’s Brigade, R.A. |
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 19 May, 1813.
In the middle of May the plan of the campaign was arranged. The army was ordered to move in two columns, the head-quarters to leave Frenada on the 22nd May. One column was to cross the Douro at the mouth of the Coa, and to advance by Miranda de Douro; the other was to go by Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington was to accompany the latter column, which consisted of Sir Rowland Hill’s corps, the Light Division, Cavalry, &c. The other column, composed of the rest of the army, was under Sir T. Graham; and with it went the pontoon train. It was decided to lay the pontoon bridge across the Douro, near Miranda, and thus unite the two columns; this operation to be followed by the siege of Zamora, which, when concluded, would leave the Ibid. dated Matilla, 25 May, 1813. Allies masters of the Douro. Following the head-quarters, the reader finds that they moved to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 22nd May, to Tamames on the 23rd, and to Matilla, about six leagues from Salamanca, on the 25th. On the way, Lord Wellington inspected the Portuguese Division, commanded by General Silveira, and found the men better equipped than they had ever yet been. The brigades of Artillery with them were commanded by Colonel Tulloh, an officer of the Royal Artillery, whose zeal and ability were repaid by the efficiency of the men under his control. The whole of the reserve Artillery of Lord Wellington’s army, with the exception of the brigade under Captain Cairnes, which was now re-equipped, had gone with the main body, under Sir T. Graham.
Colonel Dickson was now in command of the Artillery, although junior to many in point of regimental rank; and as the way in which he obtained the command is not so generally known in the Regiment as the fact, it seems desirable to state it. While he was at Corilhaa, preparing the reserve Artillery for the coming campaign, Colonel Fisher, who had succeeded to the command of the Artillery after Colonel Robe was disabled at Burgos, but who had not held the command as yet in the field, wrote to him, requesting his attendance at head-quarters without loss of time. On his arrival, he ascertained that a misunderstanding had arisen between Lord Wellington and Colonel Fisher, which had ended in the latter’s requesting permission to resign, and return to England. Lord Wellington inquired of Colonel Dickson whether he was senior to Colonel Waller, who had arrived in Lisbon, and on learning that he was not, he said, “Colonel Dickson, then, will take the command of all the Artillery in the field, both British and Portuguese; and Colonel Waller and General Roza, as commandants of the Artillery of the two nations, will remain at Lisbon for the purpose of forwarding supplies.” He then desired Colonel Fisher to give such explanations of the state of affairs as would enable Colonel Dickson to enter on his charge.
There would seem to have been considerable hastiness and injustice on the part of Lord Wellington in this matter. Colonel Dickson himself, while naturally flattered, could not To D.-A.-G. dated 25 May, 1813. but say, “I am convinced, if Lord Wellington had known Colonel Fisher’s talents and abilities, he would never have allowed any such circumstance to take from him such an officer; and I hope you will forgive my thus presuming to discuss in so particular a manner the merits of a superior, which I am only induced to do in order that you may better know the merits of an officer I love and esteem; and I am sure every man of sense or ability in the Corps of Artillery in the Peninsula will subscribe to what I now state.”
The honour paid to Colonel Dickson was an embarrassing one. Although his Portuguese rank placed him over all officers under the rank of Colonel, many such were senior to him regimentally. This fact demanded great tact from him in the execution of his duty. Fortunately, he met with ready, soldierlike co-operation from all; and one, who had commanded him on service before, in writing to his friends on the subject, expressed the general feeling Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page 101. when he said: “I shall get on very well with Dickson; he was second to me in the South American Expedition, and then obeyed my orders with the implicit readiness which I shall now transfer to his. He is a man of great Ibid. page 106. abilities and quickness, and without fear of any one.” And again: “Colonel Fisher left us the day before yesterday, sincerely regretted by all. I hope Dickson’s reign may be long for the sake of the service, but the times are Ibid. page 110. slippery.” Yet once more: “Dickson showed me yesterday a very sensible, plain letter, which he had written to Colonel Waller, and was just going to send off. Dickson, too, feels himself awkwardly off, but will bear his honours well. There is an open, manly simplicity about Dickson very prepossessing. I hope and trust he will long enjoy the confidence of the Marquis; and this I should desire for the sake of the service, independently of any regard I might have (and I have a very sincere one) for Dickson.”
Colonel Dickson. to D.-A.-G. dated 6 June, 1813.
To return, however, to the movements of the army. On the 26th May the head-quarters moved forward in the direction of Salamanca, on approaching which place columns of the enemy’s infantry were observed, halted at each side of the town, a part of their cavalry being, however, on the left bank of the river to watch the movements of the Allies. As the latter advanced, the cavalry retired across the bridge into Salamanca, but the infantry for a considerable time remained unmoved. In the meantime, Sir Rowland Hill’s Cavalry and Captain Beane’s troop of Horse Artillery were ordered to push for the ford of Santa Martha, a little above the town. As soon as the French saw these troops approach the river, they moved off with their whole force, which included about 2500 infantry, two or three squadrons of cavalry, and three or four guns. General Fane, who was in command of Sir R. Hill’s Cavalry, passed the river in a moment, and came up with the French before they had gone three miles from Salamanca. They were retiring by squares along the Arivalo road, which leads up the Tormes by Aldea Langua; and, on overtaking them, the Horse Artillery opened upon their squares with considerable execution. The pursuit was thus continued for five or six miles, the Horse Artillery cannonading them from every available point. The Artillery fire was interfered with by the repeated interposition of the Cavalry between the guns and the enemy; but was nevertheless very efficient. According to Colonel Dickson,—of 400 killed, wounded, and prisoners, lost by the enemy,—100 were victims to the Artillery fire alone; and the squares were so shaken by it, that, if the regiments moving on the flank had pushed on, the whole force might have been captured. Lord Wellington, however, seeing that the pursuing Cavalry were somewhat exhausted, desisted from further pursuit. The head-quarters halted at Salamanca on the 27th May, and orders were issued for their transfer to the other army, north of the Douro. On the 28th, therefore, the head-quarter staff proceeded to Almeida, and on the 29th to Miranda, crossing the Douro at a ferry near the latter place. Lord Wellington, himself, remained one day later at Salamanca; and on the 29th proceeded the whole distance to Miranda. On the 30th the head-quarters were moved to Carvajales, and on the same evening the Esla was reconnoitred, and preparations made to cross it on the following morning. Small parties of the enemy were seen on the opposite bank with two guns. Early on the morning of the 31st, the Hussar Brigade, Gardiner’s and Webber Smith’s troops of Horse Artillery, and two regiments of Infantry crossed,—upon which the French parties immediately retired. The Infantry found the greatest difficulty in crossing,—the river being both deep and rapid,—and several men were drowned. A pontoon bridge was therefore made in a couple of hours, over which the rest of the army passed, with the exception of the Cavalry, Artillery, and waggons, which forded the river. A special pontoon bridge was made for the 18-pounder brigade, over which it passed with safety. On the 1st June head-quarters proceeded to Zamora, and the army completed the passage of the Esla,—the French evacuating Zamora as the Allies approached.
“Thus,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “we succeeded in our manœuvre of turning the Douro, and getting possession of that river without sustaining the smallest loss. It has been a bold one; but, by his Lordship’s rapidity in moving the army, and transferring himself from one point to the other, I think the French did not succeed in discovering our real intention until it was too late for them to hinder it. Otherwise, we found the Esla such an obstacle, that if they only had had ten or twelve thousand men on that river, the passage of it would have been a serious operation to us, and could not have been effected without either great loss of time or of men, and probably both.”
On the 2nd June, the French abandoned Toro, and Wellington’s head-quarters proceeded there,—remaining over the 3rd, on which day, and on the 4th, the force which had advanced by Salamanca, under Sir R. Hill, crossed the Douro. On the 4th, the army moved forward in three columns,—the right, under Sir R. Hill, in the direction of Valladolid; the centre upon La Mota, and the left under Sir Thomas Graham towards Rio Seco. The head-quarters proceeded to La Mota on the 4th, to Castro Monte on the 5th, and to Ampudia on the 6th; the French abandoning Valladolid, as the Allies advanced, and retiring upon Palencia and Duenas. The armies continued to keep within a day’s march of one another: indeed, when the Allies reached Palencia, on the 7th June, the rear-guard of the enemy was clearly visible from the high ground. On the 12th (the pursuit still going on steadily, and Wellington continuing this, his greatest, march in the most persevering, relentless manner) the French army had reached Monasterio and the neighbourhood of Burgos,—but indicated no sign of discontinuing its retreat. Warned by past experience, Wellington had decided to take no active measures against Burgos, but merely to blockade it with part of the Spanish army, leaving the English troops undiminished. In the meantime, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column of the army, inclined to his left in the direction of the upper part of the Ebro; with the view, it was believed, of turning or crossing that river. The events of the next few days, however, modified matters very much. On reaching Villa Diego, Lord Wellington ascertained that the Castle of Burgos had been blown up by the French, and was in utter ruins. Sir Richard Fletcher, of the Engineers, accompanied by Colonels Dickson and May, and Major Frazer of the Artillery, penetrated into the place, although the French rear-guard was still close at hand, and brought back the report. Joseph Buonaparte had meditated taking up a position at Burgos, but it having been pronounced unwise, he continued to retire on Vittoria. His army—which was known to be en route for France—was embarrassed with huge convoys of spoils,—and crowds of followers, male and female, who were unwilling to be left in Spain, unprotected by the French troops. Lord Wellington now executed a very brilliant Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 19 June, 1813. strategical manœuvre,—the crossing of the Ebro. The route by which he abruptly moved his army was unfrequented and considered impracticable. The descent to the river by the Puente de Arenas was by a very narrow and steep pass, opening into a small but fertile valley, entirely surrounded by high mountains, with the river running through it. The sortie from the valley of Puente de Arenas was by a road running for a considerable distance close to the river, with stupendous rocks overhanging on either side. Had this movement been foreseen, a very small body of the enemy could have impeded the passage of the army. The advantages of this manœuvre were many. The Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’ French communications with the coast were cut off, and a new base was opened for the operations of the Allies. The English fleet entered Santander, and commissariat communication was opened with the coast. Wellington was also in a position to threaten the communications between Vittoria and the Pyrenees, and the French found the English already in rear of their right. An engagement took place between Sir Thomas Graham and the French General, Reille, who had been detached to protect the communications between the French army and their own country; and the Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 19 June, 1813. Light Division—with which Lord Wellington himself was—succeeded in surprising General Mancune’s division on the march,—killing a good many, dispersing one brigade, and capturing an immense quantity of baggage, and 300 prisoners. But these were merely the preliminaries to a battle, which, in its results, was unsurpassed in the whole narrative of the Peninsular War. Writing on the evening of the 19th June, from Subijana de Morillas, three leagues south-west of Vittoria, Colonel Dickson said: “We can see the whole French army on their march to Vittoria;—the column is not more than six or seven miles off. To-morrow we expect to move forward upon Vittoria, which, I think, must lead to something.”
In proceeding to discuss the share of the Royal Artillery at the battle of Vittoria, it has unfortunately to be premised that the most valuable letter on the subject has been mislaid, or lost. In writing to General Macleod after the Dated 23 June, 1813. battle, Colonel Dickson said: “I know Frazer has given you some account of it, so I will not enter into further details at present, except on our own matters.” And in two subsequent letters, he said: “Frazer’s letter will have explained everything.” Now, in the published letters of Sir Augustus Frazer, this letter is not to be found; nor is there much in his allusions to the battle in his other letters to assist the Artilleryman in tracing the services of his Corps. The loss of the letter is, to a certain extent, compensated by details given in subsequent letters from Colonel Dickson, but still remains irreparable.
It would be beyond the province of this work to describe the battle of Vittoria, as a whole. In the pages of the general military historian such a description can be found. In these, the regimental statistics alone need be reproduced. The general plan of the battle is, doubtless, familiar to all:—the plain in front of Vittoria, into which—as into a trap—Joseph Buonaparte poured all his troops and convoys;—the one road available for the retreat of his forces to France, which was menaced—but not with sufficient decision—by Wellington’s left;—the confusion in the space between the French army and the town of Vittoria, where mobs of terrified fugitives were mingled with heaps of vehicles and stores;—the three-handed assault of the Allies, advancing with steadfast purpose from three quarters at once;—the frequent Artillery duels, in which the Artillery on both sides so greatly distinguished themselves;—the grand final effort of the French artillery, Napier. when “more than eighty guns, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, bounding with a frantic energy;” and then the wild rout, the headlong flight of an army leaving its guns and everything behind it;—the shrieks of women, the terror of men, rising so vividly before his mind as he wrote, that Napier exclaimed, “It was the wreck of a nation!” But no such ambitious description is required in detail from the mere regimental historian. What is demanded from him is the narrative, from old records that have never seen the light, of the share taken by his corps on this eventful day.
Official Report to the Master-General, dated 23 June, 1813.
Let the distribution of the various troops and brigades of Artillery at Vittoria first be given. Colonel Dickson was in command, assisted by the following field officers:—
Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., commanding the reserve Artillery.
Major Carncross, with Sir Rowland Hill’s column.
Major Buckner, with column of 3rd and 7th Divisions.
Major Frazer, commanding the Horse Artillery.
The troops of Royal Horse Artillery were distributed as follows:—
Captain Webber Smith’s, with the Reserve.
Major Ross’s, with Light Division.
Captain Beane’s, with General Fane’s Cavalry.
Major Gardiner’s, with the Hussars.
Captain Ramsay’s, with the Cavalry Division.
The Field Brigades were distributed as follows:—
Major Lawson’s, with 5th Division.
Captain Douglas’s, with 3rd Division.
Captain Maxwell’s, with 2nd Division.
Captain Dubourdieu’s, with 1st Division.
Major Sympher’s (K.G.A.), with 4th Division.
Captain Cairnes’, with 7th Division.
Captain Parker’s, with the Reserve.
Lieut.-Colonel Tulloh, R.A., commanded two Portuguese brigades with Sir R. Hill’s corps, and Major Arriaga commanded the Portuguese Reserve Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel May acted as Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Woodyear acted as Brigade-Major. Lieutenants Ord, Harding, and Pascoe, were employed as staff officers by Colonel Dickson.
The number of guns, exclusive of the Spanish, which were brought into action by the Allies at Vittoria was ninety; but the French had considerably more. There happened in this battle, on the 21st June, 1813, what rarely happens;—every brigade of Artillery was brought into action. In his official report, Colonel Dickson said that he had reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery on this occasion; that their skill and bravery were highly conspicuous, as were their exertions in bringing forward the Artillery through a difficult and intersected Dated 23 June, 1813. country, both during the attack and the pursuit. “In short,” he added, “I can safely assert that artillery could not be better served; and, to the credit of the officers, I have to add that from the beginning of the day to the last moment of the pursuit, it was always to be found where it was wanted.” In his private letter to General Macleod, Colonel Dickson particularised some of the officers who had especially distinguished themselves; and the following extract deserves publication: “I cannot close this letter without mentioning the valuable assistance my friend Frazer afforded during the whole business. I may truly say he flew from one troop to another,—accompanying them into action and attending to their supply, or looking out for roads for them to move. You, who know Frazer so well, can easily anticipate what he would be on such an occasion.”
The massing of the English Artillery was effected at Vittoria to an unprecedented extent, and with most happy results. It might at first be assumed that the admirable use made of this arm on that occasion is a sufficient reply to any insinuations against Lord Wellington’s knowledge of Artillery tactics. Unfortunately for him, a letter has survived which proves, on the best authority, that to accident alone was this artillery display due. “The nature of the country,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “and want of roads, was the means of throwing a large proportion of our Artillery together, away from their divisions, which I availed myself of, and by employing them in masses it had a famous effect. This was adjoining to the great road to Vittoria; and the French brought all the artillery they could to oppose our advance, so that the cannonade on one spot was very vigorous. In none of our Peninsular battles have we ever brought so much cannon into play; and it was so well directed that the French were generally obliged to retire ere the Infantry could get at them. There were few or no instances of the bayonet being used during the day.”
MS. Official Return to D. A. Gen.
Considering the duration of the battle, the casualties among the Artillery were singularly few. They were as follows:—
Staff.—Wounded: Colonel May, and Brigade-Major Woodyear (died of wounds).
| Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Royal Horse Artillery | 4 | 36 | 2 |
| Royal Artillery | 8 | 19 | ·· |
| Horses of R. H. A. | 28 | 23 | 8 |
| Horses of R. A. | 15 | 2 | ·· |
Ibid.
The number of guns captured from the enemy was no less than 151, besides 415 caissons. Of gun ammunition 14,249 rounds were taken, besides 40,668 lbs. of gunpowder and 1,973,400 musket ball-cartridges. The other spoils were countless; and it is difficult to conceive a more complete defeat.
Lord Wellington’s account of the battle contains the following short, but satisfactory, allusion to the services of the To Lord Bathurst dated 22 June, 1813. Artillery:—“The Artillery was most judiciously placed by Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, and was well served; and the army is particularly indebted to that Corps.” During the pursuit of the enemy after the battle, Colonel Dickson kept the Artillery well up,—and was rewarded, as will be seen from Extract from the private Journal of F. S. Larpent, Esq., Judge-Advocate-General to the British forces in the Peninsula. Published by Sir G. Larpent, page 142. the following anecdote:—“In the pursuit after Vittoria, in the bad roads, Lord Wellington saw a French column making a stand, as if to halt for the night. ‘Now Dickson,’ said he, ‘if we had but some Artillery up!’ ‘They are close by, my Lord.’ And in ten minutes, from a hill on the right, Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s Light Division guns began; and away went the French two leagues farther off.” The same author from whom this quotation is made says: “Dickson, though only a Captain in the Royal Regiment of Artillery, now conducts the whole department here, because he makes no difficulties.”
Lord Wellington’s Despatch, dated 24 June, 1813.
During the pursuit, the only remaining guns—two in number—taken away by the French from the field, were captured,—one being disabled by the fire of the Chestnut Troop, and the other being taken within a league of Pampeluna, ‘Memoirs of Sir Hew Ross,’ page 41. in which direction the French had retreated.
The results which followed the battle of Vittoria are summarised by Napier in his description of the campaign, in which that battle was the chief incident. “In this campaign of six weeks,” he wrote, “Wellington, with 100,000 men, marched 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain.” The fortresses referred to were Pampeluna and San Sebastian; and it is now proposed to treat of the double siege of the latter, as an episode of essential importance in the history of the Regiment, and one concerning which Sir Alexander Dickson left much valuable information, yet unpublished. Before doing so, however, there are two incidents which deserve to be mentioned.
In the brevet which followed Vittoria, Majors Frazer and Ross were made Lieut.-Colonels, and 2nd Captain Jenkinson (of the Chestnut Troop) was made Major. Captain Jenkinson’s brevet promotion was the first which had been received by a 2nd Captain of Artillery. In the beginning of the year 1813, the 2nd Captains serving in the Peninsula had memorialised Lord Wellington on the subject. The Sir Henry Torrens to Lord Wellington, 3 March, 1813. memorial having been referred to England, a favourable reply was given, and Captain Jenkinson’s promotion was the first fruits. In addition to the somewhat scanty recognition of the Artillery in this brevet, a boon was granted, which is described in the following extract from a letter written by the Master-General of the Ordnance, Lord Mulgrave, to Dated 16 July, 1813. Colonel Dickson:—“On receipt of your letter, addressed to Major-General Macleod, I did not fail to bring under the consideration of the Prince Regent the very striking and unexampled circumstance of the whole of the British Artillery having been brought into action at the battle of Vittoria, and the whole of the enemy’s Artillery having been captured in the glorious victory which crowned the exertions of the Allies on that ever-memorable occasion. His Royal Highness has been graciously pleased—in consideration of the peculiar circumstances above stated—to mark His Royal Highness’s approbation of the particular and successful activity of the Corps of Royal Artillery under your orders, by granting severally to the officers entrusted with the command of divisions or brigades an allowance for good service in the following proportions:—To the officers commanding divisions, each 10s. per diem; to the officers commanding brigades, each 5s. per diem; and to yourself a similar allowance for good service of 20s. per diem.”
Better, far better, that these words had never been penned, and that the generous thought had died in its conception! For the day was to come when a reference to this precedent after Vittoria should call forth from him under whom the representatives of the Corps had so often and so Vide Appendix A. bravely fought, a letter as cruel and unjust to those of whom it treated, as it was unworthy of him who penned it.
The other incident is one which has become a household word in the Regiment. If there is one name more familiar than another to the Artilleryman, it is that of Norman Ramsay. From public orders and the pages of history his gallantry and professional skill may be learnt; but it is from the pages of private correspondence that one ascertains how lovable he was. He joined the Regiment in 1798, and he fell at Waterloo; and yet in that short space of seventeen years he had gained the love of his brother officers without exception, the devotion of his men, and the admiration of all. A man sans peur et sans reproche, he reminds one of the knights of Arthur, whose pleasure was to “Live pure, speak true, right wrong, follow the king.”
A thorough master of his profession, he earned the respect as well as the love of those whom he commanded: and let all remember that the love of men for their commander must have that element in it to make the gift worth having. The personal qualities of an officer may attract the affection of his men; but if he is deficient in knowledge of his profession, there will be in their love an element approaching pity, which will be fatal to their confidence in the hour of trial. It will be like the love for a child,—pure, warm, and sincere,—but not such as will demand from the soldier, in the day of battle, blind confidence and unhesitating obedience. In Norman Ramsay were combined all the virtues which compel affection, and all the skill which demands respect. But there was more: he possessed that professional enthusiasm, which hallows the dullest tasks, and gilds the severest hardship. His pride in his troop made its men strive to be worthy of his good opinion; and it is in this way that a commander can with certainty generate esprit de corps among his men. Let him but place before them a standard of perfection, even although unattainable, and, in their voluntary efforts to reach it, they will rise far higher, than if driven by order, or goaded by fear of punishment.
Successful in all his aims, Norman Ramsay was yet so fortunate as to escape jealousy. The letters of his brother-officers,—written for private eye alone, but subsequently published,—show this to a singular extent. Sir Alexander Dickson, Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir Hew Ross, Major Cairnes, and others,—all men of different characters and disposition,—rarely wrote without a loving word or kind inquiry about Ramsay. If his troop distinguished itself, they all rejoiced as if it had been their own; if he met with any grief, they longed to share it; and if sorrow came upon themselves, their first instinct was to confide it to him. In October, 1813, a distinguished Artilleryman, Sir Howard Douglas, lost in action a brother whom he deeply loved. Older than Ramsay, one yet finds without surprise that it Sir A. Frazer’s Letters, page 314. was to him he went, “bitterly lamenting his loss.” So also when any of them came within his reach at any time, the letters always speak alike,—as if every one would readily understand the writers’ longings—“I must go and see Ramsay.”
In these pages, later on, the story will have to be told how, in the midst of the din of battle, there seemed to fall a silence like a pall, as he, the brave and much-loved, met with a soldier’s death; but the grief was then that of his friends. The incident now to be told tells of a grief which was his own,—which never quitted him while he lived, and which was said by many who knew him to have led him to court unnecessary exposure on the day in which he died. At Vittoria, Bull’s troop, commanded by Ramsay, had done special service. On the following day, during the pursuit, Published Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page 183. “Lord Wellington spoke to Ramsay as he passed; desired him to take his troop for the night to a village near, adding that if there were orders for the troop in the course of the night, he would send them.” No orders came; but at 6 A.M. an Assistant Quartermaster-General arrived, and ordered him to join the brigade to which he belonged. The troop at once marched, but was shortly afterwards overtaken by a written order from General Murray, the Quartermaster-General Published Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page 186. of the army, directing “Captain Ramsay’s troop to rejoin General Anson’s brigade.” The troop halted, while Ramsay rode on to discover the road; and at this moment Lord Wellington rode up, and called repeatedly for him. “His Lordship,” wrote Sir Augustus Frazer, “then called for Dickson, whose horse being unable at the instant to clear a wide ditch over which we had just passed, I rode up to mention the circumstance to Lord Wellington, who ordered me to put Captain Ramsay in arrest, and to give the command of the troop to Captain Cator. This I accordingly did.... It appears that Lord Wellington had intended that Ramsay’s troop should not have moved that morning till he himself sent orders, and his Lordship declared that he had told Ramsay so. This Ramsay affirms he never heard or understood; and his Lordship’s words, repeated by Ramsay, young Macleod, and a sergeant and corporal, all at hand when his Lordship spoke to Ramsay, are precisely the same, and do not convey such a meaning. I spoke instantly to Lord Fitzroy Somerset on the subject, who, together with every other individual about head-quarters, was, and is, much concerned at the circumstance. Nay, two days afterwards, when the despatches were making out, every friendly suggestion was used by several that Ramsay might be mentioned as he deserved; but I have reason to believe that he is not. There is not, among the many good and gallant officers who are here, one of superior zeal or devotion to the service to Ramsay, who has given repeated proofs of spirit and good conduct. Admitting, contrary to all evidence, that he had mistaken the verbal orders he received, this surely is a venial offence, and one for which long-tried and faithful services should not be forgotten.... Few circumstances have engaged more general attention, or occasioned more regret. It has naturally been expected that after the first moment was over, a deserving officer would, at least, have been released from a situation most galling to a gallant spirit. ... I trust this will soon be the case; but ... I am at a loss to account for the delay in a point so easily settled. In the meanwhile, Ramsay bears up with great fortitude, although he deeply feels.” Writing on the same ‘Memoir of Sir Hew Ross,’ page 46. subject, some weeks later, Sir Hew Ross said: “Norman Ramsay is at present with his troop in this neighbourhood, and we are much together. He is quite well, and bears his unjust treatment, and consequent disappointment, in the manly and proper way that might be expected of him.” For a considerable time he was kept under arrest; and the numerous applications on his behalf, including a very urgent one from Sir Thomas Graham, seemed to have the effect of irritating Lord Wellington. The consciousness of having done an unjust act is rendered more difficult to bear, when the victim has been one for whom affection has been entertained; and it was believed in the army that, as far as his undemonstrative nature would allow, Lord Wellington had a strong liking for Norman Ramsay. There was no doubt of the devotion of the latter for his great chief; and the keen suffering caused by injustice from a person whom one loves must be realised to be fully understood. He was happily released from arrest in time to carry his brave troop through the many actions, with which the war concluded; and he received a brevet promotion for these services; but he was never the same man. At Waterloo, on the morning of the battle, as the Duke rode along the line, he saw Ramsay at the head of his troop for the first time since his arrival in Communicated by Sir J. Bloomfield, R.H.A. Flanders. He accosted him cheerfully as he passed. Ramsay merely bowed his head sadly, until it nearly touched his horse’s mane, but could not speak. In a few hours he was where sorrow and injustice are unknown.
It is necessary now to turn to the siege of San Sebastian. Pampeluna was blockaded and ultimately starved into submission; but stronger measures were adopted with San Sebastian, into which place Marshal Jourdan had thrown a Jones’s ‘Sieges of the Peninsula,’ vol. ii. chap. ii. garrison of between 3000 and 4000 men. On the land side, it was invested by the left wing of the Allied army, under Sir Thomas Graham; and on the sea side it was blockaded by a squadron under Sir George Collyer. On the 4th July, 1813, Lord Wellington wrote as follows to Colonel Dickson: Dated Lanz, 4 July, 1813. “From what I have heard of San Sebastian, I am inclined to form the siege of that place, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send an officer to Bilbao to order Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 10 July, 1813. the train from thence to Passages.”[41] The order was immediately obeyed, and Captain Morrison’s 18-pounder brigade was also directed to proceed to Passages for the same purpose. On the 12th, Lord Wellington reconnoitred San Sebastian, and on the 14th, he departed to join the army on the field, leaving Colonel Dickson to conduct the Artillery part of the siege. Lord Wellington’s operations in the field were at this time of a very delicate nature. The Allied army in the east of Spain had failed, and had raised the siege of Tarragona; while, in his front and on his right, there were menacing French armies. French garrisons in Pampeluna and San Sebastian also weakened his available force, by demanding troops to watch them.
Before entering on the details of the double siege, the following list of artillery officers, who were present, may be interesting.
MS. Returns dated 12 Sept. 1813.
List of Officers of the Royal Artillery employed in the Sieges of St. Sebastian under Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, commanding the Artillery under the Marquis of Wellington.
| First Operation. | Second Operation. | |
|---|---|---|
| Lieut.-Colonel May, A. A. General | 1 | 0 |
| Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 1 |
| Major Buckner | 0 | 1 |
| Major Dyer | 0 | 1 |
| Major Webber Smith, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 1 |
| Captain Morrison | 1 | 1 |
| Captain Douglas | 0 | 1 |
| Captain Dubourdieu (killed) | 1 | 0 |
| Captain W. Power | 1 | 1 |
| Captain Green | 0 | 1 |
| Captain J. B. Parker | 1 | 1 |
| Captain Deacon | 1 | 1 |
| Captain Dansey | 1 | 0 |
| Captain C. Gordon | 0 | 1 |
| Captain A. Macdonald, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 0 |
| Lieutenant J. W. Johnstone | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant Henry Blachley, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant R. H. Ord | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant W. Brereton, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 0 |
| Lieutenant J. Wood | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant Basil Heron | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant G. Mainwaring | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant R. Hardinge | 1 | 0 |
| Lieutenant R. Harding, R. H. Artillery | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant R. F. Phillips | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant J. Pascoe | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant R. Manners | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant W. Dennis | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant Hugh Morgan | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant C. Shaw | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant H. Stanway | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant R. Story | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant H. Slade | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant H. Hough | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant F. Monro | 1 | 0 |
| Lieutenant H. Hutchins | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant John Bloomfield | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant H. Palliser | 0 | 1 |
| Lieutenant T. G. Williams | 1 | 1 |
| Lieutenant A. Macbean | 1 | 1 |
| 25 | 33 |
Lieut. England’s name also appears in some of the Journals of the First Operation, and in Jones’s ‘Sieges,’ and should be included above.
Total, exclusive of King’s German Artillery, present at St. Sebastian:
First Operation.—Colonel Dickson and 25 officers of the Royal Artillery.
Second Operation.—Colonel Dickson and 33 officers of the Royal Artillery.Extract from a letter dated Passages de la Calçada, 12 Sept. 1813:
“These officers vied with each other in their endeavours to forward the object in view in the most indefatigable manner.”—Colonel Dickson to General Macleod.
The story of San Sebastian divides itself into three parts,—viz.: the first siege, terminating in an unsuccessful assault; the blockade; and the second and successful siege. The matériel at the disposal of the Artillery at the first siege was inadequate, even when supplemented by field guns, and guns borrowed from the navy; but during the second siege the supply was ample, and the fire most efficient. In sieges, the association of the Artillery with the breach made by them ceases when the assault commences; but this was not so in the second siege of San Sebastian, when the assault would certainly have failed but for the powerful fire maintained by the Artillery over the heads of the assailants. Of this, however, more hereafter.
Colonel Dickson to D. A. G.
San Sebastian is built on a neck of land jutting out into the sea; and the first point which it was necessary to secure on the land side was a place which had been fortified,—the convent of St. Bartholomew. This was taken, after four days’ vigorous cannonade, by assault, on the 17th July, 1813. Colonel Dickson’s Diary; and Jones’s ‘Peninsular Sieges.’ The guns employed against the convent and the adjoining redoubt were placed in the batteries of the left attack, numbered 1 and 2, and were four 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers. Before the assault, however, Sir Thomas Graham, who had been left by Lord Wellington in command, Sir Thomas Graham to Colonel Dickson, dated 15 July, 1813. directed as many field guns as possible to be brought into play in support. This was done; and they were found to be of material assistance, and were served with great effect during the assault. The number of rounds expended against the convent and redoubt was 3000: a large Jones’s ‘Sieges.’ quantity of hot shot was employed; and in his despatch announcing the success of the assault, Sir Thomas Graham To Lord Wellington, dated 18 July, 1813. said: “I cannot conclude this report without expressing my perfect satisfaction with all the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, both in the four-gun battery employed for three days against the convent, and on the opposite bank of the river, whence several field-pieces were served with great effect.”
The batteries against the town had been in course of preparation during the bombardment of the convent; and the following tables extracted from Sir A. Dickson’s letters and returns will show at a glance much that would otherwise occupy much space in description. The numbering of the batteries differs from that of the Engineers; but where possible, both have been shown.
The batteries were divided into those of the right and left attacks. Lieut.-Colonel May assisted, during the first siege, under Colonel Dickson; the left or detached attack was under Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., and the batteries were armed, manned, and superintended as follows:—
| No. 1 Battery (No 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) | {2 24-pr. guns {4 8-in. hows. | {Against the Mirador {and castle, {and to enfilade {the land fronts. |
| No. 2 Battery (No. 12 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) | 2 24-pr. guns | {Against defences: {only used two {days. |
| No. 3 Battery (No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) | 4 24-pr. guns | For breaching. |
| No. 4 Battery (No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’[42]) | 12 24-pr. guns | For breaching. |
| No. 5 Battery (No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) | {4 68-pr. {carronades | {Against breach, {and to annoy {defences. |
| No. 6 Battery (No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) | {4 10-inch {mortars | {Against land front {and castle. |
| Total | 32 pieces. |
Major Webber Smith, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 1, 2, and 6 Batteries.
Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 4 and 5 (the breaching) Batteries.
Major Arriaga, Portuguese Artillery, was in charge of No. 3.
The officers in the various batteries were as follows:—
No. 1 Battery.—Captain Macdonald, and Lieutenants Brereton, Heron, and Williams.
No. 2 Battery.—Captain Deacon and Lieutenant England.
No. 3 Battery.—Captain Rosières and Lieutenant Costa (Portuguese).
No. 4 Battery.—Captains Dubourdieu and Parker, and Lieutenants Hardinge and Bloomfield of the Royal Artillery, and Lieutenants Silva and Judice of the Portuguese Artillery.
No. 5 Battery.—Captain Dansey and Lieutenant Johnstone.
No. 6 Battery.—This was not manned at first.
| No. 1 Battery | 4 18-prs. | {Against the convent up to 17 July, 1813. |
| No. 2 Battery | 2 8-inch hows. | Ditto. ditto. |
| No. 3 Battery No. 4 Battery | 6 18-prs. 2 8-inch hows. | {To annoy defences of land front, and support attack. Doubtless these included the guns from Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries. |
The officers of the Royal Artillery engaged in the left attack, were—
| Captain | Morrison. |
| ” | Power. |
| Lieutenant | Shaw. |
| ” | Oldham. |
| ” | Story. |
| ” | Stanway. |
The strength of the companies of Artillery before San Sebastian, on the 18th July, 1813, was as follows:—
| Captain Morrison’s (18-pr. brigade) | 162 | of all ranks. |
| Major Lawson’s | 57 | ” |
| Captain Dubourdieu’s | 66 | ” |
| Captain Parker’s | 68 | ” |
| Detachment | 17 | ” |
| Portuguese Artillery | 107 | ” |
| Total | 476 |
The ammunition expended during the first siege amounted to 27,719 rounds, and, as the batteries did not open until the 20th July, and the assault took place on the morning of the 25th, the rapidity of fire must have been excessive. In alluding to this, General Jones says: “The expenditure from the breaching battery alone, on the 22nd July, amounted to 350 rounds a gun, expended in about 15 hours of daylight. Such a rate of firing was probably never equalled at any siege, great accuracy of range being at the same time observed.” Captain Dubourdieu of the Royal Artillery was mortally wounded in the batteries on the first day; and the total loss of the Corps and the Portuguese Artillery during the first operation was 12 killed, and 44 wounded.
On the morning of the 24th July, two breaches were deemed quite practicable, but the assault which was first intended to take place on that day was postponed until the 25th at 5 A.M. It completely failed: a certain amount of gallantry was shown by the attacking troops, but there was a feeling of depression among them, which seemed to have arisen from exaggerated ideas of the difficulty of the task. Sir Thomas Graham, while giving due credit for the courage which was shown, and which was proved by the list of casualties, felt that his troops were not in the same mood as those who stormed Badajoz. In a letter to Colonel Dickson To Colonel Dickson, dated 8 p.m. 25 July, 1813. on the night of the assault, he said: “It is evident to me that the troops here never will carry this breach, unless every annoyance but the castle fire (which is not come-at-able at present) be removed.... The approach to the breach is certainly very unfavourable, and does not admit of attempting to feed or renew the attack, as all must go in one narrow column over rough, slippery stones,—and that, with an enfilading and flanking fire, occasioned the complete failure; nor would it have been possible at last to get any other fresh men from the trenches to have advanced.” Further than keeping up a fire which would not interfere with the attacking party, the Artillery had nothing to do with the assault; but Sir Thomas Graham in reporting the failure took the opportunity of referring to their services on the preceding days, in the following gratifying terms:—“The To Lord Wellington, dated 27 July, 1813. conduct, throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, never was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry; and I beg to mention particularly to your Lordship Lieut.-Colonels Dickson, Frazer, and May, and Major Webber Smith, of the Royal Artillery”....
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 12 Aug. 1813.
Lord Wellington came in person to look at the state of affairs, and as it was not deemed prudent to repeat the assault, and the ammunition of the Artillery was nearly expended, the operations against the place were brought to a close;—greatly to the disappointment of many. After the failure of the assault, Lord Wellington ordered, for security, that all the guns, with the exception of a few pieces, should be removed from the batteries, and a blockade substituted for a siege. The forward movement of Soult’s army, which will be discussed hereafter, produced a further order to embark the guns and stores. On the French being driven back, Colonel Dickson received orders to land them again; the batteries also were repaired, new ones constructed, and everything put in readiness for a second siege as soon as ammunition should arrive from England. The arrival of this was, however, delayed beyond the endurance of Sir Thomas Graham, who was not so familiar with the dilatory habits of the Civil branch of the Ordnance, as Colonel Dickson was. In one of his numerous letters to the latter Dated 7 Aug. 1813. during this period, he wrote: “It is too provoking to think of such mistakes and delays at home, where they have nothing else to do or think of, but the execution of demands made at an early enough period to give full time for preparation.” Sir Thomas Graham’s correspondence shows at this time a feverish, almost fretful, anxiety about the preparations for the second siege, which was not unnatural in a General anxious to wipe out the recollection of failure. The reader of his letters cannot resist a wish to have seen his face when the incident occurred, described by Napier: “With characteristic negligence, this enormous armament (i.e. two new battering trains) had been sent out from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one day’s consumption.” At length, everything was in readiness, and the batteries opened on the 26th August, 1813. Before entering on the narrative of the siege, a list of the batteries with their respective armaments will be given, extracted not merely from Sir A. Dickson’s official returns, but also from private letters written at the time,—with all the necessary information at his hand.
To commence with the Left Attack. The only batteries used before the storming of the city on the 31st August were those numbered 5 and 6,—containing 7 24-pounders, 2 8-inch howitzers, and Captain Morrison’s brigade of six 18-pounders. Others will be given, hereafter, which were used at the bombardment of the castle. The object of the fire of the left attack was to breach the right face of the left demi-bastion, and the curtain over it; also, the face of the left demi-bastion of the hornwork, and generally to annoy the defences. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., again commanded the left attack.
The Right Attack was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, and consisted of the following batteries, according to Colonel Dickson’s numbering:—
| No. 1 (evidently No. 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 2 8-inch howitzers. |
| No. 3 (evidently No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 1 12-inch Spanish mortar, and 5 10-inch mortars. |
| No. 4 (evidently No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 5 8-inch howitzers. 4 68-pr. carronades. 6 24-pr. guns. |
| No. 5 (evidently No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 15 24-pr. guns. |
| No. 6 (evidently No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 4 10-inch mortars. |
| No. 7 (evidently No. 17 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing | 6 10-inch mortars. |
The breaching batteries were Nos. 4 and 5, but more especially the latter. Field officers were detailed for duty alternately in these two batteries, while the firing was going on: Majors Dyer and Webber Smith being in No. 4, and Majors Buckner and Sympher, K.G.A., in No. 5.
According to Sir J. Jones, the batteries opened with a general salvo from 57 guns;—according, however, to Colonel Dickson, only 48 were in action. The whole commenced by signal, and as Sir Thomas Graham wrote to Colonel Dickson, Dated 26 Aug. 1813. “Nothing could be more imposing than the opening of your fire this morning.” The guns in the left attack were found to be too distant for the effect required; but the fire from the batteries of the right attack was so destructive, Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 1 Sept. 1813. that in the course of five days, from the 26th to the 30th, the demi-bastion was demolished, a breach made in the curtain behind it, the towers on each side of the former breach laid down, and the wall laid open which connected the curtain with the left of the first breach. The batteries of the left attack laid open a hornwork; and four guns having been brought forward into a battery (No. 7) which was much nearer the works, they breached the right face of the demi-bastion, and greatly assisted in bringing down the end of the curtain.
About 11 o’clock A.M. on the 31st August, the column for the assault, which had now been ordered, moved forward, and arrived at the breach with comparatively little loss. The defence of the French was such, however, that no lodgment could be effected,—more than one attempt having been repulsed; and as the enemy occupied a higher position than his assailants, he was able to fire down upon them and inflict great loss. It was at this time that Sir Thomas Graham ordered the Artillery to commence a fire, which has received the greatest praise at the hands of historians, and of which the following graphic description, from Colonel Dickson’s pen, cannot fail to interest the reader:—“The great body of our cannon, howitzers, and carronades fired upon the great curtain and behind it—over the heads of our own men (only a few feet perpendicular lower down), with a vigour and accuracy probably unprecedented in the annals of artillery. It was the admiration and surprise of Sir Thomas Graham, and Marshal Beresford, and all who beheld it. No one could say there was a single error to the disadvantage of our own people; and the force of the fire entirely prevented the enemy making any effort along the rampart to drive us from the breach. I must say the enemy stood with great firmness, firing over the parapet as well as they could, notwithstanding numbers had their heads taken off by our round shot. In short, on this occasion, our artillery was served in such a manner that I would not have believed it, had I not seen it.”
Sir J. Jones says of the Artillery fire at this time, that it was admirable, and occasioned no casualties among the assailants; and Napier describes the stream of missiles, like a horrid tempest, in its fearful course strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders. It was a critical time; and a want of precision on the part of the Artillery Dated Oyarzun, 1 Sept. 1813. would have produced a fatal panic among the assailants. In his despatch to Lord Wellington, announcing the success of the assault, Sir Thomas Graham admitted that, prior to the Artillery coming into action on this occasion, the state of the attack was desperate; and he described the fire (which after consultation with Colonel Dickson he ventured to order) as having been “kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example.” The ultimate success was almost accidental. A large number of shells and combustible materials had been accumulated above the breach to throw down on the storming party. This was fortunately ignited by the fire of the Allied Artillery, and a great explosion followed, killing many of the French, and producing a disorder which enabled the troops to establish themselves on the curtain, which they fought from traverse to traverse. Some additional troops having entered the town by another breach near the Towers, the curtain was abandoned, and the fighting confined to the streets; but very soon the French were driven into the castle, which alone remained in their hands at the end of the day. The Allies lost 500 killed, and 1500 wounded in this assault.
To ensure the surrender of the castle, a bombardment from mortars was kept up, until two batteries were made ready in the left attack (Nos. 9 and 10), which were armed with 17 24-pounders,—and 2 24-pounders with 1 8-inch howitzer, respectively. No. 9 was to breach the Mirador and Battery de la Reyna, and No. 10 to operate against the lower defences of the castle, and to enfilade the Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 12 Sept. 1813. back of the hill. On the morning of the 8th September, the preparations being complete, the whole of the batteries opened on the castle. Colonel Dickson describes the bombardment as having been conducted in beautiful style, and carried on so vigorously, that in two hours the enemy hoisted a flag of truce. Sir J. Jones says that the fire was so extremely rapid and well directed, and of so overpowering a nature, that the castle scarcely returned a single shot. The terms of the capitulation having been agreed to, two batteries of the castle were delivered up the same evening, and on the next day the garrison marched out with the honours of war, and laid down their arms. Colonel Dickson was one of the three officers detailed to arrange the terms of the capitulation.
The sufferings of the garrison, and of the prisoners in the castle, during the bombardment, were excessive, as may Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 12 Sept. 1813. readily be imagined when one learns that “they had not a bomb-proof in it except for powder.”[43]
The siege of San Sebastian has an especial interest for the Royal Artillery,—more especially for that part of the Regiment, the duties of which are confined to the use of heavy ordnance. This episode was selected by an able and dispassionate historian, as one reflecting especial honour on Gleig’s ‘Military History.’ the Corps. “It offers,” he wrote, “an example of precision of aim, and absolute coolness on the part of the gunners, never surpassed.... Such services as these were rendered thirty years ago by no other artillery in the world; and as the same spirit still prevails, which prevailed then, in the magnificent corps of which we are speaking, it cannot be doubted but that when the opportunity offers again, they will prove themselves worthy of the renown that attaches to them.”
These words corroborate what has been so frequently urged in this work, that a regimental history differs essentially in its aim from all others. The glow, which it endeavours to throw over past events, is not meant to conceal defects, or to distort facts, but to awaken the spirit of emulation;—the boastful way in which special honours are recounted, and distinctive triumphs sung, is not egotistical pride, or aggressive conceit, but merely the fond treasuring of a glory which has been gained by others, and transmitted to their successors for safe keeping;—and the anxious gleaning among the fields of former action is but to find herbs, which in times of peace shall brace the gleaner for coming days of work or danger. The more truly a soldier knows and values the deeds and honours of those who have gone before him in his corps,—the more certain will he be to emulate them. There is no jealousy of the dead. Admiration of their qualities passes unconsciously into a love for their memories; and this love inspires a longing not to be unworthy. It may seem to some but a poor ambition, to use the weapons well which have been given to us,—to sacrifice one’s will unmeaningly,—and never to be downcast by discomfort or failure; but it is the highest ambition to which a soldier can aspire. Nor is it easy for him to conceive a higher. Cheerful obedience and conscientious zeal imply most of the higher qualities of humanity; and a perfect soldier must possess both. The great poet of England in these days has been the noblest preacher, to whom her army has ever listened. As he places before his readers the ideal of a true knight, the soldier sees a standard which he should never cease to gaze upon. He sees, it may be for the first time, that opposite virtues should not rebel, but mingle; and that such should be found in himself as “Utter hardihood, utter gentleness,
And loving, utter faithfulness in love,
And uttermost obedience to the king.”
And, once realising this,—with the knowledge, possibly, in his heart that there have been in his corps before him men who approached even the standard of Arthur’s knights,—he must, as he reads of their deeds, long “To sweep
In ever-highering eagle-circles up
To the great sun of glory, and thence swoop
Down upon all things base, and dash them dead.”
CHAPTER XXI.
Conclusion of the Peninsular War.
The absence of Colonel Dickson from the head-quarters of the army during the sieges of San Sebastian has had the effect of leaving the Artillery share in the operations Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 18 Sept. 1813. known as the battle of the Pyrenees, unwritten. He did not rejoin head-quarters until the 17th September, 1813: the period, therefore, between the battle of Vittoria and that date is, as far as the operations of Lord Wellington’s army are concerned, almost ignored in his correspondence. In the chapter on the Old Tenth Battalion, in this volume, some allusion to the services of the Artillery at this time will be found; and one or two facts are mentioned in Sir Hew Ross’s memoir; but, really, the chief work fell upon the Infantry during these operations. Soult had been sent to take command of the army of Spain, with orders to assume the offensive at once; which he did, with the ostensible Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1 Nov. 1813. view of relieving the blockade of Pampeluna. This he failed to do, and that city ultimately surrendered on the 31st October, 1813, relieving Lord Wellington of a great drag on his movements. The mountainous country, in which the combats which constituted the battle of the Pyrenees were fought, was unsuited to the movements of Artillery; ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ p. 45. and the Chestnut Troop, which may be taken as a sample of those engaged, had its carriages completely shaken to pieces. Soult, having failed to relieve Pampeluna, made an attempt to raise the siege of San Sebastian; and, on the very day when the city was stormed, the 31st August, he attacked the Spanish forces on San Marcial for this purpose, but was defeated with loss. The conduct of the Spanish on this occasion was much commended by Lord Wellington; and it was a singular and happy coincidence that this engagement, To Lord Bathurst, dated 2 Sept. 1813. so creditable to the Spanish troops, was the last fought on Spanish soil. Soult withdrew his forces across the frontier, and assumed the defensive. For six weeks Lord Wellington remained inactive, pending intelligence from the Allies in the north, who were then concentrating their forces against Napoleon, and would shortly demand from Lord Wellington a diversion in the south.
During these six weeks, much was done to render the equipment of the Artillery suitable for a rough and winter campaign; measures were taken to expedite the arrival, from Lisbon, of some additional horses which had been sent from England; and, in the meantime, the troops and To D.-A.-G. dated 3 Oct. 1813. brigades were, as Colonel Dickson wrote, “kept above water” by the purchase of mules and French horses.
On the 7th October, Lord Wellington made a forward movement into France by crossing the Bidassoa. This has always been considered one of the ablest movements made Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 10 Oct. 1813. by the great English General. The passage was effected as follows. The 5th Division and two 9-pounder brigades forded at Fuentarabia. The 1st Division, and General Wilson’s brigade, with one 9-pounder brigade, and Webber Smith’s Troop of Horse Artillery, crossed at Irun; the Artillery of this column being commanded by Major Dyer. The passage of the 1st Division column was covered by the 18-pounder brigade and a troop of Horse Artillery. General Freire’s Galician army passed at two fords higher up, covered by a 9-pounder brigade, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery, and a brigade of Spanish Artillery. The passage of the river was effected, and the French position carried with great ease. The most difficult duty fell upon the Spaniards, who behaved well. The French, on the other hand, behaved ill. The 18-pounder brigade was especially useful in covering the passage of the troops.
The attack upon the Puerto de Vera was made by the Light Division and General Giron’s Spanish reserve army, supported by the 4th Division, who were successful in getting possession of the pass and adjoining heights; but not until the 9th October did the French quit the Montagne de la Rhune.
The night prior to the crossing of the Bidassoa had been very stormy, and aided in concealing the movements of the Allies. But Soult never imagined such a thing possible as Cust. “the astonishing hardihood of passing columns by fords where the tide rose 16 feet, and where the sands were half a mile broad, to force such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth.” In his description of the crossing of the Bidassoa, Sir Augustus Frazer mentions that, when he reached Irun with Ramsay’s troop and Michell’s (late Parker’s) brigade, he found 400 Infantry waiting to pull the guns over the mountain to the places from which they ‘Frazer’s Letters,’ p. 290. were to cover the crossing of the army. “But,” he adds with pride, “Bull’s (Ramsay’s) horses never want assistance; they were soon posted on a height with some Spanish Dated Vera, 10 Oct. 1813. “Horse Artillery.” From a subsequent official return to the Master-General, it appears that the 9-pounder brigade which accompanied the 1st Division was Captain Dansey’s; and that the 9-pounder brigade which accompanied the 5th Division was Lawson’s, commanded by the 2nd Captain,—Mosse. Captain Morrison still commanded the 18-pounder brigade; and Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop of Horse Artillery was held in reserve, moving from one point to another as most required. Including Major Arriaga’s Portuguese brigade, and the other troops and brigade already mentioned, there were 48 British and Portuguese guns engaged at the passage of the Bidassoa; and the Master-General was informed that the fire of the Artillery on the occasion was well directed, and that the exertions made by the officers in bringing forward their respective brigades to the point of attack were most satisfactory. Lieut.-Colonel May was Assistant Adjutant-General to the Artillery, Lieutenant Ord was Brigade-Major, and Lieutenant Pascoe Adjutant. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann was in charge of the artillery in position, and Lieut.-Colonel Frazer and Major Dyer superintended the bringing forward of the guns.
Further inaction followed the passage of the Bidassoa, until the fall of Pampeluna, already mentioned, set Lord Wellington free for a further advance. During this time, attempts were Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 17 Oct. 1813. made to supply mountain batteries for the coming service. Marshal Beresford brought a few 3-pounders from Lisbon; but it was found almost impossible to procure mules for them. Three guns of the same calibre, which had been taken from the French, had been temporarily equipped for single draught, and placed under the command of Lieutenant Robe, the son of the gallant officer who commanded at Roliça and Vimiera. This young officer subsequently fell at Waterloo, Ibid. 24 Oct. 1813. having seen more battles than years. A medley equipment was found for the guns brought from Lisbon,—the Artillerymen being Portuguese, but the drivers and mules being British. These guns were carried on the backs of the mules, and three of them were added to Lieutenant Robe’s command. A detachment for rocket-service was also sent from England, but received by Lord Wellington with very mixed feelings, as he had rather a horror of the rocket as Ibid. 31 Oct. 1813. a weapon of war. The Chestnut Troop and Douglas’s and Sympher’s field brigades were also got over the mountains to Vera, for outpost duty, and to be in readiness to support the attack on the enemy’s position, which Lord Wellington had decided to make as soon as Pampeluna should surrender. The difficulty in getting these guns over was very great, and was aggravated by the tempestuous weather which prevailed; Ibid. 7 Nov. 1813. but it was effected without accident. When the news arrived from Pampeluna, which should have set the army free for forward movement into France, the weather had become such that movement was impossible. At Roncesvalles, the fall of snow was so heavy and unexpected, that three of Captain Maxwell’s guns had to be abandoned in a redoubt,—the guns being buried under ground and the carriages concealed under the snow. Ross’s, Douglas’s, and Sympher’s guns had, however, been advanced still farther to support in the meditated attack on the position of Sarre; Robe’s mountain guns were attached to the 6th Division, and the Portuguese 3-pounders to the Light Division and Giron’s army; while no fewer than 54 guns had been attached to the left of the army under Sir John Hope,—Colonel Hartmann being in command. It will thus be seen that all necessary arrangements had been made, as far as the Artillery department was concerned.
Official Report to Master-General, dated St. Pé, 14 Nov. 1813, and Letter from Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. of same date.
The attack—which is known as the battle of La Nivelle—took place on the 10th November, and resulted in the enemy’s entrenched position being carried at every point, from St. Jean de Luz to the front of the Puerto de Maia; and in the capture of 51 French pieces of ordnance, and 1500 prisoners. The following was the distribution of the Artillery during the battle; and it will be seen that the greater part remained on the left of the army,—the nature of the country rendering it extremely difficult to move Artillery, except by the high road from Irun:—
With Sir Rowland Hill’s corps—
Lieut-Col. Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades One of 9-prs.
One of 6-prs.With the 6th Division: Lieutenant Robe’s mountain guns.
To support the attack of the 4th
and 7th Divisions on the redoubts and
position of Sarre.Lieut.-Col. Ross’s troop, R.H.A.
Major Sympher’s brigade of 9-prs.
Captain Douglas’s brigade of 9-prs.With General Giron’s Spanish reserve: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.
With the Light Division: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.
With Lieut.-General Sir John Hope’s corps—
Lieut.-Col. Webber Smith’s troop, R.H.A. Captain Ramsay’s troop, R.H.A. ” Carmichael’s brigade of 9-pounders. ” Mosse’s brigade of heavy 6-pounders. ” Greene’s brigade of 9-pounders. ” Cairnes’ brigade of 9-pounders. ” Michell’s brigade of 9-pounders. Major Arriaga’s Portuguese 9-pounders. ” Morrison’s 18-pounders.
| Lieut-Col. Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades | One of 9-prs. One of 6-prs. |
| To support the attack of the 4th and 7th Divisions on the redoubts and position of Sarre. | Lieut.-Col. Ross’s troop, R.H.A. Major Sympher’s brigade of 9-prs. Captain Douglas’s brigade of 9-prs. |
| Lieut.-Col. Webber Smith’s troop, R.H.A. | |
| Captain | Ramsay’s troop, R.H.A. |
| ” | Carmichael’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Mosse’s brigade of heavy 6-pounders. |
| ” | Greene’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Cairnes’ brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Michell’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| Major | Arriaga’s Portuguese 9-pounders. |
| ” | Morrison’s 18-pounders. |
There was also a brigade of Spanish Artillery with General Freire’s army.
The Artillery with Sir John Hope’s column was but little engaged, as its advance depended on the success of the right; but it kept up a heavy and successful cannonade, and met with a few casualties. The Artillery on the right, in support of the attack on the redoubts, was, however, of essential service; and was skilfully handled by the field officers in charge, Lieut.-Colonels Frazer and Buckner. They opened a vigorous fire on the first redoubt, while the 4th Division was moving forward to assault it, and the effect of the fire was such as to compel the enemy to abandon the redoubt without waiting for the assault. At this time the Chestnut Troop distinguished itself especially. “I must particularly notice,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “the gallant manner in which Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop was moved to an advanced position, when it reopened its fire at the distance of 350 yards from the work, and covered the approach of the others. In this operation Lieutenant Day was severely wounded.” As soon as the enemy quitted the first redoubt, the guns moved forward to support the 7th Division in the attack of the second, but after a few rounds it also was abandoned. In the subsequent operations on the right, the Artillery were unable to take much part, on Cust. account of the difficulty in moving the guns. The frightful state of the roads also aided the ultimate escape of the enemy without pursuit. To use Sir Augustus Frazer’s words, the Frazer’s ‘Letters,’ p. 342. ground over which the battle of La Nivelle was fought was “so rugged, that it would be difficult to attempt a sketch of it. You must fancy rocks, and hills, and woods, and mountains, interspersed with rough heaths and rivers, and everything but plain ground.” The casualties in the Artillery were as follows:—
Lieut.-Col. Rosa’s troop— Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse. Wounded: 1 officer, 10 non-commissioned officers and men, and 4 horses. Lieut.-Col. Smith’s troop— Killed: 1 man, and 2 horses. Wounded: 6 non-commissioned officers and men, and 7 horses. Major Bull’s (Ramsay’s) troop— Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse. Wounded: 2 non-commissioned officers and men. Captain Michell’s brigade—Wounded: 3 gunners. Captain Carmichael’s brigade—Wounded: No officers or men. 1 horse. Lieutenant Robe’s brigade—Killed: 1 mule. Total—Killed: 3 men, 4 horses, 1 mule. Wounded: 1 officer, 21 non-commissioned officers and men, 12 horses.
The entire losses of the Allies at La Nivelle amounted to 2694 killed and wounded. The conduct of the Artillery during the battle was such as to excite the following comments: Frazer’s ‘Letters,’ p. 335. “Flattering compliments were paid by all on the undoubted service of the three batteries of Artillery on Official Despatch, 14 Nov. 1813. this occasion, i.e. the attack on the redoubts.” “I beg you will further state to the Master-General,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “that I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the field officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, employed on this occasion; as also of Lieut.-Colonel May, and the officers of the Artillery Staff.” In his private letter to General Macleod, Colonel Dickson wrote: “The attack of the first redoubt at Sarre it was expected would be a very obstinate operation, and for that reason all the eighteen guns were brought up against it; however, their fire was so active and well directed, and Frazer pushed the guns up so close, Dated St. Jean de Luz, 21 Nov. 1813. that the enemy could not stand it.” In another report, Colonel Dickson said that the mountain guns under Lieutenant Robe, and the Portuguese guns of similar calibre, were most active and useful, accompanying their respective corps during the day, and supporting the advance of their Major Dyer to Lieut.-Col. Hartmann, 12 Nov. 1813. light troops. Captain Ramsay’s troop and Captain Carmichael’s brigade, with Sir J. Hope’s force, were especially mentioned;—the former for having repeatedly silenced the guns opposed to him, and dismounted one in the redoubt in front of the 12th and 16th Dragoons; and the latter for having repeatedly driven back the enemy’s skirmishers, silenced their guns, and dismounted one in the redoubt opposite the 1st German Regiment of Infantry. Lord Wellington, To Lord Bathurst, dated St. Pé, 13 Nov. 1813. in his despatch, said: “The artillery which was in the field was of great use to us; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack, under the direction of Colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains, at this season of the year.”
The success of the Allies on the right obliged the enemy to abandon the works at St. Jean de Luz, but any further immediate advance was forbidden to Lord Wellington by the Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 28 Nov. 1813. incessant rain which fell for some days. During this period of compulsory inactivity, every endeavour was made to generate confidence among the French inhabitants, and although rendered difficult by the irregularities committed by the Allied troops, the attempts were ultimately successful. Writing on the 5th December, 1813, Colonel Dickson, after his usual announcement that it had never ceased raining, and that the country was quite impassable, went on to say: “The inhabitants continue to return to their homes, and we are the best friends possible.” The dulness of the weather at St. Jean de Luz, and the inactivity which Colonel Dickson abhorred, were cheered by an announcement that the Portuguese Government had been pleased to promote him to the rank of Colonel in their service, in recognition of his recent services.
Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, dated 14 Dec. 1813.
The weather having at length sufficiently moderated to admit of further operations in the field, Lord Wellington forced the passage of the Nive at Ustaritz and Cambo, on the 9th December, with the view of extending his right towards the Adour. On the 10th, Soult made an attack on MS. Return to the Master-General, dated 15 Dec. 1813. the Allies’ left, near Biarritz, and on the Light Division near Arcangues; but he failed in both. The services on this occasion of Captain Ramsay’s troop, and of a division of Captain Mosse’s brigade, were very conspicuous. A similar attempt was made on the 11th, in which the French were Colonel Dickson to General Macleod, dated 15 Dec. 1813. again repulsed; Captain Ramsay’s troop, and the whole of Captain Mosse’s brigade, again rendering most valuable assistance in the defence of the position. Marshal Soult, being thus disappointed in his hopes of making an impression on the Allied left, drew the greater part of his force back to Bayonne on the night of the 12th December, and in the early morning of the 13th, made a determined attack with great force on Sir Rowland Hill’s corps, which was in position on the right of the Nive. His attempts were, however, vigorously repulsed, and he had eventually to retire into his entrenched camp, with great loss. The Artillery with Sir Rowland Hill consisted of the Chestnut Troop and Colonel Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades. With reference to their conduct, Colonel Dickson wrote: “Nothing could be stronger than the manner in which Sir Rowland expressed to me his satisfaction at the conduct of both these corps.” Colonel Tulloh was wounded on this occasion. At the same time as the passage of the Nive was forced, Sir John Hope’s corps on the left reconnoitred Bayonne. General Hay, who commanded the 5th Division with this corps, wrote as follows with reference to two guns of Captain Ramsay’s troop, which were attached to him. General Hay to Colonel Dickson, dated 12 Dec. 1813. “I take the first spare moment to mention to you how much I was pleased, on the 9th instant, with the very gallant, zealous, and skilful conduct of Captain Cator, who commanded two guns of Captain Ramsay’s troop of Horse Artillery attached to me on that day, which were of the greatest use in assisting me to dislodge a very superior body of the enemy opposed to me.”
The attacks made on the 13th by Soult were admirably planned, but the dogged courage of the five Infantry brigades, which was the whole force which Sir Rowland Hill had at first to oppose to him, was invincible. Although driven back into his intrenchments, his position was one which was most objectionable to the Allies. His attacks were like sorties from a fortress,—which he could make in great force upon any point, and if he failed, his retreat was short and Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 15 Dec. 1813. easy. It was resolved, therefore, to strengthen the position occupied by the Allies,—to fortify one or two salient points,—and to place some guns of position. The army then went into cantonments,—the Spaniards recrossing the Bidassoa for that purpose,—but, as may be imagined, winter quarters in front of an enemy, known to be very active, did not conduce to any sense of repose among the commanders. The conduct of the Artillery at the action of the 13th December To Lord Bathurst, 14 Dec. 1813. was thus noticed by Lord Wellington: “The British Artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Ross, and the Portuguese Artillery under Colonel Tulloh, distinguished themselves.” In the same despatch, the name of Norman Ramsay appears, as having been favourably mentioned by Sir John Hope. Like that brave General, Ramsay had also been twice wounded during the operations on the Nive.
During the few weeks which preceded the resumption of hostilities in 1814, the mortality among the Artillery horses exceeded anything that had yet been witnessed.[44] An accident, which occurred to a supply sent from England to reinforce them, by which many were killed on board the transports during a storm, was particularly ill-timed. And, to crown the evil, Lord Wellington, having decided on the passage of the Adour, ordered the pontoon train to be increased, and horsed without delay. There was no alternative but to take the horses from one of the Artillery brigades; and the unfortunate Captain Cairnes was again the victim. Luckily for him, the promotions consequent on the formation of the Rocket troops had just been notified from England; and as Norman Ramsay received his promotion to the rank of 1st Captain, and returned to England, the command of his troop was given to Captain Cairnes.
The movements in the spring of 1814 were important, and on a considerable scale. In the end of January, the enemy showed considerable activity on the Adour, and fitted out several gun-boats to keep the navigation open, and to Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G, dated 30 Jan. 1814. annoy the posts of the Allies. Against these Lieutenant Robe’s mountain brigade was first employed, but it was soon found necessary to supplement it with guns of a heavier calibre. But in the following month, a change in the weather—from rain to frost—induced Lord Wellington to commence the execution of operations, which he had been quietly designing for some weeks. These included the passage of the Adour near its mouth,—a feat deemed by Soult impossible,—and a simultaneous attack on the left of the French army to conceal his real intention from Soult. Colonel Dickson was sent to assist Sir John Hope in the former operation, which the reader knows was well and skilfully executed. While the covering fire of the Artillery at the passage of the Adour was generally effective, that of the now famous 18-pounder brigade was especially so. Lord Wellington superintended the operations on the right; and as his numbers were now superior to his enemy’s, he was able without risk to carry out both parts of his scheme at the same time, and to drive Soult’s forces back from their position. The various operations, which culminated in the battle of Orthes, are too long to reproduce in a work of this description; suffice it to give an account of the services of the Artillery at that great battle. Colonel Dickson being away, the command of the Artillery with the right of the army fell to Major Carncross. Colonel Frazer had been ordered to go with Sir John Hope’s army to the Adour, in charge of Captain Lane’s rocket detachments, which did good service during the passage of the river. It may here be mentioned, that during the operations prior to the investment of Bayonne, which followed the passage of the Adour, Colonel Frazer was wounded. Although, however, Major Carncross was senior officer of Artillery on the field, yet, being with Sir Howland Hill’s column, he did not participate in the action so much as Major Dyer, who was with Marshal Beresford’s column, and from whose reports the services of the various batteries can more readily be traced. On the morning of the 27th February, the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and light Major Jenkinson, R.H.A., to Colonel Frazer, dated 4 March, 1814. divisions of Infantry, Colonel Vivian’s and Lord Edward Somerset’s brigades of Cavalry, Ross’s and Gardiner’s troops of Horse Artillery, and Maxwell’s, Sympher’s, Turner’s (late Douglas’s), and Michell’s brigades of Field Artillery, had crossed the river Pau, over which a pontoon bridge had been placed during the night. Colonel Ross was no longer with ‘Memoirs of Sir Hew Ross,’ p. 55. the Chestnut Troop, he having returned to England on leave, and given the command to his 2nd Captain, Major Jenkinson. The enemy was found to be in full force on a strong Major Jenkinson, 4 March, 1814. height near the villages of St. Marie and St. Boe’s, and his left covering Orthes, and the fords between Depart and Biron. The battle commenced early in the day, and ended after severe fighting, and a loss to the Allies of 2200 killed and wounded, in the total defeat of the French, with a loss, which—if the numerous deserters be included, who came ‘Cust’s Annals.’ over afterwards—has been estimated at no fewer than 14,000. Although the verdict of Lord Wellington might Despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated 1 March, 1814. satisfy the most fastidious Artilleryman, “The conduct of the Artillery throughout the day deserved my entire approbation,”—a few extracts from the correspondence of the officers present at the battle cannot fail to be interesting;—and the opinions of Generals of division must be Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 4 March, 1814. deemed valuable. Taking the latter first, it is recorded that Sir Thomas Picton expressed himself in terms of the highest praise with reference to Captain Turner’s brigade; and Sir Lowry Cole did the same in regard to Major Sympher’s. The last-named officer, who had done such good and continuous service in the Peninsular War, was killed at Orthes, at the very commencement of the action. Major Jenkinson wrote in general terms, that “all the General Officers speak in high terms of the services of Ross’s and Gardiner’s troops, as also of poor Sympher’s brigade.” Major Dyer, in his To Colonel Dickson, dated 3 March, 1814. report, wrote: “I had the satisfaction about one o’clock to get Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s and Gardiner’s troops of Horse Artillery, and the German brigade of Artillery attached to the 4th Division, into position opposite the enemy’s strongest columns: the fire from their guns was tremendous, and, being admirably served, soon caused the enemy to retire. The brigades then took up separate positions and annoyed the enemy. About 4 o’clock the guns ceased firing, the enemy retreating in great confusion, leaving some pieces of cannon on the field. I have to regret the loss of Major Sympher and many valuable Artillerymen.” Dated 3 March, 1814. In his official report to Marshal Beresford, Major Dyer wrote: “I should really feel that I omitted a duty imposed upon me if I did not recommend to your Excellency’s notice the conduct of Major Sympher, Major Gardiner, and Major Jenkinson on that brilliant day.” Captain Beane’s troop of Horse Artillery was with Sir Rowland Hill’s force, under Major Carncross; and that officer was Major Carncross to Colonel Dickson, dated 10 March, 1814. able to speak with pride of the steady, well-directed, and destructive fire kept up by it, although exposed to a very severe fire of musketry. On the 2nd March, Sir Rowland Hill’s force came up with the enemy, and Captain Beane’s troop performed services for which it was specially mentioned in orders. Four guns belonging to it were brought into action with great effect; and one of them, under Lieutenant Brereton, after a few rounds, silenced two of the enemy’s, and forced them to retire. On this day, Captain Macdonald, of Captain Beane’s troop, distinguished himself in leading on the Portuguese troops, who had been forced back; and received Sir Rowland Hill’s thanks in public orders on the following day. Sir Rowland took the opportunity of assuring Major Carncross that, on the several occasions on which the troop had been recently engaged, he had been much satisfied with the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men composing it.
A period of inactivity followed the battle of Orthes; and not until April did Wellington resume active operations; but in the meantime Marshal Beresford, with a considerable force, proceeded to Bordeaux, and was received with great delight. Louis XVIII. was proclaimed, and the badges of the Empire were doffed by the magistrates. During this time Colonel Dickson’s life had become a burden to him. Innumerable accidents and delays occurred to the horses which were on the way to reinforce his brigades; and at the same time the drain on his resources to meet the wants To D.-A.-G. dated 2 April, 1814. of the pontoon train daily increased. “The pontoon equipment,” he wrote, “has become such a sink of horses under the stupidity, inability, and inactivity of the Driver officers, that I have been obliged, in consequence of the continued observations of Lord Wellington, to place Artillery officers to superintend the care of the horses, until the arrival of the Alicante army, when officers and men of the Royal Artillery are to be posted to the pontoon train, by which the bridge department will revert to the Corps it always belonged to. The bad state of the concern in its mode of organization enabled me to convince his Lordship of the benefit that would arise by having it under one head and managed by the same officers. He was ignorant of its having formerly been an Artillery concern; and he added that he did not know how it had got into the hands of the Engineers at first.”
To return, however, to the movements of the army. Marshal Soult, having learnt what had taken place at Bayonne, commenced to retire upon Toulouse, and Wellington followed Cust. in pursuit, but very leisurely. The Allies had 40,000 bayonets and 60 guns to oppose to Soult’s 28,000 and 38 guns; but a reinforcement was expected by the latter in the shape of Suchet’s army from the east of Spain; and the position at Toulouse, on which he was retreating had been strengthened by gradual intrenchments during the past few weeks. In the commencement of Soult’s retreat, one or two smart actions had taken place between divisions of the Allies and the French, but without any result other than perhaps increasing the rapidity of Soult’s movements. Toulouse was an important strategic post for the French; it commanded the passage of the Garonne; a number of roads met there, which would enable Soult to carry out many different schemes; and it was the chief military arsenal in the south of France. Here, if ever, something might be done to benefit the fast-failing fortunes of the French Emperor, whom the Allies in Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 13 April, 1814. the north were hunting relentlessly to his doom. When Wellington reached the Garonne, his first intention was to cross it above Toulouse; but this was found so difficult that the idea was given up, and a flank march having been made on the 3rd April to a convenient situation about a mile above Grenade, and below Toulouse, the pontoon bridge was laid early in the morning of the 4th, and three divisions (the 3rd, 4th, and 6th) with their artillery, as also six regiments of Cavalry with Major Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery, crossed without opposition. During this operation, however, the river rose considerably, owing to the rains which had fallen during the previous night; and at last the further passage of troops was suspended. Heavy rain fell again on the night of the 4th, and the river increased so much that the pontoons were obliged to be drawn into the banks, and the army was thus divided into two parts. Strangely enough, Marshal Soult did not avail himself of this circumstance, although it was the morning of the 8th before the river was sufficiently low to admit of the bridge being relaid. The Spanish corps, Colonel Arentschild’s Portuguese Artillery, and the head-quarters staff passed over on that day. The bridge was then moved a little farther up the river, and early on the MS. Official Despatch to the Master-General, dated Toulouse, 13 April, 1814. morning of the 10th April the Light Division crossed. On this day was fought the battle of Toulouse. The offensive was taken by Lord Wellington, who attacked a strong position which the enemy had fortified to cover the city of Toulouse, and succeeded in obtaining entire possession of it after an obstinate resistance. In consequence of this defeat, Soult evacuated Toulouse during the night of the 11th, retiring by the route to Carcassone. The distribution and services of the Artillery of the Allies were as follows. The Portuguese Artillery, consisting of ten 9-pounder guns, under Colonel Arentschild, covered the attack made by the Spaniards on the left of the enemy’s position. This Artillery was warmly engaged during the best part of the day, and distinguished itself greatly by its firmness and correct firing. A German brigade, under Captain Daniel, and Captain Brandreth’s 9-pounder brigade, both under Major Dyer, were for some time employed in covering the movements of Marshal Beresford’s column in its attack on the right of the position; and on that being carried, they moved up to higher ground, and assisted in taking the remainder of the position, and also in moderating the fire of the enemy from the opposite side of the canal, across which the French were ultimately driven. The enemy’s fire from that point had greatly annoyed the Allies; and Colonel Dickson expressed himself highly satisfied with the counter-effect produced by the fire of Captain Brandreth’s and Captain Daniel’s guns.
Major Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery was at first employed in supporting the left of the Spanish attack, and afterwards moved to the ridge carried by Marshal Beresford, where Colonel Dickson reported that it was “of infinite service.” While these operations were going on, the 3rd and Light Divisions were employed in threatening the enemy’s position along the canal, towards the point where it joined the Garonne. In this service, Captain Turner’s (late Douglas’s) brigade was engaged. Captain Bean’s troop and Captain Maxwell’s brigade (now No. 4 Battery, 7th Brigade) were on the opposite side of the river with Sir Rowland Hill’s corps, engaged in the attack made upon the tête de pont. The officers on the Staff of the Artillery at the battle of Toulouse were Lieut.-Colonel May, Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, and Lieutenants Ord and Bell. From these officers Colonel Dickson reported that he had received every assistance. MS. Return to B. O. The casualties among the Artillery engaged amounted to 1 officer (Lieutenant Blumenbach, K.G.A., killed) and 58 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded. Among the horses, 28 were killed and 13 wounded. The casualties among the Royal Horse Artillery engaged amounted to 8 men and 4 horses; and among the Royal Artillery brigades to 29 men and 23 horses. The remaining casualties occurred among the Germans and Portuguese.
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 13 April, 1814.
Early in the morning of the 12th, the Allies took possession of Toulouse, and the white flag was hoisted. Lord Wellington was received by the corporation at the Town Hall, and addressed them, pointing out the necessity of weighing well the step which they were about to take at a moment when a congress was possibly sitting, for the purpose of making peace with Napoleon. Vive le Roi! however, was heard from every lip, and every one mounted a white cockade. In the evening of the 12th, a messenger arrived from Paris with the intelligence of Napoleon’s abdication, and the restoration of the Bourbons. The intelligence was very welcome to the inhabitants of Toulouse, who could not but feel rather nervous after the step which they had taken. The same messengers carried to Marshal Soult the news of the Allies entering Paris, and of the official dethronement of Napoleon by the Senate; but he would give them no credence. How faithfully Napoleon was served by his Lieutenants, and how devotedly they clung to his cause, must be apparent to the most superficial reader of his history. In him, who has been called the incarnation of war in all its bad as well as good attributes, they saw but one who was facile princeps in the profession which they loved;—seeing this, they clung to his cause to the bitter end; and with a hungering in their hearts for his leadership, even while serving another prince, they turned to him, after his escape from Elba, with an enthusiasm more like the love of a woman than the cold, reasoning affection of a man. Soldiers, indeed, have many of the qualities of the other sex. Once let them believe in a leader, and no disasters, no slanders will upset their creed; and from a leader, whom they love, even many harsh words will be forgotten in the presence of one word of kindness. There are those who think that a soldier’s mind is like a blank page, on which their own views and wishes may with ease be inscribed. And in one sense they are right. Let skill and courage once be visible in a commander, and the obedience and enthusiasm of his men will be his; but let him supplement these qualities by thoughtful consideration, by kind words, by ready participation in hardships, and he will earn from them a love which shall pass even the love of women. But the kind words will not win it without the skill, nor the consideration without the courage.
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Toulouse, 18 April, 1814.
On Soult’s refusing to credit the intelligence from Paris, Lord Wellington made arrangements for moving forward with the army. On the 16th, however, a French officer arrived from Paris with despatches for Marshal Soult; and this was followed by an officer arriving from the French army to treat with Lord Wellington. Had the despatches but arrived a little sooner, a loss of life would have been saved at Bayonne. A sortie was made from the city, on the 14th April, which, although unsuccessful, resulted in the death of General Hay and not a few brave officers, and in the capture of that most brave and chivalrous leader, Sir John Hope.
The war was now over; but, before closing this chapter, let a word be said with reference to the services of an officer of the Corps who commanded with distinction the rocket detachments attached to the Allied army at Leipsic in 1813, and who met a soldier’s death many years after, at the battle of Inkermann—Thomas Fox Strangways. At Leipsic he commanded, from the circumstance that his Captain, Bogue, fell early in the day. He was then but a subaltern; but ere he left the field, at the head of his brigade he received the personal From a Letter written by Lady Fox Strangways. thanks of the Allied sovereigns; and the Emperor of Russia, taking from his breast the order of St. Anne, placed it upon that of the young officer whose services had been so eminent on that day. In recounting the story of the battle, Sir Edward Cust says that such was the fearful effect of the rockets, that a whole brigade surrendered after enduring their fire for a few minutes; and it has also been recorded, on the best evidence, that, at a most critical time of the battle, the Crown Prince of Sweden rode up to him, and implored him to advance his brigade, as nothing else would save the day. To his exertions at Leipsic was the subsequent organization of regular rocket troops due; and on this taking place the command of the brave men, who had distinguished themselves at Leipsic, passed into the hands of one both able and brave,—one who had done noble service in the Peninsula, which he was to repeat at Waterloo,—gentle and yet enthusiastic,—the late Sir E. C. Whinyates.
In closing this narrative of the services of the Artillery in the Peninsula, it is impossible to avoid feeling that it has fallen immeasurably short of the narrative to which these services are justly entitled. It is felt that the attempt to place before the reader the chivalry, courage, and endurance of those who represented the Corps in the great wars with France, has been defeated by considerations of space, as well as by the writer’s inexperience. To realise these qualities thoroughly, it will be necessary for the reader to clothe these skeleton pages with the noble drapery of Napier.
But if these qualities, which are matter of history, have failed to receive adequate description, how much greater has been the shortcoming in endeavouring to picture those virtues, which can only be detected in the intimacy of private friendship, or the study of private correspondence! It is only from the latter that the student is now able to see how almost brotherly was the relationship between the officers of the Corps in Lord Wellington’s army. For example:—on hearing of Colonel Dickson’s promotion by the Portuguese Government, in the winter of 1813, what were the words of the man whom he had superseded, and who was as able as himself? “I wish,” wrote Sir Augustus Frazer, “that he were a General; he fully deserves all that can be given him either as honour or reward.” And as he felt, so did all. In the letters, also, announcing the Artillery losses at the various battles in that war, of which it has been said that the Allies “left 40,000 of their own number dead on Cust. the plains and mountains of the Peninsula,” how fervently does the loving, brotherly spirit appear! Each good quality in the dead is fondly dwelt upon; and as one gazes on the loving words, written on pages now so faded by hands so long still, there rises a picture of a Regimental unity which it were a sacrilege now to disturb by internal differences. It is, indeed, well at times to close our eyes to the present, and to look back at the past;—a standard is often to be found there which shall dwarf that which we may have set up in our self-esteem, and thought colossal. Possibly, never in the whole history of the Regiment has there been a time of such intellectual life among its members, as at the present day; but as the great school of experience, which in the beginning of this century made giants of our Artillerymen, is not now open, it may be that there is almost a danger in this mental activity, unless it be tempered by the study of comrades, who in days gone by were the embodiments of duty, courage, and hardihood. Thus history may furnish to the student a stability, which shall allay present restlessness.
CHAPTER XXII.
The Second American War.
The Canadian incidents in this war have been glanced at in the chapter on the Old Tenth Battalion; and the actions, in which the various Companies were engaged, have been given in the tables of the Battalions to which they belonged. No allusion has, however, been yet made to the disastrous chapter in the history of the war, in which the scene was laid at New Orleans; and, as the largest Artillery force together during the campaign was with the army on that service, it is proposed in this chapter to devote the chief space to the incidents connected with it.
The story of the second American War may be summarised as follows. On the 18th June, 1812, the Government of the United States declared war against Great Britain. It is not uncharitable to repeat what is matter of history, that the United States have always found their grievances against the mother-country more intolerable, when that country has happened to be engaged in war. It was so in 1812; and the dream of annexing Canada, which has haunted American statesmen for nearly a century, seemed likely to be realised. But, then, as since, the United States underrated the loyalty of the Canadians; and their attempted invasion in 1812 proved a ludicrous failure. Their first Cust. attempt was made with a force of 2500 men under a General Hall, who invaded Upper Canada, but was successfully resisted by a force of Regulars and Militia under a British General, Brock, and had to retire to the American side of the St. Lawrence, where he took shelter in Fort Detroit. Here he was followed by General Brock, to whom he surrendered on the 16th August. A similar fate awaited the second attempt made by the United States. A force of 1400 men, under General Wadsworth, crossed into Canada, near Niagara, in October 1812. The reception he met was a warm one; the American fort at Niagara was captured by the English; and after a few minor operations, in which, unfortunately, General Brock was killed, the American General surrendered himself, with 900 men, to General Sheaffé, who had succeeded to the command on the death of General Brock. A third invasion, on a larger scale, was then decided on. One detachment crossed the frontier between Chippewa and Fort Erie, but was repulsed with loss; while the main body menaced Montreal. Such, however, were the preparations made by the English General, Prevost, at the latter place, that the Americans withdrew into their own country without an engagement.
The operations during the year 1813 were on a larger scale, and success was not always on the side of the British. The year commenced with the defeat of the Americans at Fort Detroit by a mixed force under Colonel Procter; but was followed by the capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada. The lakes became the scene of very active hostilities. A severe engagement took place at the rapids of the Miami, a river flowing into Lake Erie, in which the English were successful, but could not maintain their position. Russell. The loss of Fort George, at Niagara, by the English followed; and this became for a time the American General’s head-quarters. Disasters on the lakes, which ensued, made the English position in Upper Canada very feeble; but affairs brightened in the autumn with the discomfiture of the Americans in their attempted invasion of Lower Canada. Operations were therefore ordered to be resumed in the west with vigour; and it having been found that the Americans had evacuated Fort George and set fire to many Canadian villages, the English followed them across the frontier, and took Fort Niagara and Buffalo, setting fire to the latter city in retaliation for the injury done to the Canadian settlements.
The attempts made by the Americans in the beginning of 1814 to invade Lower Canada were so unsuccessful, that the Cust. war was now limited to the more western districts, where they had the advantage on the lakes. The commencement of the campaign in the west was favourable to the Americans, but the arrival of reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington’s army in France speedily gave a change to the aspect of affairs. While the British troops were retreating in good order before the Americans, they were joined by General Drummond, with these fresh troops, and had hardly formed up before they were attacked by the enemy, and the combat known as the battle of Lundy’s Lane followed. It was a very fierce engagement, and lasted till midnight; and Ibid. so closely was it fought, that “several of the British Artillerymen were bayoneted at their guns;” but it ultimately resulted in the precipitate retreat of the Americans. This part of the enemy’s force was subsequently cooped up in Fort Erie, which was invested by General Drummond during the rest of the war. The strength of the Royal Artillery Kane’s List. in Canada had increased in 1814 to eight companies, under the command of Major-General Glasgow.
The commanding officers of Artillery at the various affairs which took place during the war in Canada, hardly worthy of the name of battles, were as follows:—
Browne’s ‘England’s Artillerymen.’
At Detroit: Lieutenant Felix Troughton.
At Queenstown: Captain Holcroft.
At Fort Erie, in Nov. 1812: Lieutenant King, who was wounded, and subsequently died of his wounds.
At Frenchtown, in Jan. 1813: Lieutenant Troughton:—wounded.
At Fort George, in 1813: Major Holcroft.
At Black Rock, in July 1813: Lieutenant R. S. Armstrong.
At Christler’s Farm, in Nov. 1813: Captain H. G. Jackson.
At Fort Niagara: Captain Bridge.
At Fort Oswego, 1814: Captain Edwin Cruttenden.
At Lundy’s Lane, 1814: Captain Mackonochie.
At Fort Erie, 1814: Major Phillott, assisted by Captain (now Sir Edward) Sabine.
At Moose Island, 1814: Captain W. Dunn.
At Hamden, 1814: Lieutenant Garstin.
At Castine, 1814: Major G. Crawford.
At Machias, 1814: Lieutenant J. Daniel.
It had been decided by the English Government to carry the war into the enemy’s country in another direction, and the energy of the officer who commanded the expedition against Washington—Major-General Ross—was a marked contrast to the nervous indecision of Sir George Prevost, in the operations of the latter against the States from Canada. General Ross’s force came from France, and the companies of Artillery were those commanded by Captain—afterwards Sir John—Michell, Captain Carmichael, and Captain Crawford. Some rocket detachments, under Captain Deacon, formed part of the force. The engagements in which this army was engaged were the battle of Bladensburg, the capture of Washington, and the battle of Baltimore; on all which occasions—as in the previous operations in Canada—the Artillery earned the commendations of the Generals under whom they served. In one despatch it was said, that “the Royal Artillery, in the laborious duties they performed, displayed their usual unwearied zeal.” It is pleasant to find how often, in various campaigns, the services of the Corps are alluded to in almost these words. Courage is expected from every soldier; but a zeal, which no labour can weary, is a nobler, and as necessary a quality.
The next episode in the war is one which it is intended to treat at somewhat greater length,—the New Orleans expedition. On the 25th November, 1814, a squadron arrived MS. Journal of the operations against New Orleans by Major Forrest, A. Q.-M.-Gen. from England, with a body of troops under the command of Major-General Keane, and cast anchor in Negril Bay, Jamaica. Here the force, lately commanded by General Ross, who had been killed at the battle of Baltimore, was also assembled; and General Keane, as senior officer, assumed command of the whole, viz.:—
| No. | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1 squadron 14th Light Dragoons | 160 | |
| Royal Artillery | 320 | |
| Captain Lane’s Rocket Brigade | 40 | |
| 1st Brigade, Major-Gen. Keane | 93rd Regiment | 907 |
| 1st West India Regiment | 0 | |
| 5th West India Regiment | 643 | |
| 2nd Brigade, Colonel Brooke, 44th Regiment | 4th Foot | 893 |
| 44th Foot | 647 | |
| 21st Foot | 995 | |
| Advance, Colonel Thornton, 85th Regiment | 85th Light Infantry | 456 |
| 95th Rifles | 488 | |
| Total | 5,549 | |
It will be observed, that the numbers of the 1st West India Regiment are not given. This is because at the date of both forces uniting, only seventy men of that Regiment had yet arrived.
Some modifications in the strength of the Royal Artillery took place during the campaign, but it may be as well to anticipate matters, and to give now the exact details of the force as it ultimately stood, on Christmas Day, 1814.
The information is obtained from the MS. official returns of that date; and those shown as “on board ship” were those who had not landed in time for the engagement on the 23rd December. They were landed immediately after the arrival of Colonel Dickson on the 25th December, which is mentioned hereafter.
| Officers. | N.-C. O. and men. | |
|---|---|---|
| Effective present | 14 | 224 |
| Effective Rocket Brigade | 2 | 96 |
| Total present | 16 | 320 |
| On board ship | 1 | 114 |
| General Total | 17 | 434 |
| Officers. | N.-C. O. and men. | |
|---|---|---|
| Effective Rocket Brigade | 2 | 62 |
| Total present | 2 | 62 |
| On board ship | 0 | 184 |
| General Total | 2 | 246 |