TABLE B.
Second Siege of Badajoz.
May 22, 1811.—The following was the appropriation of ordnance determined upon for the siege:—
Cristoval Attack. South, or Castle Attack. 24 -pounders (brass) 12 24 -pounders (brass) 14 16 -pounders 4 10 -inch howitzers 2 10 -inch howitzers 2 8 -inch howitzers 4 8 -inch howitzers 4 20 22 In reserve: 24-pounders (brass) 4 Detail of men for siege artillery:—
1st Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men 100 2nd Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men 100 3rd Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men 300 Royal Artillery: officers and men 110 610
| Cristoval Attack. | South, or Castle Attack. | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | -pounders (brass) | 12 | 24 | -pounders (brass) | 14 |
| 16 | -pounders | 4 | 10 | -inch howitzers | 2 |
| 10 | -inch howitzers | 2 | 8 | -inch howitzers | 4 |
| 8 | -inch howitzers | 4 | |||
| 20 | 22 | ||||
| In reserve: 24-pounders (brass) 4 | |||||
| 1st Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men | 100 |
| 2nd Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men | 100 |
| 3rd Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men | 300 |
| Royal Artillery: officers and men | 110 |
| 610 |
Many of these guns were replaced during the siege, as may be gathered from the following table:—
| 24-pounders. | 10-in. howitzers. | 8-in. howitzers. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Disabled by the fire of the enemy | 3 | ·· | 3 | |
| Disabled by the effects of their own fire | 15 | 2 | 1 | |
| Total | 18 | 2 | 4 | =24. |
The expenditure of ammunition during the siege was as follows:—
No. of rounds. 24-pr.
round
shot.24-pr.
grape
shot.16-pr.
round
shot.Shell. 10-in. 8-in. North, or San Cristoval Attack 5950 200 1134 62 989 South, or Castle Attack 8419 441 ·· 640 1090 Total 14369 641 1134 702 2079 N.B.—The totals given above, and in the first table (Table A), agree with those given by Sir J. Jones; but the details here are more minute. It was but natural that Sir J. Jones, being an Engineer officer, should devote more space and detail to the labours of his own corps; but his artillery details in most sieges in the Peninsula were obtained from Sir A. Dickson and Sir J. May, and generally agree with the MSS. of the former.
| No. of rounds. | 24-pr. round shot. | 24-pr. grape shot. | 16-pr. round shot. | Shell. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10-in. | 8-in. | ||||
| North, or San Cristoval Attack | 5950 | 200 | 1134 | 62 | 989 |
| South, or Castle Attack | 8419 | 441 | ·· | 640 | 1090 |
| Total | 14369 | 641 | 1134 | 702 | 2079 |
On the 10th June Lord Wellington determined on raising the siege.
On the night of the 30th May the trenches were opened on both attacks, and great progress was made. The whole of the guns for the batteries were also set in movement, with ammunition at the rate of 300 rounds per gun.
Captain Rainsford’s company (now No. 7 Battery, 17th Brigade) having arrived from Lisbon, the Artillerymen were divided as follows:—
Attack Against the Castle.
Major Dickson commanding.
| Officers’ Names. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Royal Artillery | 55 | officers and men. | Captain Rainsford. |
| 1st Reg. Portuguese Artillery | 100 | officers and men. | Captain Latham. |
| 2nd Reg. Portuguese Artillery | 100 | officers and men. | Lieut. Saunders. |
| 3rd Reg. Portuguese Artillery | 50 | officers and men. | Lieut. Willis. |
| Total | 305 | ||
| Attack Against San Cristoval. | |||
| Captain Cleeves, (K.G.A.), commanding under Major Dickson. | |||
| Royal Artillery | 55 | officers and men. | Lieut. Hawker. |
| 3rd Reg. Portuguese Artillery | 250 | officers and men. | Lieut. Connel. |
| Total | 305 | ||
Lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, dated 13 June, 1811.
This gave but a very small relief; and Lord Wellington remarked, after the raising of the siege, that some of the Royal Artillery were indefatigable, and had never quitted their batteries.
Captain Latham was the 2nd Captain of Captain Hawker’s Field Brigade, and was lent for the service of the siege train. To D.-A.-G. dated 13 June, 1811. Of him Major Dickson afterwards said: “I assure you the assistance I derived from his professional knowledge and activity can never be forgotten by me.” Instances like this, and others hereafter to be mentioned, when even Horse Artillerymen served in the trenches, are arguments against the necessity of any complete divorce between the Field and Garrison branches of the Artillery service. Of Captain Rainsford’s company—now 7 Battery, 17th Brigade—Major Ibid. Dickson wrote: “It was of wonderful assistance; it is an uncommon fine one.”
To D.-A.-G. 20 June, 1811.
On the 1st June the batteries on both sides were in a very forward state, and two on the north side received their armament. On the south side several guns were brought into the parallel, ready for mounting on the following night, when the batteries should be prepared for them. By half-past 8 o’clock on the morning of the 3rd everything was ready; and on the south side a fire was commenced with fourteen guns against the point which it was intended to breach. The fire was most vigorous, and, although well replied to, gave considerable hopes of success. Two of the guns became disabled from the effects of their own fire,—a casualty whose recurrence during the siege was most monotonous. On the north side No. 1 Battery was partly employed to breach San Cristoval, and partly to enfilade the Castle front; No. 2 to breach San Cristoval; No. 3 against the defences of the same fort; and No. 4 to keep in check the tête de pont and enfilade the bridge. The breach in San Cristoval was begun in the shoulder to the right of the work, where it formed a dead angle; and in firing at this from a battery on the north side, a gun, on the very first night, became disabled by muzzle-drooping. These incidents will prepare the reader for the verdict of condemnation which was unanimously passed on the armament of the Allied siege trains in the earlier Peninsular sieges.
The howitzers were used as mortars, by taking the wheels off the carriages and inventing means of elevating them. Major Dickson had carefully tested what was the extreme elevation at which they could be used with safety, and found the maximum was an angle of 30°. Righteous, therefore, was his indignation when he learnt that, in spite of his own and Captain Cleeves’ positive orders, an officer on duty on the north side, whom he tersely stigmatised as “a brute of a Portuguese Captain,” had thought proper to elevate them to 40° or 42°, with a charge of 2½ lbs. to 3 lbs., the result being that both carriages were rendered entirely unserviceable, without any means of replacing them.
On the 4th June, the fire from the south side continued, but with less effect, the shot entering the wall without bringing down any part of it worthy of mention. On this day another gun was disabled at the vent by the effect of its own fire; and one was rendered unserviceable by that of the enemy. On the 4th very considerable progress was made in the breach at San Cristoval. During the night a new battery was opened in the south attack, and the guns from No. 1 Battery removed to it.
The 5th of June was a very disheartening day. The progress in the breach of the south attack was little more hopeful than on the 4th; and before afternoon the batteries were reduced—principally by their own fire—to nine serviceable guns. Major Dickson, therefore, proceeded to Lord Wellington, and obtained his permission to bring six iron 24-pounders from Elvas to the south attack. The breach in San Cristoval made by the north attack made apparent progress, but was not yet deemed practicable. Here, also, one or two of the guns showed symptoms of giving way.
On the 6th June, Lieutenant Hawker of the Royal Artillery was killed in the north attack:—a gallant young officer, of whom Major Dickson wrote, “He has never been out of No. 1 Battery from the commencement of the fire.” In the south attack, a steady fire was kept up from the nine serviceable guns during this day, and more progress was made in breaching the wall, than had been effected during the two preceding days. Before night, the breach was practicable for a single person. In the evening, the breach at San Cristoval was also considered practicable for an assault, which accordingly was ordered, but repulsed. The enemy had previously cleared the breach, leaving a certain portion of the wall standing perpendicular: and their fire was so warm that the troops could not face it at the breach for any time. Attempts were made to escalade at one or two other points, but the ladders were too short; so the party had to retire with a loss of 130 men.
On the 7th June, another battery of the south attack, No. 3, was completed; and the iron guns, having arrived from Elvas, were mounted during the night. The breach on this side was a little improved, but the resistance of the wall was far in excess of Major Dickson’s expectations.
On the 8th June, under a fire from 16 24-pounders in the south attack, the breach on that side seemed large enough to admit several persons abreast. On the north side, the fire continued, but the breach was not yet deemed again practicable. During the night of the 8th, grape-shot was fired from the south side, but the Portuguese grape was extremely bad, and the enemy was successful in clearing away all the rubbish from the breach, in spite of the fire, leaving to view a considerable height of wall yet uninjured. A quantity of 3-pounder shot was therefore brought up from Elvas, which, when tied up in bags containing eight or ten each, formed a better description of grape. Various guns in both attacks showed symptoms of distress during this day.
On the 9th June, there were only twelve or thirteen guns left serviceable on the south side after the day’s firing, but the breach was decidedly larger, and grape was fired all night to prevent the enemy working at it. On the north side, there were only eight or nine guns left undisabled in in the evening, but the breach at San Cristoval was pronounced practicable; and another attempt was made, at 9 o’clock, to carry it by assault. It was, however, again repulsed; for it was found that, notwithstanding the appearance of the breach, there was a perpendicular wall about 6 or 7 feet high still standing, which had been concealed from view by the counterscarp: and the enemy had taken every precaution to keep it clear of the débris of the breach. The gallantry of the assailants was as great, as the defence Major Dickson to D.-A.-G. 26 June, 1811. of the French was resolute. The ladders were thrown down,—grenades thrown among the stormers in great abundance, and masses of stone hurled down upon them. With the loss of 150 men, the assailants were obliged to retire.
On the following morning it was found that the grape-shot from the south attack had been successful in preventing the enemy from working at the breach, and preparations for resuming the battering had been ordered, when Major Dickson received a summons from Lord Wellington. He met him Dickson’s MSS. with Colonel Fletcher on the north side: and they were informed that he had decided on raising the siege. He mentioned his reasons; but he particularly pointed out the impossibility of getting possession of San Cristoval without advancing to the crest of the glacis;—the still difficult situation of the main breach on the south side;—the imprudence of attempting it, even when practicable, without first having Cristoval;—the strong entrenchments which the enemy had had time to construct within the breach;—and finally the approach of the enemy in such force that prudence would not allow him to be caught by them in the midst of a siege. Major Dickson to D.-A.-G.c Elvas, 13 June, 1811. Soult was at this time in force at Llerena, and Drouet’s corps was reported as having joined him; while the Northern French army under Marmont was also in motion.
Major Dickson immediately set to work, and by the evening of the 12th the whole of the guns, stores, and ammunition were either in Elvas again, or at such a distance as to be in perfect safety in all circumstances.
“Thus,” wrote Major Dickson to General Macleod, “ended this siege, in which everything that artillery could do was done, considering our miserable means; and this Lord Wellington was good enough to express, both to Colonel Framingham and myself. The brass guns could not stand the necessary fire, and their destruction, I am of opinion, was considerably occasioned by the lowness of the shot, which generally had so much windage that you could put your fingers in between the shot and the bore.... On the whole I have to observe that our batteries were too far off.... The whole principle of the attack was founded on the supposed weakness of the Castle wall, which it was thought could be beat down at a distance. On discovering the difficulty of this, the batteries were thrown forward as far as they could, at the same time avoiding the fire of the modern fronts, nor could they be advanced farther until Cristoval was in our hands. Indeed, if that had been carried, I think we should have got the place.... Lord Wellington was good enough to say that everything that could be done on our parts, had been done.”
The casualties among the Artillery during the siege were as follows:—
Officers, Royal Artillery Lieut. E. Hawker, killed. Lieut. W. Saunders, wounded. Officers, Portuguese Artillery Captain Barreiros, wounded. Lieut. Lopez, wounded dangerously.
Killed. Wounded. N.-C. officers and men, Royal Artillery 0 4 N.-C. officers and men, Portuguese Artillery 6 28 Total 6 32 The total loss of the Allies amounted to 118 killed, and 367 wounded and taken prisoners.
| Officers, Royal Artillery | Lieut. E. Hawker, killed. |
| Lieut. W. Saunders, wounded. | |
| Officers, Portuguese Artillery | Captain Barreiros, wounded. |
| Lieut. Lopez, wounded dangerously. |
| Killed. | Wounded. | |
|---|---|---|
| N.-C. officers and men, Royal Artillery | 0 | 4 |
| N.-C. officers and men, Portuguese Artillery | 6 | 28 |
| Total | 6 | 32 |
In his despatch to Lord Liverpool, announcing the raising of the siege, in addition to expressing his great satisfaction with the Corps, Lord Wellington said that the British service had derived great advantage in the different operations against Badajoz from Major Dickson’s zeal, activity, and intelligence.
The subsequent sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz, which took place in 1812, were in marked contrast to those described in this chapter; and the rapidity with which the breaches were then made was mainly due to the employment of iron ordnance from England, instead of the miserable brass Portuguese guns which were employed in the sieges of To Lord Liverpool, 13 June, 1811. 1811.[27] Of these guns, Lord Wellington truly said that they were very ancient and incomplete, and that their fire was very uncertain. It had at first been intended to fire at the rate of 120 rounds a gun per diem: but that was soon found to be impossible with the wretched brass pieces at the disposal of Major Dickson. It was therefore reduced to 80 rounds; but even with this limited expenditure the guns were repeatedly disabled by the effect of their own fire.
The Peninsular sieges cannot be thoroughly understood without two points being borne in mind. First, the besieged cities belonged to, and were inhabited by, the allies of England, and the war was only with the garrison. The Artillery fire, therefore, was confined to breaching, and dismounting the ordnance in battery,—not used for bombardment. Secondly, the sieges were mere episodes in Wellington’s general operations, not goals to which these operations tended. Hence, in 1811, the raising of sieges, without hesitation, after but a brief continuance; and hence, also, in 1812, the rapidity and loss of life with which he stormed cities, rather than complicate his plans by indulging in siege operations of a longer and, perhaps, more regular description.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.
The enemy approaching in force, after the raising of the second siege of Badajoz, the Allies crossed the river on the 17th June, 1811, and on the 19th encamped between Elvas and Campo Maior. Elvas had been put in a state of siege, and a position had been marked out behind Campo Maior, in case the French should show any inclination to attack. The bold front which Lord Wellington here showed deceived the two French Marshals, Marmont and Soult, who had now united their armies, and entered Badajoz in triumph, Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 26 June, 1811. congratulating its gallant governor, Philippon. They concluded that he must have received great reinforcements; and although they crossed the Guadiana with a great body of cavalry supported with infantry, and one or two small affairs with the outposts took place,—they declined a general engagement. A want of entente cordiale between Marmont and Soult led soon to a separation,—the latter moving towards Seville, whither Wellington despatched Blake’s Spanish troops,—and the former marching away by the valley of the Cust. Tagus towards Almaraz. Thus relieved of their presence, Lord Wellington took up his quarters at Pontalegre, and allowed his army to have some repose after its recent exertions.
This seems a favourable moment for placing before the reader a tabular return (see next page) which shows the gradual increase in the Artillery element of Lord Wellington’s army in the Peninsula. Prepared from the monthly returns, it shows the numbers at different periods, distinguishing between the Royal and Foreign Artilleries. The point which will doubtless strike the reader most is the steady increase in the force of Horse Artillery and Artillery drivers, which took place; marking the growing recognition of that which had hitherto been overlooked to a great extent,—the value of mobility in Field Artillery.
| A. | March. | B. | May. | C. | January. |
| D. | April. | E. | May. | F. | July. |
| G. | December. | H. | January. | I. | April. |
Return of the Royal British and German Artillery attached to the Army under the Command of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula and France at the undermentioned periods.
| 1811. | 1812. | 1813. | 1814. | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G. | H. | I. | |
| 1. General, Field, and Staff Officers, not included on Company Rolls | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 8 |
| 2. Royal Horse Artillery | 495 | 499 | 699 | 728 | 926 | 988 | 1,016 | 1,007 | 1,021 |
| 3. Royal Foot Artillery | 884 | 1,111 | 996 | 1,327 | 1,876 | 1,862 | 1,950 | 1,985 | 1,966 |
| 4. Royal Artillery Drivers | 777 | 858 | 1,040 | 1,159 | 2,154 | 2,150 | 2,683 | 2,719 | 2,734 |
| 5. Ordnance Medical Staff | 9 | 10 | 18 | 18 | 27 | 26 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
| 6. Field Train or Commissariat Department of the Ordnance | 84 | 86 | 129 | 121 | 130 | 128 | 153 | 154 | 148 |
| General Total of Royal British Artillery | 2,257 | 2,572 | 2,891 | 3,363 | 5,124 | 5,165 | 5,840 | 5,904 | 5,897 |
| King’s German Artillery | 421 | 412 | 449 | 434 | 450 | 446 | 430 | 439 | 412 |
N.B.—The Field Train Department attached to the Engineers is not included, as it did not appear in the Monthly Returns of the Artillery.
General Howorth vacated the command of the Artillery in the Peninsula in July 1811, being obliged to return to England on account of ill-health,—and was shortly afterwards succeeded by General Borthwick. This officer was wounded at Ciudad Rodrigo, and returned to England,—a coolness having sprung up between him and Lord Wellington, which recurred with one of his successors, and continued until the command of the Artillery devolved upon his favourite, then Colonel Dickson, a few months after the siege of Burgos.
Major Dickson D.-A.-G. dated Castel Branco, 23 Jul. 1811.
On the 19th July, 1811, Lord Wellington sent for Colonel Fletcher, Colonel Framingham, and Major Dickson, and informed them that it was his intention to attempt the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and after a little conversation as to the means of transport, &c., he desired Major Dickson to proceed to Oporto, to superintend the conveyance of the English battering train up the Douro to Lamego, and thence by land to Francoso, whence it would also be conveyed by land to its final destination. This battering train had arrived in Lisbon in the first instance, and had been carried secretly to Oporto, with a view to the proposed siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, its ostensible destination being Cadiz.[28] Two new companies of Artillery which had arrived in Lisbon were now ordered to Oporto to assist Major Dickson. In all these arrangements Lord Wellington underrated the strength of the French army in the north of the Peninsula.
To D.-A.-G. dated Oporto, 27 Aug. 1811.
Major Dickson reached Almeida, on his way to Oporto, on the 28th July, and arrived at the latter place on the 3rd August, where he found Captain Bredin’s and Captain Glubb’s companies—now H Battery, 1st Brigade, and 5 Battery 5th Brigade—waiting his orders. Before the 13th the whole of the train had been embarked in boats, about 160 in number, and despatched to Lamego; but the work and the climate proved too much for Major Dickson, and before he could follow the train he was struck down with a violent fever, accompanied by delirium. When first attacked, he requested Lord Wellington to send some one to take up his duties, and, accordingly, his friend Captain May was sent, and superintended the movement of the train until the 5th September, when the gallant Dickson, only half recovered, and travelling in a litter, arrived at Lamego. Here he found that all the guns and stores had marched for Villa da Ponte, and that Captain May was on the point of following Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Villa da Ponte, 13 Sept. 1811. them. On the 8th Major Dickson left Lamego, and reached Villa da Ponte on the 10th, where he fell an immediate victim to a relapse of fever, which lasted acutely several days. Captain Bredin’s company had, in the meantime, been recalled to the head-quarters of the army, to take over the brigade of guns from Captain Thompson’s, which was almost hors de combat from sickness.[29] The troops left with the battering train were therefore reduced to Captain Glubb’s company of Royal Artillery, about 250 Portuguese Artillery, and from 1200 to 1400 Portuguese Militia, intended to assist on the march. Captain Holcombe’s company of Royal Artillery was hourly expected. That company is now No. 4 Battery 2nd Brigade.
Ibid. 20 Sept. 1811.
On the march, the battering train had been arranged by Captain May as follows. It was divided, as far as the ordnance was concerned, into five divisions; each gun marched with 350 rounds, and each howitzer and mortar with 160 rounds. An officer was placed in charge of each division, and each division marched separately. The remaining stores and ammunition requisite to furnish a total of 800 rounds per gun, and 400 for each howitzer and mortar, were under the charge of the Commissary and other officers, and marched in rear.
While at Villa da Ponte, awaiting orders from Lord Wellington for a further advance, Major Dickson’s correspondence was of a nature which reveals to the reader more of the personal element than his letters, as a rule, allow to become visible. The alternate hoping and despairing as to orders for advance,—the ennui produced by enforced idleness,—the impetuous way in which he would fling himself into professional discussions with General Macleod, merely to occupy his leisure,—the spasmodic fits of zeal in improving the arrangement of the immense train,—all unite to present to the reader a very vivid picture of him whose hand, so long still, penned these faded letters. His recurring attacks of fever—followed by apologies like the following: “The fact is, when I am well I forget all, take violent exercise at all times and seasons, and knock myself up; but I am determined to be more careful in future”—followed by an inevitable relapse, in proof of the failure of his good resolutions,—combine to bring before the reader a very lovable picture of a very earnest man. It is by such study alone that the Artilleryman can realise the characters of the great among his predecessors in the Corps, and by such links that he can bind them to himself with that almost family tie, of which the Regimental union is but an expansion.
To D.-A.-G. dated 27 Sept. 1811.
The extent of the battering train under Major Dickson’s command was as follows:—34 24-pounders, 4 18-pounders, 16 iron 5½-inch howitzers, 2 8-inch howitzers, and 8 10-inch mortars; and much of his leisure at Villa da Ponte was devoted to improving and renewing the somewhat shattered Ibid. 22 Nov, 1811. carriages of this ordnance. On the 16th November he received an order from Lord Wellington to commence moving the battering train to Almeida; and by the 21st the last Ibid. 4 Dec. 1811. division, spare carriages, &c., had left. The march was most successful. No fewer than 1100 bullocks were employed for the divisions alone, apart from the reserve of stores; and in no case did the march occupy more than six days, although the country was very mountainous; nor did a single accident occur. The bringing up the reserve of ammunition and stores was delayed by want of means of conveyance; and pending its arrival, Lord Wellington requested Major Dickson to superintend the unspiking of the ordnance in Almeida, and the placing the batteries in a state of defence. In this occupation the reader is requested to leave him while he returns to the movements of Lord Wellington, which were now assuming an active form.
The English General had moved northward, with the view of besieging Ciudad Rodrigo; and a summary of his movements may be given from some admirable MS. letters, written by Captain May on his return to the head-quarters of the army. On the 23rd September the enemy’s advanced guard was near Ciudad Rodrigo. The French army was under Marmont and Dorsenne, and numbered 60,000 men, including 6000 cavalry. On the 24th, the whole of this cavalry had crossed the Agueda, about 10,000 infantry remaining on the other side. On the 25th the enemy advanced, and Wellington disputed the ground, retiring gradually to the position at Fuente de Guinaldo. In this advance the enemy’s cavalry and artillery were principally engaged; and on the side of the Allies, the Cavalry, Portuguese Artillery, and Cole’s and Picton’s divisions of Infantry. During this forward movement the enemy, by a charge of cavalry, gained possession of five Portuguese guns, which, however, were speedily recaptured by the 5th Regiment of Foot, in a most gallant and intrepid manner. On the 26th, the Allies remained all day in the position of Guinaldo, which extended from the right and front of the town for four miles towards Ituero, the woods being occupied by two Infantry brigades from the right down to the Agueda. Thus posted, they witnessed the arrival of the whole French army, the last of which did not arrive until sunset. On satisfying himself as to their numbers, and bearing in mind the great extent of country to be watched, Lord Wellington determined to retire in the evening to a more favourable position for concentration and battle. The army, therefore, began its march to the rear at 10 P.M., and next day, the 27th, everything was in the neighbourhood of the new position, which occupied a length of about six miles. The left was near Reudon, on the Coa, and the right in the rear of Çouta, resting on the mountains. When daylight revealed to the enemy the masterly retreat which had taken place, some cavalry and infantry were pressed forward, and the Allied piquets were driven in; but Wellington, suddenly assuming the offensive, drove them back from Alfaites to Aldea da Ponte, his troops occupying the latter village. After sunset, however, the enemy advanced in such force, in front and also on the flanks of the village, that the officer commanding there wisely withdrew his troops to Alfaites. This final advance of the French was made to cover a retreat which had now been determined on. On the morning of the 28th nothing could be seen of them; and on the 29th it was learnt that they were moving back on Ciudad Rodrigo. After they had thrown provisions into that city, they continued to retire, and went into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. The British army did the same between the Coa and the Agueda, Lord Wellington, with his head-quarters at Freneda, keeping watch on the city which he had determined to take.
The only brilliant affair which took place between this time and the successful sieges, which will now have to be mentioned, was the surprise of Girard’s division by General Hill, at Arroyo de Molinos. As, however, the Artillery with Hill’s force was Portuguese,—Major Hawker’s 9-pounder brigade of Royal Artillery having been unable to get up on account of the state of the roads,—its further notice in this work will be unnecessary.
Taking advantage of the French troops being scattered in their cantonments, and having ascertained that large reinforcements from Marmont’s army had been detached to Valencia, Lord Wellington resolved on a short, sharp siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the end of December he sent for Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 1 Jan. 1812. Major Dickson, and directed him to move forward the battering train and stores from Almeida, Galegos being made the intermediate depôt. To the latter place the army head-quarters were moved on the 7th July.
The main interest to the military reader in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, in 1812, attaches to the gallantry of the Infantry. The monotonous, albeit shortlived, work in the batteries is drowned in the recollection of the scenes of valour at the final assault. In these pages, therefore, the Artillery share in the sieges will assume, of necessity, the form of a few dry statistics.
The Artillery present at the siege included 185 of the Royal Artillery and 370 of the Portuguese. The names of the officers of the Royal Artillery who were present were General Borthwick, Major Dickson, Captains Holcombe, Thompson, Power, Dundas, and Dyneley; Lieutenants Bourchier, Love, Johnstone, Ingilby, Smith, and Grimes; and Captain May, Brigade-Major.
The batteries opened in the afternoon of the 14th January, 1812, the guns having narrowly escaped being spiked in the morning of that day. On the night of the 19th, the breaches were pronounced practicable, and Wellington announced in orders, “Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening.” Except on the 16th and part of the 17th, the weather was clear and admirably suited for artillery practice, and the batteries were in action daily for an average of eight and a half hours.
The guns employed were as follows:—On January 14th, 20 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; on January 15th, 23 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; on January 16th and 17th, the same; on January 18th, 30 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; and on January 19, 30 24-pounders.[30]
The expenditure of ammunition during this short siege was as follows,—the total number of guns in battery having been 34 24-pounders, and 4 18-pounders:—
24-pr. guns: Round shot, 8950. Rounds expended per gun, 263.
18-pr. guns: Round shot, 565. Rounds expended per gun, 141.
The absence of mortars and howitzers from this siege was explained by the increased amount of transport required for shell, compared with shot, and by the fact that Lord Wellington had resolved on an assault the moment a breach was practicable, without any other siege operations. Shot were, therefore, all that was necessary, except for keeping the enemy from working at the breach.
To D.-A.-G. dated 29 Jan. 1812.
The following extract from a letter written by Major Dickson after the siege, is interesting:—“Lord Wellington has certainly made a most brilliant coup, and, I am convinced, astonished the enemy by the rapidity of his operations. They intended to relieve the place and raise the siege about this day (29th January). We were certainly favoured by the most delightful weather—excessively cold, but perfectly dry. It was not even necessary to put the powder under the laboratory tents, which I was enabled to spare to keep the poor fellows from the pinching frost; for we were nearly without cover.... I am hard pressed for time, but I must say a word in favour of our fine fellows of the Corps. They were (Portuguese and all) at relief and relief, off and on; but nothing could exceed their zeal and activity, and their work speaks for itself. Never was better practice made. I had only 430 Artillerymen of both nations,—about 130 British, and the rest Portuguese. We had somewhere more than 50 Artillerymen killed and wounded, but no officer materially hurt. The latter days, to make it up, I had some help from our own field Artillery:—part of Lawson’s company was one day in the trenches, and part of Sympher’s German company another.”
MS. Return dated 26 Jan. 1812.
The actual number of killed and wounded between the 14th and 19th January,—while the siege lasted,—was as follows (excluding Portuguese Artillery):—[31]
Captains Dyneley and Power, wounded.
Captain Glubb’s company, now 5 Battery, 5th Brigade; 2 gunners died of their wounds; 2 gunners wounded slightly.
Captain Holcombe’s company, now 4 Battery, 2nd Brigade; 1 gunner killed; 17 non-commissioned officers and men wounded.
Captain Lawson’s company, now H Battery, 8th Brigade; 1 gunner died of his wounds; 2 gunners wounded.
Captain Sympher’s company (K.G.A.); 1 gunner killed; 3 gunners wounded.
The ammunition expended was:—8950 rounds from 24-pounders, and 565 from 18-pounders.
To Lord Liverpool, dated 20 Jan. 1812.
In Lord Wellington’s despatch, announcing the successful termination of the siege, he—after extolling Major Dickson’s conduct of the Artillery operations—proceeded to say: “The rapid execution produced by the well-directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of the merits of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and of the Portuguese Artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly mention Brigade-Major May, and Captains Holcombe, Power, Dyneley, and Dundas, of the Royal Artillery.”
General Borthwick’s name is not mentioned, either in the despatch or among the wounded; but he appears in Kane’s list—generally most accurate in its details—as having been in command of the Artillery, and also as having been wounded, during the siege.
Ciudad Rodrigo had hardly fallen, before Lord Wellington resolved to attempt a third siege of Badajoz,—now that he had suitable ordnance. He ordered Major Dickson to proceed on the 30th January to Setubal, calling at Elvas to make some necessary arrangements. From Setubal he was directed to send 16 24-pounders of a new battering train, which had arrived, to Elvas,—as well as 20 guns of the same calibre, which were to be furnished from the navy. The whole of these guns were to travel on block carriages. The difficulty of sending the heavy guns of the train at Almeida to Elvas led to this arrangement: but it was decided to send the 24-pounder howitzers, as being much lighter, and also a number of 24-pounder carriages, which were stored at Almeida. By this means it was hoped to have speedily equipped at Elvas a new battering train of 36 iron 24-pounder guns, and 16 24-pounder howitzers,—an armament very different from the brass Portuguese guns which had assailed the stronghold of Philippon twice before.
So incessant was the work which now devolved on Major Dickson that he had no time for correspondence, and there is a great blank, where the student had hoped to find much that was interesting. From other sources, therefore, the Artillery details of a siege, which can never be forgotten, must be procured. As at Ciudad Rodrigo, the Infantry share in the operations dwarfs all other;—but it dwarfs it to even a greater extent. The story of the storming of Badajoz is one which will thrill the heart of every Briton for all time; which will bind together by sacred memories the regiments which were so nobly represented on that day; and which will impress on all, who study it, the truth of Napier’s words, that “a British army bears with it an awful power.” The scene on the night of the 6th April, 1812, was one before which the energy, zeal, and proficiency of the Artillery on the preceding days pale away into nothingness; and the chronicling of their humble statistics seems almost an impertinence. For, the night of the 6th Napier. was, indeed, one in which “many died, and there was much glory;” it was one in which death took many and hideous forms,—“the slain dying not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; some perishing by steel, some by shot, some by water, some crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by fiery explosions;” and yet it was a night in which the most cruel death was fair to look on,—because hallowed by marvellous courage and rare devotion.
Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.
The breaches, which were rendered famous by this combat “so fiercely fought, so terribly won,” were virtually made between the 30th March and the 6th April. On the 30th March 8 18-pounders were in action for purely breaching purposes; on the following day, this number was increased, by 12 24-pounders, and 6 18-pounders, to 26 guns; and these remained in action, for 13 hours a day, until the storming of the place. Of round shot, alone, no fewer than 18,832 24-pr., and 13,029 18-pr., were expended during the short siege; besides 1163 24-pounder grape shot, and 496 of the same from the 18-pounders. Of the round shot, 23,896 were employed in forming the three breaches. Besides the breaching guns, there were 10 24-pounder and 18-pounder guns, and 16 5½-inch howitzers, employed for enfilading and other fire. From the last mentioned, 507 common shell and 1319 spherical case were fired during the siege.
Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.
The three breaches were rendered practicable from a distance of between 600 and 700 yards; and the curtain breach was made in one day, the day of the assault. To the rapidity of the making of this breach was much of the success in the final storming due; because, had several days been required, measures would have been adopted by the defenders during the intervening nights to render it wholly impracticable. In making this curtain breach, 14 guns were employed, with an expenditure of 3514 rounds.
Colonel Framingham commanded the Allied Artillery during the siege, but Major Dickson virtually directed the operations. From a rough MS. diary in the Record Office, in the handwriting of the latter officer, it would appear that the strength of the Artillery was as follows:—
| N.-C. officers and men. | |
|---|---|
| Captain Holcombe’s company | 110 |
| Captain Gardiner’s ditto[32] | 110 |
| Captain Glubb’s (commanded by Captain Power) company | 78 |
| Captain Rettberg’s (King’s German Artillery) company | 30 |
There were also 377 of the 3rd Regiment, and 249 of the 2nd Regiment, of Portuguese Artillery.
To Lord Liverpool, 7 April, 1812.
In his despatch, after the storming of the city, Lord Wellington said: “Major Dickson conducted the details of the Artillery service during this siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Framingham, who, since the absence of Major-General Borthwick, has commanded the Artillery with this army. I cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the British and Portuguese Artillery during this siege, particularly Lieut.-Colonel Robe, who opened the breaching batteries, Majors May and Holcombe, Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Royal Artillery; Captain de Rettberg, of the King’s German Artillery; and Major Tulloh, of the Portuguese. Adverting to the extent of the details of the Ordnance Department during this siege, to the difficulty of weather, &c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most particularly to your Lordship.” Besides the officers named in the despatch, there were present in the batteries Captains Power, Latham, Dundas, and Dansey; and Lieutenants Weston, Connel, Grimes, and Love.
The loss of the Royal Artillery during the siege was as follows:—
Killed: Captain Latham, Lieutenant Connel, and 23 non-commissioned officers and men.
Wounded: Captain Dundas, Lieutenants Grimes and Love, and 48 non-commissioned officers and men.[33]
Major Tulloh, an officer of the Royal Artillery attached to the Portuguese, was also wounded.
The troops of Horse Artillery commanded by Majors Bull and Ross were present at the investment and siege of Badajoz; and although not included in the detail made Major Ross to Sir H. Dalrymple, 8 April, 1812. out by Major Dickson for duty in the trenches, it is evident that they must have taken part in the operations, for Major Ross was severely wounded by a grape-shot. But his name does not appear in Lord Wellington’s lists.
The losses in the other arms of the service employed in the siege were very great. No fewer than 5000 officers and men fell during the siege, and of that number 3500 fell on the night of the 6th April. Sixty officers and upwards of seven hundred men were slain on the spot.
Napier.
No wonder that, “when the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.”
The recollections of such a night are among the greatest treasures which an army can cherish. Even the reaction after success, the irregularities and licence displayed by the troops in the captured city, while certainly dimming, could not permanently injure the glory of the marvellous assault. Such traditions are a weapon for discipline, which only a soldier can estimate. Inspired by them, men will feed the lamp of their present lives with the oil of past glory, and strain every nerve to make the flame burn pure and clear.
Perhaps one of the highest motives, which can influence a soldier, is the desire to be worthy of his predecessors, and true to the reputation which they have earned for their corps. It carries him at once out of himself, and introduces an unselfish element even into his own ambition and aims. Only those who have served long in a regiment which they love can understand the fond jealousy for its honour, which will inspire its members. Its history never dies; the deeds of the years that are gone are the living possession of all; the valour which may have been exhibited in former days lives again in the breasts of those, who hunger for an opportunity of similar display; and the men who, by their courage and skill, may have earned honour for their corps, still haunt in no shadowy form the dreams of the young aspirant, and the memories of the old.
Note.—In alluding to the services of the two scientific corps at this siege of Badajoz, Sir J. Jones wrote that “as an engineer and artillery operation, it succeeded to the utmost letter.”
CHAPTER XIX.
Salamanca and Burgos.
After the fall of Badajoz, Lord Wellington decided on marching northward, and carrying the war into Spain. In the meantime, however, he directed General Hill to storm the forts at Almaraz, a great French depôt,—and so weaken the chance of union between the armies of the North and To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 6 May, 1812. South. Colonel Dickson[34] was detailed as commanding officer of the Artillery for this service, which consisted of a brigade of 24-pounder howitzers, horsed by the mules of one of the Portuguese Field Brigades, and manned by Captain Glubb’s company of the Royal Artillery, and a Portuguese company. The ammunition, which was carried in Spanish mule carts, comprised 600 24-pounder round shot, 300 5½-inch common shells, 240 5½-inch spherical, and 60 General Sir R. Hill to Lord Wellington, dated 21 May, 1812. 5½-inch common,—case shot. Six pontoons accompanied the guns on this expedition, which was perfectly successful; and in which General Hill was pleased to say that he found the exertions of Colonel Dickson, and his officers and men, to be unwearied.
Before turning to Lord Wellington’s movements in the north, which culminated in the battle of Salamanca, and the temporary occupation of Madrid, a statement of the strength of the Artillery force of England during this eventful year may possibly be found interesting. Two dates have been chosen, and it will be seen that the numbers—already large in the beginning of the year—continued to increase; more especially in the item of drivers for the brigades in the Peninsula. These tables give one an idea of the strain on the resources of England MS. ‘Wear and Tear Return’ of the Regiment for 1811. which was caused by the Peninsular War. No fewer than 1811 recruits joined the Artillery alone, and over 1200 became non-effective from various causes during the same period.
Return of the Artillery Forces of England on the 25th June, 1812, distinguishing the Royal Artillery from the Royal Horse Artillery, and specifying the Numbers serving at home and abroad.
| A. | Officers. | B. | N.-C. Officers and Men. |
| C. | Officers. | D. | N.-C. Officers and Men. |
| E. | Officers. | F. | N.-C. Officers and Men. |
| At home. | Abroad. | Total. | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | |
| Royal Horse Artillery | 49 | 1,417 | 21 | 696 | 70 | 2,113 |
| Royal Artillery | 391 | 8,812 | 331 | 6,599 | 722 | 15,411 |
| R. A. Drivers | 63 | 3,521 | 24 | 1,950 | 87 | 5,471 |
| King’s German Artillery | 21 | 430 | 28 | 587 | 49 | 1,017 |
| Royal Foreign Artillery | 6 | 158 | 15 | 327 | 21 | 485 |
| General Total | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 949 | 24,497 |
| Return of the Artillery Forces of England on 25th Dec. 1812, &c. | ||||||
| Royal Horse Artillery | 51 | 1,452 | 19 | 733 | 70 | 2,185 |
| Royal Artillery | 405 | 8,723 | 333 | 6,817 | 738 | 15,540 |
| R. A. Drivers | 70 | 3,554 | 25 | 2,305 | 95 | 5,859 |
| King’s German Artillery | 21 | 392 | 27 | 638 | 48 | 1,030 |
| Royal Foreign Artillery | 7 | 123 | 15 | 348 | 22 | 471 |
| General Total | ·· | ·· | ·· | ·· | 973 | 25,085 |
The year 1812 was the most eventful in the Peninsular War. Already marked by the successful sieges described in the last chapter, it was to be distinguished by events, both in Spain and elsewhere, which were to have a great effect on subsequent hostilities. The English General—who opened the year with an unexpected attack on Ciudad Rodrigo—was destined, ere it should be much more than half over, to defeat his enemy in a pitched battle, drive him ignominiously before him, and enter the capital of Spain in triumph. These successes were to be further heightened by Soult raising the long-continued siege of Cadiz, in alarm at the intelligence of the French disasters in the north. Scarcely, however, were these advantages to be realised, ere the whole picture should change. The conqueror at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz should find himself fretting hopelessly before the castle of Burgos; and the General, who entered Madrid in triumph at the head of a victorious army, should lead that same army—in disorder and semi-mutiny—from Salamanca to Portugal, in retreat. The light and shade in the military operations of the Peninsula were also to be intensified by news from without, which should mightily affect the powers whose armies had faced one another for so many years. Another war should be thrust upon England’s preoccupied people;—her own children in America should seize the opportunity of gratifying a seemingly undying jealousy;—while, away in the colds of Russia, the greatest army that even Napoleon had ever commanded, should dissolve, as utterly as the snows amid which they died should melt before the strengthening sun.
It was, indeed, a year of great events: but of these the two with which this history has most interest were the battle of Salamanca and the siege of Burgos.
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Orbada, 30 June, 1812.
Colonel Dickson, with the brigade of howitzers which he had commanded at Almaraz, left Elvas on the 5th June to join Lord Wellington’s army in the north. Passing the Tagus at Alcantara, he joined the army at Salamanca by way of Zarza, Fuente Guinalda, and Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington was engaged at this time, with very limited means, in endeavouring to reduce the French Fort St. Vincent at Salamanca, a strongly entrenched work, having a large convent as its stronghold, and mounted with 36 pieces of ordnance. The Allied siege Artillery—previous to Colonel Dickson’s arrival—consisted of only 4 18-pounder guns, and a battery of long 6-pounders, under Lieut.-Colonel May.[35] That officer had performed his duty, with inadequate means, in a manner which called forth universal admiration; and Colonel Dickson when he arrived with his howitzers to assist him, expressed the great satisfaction it afforded him to be able now to repay, in a small degree, the many acts of kindness and co-operation, which he had enjoyed at Colonel May’s hands. Several points of the defence were breached by the fire of the Allied Artillery, but the whole work was so strong, and the defences so connected, that no assault could be attempted on the body of the work. An assault made on two outworks failed at first, but the gorge of one of them having been subsequently breached, they were carried with little or no loss a few hours before the surrender of the chief fort. The means at their disposal being very small, Colonels May and Dickson employed hot shot from the howitzers against the Convent, and succeeded, after firing 260 rounds, in setting fire to it, and destroying the whole of the enemy’s provisions. The surrender followed almost Despatch dated Fuente la Pena, 30 June, 1812. immediately. These operations had been mainly conducted by General Clinton, under the supervision of Lord Wellington; and, in his despatch, Lord Wellington reported that that officer had mentioned in strong terms Lieut.-Colonel May, who commanded the Royal Artillery under the direction of Colonel Framingham, and the officers and men under his command. The capture of the forts was delayed until the 27th June, it having been necessary to send to the rear for more ammunition, a step which caused a delay of six days. As soon as they fell, the French army commenced to retire, pursued by the Allies.
The loss of the Royal Artillery at the siege of these forts was as follows:—
Killed: Captain Eligé, and 9 rank and file.
Wounded: 1 lieutenant (Love), and 25 rank and file.
In the various movements of both armies between the 27th June and the 22nd July, 1812, on which day the great engagement known as the battle of Salamanca was fought, no use appears to have been made of the Artillery, with the exception of the Horse Artillery attached to the Cavalry division. In one affair, on the 18th July, at Castrejou, when the troops under Sir Stapleton Cotton were attacked, Lieutenant Belson, an officer in the Chestnut Troop, was wounded. For honest, conscientious hard work, and staunch performance of his duty, this officer was unsurpassed by any in the Regiment. On reference to his record of service, it appears that between the 3rd August, 1809, and 14th April, 1814, Lieutenant Belson was present in no fewer than thirty-three engagements. Beside such services, which received but little official recognition, those of men in more recent campaigns, who have received lavish, although merited, rewards, sink into insignificance.
It is impossible, without exceeding the limits of this work, to describe in detail the services of the Horse Artillery in the Peninsula,—the branch of the regiment to which young Belson belonged. The tables at the end of the preceding volume give some idea of what these services were, but are totally inadequate. The history of some of the individual troops would alone fill a volume; and the writing of such a history will doubtless be undertaken by some officer, who may find himself in the proud position of commanding one. Their active duties were incessant; even during the sieges, when they ostensibly formed part of the armies of investment or observation, they were ready to volunteer at all times to do additional duty in the trenches. At San Sebastian, as will be seen shortly, their services in the sieges, as siege artillerymen, were invaluable. The details of their services in the great battle now to be described are, unfortunately, not given in any of the documents in the Record Office. The fact of the presence of three troops, Ross’s, Bull’s, and Macdonald’s, is known, but little more. They were included in the general mention of the Corps, by Lord Wellington, after the battle, when he Despatch dated Flores de Avila, 24 July, 1812. said that “The Royal and German Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Framingham distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire;” but no further details are given. From another pen we learn that the whole of the Browne. troops and batteries were more or less engaged during the eventful day; but this general statement is neither satisfying, nor quite exact. In a letter from Colonel Dickson, written three days after the battle, he mentions that one of his heavy brigades was not ordered up, but was kept in the rear, ready to move in case of retreat. Possibly this brigade may have been manned by Portuguese, and the howitzer brigade, which he commanded during the battle, may have been manned by Captain Glubb’s company, which was under his orders;—in which case the author referred to would be right; but it is extremely rare in Colonel Dickson’s correspondence to find him alluding to any action, in which he commanded men of his own Corps, without particularizing some by name. On the other hand, it must be admitted that Napier describes Colonel Dickson’s howitzers as being manned by British and Portuguese brigaded together.
Lord Wellington’s letters show that he was by no means anxious for a general action at this time, if it could have been avoided; and this fact was apparent to those around him. When it was inevitable, he found that the enemy had a better position than himself; and but for the unexpected To D.-A.-G. dated 25 July, 1812. opening given by Marmont, in the over extension of his left, it would have been a very doubtful issue. “I really believe,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “that Lord Wellington fought against his inclination, and that if Marmont by his manœuvres had not pushed him so hard, he would quietly have fallen back, and relinquished Salamanca to the French. The audacity of the enemy was such, however, that British honour required it should be checked; and most severely Marshal Marmont has been punished for playing tricks with such a leader as Lord Wellington. When at last his Lordship determined to attack the attacker, his dispositions were splendid, and his operations rapid and overpowering. I can compare the close-fighting part of the battle more to one of those battles between the French and Spaniards, of which there have been so many, with always the same result, than to a contest between armies equally powerful. It was a rapid succession of overthrows, with some failures, but none that for a moment impeded the grand result.”
There were two hills on the left of the Allied line, called Dos Arapiles or Los Hermanitos, situated within easy artillery range of one another. The French had obtained possession of the loftier of these, and by this means had acquired an undoubted advantage. But this advantage was modified by the artillery fire on the left of Lord Wellington’s line, which was very effective. It was here that Colonel Dickson’s howitzer brigade was in action, taking part in an Artillery duel, which is mentioned in the correspondence of To Colonel Shrapnel, dated 9 May, 1813. several Artillery officers who took part in it. Major Macdonald, who commanded a troop of Horse Artillery on the occasion, said that the French artillerymen were driven from their guns on the hill opposite, and prevented from returning, by the destructive fire of Shrapnel shell from the Lieut. Sinclair, R.A., to Colonel Shrapnel, dated 22 Oct. 1814. English guns. In another letter, from an officer who was also present, the same statement is endorsed; and the reader learns that the brigades of Artillery chiefly engaged were Ross’s, Bull’s, and Macdonald’s troops, Colonel Dickson’s and Captain Douglas’s brigades, and Major Sympher’s of the King’s German Artillery. From the same sources it is ascertained that in the staunch final advance of the enemy against the village of the Arapiles, the fire of Shrapnel shell from the howitzers of the English Artillery produced great effect; and that, on another important occasion during the battle, a battery of the enemy’s guns was disabled by the same means. It will be in the recollection of the military student that Marmont’s extension and weakening of his left sprang from a desire to cut off the retreat of the Allies on Ciudad Rodrigo, while he should yet retain the strong position on his right, afforded by the possession of the hill already mentioned. The division Thomières was selected for the flank movement, and against it Pakenham’s division was despatched by Lord Wellington, accompanied by 12 guns. The service performed by these guns was most valuable. Being placed in a commanding position, they suddenly took the French troops in flank, and aided materially in ensuring a victory, which Lord Wellington’s quick judgment and military skill had placed in the way of his troops. Then followed the stern battle all along the line, which resulted in the “beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes;” the French seeing General after General fall, and fighting at times in bewilderment, for want of orders;—the English fighting with all the courage of their race, and all the confidence which a General like Wellington inspired,—who seemed to be always at the right place at the right time:—then the French falling back from their first position only to make a new effort; and then the utter rout and confusion, redeemed but by the coolness and skill of the brave Foy, who with his rear-guard strove to cover the headlong flight of the others.
The strength of the Allied army at Salamanca was 46,000, that of the French 42,000; but the superiority in point of numbers on the side of the Allies was caused by the presence of some utterly useless Spanish troops. The French had 74 guns on the field, the Allies only 60. These, according to Napier, were as follows:-
| Royal Horse Artillery. Three troops | 18 | guns. | |
| Royal Foot Artillery. Two 9-pounder brigades | 12 | ” | |
| Royal Foot Artillery. Two 12-pounder brigades | 12 | ” | |
| King’s German Artillery. One 9-pounder brigades | 6 | ” | |
| Portuguese and British brigaded together | 6 | 24-pr. | howitzers. |
| One Spanish battery | 6 | guns. | |
| Total | 60 | pieces. |
There would certainly appear to be an error in this statement. In none of Colonel Dickson’s manuscripts can it be traced that there were more than five 24-pounder howitzers with his brigades; it would therefore seem that the strength of the Allied Artillery at Salamanca was even more disproportionate than that given, and that Lord Wellington had only 59 guns against Marmont’s 74.
The losses on both sides at Salamanca were very heavy. The Allies lost 1 General, 24 officers, and 686 men killed; and 5 Generals, 182 officers, and 4270 men wounded. The loss of the French has never been exactly stated. They lost 7000 prisoners alone, besides 11 guns and other Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’ trophies. An approximation to their real loss has been obtained by taking General Clausel’s statement of the army on the 18th of the following month. He had succeeded Marshal Marmont in the command, on the latter being wounded; and on the 18th August he reported that the army, which had been 42,000 strong on the 22nd July, had fallen to 21,800, with 50 instead of 74 guns. Much of the loss may have occurred during the pursuit after the battle, but the whole was virtually attributable to the contest of the 22nd.
Important as the results of the victory were, they would have been more so, had not the retreat of the French across the Tormes been facilitated by a blunder of the Spanish General, Espana, who left the bridge of Alba open to them. This enabled Clausel to get as far as Peneranda with far less punishment than an army so beaten as his was should have received from his pursuers.[36] Wellington followed him to Valladolid, but failed to overtake him; so, while Clausel continued his flight to Burgos, Wellington, after a pause of some days, turned towards Madrid, to free the capital from the presence of Joseph Buonaparte and his army.[37] He entered it in state on the 12th August, Joseph having quitted it without waiting for the Allies; and he remained there until the 1st September, receiving from the Spaniards a perpetual ovation, and learning from England how valuable his services were deemed, by their further recognition in the form of a Marquisate.
Affairs in the Peninsula forbade longer repose, nor was Wellington the man to risk his army finding a Capua in Madrid. Soult, alarmed at the news from the north, raised the siege of Cadiz, and let Seville fall into the hands of the Allies, while he moved northward himself. An expedition from Sicily landed in the east of Spain, to co-operate with Lord Wellington, of which it must suffice here to say that the Royal Artillery accompanying it was commanded by Captain—then Brevet Lieut.-Colonel—Holcombe, the same officer whose company had been at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. And, lastly, the French General, Clausel, had reorganized his army, and was taking the offensive against the Allied troops left in the north. Of the operations of Wellington to check this General, and to defeat him again before Soult’s army could join him from the south, it is proposed to select one, as being a specially Artillery subject—the siege of the Castle of Burgos.
Dickson’s MSS.
After the fall of the forts at Salamanca, the heavy Artillery employed there continued to be attached to the reserve Artillery under Colonel Dickson, and followed the movements of the army during the campaign. It consisted of three 18-pounder guns on travelling carriages, and five 24-pounder howitzers, to which were attached Captain Glubb’s company of the Royal Artillery, commanded by Captain Power, and a company of Portuguese Artillery, commanded by Major Arriaga, with some additional detachments of the Artillery of both nations. After the battle of Salamanca, the whole eight pieces were brought forward to the neighbourhood of Madrid, preparatory to the attack of Fort la Chine, which was still occupied by the French, but which ultimately surrendered without a contest. On the 1st September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid, to proceed to Arevalo, where the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions were ordered to assemble preparatory to a movement to the northward; and Colonel Dickson, with his 18-pounders and howitzers, was ordered to accompany this corps.
Previous to this movement, measures had been taken to bring forward from Ciudad Rodrigo the following proportion of ammunition, viz.—
| 24-pr. round shot | 600 |
| 18-pr. round shot | 800 |
| with powder, and all necessary small stores. | |
On the 9th September, this small siege-train arrived at Valladolid, and on the following day continued its march towards Burgos. On the 19th, the Castle of Burgos was invested, the Artillery park being formed near Villa Toro.
That Lord Wellington undertook this siege with wholly inadequate means has been well known; but how inadequate these means were will appear from the following statement. First, as regards personnel: how many Artillerymen had he to carry on the duties in the batteries against a place which held a commanding situation, and was powerfully armed? He had merely
| No. of men. | |
|---|---|
| Capt. Glubb’s company, under Capt. Power | 45 |
| Lieut.-Col. May’s company under Lieut. Elgee | 45 |
| Major Arriaga’s company of Portuguese Artillery | 57 |
| Total | 147 |
As mentioned above, he had only eight guns; and the following was the total ammunition of all sorts, including the additional supply from Ciudad Rodrigo.
| 24-pr. round shot | 900 |
| 24-pr. common shell | 208 |
| 24-pr. spherical case | 236 |
| 18-pr. round shot | 1306 |
| 18-pr. spherical case | 100 |
To swell this amount, Colonel Dickson offered a reward for bringing in any shot fired by the enemy. He found that the enemy’s 16-pounder shot fitted his own 18-pounder guns, and that his 8-pounder shot would fit the 9-pounders of the English field brigades. Before the end of September, about 1400 shot were brought in, in this way. Colonel Dickson also obtained detachments from the Horse and Field Brigades occasionally, to give his siege artillerymen relief; but the duties of the Field Artillery were so active at this time round Burgos that men could with difficulty be spared.
The names of the officers of the Royal Artillery engaged in the siege were as follows:—