THE MYTH OF THE 42ND DIVISION

[68] General Canonge, in his historical sketch, confirms my own inquiries. The embryo of the myth is to be found in the “Official Résumé,” published on June 8, 1915, in the Bulletin des Armées, according to which, on the evening of September 9, Foch’s Army, “moving from west to east toward Fère Champènoise, took in flank the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Corps which were attacking south-east of this locality. This audacious manœuvre decided the success.” This was presently elaborated, with various romantic decorations.

[69] Canonge, after two inquiries on the spot, and with written evidence in addition, says that the 42nd Division left Broyes between 2 and 3 pm., reached Linthelles about 5 p.m., stopped there, and then bivouacked in the zone Linthes–Linthelles–Ognes–Pleurs, passing the night there “in general reserve,” and moving away only about 5 a.m. on September 10. Fère Champènoise, he adds, was evacuated by the Germans, after an orgie of 24 hours, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 9th, but was traversed during the greater part of the night by German troops coming from Connantre and Gourgancon. Connage thinks that, “on sight of the troops of the 42nd Division, those of General Dubois, certain now of support, advanced, and the Division then stopped and turned back to night-quarters.” Bülow, he believes, had ordered his retreat at 3.30 p.m. The first French detachment entered Fère Champènoise at 7 a.m. next day.

[70] Giraud (Histoire, p. 166) gives a rather different report of this dialogue. I rely upon an article in L’Illustration of Jan. 9, 1915, containing a long passage from the diary of “an officer who was the soul of the defence”—doubtless, Captain Heym himself.

[71] Colonel Feyler’s Avant-Propos Stratégiques (Paris: Payot. 1915) are particularly valuable for a pitiless analysis of the “moral manœuvre” represented in early German accounts of the first part of the campaign.

[72] Major-General Maurice says: “I am convinced that history will decide that it was the crossing of the Marne in the early hours of the 9th by the British Army which turned the scale against Kluck and saved Maunoury at a time of crisis.... That an army which on August 23 had been all but surrounded by an enemy who outnumbered it by two to one should have fought its way out, retreated 170 miles, and then immediately turned about and taken a decisive part in the battle which changed the course of the campaign of 1914, is as wonderful an achievement as is to be found in the history of war” (Forty Days, pp. 183–4).

[73] Hanotaux, Histoire Illustrée, vol. vii. pp. 132–8.

[74] Idem, pp. 172–5.

[75] Foch, Des Principes de la Guerre.

[76] M. Hanotaux (p. 76) regards this last part of the plan as “pure folly,” as “a few thousand resolute men holding the defiles, crests, and cliffs would break whole armies before Nancy was attained.” This appears to be an exaggeration; but it is highly probable that before Nancy, as before Mons and on other occasions at the beginning of the war, the German Armies lost, through the traditional belief in envelopment, what they might have gained by concentration on the central attack.

[77] “Choses Vues à Metz,” Revue Hebdomadaire, December 18, 1915. Colonel Feyler quotes from the Lokal Anzeiger of Berlin the following commentary on one of the Kaiser’s earlier appearances at the Front: “The presence of the Emperor demonstrates clearly what a development events have taken.... The Emperor would never have gone into France if those responsible had envisaged the possibility of the German Army being thrown back beyond the frontier. His presence among his troops in enemy country will not fail to produce a deep impression in Germany as well as abroad.”

[78] Quoted in Un Village Lorrain en Août—Septembre 1914. Réméréville, by C. Berlet.

[79] Lt.-Col. Thomasson, Le Revers, introduction.

[80] Professor Friedrich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, in the Frankfürter Zeitung, December 31, 1916.


INDEX

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Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.

In this version of this eBook, dashes between multiple locations and within numeric ranges are shown as en-dashes (–), which are longer than hyphens (-) but shorter than em-dashes (—).

Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.

Page [99]: “Ronar’ch’s” is a misprint for “Ronarc’h’s”.

The Order of Battle lists beginning on pages [97] and [199] are in the same sequence as in the original book, but the side-by-side Allied and German units often do not align as they did in the original.

Page [272]: The Index reference to General Gallieni and the battle of the Ourcq did not include a page number.