ROUSSEAU AND HERDER
Discourses.—In his Discourse concerning the Arts and Sciences Rousseau insists that our outward lives should be true expressions of our inner feelings. This harmony between expression and feeling began its decline under the influences of overrefinement and of tastes that had been distorted by excessive civilization. Therefore, he argues, it is the common man, the crude rustic, rather than the polished and elegant courtier who reveals his heart in all purity; we may deal with this common man without suspicions, fears, reserves, and treacheries. It was the simplicity of ancient times when men lived in a primitive state that bred innocence and virtue, courage and genuine humanity. In this discourse there is in general a pointed attack upon literary and scientific training and polish.
The discourse which deals with the inequality of man is based in general upon the same doctrine which furnishes the ground for the attack on the sciences and the arts. It attempts to show us what men would have been had they remained in their original state. This original state was one in which man lived much like the dumb animals; forests and rocks, running brooks and springs, furnished abode by day and bed and shelter for the night, and among these were to be found the meat and drink which produced strong healthy bodies; bodies robust because their nourishment was simple. This was a primitive state which had remained true to nature by not advancing at all or at least not more than a single degree beyond the original. In such a state man by reason of both his physical hardiness and his native animal instincts and alertness has all his faculties, these operating with a force and fineness unknown to the highly civilized man. Here, as in the essay on the social contract, the philosopher is opposed to a superior ruling power and arbitrary establishment of laws.
Social contract.—In the Social Contract in which Rousseau’s social state is presented as the superior form of government, men had been brought to realize their dependence upon one another and to know that co-operation was the true basis of welfare. The doctrine of individuality which made of man a self-centered unit was weak in that it offered little protection for the individual. For this individual, born with natural freedom, was in danger of exercising this freedom to the detriment of the rights of others.
In giving up himself and his rights to the group, the individual became subject to no one person, but gained certain rights over each member of the community. In this compact there is a union of individuals, each working for the good of the body politic, each a sovereign with civil liberty and moral freedom.
Thus the restrictions which would be imposed upon members of society by one supreme authority were avoided. By this means the general will worked for the general good of humanity.
But the idea of progress implied not only the teaching that the good of one must be the good of all, but meant also: (1) That man was not self-sufficient and therefore could come to fullest development only in the group. (2) That the seeds of individuality lay within man as a universal element and were nurtured and brought to flower by the peculiar touch of him who was expressed in their flowering. The fundamental tendencies in mankind being allowed to unfold, the man will be good; this goodness is the essential thing in his manhood, and it is natural.
Emile.—The keynote of Rousseau’s doctrine here is that of absolute reliance upon nature without impeding or diverting her progress at any point. He is in accord with the epistemological side of Locke’s philosophy, and therefore demands that Emile shall have his senses well developed. He is to have a strong vigorous body, full of courage and hardihood. Moral education is to be the result of natural discipline carried on in a sort of laissez-faire way. In general, Emile gets his education by being thrown into contact with nature and being allowed to observe and feel the phenomena of a crude environment, and by expressing directly what he has learned at first hand from this teacher. Emile, then, is shaped by primitive forces just as the simple, common man in the Social Contract and the Inequality. These made the simple, common man the epitome of that which was of greatest worth to humanity.
Origin of language.—In fixing the beginnings of speech, Rousseau says we can believe that necessities dictated the first movements, and that passions called forth the first voices. The genius of oriental languages, the most ancient known to us, have nothing in them that is methodical or reasoned out; they are vivacious and figurative. It is evident that the origin of languages is not at all due to the primary needs of man. The origin is due to the moral needs, to the passions. It is neither hunger nor thirst, but love, hate, pity, or anger which have called forth from men the first voices. Fruits do not steal away from our hands at all; one may nourish one’s self with them without talking; we may follow in silence the prey of which we wish to make a repast; but to move a young heart, to repel an unjust aggressor, nature dictates accents, cries, and tones of resentment. It was for this reason that the oldest words were invented.
The following quotations affirm in a general way the preceding statements of Rousseau’s philosophy:
L’astronomie est née de la superstition, de la haine,
de la flatterie, du mensonge;
la géométrie, de l’avarice;
la physique, d’une vaine curiosité;
toute et la morale même de l’orgueil humain.
Les sciences et les arts doivent donc leur naissance à nos vices.
Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, Part. II:
O vertu! science sublime des âmes simples, faut-il donc tant de peines et d’appareil pour te connaître? Tes principes ne sont-ils pas graves dans tous les coeurs? et ne suffit-il pas pour apprendre tes lois de rentrer en soi-même et d’écouter la voix de sa conscience dans le silence des passions?
Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes:
Il suit de cet exposé que l’inégalité, étant presque nulle dans l’état de nature tire sa force et son accroissement du developpement de nos facultés et des progrès de l’esprit humain, et devient enfin stable et légitime par l’établissement de la propriété et des lois.
Il suit encore que l’inégalité morale autorisée par le seul droit positif, est contraire au droit naturel toutes les fois qu’elle ne concourt pas en même proportion avec l’inégalité physique; distinction qui détermine suffisamment ce qu’on doit penser à cet égard de la sorte d’inégalité qui règne parmi tous les peuples policés, puis-qu’il est manifestement contre la loi de nature.
The primitivism which stands out in Rousseau’s two discourses is to be seen in a general way in Herder’s dislike for the higher culture that would discourage spontaneous outbursts of human feelings as they appear in the so-called cruder forms of literature; a culture that would displace these by a smoother product born of reflection and regulated by set rules and formulas.
He has an admiration for the instinct which to him is always to be found in women, children, and fools, and which he sees as the foundation of a naïveté more valuable as a part of mental equipment than anything which could be substituted by processes of training and culture.
Rousseau’s attempt to return to nature for concrete everyday life finds its approval with Herder, but the general idea takes a new turn. He finds in it the inspiration for scientific methods of studying art, history, and philosophy. His line of investigation in these will be by way of nature; i.e., man in his primitive abode; man in the hands of nature; man as the product of his environment.
The opposition to a central and superior governing power, which is found in the Social Contract, to be opposed to the natural method of community life, finds its echo in Herder in frequent tirades against the policirte Nationen. It is the unpolicirte Nationen to whom nature has given a certain solace that can scarcely be found in Menschliche Künsteleien.
The Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität carry a constant strain, which makes the interdependence between the individual and the group a requisite for well-being. This theory, we have seen, finds a distinct place in Shaftesbury’s philosophy before Rousseau had voiced it as his own.
Emile’s senses have been highly developed by his contact with nature, and it is this sharpness and exactness of the senses that Herder extols so much in primitive peoples. They are both cause and effect of the work which nature achieves by her most trusted handmaiden; namely, environment.
In discussing the origin of language, even though Herder at certain points takes issue with Rousseau, it is very clear that he is influenced by the latter and is in agreement with him to considerable extent.
Rousseau has pursued the question of the origin of language, not only in his essay bearing this title, but also in the Discourse on Inequality.
The first sentences of Herder’s essay Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache run not unlike a passage in Rousseau’s Discours just mentioned:
Schon als Thier, hat der Mensch Sprache. Alle heftigen, und die heftigsten unter den heftigen, die schmerzhaften Empfindungen seines Körpers, alle starken Leidenschaften seiner Seele äussern sich unmittelbar in Geschrei, in Töne, in wilde, unartikulirte Laute.
Le premier langage de l’homme, le langage le plus universel, le plus énergique et le seul dont il eut besoin avant qu’il fallût persuader des hommes assemblés est le cri de la nature. Comme ce cri n’était arraché que par une sorte d’instinct dans les occasions pressantes, pour implorer du secours dans les grands dangers ou du soulagement dans les maux violents, il n’était pas d’un grand usage dans le cours ordinaire de la vie, où règnent des sentiments plus modérés.
Further, in his own essay, Herder says, that as our tones of nature are for the purpose of expressing passion, it is natural that they should become also the elements of all that which is emotional, and if we call this immediate sound of feeling speech, then, says he, it is easy to find the origin of speech natural.
But although all animals have a speech by which they sound forth their feelings, such speech will never become human language until reason, understanding (Verstand), arises to use these tones with direct intention.
In so far, then, as the very beginnings of language are cries of passion, Herder is in accord with Rousseau in both essays in which the latter discusses the question.