LECTURE I
MIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate knowledge of Matter; what we know is always Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can exist by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one?
2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind. This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour, sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations, no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did not adequately distinguish between sensations and intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for our transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which and for which all things exist, i.e. God, . . . . . . . 16
5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The impossibility of Materialism has generally been recognized (e.g. by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel). If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the higher than vice versâ, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26