LECTURE II
THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to recognize the necessity of a Mind which thinks the world. Insufficiency of this view.
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2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with nothing but succession, never with Causality. The Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition. Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events which we do not cause must be caused by some other Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that this cause must be One Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought, Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the relations between mind and matter, and with the tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48
6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54