IN EAST TENNESSEE
About the 1st of November, 1863, it was determined at Confederate head-quarters that Longstreet should be ordered into East Tennessee against General Burnside’s army.
On the 22d of October General Grant joined the army, and it was known that General Sherman was marching to join him.
On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter to General Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd guns, but his returns for November gave a force of twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety, and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of his men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.
To march, capture, and disperse this formidable force, fortified at points, Longstreet had about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging parties. Marching and fighting had been his almost daily occupation from the middle of January, 1863, when he left Fredericksburg to move down to Suffolk, Virginia, until the 16th of December, when he found bleak winter again breaking upon him, away from friends, and dependent upon his own efforts for food and clothing for his ragged and hungry Confederates.
It is not in the purview of this paper to more than briefly refer to Longstreet’s work in East Tennessee in the bitter winter of 1863–64. He has said that Washington’s men at Valley Forge did not suffer more than his command on the hard campaigns of that severe winter. Much of the time half-clad and shoeless, the snow-covered ground bore the bloody imprint of their naked feet. They were compelled to dig holes in the frozen ground, which were thawed out by fires to furnish their usual couch. They had nothing to eat but parched corn. But the brave fellows never lost heart. They undertook to make a joke of their dire straits. As General Longstreet rode out among them, they would call cheerily to know if they might not have a little fodder to eat with their corn.
It is now generally conceded that no more valorous service was rendered the Confederate cause during the four years’ fighting than Longstreet’s work in East Tennessee, cut off from supplies, improperly supported by his government, and sent with an inadequate force to attack Burnside in his stronghold.
Mrs. Grant, a few years before her death, in discussing the events of those campaigns, said to me that General Grant had come to Nashville to spend Christmas with her. She had scarcely given him greeting when a hurried message came from Knoxville,—“Longstreet is coming!” He was much perturbed at having to forego his Christmas with his family and return immediately to his works about Knoxville. In parting she said to him, “Now, Ulysses, you know that you are not going to hurt Longstreet.” Grant quickly replied, “I will if I can get him; he is in bad company.”
THE ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS, KNOXVILLE.
To “get” Longstreet or to drive him out of Tennessee came to be the chief concern of Grant and his government. General Halleck was much concerned about the Confederate army in East Tennessee, the only strategic field then held by Southern troops. It was inconveniently near Kentucky and the Ohio River. President Lincoln and his War Secretary added their anxiety to Halleck’s on account of its politico-strategic bearing. General Halleck urged his views upon General Grant, and despatched General Foster that it was of first importance to “drive Longstreet out of Tennessee and keep him out.” General Grant ordered: “Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east that you can.” It was easier to issue that order than to execute it. And Grant reported to the authorities:
“If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely, and the road destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. Reports of deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be too much demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. I will get everything in order here in a few days and go to Nashville and Louisville, and, if there is still a chance of doing anything against Longstreet, to the scene of operations there. I am deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it to me.”
About the middle of December orders were given the Confederate army, which was on the west bank of the Holston River, to cross and march for the railroad, only a few miles away.
The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed by diligent work and the use of such flatboats and other means of crossing as could be collected and constructed. They were over by the 20th, and before Christmas were in camps along the railroad near Morristown. Blankets and clothes were scarce, shoes more so. But to the hungry Confederates the beautiful country in which they found themselves seemed a land of milk and honey. The French Broad River and the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country between and beyond them contains as fine farming-lands and has as delightful climate as can be found. Stock and grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had been thoughtfully hidden away by the Federals, but the fields were full of maize, still standing. The country around the French Broad had hardly been touched by the foragers. The Confederate wagons immediately on entering the fields were loaded to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the ground in places like apples under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, vegetables, maple sugar, and honey were all abundant for immediate wants of the troops.
When the Federals found that the Confederates had moved to the east bank, their cavalry followed to that side. They were almost as much in want of the beautiful foraging lands as the Confederates, but there was little left for them. With the plenitude of provisions for the time, and many things which seemed luxuries, the Confederates were not altogether happy. Tattered garments, blankets, and shoes (the latter going, many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for piercing winter blasts. There were some hand-looms in the country, from which there was occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, and here and there other comforts were received, some from kind and some from unwilling hands, which nevertheless could spare them. For shoes the men were compelled to resort to the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary protection from the frozen ground. Then soldiers were discovered who could tan the hides of beeves, some who could make shoes, some who could make shoe-pegs, some who could make shoe-lasts; so it came about, through the varied industries of Longstreet’s men, that the hides passed rapidly from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers. Thus the soldier’s life was made, for a time, passably pleasant in the infantry and artillery. Meanwhile, the Confederate cavalry were looking at the Federals, and the Federals were looking at them, both frequently burning powder between their lines.
General Sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the other side, to relieve General Shackelford, and he seemed to think that the dead of winter was the time for cavalry work; and the Confederate General Martin’s orders were to have the enemy under his eye at all hours. Both were vigilant, active, and persevering.
About December 20 a raid was made by General Averill from West Virginia upon a supply depot of General Sam Jones’s department, at Salem, which was partially successful, when General Grant, under the impression that the stores were for East Tennessee, wired General Foster, “This will give you great advantage.” And General Foster despatched General Parke, commanding his troops in the field, December 26, “Longstreet will feel a little timid now, and will bear a little pushing.”
General Grant made a visit to Knoxville about New Year’s, and remained until the 7th. He found General Foster in the condition of the Confederates,—not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want of shoes. So he authorized a wait for clothing, then in transit and looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the Confederates.
Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered him, on receipt of clothing, to advance and “drive Longstreet at least beyond Bull’s Gap and Red Bridge.” And to prepare for that advance, he ordered the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to Strawberry Plains, and the cavalry to Dandridge.
The Union army—equipped—marched on the 14th and 15th of January. The bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly quarried rocks, and the bare feet of the Confederates on this march left bloody marks along the roads.
General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied Dandridge by Elliott’s, Wolford’s, and Garrard’s divisions of cavalry and Mott’s brigade of infantry. The Fourth and Twenty-ninth Corps followed the cavalry, leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains.
General Martin gave prompt notice that the march was at Dandridge and in full force. Dandridge is on the right bank of the French Broad River, about thirty miles from Knoxville. Its topographical features are bold and inviting of military work. Its other striking characteristic was the interesting character of its citizens. The Confederates—a unit in heart and spirit—were prepared to do their share towards making an effective battle, and the plans were so laid.
At the time ordered for his advance General Foster was suffering from an old wound, and General Parke became commander of the troops in the field. The latter delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part of his command, and General Sheridan, marching with the advance, became commander, until superseded by the corps commander, General Gordon Granger.
The Confederate plans were laid before the army was all up. Their skirmish line was made stronger, and relieved the cavalry of their dismounted service. A narrow, unused road, practicable for artillery, was found that opened a way for the Confederates to reach the enemy’s rearward line of march. Sharp-shooters were organized and ordered forward by it, to be followed by our infantry columns. It was thought better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing of the iron axles of the guns might give notice of the Confederate purpose; the artillery to be called as the Confederate sharp-shooters approached the junction of the roads. The head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard, some of whom escaped without firing. General Granger decided to retire, and was in time to leave the crossroads behind him, his rear guard passing the point of intersection before the Confederate advance party reached it about midnight.
The weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain began to fall.
When Longstreet rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of his horse. When the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by the heavy Confederate columns useless. The cavalry was ordered on, and the troops at Morristown, on the Strawberry Plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery.
While General Longstreet rode through the streets of Dandridge, giving directions for such pursuit of the fleeing Federals as could be made, a lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited him into her parlors. When the orders for pursuit were completed, he dismounted, and with some members of his staff walked in. After the compliments of the season were passed, the Confederates were asked to be seated, and the lady told, with evident great enjoyment, of General Granger during the night before. She had never heard a person swear about another as General Granger did about General Longstreet. Some of the officers proposed to stop and make a battle, but General Granger swore, and said, “It’s no use to stop and fight Longstreet. You can’t whip him. It don’t make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand.” Presently she brought out a flask that General Granger had forgotten, and presented it to General Longstreet. It had about two horizontal fingers left in it. Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Although the weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as General Longstreet had taken his coffee at three o’clock, it was resolved to call it noon and divide the spoils. Colonel Fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, “General Granger—may his shadow never grow less.”
The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that the pursuit was reduced to a labored walk. The previous hard service and exposure had so reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry service. They found some crippled battery forges and a little of other plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and broke his bridges behind him, and Longstreet’s men returned to their huts and winter homes.
To seek some of the fruits of his advantage at Dandridge, the roads being a little firmer, General Longstreet ordered his leading division, under General Jenkins, on the 21st, to proceed to march towards Strawberry Plains, and the Richmond authorities were asked to send a pontoon bridge, tools of construction, and to hurry forward such shoes as they could send.
On the 24th, as the official records show, General Grant sent word to General Halleck of Longstreet’s return towards Knoxville; that he had ordered General Foster to give battle, if necessary, and that he would send General Thomas with additional troops to insure that Longstreet would be driven from the State. He also directed General Thomas to go in person and take command, and said, “I want Longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits of Tennessee.” And he ordered General Foster to put his cavalry on a raid from Cumberland Gap to cut in upon Longstreet’s rear.
On the 6th of February General Grant reported from Nashville,—
“Major-General H. W. Halleck,
“General-in-Chief:“I am making every effort to get supplies from Knoxville for the support of a large force—large enough to drive Longstreet out.
“U. S. Grant,
“Major-General Commanding.”
*****
“Major-General Thomas:
“Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed most of his force from our front, two divisions going to Longstreet. Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the east. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out or get whipped this month. For this purpose you will have to detach at least ten thousand men besides Stanley’s division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by troops from Logan’s command. It will not be necessary to take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each two hundred men should be taken, if you have them to spare. Let me know how soon you can start.
“Grant,
“Major-General.”
On the 9th Major-General J. M. Schofield arrived at Knoxville, and assumed command of the Army of the Ohio.
General Grant reported on the 11th,—
“Major-General H. W. Halleck,
“General-in-Chief:“I expect to get off from Chattanooga by Monday next a force to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. It has been impossible heretofore to subsist the troops necessary for this work.
“U. S. Grant,
“Major-General.”
*****
“Major-General J. M. Schofield,
“Knoxville, Tennessee:“I deem it of the utmost importance to drive Longstreet out immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and to prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. Thomas is ordered to start ten thousand men, besides the remainder of Granger’s corps, at once. He will take no artillery, but will take his artillery horses, and three mules to one hundred men. He will probably start next Monday.
“U. S. Grant,
“Major-General.”
How General Grant abandoned the move against Longstreet, while Longstreet kept Schofield bottled up all through that trying winter in his works about Knoxville, is old history.
The Confederate government finally abandoned the plan of occupying East Tennessee, and on the 7th of April Longstreet was ordered, with the part of his command that had originally served with the Army of Northern Virginia, to join General Lee on the Rapidan.
I have gone thus far into the East Tennessee campaigns for the pleasure it gives me to reproduce the following resolutions passed by the Confederate Congress during General Longstreet’s arduous work in the winter of 1863–64:
“No. 42. Joint Resolutions of Thanks to Lieutenant-General Longstreet and the officers and men of his command.
“Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, That the thanks of the Congress are due, and hereby cordially tendered, to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet and the officers and men of his command, for their patriotic services and brilliant achievements in the present war, sharing as they have the arduous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Tennessee, and participating in nearly every great battle fought in those States, the commanding general ever displaying great ability, skill, and prudence in command, and the officers and men the most heroic bravery, fortitude, and energy, in every duty they have been called upon to perform.
“Resolved, That the President be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for publication to his command.
“Approved February 17, 1864.”