THE WILDERNESS
The Wilderness is a forest land about fifteen miles square, lying between and equidistant from Orange Court-House and Fredericksburg. It is broken occasionally by small farms and abandoned clearings, and two roads,—the Orange Plank Road and the turnpike, which are cut at right angles by the Germania road,—in general course nearly parallel, open ways through it between Fredericksburg and the Court-House. The Germania Ford road joins the Brock road, the strategic line of the military zone, and crosses the turnpike at Wilderness Tavern and the plank road about two miles south of that point.
General Grant was making his head-quarters near the Army of the Potomac, in Culpeper County, Virginia, commanded by Major-General George G. Meade. The aggregate of the Federal command was about one hundred and thirty thousand men.
The Army of Northern Virginia was on the west side of the Rapidan River. Its total number at the beginning of the campaign was then put by Colonel Taylor, chief of staff, at about sixty-four thousand.
However, the numerical strength of the armies did not decide the merits of the campaign. The commanders on both sides had chosen their ground after mature deliberation. They knew of each other’s numbers and resources, and made their plans accordingly. A number of their respective leaders had known each other personally for more than twenty years. They had the undivided support and confidence of their governments and their armies. General Lee was as always the trusted leader of the Confederates; General Grant by his three years’ service in the West had become known as an all-round soldier seldom if ever surpassed. General Longstreet, who thought most highly of General Grant from every stand-point, always said that the biggest part of him was his heart.
In this case General Grant had no fixed plan of campaign except to avoid the strong defensive line occupied by General Lee, and to draw him out to open battle.
General Lee’s orders were against a general engagement until the Federal forces should attack, but in the midst of varied manœuvrings the battle was begun in half a dozen quarters before either commanding general had expected it. Hancock advanced before sunrise ready for battle, just as Longstreet’s command, which had come up from Mechanicsville, reported to General Lee. Longstreet’s line was formed along the right and left of the plank road, Kershaw on the right, Field on the left. Hancock’s musketry was doing considerable damage to the forces in front, and as Longstreet’s lines were forming the men broke files to give free passage for their comrades to the rear. The advancing fire was getting brisk, but not a shot was fired in return by Longstreet’s troops until the divisions were ready. Three of Field’s brigades were formed in the line of the left, and three of Kershaw’s on the right. The advance of the six brigades was ordered, and Hancock’s lines, thinned by their previous fighting and weaker than the fresh men now coming against them, were checked and pushed back to their intrenched lines. Then the fighting became steady and firm.
THE WOUNDING OF GENERAL LONGSTREET AT THE WILDERNESS, MAY 6, 1864.
Finally Hancock’s line began to break. As they retreated and the Confederates advanced, a fire was started in the dry leaves and began to spread. The Confederate forces, in spite of the fire, moved on. As the battle waged, General Wadsworth, who was gallantly leading a division of the Federal forces, fell mortally wounded, and there was then a general break in the Union line. Jenkins’s brigade was conspicuous among the Confederates in pursuit. Jenkins exclaimed to those around him, “I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before night.” A few minutes later he fell mortally wounded. In the general mêlée Longstreet was leading in advance of his troops, and in the midst of close firing was shot by his own men. This caused the Confederate lines to slow up in their advance. Orders were given General Field by Longstreet to push on before the enemy could have time to rally, but in the midst of the general confusion, General Lee ordered the broken lines to be reformed, and the advantage already gained was not followed up.
General Field, in his subsequent account of the day, said,—
“I was at Longstreet’s side in a moment, and in answer to my anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the corps and push on. Though at this moment he could not have known the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest of the movement he was making.
“Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have always believed that Grant would have been driven across the Rapidan before night; but General Lee was present, and ordered that our line, which was nearly a right angle, should first be straightened out. The difficulty of manœuvring through the brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance with large reinforcements from Ewell’s Corps placed under my orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared.”
In a letter touching this subject to General Longstreet, Colonel Fairfax said,—
“On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth and said, ‘Tell General Field to take command, and move forward with the whole force and gain the Brock road,’ but meantime hours were lost.”
A Northern historian[H] said, on the same point,—
“It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and all was still. What could cause this surcease of effort at the very height of success was then wholly unknown to us.”
Some years after, General Hancock said to General Longstreet,—
“You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours before I could reorganize the battle.”