History of Mexico, Volume 1, 1516-1521

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

FOOTNOTES

[744] Which speaks little to the credit of either Mary or Santiago. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102. ‘Otro miraglo ... é fué muy notorio.’ ‘Ya sé que los incrédulos ... dirán que mi ocupaçion en esto de miraglos, pues no los ví, es supérflua ... é yo hablo que esto é más se puede é debe creer;’ for did the Indians have mysteries and miracles, surely God, the virgin, and the saints could effect greater deeds. Oviedo, iii. 511. He quotes from Livy and others concerning the reliable miracles of Roman times. Prescott and others transfer the miracles to the siege under Cortés for greater effect. Bustamante, the modern champion of the shrines of Mexico, who is ready to uphold any deed attributed to these images, is rather incredulous about miracles recorded in favor of Spanish cutthroats. See Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., i. 283 et seq. ‘Si no oviéssemos miedo de esse del caballo blanco, ya vosotros estaríedes coçidos,’ cried some, Oviedo, iii. 511, while the more valiant added that ‘con todo esto si no soltays a Motecçumacin, y os vays luego, presto sereys muertos.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 152.

[745] Cortés, Cartas, 127. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101-2, says seven, two having been taken alive. ‘Mataron a Peña, el querido de Motezuma,... Valdibia, y Juan Martin Narizes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.

[746] ‘Tuvieron guerra con los yndios en esta Cibdad dos medios dias que fueron jueves e viernes.’ ‘Guerra casy dos dias.’ Lopes and Flores, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 131, 134. ‘Dieron bateria los Mexicanos á los Españoles siete dias, y los tuvieron cercados veinte y tres dias.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 29. ‘Cercados los españoles ocho dias.’ Id. (ed. 1840), 105. ‘Pelearõ y combatieron la casa diez dias arreo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. Torquemada explains this by assuming two days of fighting and eight days of close siege, with attacks upon all who sallied, i. 490. Sahagun states that Itzquauhtzin, governor of Tlatelulco, accompanied Montezuma to the roof and spoke to the people, representing that the Spaniards, as the mightier race, would inflict great injury on them unless they ceased to fight, and that the emperor would be murdered. The Mexicans responded with insults and missiles, but as the soldiers interposed their shields no harm was done. They appear to have stopped active operations, however. Hist. Conq., 28-9. The insults and missiles belong no doubt to the later siege under Cortés. Duran states, however, that Montezuma was henceforth looked on as an accomplice of the Spaniards, and discarded as a ruler, it being resolved to kill him and his family. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 463. According to Oviedo the news came at this time of the victory over Narvaez, ‘é Monteçuma mandó á los indios que dexassen de pelear é dexassen venir los otros chripstianos, porque á todos juntos matassen; é aquesto se cree que fué su intento.’ iii. 512. That he may have urged this with intent or as a bait is not unlikely, but it should apply equally to Narvaez’ men, since it appears that their defeat could not yet have been known. When known, however, it must have had its effect. ‘Quando supieron nuestra vitoria, cessarõ de dalle guerra.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101. Yet Gomara writes that on learning of the large forces coming against them, the besiegers resumed the attack at one time. Hist. Mex., 151.

[747] This spring was rediscovered during the reign of Viceroy Revilla Gigedo. Bustamante, Mem. Piedad Mex., 7. A pool of sweet water was the chief inducement for founding the city on this site in 1325. Native Races, ii. 559-61; v. 345 et seq.

[748] Cortés, Cartas, 126. The Spanish messenger from Mexico returned wounded. Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v. With him, or about the same time, arrived four chiefs sent by Montezuma to complain that Alvarado had attacked the nobles without cause. While defending themselves six soldiers had fallen. Cortés told the chiefs with stern countenance that he was returning to investigate the matter. A letter was sent to Alvarado enjoining him to guard the emperor closely. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101.

[749] And the zealous aid of Velazquez de Leon, who did so much toward securing the Goazacoalco command for Cortés when Narvaez sent letters to win it over. Cortés, Residencia, i. 409; ii. 6, 31, 165-6. He is accused by his enemies of impiety and licentiousness, and as one whom the general favored above more worthy men. Solis assumes that Sandoval nominally retained the command of the coast province, Rangel being merely his lieutenant. Hist. Mex., ii. 108.

[750] ‘Llegò aquel dia [the first] à la Rinconada, el segundo caminò siete Leguas ... llegò à Tlaxcalla à diez y siete de Junio.’ Torquemada, i. 492. Herrera tells a long story of suffering from hunger and thirst during the march through the desert. Marquez and Ojeda were sent ahead to Tlascala for supplies, and came back with 1200 carriers laden with fowl, bread, fruit, and other refreshments. Cortés, among others, was found starving, and a number were discovered on the road almost dead. All, it seems, were rescued. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. There are several reasons for believing that Herrera, who is somewhat confused about this period, has confounded the present march with the flight from Mexico to Tlascala of a month later, when the people were really starving. This seems confirmed by the erroneous statement that the troops arrived at Tlascala July 17th, the time, according to Herrera’s own later statement, when they reached that place after the flight. The account also intimates that the starving army was met among the Otomí settlements, where food could readily be obtained, without the necessity for Marquez and Ojeda to go ten leagues farther, to the capital, to obtain it. These and other discrepancies are overlooked by all who refer to the march. Prescott dwells in particular on the suffering from thirst, forgetful of the statement on a previous page that the rainy season had begun about three weeks before, and that water must have been abundant along the whole route. Solis finds that the effeminate followers of Narvaez endured the suffering remarkably well. Hist. Mex., ii. 109.

[751] ‘Embiò a fray Bartolome de Olmedo ... a Motezuma.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. It is unlikely that so valuable a man would have been sent while affairs were threatening.

[752] Narvaez landed with about 900 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 120 with bows, and 80 with fire-arms. A number had been picked up at Cozumel, but an equal proportion perished by shipwreck. Cortés had about 250 men, and 200 were probably left on the coast, of garrison, guards, and invalids. To the 950 soldiers thus taken may be added at least 150 from the crews of the dismantled or destroyed vessels. Prescott manages to mysteriously increase the horses and projectile arms beyond what he previously assigns to Narvaez and Cortés. One thousand infantry, 100 horsemen, and many allies, say Gomara and Herrera. The Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 425, indicates 80 horses. Bernal Diaz places the figures as high as 1300 soldiers, including 96 or 97 horsemen, 80 archers, 80 musketeers, and 2000 Tlascaltec warriors; while Cortés, with a prudent desire to cover the subsequent losses at Mexico, reduces them to 500 infantry and 70 cavalry. Solis gives the reason of the profound historian for the small number of allies taken to Mexico: ‘Por no escandalizar á Motezuma, ó poner en desesperacion á los rebeldes.’ Hist. Mex., ii. 111.

[753] The arrival at Tezcuco is evidence enough that a more northern road was taken than the one previous. The middle route by Telapon appears somewhat more direct for Mexico, but requires a detour to reach the Acolhua capital, and it is not likely that an army in hurried march could afford to go out of its way. Hence the Calpulalpan road must have been followed.

[754] See Native Races, ii. 162-3, 168-73, 569; v., passim; Motolinia, Hist. Ind., 181-3.

[755] Cortés writes that he was on the point of sending a Spaniard to Mexico with Tezcucan rowers, a chief being taken as hostage, but just then came this canoe. Cartas, 127.

[756] Two, named Santa Clara and Pedro Hernandez, says Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.

[757] ‘Parò en Tepeaquilla, lugar a legua de Mexico.’ Id. Now the shrine of Guadalupe. Prescott assumes that the Iztapalapan road was taken, as before, but it was avoided probably because Cortés feared the fort Xoloc, which guarded the centre. It was also longer, and had more movable bridges than the other causeways.

[758] ‘Riñas por San Iuan pazes para todo el año.’ Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139. The following day a dress was found hanging from a beam, and in a square a pile of bread, with over 500 fowl, without a guard. This Cortés considered less favorable, and said ‘que serian riñas de por San Iuan.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.-viii.

[759] ‘Para dar á entender con esto que ellos estaban de guerra y muy ofendidos de los españoles que él habia dejado.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 108. His account of deserted streets, applied to Cortés’ first arrival in Mexico, belongs no doubt to this occasion. Duran argues that had the massacre taken place before Cortés’ arrival he would not have been allowed to enter. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 470. Equally in the dark is Acosta, who assumes that the Indians were openly at war, but the custom being to rest every fourth day, Cortés managed to enter during the cessation of hostilities. Hist. Ind., 522. Oviedo looks on the non-resistance of the Indians as a wile to entrap all the Spaniards. iii. 510.

[760] Herrera writes amusingly that Cortés shouted before the closed gates, ‘Open!’ ‘Who is there?’ demanded Alvarado. ‘I,’ replied Cortés. ‘Do you come with full liberty, and power to command, as before?’ ‘Yes, and with victory, and greater forces.’ Alvarado thereupon opened, kissed his hand, and surrendered the keys! dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.

[761] ‘Con que aventuró la mayor parte de sus fuerzas.’ Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 120. Or perhaps because he had not had recourse to some safer measure, such as arresting the leaders of the proposed plot, for hostages. ‘Le dixo muy enojado, q̄ era muy mal hecho, y grande desatino, y poca verdad ... no le hablò mas en ello.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102. Cortés would hardly have told him that he lied, since his statements were confirmed by so many; they certainly were years after. Vetancurt supposes that Cortés told him he should have allowed the emperor to attend the festival, and should have awaited the attack rather than opened the war. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 140. ‘Dissimulo por no enojar a los que lo hizieron.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151.

[762] Solis supposes, however, that the two met in friendly intercourse, and takes Bernal Diaz and Herrera to task for asserting the contrary. Hist. Mex., ii. 112-14. He refers to Cortés’ friendly message from Tezcuco, which is doubtful, and to Gomara, who certainly allows Cortés to refer to Montezuma and his courtiers as ‘dogs.’ Hist. Mex., 153. In the testimony during Cortés’ residencia the discourtesy is asserted. Cortés, Residencia, i. 42 etc. Clavigero suggests ‘ch’era d’uopo il far sembianza di credere il Re colpevole dell’inquietudine.’ Storia Mess., iii. 121.

[763] Native Races, ii. 134-6; v. 462-4; ‘Il y joignait, comme de coutume, la charge du grand prêtre de Huitzilopochtli.’ Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 309. Gomara assumes that Cortés orders a chief to open the market. He, offended at the insults used, goes only to rouse the people. Hist. Mex., 153. Ixtlilxochitl supposes that the chief is offended at the reprimand administered for delaying to open the market. Hist. Chich., 301. ‘Mandò Hernando Cortes llamar a los mas principales caualleros, hizoles vna larga platica diziẽdo, que les perdonaua lo passado, con que para adelãte fuessen ... amigos: ... sin responder ... se fueron.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.

[764] Duran enumerates some of the provinces summoned, as Xilotepec and Matlaltzinco. ‘Mandó llamar á ... Encantadores y Hechiceros para que los asombrasen y los mostrasen algunas visiones de noche, ... para que alli muriesen de espanto.’ Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 462-6.

[765] Cortés describes first a brief attack, then a sally, succeeded by a fresh assault on the fort, while Bernal Diaz and Herrera let a force advance against the Indians before they reached the palace. I follow Cortés as the chief guide, because his account of all this period was written while quite fresh in his mind, and appears the most sensible and correct, while the other versions depend more or less on faint recollection and hearsay. Cortés as a rule did not wait till the enemy approached, but he may not have been prepared for the sudden attack. Yet it is probable that he wished in his report to lay the responsibility of the attack upon the enemy. I do not think Cortés inclined to misrepresent in general or without an object.

[766] For war customs see Native Races, ii. 400-32.

[767] ‘Sinistræ manus digitis duobus mutilis.’ Peter Martyr, De Insvlis, 5. Cortés also says ‘quedé manco,’ Cartas, 142, 131, yet Cano ridicules the statement, and declares ‘nunca fué manco dellos ni le faltan.’ Oviedo, iii. 551-2.

[768] Cortés, Cartas, 128-9. Bernal Diaz speaks of a sally by Ordaz, with 400 men, before the natives reach the fort. He is sorely beset, as related, and retires with a loss of 23 soldiers. Hist. Verdad., 102-3. Herrera’s account, as usual, is confused. After Rio returns wounded to report the uprising of warriors, five horsemen rally to reconnoitre. The following day Ojeda and Marquez set out to forage, and come to announce the approach of assailants. Two hundred men now make a sortie and kill a multitude without losing a man. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. It is useless to follow this author here except for incidents.

[769] Bernal Diaz places the dead at 35 soldiers, besides a large number of allies. Eight fell during the first discharge upon Ordaz’ party and fifteen more before he regained the fort, while of the 46 wounded among the garrison twelve died. Hist. Verdad., 103. Cortés, with his usual prudent suppression of evil news, allows four deaths and over 80 wounded. He never refers to those who die of wounds. Gomara follows him. Hist. Mex., 153.

CHAPTER XXIV.
FIGHT UPON THE TEMPLE SUMMIT.
June, 1520.

The Natives Continue the Assault—Their Fierce Bravery—The Spaniards Build Turrets—Still the Mexicans Prove too Strong for Them—Montezuma Called to Intercede—He is Insulted and Stoned by his Subjects—Cortés Attempts Egress by the Tlacopan Causeway—Failure of Escobar to Take the Pyramid—Cortés Gains the Slippery Height—The Gladiatorial Combat there.

At dawn the assault was renewed with the same fierceness as before, and with even less regard for the sweeping volleys of the cannon, which were fired without aim into the packed masses of the natives, bringing them down by the score. The gaps were quickly closed, and the rapidly repeated shots seemed to make no more impression on the surging mass than pebbles dropped into the boiling surf. It was a critical time for Cortés, who seemed not yet to recognize the full extent of the danger. He felt the necessity of open communication with the mainland, for obvious reasons, and to this end, in the course of the morning, he arranged another sortie like that of the preceding day, but in one direction only. The Indians retired, as before, into lanes and buildings, and beyond canals, raising; the bridges behind them. Barricades having been thrown up to impede the advance since the last sally, some guns were brought to the front, and with their aid a few of the obstructions were demolished and more than one bridge was gained, together with a number of houses, to which the torch was applied. The discharges from the roofs were kept up with galling pertinacity, although the effect was not so fatal as during the preceding day, owing to the experience then gained. The forces below, who had retired before the charges of the advance, rolled back like recurring billows, and in ever increasing number, upon flank and rear, as if to overwhelm them. Such were their numbers and stubborn recklessness that ten thousand Hectors and Rolands, says Bernal Diaz, could have effected nothing against them, and soldiers from the Italian war swore that never among Christians or Turks had they witnessed such fierceness. Considerable alarm was also created by the appearance of long pikes, like those of the Chinantecs, directed particularly against the cavalry. Fortunately they were not numerous, nor were the pikemen sufficiently practised to be very dangerous. Worn out in the unequal contest Cortés turned to gain his camp, which was no easy task, since the natives were massed in greatest number in the rear, determined to cut off retreat. The fort was gained, nevertheless, although hardly a man escaped uninjured, while about a dozen were killed; one unfortunate soldier being captured and sacrificed in full view of the garrison.[770]

It had been found that the greatest danger to the sallying parties came from the roofs, whence discharges could be directed with comparative impunity and with greater effect than from the ground. In order to counteract them, three mantas, or movable turrets, were planned, whose occupants were to devote their attention wholly to clearing the roofs of assailants. The completing of these machines and other preparations kept the garrison busy all the 27th of June, so that no sally was made. Ascribing this to fear, the Indians became more pressing in their assault, and more profuse with their insults. “Dogs!” cried some, “of hunger and thirst shall you die!” Others shouted, “Here is a piece of my tortilla!” at the same time flinging them unpalatable fragments of toasted bread. “Eat it, you perjured villains, who can fight only on the backs of animals; for soon shall your own bodies be cut up for food and cast before the beasts!” The enemy appeared more numerous than ever, and the roofs and yards were literally covered with their missiles. The greatest danger to the Spaniards lay in the operations of the battering and mining parties, who, regardless of bullets from the wall turrets, sought steadily to open fresh breaches. Conspicuous in the hostile camp was a richly dressed Indian, surrounded by a staff of finely attired warriors, who seemed to direct operations, and whose orders were received with the deepest reverence. This personage the prisoners declared to be Cuitlahuatzin, and the next in rank Quauhtemotzin.[771] Charge after charge was made by his direction, and with a vehemence that threatened to carry everything before it; and loudly rang the yells, whether of delight at some advantage gained or of fury over a repulse.

Thus the besieged were harassed beyond endurance. Large numbers were wounded, and all were exhausted from vigils, hard fighting, trying work, and the want of sufficient water and food; for in view of the stoppage of supplies, rations had been reduced. Those of the Narvaez expedition were particularly disheartened, and bestowed freely their maledictions, first on Velazquez, who had sent them to such a country, and then upon Cortés, whose promises of golden treasures and well stocked encomiendas had lured them to this plight. Perceiving, however, that unity of purpose alone could save them, they stifled regrets and showed Cortés that something must immediately be done to stay the onslaught, lest the building fall about their ears. It was exceedingly disagreeable, but it must be done; the proud Spanish general must sue to the greatly injured captive king, pleading for his influence in behalf of peace.[772] Montezuma had all these days been closely confined to his rooms brooding over the insults offered him, and apparently indifferent to the danger from without. When the message was brought he sullenly said, “Why does Malinche address himself to me, who care no longer for life? I will not listen to him, for he it is who has brought me into this plight.” He intimated further that the promises of the general could not be relied upon, and that his words carried a double meaning. Olmedo and Olid, who had come to urge the request, had recourse to soothing words and persuasion, and succeeded in mollifying him somewhat.[773] He replied, however, that it was probably too late to appease the Mexicans by promises. “They have now a new leader,” he said, “who is resolved to spare no Spaniard, and I believe that you have all to die in this city.”[774] Nevertheless he yielded, and as befitted the momentous point at issue, he arrayed himself in the richly bejewelled robes of state, and placed upon his head the mitred copilli, beneath whose precious feathers gleamed the golden plate.[775] Carefully guarded he ascended to the roof and stepped to the parapet, preceded by a courtier who bore the triple wand of the empire, as was customary on such occasions. Instantly the tumult was hushed, even before the leaders could issue orders for a stay of hostilities; instantly a thousand heads were bent in humble adoration before the august majesty of their sovereign. This attitude, however, was assumed but for a moment; soon these same heads were held higher than ever. Then the chiefs drew near to listen to the unhappy monarch.

Montezuma had appeared with a feeling of mingled fear and doubt as to what his reception might be, and he did not fail to observe that the accustomed reverence was shown only for an instant, involuntarily, as it were, and that silence was prompted rather by curiosity than respect. The urgency of the moment demanded that he should speak, but it was rather as supplicant than ruler that he turned to his people.

“You are in arms, my children,” he said, “in hot battle. Why is this? You will be slain, and there will be heard throughout the land for many years the wail of wives and little ones. You would give me my liberty, and I thank you. You do not turn from me in anger, and I thank you. You have not chosen another king in my stead, and I thank you. Such an act would displease the gods, and bring destruction on all. And see! I am no prisoner. Go your way; I am free. By divine command I must remain the guest of the Spaniards yet a little longer, and you must not molest them, for soon they will return whence they came. Alas, my people, my country, my crown!”[776]

With a heavy sigh, and midst copious tears, his head fell on his breast. The monarch’s strength had indeed departed. The people knew that he spoke falsely, that he was little better than imbecile, unfit to be their sovereign. Oh, if he but had the good fortune to die while helping them to grind to powder these hated enemies! Only a little while ago his words would have been received as the utterances of a deity. Now the scales had fallen from their eyes, and they saw him as he was. They could bear no more. Jeers and groans reached him from every direction. “Coward! chicken! Woman to the Spaniards, fit only for the gown and the spindle! Murderer of your nobles!” Such were the cries which now reached his ears as he stood stupefied with agony. Presently came a shower of arrows and stones, and before the Spanish guard could interpose their shields several missiles struck him, one on the left temple, which caused him to fall senseless into the arms of the by-standers.[777]

Startled by the crime they had committed, awe fell upon the multitude as the stricken sovereign was led away. Taking advantage of this feeling Cortés beckoned the chiefs to a parley with a view to explain what Montezuma had intended to convey. He had always wished them well, he said, and felt grieved to wage war for what had occurred during his absence. He desired peace, yet the desire was not prompted by fear, but by consideration for their safety and that of the city. The chiefs replied that the Spaniards must leave the country to the natives, and depart at once. That was exactly what they wished to do, replied Cortés, but they would not be driven away. If the Mexicans desired them to go, they must abandon the siege, tear down the barricade, and retire to their homes; they must likewise restore the bridges and supply provisions. To this the chiefs declined to listen, declaring that they would not lay down their arms so long as there was a Spaniard left on whom to use them.[778] The evident desire of the besieged for peace served only to encourage the Indians, and the assault was renewed with an increased ardor that taxed the defenders to the utmost.

And now, whatever the cost, a way out of this place must be opened. Cortés knew of three causeways which led to the mainland, the only means of exit for his forces. He knew that they were low and narrow, exposed on both sides to the attacks of canoe fleets, and intersected by a number of bridges which were perhaps by this time raised. Each of these openings was an almost impassable chasm. The southern causeway to Iztapalapan was two leagues in length, and provided with seven drawbridges, besides a strong fortress, which rendered it impassable to an enemy. The northern, leading to Tepeyacac, was one league long, while the shortest, conducting westward to Tlacopan, half a league distant, was broken by only three bridges.[779] Cortés resolved to undertake the passage by this last named causeway. During the night had been completed three mantas, of light framework and planks, each to hold twenty musketeers and archers, with which it was hoped to check the assailants on the roofs. These mantas were built with two chambers, provided with loop-holes; the upper ranged on a level with the house-tops of ordinary one-story buildings of the city, and had doors, so as to allow of sallies upon the roofs.[780]

The following morning, June 28th, Cortés placed himself at the head of five hundred Spaniards and over three thousand allies, and took the direction of the Tlacopan causeway.[781] By a sudden charge the cavalry drove back the Indians and allowed the free passage of the mantas, which were drawn and pushed by Tlascaltecs, and protected by bodies of infantry. A corps of pioneers accompanied them with pickaxes, mattocks, crow-bars, and ladders, to destroy barricades and walls, and to scale buildings. Four cannon were also brought. The rear was protected by a portion of the cavalry. The Aztecs were at first amazed at the curious moving turrets, and feared that they might contain more terrible destroyers even than the grape-charged guns; but finding them less dangerous, they continued their efforts, and fast and thick poured the stones and arrows on the line of advance, particularly on the engines, which were severely damaged. The march proceeded, however, with more or less interruption till a raised bridge was reached on the main road, where the Indians had gathered in vast numbers, with an evident determination to check the expedition. The turrets were brought alongside the houses adjoining the canal in order to clear the crowded roofs, but regardless of the volleys from the firelocks, the natives on the roofs plied their missiles only the faster, letting fly heavy rocks[782] upon the engine coverings, so as to render them untenable and hinder the manœuvring of the cannon. This success enabled the warriors beyond the canal and behind the barricades to maintain their assault with great effect, and to prevent a further advance. They gained a considerable advantage by a change of tactics in directing the missiles to a great extent against the legs of the Spaniards, to their serious discomfiture.[783] After spending the greater part of the forenoon in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the houses nearest the canal, and to fill a passage across it, the troops retired to the fort greatly disheartened. Even the Tlascaltecs, who were usually so glib of tongue in replying to Aztec taunts, for once held their peace.[784]

Meanwhile the battle raged fiercely round the fort. The temple in front of it, since its evacuation by the Spaniards, had been occupied by some five hundred Mexicans, chosen men,[785] who introduced a large quantity of ammunition and supplies, and began to batter the besieged quarter. It was this shower which had first damaged the turrets and harassed the march. Perceiving the danger of leaving so commanding a position in hostile hands, Cortés had sent his chamberlain, Escobar, with one hundred men[786] and some allies to dispossess them. This was no easy task, for the pyramid was of great extent and over eighty feet in height, composed of a series of abrupt stone terraces, each receding about six feet from the one beneath, and so arranged that the ascent led along the entire circuit of each ledge before the steps conducting to the next could be gained.[787] Twenty men, says Cortés, could have held it against a thousand; yet the one hundred were to attempt it. Step by step they fought their way, beneath showers of arrows, and against javelins, and sword and lance thrusts from the upper ledges. More dangerous even than these weapons were the cumbrous missiles in the shape of heavy stones and timber which came crashing down upon them. Three times[788] did Escobar lead his men to the charge, only to see them repulsed and sent rolling down the steps and over the ledges. Finally he sent word to Cortés that the task was impracticable. The general received this notice while vainly battling at the canal, and he eagerly seized upon it as excuse for changing his base of operation. He hurried to the spot, threw a cordon round the pyramid, and although badly wounded in the left hand he immediately led his men to the charge. The Spaniards were making fair progress, when two heavy beams, which had been reserved at the summit for the last extremity, were loosened and sent tumbling down the side, so directed as to sweep to destruction the assailants along its entire length. At about the centre of their terrible passage, full before them, stood Cortés. Immediate death for himself and his brave comrades seemed inevitable, when behold! by some unseen finger the beams were turned end foremost and shot harmlessly through the opening made for them by the soldiers. “Thanks be to God and the virgin, whose image was placed in this tower!” cried Cortés, as without the loss of a moment he sprang forward and speedily gained the summit. There the fight assumed the form of a gladiatorial combat, a hand-to-hand and line-to-line conflict, poised in mid-air on this narrow slippery summit, and in full view of the whole city. As if by common consent the combatants below paused in their bloody work and stood breathless, lost in the more thrilling sight above.

At the eastern end of the platform stood the two three-story chapels, over fifty feet in height, originally dedicated to Huitzilopochtli and Tezcatlipoca. Against this the Indians had massed themselves, fierce in their desperation. The Castilians had taken their stand at the other end. It was an awful situation, dire destruction being inevitable to one side or the other. With nerves and sinews strained to their utmost tension, they stood between attacks regarding each other, regarding every motion, anon picking from the other’s number with javelin, dart, or musket, as they were able. It was with difficulty the Spaniards could stand, and there was no railing round the slippery height; but fortune again assisted by unveiling the sun and sending its blinding rays full in the face of the enemy. Every now and then the soldiers charged in solid phalanx into the centre of the opposite mass, only to be obliged to retire under the pressure of its weight, and to receive the counter-charge, encouraged by wildly gesticulating priests, who flitted to and fro in bloody robes and dishevelled hair. Aware of the inferiority of their weapons, the natives sought rather to seize hold of the Spaniards, singly or in groups, and with the recklessness of doomed men to hurl themselves with their victims from the dizzy height. In one instance Cortés himself was selected for this terrible fate. Inspired to martyrdom and revenge, two young nobles watched their opportunity, and approached him on their knees, as if pleading for mercy. Ere he had time to consider the situation they had seized him in their arms and were struggling to gain the edge. One moment more and he would have been dashed to death, but by putting forth his whole strength, nerved by desperation, he succeeded in freeing himself from their grasp. Ojeda was singled out for a similar attempt, and would have perished had not a Genoese come to his aid.[789]

For three hours the struggle lasted, while one Indian after another was picked off by the bullet and the arrow, or pierced by the pike and sword, or sent headlong over the platform, either to be crushed by the fall or to be transfixed by the Spaniards on the ledges below. As their number diminished, many a one sought the higher martyrdom by leaping from the sacred spot into paradise. Thus melted away that fated band of Aztec warriors. At the portal of Huitzilopochtli’s chapel fell the last defender; and two priests, one of them the high-priest, alone remained to offer themselves as captives. On entering the chapel consecrated to the virgin no traces appeared of the holy emblems, only evidences of idolatrous rites, and upon the altar stains from the blackened hands of the temple attendants.[790] In the adjoining chapel the war-god was found reinstalled in all its glittering hideousness. Some consolation for this sacrilegious intrusion was offered to the victors in despoiling it of the rich ornaments, while the cacao and other provisions stored here by the garrison proved a prize to the half-famished Spaniards. The Tlascaltecs, so long deprived of meat, pounced upon the bodies of the slain heroes to secure them for a feast, which should not only satisfy the cravings of hunger, but infuse their hearts and minds with some of the qualities of the valiant dead.[791] The chapels were then fired. The upper portion of the structure being of wood, the flames rose in columns heavenward, heralding the triumph of the Spaniard, and striking the Indian with awe. It was a great and thrilling feat, this fight upon the temple top; and so the natives regarded it, their heart, and mind, and paintings being all stained sanguine over its remembrance.[792]