History of Mexico, Volume 1, 1516-1521

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

FOOTNOTES

[711] Cartas, 124; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12. Bernal Diaz confirms that this was effected long before dawn, while Herrera states that 300 held out till morning; but he is contradictory. Carrasco, whom he assumes to be free, urged them to fall upon the attacking party, who were scattered to plunder. But this was not done for want of a leader. Nor did they favor his advice to plunder the baggage of Cortés, which was protected only by Indians, and to embark with Diego Velazquez. Carrasco accordingly proceeded alone to the baggage camp, and securing a horse and lance he returned and urged them to follow. He had evidently supernatural means wherewith to penetrate the besieging force. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Duran allows Cortés to form ambuscades and leap walls, so that the arms are secured ere the men of Narvaez can form in defence. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 453. Peter Martyr disposes briefly of the matter, and assumes that the chief captains of Narvaez were seduced. dec. v. cap. v.; Castellanos, Varones ilustres de Indias, 71-2; Galvano’s Discov., 144-5.

[712] ‘Cortes se mandò pregonar por Capitan general, y justicia mayor, de ambos exercitos.’ Carrasco was three days in stocks before he yielded obedience. Herrera, ubi sup. ‘Y todo esto era de noche, que no amanecia.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99.

[713] ‘Viua, viua la gala de los Romanos, que siẽdo tan pocos, han vencido a Narvaez!’ to which Guidelo, the negro jester of Narvaez, added, ‘Behold! the Romans never performed such a feat.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera speaks more at length of the sayings of this negro, who was rewarded with a crown of gold worth 600 ducats. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[714] ‘I saw Narvaez in Spain in 1525, and heard him publicly denounce Cortés as a traitor. He asked but royal permission to prove it, face to face with his enemy; furthermore, he was a liar, a tyrant, and an ingrate. Narvaez had been betrayed by those in whom he confided.’ Oviedo, iii. 316. Still, the chronicler cannot excuse his carelessness nor his entering into parley with Cortés; and he told him so. iii. 316.

[715] Bernal Diaz mentions fifteen dos for doce makes it only five deaths among Narvaez’ men, including Captain Rojas, Alférez Fuentes, who was an hidalgo of Seville, and Carretero, one of the deserters from Cortés’ explorers. Cortés lost four. Hist. Verdad., 99. Cortés prudently mentions to the king only two deaths, but leaves it uncertain to what side they belonged. Cartas, 124. Gomara claims them for Cortés, and states that Narvaez lost his eye, his honor, and sixteen men. Hist. Mex., 148. Cortés lost two men and one wounded; Narvaez eleven. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés four, Narvaez eleven, besides many wounded on both sides. Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 138. Solis supposes that two wounded of Cortés’ army died, making four in all, while Narvaez lost fifteen. Hist. Mex., ii. 101. One version claims that Narvaez lost fifteen by arms and six by fire in the burning of the quarters, which is probably an exaggeration. Narvaez lost all his property, including notes of hand. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, i. ii., varies from twelve to sixteen for Narvaez.

[716] Oviedo looks on Cortés’ reasons as insufficient to justify his procedure, such as ordering Narvaez to be seized, and demanding of him to exhibit a royal commission, ‘as if Cortés had been appointed by the king.’ Velazquez, as the principal who sent him forth, had every right to remove him. iii. 316.

[717] Bernal Diaz places the number at 1500, while Ceballos raises it to 3000, under Heredia, and places the arrival a day or two later. Herrera assumes that they came in time to march with Cortés on Cempoala. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[718] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, names Francisco de Lugo as the captain of this party, but Tirado states that he had been sent back to Mexico as an adherent of Velazquez. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6. ‘Dió con los once navios que el dicho mi parte allí tenia, al través, é les fizo quemar.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. Bernal Diaz also intimates that all but two vessels were destroyed when the army proceeded to Mexico and one afterward. Hist. Verdad., 109. It is not probable, however, that more than a few were destroyed, because unseaworthy. Some were wrecked a few months later.

[719] ‘Por Almirãte, y Capitan de la mar ... al qual dizen que le dió primero buenos tejuelos de oro.’ His baptismal name was either Juan or Pedro. Two vessels were still expected to arrive. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, 113. Caballero was probably an old friend. ‘Pedro de Maluenda criado de Diego Velazquez, que venia por mayordomo de Naruaez, recogio y guardo los nauios y todo la ropa y hazienda.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 148. By Cortés’ order, adds Herrera.

[720] ‘Envié otros docientos hombres á la villa de la Veracruz.’ Cortés, Cartas, 125. Clavigero assumes that Cortés at this time already gave orders for removing Villa Rica southward, but events interfered with the project. Storia Mess., iii. 120.

[721] ‘Cortés le [Narvaez] tuvo preso con muy ásperas prisiones tres años, poco mas ó menos, é con guardias que nadie no le pudiese ver; é aquellos pasados, le quitó las prisiones é le tuvo preso otros dos años.’ So says Narvaez’ agent. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442-3. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, reduces the term to two years, and intimates that several other men were kept at Villa Rica, under surveillance at least. i. 223, 362-3, et seq.

[722] Narvaez claims to have been robbed of 100,000 castellanos’ worth of effects, and it is not likely that his property was restored. See Demanda de Ceballos, ubi sup. Bernal Diaz had to surrender a horse fully accoutred, two swords, three daggers, and other effects. Hist. Verdad., 100. Santa Clara intimates that the horses and arms were not as a rule restored. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 169. If so, compensation was probably given, according to the Relacion hecha por el Señor Andrés de Tápia, sobre la Conquista de México. This is one of the most valuable documents extant on the earlier period of the conquest, but it is unfortunately only a fragment, which takes up the narrative from the eve of leaving Cuba, and carries it to the capture of Narvaez, relating with rather uneven completeness the principal incidents of the voyage to Vera Cruz, the march to Mexico, the stay there, and the operations against the forces of Velazquez. Andrés de Tápia appears from his own statement to have been a poor nephew of Governor Velazquez, to whom he presented himself just in time to join the expedition of Cortés. At this time, says Bernal Diaz, he was about 24 years old, of good build, with a grave face, slight beard, and somewhat ashy complexion. Hist. Verdad., 246. He took an active part in the leading wars and expeditions during and after the conquest, and became one of the most noted among the captains, favored by Cortés, with whom he was frequently associated, accompanying him also on a voyage to Spain. Settling in Mexico, he died there peacefully, long after 1539, to judge from his reference to this date. His narrative, as may be supposed, is a panegyric upon his leader and patron, and some statements have accordingly to be weighed, but this defect impairs the importance of only a few passages, the rest being highly valuable, and many of them unique in their testimony. Guided by a reference in Bibl. de Autores Esp., xxii., Señor Icazbalceta of Mexico obtained, after great trouble, a copy of the apparent original from the Royal Academy of History, Madrid, entitled: Relacion de algunas cosas de las que acaecieron al Muy Ilustre Señor Don Hernando Cortés, etc. This he published in his Coleccion de Documentos, ii. 554-94. The last three pages form an appendix of brief remarks on the inhabitants and resources of New Spain.

[723] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 149. ‘Dos dias después de preso el dicho Narvaez, porque en aquella ciudad no se podia sostener tanta gente ... despaché dos capitanes.’ Cortés, Cartas, 125. Cortés writes that before leaving for Mexico he sent Mexican envoys to obtain the friendship and allegiance of the lord of Pánuco. This was at once offered, and presents were exchanged. Id., 56-7, 125, 144-45. Cortés was either deceived or he invented the story to counteract Garay’s schemes. Bernal Diaz names Ordaz for Goazacoalco and Velazquez for Pánuco; but it has entirely escaped his memory or notes that Velazquez had already been charged to form a colony in Goazacoalco, for which he was also better fitted, while Ordaz was more suited for rough warfare in Pánuco. This author gives to each 120 men, twenty of them from the ranks of Cortés, ‘porq̄ teniã mas experiẽcia en la guerra.’ Hist. Verdad., 100. The 200 allowed by others may include the ship-crews. Herrera places 300 men under Ordaz. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[724] For description of the feast, so as better to understand what follows, see Native Races, ii. 317-21, iii. 422-8.

[725] Oviedo refers the council and its acts only to the time immediately preceding Cortés’ departure, iii. 509.

[726] ‘Esto afirmaron muchas mugeres, de las quales se sabia siẽpre la verdad.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.

[727] ‘Nos quitaron la comida e enbiando por ella no nos la quisieron dar e nos davan de palos a las naborias e estando lavando una yndia de las nuestras la hahogaron e dezian e publicavan que asy avian de hazer a los españoles.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66. This testimony is confirmed by a number of his followers.

[728] ‘Con muchas escalas para subir y matar a los españoles.’ Id., 67. Martin, in Id., 144.

[729] ‘Le prince acolhua Tecocoltzin.’ Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287.

[730] ‘A number of poles were raised in the court-yard, destined, as I was told, to impale the Spaniards, one taller than the rest upon the pyramid being reserved for me.’ Alvarado, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66.

[731] Alvarado’s statements with regard to reports and signs of revolt, and to the confession of several natives, is confirmed by a number of witnesses, including the clergyman Juan Diaz. Id., 66, 113, et seq. Tapia, who is arrayed against Alvarado, intimates that torture induced the natives to give the confirmation of the plot as desired by the Spanish captain, and that the interpreter was unreliable. One witness declares that the uprising was understood to be planned to take place within ten days; another says on the day following the torture, intimating that it was to be after the great dances. Id., 37, 150. ‘Alvarado dixo, que luego le auian de venir a dar guerra ... que lo supo de vn Papa, y de dos Principales, y de otros Mexicanos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102.

[732] Tapia’s testimony to this and other criminating points is particularly valuable, as he was a bitter opponent of Alvarado. The latter states that Montezuma declared himself powerless to prevent the premeditated sacrilege to the Christian images. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36-7, 66-7. But this plea, if made, must, according to other accounts, be interpreted to apply only to pagan ceremonies, held almost before the images, and which might be regarded as a sacrilege. Torquemada writes that arms had been collected within the temple and everything prepared for the day when the Spaniards attended by invitation to witness the dance of the nobles. At a given signal an evidently simultaneous attack was to be made on the assembled guests and on the fort, thus taking the Spaniards at a disadvantage. Jars stood prepared, filled with certain liquids, wherein to cook their bodies for the feast. i. 489-90. The general inclination of those who follow the Spanish version, of which Torquemada, usually so stanch for the natives, is here the best exponent, has been to assume that the attack was arranged for the day of the great dances; and this is not unlikely, although the original writers and their commentators appear to be ignorant of or oblivious to certain features of the festival. Another view has been to place the attack during the installation of the new image of the war-god. This ceremony belonged to the preceding day, a fact not as a rule understood, and therefore the source of much confusion. Brasseur de Bourbourg, who is clearest on these points, assumes that the raising of the idol would involve the casting forth of the Christian emblems, and be the signal for attack. But evidences are conclusive that the natives were not ready on that day. They were too occupied with the celebration, and Alvarado, with his small force, was not so negligent as to wait till the last moment, when the enemy was fully prepared. He and several of his men indicate clearly enough that they attended the temple at the installation. The uprising must therefore have been appointed for the following or even a later day. See [note 25]. Vetancurt, Teatro Mex., iii. 139, is among the authorities who follow the version of Torquemada in general. One of the fervid-minded witnesses of Alvarado repeats the account of pots and jars for cooking the Spaniards. Helps supposes that Huitzilopochtli’s festival had not yet been entered upon, and that Tezcatlipoca’s image is the one in question; but the Spaniards, who knew the difference between these idols, all affirm that the celebration of the war-god was now held. See Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 69, 113, 130, 137, and 150.

[733] This received support from his neglect to interfere when supplies were cut down. Even Tapia refers to a change in his disposition, and to Alvarado’s displeasure thereat, but his words may apply to the stoppage either of supplies or of presents. Id., 36. Want of power could not be pleaded by Montezuma, because a few days later, when the natives were far more embittered both against the Spaniards and against their captive sovereign, the latter was able by a mere appeal to stay their onslaught. The testimony speaks not only of an undermined wall and scaling ladders, but of weapons, ‘porras y otras armas,’ and of conspirators within the fort. Id., 67, 113, et seq. Gomara says that his love for the Spaniards has been denied by some. Hist. Mex., 154-5; but Bernal Diaz will not believe Montezuma guilty of conspiracy. Hist. Verdad., 102. The grief of the Spaniards at his death, and the care taken of his children, indicate that they and the crown regarded him as loyal.

[734] ‘Los españoles lo requirieron al dicho D. Pedro.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 150. Tapia pretends that he objected. Id., 37.

[735] Alvarado and his men in more than one instance indicate the day when the dough idol was raised. Id., 67, 113, 134. Ixtlilxochitl points to the following greater day, which he dates May 19th. Relaciones, 412. Sahagun is not so definite, but his editor accepts the chief day, calling it whitsunday, May 27th. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 99. In another place he says May 25th. Tezcuco en los ultimos tiempos, 274. One of Alvarado’s men states that it was a Thursday. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 131.

[736] The testimony of the conquerors, confirmed by native paintings and records, leaves no doubt that the dance of the nobles and the massacre took place in the great temple adjoining the fort. Ramirez, Proceso, 37 et seq. Acosta writes, however, that they occurred in the palace, Hist. Ind., 522, and he is partly right, since a massacre was carried out here also. Clavigero follows Acosta, and assumes that the fort is meant. He argues that the dance was held there so that the emperor might, as customary, be present, and that a massacre could not have been undertaken by so few Spaniards in the great temple, where the arsenals were situated, and where the concourse of people must have been very large. Storia Mess., iii. 118. The Spaniards had forbidden the use of arms during the festival, and none appear to have been produced in the temple. Among other precautions Alvarado appears to have insisted on a small attendance beyond that of nobles, and most authorities so accept it.

[737] Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom counted.

[738] ‘Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o veynte criados,’ says the charge against Alvarado. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally ignored part of the massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the attendants of Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to punish them for this.

[739] Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412. ‘Este bayle es como el Netoteliztli.’ ‘Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir Merecimiento con trabajo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 150.

[740] See Native Races, ii. 288-9.

[741] ‘Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha gente junta para le subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente los quales comensaron a pelear con nosotros.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 67. This is a mere excuse evidently, which none attempt to support, definitely at least; but it sounded well to say that the actual fight began on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur de Bourbourg’s unique manuscripts states that the first attack by the Spaniards was upon those who were advancing with the idol. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287. ‘Este testigo desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir donde estava Nuestra Señora.’ Nuño Pinto, in Ramirez, 134.

[742] There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs, and an audience of from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from the wording of the accusation against Alvarado it appears that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest, besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets the native painting to signify 400, most likely of the nobles only, Id., 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, Cortés, Residencia, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one hour, Cano, in Oviedo, iii. 550; 600 to 1000 nobles and caciques, Gomara; over 1000 nobles, Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412, and Brasseur de Bourbourg. ‘Fué tan grande el derramamiento de sangre, que corrian arroyos della por el patio como agua cuando mucho llueve.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details of truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of draggling entrails. Father Duran goes to an extreme in his account, according to which Alvarado prompted the deed, and Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men were summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in order to permit Cortés to kill them and thus become master in the country. He places ten soldiers at each gate, and sends in ten to commit the slaughter. Hist. Ind., MS. ii. 456-9. Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but close behind him in the estimate, for he states that the slaughter was carried on in different parts of the city at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young nobles fell. Prescott misinterprets him. ‘Non procul à palatio aberant, duo circiter millia juvenum nobilium.... Ad hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad reliquas urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit, ... non cessabunt celebrare & lamentari ... calamitatem,’ etc. Regio. Ind. Devastat., 32.

[743] Tapia, and others, in Ramirez, 38, 67, 131. Torquemada assumes that the arms used by the assailants were those which had been collected for the outbreak in the houses adjoining the temple, i. 490. As regards the motives for the massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to justify them, while the native accounts are equally inclined to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty. According to Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado, who slaughtered the devotees without known cause. Hist. Conq., 27 (ed. 1840), 100. Duran, who is as prejudiced as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the return of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure the submission of the country by killing all the lords and chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to their death. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 456-7. Las Casas inclines to a similar motive; ‘quo magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis formido illorum crudelitatis.’ Regio. Ind. Devastat., 30. Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed to credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards, and so takes the prudent middle course of casting the blame on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred bred of former wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they invent charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being also avaricious, is readily induced to believe them, and considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain control by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Ixtlilxochitl is not to blame for his assumption, since his admired guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend Alvarado, but merely mentions that he was influenced either by reports of a proposed uprising or by avarice. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly that the latter motive ‘es mas de creer.’ Hist. Conq., i. 281; Benzoni, Mondo Nuovo, 94; Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns Alvarado for acting on insufficient evidence. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139-40. Cortés’ silence respecting the cause may be attributed to his usual prudence in suppressing unpleasant facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated him not to be annoyed at what had happened, since he regretted it as much as the Spaniards. This implies that the Indians were regarded as originators of the trouble. The severity with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico, notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the Spaniards, indicates still more strongly that Cortés was convinced of Mexican treachery. Cartas, 126 et seq. In the letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed to Narvaez’ plots. Carta del Ejército, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 429. Herrera notices the native versions, particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs of having trumped up charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms, ‘la verdad fue, que pensaron matar los Castellanos.’ He thereupon enumerates proofs of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with native accounts, condemns them as unreliable, and states that Sahagun accepted them without investigation, i. 489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice is promptly rejected by Bernal Diaz. ‘No lo creo, ni nunca tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.’ His motive was to inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the Indians from attacking him. That they intended to attack, Bernal Diaz fully believes. Hist. Verdad., 102. Solis is quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled the Spaniards. Hist. Mex., ii. 117. According to Oviedo the intention of the natives was to kill also Cortés on his return. He inserts without comment the version of Cano, married to Montezuma’s daughter, that avarice was the motive, iii. 510, 550. Acosta, who generally adheres to native versions, does not apparently find them reliable in this case, since he merely says that a ‘chastisement’ was inflicted, but that it was excessive. Hist. Ind., 522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who believes that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of a plot, and wished to anticipate it, on the principle that ‘chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la sua condotta non può scusarsi d’imprudenza, e di crudeltà.’ Storia Mess., iii. 119. This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern Mexican historian Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be. Hist. Mex., ii. 339. His confrère Bustamante, as editor of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero’s views and disbelief in Alvarado’s apology. But in expressing his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises some meaningless questions. Mex., ii. 284-6. There is no doubt that the Indians were bent on mischief. A large faction had been hostile to the Spaniards ever since their arrival, as intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading under the threatening attitude assumed by the unbidden guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting tribute, and in assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole population became possessed with a desire to avenge not only the outraged idols, but themselves and their sovereign, and to uphold the tottering throne. The observations of the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were correct in pointing to an uprising, to take place during the gathering of pilgrims for the war-god festival, when the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted by torture or not, confirmed the charges and justified belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent commander ignore them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the protection of his force, and of the interests of his king and the expedition. It might be urged by those who seek to defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims for hostages would have been equally effective and more humane; but from the precedence established by the general himself at Cholula the conduct of the rash Alvarado is scarcely to be wondered at. Cortés’ object had been to strike terror as the only effective lesson for a people who seemed to recognize no other sway, and if this was regarded as necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have held it to be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than that at the former city, for his resources were smaller, the prospect of aid was hopeless, and escape was cut off. He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would apparently have greater effect. It was natural to suppose that the installation of the war-god would be attended by the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to level the blow at this class must be considered as less cruel at least than to strike the multitude, as at Cholula. Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the silence of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor motives prompting a dastardly deed I do not regard as very relevant. I am very sure that the motives of the Spaniards in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for a higher stake, for the whole country, and, in case they won, all in it would be theirs. The present heavy blow was but one of the points in the game.

CHAPTER XXIII.
UPRISING OF THE AZTECS.
May-June, 1520.

Character of the Aztecs—Spanish Quarters—The City in Arms—Growing Hatred toward the Invaders—Perilous Position of Alvarado—Montezuma Called to Interfere—Failing Provisions—Miraculous Water—Cortés to the Rescue—Rendezvous at Tlascala—The City and its People—The Army Joins Alvarado—Desperate Encounters.

The Spaniards had mistaken somewhat the character of the Aztecs. Ground to the dust by political despotism and bloody superstition, their features had assumed a melancholy cast and their form the attitude of humility. Yet beneath all slumbered a ferocity the most blood-thirsty among the Nahua nations. And now, though their nature might be as cold and impassive as the stone of the pavement, the iron heel of the conqueror had struck fire from it.

Before the fort the angry throng increased, until the whole city seemed to have gathered there. On the roofs and in the courts fell showers of arrows, stones, and darts, and charge after charge was made at the entrances. Attempts were also made both to scale and undermine the walls, and some resorted to battering, until it seemed to the besieged as if the whole habitation was coming down upon their heads.

The structure consisted of a vast irregular pile of stone buildings, one story in height, and raised, like most of the pretentious edifices, on a pyramidal foundation, which was low and difficult to undermine or beat down. An occasional tower relieved the monotony of the outline and offered a view over the neighborhood. Beside the smaller courts inclosed by the buildings, a larger yard appears to have been formed by a stout wall, within which the allies had erected temporary shelter. This was the weakest point, and here the battering parties were chiefly collected. The flanks and curtains of modern fortification were wanting, and the protection of the wall face depended on the turrets which rose here and there, and on the parapets, with their few embrasures.

Though attempting no sortie beyond the immediate vicinity of the gates, the Spaniards were not sparing of powder and arrows, and picked off the more presumptuous assailants, while their pikes and swords did good service at the parapets and openings. The cannon, however, loaded as they were with small shot and scraps, which brought down a dozen or more at a time, were the only weapons that could hold the enemy in check. On one occasion, when a charging party had approached in a somewhat wavering column to carry the main entrance, the cannon charge failed to explode, owing to dampness. This the assailants were quick to observe, and with yells of encouragement they rushed forward, and were soon in a hand-to-hand conflict with a party which had sallied to break the first column. The Spaniards plied their swords and pikes with desperation, supported by a desultory fire from the musketeers and archers of the fort, but without effect. The gaps made by their weapons were quickly filled with fresh warriors, and the sallying party was obliged to fall back with the loss of two soldiers, who were captured alive and devoted to sacrifice. It was a critical moment, for the enraged horde was about to follow them into the quarters. Just then, as if touched by invisible fire, the powder ignited, sending from the cannon its death-dealing missiles, mowing a path through the crowd of pursuers. The Mexicans were appalled and speedily thrown into disorder, of which the Spaniards were not slow to take advantage. Nor was this the only miracle of the day; for it is alleged that the virgin, and he of the dazzling white steed, both appeared fighting on the side of the Spaniards, and bringing defeat and confusion upon their assailants, as at Tabasco and Tlascala.[744]

Thus closed the first day of Alvarado’s chivalrous doings, during which a large number were wounded, although there were but six killed,[745] not including allies. A portion of the quarters, with a quantity of ammunition and supplies, had been burned, and a large breach made in the wall. The brigantines were also burned, the bridges raised, and barricades erected in different parts of the city; while the supply of provisions was cut off. Even after darkness had stilled the fury of the warriors the unhappy people remained before the Spanish quarters, and with outstretched arms and dishevelled hair they lifted up their voices, crying, “You are doomed, you vile things! But for your thunder and your fortress walls, curses on them, you would now be killed and cooked. And you shall be, unless you instantly release Montezuma and depart. You shall meet with holy death, and be cooked with chilmole, and be given as food to the eagles and the beasts, for your flesh is bitter, as we have found, and not fit for men to eat. Why does not the earth swallow you alive? Oh ye gods! ye gods! unmoved all, all but the devilish gods of these devilish men. But our mighty ones, whom you have outraged, shall yet give you your deserts. If they do not, we shall; nor shall they escape, the despicable ones of Tlascala, your slaves, who serve you as women and hire out the wives of their lords!” Thus raved the heart-broken.

So critical had become his condition on the second day that Alvarado appealed to Montezuma to exert his influence to stay the assailants, intimating that if the Spaniards perished so would the Aztec king. Montezuma’s overtures were not received with enthusiasm by the people; nevertheless aggressive operations were reduced to desultory attacks.[746] Water was greatly needed by the besieged, and again the good fortune of the Spaniards, which hardly ever forsook them, came to their aid. Digging, under inspiration or desperation, they struck fresh water within the fortress,[747] and offered thanksgiving.

Communication was shortly after established between Alvarado and Cortés. Several Tlascaltecs and Cholultecs were despatched by different routes to the coast, and a courier arrived from Cempoala and gained entrance to the fort.[748] Ordering Velazquez and Ordaz to abandon their mission and direct their march to Tlascala, Cortés hastened preparations to join them there. A garrison of one hundred men was left at Villa Rica, under Rodrigo Rangel, a relative of the general,[749] and about thirty men remained at Cempoala to take charge of the sick and wounded, and some baggage, with orders to follow as soon as possible.

The route to the plateau lay partly through a bleak and desert country, and the inhabitants being beside less friendly than before, the army would have found it difficult to obtain supplies; but Cortés had gathered experience from his previous march, and Tlascala was entered in the middle of June.[750] A hearty reception was accorded, and more encouraging news obtained from Mexico, showing that the siege maintained its passive character. Reinforcements were nevertheless urgent, since a fresh outbreak might at any time occur. A message was again sent to gladden the garrison with promises of speedy relief.[751]

Including the troops under Velazquez and Ordaz the muster-roll showed about eleven hundred men, with some eighty horses, one hundred cross-bows, and eighty fire-arms, besides several cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition.[752] The heart of the company, however, was the veterans of Cortés, whose superior discipline and familiarity with native warfare made them doubly reliable. Eager for a fray with the detested Aztecs, and desirous of excusing their refusal of men a month before, the Tlascaltecs offered not only supplies but large reinforcements, of which only two thousand were accepted, besides a small number from Cholula and Huexotzinco.

The more northerly route by way of Calpulalpan, recommended already on the former march as the easiest, was this time selected, partly with a view to obtain provisions more readily.[753] As the lake region was approached evidences were seen of the revolt in deserted villages and in the sullen demeanor of the few Indians who showed themselves. The contrast was chilling indeed as compared with the reception accorded on the former occasion, when the journey resembled the triumphal march of gods. Oppressed with misgivings the army entered Tezcuco, the seat of the Acolhua kings, a few leagues north of Mexico, on the border of the same lake.

It was one of the most ancient cities of the country, ranking since the early half of the eighth century as the capital of a dominion founded by Tezcatlipoca, the later supreme deity of the Nahuas. After the fall of the Toltec empire it took the leading position in Anáhuac, as the centre of Chichimec power. The new dynasty fostered the inherited culture in every way, and made the city not only the political capital, but the Athens of the country. The rise of the Aztecs gave it a rival in Mexico, which in course of the fifteenth century assumed the political sceptre, but Tezcuco still maintained the precedence in culture and elegance. It was said to contain one hundred and forty thousand houses, distributed among different suburbs, and extending with their smiling gardens from the border of the lake to a distance of from three to four leagues. The six divisions of the city were crossed by a series of fine streets lined with tasteful and costly buildings. Among the finest structures were the two palaces, which are claimed to have excelled those of Mexico. The older, the Huetecpan, wherein the poet-king Nezahualcoyotl held his court, formed a magnificent monument of his artistic taste. It lay upon a triple terrace bathed by the lake, and was surrounded by an immense wall, from fifteen to twenty-five feet high, inclosing two large squares. Within this precinct were the council-chambers, the halls for various arts and sciences, and the royal apartments. The pleasure-grounds, almost hedged by cedars, were filled with shady groves, traversed by labyrinthian paths, and interspersed with well stocked ponds and aviaries, baths, and sparkling fountains. The new palace, which occupied a smaller space, excelled in imposing architecture and in comforts of the most varied character.

Beside these there were a number of summer resorts in the neighborhood, conspicuous among them the fine palace of Tezcocingo, a prototype of Chapultepec, and like it overlooking the capital from a hill, two leagues to the east. An aqueduct of stone supplied two reservoirs on the summit, whence the water was distributed over grounds intersected by canals with meandering currents and picturesque cascades. The palace lay almost hidden within groves of gigantic cedar and cypress, revealing to the rapt beholder pavilions of marble, tessellated pavements, and playing fountains with statuary of unique form.[754]

The Spaniards found none to welcome them, but were allowed unmolested to take up their quarters in the palace. Shortly afterward a canoe arrived from Mexico[755] with an imperial messenger and a Spaniard,[756] bearing the cheering news that everything had been quiet in the capital for some time, and that supplies, which had been scantily furnished only against heavy payments, had now become more liberal. Montezuma sent word that the city would return to its normal condition the moment Cortés entered it, and he expressed a hope that no ill-will would be entertained toward him for what had happened, since this had been beyond his control, and had grieved him as much as the Spaniards. Reassuring messages were forwarded to Villa Rica.

After a stay of four days the army proceeded from Tezcuco by the northern shore of the lake, and camped for the night at Tepeyacac, the terminus of the northern causeway from Mexico.[757] On entering this place the horse of Solis, Casquete, stepped into a hole on the bridge and broke a leg, throwing its rider into the water. This was looked on as a bad omen, particularly by an astrologer soldier named Botello, but Cortés made light of it, saying, “Troubles at St John’s festival bring peace for the year.”[758] The following morning, St John’s day, the army entered the capital. On all sides an ominous silence prevailed. The streets were deserted, the houses apparently abandoned, and the solitary native occasionally seen hovered in the distance like a shadow.[759] It was also noticed with apprehension that many of the canal bridges were removed. On approaching the Axayacatl palace the arrival was heralded by trumpet blasts, which called forth responsive shouts from the garrison. Throwing open the gates, the besieged received their deliverers with the most extravagant demonstrations of joy.[760] For greater accommodation a part of the troops were quartered in the great temple adjoining the fort.

The unpleasant aspect of affairs, so apparent during the last days of the march, had ruffled the temper of Cortés, and his treatment of Alvarado was not altogether cordial. Still, as he had ever been a close friend, and as he was an invaluable officer, brave and influential, he deemed it prudent to go no further than to express a curt disapproval of his rashness.[761] Indeed, an inquiry into the causes and results of the massacre could criminate Alvarado no further than the Cholula affair did himself. The captain had acted in full accord with his party, and whatever blame might attach must be shared by all. Dissension would never answer, and so the matter was dropped. But the ill-temper which the general dared not wreak on his own men found a ready object in Montezuma. The conduct of Cortés in this respect was most ungenerous. It shows the several sides of humanity: how odious in some respects are those who appear to the best advantage in other respects. This poor king had a superstitious sympathy, a maudlin affection for the captain, who, considering his own infamous conduct toward him, might at least have saved the captive unnecessary mental suffering. As Cortés entered the fort Montezuma stepped out of his apartment to welcome him. The cavalier passed by the king in lofty disdain, ignoring his presence. Cut to the quick, the monarch shrank back, apparently more stunned by this treatment than by the late terrible slaughter of his subjects.[762] He retired deeply chagrined to pour his sorrow into Olmedo’s ear. “What can I do?” he cried; “he loves gold and fame, and I will give him a life-size equestrian statue of himself in gold if he will but be kind to me.”

With the arrival of the main forces supplies were stopped, as if in protest, and Cortés became only the more irritated. Accordingly, when two chiefs appeared on behalf of the emperor to ask for an interview they were repulsed with the insulting epithet of ‘dogs!’ Velazquez and other officers remonstrated against the policy of this rudeness to one who had interfered to save his troops. “What consideration can I have for a dog?” was the dastardly rejoinder. “Was he not willing to treat with Narvaez, and does he not now seek to starve us?” Persuaded presently of the necessity for imperial interposition, he addressed the chiefs roughly, “Tell your master, Montezuma, to order markets to be held at once, or there will be trouble.” His tone and gesture were sufficient indications to the chiefs of the insults offered to them and their august lord, and they failed not to give them full force in their report. In answer to the demand Montezuma said that he and his chief officials were prisoners, and that nothing could be effected without the release of one among them. Cortés saw the necessity, and, without considering the result, released Cuitlahuatzin, lord of Iztapalapan, the emperor’s brother, and generalissimo of the army, a man whose hostility to everything Spanish was well known. According to Aztec law he was the most probable successor to the throne, and therefore particularly dangerous.[763]

Cortés was becoming foolhardy. Whether the brothers were in accord upon the measures to be adopted is uncertain; but Cuitlahuatzin, who was not only bold, but ambitious, had evidently determined on his course. If the Mexicans had hoped for better prospects with the arrival of Cortés that hope was now dissipated, and bitter indignation filled their breasts. Cuitlahuatzin was welcomed as a liberator. His constant efforts in the imperial council to oppose the admission of the Spaniards, by force if necessary, and his services for the cause of liberty and religion in connection with the Cacama revolt, were sufficient to endear him to his brother patriots. Strongly urged, he accepted the leadership of the insurgents, a position for which his experience and success as a general had well fitted him. He began by ordering war material and erecting barricades. The value of the Chinantec pikes introduced by Cortés had not been lost on him, and a number were provided, barbed with the vitreous iztli. Arrangements were made with adjoining towns and provinces for a supply of provisions and reinforcements to carry on the holy war.[764]

The Spaniards soon learned what was brewing, and first in this way: Ojeda and Marquez, when out foraging early in the morning of the day following their arrival, observed several suspicious circumstances, among others broken bridges, which in one place obliged them to fill up a canal before crossing it. Here and there they saw large collections of slings and other weapons, and presently they came on a priest with dishevelled hair shouting with wild gesticulations to a crowd of armed men. They hurried back to inform the general, guided through intricate cross-streets by a Tlascaltec. Antonio del Rio, who had been despatched for Villa Rica the same morning, returned at a gallop in less than half an hour, excited and bleeding. The streets, he said, were full of warriors, who had raised the bridges and were apparently prepared to attack. Had it not been for his trusty sword and swift horse he would have been slain. At this moment the sentinels in the towers announced the approach of a vast multitude from different directions, with gleaming iztli weapons, and speedily the neighborhood was alive with warriors, whose yells rose high above the shrill shell and doleful drum.[765] Even if they did not inspire the full measure of dread intended they presented a striking picture in their painted bodies, grotesque with patterns and brilliant colors, with no covering among the rank and file save the raw cotton on the head and the universal maxtli round the loins. They were protected in part by the chimalli, or shield, a slight bamboo frame covered with gaudily colored skin or reed-grass, chiefly oval and round, and often large enough to cover the whole body. Secured to the arm it left the hand free to hold the bow or stone, while the right managed the arrow or the sling. The latter was an implement of great effect with the Aztecs, who could impel the stone with wonderful precision and force. The maza, or club, with its knotty head, and the macana, or sword, toothed with iztli, were well represented, while high above gleamed the obsidian or copper points of the spear. One of the most dreaded weapons was the tlacochtli, or javelin, often provided with three points, and attached to a cord by which it could be recovered for a fresh cast. Conspicuous among the warriors were the nobles, those that were left of them, in lofty quetzal plumage on a head-dress of green feathers set in tiger-skin, or in a gold or silver band, which gave the appearance of metal helmets. The body was covered in corselets of red, green, or yellow feathers, worked with gold, and so arranged as to indicate the company or district to which the wearer belonged. Beneath gleamed occasionally cuirasses of gold or silver. The limbs were covered with wood or leather armor set with feathers or gold plates. A more common body armor was the cotton tunic, one or two fingers in thickness, which extended to the knees and elbows. It was almost equivalent to the quilted cotton protector used on the eastern coast, whose efficiency against native weapons had caused the Spaniards to adopt it. The tunic was adorned with feathers, which corresponded to the uniform in color and arrangement, usually in the form of an animal. Many were distinguished by casques in the form of eagle-heads, and in armor spotted like a tiger-skin, indicative of the two orders of Quauhtin and Ocelome, eagles and tigers. At the head of the different columns appeared officers with small drums, painted and adorned with feathers, with which they directed the march. Beyond, in the centre of the masses, could be seen banners, with devices in various colors and forms, which the Tlascaltecs pointed out as belonging to different wards and to cities on the mainland, a sign that an extensive body of troops had been enlisted for the war.[766]

As the forces drew near, slingers and bowmen appeared on the roofs of the neighboring buildings, who, together with those below, began to send stones, arrows, and darts in showers upon the fort. The Spaniards responded with a series of volleys, the number of cannon being increased to twelve or more. The effect was merely to startle them for a moment, and on they pressed over dead and dying, amid encouraging shouts, till they reached the sides of the wall, where the dreaded cannon, at least, could not destroy them. All attempts to scale the wall proved futile, and soon their efforts were confined to effecting breaches. With their rude implements this was slow work, but they persevered with reckless obstinacy, reinforced at frequent intervals, while the main body kept up a galling discharge of missiles, and occupied the attention of the besieged with continual charges at different points.

This passive or defensive policy did not suit the Spaniards, while it encouraged the Aztecs. Therefore two corps were formed, each of two hundred men, besides allies, under Cortés and Ordaz. Clearing a path with a volley of artillery, they sallied in different directions to drive back the assailants, who hurried for safety into lanes and houses, and behind barricades. This comparative freedom of advance appears to have been permitted to entice the Spaniards into a disadvantageous position, for soon the natives reappeared in swarms in the rear and along the flanks, showering arrows and stones, and coming to close quarters with spears and swords. The heaviest attack was from the roofs, on which large supplies of missiles had been collected, and from which commanding position the enemy was able to direct the discharges with terrible effect, particularly upon the naked Tlascaltecs. Several Spaniards also fell, and the greater number were wounded. Ordaz received three cuts, and Cortés a wound which maimed two fingers of the left hand.[767] The assailants were comparatively safe, for those on the roofs could be picked off only by archers and musketeers, and those below took refuge when pressed, only to return to fresh attack. Efforts were made to fire the houses, but this was slow work, since they were constructed almost wholly of adobe or stone, and were filled with defenders. Nor would the fire spread, owing to the detached form of the buildings, separated by alleys or canals, so that the torch had to be applied to each.

Thus matters continued until Ordaz, who was engaged on the street to the west of the fort, sent word to Cortés, who was pressing forward in the direction of the Iztapalapan causeway, that he was losing ground. Leaving his own forces, the general hurried to the scene with a few horsemen, and heading the charge, drove back the warriors at the most exposed point, so as to relieve the infantry in the retreat which was now found necessary. Returning to his men he found them also retreating, those who headed the column, including Andrés Duero, the Cuban secretary, having been cut down. “Shame upon you!” exclaimed Cortés to the corps, as he led the horsemen to the rescue of the fallen cavaliers. He was just in time to save them, for a moment more and Duero, at least, would have been slain. The elated warriors fell back before the charge of the terrible Malinche, although they soon recovered. Cortés then concluded to retreat, but this proved no less dangerous than the advance, and among others Lezcano was dragged from his horse and killed, after having distinguished himself for bravery and execution. The fort had meanwhile sustained an active siege, and when the retreating corps approached it they found more enemies in waiting, who, fearful of losing their prey, rushed forward with greater fury than ever. An entrance was finally effected, the forces in the temple being at the same time withdrawn for the greater safety of themselves and the fort.[768]

Swelling with triumph the Aztecs now directed all their efforts against the Spanish quarters. Burning arrows and whirling brands began to mingle with their missiles. Although the building itself was of stone, the roof and portions of the outwork, and the Tlascaltec camp in the yards, were of inflammable material, and more than once the flames burst forth, filling the whole place with suffocating smoke, and calling for the greatest exertions to subdue them. The little water at hand could not be spared, and so earth was cast up, and portions of the wall were torn down to check the fire and to stop the gaps. The assault continued all day, till darkness sent most of the warriors to their homes.[769]