FOOTNOTES
[654] ‘Velazquez ... si yua en persona no podia escusar de respetarle, aunque por su buena, y blãda condicion, confiaua que le traeria a qualquier buen partido; pero temia que yendo otro qualquier General.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix.
[655] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 144; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90. ‘Afirman muchos, que en essa saçon estaba tan bien quisto Cortés, que si á todos los quisiera llevar, todos se fueran trás él.’ Oviedo, iii. 509. Which is exaggerated, as we have seen.
[656] ‘Debia ser alguna mala gente, y no vasallos de V. A.,’ is Cortés’ version of the reply, Cartas, 119-20, while his interpreter, Aguilar, gives it more literally as ‘una gente vizcaynos e que no los enbiava el enperador.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 47, 184. Gomara adds that Cortés said he was going to protect Montezuma’s subjects, and to keep the strangers on the coast till he was ready to depart. The emperor probably dissimulated, ‘holgando que vnos Christianos a otros se matassen.’ Hist. Mex., 145. Forgetting that the declared purposes of Narvaez were well known in Mexico, Herrera renders the answer that this captain was a brother of Cortés, sent with a present from their king. Both would come up to the capital and then leave the country. The rumored enmity was due to an order from Spain to avenge any injury suffered at the hands of the natives, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows him.
[657] ‘Aquellos españoles le dejaba encomendados con todo aquel oro y joyas que él me habia dado ... y le dí muchas joyas y ropas á él,’ et seq. Cortés, Cartas, 119-20. ‘Aun prometiò, que embiaria en nuestra ayuda cinco mil hombres de guerra, e Cortes ... bien entendiò que no los auia de embiar, e le dixo, que no auia menester.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 91; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 135. Ixtlilxochitl assumes in one place that Cortés asked for men, and was told that Aztecs dared not fight Spaniards, but would go as carriers. In another version the confederate kings grant the auxiliaries. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Solis assumes that Montezuma is devoted to Cortés; so does Zamacois, who sees a proof thereof in the offer of troops. He could not communicate with Narvaez for want of interpreters, and had he wished to aid the latter he would have attacked the Spanish quarters. Hist. Mex., ii. 70-1. All of which shows that this author is not profound either in investigation or argument.
[658] Bernal Diaz places the force at 83 men, with 10 cross-bows, 14 firelocks, 4 large guns, falconets, 7 horses, and all the ammunition; 150 men were left, and 150 taken, Oviedo; a little over 50 were left, Tapia; all wished to go, but 200 were left and 250 taken, including the men of Velazquez, with 8 to 9 horses, and a force of carriers, Gomara; 150 left, 250 taken, with a number of Indians, Ixtlilxochitl; 150 left, Probanza de Lejalde. B. V. de Tapia, who remained with Alvarado, says 130; Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36. Cortés’ own account distributes the total of his force as follows: 140 left at Mexico, 150 absent under Velazquez, 70 taken by himself, 150 at Villa Rica; but this is more than the original number given on setting out for the plateau. The Villa Rica force may, however, have been reduced by later drafts, for other authorities allow only about 70 men for this fortress. In the Ramusio edition of the Cartas 140 men are given as the garrison left under Alvarado, while 60 are taken by Cortés, Viaggi, iii. 244, but later issues place the former figure at 500, which is evidently a misprint. However much the figures of different writers may vary, it seems to be admitted that war and disease had made a considerable inroad upon them.
[659] ‘Fizo capitan dellos a Alonzo Davila.’ Monjaras and Aguilar, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 48, 184.
[660] ‘Que seria fasta catorze mill castellanos.’ Monjaras, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49. ‘Cinco o seys mill.’ Tirado, in Id., 7.
[661] ‘Porq̄ le pareciò q̄ auia conseguido su intento.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Perhaps in spreading the rumor that he came with Indian auxiliaries. Among the auxiliaries were 400 men from Huexotzinco, under Pedro Gonzalez de Trujillo. Tirado, and others, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 247 et seq.; ii. 7 et seq. It is this expedition of Rodriguez, assisted by Diego Garcia, Alonso de Ojeda, and Juan Marquez, as captains, that has misled Gomara, and particularly Herrera, in supposing that the whole expedition received a grand reception at Tlascala; but, beside the above reference, Cortés intimates clearly enough that he did not go that way, and he certainly did take a more southerly route to the coast than on the previous journey. Cartas, 120. Bernal Diaz also says: ‘embiò Cortes a Tlascala â rogar ... que nos embiassen de presto quatro mil hombres.’ Hist. Verdad., 91. Prescott falls not only into this generally adopted error, but states that 600 troops were asked for, Mex., ii. 243, whilst the chroniclers all say from 4000 to 10,000.‘La maior parte de ellos se bolviò, porque aquella Nacion no estaba acostumbrada à pelear fuera de su Tierra.’ Torquemada, i. 482. A not very sound excuse, since their troops had already gone to Mexico.
[662] About twenty leagues east of Cholula.
[663] ‘Vezino de la Puebla, que era ballestero.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.
[664] ‘Púsole preso en su pié de amigo.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441. But this is not likely. Bernal Diaz says that Narvaez was told to send communications to Tampaniquita. Hist. Verdad., 91; Cortés, Residencia, i. 248, ii. 185.
[665] Torquemada and Clavigero attempt to correct this spelling, but Bernal Diaz is sustained by Orozco y Berra, in Mex., Noticias Ciudad, 244-6. Bernal Diaz also mentions Mitalaguita, which may be Metlangutla, a few leagues farther east. Hist. Verdad., 91. Herrera states that they passed through Cotastlan, by which he means probably the province, and not the town, of Cuetlachtlan. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[666] Herrera, ubi sup., leaves Ircio in command at Villa Rica, which is improbable. Sandoval arrived at the rendezvous the day after us. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 3-9. Prescott makes him join long before this, on the high plateau, but he misunderstands his authorities, and is quite at sea with respect to the route followed by the forces.
[667] Bernal Diaz and Herrera say 266 in all; Torquemada has 266, beside captains and five horsemen; Cortés, 250 in all; Tapia, about 250.
[668] ‘Por vn peto, ó capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro, dieramos aquella noche quãto nos pidierã por ello.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98.
[669] Thirty-eight palmos long. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.
[670] According to Bernal Diaz this commission was arranged by the combined influence of Olmedo and Duero, during Olmedo’s second visit to the camp. The friar appears, however, to have been there but once, when he was expelled. Knowing Salvatierra to be a blusterer, Bermudez, the alguacil mayor, proposed that he should join the commission, but his intended victim, not caring to trust himself within the power of Cortés, pleaded sickness and a dislike to speak with a traitor. ‘Señor Veedor,’ chimed in Olmedo, ironically, ‘best it is to be prudent, and you may have him prisoner before long.’ Hist. Verdad., 93.
[671] Duero was to receive the share of treasures claimed, a command in the expedition equal to that of Cortés, and after the conquest a grant of towns similar to his own. As a further inducement, sufficient gold was given to load his two Cuban servants. On taking leave of the general, on pentecost morning, Duero asked: ‘What has your worship to say, before I leave?’ ‘God be with you,’ was the reply, ‘and see to it, Señor Duero, that it be done as arranged, or by my conscience [Cortés’ favorite oath] I’ll be in your camp within three days, with all my companions, and the first to receive the lance will be your worship, if I see aught contrary.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 94. Monjaras states that Duero and Leon warned Cortés against opposing Narvaez’ army and commission. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49.
[672] Cortés to remain governor of the part to be allotted him till the king should decide. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588. According to Gomara, who sends Veedor Álvarez Chico, Juan Velazquez, and Juan del Rio, to carry the message, Cortés proposed a private interview for the discussion of two points, whether Narvaez would leave Mexico to him and go to Pánuco or elsewhere, aided by Cortés with gold and supplies, or whether Narvaez preferred to take Mexico and give him 300 or 400 men wherewith to pass on to new conquests. Hist. Mex., 144. The last proposal could only have been a trap to secure Narvaez’ men. Prescott chooses to omit the proposal for an interview, and sends instead the ultimatum with Duero, a glaring disregard of Cortés’ own text, as confirmed by others. Cortés, Cartas, 121-2; Oviedo, iii. 314.
[673] ‘Dize Narvaez, y en todo su Real ay fama, qui si U. merced [Velazquez] vá allâ, que luego yo [Cortés] soy deshecho.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.
[674] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés made the request in a manner that appeared to Velazquez an attempt to probe his loyalty. He therefore refused to take any valuables with him, but was finally persuaded. Juan del Rio, Cortés’ equerry, kept him company.
[675] Bernal Diaz adds that, these efforts being observed by Salvatierra, Narvaez was urged to seize Velazquez, and this would have been done but for the representations of Duero and others. During the dinner given in his honor, Captain Diego Velazquez, nephew of the Cuban governor, alluded in one of his remarks to Cortés as a traitor. The guest appealed to Narvaez against such expressions. Diego repeated the term, and added that Juan did not deserve to bear the name Velazquez. Grasping his sword the latter retorted, calling him a liar. He would prove himself a better man than either uncle or nephew, if permission was granted. The others had to interfere to prevent the clashing of swords, and Narvaez was persuaded to order the turbulent visitor away. At leave-taking the general showed his annoyance, and said that it would have been better had he not come. Diego Velazquez, who stood by his side, added a threat, to which Juan rashly retorted, with a twirl of his beard: ‘Before many days I shall see if your prowess equals your boast.’ Alarmed at his want of self-control, Duero and other sympathizers hurried him away before he could utter any more indiscretions. He and the equerry had hardly left camp before some horsemen appeared, as if in pursuit, and caused them to increase their pace. Hist. Verdad., 95-6; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[676] Cartas, 122. Bernal Diaz assumes that the proposal for an interview came from Narvaez, through Duero, to whom he also confided the intended treachery. Olmedo, who had pretended to be won over, was also informed. Hist. Verdad., 93. Herrera supposes that Sandoval warns Cortés, who, according to Gomara, is still at Mexico when the proposal comes. Hist. Mex., 144. Solis is more correct in ascribing the warning to Duero. Hist. Mex., ii. 83.
[677] The fact that he allowed such dangerous men as Velazquez de Leon and Olmedo to go free indicates that he harbored no treachery.
[678] Gomara sends them with Velazquez de Leon. Hist. Mex., 144. ‘Chico, é Pedro Hernandez, escribano.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440. Velazquez having gone on a mediatory mission, Chico must have been sent after his departure.
[679] ‘La respuesta ... fué prender al escribano y á la persona que con mi poder ... los cuales estuvieron detenidos hasta que llegó otro mensajero que yo envié.’ ‘Escribí una carta al dicho Narvaez y otra á los terceros, diciéndoles cómo yo habia sabido su mala intencion.’ Cortés, Cartas, 122-3. The reference to a messenger indicates Cortés’ meaning to be that Chico preceded Velazquez de Leon. Gomara assumes that Cortés’ pretext for withdrawing the proposal for an interview was that Narvaez had declined to entertain the points to be there discussed. See [note 19]. Chico had warned him of the intended treachery. Hist. Mex., 144. ‘Y que supiesse que no auian de cantar dos gallos en vn muladar, y que aparejasse las manos.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi. Bernal Diaz sends the message with Olmedo, ‘since no royal notary dare carry it,’ and gives Narvaez three days in which to send in any commission he may possess signed by the king. Without such commission he must leave the country, or Cortés will seize him and inflict punishment for the outrage on Aillon and on the Indians. This ultimatum was signed also by the captains and some soldiers, including Bernal Diaz. Hist. Verdad., 92-3. An answer was demanded through the same messengers. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
[680] ‘Daria dos mil pesos, a quien matasse a Hernando Cortes, o a Gonçalo de Sandoual.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. ‘Traia mandado de Diego Velazquez que á mí y á ciertos de los de mi compañía que ... nos ahorcase.’ Cortés, Cartas, 121. ‘Hizo proceso en forma contra Cortés, y por su sentencia, le condenó á muerte.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 300; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143, 146.
[681] ‘Dende a dos horas que se partiô el Juan Velazquez,’ says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.
[682] Implying that since Narvaez would not listen to reason, Cortés or he should die. ‘Velazquez dixo al ... Cortés que adonde yva que yva a la carnesceria.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 9, 50, 185-6. On the way to Rio de Canoas, where they arrived the day after leaving camp, two hogs, with navel on the back, were killed, an incident which many interpreted as a sign of victory. Velazquez having arrived with the messenger who carried the ultimatum, the army proceeded. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95. ‘Anduvimos aquel dia casi diez leguas.’ Tapia, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
[683] Two men were drowned in crossing the stream. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
[684] ‘Dos leguas de los contrarios.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc.. ‘Fuimos a dormir a vn riachuelo, adõde estava en aquella sazon vna puẽte obra de vna legua de Cẽpoal.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96. Prescott here evidently follows the erroneous topography of Solis, who confuses this creek with Rio Canoas. Hist. Mex., ii. 85; Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 50.
[685] ‘Como yo deseaba evitar todo escándalo, parecióme que seria el menos, yo ir de noche, sin ser sentido ... y prenderlo [Narvaez]; ... porque los demás querian obedecer á la justicia, en especial que los mas dellos venian por fuerza.’ Cortés, Cartas, 123-4.
[686] He also stated that offers had been made favorable to him alone, not to them, hence he had declined them. ‘Muera el asno ó quien lo aguija.’ Any other course will disgrace us, was the concluding remark, whereupon we lifted him upon our shoulders and carried him round. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588-9. ‘Hizo muchas ofertas, y prometimiẽtos, que seriamos todos muy ricos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. It would be his fault, not theirs, if success failed. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
[687] ‘Gonzalo de Sãdoual, Alguazil mayor desta Nueua España, por su Magestad, yo os mando q prendays el cuerpo de Panfilo de Narvaez, e si se os defendiere, matadle, que assi conviene al servicio de Dios, y de su Magestad, y le prendió a vn Oidor.’ Countersigned by Secretary Pedro Hernandez. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590.
[688] Herrera writes 3000, 1500, and 1000 pesos de oro. Cortés’ acts are said by the men of Velazquez to have been prompted by ‘un diabólico pensamiento é infernal osadía.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441.
[689] The above agrees chiefly with Herrera, who assigns Sandoval 60 men, and names a number of the leading members of each party. The parties were to keep a stone’s throw apart. One of Cortés’ squads was to look to the cacique’s palace, and another to Alcalde Yuste’s quarters. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii. He is evidently confused on many points, and several names are guessed at. Bernal Diaz states that Pizarro, with 60 young men, including himself, was charged to capture the artillery; Sandoval received 60 men; Velazquez de Leon also a force of 60, wherewith to attack Diego Velazquez’ quarters; Cortés remained with a reserve of 20. It is more likely that a higher officer, like Olid, received the order to capture the artillery, rather than the comparatively unknown Pizarro. Velazquez de Leon does not appear to have been detailed for his charge till afterward. Cortés names only Sandoval as the leader of one party of 80 men, he himself following with the remaining 170. Cartas, 123. Solis reverses Herrera’s order. Hist. Mex., ii. 91-2.
[690] The stout cacique had remonstrated with the general on his carelessness, assuring him that Malinche with his Teules was far different. ‘When you least expect it he will be here and will kill you.’ Although the warning was received with laughter, yet the hint was not lost. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96.
[691] Eighty horsemen and 500 infantry. ‘Y llegó casi una legua de donde yo estaba.’ Cortés, Cartas, 123.
[692] Laet, Nov. Orb., 221; Hakluyt’s Voy., iii. 467.
[693] Botello, known as the Astrologer, who had made several successful predictions, had assured Cortés that a night attack would secure him the victory. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.
[694] Cortés rallied him upon his capture, and addressed him as compadre. After obtaining certain information, more was demanded. The prisoner declared that he knew nothing more. ‘Well, then, you will swing,’ said Cortés, half jestingly. The two pikemen who held the rope round his neck took this for a command, and hoisted him. Rangel rode up, however, and saved his life, but the compression of the throat troubled him for some time. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.-iii. Carrasco warned him against attacking the powerful Narvaez. Vetancvrt, Teatro Ecles., pt. iii. 137; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589. Prescott says that he with ‘Spartan heroism’ remained silent, Mex., 257-8; but Prescott has evidently not understood his authorities.
[695] At a cross-road a little farther on, says Herrera.
[696] May 28th. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., 277. Clavigero and others assume it to be the night between Saturday and Sunday, but the authorities are pretty clear in mentioning the following night.
[697] Estimated by various authorities at from twelve to nineteen pieces. Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12, 168.
[698] Expressing the belief that Cortés would be foolhardy enough to attack in the morning. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589.
[699] ‘Llegamos junto á las centinelas sin que nos sintiesen, é iban huyendo é diciendo: Arma, arma!’ Id., 590. ‘Auisado Naruaez, y se estaua vistiendo vna cota: y dixo aqui ẽ le auisò, no tengays pena, y mandò tocar al arma.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.
[700] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99, calls the flies cocayos.
[701] Prescott, following Herrera, makes Cortés shout the password ‘Espíritu Santo,’ which Bernal Diaz says was given as a secret word for mutual recognition.
[702] So say all the original authorities that refer to it, except Bernal Diaz, who claims that four guns were fired, three balls passing overhead and the fourth killing three men. Cortés acknowledges no casualties from it. Tapia even intimates that no discharge took place, owing to the fact that to protect the touch-holes from rain they had been covered with wax and tiles. Confused by the sudden alarm the artillerists applied the match, forgetful of the wax, and ‘we saw that the charges failed to go off.’ Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. Perhaps he would have been more correct in saying that the men were confused by the glittering bribes of Usagre. Bachiller A. Perez testifies: ‘Dixo al artillero poned fuego a estos tiros ... puso fuego e no salieron los tiros e oyo dezir este testigo que avian puesto cera en los dichos tiros.’ Cortés, Residencia, ii. 85. This implies that the wax had been smeared on by accomplices.
[703] With from 40 to 100 men, are the different estimates.
[704] ‘Vinien los contrarios á nuestra gente, creyendo que eran de los suyos, á preguntar, “¿qué es esto?” é así los prendien.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. ‘De las otras dos torres ... no le acudierõ, porq̄ dizen algunos que se hizieron sordos, otros que no pudieron llegar, por el impedimento de las tropas de Cortes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.; Cardona, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 181-2.
[705] ‘Uitoria, vitoria por los del nõbre del Espíritu Sãto, q muerto es Narvaez!’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. Even this authority now shouts forth the password!
[706] Solis assumes that Farfan gave also the thrust. Bernal Diaz’ text leads one to suppose that Narvaez received the thrust before his followers were driven into the building, but the other authorities state clearly: ‘al salir de su camara, le dieron vn picaço.... Echaronle luego mano.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 147; Oviedo, iii. 510. Monjaras states that Narvaez supplicated for his life: ‘Hidalgos, por amor de Dios no me mateys!’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 51, 85, 107; i. 365. ‘Alonso Dávila le sacó dichas provisiones reales de V. M. del seno, teniéndolo preso é abrazado el dicho Pero Sanchez Farfán.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. This occurred some time after the capture. Narvaez called upon his fellow-prisoners to witness the deed, but Ávila shouted that the papers were merely letters. They were given to Cortés. ‘Las avian quemado.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 345, 365, 250; ii. 52, 187.
[707] He died, however, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera calls him Diego de Rojas, whom Bernal classes as a captain.
[708] ‘Se retrajeron á una torre alta de un ídolo de aquel pueblo casi cuatrocientos hombres, é muchos de los de caballo ... salieron al campo.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., 590. Herrera says that 300 intrenched themselves till the morning. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés reached the battery just in time to prevent a catastrophe, as Tapia relates. A hot-blooded young companion of the latter, carried away by excitement, rushed to powder barrels, eight in number, and shouted, ‘Let us fire the powder and spoil it for the enemy!’ Cleaving a barrel, he cast a brand into it, and threw himself flat upon the ground, commending his life to God. It happened, fortunately, that this barrel contained sandals, which by some mistake had been mixed up with the ammunition. After waiting in vain a while for the explosion, the madcap discovered the reason and began to open another barrel. At this moment Cortés came up, and learning of his intention he rushed forward and snatched away the brand.
[709] Including also Juan Yuste, Juan Bono, and Gomara.
[710] Oviedo, iii. 510. Bernal Diaz lengthens Cortés’ reply: He thanked God for the victory and for giving him such valiant gentlemen and companions to aid him. One of the smallest things he had done in New Spain was to secure and defeat him; it appeared more daring to seize an oidor of his majesty. Las Casas relates that Narvaez had a not dissimilar surprise by night from Cuban Indians, during his campaign for Velazquez, and had a narrow escape. Hist. Ind., iv. 6-8.
CHAPTER XXII.
ALVARADO’S MERCILESS MASSACRE.
May, 1520.
After the Battle—Victory Made Secure—Conduct of the Conquered—A General Amnesty—Disposition of the Forces—Affairs at the Capital—Insurrection Threatened—The Spaniards Hold a Council—Alvarado’s Resolve—The Great Day of the Feast—The Spaniards Proceed to the Temple—The Grand Display there Witnessed—The Attack of the Spaniards—Horrors upon Horrors.
Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely had his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the whole heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and Mexico! And Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and in some respects his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the outlaw with his grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured the grand army, and was now master of all the ships, and men, and munitions of war, which he so much needed in consummation of his further designs. It seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his solid substance to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.
Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in confinement such persons as might question his rights as victor; the remainder on surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large.[711] In order to make more secure his magnificent prize before the all-searching sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the victors, Cortés seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-colored robe, and ordered the conquered troops to pass before him, and swear allegiance to the king, and fealty to him as captain-general and justicia mayor. This was done by nearly all, some humbling themselves and kissing his hand, while the late hostile leaders and old acquaintances were recognized with friendly greetings and embraces.[712]
Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the captured horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in the field. Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little persuasion was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn the whole cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting vivas for Cortés.[713] High above this noise were heard from a window the voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with their loud philippics. “Villainous Dominicanos!” they cried to the soldiers of their own party, “the distaff would better suit you than the sword. A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate women we to have come to the wars with such men!” Truly might Narvaez exclaim with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen Artemisia, outwit her Athenian pursuers, “My men fight like women, and my women like men.” The Ordaz women, however, fought only with their tongues, and that after the issue of battle. And thus relieved they immediately descended and did homage to the victor. The general did all he could to check this excess of zeal, which he feared might engender ill feeling, and he even seized some of the noisiest enthusiasts, although they were afterward rewarded.
The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded during the battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his previous occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to obliterate their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and hospitality, while many among Narvaez’ men thought it necessary to excuse their tardy surrender by pleading that they had been deceived by their principals, who had assured them that Cortés was a traitor. Great was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how few the victors were and how poorly they were armed. And where were the much talked of native auxiliaries? At the same time they could not but admire a leader who had achieved such results with such means. Narvaez and his supporters declared that the victory was due wholly to treachery, particularly noticeable in the action of the artillerists.[714] In this there was much truth, but the consummate tact and soldierly qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that. And the cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was! Four of his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain, beside a number wounded on both sides; this was all.[715]
In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the occurrence by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it was on both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other falsehoods than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal conflict. He was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his conduct, and could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare every misfortune. He was aware that even to the impartial observer he must appear as a defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal, and in the agreement or partnership which he had formed, and also as the usurper of an expedition fitted out in the name and under the auspices, at least, of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and masterly conquest of a rich country, and on his election to independent command by a party formed on the pretence that the superior interests of the sovereign demanded the immediate subjugation of the country. But his acceptance of that command was a breach of duty and of contract; the right of the party to act as it did was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or perhaps usurped from Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while the commission to undertake the conquest had already been conferred on the latter. Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this coast, and above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it was so far as indicating the situation and extent of territory. He had a right to claim his own; though circumstances had so changed, Cortés claimed, as to render this perilous to the interests of God, the king, and the people, which rose above those of individuals; and in ignoring the orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his countrymen he followed only natural law and justifiable impulse. In this respect Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to yield to the rightful claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king, however, that self-preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had determined to hang him and several of his followers. Here he again hides the fact that favorable terms were at one time offered. “Had Narvaez carried off the victory,” he continues, “it would have been with a great loss, which must have so weakened him as to surely enable the Indians to succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have lost the country to the king and to the faith, and twenty years would not have sufficed to regain it.”[716] In brief, howsoever we admire Cortés, however much we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez or Narvaez, we must admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his side, and that no position in which he could possibly place himself was tenable. He was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor, outlaw, hypocrite; but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable soldier, a rare hero. On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But, though deeply injured, he was disagreeable; though foully wronged, he was vanquished. And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last to smile on iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining, disappointed virtue.
In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had been staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec warriors, two thousand in number.[717] They had reached the rendezvous on pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it convenient to advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended. An imposing sight they presented as they marched by amidst vivas in a file of three abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the centre man with bow and arrows, while his companions on either side carried the formidable pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was fortunate that they had failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed was saved thereby. In fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear that they would have fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was nevertheless delighted with their coming, since this proved not only the sincerity of their friendship, but showed the conquered that he did indeed control native armies. Distributing some beads and trinkets, he bade them return peaceably under the supervising care of Barrientos.
One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet; and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba.[718] Shortly after, when the masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were placed in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels under Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence.[719] The fortress was again garrisoned, with a larger force,[720] and thither were sent Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.[721]
As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days their arms to all except a few leaders, and ordered his men to return the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of war.[722] What with their admiration of the liberality and soldierly qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the terms. But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid veterans. They had seen with envy that rich presents were made to the conquered, while they, whose courage and devotion had achieved such magnificent results, received nothing, and were even told to return what they regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to share with these late comers and intended despoilers the fruits of their years of toil and victories. A general murmur arose, and many soldiers refused to surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila and Father Olmedo being requested to remonstrate, did so earnestly, and told Cortés that he acted like Alexander, who honored more the conquered than those who won the battle. He and all he possessed belonged to his comrades, was the reply, but at present it was necessary to conciliate their invaluable acquisition, whose aid was needed to overcome the threatening danger in Mexico, and who being the more numerous party might otherwise rise against them. Their aims effected, the entire resources of a vast and rich country were theirs. Olmedo was convinced of the wisdom of the course, although he considered that too great liberality had been shown. The headstrong Ávila pressed the point with his natural haughtiness, whereupon Cortés said: “I am for Mexico; those who please may follow; those who do not, may leave it alone. There are yet women in Spain to bear soldiers.” “Yes, and captains and governors,” retorted Ávila. Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy no further words at present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with gifts; but Cortés awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.
With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of the late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under the command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this commission, and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to Jamaica for live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the proposed colony. The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the occupation of Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels were given him to explore the coast.[723]
While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at Cempoala the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater perils. At the time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth month, had begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It was in honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and identified with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily worship of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor deities, whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme divinity, whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The Mexicans had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great temple, which had been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on condition that no human sacrifices should take place.[724] A festival of this prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the natives the indignities to which they and their gods had been subjected. We have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the occupation of the great temple by strange religious emblems was escaped, and how it was restrained only by the promise of the speedy departure of the Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital he saw the smouldering fire, and it was this that led him to strengthen the defences of the fort, to obtain extra supplies from Tlascala, and to enjoin the strictest watchfulness and moderation.
The hostile feeling was by no means diminished by the tidings of another larger host of invaders with doubtful motives. At a meeting of native leaders it was admitted that the promises and statements of the newly arrived Spaniards could no more be relied upon than those of the deceitful Malinche, and the deferred proposition to drive out or to kill the Spaniards was renewed with ardor. A better opportunity for carrying out such a measure could never again be found. The great Cortés with his cunning controlling mind was absent. There remained only a small force in charge of the city, and the troops on the seaboard were divided against each other. On the other hand a multitude of pilgrims were pouring in for the festival; and what better subjects to be worked upon for an uprising than these, and what better incentive than religion? Beside the appeal for vengeance on the desecrators of their altars came the patriotic call for the release of an oppressed sovereign, whose influence was still supreme with many, and the alluring prospect of securing the rich spoils in possession of the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs, the latter still more detested as an inferior race which after years of contest had now assumed the galling attitude of master. The preparations made during the late fermentation required only to be perfected. More arms were made, the people were stirred by passionate appeals, warriors were enrolled, and other measures taken.[725]
The utmost secrecy had been observed by the conspirators, but with so many confidants, actuated by race jealousy, by ties of friendship, by interest, and by one above all others, the love of woman, that the rumor was whispered in Alvarado’s ear.[726] Yet to the mistress, who in her devotion to the lover forgot her duty to home and kindred, must not be charged more than is her due. Sharpened by the remembrance of past wrongs suffered on battle-field and stone of sacrifice, the wits of the Tlascaltecs discovered evidence which their hatred failed not to magnify. Warnings were hardly required, however, to indicate that something unusual was stirring, for the demeanor of the Indians had undergone a yet more marked change. Supplies were further diminished; servants sent to market were abused and ill-treated, and insolence was shown even to the Spaniards themselves.[727] A still more alarming sign was the discovery of an undermined wall,[728] and after obtaining further particulars from a devoted Tezcucan chief,[729] afterward known as Don Hernando, Alvarado resolved to inspect the adjacent temple where the chief celebration was held. Here a number of suspicious circumstances were noticed, which the Castilians readily wrought into threatening realities; among them several victims destined for sacrifice, regardless of the promises given, while some bloody hearts which they saw testified to the work already done by the knife.[730] With the victims Alvarado seized their attendants and certain of the emperor’s courtiers, from some of whom he tortured a confession. In this manner he learned what he already partially knew, namely, that many arms were prepared; that during the Incensing of Huitzilopochtli, as the festival was called, the Christian emblems would be cast out of the temple, and that the uprising was to take place at the conclusion of the feast.[731]
A seeming confirmation of the proposed sacrilege came from Montezuma himself, who sent to request the removal of the Christian emblems from the summit of the great temple, pleading as high-priest that the presence of strange images must prove irritating to the worshippers of other gods. Alvarado indignantly refused; he would rather fight. The Mexicans did not choose to see their festival broken up before the appointed time, and so the point was waived. It was then arranged that the Spaniards should attend the ceremonies, so as to be assured that no indignities would be offered their images.[732]
And now comes another of those diabolical deeds which, done in the name of civilization, or religion, or any other entity or idea, fills us with horror toward the gods and men for whom or by whom such acts are consummated. The lion and the tiger are humane and gentle beside the Spaniard, harboring thoughts born of bigoted zeal or blind apprehension. And what are his thoughts? These: He would enter the sanctuary, the holy temple of his god and their gods, and while all the people, while priests and nobles, the flower of the Aztec race, were celebrating the highest service of the highest festival, he and his men would fall upon them and hew them in pieces! And this because they had tired of harboring and feeding them. They desire to be relieved of the self-invited guests, and since dismissal does not avail they must be driven out or killed. But the intruders do not wish to be exterminated, and if there is striking to be done, they propose to strike first.
Pedro de Alvarado was no such man as Hernan Cortés. He was scarcely fit to be his servant. There were a dozen prominent qualities that combined to make up the great man in Cortés which were absent in Alvarado. Both of them were loyal, brave, and merciless, but there was a method in the excesses of Cortés which those of Alvarado lacked. Cortés was deep, Alvarado shallow; Cortés was patient under affront, Alvarado was violent; Cortés was cool in time of danger, Alvarado was excited—and so on. And yet Alvarado was a gallant cavalier.
The Spaniards now held a council, before which Alvarado placed the information thus far obtained of the plot, and the necessity of prompt measures was at once recognized. They did not believe Montezuma to be taking any active part in the conspiracy, but that swayed by hopes and fears he was allowing himself, with his usual want of resolution, to yield to the stronger will of his courtiers a passive consent to the efforts for his release.[733]
Less prudent than his chief, and less fertile in resources, Alvarado did not look for preventives to check the conspiracy, but to what he regarded as a decisive blow to crush it, such as that administered at Cholula. He had not the foresight of his general with regard to the proper adjustment of means to ends, nor his magic influence over those around him, friend or foe. He remembered only the good effect of the massacre on the effeminate Cholultecs, and felt convinced that so excellent a measure must answer also for the apparently abject Aztecs. It thoroughly suited his rash daring and cruel disposition. To attack is to win, was his maxim. The difference in circumstances hardly entered into consideration, chief among which was the smaller force, unsupported by the neutrality of half the city, as at Cholula, and without allies close at hand. The gathering of so many nobles and military leaders in connection with the war-god celebration provided the opportunity desired, since this would permit the blow to be directed against those who were looked on as the promoters of the revolt; and deprived of their leaders the people would be likely to abandon any further attempt. This plan met with general approval.[734]
The hour[735] having arrived for the visit to the temple,[736] Alvarado selects half the force to accompany him,[737] and proceeds thither, armed with more than usual care. Upon those who remain in charge of the fort, says Tapia, devolves the safer, though even more cruel task of slaughtering the greater part of the courtiers and attendants,[738] who have this day presented themselves in larger numbers than usual.
The Spaniards with their Tlascaltec followers are welcomed at the sanctuary with great demonstrations by the unsuspecting nobles, who see nothing to apprehend in the gleaming arms, since the Spaniards never go forth without weapons. We must remember it is a gala day, and the court presents a magnificent scene with its festive decking of garlands, festoons, and drapery, and its gayly attired audience. A procession of plumed priests and pages march by with swinging censers, chanting weird music before the hideous idols. Behind comes a file of nuns and novices, with red feathers and painted faces, surmounted by garlands of toasted maize, and bearing in their hands flags with black bars. Hidden musicians strike, and the dance begins. Joining the priests, the consecrated women and the tyros whirl round a large brazier, while two shield-bearers with blackened faces direct their motions. A conspicuous figure is the ixteocale, the living representative of the god, for whom he is fated to die, like the more prominent proxy of Tezcatlipoca. Dressed like a warrior ready for the fray, and prepared to lead in the chief dances as is his duty, he seems to impersonate the omen of evil which hovers over the scene.
Presently the Spaniards are conducted to a separate court, wherein are assembled several hundred nobles and leading men, arrayed in rich costumes glittering with gold and precious stones. The centre of attraction is the new image of Huitzilopochtli, of tzoalli dough, its jacket wrought with human bones. Before this image the mazehualiztli dance now begins.[739] Rings are formed round the music-stand, where two leaders direct the movements, the highest nobles and the most aged composing the inner circles, and the younger men the outer. When all is ready the music strikes up lightly to a well known tune, and the dancers move off, chanting a song bearing on the event of the day, and on gods and kings.[740] Forewarned as the Spaniards are, they see treason in every act and word, and many who understand somewhat the Aztec language declare that the songs bear distinct allusions to the intended uprising.
As the dance progresses a few of the soldiers, together with a number of Tlascaltecs, take possession of the different entrances, while the rest distribute themselves in suitable positions and watch for the signal.[741] Instructed by his native allies, Alvarado waits the time when the Indians shall install the war-god image in the chapel. And now the sanguinary moment has come. Falling on the assembly with pike and sword, some strike the idol and some its worshippers. They hew down the priests and drive the cruel steel through the bodies of the nobles. Few of the Indians possess any weapons with which to defend themselves from the sharp Toledo blades. Taken thus by surprise, panic-stricken, they tread one upon another, and then fall helpless under the merciless thrusts of the enemy. Their first impulse has been to rush for the gates, but lines of bristling pikes oblige them to press back against the crowd, thereby increasing the confusion. Some attempt to climb over the high walls, some to hide in the temple buildings, even burrowing beneath the heaps of the slain. Before an hour has passed there is nothing left in sight deemed worthy of Spanish swords, so suddenly has this brilliant assembly been transformed into loathsome masses of mangled bodies. The pathway of the conquerors is everywhere slippery with the blood of their victims.
In this horrible butchery, as we have seen, the lower classes suffered less than the nobles. Desolation was brought home to nearly every prominent family in the city. Their grief, shared by dependants and adherents throughout the provinces, was commemorated in plaintive ballads, by which the people kept alive the hatred of their oppressors long after the conquest. The estimates of the killed vary from four hundred to over three thousand, the most common number being six hundred; and as this generally refers to prominent personages it may be accepted as not too low.[742]
Finding no more to kill, or rather no more worth the killing, the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs proceeded to plunder. The reward was rich, but even in the eyes of their national historians odium attached to every trinket, for by such action, as Herrera observes, they gave currency to the charge that the deed had been prompted by avarice. But this interesting occupation was destined to be interrupted. Shouts from the maddened multitude without were soon heard, roaring in response to the death clamor of their countrymen. Warned by the guard at the gates, the plunderers hastened to regain the fort. Yells of execration greeted them as they issued from the temple, and showers of stones and darts fell thick, while the front ranks of the assailants pressed them with swords and clubs.[743] Short as was the distance to the fort, much time was occupied in reaching it, and hardly a man escaped injury. Alvarado was severely wounded, while one soldier and a number of allies were slain.