FOOTNOTES
[605] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 136-7; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 85-6. ‘El diablo q̄ muchas vezes le hablaua, le amenazaua.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. ‘Hiço Monteçuma aperçebir çient mill hombres de pelea.’ Oviedo, iii. 507. Others make the number less. To this Clavigero objects: ‘Mi persuado che vi sia stata in fatti qualche truppa allestita, non però per ordine del Re, ma soltanto d’alcuni Nobili.’ Storia Mess., iii. 112.
[606] Solis sees in this determination only a proof of his supposition that the offer of vassalage and tribute was but a bribe to satiate the Spaniards, since he now bids them go. Hist. Mex., ii. 35-6.
[607] ‘Yo os daré para vos dos cargas de oro, é una para cada chripstiano.’ Oviedo, iii. 507; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Herrera increases this to four loads for Cortés and two loads for each horseman. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. And Duran heard that a ship-load of treasures was offered; but the pious Cortés was too intent on converting souls to accept the bribe. Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 91; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. Montezuma had become attached to many of the Spaniards, including the courteous general, and really wished them well.
[608] ‘Dixo a vn Español de los doze, q̄ fuesse a auisar a los compañeros q̄ se aparejassen por quanto se trataua cõ el de sus vidas.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 137-8. This author and others state that Cortés gives thanks for the warning, and offers to go whenever he is bidden. Montezuma, equally polite, tells him to select his own time. When ready to leave he will give a load of gold to each man, and two for himself. Cortés thereupon brings up the question of vessels.
[609] ‘Cortes le dixo ... q̄ por fuerça auia de ir el Mõteçuma con nosotros, para que le vea nuestro gran Emperador.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. It is not probable that this was said on the present occasion, however, and it would only have irritated the emperor.
[610] ‘Yd con essos indios, é córtese la madera, y entretanto Dios nos proveerá de gente é socorro: por tanto, poned tal dilaçion que parezca que haçeys algo.’ Oviedo, iii. 507-8; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Bernal Diaz considers this wrong. He knows not what Cortés told Lopez, ‘mas muy secretamente me dixo el Martin Lopez, que de hecho, y apriessa los labrava.’ Montezuma had demanded that ‘no huviesse mas palabras, sino obras.’ Hist. Verdad., 86. Perhaps Lopez did hurry, from personal fear of remaining in the country; or he may have been instructed by Cortés to say so to the soldiers, in order to calm them.
[611] ‘Comenzó á faltar todo lo necessario para comer y beber.’ To remedy this, strict orders had to be issued to purveyors, and the Tlascaltecs were sent on foraging expeditions, which led to much abuse. Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 25 (ed. 1840), 90.
[612] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. In speaking of this, Bernal Diaz says that he became so used to sleeping in his clothes, and enduring hardships generally, that he almost discarded the bed during his later encomendero life, and could take only short naps. ‘Esto he dicho, por que sepã de que arte andamos los verdaderos Conquistadores, y como estavamos tan acostũbrados a las armas, y a velar.’ Hist. Verdad., 86.
[613] This was dated Saragossa, November 13, 1518, within a week of Cortés’ usurpation of the fleet, as Las Casas observes, and conceded to Velazquez the position of adelantado not only over Yucatan, Cozumel, and ‘other islands’ discovered by his expeditions, but over any further lands that he might find. In connection with this title was granted, to him and one heir, one fifteenth of the revenue accruing to the king from these lands; and after their conquest and settlement one twentieth of the same revenue, in perpetuity for himself and heirs, from any one island that he might select—the discoveries were supposed to be all islands. All supplies of food, clothes, and arms, introduced by him during his life, were to be free of duty. In support of his expenses a royal plantation near Habana was transferred to him, and an annual salary conferred of 300,000 maravedís. A number of other provisions were made for the promotion of economic, politic, and spiritual welfare in the new region. A synopsis of the commission is given in Las Casas, Hist. Ind., v. 2-5. Prescott misunderstands the Carta de Velazquez of October 12, 1519, in supposing that the governor had not received notice of his appointment by that time, and is therefore wrong in taking Gomara to task for saying: ‘Estando pues en aqueste pensamiẽto [to thwart Cortés], auino que llego a Santiago ... cartas del Emperador, y el titulo de Adelantado, y cedula de la gouernacion ... de Yucatã.’ Hist. Mex., 140.
[614] Carta de Velazquez, October 12,1519, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 246-51. Solis assumes that the preparations of Velazquez were influenced by the news of the reception accorded in Spain to the procuradores of Cortés. Hist. Mex., ii. 42-4. But this supposition, based partly on a vague expression of Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii., is wrong, for the procuradores reached Spain only in October, and were detained for some time before they saw the emperor.
[615] ‘Conociendo que la gẽte, de vna manera o de otra, se auia de yr, acordò de recogerla.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.
[616] Letter to Figueroa, Nov. 17, 1519, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 400.
[617] It appears that Velazquez’ suspicious nature had led him to cast reflections upon Porcallo, who resented them by throwing up the appointment. Herrera tells the story, which is not very interesting. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.
[618] Bernal Diaz says also ‘Ualladolid, ó de Tudela de Duero.’ Hist. Verdad., 246, 38.
[619] ‘A este Narvaez hizo Diego Velazquez su Capitan principal, siempre honrándolo, de manera que despues dél tuvo en aquella isla el primer lugar.’ Las Casas, Hist. Ind., iv. 4-6; Oviedo, i. 496. ‘Dezian que era muy escaco.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 247.
[620] In a letter to Judge Figueroa, of the Española audiencia, dated November 17, 1519, he gives notice of this appointment, and states that the object of the expedition is to prevent injury to the royal interest and outrages upon the natives. That very day he was leaving for Trinidad and other parts to aid Narvaez in the preparations. Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 399-403. Narvaez’ appointment is mentioned already in the letter of October 12th, addressed to a Spanish dignitary, wherein he is spoken of as contador for the new countries. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 250.
[621] ‘Auiso y relacion dellos les embió desde Cuba el licenciado Zuaço, que auia venido ... a tomar residencia.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87. But we are safe in saying that Duero gave the impulse.
[622] This official, Juan Carrillo, laid the case before the audiencia, December 24th, representing that Cortés had without superior permission made war on the natives of the new lands and conquered them. He had also appropriated Velazquez’ fleet and captured men from Garay’s party, greatly to the injury of both. Velazquez was now preparing an expedition against him. The two parties would meet and fight, giving the natives the opportunity to rise and recover the country. Both Cortés and Velazquez being guilty in undertaking such expeditions without authority, the fiscal prays that they be punished in person and estate. An oidor or his proxy should at once be sent to investigate the case and prevent such war. During the following weeks Carrillo presented letters and witnesses in support of his petition. Proceso por Real Audiencia de la Española, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 404-10.
[623] Fourteen leagues west of Trinidad.
[624] ‘Todo lo qual se asentó desta manera, y lo dió por instruccion en mi presencia al dicho Pánfilo de Narvaez.’ Ayllon, in Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. For fuller text of this agreement see Ayllon, Parecer, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 476-9. By the time the discovery voyage was concluded the king would have decided the case.
[625] This creeps out in his report, to which he adds: ‘Parecióme que, pues yo principalmente habia ido á estorbar que no oviesen debates y escándalos, que debia seguir mi camino hasta los dexar pacíficos.’ Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. The account of his efforts in Cuba is also given in a special letter to the king, written by him at Guaniguanico March 4th, on the eve of departure for New Spain. This letter was detained in Cuba till August. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xi. 439-42; Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 481-6. Herrera, who is not aware of the agreement with Aillon, assumes that Velazquez and Narvaez answer his protests by mere assurances that they intend no harm, but will take care of the king’s interest, Narvaez ending the discussion by saying: ‘de qualquiera manera se pensaua embarcar dentro de dos horas.’ dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Bernal Diaz also states that Velazquez relied so much on the favor of the bishop that he totally ignored the protests of Aillon. ‘Soldados dixeron, que venia con intencion de ayudarnos, y si no lo pudiesse hazer, tomar la tierra en si por su Magestad, como Oidor.’ Hist. Verdad., 87. Solis supposes that Aillon hoped to prevail on Narvaez when once out of Velazquez’ reach. Hist. Mex., ii. 47; Cortés, Cartas, 117; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 140. The governor evidently feared to oppose Aillon’s distasteful resolution to embark, lest he should induce the audiencia to adopt a more forcible interference; and perhaps he thought that his protests could be more safely disregarded the farther he was removed from the centre of government.
[626] At the review in Cempoala, New Spain, were found 80 musketeers, 120 archers, 600 infantry, and 80 horsemen. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 146. Cortés was told by Guevara that there were 800 infantry, including 80 archers and 120 musketeers. Cartas, 116. Oviedo has only 800 men, but with 200 horses, iii. 508, while Bernal Diaz raises the totals to 19 vessels, with 1300 to 1400 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 90 archers, and 70 musketeers, but not counting the sailors. The artillery of guns was in charge of Captain Rodrigo Martin. Hist. Verdad., 86-7. Clavigero adopts 18 vessels, 800 infantry, 85 cavalry, over 500 sailors, and 12 guns. Storia Mess., iii. 113. Aillon vaguely mentions ‘over 600 Spaniards in sixteen vessels.’ ‘Sin que yo lo supiese, llevaron hasta mil indios.’ Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337; and Tapia says 1000 and odd men. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. The figures from the review in New Spain must be increased by the number lost with six of the vessels off that coast, and this may be what Bernal Diaz attempts to do, although he evidently makes the estimate too high. Agustin Bermudez was alguacil mayor, and Cortés’ old friend, Duero, managed to join as contador. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[627] Eighty Spaniards had been landed, and a number of Indians, but most of the latter, together with a large proportion of the natives, had died of small-pox introduced by the Cubans. To judge from Aillon’s report he appears to have allowed a number of Spaniards to remain, with a view to make there a calling-place for ships, and which might serve as a base for operations tending to the conquest of Yucatan. He refers to the latter country as an island adjoining Ulua, which he believes is a continent, lying near the land discovered by Solís and Yañez. Carta de Audiencia, Aug. 30, 1520, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338.
[628] ‘Se ahogaron cinqüenta ombres é los demas escapamos con harto riesgo.’ Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338-9. Montezuma informed Cortés of this shipwreck, ‘é le mostró en una manta pintados diez y ocho navíos, é los cinco dellos á la costa quebrados é trastornados en el arena.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586. ‘Tuuo vn viento de Norte ... y de noche se le perdio vn nauio de poco porte, que dio al traues; Capitan ... Christoval de Morante ... y se ahogó cierta gente.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.
[629] Aillon was among the first to arrive, Narvaez and the other captains coming in during the following two days. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 339. Hence Prescott’s date of April 23d is somewhat too accurate. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes that a landing is effected on April 20th. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 276. Cortés states that the news reached him in the beginning of May. Cartas, 113. Taking four days to travel to Mexico, the fleet arrived eight days after the ship-building party had left the capital. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138; Alaman, Disert., i. 109. Narvaez’ agent in Spain states that the fleet numbered eleven vessels on arrival. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 437.
[630] Three of the men left in Chinantla, ‘que se dezian Ceruantes el chocarrero, y Escalana, y ... Alonso Hernandez Carretero.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Porras gives several and different names. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 500. Cortés appears to say that they were the men sent by him to bring news of Narvaez and who deserted. Cartas, 115. Aillon speaks of one man who came on board of his vessel. Finding that Cortés had instructed the Indians to regard any foreign arrivals as inimical, this man was sent to reassure them. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 339. It appears probable, however, that Cortés’ expectation of messengers from his king was known to the Indians.
[631] ‘Alçauan las manos a Dios, que los librò del poder de Cortés, y de salir de ... Mexico, donde cada dia esperauan la muerte ... y aũ dezia el Cervantes, ... O Narvaez, Narvaez, que bien avẽturado que eres ... que tiene esse traidor de Cortes allegados mas de seteciẽtos mil pesos de oro, y todos los soldados estan mui mal con el.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.
[632] This was speedily abandoned for a camp at Cempoala. Aillon wanted merely a camp to be formed near a well supplied town. The municipal officers were: ‘Alcaldes hordinarios á Francisco Verdugo, cuñado del dicho Diego Velazquez, casado con una hermana suya, é un Juan Yuste, su cuñado é mayordomo, é regidores á Diego Velazquez é Pero Velazquez, sus sobrinos, é á Gonzalo Martin de Salvatierra é Juan de Gamarra.’ Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342.
[633] ‘Conocian en el Narvaez ser la pura miseria, y el oro, y ropa ... todo se lo guardaua.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 87. According to Oviedo’s version Montezuma held a council, wherein some members favored the plan of attacking and killing the Spaniards then in Mexico, so as to prevent a junction of forces. This might frighten the rest into departing. Others, who were more confident, urged that the new arrivals should be allowed to come to Mexico, so as to swell the list of victims for the sacrifices, and this proposition was carried, iii. 509. Oviedo’s informant evidently ignores the declared object of Narvaez; or, like Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 64-6, he does not believe that any communication could have taken place, for want of an interpreter. But Solis forgets the three deserters, and Indian mediums, perhaps. Prescott takes the peculiar ground that for Montezuma to ‘have entered into a secret communication, hostile to the general’s interests, is too repugnant to the whole tenor of his conduct.’ Mex., ii. 236. Cortés states that Father Olmedo had evidence of communication and interchange of presents between Montezuma and Narvaez. Cartas, 120-1. Others confirm this, as: Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 141-2; Carta del Ejército de Cortés, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 428-30. The position of the emperor as prisoner, and the speedy succession of events, did not permit the relationship between the two to develop.
[634] Francisco de Lugo being actually secured with shackles. Tirado, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6; Cortés, Cartas, 118; Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342. Oviedo reviews Velazquez’ conduct in this instance, and concludes that, since Cortés gave him the men and appointed him captain, he was bound to obey this his immediate principal, unless royal orders to the contrary had been exhibited. ‘Si aquel capitan, Johan Velazquez de Leon, no estoviera mal con su pariente Diego Velazquez, é se passara con los çiento é çinqüenta hombres, que avia llevado à Guaçacalco, á la parte de Pámphilo de Narvaez, su cuñado, acabado oviera Cortés su offiçio.’ iii. 316-17.
[635] ‘Alonso de Vergara, escribano, é con Antonio de Maya.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 439; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, writes Amaya; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 412.
[636] ‘Me trajeron mas de cien cartas,’ wherein the soldiers were told to give credit to the statements of Guevara and his companions, and to rest assured that they would be rewarded on joining. Cortés, Cartas, 116.
[637] While selling cherries to Captain Salvatierra they heard him refer to the treasures of Cortés as a magnificent prize. The designs of Cortés against Montezuma and his subjects were painted in dark colors. One of the stolen horses belonged to this captain, whose raving against the spies afforded great amusement to the camp. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587.
[638] He ordered Vergara to read the provisions. Sandoval declared that none but a royal notary should do so, and threatened him with 100 lashes unless he desisted. Guevara interfered, and was told that he lied, and was a low clergyman. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88.
[639] Alguacil Pedro de Solis was in charge. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, describes how they wondered at the succession of great cities, etc. The guard consisted of twenty men. Cortés, Cartas, 115.
[640] Gomara describes somewhat minutely the apprehension created among the soldiers by this summons, in face of the threatening aspect of affairs. Hist. Mex., 138-9. Bernal Diaz states that Montezuma kept the news back for three days, while he communicated with Narvaez. He might have delayed longer, but feared that Cortés would suspect something. Hist. Verdad., 87.
[641] While still talking, they received another message, saying that troops, horses, and guns had been landed. In his joy Montezuma embraced Cortés, exclaiming that he loved him more than ever, and saying that he would dine with him. While at table both were in good humor, the emperor thinking of the departure, the general of renewed conquests. After this Montezuma gave daily feasts, in the belief that the task of entertaining would soon be over. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 139. It is more likely that apprehensions prevailed on both sides. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls attention to the fact that no stranger had till then been so far honored as to sit at the same table with the monarch. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 277.
[642] Monjaras gives their names. ‘Fuesen ... tiznados como los yndios,’ et seq. Cortés, Residencia, i. 442-3; ii. 47-49, 134-5. Andrés de Tapia, who had just returned from Cholula, after settling a boundary dispute with Tlascala, was the fourth messenger. He followed by-paths, walking by day and being carried by Indians at night, so that he reached his destination in three days and a half. Finding that Sandoval had already sent messages, he remained with him. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586-7. Cortés writes that after being informed by Montezuma he received a letter, by a Cuban Indian, from a Spaniard who had been stationed on the coast to watch for vessels. This announced that a vessel had anchored at San Juan de Ulua, which was supposed to be that of the returning procuradores. The general now despatched his four messengers. Fifteen days passed without further news—this is probably a misprint—after which native paintings were received showing the number of men landed, and with them the report that the messengers from Mexico were detained by the new arrivals. Cartas, 114-15. A man named Pinedo, who fled from the capital, was overtaken by Aztecs, at Cortés’ order, and brought back dead. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440.
[643] Cortés intimates that a friar carried this message, and that one of the questions was the nationality of the expedition. Cartas, 115. The friar appears to have carried a later message. Gomara assumes that Cortés already knew who the commander was, and offered his friendship. Hist. Mex., 142.
[644] ‘A cabo de dos dias ... donde venian muy bravosos leones, bolvieron muy mansos, y se le ofrecieron por servidores.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 465, 500.
[645] Cortés said that he could not leave Mexico, where his presence was necessary for the preservation of peace and treasures. Cartas, 117-18. ‘Y q̄ se viessen solos.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 142. According to Bernal Diaz a letter of similar tenor had been sent on before, by a swift messenger, to clear the way for Guevara’s recommendations, and Cortés therein intimated that the hostile utterances attributed to Narvaez must be due to the interpreters, for he was sure that so wise and brave a captain would not utter anything to the prejudice of king and comrades. Hist. Verdad., 89.
[646] ‘Porq̄ dadivas quebrantan peñas.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89.
[647] According to Bernal Diaz, Duero persuaded Narvaez, at the instigation of the friar, to invite the latter, and to seek by friendly efforts to win him over. Pretending to yield to his persuasions, Olmedo told him that if the proper persons were sent to confer with Cortés, he could no doubt be brought to terms. It was then agreed that Duero and others should arrange a private interview between the two generals. Hist. Verdad., 93; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.
[648] The reason for this separation of oidor and officers was to prevent the former from issuing authoritative orders. This seizure had been effected just as Guevara returned from Mexico. Cortés, Cartas, 118. Hence, Cortés’ letter failed to reach him; yet Bernal Diaz assumes that he received it, and coöperated accordingly. Hist. Verdad., 89.
[649] This report, embodying Aillon’s, is dated August 30, 1520. A formal statement of the case, prepared on the arrival of the secretary, was forwarded on November 10th. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 332-48; Ayllon, Relacion, in Id., xii. 251-2; Carta al Rey de los Oidores, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 495-511. The report proved a heavy argument against Velazquez’ case, although Bishop Fonseca at first sought to keep it back. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90; Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v.
[650] Two soldiers were also imprisoned for speaking favorably of Cortés. One of them was Sancho de Barahona who settled in Guatemala. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 100. To Bernardino de Santa Clara, who had aided Aillon in the formal demands upon Narvaez, nothing was done, owing to his many friends in the camp. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xx.-xxi. This man was not actuated by friendship for Cortés, however. He had been treasurer of Española, where his prodigality nearly made him a defaulter. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 166-8.
[651] ‘Villalobos, y vn Portugues, y otros seys o siete se passaron a Cortes. Y otros le escriuieron, a lo que algunos dizen ofreciendosele, si venia para ellos y que Cortes leyo las cartas, callando la firma ... y que publicaua tener en Zempoallã dozientos Españoles.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143. Bernal Diaz says five deserters, relatives and friends of Aillon. Hist. Verdad., 90, 92.
[652] Herrera assumes that he was deceived by Narvaez, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix., but intimidation was no doubt the leading motive, for he could not possibly relish the prospect of Montezuma’s release by the new-comers, nor the licentiousness and greed of the soldiers. ‘This conduct of the men drove the inhabitants to flight,’ says Cortés, Cartas, 119, 125. When the jewels and other effects belonging to Cortés’ party were seized, together with the Indian wives of the conquerors, the cacique became seriously alarmed, exclaiming that he would surely be killed for permitting the outrage. This excited only derision, Salvatierra remarking: ‘Aueys visto que miedo que tienen todos estos Caciques desta nonada de Cortesillo.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.
[653] Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. ‘Ellos dejaban la villa sola por no pelear con ellos.’ Cortés, Cartas, 119.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE COUP DE MAÎTRE OF CORTÉS.
May, 1520.
Dismal Prospects—Empire to Hold, Invasion to Repel—The Army Divides—Alvarado Guards Montezuma, while Cortés Looks after Narvaez—The March Seaward—The Rendezvous—The Chinantecs and their Pikes—Cortés Sows Alluring Words in the Camp of the Enemy—Proposals of Peace—Defiance—Night Attack—Cortés Captures Narvaez and his Army.
It now behooved Cortés to look well to himself. He might win a score of Marathons, but one Paros would ruin all. When embarking in this enterprise, he was to all appearance little above the common adventurer. But rare talents were constantly appearing as required by occasion. Though sometimes carried away by excess of zeal, he had proved himself an adept in diplomacy. And for one hitherto so sportive and pleasure-loving, his temper was now grave, particularly in times of peril, when his calm self-mastery increased with increasing danger. The rhythm of battle was the sweetest harmony that could stir his soul, and yet he never fought but for a purpose. On gaining an advantage he indulged in no holiday of retrospect or repose; so long as anything remained to be done no time was wasted in self-gratulations. He never turned from danger, but hastened to seek it out, perceiving it even in the darkness, intuitively, and always looking it full in the face. It was while preparing to strike that the enemy received the staggering blow, and the advantage thus gained was followed up to yet greater advantage At no time appears this hero stronger, grander, than now, when, without authority, without the royal sanction, in one sense an outlaw, with the people of the country against him, his own countrymen coming to war on him, his force insignificant as compared with that of any one of his several enemies, he yet holds them all at bay, by his iron nerve and ever ready strategic resources, keeping them asunder, pitting one against another, playing on the foibles of them all as easily and serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.
Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror’s brilliant visions of conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of the opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor and themselves, or to attack the foreigners’ quarters on their own account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the enemy would be to surrender the most important part of the conquest.
To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the capital and meet this new visitation—such a measure would render his already small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its equal in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez’ messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts and promises, to sow discord in the enemy’s camp. The priests Guevara and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at work, and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus would he seduce to his purpose the opponent’s troops, in so far at least as to effect a compromise by which Narvaez might leave him in comparative peace.[654] Who shall say that his good fortune may not still favor him! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer to the enemy, so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to give himself a more imposing appearance by the addition of native auxiliaries. Another reason for this advance was by his presence to counteract the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a superior force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an impostor.
He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious discontent in the enemy’s camp. Hundreds, they said, would be ready to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold front. Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance and secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless Narvaez. With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they could not fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but promptly suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his comrades of their glorious achievements under Cortés, and their probable fate should Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was an unanimous approval of the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon commissioned the captains to represent the matter to the men, and to ascertain who were willing to follow, and who should remain in Mexico.[655]
On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch questioned him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other force. Cortés well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the state of affairs. He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give him pain. He and his men had been sent by their king on this mission, and were from the royal province of Castile, whilst the forces on the coast were a rebellious horde from the outside province of Biscay, and inferior to them, as Otomís, for instance, were inferior to the nobler Aztecs. They had come with the design of injuring the natives, and Cortés as their protector; but with the aid of his patron saint he would have no trouble in chastising them, and in securing their vessels for his speedy departure.[656] Alvarado, the tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico, and him he recommended to the monarch’s consideration, requesting that supplies be provided and peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would react with terrible effect on himself and his people. The emperor promised that this should be done, and offered not only guides, but an army to aid him. The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec troops could not be relied on.[657]
It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with Cortés, should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico, since self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and with the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured. The defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the guns and most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were left with the garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over abundant, owing to the drought, maize and other provisions were brought from Tlascala to serve in case of need. The men were promised wealth and honors if they remained faithful, and their somewhat hot-headed commander was exhorted to prudence. “You are few in number,” said Cortés to them on leaving, “and yet you are strong; finally, have a care of your prisoner.”[658]
About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with seventy Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience.[659] There were also native carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and guides who were to take them by a short southern route through Aztec territory to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the Iztapalapan causeway, and there took his leave with friendly demonstration, while a number of chieftains continued with him for some distance on the way to the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no intention of encumbering himself with heavy war material, for the little he possessed could not avail against the superior armament of the enemy. His must be a light corps, capable of quick movements; stratagem should supply the place of numbers. And now what hopes and fears were theirs as they marched on toward the sea! Surely so brave a little army was never more beset by pitfalls and snares.
On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel, with one hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the expedition. About a score of these, suspected of favoring too strongly the Cuban governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the enterprise might not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder were distributed the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec and adjoining region, in order to encourage loyalty.[660]
Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco Rodriguez, with instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors. He succeeded in enlisting several thousand; but as it became evident whom they were to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly the terrible effect of Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to desert, so that only a few presented themselves before Cortés, and they were dismissed with presents.[661]
During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main road and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not far from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from Narvaez demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for although the latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by holding a review of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the disposition of the men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather disposed to underrate the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of the ludicrous he amused the camp with his description of the vanity and carelessness of the leader, and the arrogant assumption of the officers. When, therefore, at Quecholac[662] they encountered Alonso de Mata,[663] notary of Narvaez, who had been sent with four witnesses to advise Cortés of his commission and demands, he was told first to produce his own credentials as royal notary, and being unable to do so he was refused a hearing.[664] The official mission of the messengers being thus disposed of, Cortés soothed their wounded pride with soft words and hospitable cheer; he gave them presents, and took care before dismissing them to feast their eyes on the gold and jewels which he caused his men to display, and to let them know that thousands of Tlascaltec and other troops were on the way to join him. Their report to Narvaez was a confirmation of Guevara’s statement, and did much to promote the growing disaffection toward Narvaez.
The army now descended from the plateau to Ahuilizapan, and followed the slope northward to Huatusco. This town appears to have been situated on the head-waters of the present Rio Jamapa. Half-way down this river, about ten leagues south of Cempoala, lay the town of Tampaniquita,[665] which was the rendezvous. A number of Indians who here appeared with complaints of outrages by Narvaez were consoled with promises of speedy relief. Sandoval had come by a long and difficult mountain route to avoid the enemy, and had brought with him about sixty able-bodied soldiers, the old and infirm remaining at Papalote.[666]
This addition raised the force to about two hundred and sixty men, according to common statement, including the deserters from Narvaez. Among the number were five horsemen, and a few archers and musketeers.[667] They were poorly equipped, for they brought from Mexico little else than well-worn escaupiles, or quilted cotton armor, shields, swords, and dirks, a miserable outfit in which to meet the well armed troops of Narvaez.[668] But the ready resource of Cortés had found a remedy. He had noticed in the hands of the Chinantecs a spear, twenty feet in length, which struck him at once as a formidable weapon, either in defence or attack. It would be particularly serviceable against cavalry. Immediately on hearing of Narvaez’ arrival he had sent a messenger to that province with an order for three hundred of the pikes, to be finished not with the usual iztli head, but with double points of copper, a metal which abounded in that region. The natives having previously tendered submission to the Spaniards, Cortés also asked them for two thousand warriors, to join him on pentecost day at the rendezvous. Both of these requests were promptly granted, and before the Spaniards were on the ground the messenger had returned with a force of Indians bearing the weapons,[669] with points superior in finish to the models sent. The messenger was Tobilla, a soldier from the Italian wars, and an expert at arms, particularly with the lance. Under his instruction the soldiers soon became expert pikemen, and gained no little praise. Add to this courage, increased by many victories, their admirable discipline, their influence over the natives, and their knowledge of the country, and the little band assumes more formidable proportions.
Under the several influences surrounding him the original fierce design of Narvaez in his dealings with Cortés had cooled somewhat. The calm confidence and caustic wit of Olmedo tended to inspire respect for his commander, which was not lessened by the rumor of vast Indian armies massing under his banner. Nor were his men apparently inclined to turn the sword against their countrymen.
Before the return of Mata he despatched a commission to Cortés demanding the surrender of the country, but offering him liberty to depart for any other region, accompanied by those who wished to follow his fortunes. With this object vessels and stores would be provided. The bearers of this proposal were his old friend Andrés de Duero, Guevara, another clergyman named Juan de Leon, and one or two others.[670]
Duero, it will be remembered, had greatly assisted Cortés in fitting out his expedition from Cuba; in fact, without his intervention Cortés would never have been appointed to the command. Láres was dead, and it was quite natural, after this lapse of time, that Duero should desire to look in on Mexico, and for that reason had joined the expedition of Narvaez. Yet his sympathies were wholly with his partner, and after a warm embrace he came at once to the subject of his ducats. Their interview was private and protracted, and appears to have been satisfactory, Cortés receiving on the one hand valuable information about Narvaez’ plans and position, and Duero, on the other, coming forth with weighted pockets, as an instalment of the larger sum to follow. According to Bernal Diaz it was arranged that Duero should receive valuable grants and offices if he persuaded the alguacil mayor and other leaders so to manage affairs that Narvaez should be captured or killed, and Cortés acknowledged captain-general over all the troops.[671] Whatever may have been the agreement, there is no doubt that Duero promised to promote his friend’s schemes in the other camp.
Guevara and the other members of the commission were also loaded with presents, and confirmed as supporters of Cortés. As for Narvaez’ proposition, he charged them to reply that he would listen to none but a royal mandate, and would hold the country for the king, as was the duty of a loyal subject, and to this he and his followers were prepared to pledge their lives. Still, he was ready to meet Narvaez, each accompanied by ten attendants, in order that their respective claims might peradventure be happily adjusted. It was supposed by the captains of Cortés, who had influenced the proposal, that the result would be a division of territory, and to this they were willing to agree.[672]
Duero had been requested by Narvaez to persuade Velazquez de Leon to visit their camp, in the hope that a personal meeting might win him to their cause.[673]
Velazquez’ disregard of the former summons from the enemy had confirmed the faith of Cortés in his loyalty, and since a visit to the camp of Narvaez might lead to important information, he advised him to go; at the same time intimating that his heavy ornaments might have a happy effect on that gold-thirsty crew.[674] With a view to temporize he was authorized to offer himself as mediator between the two generals, and with a supply of gold for bribes he went over to the camp of Narvaez. There he met a most cordial reception. Gently the commander remonstrated at his adherence to a traitor who had so deeply injured his relatives. “He is no traitor,” replied Velazquez warmly, “there has been no treason either acted or intended.” He would not listen to any overtures, even when coupled with the promise of a command second only to that of Narvaez. “I have sworn loyalty to Cortés,” he said, “and I will remain true.” Nevertheless, that he might not appear ungracious, he promised to use his efforts toward the recognition of Narvaez’ supremacy. A review of the troops was held to impress him with the superiority of the forces with which he might soon have to contend.
A courtier in manner, and with a fine presence, Velazquez quickly won his way among the captains and staff; nor did he fail to improve the opportunity by presenting his general’s cause in the most attractive light. No little weight was given to his words by the heavy gold chain which fell in several coils upon his breast.[675]
Cortés affirms that the proposal for an interview with Narvaez had been accepted, and that he was preparing to attend it when the warning came that advantage would be taken of the meeting to seize or kill him.[676] If treachery was intended, it is more likely to have originated with Cortés, who was by no means scrupulous, as we have seen, while Narvaez appears to have borne the reputation of a man of honor.[677] It is still more probable that Cortés invented the warning in order to be free before his followers, and before Narvaez, to carry out a more momentous project, which, with the increased knowledge of affairs in the enemy’s camp, and with the growth there of his party, had begun to unfold in his mind.
It was a grand conception; yet grander still the execution. It was a different matter with a small force to fall upon a well appointed army of countrymen; different from war on naked savages, to surprise them by night, or otherwise to vanquish them. Yet this was what Cortés now proposed to do. Nor, in adopting this bold measure, does he lay himself open to the charge of rashness or recklessness. His situation was desperate: he must conquer or be conquered. Cortés was no abstract theorist: he dealt mainly in concrete facts; not necessarily demonstrated facts, but facts reached often by intuition alone. With facts, intuitively or practically arrived at, he kept himself well stored. He possessed many noble qualities, but on the whole, as we have seen, his character was not cast in an immaculate mould. He was exceedingly religious; and while, as I have said, he would not let religion stand in the way of his ambition, yet he was more bigoted than any of his followers. Aside from the chivalrous abandonment of himself to fate, and the brilliant achievements thence arising, there was little admirable in him. He knew nothing of lofty magnanimity, although he did many magnanimous acts; he knew nothing of pure disinterestedness, or a generosity of soul, although he was ofttimes exceedingly generous. He had none of that sense of unswerving justness and sensitiveness to wrong which characterized Grijalva. His self-possession never left him. He was a power within himself, and he knew it. Thus it was in Mexico now; and for years afterward when Mexico was all America, he was Agamemnon, king of men, the greatest of Greece when Greece was all the world.
Under the present inspiration, he sent Rodrigo Álvarez Chico and a notary[678] to withdraw the proposal he had made Narvaez for an interview, and to demand of him the production of a royal commission, authorizing his presence there, which commission would be respected; otherwise he must cease meddling with the affairs of the country. The followers of Narvaez were to be formally forbidden to obey his orders; and they were to appear before Cortés within a specified time, and learn from him what the interests of the king required of them. Failing in this, he would have them seized and dealt with as rebels against his majesty.[679]
The cool impudence of this demand, coming from the captain of a little band of outlaws hemmed in between hostile forces, gave rise to no small amusement in the enemy’s camp. Narvaez chose nevertheless to regard the matter seriously, receiving the message as an insolent defiance. He declared he would no longer show forbearance toward the traitor; he set a price on the head of Cortés, announced the estate of his followers to be confiscated, and proclaimed open war against them.[680]
Immediately after despatching his ultimatum Cortés broke camp and followed his messengers at a quick march.[681] At Rio de Canoas, or La Antigua, Velazquez came up with letters from Duero and others. They had probably been written under a preconcerted arrangement, for they were read to the leaders and discussed, the result being a unanimous resolution to advance. So forward they went, Cortés exclaiming, “Death to the ass or to him who drives it!”[682]
Crossing the swollen river with some difficulty,[683] he hurried on to Rio Chachalacas, over a league from Cempoala, where camp was formed quietly and without fires.[684] This sudden movement, coming immediately after Duero’s interview with Cortés, confirms the supposition that a plot had been concocted by them, which was to surprise Narvaez under advantageous circumstances arranged by confederates. There were to be no half-way measures; all must be staked on one cast.[685]
Calling his men round him, he made one of those stirring appeals in which he knew so well how to animate their spirit and touch their heart. He reviewed their right to the conquest, and their promises to hold the country for the king. “And now comes this emissary of Señor Velazquez,” Cortés continued, “full of envy and treacherous design, to appropriate the fruit of your hard-won victories. This pompous Narvaez, while seizing your riches and clothing himself in your glory, would load you with impositions and brand you with dishonor. Will you submit to this? Will you, who have overcome mighty hosts, who have seized empires, who even now hold monarchs in your hands, will you place your necks in the yoke and humbly submit to the unjust demands of this instrument of your ancient enemy? God, who has always been with us, will still fight on our side, if we will be true to him and true to our king. We must fight, and it is for life; ay, and more than life—for honor and glorious inheritance.” Cheer after cheer burst from the men, while the captains hastened to assure Cortés that they would follow him to the death.[686]
Although it was generally understood that coöperation was expected within the enemy’s camp, the prudent general made no mention of the fact, lest it might render the men less self-reliant. He pointed out, however, that their opponents, although more numerous than they, were unused to war, effeminate, disheartened from hardships, and discontented with their commander. He explained the arrangement of Narvaez’ camp, and divided the force into three parties, under the command respectively of Sandoval, Olid, and himself, the position of the former as alguacil mayor and comandante on the coast, and the second as maestre de campo, entitling them to this distinction, young as they were, particularly since Cortés retained the direction of affairs. To the former, aided by Jorge and Gonzalo Alvarado, Alonso de Ávila, and eighty men, was intrusted the task of attacking Narvaez’ special quarters, with the formally worded command to seize him, dead or alive.[687] As a further inducement toward the accomplishment of this important end, rewards of three thousand, two thousand, and one thousand pesos respectively were promised to the first three soldiers who should secure the general.[688] Olid received the important order to capture the artillery, from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended. With him were Andrés de Tapia, Diego Pizarro, and others. Cortés himself was to follow and render aid where most needed, supported by Ordaz, Grado, the brothers Chico, and others.[689] The password was ‘Espíritu Santo,’ suggested by Olmedo with reference to pentecost day, on which all these events took place.
While occupied with their preparations a deserter arrived, sent by Duero, it seems, to warn Cortés that, advised of his approach by the Indians,[690] Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best part of his troops in the field[691] between him and Cempoala. To this he had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains, who had not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival general. This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés not a little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp, protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue, however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was the beginning of the rainy season.[692] Most of Narvaez’ men, unused to military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the camp, found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what they termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe. The friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling by ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters, and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no means relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters before dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain and two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was ‘Santa María.’
Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when informed of this movement. Pointing out to his men the effeminacy and unsoldierly qualities of the rabble with which they had to deal, and the carelessness and inefficiency of their commander, he ordered an immediate advance on Cempoala, where they would now be scarcely expected. “You know the maxim,” he said, “‘upon the enemy at dawn;’ but better still, we will surprise them by night.[693] Let each strive to excel his comrade in valor.” These words were received with hearty approval, for anything was preferable to suspense in a dreary bivouac without fire or comfort. Crossing the creek they marched noiselessly over the plain, through the rain, drenched and hungry. On reaching the brook, near the town, they came upon the two scouts of the enemy, Gonzalo Carrasco and Alonso Hurtado; they captured the former, while the latter, warned by the cry of his comrade, hurried into camp to give the alarm. Carrasco was compelled under threats to answer a number of questions on the position and plans of his party, and was menaced with death if he played false.[694]
A cross had been erected at the ford,[695] probably during the first march to Cempoala, and here the army knelt in all humility to do reverence. Father Olmedo then gave the men the general absolution, and appealed to heaven to bless the efforts now to be made in behalf of their faith and the king, closing with the soul-stirring assurance that victory should be theirs. The men, one and all, felt no doubt that they were about to fight not only for their own rights, but for God and their sovereign; and if the robber could feel encouraged in his lawless pursuit after kneeling at the shrine of St Demas, surely these heroes of a hundred fights were stronger for their religious faith. Therefore it was with renewed confidence that the men buckled tighter their escaupiles, and pike in hand, their main reliance, they resumed the march with quickened steps, leaving the baggage and horses in the care of Marina and the carriers. The horsemen stationed in the field were not encountered, thanks to Duero who was one of them.
It was just past midnight, on the morning of whit-monday,[696] when they entered Cempoala. Owing to the darkness and the presence of troops in the field, together with the recent marches and countermarches, the presence of the intruders was not suspected till they had almost crossed the plaza. The storm was not wholly past, but the moon peered forth at times between the chasing clouds, dimly revealing the buildings occupied by the enemy. These consisted of three conspicuous edifices, rising upon pyramidal foundations, the ascent to which was by a wide staircase along one of the slopes. The highest was a temple, known as Nuestra Señora since the iconoclastic achievement of Cortés therein, and this was occupied by the troops of Diego Velazquez. Next to it was the building held by the captain-general, guarded by the whole battery of guns.[697]
Hurtado had arrived nearly half an hour before and given warning, but instead of immediately calling to arms, Narvaez lost time with questions, which elicited only that his companion had been seized and that he fancied he had heard Spanish voices. Some of the captains, friendly to Cortés, ridiculed the story as a dream, and entertained the general with speculations about the projects of the audacious rebel.[698] While so occupied the alarm of the sentinels was heard. Cortés was upon them.[699] Narvaez at once became the self-possessed commander, and hastened to issue the necessary orders. There was a rush to arms, and the confusion was increased by the appearance of innumerable fire-flies, which the besieged mistook for the fire-arms and spears of a large army.[700]
In order to avoid the range of the guns, Cortés had kept his men along the sides of the approaches, and on finding himself discovered he shouted, “Close with them! At them!” Fife and drum joined in and echoed the cry.[701] Olid rushed on the battery, ranged along a terrace on the ascent to the commander’s house. So sudden was the attack that those of the artillerymen who still remained loyal had time to discharge only one gun, which killed two men.[702] The next instant Olid, Pizarro, and their followers had practically secured the pieces, and were pressing the defenders, who offered little resistance. At the same time Sandoval rushed past and hurried up the stair-way to the summit, where Narvaez stood to receive him.[703] A volley of arrows and bullets was fired at him, but being poorly aimed, out of consideration for comrades below, he escaped unharmed. Nothing daunted, Sandoval’s followers pressed onward in a compact column, and in a moment they were on the summit platform. “Surrender!” shouted their leader with resolute confidence, to which Narvaez responded with a jeer, calling on his men to spare no traitors. But the order was an empty one, for their swords and short Spanish lances availed nothing against the line of bristling copper points on the long pikes of the attacking party, and step by step they were driven backward into the building. What they did with their fire-arms or cross-bows is not stated.
Meanwhile Cortés was doing brave work below. One body engaged the cavalry, unhorsing with the all-effective pike those who had managed to reach the saddle, and cutting the girths. Another body turned their attention to the reinforcements which came rushing from the adjoining quarters to the scene of action, and taking advantage of the confusion and the darkness, relieved only at fitful intervals by the moon, their cool opponents readily disarmed the greater number, so that but a small proportion made their way through the besieging lines.[704] While thus occupied they heard a shout from above, “Victory! Victory for Cortés! Narvaez is dead!”[705] Cortés immediately caused the cry to be taken up by the rest of his men, which added to the confusion of the enemy.
It appears that Sandoval, although reinforced by a portion of Olid’s party, could not effect an entry into the building to which his pikes had driven those who still adhered to Narvaez, a number having passed over to his side before this. After watching the vain skirmishing for a while, Lopez, the ship-builder, bethought himself of setting fire to the dry palm roof of the otherwise substantial building. The besieged now had no recourse but to come out, which they did, headed by Narvaez. No sooner had they appeared on the platform than Sandoval’s men charged them with the pikes, and the commander was the first to receive a thrust, in the left eye, which bore him down as he cried out: “Santa María, save me!” In an instant Pedro Sanchez Farfan was upon him,[706] and he was dragged down the steps and placed in a chapel. Awed by this mischance the rest speedily surrendered.
Alférez Fuentes fought valiantly till overthrown with two pike thrusts. “Our Lady save me!” he cried, still clutching the standard. “She shall!” responded Sandoval, averting the pikes of the excited soldiers.[707]
The cry of victory and the rumor of Narvaez’ death had stayed the stream of reinforcements from the adjoining houses, wherein defence was now alone thought of. Recognizing that a charge on them might meet with more determined opposition, Cortés resolved to bring the enemy’s own battery to his aid.[708] By the time the guns were in position, most of the forces of Sandoval and Olid were free to aid Velazquez de Leon in the task of reducing the quarters in which Salvatierra and Diego Velazquez still held out.
They were summoned to submit to the king and to Cortés, under pain of death, but gave a defiant answer. The guns were now brought into play, and fired first over their heads to frighten them. As the balls came whizzing by, the blustering Salvatierra, who had sworn to eat the ears of Cortés, declared himself sick. His fierceness changed to abject fear, and his men asserted that they never saw a captain behave so contemptibly. The shots, supported by promises, soon brought about the surrender of this pyramid.
The last to hold out was Diego Velazquez, a brave fellow, well liked by his followers; but after a few more parleys, and the loss of three men from well directed shots, his party was also prevailed on to descend and deliver up their arms,[709] the leaders being secured and removed in irons to the chapel, the wounded receiving there the attentions of a surgeon. Cortés looked in to examine their condition, and as the whisper reached Narvaez that the hero of the day was present, he turned and said: “Señor Cortés, you may hold high the good fortune you have had, and the great achievement of securing my person.” With a twinkle of malicious merriment Cortés regarded for a moment his fallen foe, whose insufferable conceit did not desert him even here, and said: “Señor Narvaez, many deeds have I performed since coming to Mexico, but the least of them all has been to capture you.”[710]
