FOOTNOTES:
[287] Grandson of the famous Dingiswayo, initiator of the modern Zulu military system.
When questioned by Natives as to who had given him orders to start hostilities in a country belonging to the Government, Matshwili is said to have replied: "If you don't keep quiet, I'll shoot you."
[288] Two companies N.R. (F and H) escorted the guns part of the way.
[289] B.M.R. also took part in driving up the stream.
[290] The man who led Matshwili's impi when Campbell was attacked.
[291] cf. p. 346.
[292] The B.M.R. were later on sent a short way into Zululand; they rejoined the column, along with Z.M.R., at Mapumulo on the following day.
[293] General Report, September, 1906.
[294] When advised by their elders, men who had fought for Cetshwayo during the Zulu War, not to take up arms against the whites, as they would be as surely defeated as they (the elders) had been in 1879, the semi-civilized youths of 1906 shouted derisively: Sa si nqeko tina! i.e. We were not there!
[295] Colonel Bru-de-Wold resumed duty early in July.
[296] On the 30th July, Woolls-Sampson's column was taken over by Arnott, the former having been granted leave of absence.
[297] A mistake. Mackay, acting on advice received from the Commissioner, had already imposed a fine of five head of cattle for every rebel, when 312 cattle and 169 goats had been handed over by the Chief, in addition to thirty-three rebels. Matshana was, thereupon, given a complete discharge.
Because it was supposed Mackay had not properly dealt with the position, another column, seven days afterwards, invaded the district and swept up almost every beast it could find; and yet Matshana had kept in close touch with the authorities ever since Bambata's arrival at Nkandhla. Out of his many sons, five joined the rebels, whilst a number of people had gone from the tribe. These incidents were immediately reported to the Commissioner, the Chief urging that a striking example should be made of his rebels, beginning with his sons. As regards these defections, Matshana was no worse than the majority of the Nkandhla Chiefs, and not nearly so bad as some, e.g. Sigananda, Ndube and Mbuzo. But there is another and more telling consideration. "On Sunday evening (27th May)," says Leuchars' chief staff officer, Major (now Lieut.-Col.) S. Carter, "soon after we settled down in camp, a man came from Matshana ka Mondise, saying the Chief sent him to warn us to be particularly careful, as we were in a dangerous locality. The man was told to go back and thank Matshana for his warning. Next morning, after the fight was over (i.e. the battle of Mpukunyoni), two mounted messengers, ... arrived and said they had been sent by Matshana to congratulate Col. Leuchars on having defeated the enemy." There are other facts in connection with this matter, other assistance readily afforded by the Chief under difficult circumstances, but the foregoing are, perhaps, sufficient to show the danger of sending one column to generally 'put right' what it is supposed another has failed to do through incompetency or lack of information. The result was that, on the truth coming to light, Matshana's wrongfully seized property was, of course, restored by order of the Commandant of Militia.
If further proof be required of the Chief's loyalty, we have it in the fact that, as declared by the rebel ringleader Mangati, Matshana, because of his loyalty, was to be shot by rebels then being harboured at Usutu by Dinuzulu.—Vide, Cd. 3,888, p. 186.
It is right to add that Royston was not acquainted with the foregoing facts when the cattle were taken.
[298] When, on the 10th July, Dick returned to Durban, Furze took command (under Wylie); Furze was relieved on the 13th by Boyd-Wilson. In the concluding stages of the campaign, N.R. were detailed as garrisons at such places as Thring's Post, Kearsney, Stanger, and Nkandhla, whilst E squadron cleared up at Noodsberg.
[299] Major W.A. Vanderplank, Z.M.R., prosecuted in this important case, and Capt. C.F. Clarkson, D.L.I., with Lieut. H. Walton, N.C., defended.
[300] Meseni and Ndhlovu were tried at Mapumulo on the 16th and 17th July, 1906, and convicted of high treason.
[301] Other Chiefs and headmen, whose conduct during the disturbances had been unsatisfactory, were deposed, and, in some cases, ordered to remove to other districts. Among those removed were Tshingana, Dinuzulu's uncle, and, later on, Mabeketshiya, one of Dinuzulu's cousins; the former left Mahlabatini district to live near Amanzimtoti in Natal, the latter went from Vryheid district to Alfred division.
[302] As, at a number of the places where engagements had occurred, e.g. Mome, Insuze and Izinsimba, it appeared that many bodies of rebels had not been removed, it became necessary for the Government to send out a small party to bury them.
[303] Particulars will be found in Appendix VIII. regarding expenditure from the beginning of the Rebellion to 31st May, 1910, i.e. including that incurred in connexion with the Dinuzulu Expedition, December, 1907, to March, 1908.
[XIX.]
SOME LESSONS OF THE REBELLION.
From a military point of view, the rapidity and thoroughness with which the rising was suppressed cannot but reflect the greatest credit on the Colonists and the Government of Natal. Hostilities began on the 4th April and lasted until the middle of July, barely three and a half months. The achievement was altogether a notable one, and one of which far larger Colonies would have justly been proud, especially when it is borne in mind that it was accomplished without the assistance of the Mother Country.[304] To have conducted with success so formidable a campaign, calling as it did for the employment of nearly 10,000 men and over 6,000 Natives, without Imperial aid, is probably unique in the history of the Empire. And not less creditable was it that the rising was kept from developing to far greater proportions, as might easily have happened through mismanagement.
The character of the work done by the Natal Militia, as well as by the Transvaal and Cape troops, the Natal Police and other forces, shows that a very high standard of efficiency existed at the beginning of the hostilities, indicating that organization in the hands of the Commandant, and of the authorities in the sister Colonies, was everything that could have been desired. Throughout the campaign, all units, under their respective commanding officers, discharged the duties allotted to them in a cheerful, soldier-like and exemplary manner. Many of the operations and actions engaged in from time to time were of a particularly severe and difficult nature. Especially was this the case in regard to what is known as the thorn country, which is very extensive and broken, and at Nkandhla, where forest-driving had to be repeatedly undertaken, often under the most disheartening conditions. If the men were not obliged to undergo privations to an abnormal extent, it was only because of the general excellence of the other branches of the service, e.g. transport, supplies, medical, ordnance, etc., each of which, again, was strongly supported by all ranks of the Natal Government Railways Departments.
Foremost among individuals who contributed to the success were the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, G.C.M.G., the Natal Ministry (Messrs. Smythe, Maydon, Hyslop, Watt, Winter and Clayton), and Colonels Bru-de-Wold, McKenzie and Leuchars.
Attention has already been called to the eminent services rendered by Sir Henry McCallum. That he should have made a point of discussing the position with his Ministers, as he did, daily from the day the trouble started to its close, is proof, if any were wanting, of his extreme solicitude for the welfare of the Colony. Valuable assistance was afforded him throughout the campaign by Sir Charles Saunders, for the time being his deputy in Zululand.
The Ministry are deserving of the greatest praise for the cool, resolute and statesmanlike manner in which they controlled the affairs of the Colony. They met the extraordinary difficulties that confronted them from time to time with courage and success. The stand made when the suspension of the Richmond executions was ordered is alone sufficient to cause their administration to be remembered and respected. A further measure of credit is due to Sir Thomas Watt, who, as Minister of Justice and Defence, was, of course, primarily responsible for the excellent state of military organization at the beginning of the campaign.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate what has already been said about Colonel Bru-de-Wold. The Militia was exceedingly fortunate in having so enthusiastic and experienced an officer as Commandant. The same applies to that distinguished soldier Major-General Sir John Dartnell who, for a time, relieved Colonel Bru-de-Wold.
That Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sir Duncan) McKenzie did more than come up to the high expectations formed of his capacities as a soldier was generally acknowledged. But few opportunities for distinguishing himself arose during the demonstrations in February and March. When he assumed command at Nkandhla, however, early in May, with Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson as Chief Staff Officer, they became numerous. It was due mainly to his generalship, ably supported by the column and other commanders, that the decisive results at Nkandhla and elsewhere were brought about. Every operation or action taken in hand by him during the campaign was planned with the greatest care and circumspection. He was fortunate in being provided with excellent intelligence. His policy was always to strike hard, and to afford no chance of escape. It was, in the main, owing to this method, and the vigour and resolution with which it was followed, that hostilities were brought to an end as soon as they were.
A fine horseman, with an unerring eye for country, his performances in the field were invariably marked by swiftness of action, and brilliancy and thoroughness of execution.
Colonel Leuchars commanded all troops in Natal proper and Nqutu district, though, after 30th May, he did so under McKenzie. Much useful and solid work was done by this popular officer, with Major (now Lieut.-Col.) S. Carter as Staff Officer. He proved himself to be a judicious, capable and reliable commander. The disturbed area over which he had control included no less than five magisterial districts. As these all abut on the Tugela, it can be seen that the command was one of exceptional difficulty, and this not only in a geographical, but a diplomatic, sense.
The first lesson of the Rebellion may, therefore, be said to have been (a) the happy conjunction of capable statesmen and soldiers, one and all ready to serve the Colony to the utmost in its time of need; and (b) the thoroughness of military organization.
Rebels' strategy, tactics, etc.—The primary object of the rebels was to score victories, however small, at the outset, it being felt that that was the most effective way of rousing the people from a condition of apathy or inertia brought on through chronic fear of Europeans. The masses considered it was useless fighting against a race far better armed than themselves, and one which, twenty-eight years before, had defeated the Zulu army when in its highest state of efficiency. If the Rebellion was not to fall flat, the most strenuous efforts had, therefore, to be made to secure adherents.
Having regard to their inferior weapons, the only chance of success lay in selecting a terrain suitable to their tactics. That, at any rate, would afford breathing-time, for if the theatre of war lay away from railways and in country difficult for horses, the longer would hostilities continue. Thus success was recognized as depending largely on protracting the campaign, by rendering it as difficult as possible for the troops.
To start hostilities, again, at the most favourable time, i.e. about May, when all the crops had been reaped, was regarded as essential. It is true that the Trewirgie affair occurred in February, but such must be regarded as an exception which proved the rule.
The feeling that they could, as it were, "float" a general rebellion was, no doubt, largely derived from the success achieved by a Zulu impi against Potgieter's commando at Holkrantz. The ambuscade at Mpanza, too, was a success, and afforded just the illustration required to support the cry that European bullets would not "enter." As Natives in general greatly dreaded rifle fire, it became necessary to counteract the fear by inventing the "non-entering-bullet" superstition. Had but one or two rebels been killed at Mpanza, not nearly so much would have been made of the superstition as was done.
The fact that, at the beginning of June, the position was extremely serious, only shows that the enemy's tactics had been effective, differing widely from the free, open methods practised during the Zulu War. But for the remarkable coup at Mome, the Rebellion might easily have developed to far greater proportions. As it was, many Chiefs on both sides of the Tugela had begun to assist directly or indirectly. And it is clear that the more protracted the fighting, the more Natives at large would have inferred that the Government had got to the end of its resources, and was, therefore, unable to cope with the situation. Once such a notion had been created and been widely believed, anything up to 100,000 might have risen, and so called for an army corps to deal with the outbreak at a cost of £10,000,000 or so. That is the prospect the Ministry had before them at the latter end of May and beginning of June.
That principles such as the foregoing would be followed in any future Native war appears axiomatic, particularly as Natives know quite well that their tactics in 1906 were, on the whole, successful; Mome, though a catastrophe, was due to accident or carelessness that could easily have been avoided by a competent commander.
That an outbreak should have occurred at Mapumulo subsequent to the débâcle in Zululand, is remarkable chiefly as showing lack of territorial organization. Although a certain amount had been introduced at Nkandhla, between the arrival of Bambata and the action at Mome, the army daily becoming more crafty and efficient, it had reference only to such rebels as had actually massed at that place. A supreme organizer was wanting, one who, whilst directing at Nkandhla, could have so far enforced obedience as to control situations such as those at Umsinga, and especially in Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions. That there was this want was undoubtedly felt by every insurgent. They knew too much of Tshaka's successes to do otherwise than realize that they were weak, and see what such weakness was due to. That is why Dinuzulu's personality and presence was so much in demand. That is why, for instance, one heard of such talk as that they would seize and carry him off to lead them whether he willed it or not. To have a visible leader and to submit to his direction, that was the height of their ambition. Only then did they feel themselves to be a people, possessed to some extent of their former solidarity. To sacrifice their lives for someone is everything, to have to do so for an absent reality, nothing.
Another lesson is the necessity of pursuing the enemy the moment he starts hostilities. Quick pursuit is what every Zulu holds as a primary maxim of warfare. Such action inspires loyalists with confidence, because affording them protection at the time they most require it.
The policy of the rebels having been to avoid conflict whenever the conditions were unfavourable, meant that the campaign resolved itself into one where the troops had always to assume the offensive.[305] The enemy deliberately invited being hunted in the forests in which he took refuge. There was no other alternative but to 'hunt' him. His perpetual and masterly evasiveness was resorted to just because felt to be the most telling and safest tactics to adopt. He knew that, man for man, he was infinitely better acquainted with forests, streams, dongas, caves, hills and valleys than the Europeans, most of whom had spent the greater part of their lives in towns at a distance and in sedentary occupations. But, whilst practising these methods, the motive was invariably to draw the troops on after him in the hope of small parties becoming detached when the opportunity was smartly seized, and the severest blow possible struck. This being the game, can it be wondered at that the rebels were severely punished whenever they were come upon? For it must be remembered that, up to the moment of Mome, nothing had been further from their minds than to surrender. Ample opportunities for so doing, notably when the troops first went to Cetshwayo's grave, were afforded, but the negotiations fell through because they felt, and even publicly stated that they had not had enough fighting. From their point of view, it was in their interest to continue.
This watchful evasiveness, then, was the essence of the situation at Nkandhla. Hence it sometimes happened that the troops drove one or other of the bushes in the belief the enemy was there, whereas, as a matter of fact, he was not there at all, but at Macala ten miles off or elsewhere, having slipped away during the night.
In these circumstances, it was soon realized that, not 2,500, but 10,000 men were required to deal with Nkandhla alone, although the rebels themselves did not exceed 2,000 in number. In no other way was it possible to put a cordon round the forests, and, by confining the enemy, speedily starve him into submission.
Connected with the same tactics was the waylaying of a force when on the march. This generally took place at a carefully-selected position, from which there was an immediate and safe line of retreat. Instances of this occurred at Mpanza, Bobe, Macrae's store, Peyana, Insuze and Ponjwana. At all, except Mpanza and others not here named, the method was to divide the impi into two bodies, one to attack the front, and the other the rear, of the advancing column. And the principle was observed, although the ground rendered the application thereof extremely difficult. On no occasion did attack take place in the open, as often happened during the Zulu War.
The only standing camp attacked was that of Leuchars at Mpukunyoni. This took place at dawn, there being no shelter for the troops except their saddles.
At Macrae's store, the attack came just after sunset and later—the only instance of night attack. When the offensive is assumed by Zulus, the proper time to do so is just before dawn, unless the force be a strong one, when battle would be given in broad daylight.
The rebels moved about to get food and seize cattle chiefly at night, sometimes going ten or more miles for the purpose. Those wounded in action, too, were removed after dark.
A close watch was always kept on each column, especially by spies posted on hills, where, if out of rifle range, they did not mind whether they exposed themselves or not.
Occasionally it happened that those who had fought against the troops, but had been obliged to surrender, took up arms against their own people. Several of such men were utilized as spies, and proved invaluable.
European troops.—Having regard to the number of troops in the field, the importance of the campaign, and the wide area covered by the operations, it would seem the officer in supreme command should have been given the rank of Brigadier or Major-General. The O.C. Troops was, of course, a full Colonel, but, on being appointed over Natal and Zululand, it would, perhaps, have been more in accord with the general duties he had to perform, to have conferred on him a rank conspicuously higher than that of any one else in his command. The rank, however, seeing the campaign was being conducted by Colonial troops, could have been conferred only by the local authorities.
The want of a trained staff was much felt by each column.
"It is," says Sir Duncan McKenzie,[306] "of great importance that an intelligence department should be formed on the soundest of bases.... It is not sufficient that an intelligence officer should simply be able to speak the language of the country. He should have all the available information at his instant disposal and also be able to guide or conduct his O.C. anywhere.... Intelligence officers should not be attached to any regiment in peace-time, but in the event of a force being required in any district, the intelligence officer from that district should be placed at the disposal of the column commander." All the columns were supplied with excellent intelligence. To the fine work done by Lieut. Hedges and Sergts. Calverley and Titlestad at Nkandhla must be attributed much of the success met with in that district.
The two points on which attention was, perhaps, chiefly concentrated were (a) methods of dealing with the enemy when concealed in forests, and (b) advanced guards. That such matters assumed the importance they did, was due to the enemy habitually leaving the initiative to be taken by the troops. The troops never went out to drive forests, but some catastrophe was possible. The greatest circumspection had invariably to be exercised, not so much because unable to afford the loss of men, as because the loss would have been absurdly magnified by the enemy to obtain further recruits.
The principal authority as to dealing with the enemy in the Nkandhla forests is, of course, Sir Duncan McKenzie. "A General Officer Commanding," he says, "at a place like Nkandhla should have 10,000 men at his disposal. I, however, derived confidence from the fact that not above 2,000 rebels were in the bush, consequently greater risks were taken than would have happened had they been more numerous. The chief aim as to the drives was this: I fitted my force to the bush, not the bush to my force. It was impossible to do the latter, so I did the former. As soon as the intelligence, which was good, showed in what part of the forests the enemy was, it was at once driven.
"The forests could never have been completely driven at one time, i.e. in one day. Empandhleni and a number of other places had to be garrisoned, whilst the different camps had to be protected during the actual operations. Such calls naturally greatly reduced the force available for driving.
"I do not see how the driving could have been carried out more effectively than was done with the men at my disposal. My tactics, of course, would have been considerably altered had there been, say, 10,000 troops. I would, in that event, have put the men in a line as skirmishers, with small supports at intervals of every 500 yards, and larger ones at points that appeared more dangerous.
"So long as there was no reverse or tight corner, I felt the levies were all right, hence their being sent in with the troops, as they were to assist in the drive.
"I always made a point of driving downhill as much as possible, so that when the enemy was come upon, he would be obliged to charge uphill."
Barker, who was more frequently attacked when actually on the march than any other column commander, says of advanced guards: "I would never allow the guard to be more than 300 yards from the main body as, if further, I would not have been able to gallop up in time on its being suddenly attacked.
"I had only one squadron as advanced guard between Noodsberg camp and Dalipa (wattle plantation). It was formed of two troops in front in sections of four (in close touch with each other), with two troops close up on either side in support. The head of the main column was, at the same time, marching in the centre, not more than 200 yards away. This order was adopted as I expected to be attacked. The guard, in this way, were able to at once deliver a counter attack, instead of falling back on the main body. Had they been weaker, they would have been obliged to fall back.
"It is, moreover, necessary to have the guard so arranged that the main body can be pushed forward to support whichever side the attack comes from. In Native warfare, one can never tell what flank will be threatened.
"I fully realized that the whole essence of the position lay in the advanced guard. Hence, before the action at Ponjwana, having seen Natives collecting the previous day along the route to be traversed, I warned the officer in command to be on the alert. When the attack came, sudden though it was, his men were ready in a moment to engage the enemy."
One of the surprises of the campaign, in the opinion of competent judges, was the prominent part played by infantry, e.g. D.L.I., N.R.R. and N.R. Because a less showy arm, infantry has been apt to be underrated in connection with Native warfare. It is, however, not too much to say that any such opinions as existed in Natal have had to be considerably modified on account of the consistently fine work that was done at Nkandhla, and in the actions of Bobe, Mome and Izinsimba. Not only was it found that a well-trained corps could march twenty or even thirty miles a day, but able to take a share in the fighting as effective as that of troops conveyed on horseback to the scene of action. As Native wars of the future will probably be fought on difficult and out-of-the-way ground, similar to that chosen in 1906, it would be well to bear this fact in mind.
In going through thick bush held by the enemy, as the N.P. had to do at Mpanza, it would appear advisable for the advanced guard to dismount and hand horses to Nos. 3, as, in the event of attack, men would then be able to reply at once, as well as stand together to resist the rush. Horses are startled by the shouting inevitable on such occasions, with the result that a man's time is taken up in trying to keep his seat, thereby becoming practically hors de combat at a very critical moment.
The following miscellaneous extracts are taken from an unpublished general report by Sir Duncan McKenzie:
Transport.—"The majority of the transport was ox-transport; for military operations, mule-transport is absolutely necessary.... Expense should not be considered in such an important matter.[307] ... The necessity of good conductors was apparent." Closer supervision should be exercised by O.C. units than was done to ensure that only the regulation weight per man is put on the waggons. "Pack transport is absolutely necessary in rough country, and the saddles should be carried on the waggons, so that they can be used when the country will not permit of waggons accompanying the troops."
Remounts.—"The loss of horses from hard work, exposure and want of suitable food is bound to be heavy.... Steps should be taken to enable the remount officer to know exactly where he can put his finger on suitable horses when required.... The establishment of a proper remount depôt is strongly recommended."
Boots, clothing, etc.—"These should be issued on repayment at cost price and the articles should be of really good quality. The wear and tear on clothing, and more especially on boots, was very heavy.... A man without boots is useless."
Searchlights.—"Their usefulness for defensive purposes is of the greatest value.... They should be so arranged that with one engine and dynamo, two or more lights could be placed at different positions in the defences."
Maxim Transport.—"Having seen practical results with the C.M.R., who carried their Maxims on pack mules led by Cape boys, and the Natal Militia regiment, who carried theirs on pack horses led by a mounted man, I certainly recommend that we should follow the C.M.R. in this respect."
Stretcher-bearers.—"These are indispensable when fighting takes place in the bush or rough country. There was no organized supply until too late." Natives had to be employed at exorbitant rates.
Native levies.—Their value was largely discounted by the fact that parts of many tribes had joined the rebels. "Their services came in useful in clearing up after an engagement, collecting and driving cattle, etc., and also using up the enemy's supplies. They require to be led by experienced officers who are known to them and who are also well acquainted with Native habits and customs. For operations, they need to be stiffened with a good proportion of European troops."
Colonel Leuchars, who had exceptional opportunities of observing them, is of opinion that "as a fighting force, they were useless, though those under Sibindi (a Chief quite above the average) were, as far as I know, keen to help the Government. The use I expected to make of them was in skirmishing down broken, bushy valleys, but my experience goes to show that for this work they were useless as, although I succeeded, after some trouble, in extending them, they would always, a little further down the valley, collect and march along in groups. As scouts and camp followers, they were useful. In a lager, through not being armed with rifles, they are only an encumbrance. Their only use would be to skirmish through rough country known to be occupied by the enemy, and this, as pointed out above, they failed to do."
The Rexer guns.—"This arm," says McKenzie, "gave most satisfactory results. Handiness and portability in rough country are its chief advantages. It does not afford a large target for the enemy, as is the case with the Maxim. No cases of jamming occurred. The number of spare parts to be carried is few. On more than one occasion, the gun was caught up by the gunner and used from the shoulder when, owing to scrub and long grass, the tripod could not be used. The present equipment for carrying the gun is not satisfactory.... Every squadron of mounted men and company of infantry should have three of these guns."
Branding of loot stock.—"It is imperative that all captured stock should be at once branded with a distinctive mark. A responsible officer with each column should be detailed for this purpose."
Miscellaneous.—No epidemic or cases of serious illness occurred. The organization of the medical department was so carefully planned and carried out that only four died from disease out of over 9,000 men in the field.
"Generally speaking, veterinary surgeons had more animals to look after per man than it was possible to deal with."
"The establishment of a field bakery and consequent supply of fresh bread was an excellent innovation."
Sufficient transport was always available, although at times the demands were very heavy.
The making of roads through all inaccessible parts of the Colony would appear to be necessary. The want of these was felt along both sides of the Tugela. A belt of country, some five miles wide on either side, needs attention, though that is by no means the only region in Natal that is difficult of access. Only narrow and inexpensive roads are required. These, in time of peace, would be of assistance to the inhabitants in facilitating conveyance of produce to available markets, and generally developing the locations.
MISCELLANEOUS.
The lesson to be learned from the poll tax is, of course, that no taxation should be imposed on Natives without previously consulting them in some way or another. It is, however, unnecessary to obtain the views of more than a few of the leading and most influential advisers. These would speedily reveal the attitude likely to be taken up by the majority towards any such proposal.
The advisability of securing uniformity when promulgating measures closely affecting the Natives is so obvious as to call for no special comment.
The likelihood of some of the Native police (Government) taking part in the Rebellion was realized at the outset, consequently, at such places as Krantzkop and Mapumulo, men connected with the divisions were removed to another part of the Colony, their places being taken by others. Native police from such stations as Insuze, Kearsney, Glendale, Umhlali and Stanger rebelled. Sixteen were recognized, by their finger-prints, among the rebel prisoners, whilst at least four were killed. About eighty Durban Borough police are said to have taken up arms.
On the other hand, out of the whole of the Nongqai, whose members and ex-members numbered some thousands, only one man, who left the force some twenty years previously, is known to have joined the enemy. Full and careful inquiry was made in the matter by Chief Commissioner Mansel. This highly creditable state of affairs may be accounted for by the fact that, during the many years Mansel had control of the force, he never allowed any one to serve as 'substitute' for a regular member. An account of the Nongqai will be found in Appendix XI.
The part taken by Christian Natives in the Insurrection was a large and prominent one. The teaching of many Native preachers, generally belonging to Ethiopian denominations, was of a distinctly seditious character. Here, for instance, is a type of an address frequently repeated in 1906 in a location within the vicinity of Greytown: "The end of the age is at hand! On the black race did God originally bestow the right of governing. The race, however, failed to acquire the art. Now is the time drawing to a close. The right to govern is reverting to its original possessors. Authority will be conferred on the black race, and they will now be exalted to a position above the whites. You shall enjoy complete ascendancy over Europeans, for the power has at length been restored to you by the Almighty. Even were actual conflicts to occur between you and the whites, you will surely put them to flight, for God is standing by you." The services were usually held in out-of-the-way places, and always out of hearing of Europeans or their Native agents. It was found exceedingly difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute, even though sedition was known to be constantly preached. When hostilities actually broke out, many of these men determined to practise what they had preached; they accordingly broke away from mission stations, notably in Mapumulo, Ndwedwe and Umsinga divisions, and joined the rebels.
In July, 1907, it was found that of the Native prisoners then in Natal gaols, 418 were Christians. Of this number, 204 were ordinary criminals, whilst 214 had been convicted of rebellion.[308] Of the latter figure, seven were preachers. The foregoing totals, which are below the actual numbers, owing to the difficulty of ascertaining who were converts, were obtained subsequent to the release of about 500 rebels, among whom other so-called Christians would probably have been found.
In addition to the above, several preachers and many members of different denominations were shot during the operations. Hunt and Armstrong, it will be remembered, were murdered by a band of mission Natives.
It is but fair to add that many of the Christian Natives who rebelled were not attached to any recognized missionary body at the time they did so.
A number of other matters, which might have been noticed here, have already been sufficiently dealt with in preceding chapters. The Native Affairs Commission drew attention to various reforms in administration, many of which have already been introduced, such as the appointment of a Council for Native Affairs and Commissioners,[309] limitation of interest on loans, various problems connected with labour, and compulsory service on public works.
The fact that none of the Magistrates of such districts as Mahlabatini (H.M. Stainbank, later J.Y. Gibson), Nongoma (G.W. Armstrong), and Nkandhla (B. Colenbrander), in Zululand, and Umsinga (A.E. Harrington) and Mapumulo (T. Maxwell), in Natal, were withdrawn, but continued to discharge the duties of their office throughout the Rebellion, tended to influence and reassure many European farmers, storekeepers and others, preventing them from getting into a panic, and, by flying off to other parts for protection, making matters considerably worse than they were. With the troops often operating at a distance, there is no doubt considerable danger was run of any of these magistracies being attacked and the officials murdered. As very little protection was immediately available, sometimes even with the Native police disaffected, it would have been comparatively easy for any band of determined rebels to have brought about one or more of such results before assistance could have been rendered.
Much credit is due to Magistrates generally for the admirable manner in which they retained a hold on the Natives of their districts throughout the period of unrest. Occasionally, however, scares among Europeans could not be prevented. Those at Greytown and Nqutu have already been noticed; another occurred at Pietermaritzburg.
It will already have been gathered that many loyalists, especially those of tribes within the area of disturbance, stood in an extremely invidious and dangerous position. Too little consideration is given to the fact that, unless promptly supported by Government forces, loyalists are liable to be murdered or their property looted. When an outbreak occurs, it is almost as important to support the well-affected as it is to operate against the insurgents themselves. The reason is clear. If you do not back up those on your side when in danger, do not be surprised if, in your absence, they are coerced into taking up arms against you, and so add greatly to your difficulties.