FOOTNOTES:
[338] Cd. 3998, p. 7.
[339] Shortly after the Rebellion began, and public suspicion had been aroused as to the Chief's loyalty, Sir Charles Saunders reported as follows (20th April): "At my first interview with Dinuzulu on his return from exile, I told him I would be perfectly frank and open in all my dealings with him and I expected the same demeanour on his part towards myself." That this promise was faithfully kept by Sir Charles Saunders is undoubted, only, however, to be met with gross deception on the part of Dinuzulu.
[340] Cd. 3888, p. 109.
[341] Cd. 3888, p. 149.
[342] This, though not in accordance with Zulu practice, is a method that would naturally commend itself to a man like Dinuzulu, who would realize the danger of adopting normal procedure.
[343] Too much emphasis should not, however, be laid on this, as Dinuzulu was shrewd enough to know that, only by not conforming to normal procedure, would he stand the best chance of cloaking the true intent of his words and actions.
[344] When the troops arrived at Nongoma (December, 1907), the same Mayatana volunteered to assist as a 'spy.' As he appeared to be acting in a bona-fide manner, his services were accepted. On one occasion, he led the way by night to a cave near Usutu, where a couple of useless guns and a kamba full of old cartridge cases were found. It was not, of course, known then that he was a murderer. It is not improbable that, although apparently assisting the troops, he was really acting in his master, Dinuzulu's, interests the whole time. To have done so, would have been in keeping with Zulu character in time of war.
[XXIV.]
CONCLUSION.
That unusual significance attaches to the events narrated in the foregoing pages, can hardly fail to have impressed the reader. It will, no doubt, have been borne in on him that he is here face to face with the spirit of Africa itself. Attempts have been made to explain the position as it developed. What remains now is to deal with the subject in a more general way—see if what occurred amounted to rebellion; if so, when it began and came to an end; estimate the various underlying causes; attempt replies to some of the criticisms that were passed; and, finally, put forward one or two suggestions as to future relations between the European and Native races.
(i) Nature of the Rising.
A number of people, swayed by false accusations of rapacity, unfairness or what not against the colonists, would appear to have come to the conclusion that the Rebellion was of a merely superficial nature. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not that the colonists were or are without blame, for they are of the same type of British settler as is to be found in any other part of the Empire, but such faults as they were responsible for were certainly not, as far as we can see, the principal or moving cause. There was something more fundamental than that.
But before dealing with the causes, let us inquire if what occurred was a rebellion or an insurrection. What is rebellion? It is "organized armed resistance to the ruler or government of one's country."[345] What is insurrection? It is "the action of rising in arms or open resistance against established authority or governmental restraint."[346]
It would be difficult to prove that the attack on the Police at Trewirgie amounted to rebellion or even to insurrection. It was, however, active resistance to constituted authority at a time when practically the whole country was in a state of unrest and seething with disaffection. The attack was, no doubt, intended to be an act of insurrection or rebellion, though prematurely carried into execution.[347] This conclusion is supported by the fact that it was followed by no other overt act of violence on the part of others; at any rate, not until two months later. But for such occurrence, the Mpanza one would probably not have taken place in the way it did. The former, no doubt, paved the way for the latter, though, at the same time, as a general rebellious spirit was abroad, Trewirgie may be said to have disturbed the formation of plans that were either incubating or would certainly have incubated in an environment favourable for a general rising.
When, however, we come to Bambata's attack, there can be no question but that such was a premeditated act, intended to be the first step in a revolt which, it was hoped, would rapidly become universal.
The Mpanza affair was further characterized by the plans formed in connection therewith. Evidences of plan are found in Cakijana, in the name of Dinuzulu, inciting Bambata's people to rebel, and warning them not to kill European women and children, or other than members of the Militia and Police forces; in the insurgents forthwith crossing to the Nkandhla forests, where the Chief of that part, on receipt of 'instructions' from Dinuzulu, proceeded to protect Bambata; in Sigananda, Mehlokazulu and other Chiefs or headmen promptly assisting Bambata. A war-cry, badges and pass-words, which presently became general, were, moreover, ordered to be used, and so on.
The plan undoubtedly was that the rising should eventually involve the whole of Natal and Zululand. To begin with, hostility was to be allowed to develop out of a spirit of unrest and opposition to the Government, known to have more or less infected the entire Native population. After the insurgents had to some extent established themselves at Nkandhla, they began coercing neighbouring Chiefs to join their cause by raiding their stock. Had suitable opportunity occurred, these methods would have been practised on men living at even greater distances. Later on, two indunas, Macala and another, were, as declared by Mangati, appointed by Dinuzulu—the former to take supreme command of the rebel forces.
But evidences of plan and organization are not of themselves sufficient to decide the point. The character of the motives is also a determining factor.
There is abundant evidence that the Natives of Natal were satisfied with the Crown Colony government that existed up to 1893, whilst those of Zululand were equally contented with the Imperial control which continued until the end of 1897. The majority were averse to being autocratically ruled by Zulu kings of the type of Tshaka, Dingana or Cetshwayo.[348] It is, moreover, certain that they knew themselves to be powerless against European troops. With the recent object-lesson of the Boer War before them, they realized the utter futility and madness of attempting to regain their independence as a nation. There is no evidence of any such thought having been seriously entertained, in spite of Ethiopian propaganda. The most they hoped for was that, as the Imperial troops had been withdrawn, the King would not assist the Colonial Government in the event of hostilities. The mere fact of withdrawing the troops appeared to their limited outlook to show that His Majesty disapproved of the manner in which the Colony, and especially the Native people, were being governed, and would, therefore, probably refrain from helping. Because of apparent disapproval of Natal policy, the sympathies of the King, they thought, would be with the Zulus in any conflict that might arise; and any opposition by them would be held to be justifiable. The mere fact of a quarrel occurring would be good cause why the Imperial Government should intervene and readjust matters. After interfering, a general inquiry would ensue and possibly lead to reversion to the former mode of government, and, perhaps, to the setting up of Dinuzulu as Paramount Chief.
This is the loose reasoning that Dinuzulu and Mankulumana probably indulged in, and this is the only motive that we can assign for the Chief aiding and abetting Bambata as he did. The pronounced way in which the numerous Chiefs, headmen and other Natives that appeared before the Commission approved of Sir Theophilus Shepstone's management of their affairs under Crown Colony government goes to support the theory.
The peculiar instruction that European women and children were not to be murdered or molested, or men other than Police or Militia injured, is also in harmony with the idea, for Dinuzulu knew the Natives would forfeit all sympathy with their cause in England had they put their ordinary methods of warfare into practice. Clearly this extraordinary instruction was issued to gain approval. It was certainly not to placate the rebels. If not the Imperial Government, we fail to see what other people it was intended to influence. No doubt, the severe manner in which Europeans condemned the murders of European women and children as well as civilians by the Matabele (Zulus) in the Rhodesian Rebellion of 1896, had come to Dinuzulu's notice. If the motive was simply to destroy European government and set up their own in its place, it is obvious no such order would have been issued.
It may be incidentally remarked that many Europeans, particularly at the beginning of the rising, were in a great state of alarm lest the Natives should rise en bloc and massacre them. The great difficulties of combination between Chiefs were, however, insufficiently realized, especially as many were loyal, or at least neutral, and would have reported any hostile plans or intentions that came to their notice.
We believe the order about not putting European women and children to death was issued, and it is not unlikely that credit therefor should be given to Dinuzulu himself. At the same time, one should bear in mind that the Natives of Natal and Zululand, upwards of a million in number, were in a completely disorganized condition. To a great extent, they looked to Dinuzulu as their head, and he, no doubt, desired to be their leader. They would have wished for nothing better than that he should lead in an active manner. The fact remains that he did not take up such position, and certainly a man like Bambata could never have done so. Therefore, although Dinuzulu might have given the order, there was no guarantee, had the Government dealt with the Rebellion in a less rigorous manner than it did, that the rebels, especially if they had secured a few successes in different parts of the country, would not have become so elated as to act as they saw fit, in the belief that the day had at last come when the white man was to be driven back into the sea 'from whence he came.'
As proof that the foregoing supposition is not incorrect, we find that the civilians Veal, Sangreid and Walters were murdered, and Robbins seriously wounded.[349] And these incidents happened two or three months after issue of the order.
One can understand Bambata's animus towards the Government, but, as has already been shown, Bambata was backed or supported by Dinuzulu. Had his actions not been so directed, it is impossible to understand how the many rebels that joined him could have done so merely for the sake of fighting against the Government in the certain knowledge of being speedily annihilated. So many members of a normally sane and phlegmatic people would never have followed an ignis fatuus and sacrificed themselves on the mere chance that the public would benefit. It is inconsistent with Zulu character for a man to sacrifice himself, unless there be a reasonable probability of material advantage accruing. We, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that their only reason for taking up arms was because they believed, and believed on what appeared to be the best possible authority, that Dinuzulu desired and had 'ordered' them to fight to further some practical, profitable scheme or another which he had in mind.
Another possible motive was, by offering sharp and stubborn resistance, to demonstrate to all concerned, more plainly than words could do, that the people resented the way in which they were being governed, and so urge their local rulers to bring about a change for the better. These aimless or improvident tactics are, indeed, of a merely animal type, such, for instance, as a dog, continually irritated by its master, might resort to.
Having regard to Dinuzulu's association with the rising in the capacity, to some extent, of invisible mentor and director, we cannot believe that, with his by no means scanty knowledge of Imperial rule and of Natal responsible government, especially of the conditions under which he had been repatriated, and of the political relations subsisting between the Home Government and Natal, he would not have had some ulterior object in view, even though not given expression to at the time. His personal preference for the Imperial Government has always been strong, consequently restoration of something akin to Crown Colony government was naturally what would have been uppermost in his mind and supplied a sufficiently practical goal. If, however, responsible government could not be revoked, the conditions under which he had been repatriated might conceivably have been revised by establishing him as Paramount Chief and, through him, improving the status and condition of the people at large. That such thoughts were actually in his mind is proved by his own words to Sir Henry McCallum at the important interview that took place in Pietermaritzburg in May, 1907: "I do not wish," he said, "to conceal it from your Excellency that the whole of the people, the Zulus, like me, as the son of my father, who was their king formerly.... Now, I feel it very hard on me, as I have been placed on a level with all other headmen and Chiefs in the country. We are just like a flock of goats, we are all the same.... I feel very pained about something that I wish to state. My father went to war with the British Government; he was beaten; he was taken away from the country, but afterwards, ... allowed to return.... Notwithstanding that he was returned by the kindness of the Home Government to his home in Zululand, I feel, and I wish to speak plainly here, that he was not treated as he should have been, nor I, nor the people of Zululand, as other nations or peoples who have gone to war with the Government have been treated.... We cannot help feeling that we Zulu people have been discriminated against, and have not had the same treatment meted out to us as to other races.... There is no one over us all who might be held responsible and as a superior to keep them together and to give them advice and direction."[350]
We do not believe the ordinary Natives were well enough informed to appreciate the general motives here imputed to Dinuzulu, but it was not at all necessary that they should know them before acting as 'directed' by their supreme head. In the patriarchal system, blind and unquestioning obedience is rendered, as a matter of course, even to Chiefs; much more so in the case of a Paramount Chief or King. For all they knew, the ordinary Natives might, in 1906, have been fighting for anything else. It was sufficient to know that they were acting by direction of their 'King,' the adequacy and practicability of the end in view being a matter left entirely for him to decide. Loyalty and devotion such as this could not but be admired by all who witnessed it.
It is just as well, from the rebels' point of view, that Dinuzulu did not reveal his objective (assuming the one imputed to him to be correct), otherwise many must have realized at once the futility of their endeavours. After all, he himself saw the game was hardly worth the candle, which accounts for his contenting himself with working through other tribes, i.e. through those over whom, ex hypothesi, he had no official jurisdiction.
Although he was, by birth, the supreme head, his authority was not recognized by many Natives, especially in Natal, i.e. where the new taxation pressed most heavily. Armed opposition was, therefore, contemplated to some extent independently of his control. The murder of Smith at Umlaas Road, the incident at Trewirgie, the exhibitions of defiance to various Magistrates, cannot be explained, except as spontaneous, isolated and purely local outbursts of hostile feeling in which Dinuzulu was not implicated. He had his reasons for promoting hostilities, whilst the Natives in general, particularly those in Natal, had theirs. He distinctly appears to have exercised restraint, and prevented the rising from resolving itself into isolated outbreaks in all parts of Natal and Zululand, regulated by nothing but the caprice of self-appointed leaders.
In these circumstances, the only conclusion we can come to is that the rising, dominated as it was from start to finish by Dinuzulu's personality, was more of the character of an insurrection than of a rebellion, for, although apparently aiming at a change in the constitution, such change, as we believe, was intended to be brought about by the Imperial Government of its own motion, as soon as the time came for intervening. It was what may be styled a limited or incipient rebellion, although the rebels themselves, and certain sections of the people, appear to have acted in the belief that the object was or ought to be nothing less than expulsion of the white race from Natal, if not from South Africa.[351]
That the taking of action against Dinuzulu was deferred until sixteen months after the conclusion of the Rebellion, is accounted for by his at first being presumed to be loyal; his having quickly paid the poll tax; and his offer of a levy. Had Colonel McKenzie received, prior to August, 1906, the subsequently-obtained information of the Chief's treasonable conduct—it is needless to say that he would have been dealt with without delay.
(ii) Causes, motives, etc., of the Rebellion.
The vexed question of the causes of the Rebellion appears simpler now that practically the whole of the evidence is available, by which we mean that of the Native Affairs Commission, of Dinuzulu's and other trials, and of numerous other official and private records. But, in dealing with the subject, one is at once confronted with a number of difficulties. The so-called 'causes' are found to resolve themselves into causes, motives and occasions, these again being capable of further subdivision. The word 'cause' will here be restricted to any action on the part of the Government or colonists that tended to bring about in the Natives an attitude of hostility or rebelliousness; 'motive' will be limited to anything which was an inducement to advance from attitude to action; and 'occasion' will be regarded as an opportunity, time, or state, favourable for rebelling. It is one thing for Dinuzulu to have had motives and occasions for promoting insurrection, quite another as to what causes had been at work in bringing about a rebellious spirit in the people.
The first, elementary, and most striking fact in connection with the upheaval is the profound and natural differences that existed between the contending races. Their civilizations were widely different. They had different creeds; different social systems; different habits and customs; different languages, history and traditions; a different physical, moral and intellectual nature and equipment; different tastes, ideals and outlooks on life, and countless other differences. Although the causes of any general conflict between a higher and a lower race are not, perhaps, necessarily deep-seated, in this particular instance we believe they arose out of the all-round radical differences referred to, and were as fundamental as it was possible for them to be.
Because of being a different race, the Natives, as has been seen, were governed by a set of laws different to those of the Europeans. This they strongly approved. It was, indeed, after their heart's desire. But, with the introduction of Responsible Government and development of European towns, commerce, industries, institutions, etc., Native Affairs received a gradually diminishing amount of attention on the part of the European community. As the Europeans progressed and became more engrossed in their own affairs, necessity for safeguarding purely Native interests seemed to recede further into the background. This was, to some extent, due to Members of the Legislative Assembly being invariably elected by a purely European electorate. When, as a result of the Boer War, severe financial depression came about, and Parliament was compelled to raise money, the Poll Tax Act was passed, though without being specially referred to the Natives. Theoretically there was no necessity for reference, for they were represented by Members of both Houses. The fault was not really attributable to the Government, still less to the colonists, but was rather one of the inevitable results of Responsible Government, and especially of Western Civilization, of which such Government was a natural outcome. In the Constitution Act,[352] elaborate provision was made for the protection of European interests, but no other than general provision on behalf of the Natives. That the action taken in respect of the latter was indefinite, was owing to their being barbarians, and in a very backward state of civilization. Nothing, therefore, was more natural than that the pendulum should eventually swing unduly in favour of the Europeans. As, however, the grant of Responsible Government came from the Imperial Government, such Government cannot be absolved from a share of the blame for the one-sided—and perhaps, for the time being, necessarily one-sided—tendencies inherent in the Constitution Act.
The specific grievances date, for the most part, from this granting of Responsible Government. Prior to that time, the Natives were under the immediate control of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, or officers who managed their affairs on more or less similar lines. On such regime, all still look back with affection and gratitude. But the seeds of friction and discord were nevertheless latent, only time being needed for them to develop into actual antagonism.
Apart from the system of Responsible Government, another disturbing cause was the immigration of Europeans and Indians. This had gone on steadily before 1893 and since. These increases, combined with a greatly-augmented Native population, seriously affected the conditions of living and, on account of the keener struggle for existence in a changing environment, the easy-going and comparatively indolent Native was obliged to go more and more to the wall.
It was, therefore, impossible to prevent the impression gaining ground, especially in later times, with an accelerated spreading of enlightenment, that the Natives were being discriminated against and, with such impression, accentuated by the sinister Ethiopian propaganda disseminated throughout the country since 1892, loss of confidence in the white man's rule became inevitable.
That Natives arrived at the conclusion that they were being discriminated against must be taken as fact. Dinuzulu's interview with the Governor proves that he personally had arrived at the same conclusion. Instances of like views will be found throughout the Evidence given before the Native Affairs Commission. We are not prepared to deny that this view is to a large extent correct, though cannot go the length of condemning Natal Native policy in such unmeasured terms as some are inclined to do. The clashing that occurred seems to have arisen more out of the innate character of Western Civilization than out of specific injustice, repression or inordinate self-seeking on the part of the colonists.
When once a people begins to feel that it is accorded no particularly definite status in the country, that its welfare is of no special concern to the rulers, except as a means to the latter's material advancement, that its members, in short, are pariahs in what, but a few years before, was their own country, then the time is not far distant when they may be expected to make a bid for liberty. It is beside the question to set about to defend the principles of any policy when such impression is abroad and the country in a ferment; if people believe they are being down-trodden, the belief, justifiable or not, is what has to be reckoned with. In Natal, it was a fact that many Natives believed themselves to be a down-trodden race, and it was this general fact which seems to us to have been a main underlying cause of their rebelliousness. But, whilst being a cause, one thing must be borne clearly in mind. The insurrection was partial, not universal. Had various Natal governments shown no regard whatever for the people's interests and welfare, and been content merely to exploit them for the benefit of the white race, no one will deny that such feelings of hatred would have been engendered as to have caused the rising to be far more extensive and formidable than it was. That there should have been warfare at all is bad enough, but it is at least fair to Natal to remember that the great mass of the people did not feel that provocation, sufficient for taking up arms, had been given. This testimony is manifestly in favour of successive governments not having been quite so callous as some have endeavoured to make out. Of course, the comparatively few who actually armed—between 10,000 and 12,000—wished to organize a general insurrection or rebellion; of that there is abundant evidence; and such plan might have succeeded had the rising not been sternly met and speedily repressed. The malcontents, knowing that the effects of European rule were felt as more or less oppressive by the majority of their kinsmen—just as the majority would, in time, have regarded as oppressive the rule of the highest type of British or any other rulers that could possibly have been selected—and knowing that the poll tax had still further embittered their race against European rule, calculated that the time was ripe for general rebellion. They reckoned that far greater numbers would have joined than actually did. But they were disappointed. They failed to allow sufficiently for the inertia of those who, though not particularly enamoured of European rule, saw nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by resort to arms. Even Dinuzulu, in spite of his promise, and after exerting his influence on Sigananda, Mehlokazulu and others, failed at the critical moment to afford active support. The fact is that the Natal Government had not become altogether intolerable, except to such recognized renegades as Bambata. In every State of the world, numbers of malcontents are ever ready to rise against any government that happens to be in power. Natal was no exception to the rule. And when her day of trial came, she had perforce to depend on the loyalty of the remainder of the people, and the strength of her own right hand. If the management of the Native races by Natal was worse than is here made out, how comes it that her entire Native population throughout the Boer War, which began but six, and ended four, years before the Rebellion, was as consistently loyal as it was throughout that protracted war; that Dinuzulu assisted as he did with scouts and levies (though not for the purpose of actual fighting); that, so far from wanting to rebel, the Chiefs offered their services, which, however, could not be accepted on the ground that the war was 'a white man's war'—and all this notwithstanding that the Colony had been invaded, and one of its principal towns besieged by the enemy for upwards of three months? Clearly, Natal's rule had not, at that time, become so unbearable as to cause the people to prefer a regime set up by Dinuzulu, or some other Zulu despot.
Under the circumstances, we come to the conclusion that the fundamental cause was the introduction and imposition on the aborigines of a type of civilization radically different from their own. The Government, first Imperial, latterly Colonial, was necessarily the instrument whereby such civilization was introduced and imposed. Responsibility for all that occurred must, therefore, be thrown, as it was thrown by Natives, on the Government, even the breaking down of their social system through the unremitting effects of Missionary teaching, the undermining of the tribal system by European landlordism, the innumerable deleterious effects caused by degraded or dishonest classes of Europeans, and in other ways.
This establishment and promotion of Western Civilization operated in various ways on the Natives: (a) restrictions were imposed on former conditions or modes of life; (b) indiscriminate licence was extended to various sections, as well as to Europeans, whilst, at the same time, (c) obligations to conform to the new conditions of life were enforced.
Let us consider some of the principal causes of discontent that sprang from this action.
Under (a): Natives were prohibited from undergoing military service, or joining in various military occupations, which, as shown in Chapter IV., took up a very large portion of their time; they were precluded from leading the nomadic life customary with them for ages; individual kraalheads were restricted, by the setting up of a system of freehold tenure by Europeans, from going to live where they wished, and many of the old and recognized thoroughfares were closed by the fences put up; polygamy became more difficult because of the hut tax, and there was prescription in respect of lobolo claims; the national Feast of the First-Fruits, as well as other feasts and social gatherings, were either stopped, or interfered with, not, however, without good reason; Chiefs' powers of criminal and civil jurisdiction were circumscribed, as also the control exercised by heads of families over their wives and children; diviners were prohibited from practising their calling; restrictions were imposed on hunting game, cutting wood, or making gardens in forests; and Natives were unable to enter towns, except when clad in European dress.
Under (b): Too many Chiefs were appointed, a number of these not being entitled by hereditary rank or position to the posts; usurpation by some European landlords of several of the functions of Chiefs, or otherwise imposing restrictions on their authority; making consent by all girls to marriage obligatory; permitting boys and girls to break away from their parents or guardians, in order to be converted or educated; creating undue facilities for women to obtain divorce, or break away from their homes to lead immoral lives, etc.; exaction of excessive rents by various European landlords; excessive charges by certain lawyers; too many Native herbalists allowed to practise, a large proportion being unqualified and unscrupulous; usury by certain Europeans, especially lawyers, farmers, and other employers of labour.
Under (c): In a Christian community, with children being converted to Christianity and educated, parents were obliged in various ways to adapt themselves more and more to the changing conditions, even though themselves against being converted or educated on European lines. Enlightenment, religious and secular, accentuated by Ethiopian propaganda, infused a spirit of equality in the people. This, in a polygamistic environment, was destructive of marital and parental authority, besides undermining the authority, privileges and prestige of every Chief in the country. In the case of Dinuzulu, such influences would have been particularly acute and rapid.
Besides the inconveniences involved, the spectacle of a rapidly-disintegrating and decaying tribalism was always before the people, and, with this, the vanishing of cherished national ideals, traditions, beliefs, folklore, etc.
Other permanent obligations were the having to pay various taxes, rents, and other charges; to carry passes; to register births and deaths; the census-taking, 1904.
Under the same head, may be included other causes which were but inevitable where two such races lived together in the same country: Interference by certain Europeans with Native women and girls; communication of human and stock diseases formerly unknown, e.g. leprosy, small-pox, bubonic plague, consumption,—lung-sickness, rinderpest, East Coast Fever.[353]
Among miscellaneous causes were: Laying off large numbers of farms in Zululand for the occupation of Europeans; the inconsiderate manner in which the police, especially Native police, behaved towards Natives; punishment and removal of Chiefs without proper trial; obligation to work on roads and public works (isibalo); impoverishment of the people through the effects of locusts, rinderpest, East Coast Fever, etc.; introduction of indentured Indians, thereby supplanting Native labour. Of these, the laying off of farms in Zululand was far the most important.
The alienating of land in Zululand to Europeans has always been regarded by the royal house as a serious menace. Although liberal grants were made to mission societies and to the Boers, it was never intended that Europeans should obtain holdings in the heart of the country, as they did shortly before the Rebellion, and thereby break up the nation by subjecting individuals to the payment of rent, as in Natal. It will, therefore, be understood that the laying off of farms along the coast and elsewhere for sugar planting, etc., would have been deeply though silently resented by Dinuzulu as nominal head of the people.
In addition to the foregoing, the semi-educated class of Natives, known as Kolwas, had complaints, but as the people affected were comparatively few, there is no necessity for specifying them, except to point out that the charging of rents on mission reserves, and difficulties in obtaining (a) the franchise, (b) exemption in respect of certain children, (c) firearms, and (d) European liquor, were regarded by some as indications of being distrusted or unreasonably discriminated against.
As the root-cause of the Rebellion was, briefly, the attempt made to impose the European character and civilization on the Native races, the various causes above given were of a merely subsidiary or contributory nature. Hence it is unfair to charge Natal governments with failing to circumvent what, in the nature of the circumstances, was largely unavoidable, just as many similar causes now and for long existing in other parts of South Africa are more or less unavoidable.
When, however, through the operation of the foregoing causes, the people felt disposed to take up arms, other things were required before they would act, among these, what may be called the inciting cause. This, of course, was the poll tax. This is what tended to bring about combination. It gave the Natives heart, or ubudoda (manliness) as they called it. It was precisely what they needed, in their loose, disintegrated state. And so, curiously enough, the poll tax played exactly the same part among them that a similar tax did in the Wat Tyler Rebellion in England in 1381, and as the 'greased cartridges' did in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. It is a mistake to speak of the poll tax as having caused the Rebellion; it was merely a contributory cause, and not among the most important of those that have been cited.
The principal motive of the Rebellion would appear to be the one indicated on pp. 506, 507. But there was also a general desire by the people for a form of government more in harmony with their national and individual aspirations. Reference should also be made to Ethiopian propaganda, especially the political cry "Africa for the Africans," the text of many an address shortly before the Insurrection. It was perpetually put forward, no doubt, in order to furnish people with a motive for opposing or counteracting European domination and alleged oppression. The cry was heard, not only in Natal, but throughout South Africa. Natives were told that the Europeans had forfeited the right to rule, and that it and the country had accordingly reverted once more to the Black House. There were yet other inducements, viz.: the Baqulusi having succeeded in massacring the commando at Holkrantz, thereby lowering the prestige of the Europeans in the eyes of Natives; the lessons of the Boer War, such as the guerilla tactics that were practised; and the contempt by Natives for Europeans, owing to the familiar manner in which many had been treated by British troops. There is no doubt that these motives also powerfully influenced the people.
Among the occasions may be mentioned: Withdrawal of Imperial troops from Natal; inability of the Germans to suppress the rising in Damaraland (West Africa); sense of superiority felt by Natives through being much more numerous than the colonists; palpable growth of Dinuzulu's influence; general decay of the authority of Chiefs, kraal-owners,[354] etc.; increase of hooliganism and lawlessness; belief that such fastnesses as Nkandhla were impregnable; belief that they (Natives) were impervious to bullets; belief, engendered by the widely-spread pig-fowl-killing order, that the time had arrived when the white race must be driven out or exterminated.
(iii) Replies to Criticisms.
The way in which the campaign was conducted was sharply criticized by persons in England and elsewhere, chiefly from two points of view, viz. the disparity in losses sustained, and the rigour with which the rebels were dealt with. Now, it is one of the principal objects of a commander to prevent unnecessary loss to his side, and no part of his plans to make sacrifices merely because heavy punishment is being meted out to the enemy. The greater the injury inflicted, with the least loss to himself, is one of the highest marks of generalship, particularly where his opponent vastly exceeds him in numbers. As, in every military school, one finds it approved to strike effective blows at the enemy's morale, under what circumstances can this be better done than when he is driven to finding himself out-generalled at every point, and losing more men than his adversary? What, more than cheaply-achieved successes, is better calculated to depress the exuberant spirits of barbarous rebels and sooner bring about their surrender? Justifiable or unjustifiable, rebellion should, in the interests of the community, be stamped out and stamped out thoroughly.
The losses of European troops in various Native wars in South Africa, particularly in recent times, have almost always been greater than those sustained by Natal in 1906, relatively to the personnel engaged.[355] When it is considered that the casualties sustained by the enemy totalled only about 2,300 in a four-month's campaign, with upwards of 9,000 European troops and some 6,000 Native loyalists engaged, it will be seen that the losses were proportionately less severe than in other South African Native wars.
The disparity in losses was accounted for primarily by the insurgents being in an unorganized condition. It is inevitable that, where hordes of more or less disorganized barbarians attack properly-trained troops, armed with modern weapons, mortality among the former will be far greater than among the latter. One thing, however, is quite clear. Had the O.C. Troops not dealt with the situation in a prompt and resolute manner, but afforded opportunities to the rebels to augment their forces, the proportion of casualties would have been even more striking than it was.
Most of the criticism in question came as usual from a few noisy people in England, who quite forgot the absurdly few casualties that were sustained by the Imperial troops in the Zulu War, as compared with the number of Zulus who were killed; nor did they remember that Pretorius, at the famous battle of Blood River, had three men wounded (including himself), as against 3,000 Zulus killed. It is one of the ironies of life that persons wholly ignorant, or almost wholly ignorant, of local conditions, succeeded in getting many to attend to and believe their clamour. Such incidents as the cold-blooded attack on the Police at Mpanza were glazed over or forgotten by these zealots, whose chief glory consisted in traducing the motives and actions of their own kin to the best of their ability. Everything the savages did was right, everything that those of their own race did was wrong, wrong, not because of any inherent defect, but wrong just because they are white and not black. All murders, mutilations of corpses, looting, incendiarism and terrorization of loyalists were condoned. It occurred not to these 'judges' to study the facts. If the rebels did anything that wore the appearance of wrong-doing, the act was justified by asserting (wholly regardless of the facts) that the act was but a consequence of the commission of some greater wrong. No act was isolated and considered on its own merits. If Bambata waylaid 150 Police along a difficult road, firing a broadside into a twenty-men advanced guard at a distance of five yards, in the dark, before outbreak of hostility of any kind, the act was justified by the fact that the ringleader had been deposed from his chieftainship by the Government, and because he was but protesting against the imposition of a poll tax of £1 per head. If the reasons why Bambata was deposed, or the circumstances under which the poll tax was levied, had been advanced, other excuses would have been found, and attempts made to justify at every point, with an ardour born of such as had not actually lived in the country and had nothing to lose.
The unbridled resentment and public defiance exhibited at Mapumulo, Umzinto, Nkandhla, Pietermaritzburg and Durban magistracies—at each of which places the Natives vastly outnumbered the civil authorities then present; the audacity of the murders of Hunt and Armstrong; and the still cooler attack at Mpanza,—with isolated, cold-blooded murders, such as Stainbank, Veal, Walters, Powell and Sangreid, accompanied by horrible mutilation (where this was possible),—were all these exhibitions of barbarity to have no effect whatever on the troops, most of whom had been born and bred in the country, and knew the place of the Native in the community?
Natal was being governed in accordance with Native law. Such condition naturally conferred on the higher race a position of privilege and ascendancy, whilst maintaining the Natives in a social system inherited from a far-off past. This eminence had, in the course of two generations, become settled or habitual. The Natives recognized it and had accommodated themselves thereto. When, therefore, the foregoing incidents occurred, they were rightly regarded as serious. This is one of the reasons why the shooting down of the rebels was occasionally as severe as it was, though not on nearly so large a scale as has been supposed.
There remains another and, perhaps, the chief explanation. The spectacle of a subject, lower and uncivilized race rising against its conquerors and lawful masters, with whom it had lived at peace for many years, could not fail to evoke the best energies of the latter to maintain its prestige, though to have to do this in the face of the odds possibly becoming one to ten, demanded the greatest energy, and a drawing on all available resources. It was not a time for half-measures. Rebellion had broken out. Rebellion by subjects, so long in a state of subjection, was expected to be capable of rapidly infecting the entire mass, unless sternly repressed. The possibility of universal massacres of women and children arose before the calmest minds. Such wanton butchery had taken place in the Matabele Rebellion in 1896, the Matabeles being, as is well known, off-shoots of the Zulus. It was a fire that had started, and in a country covered with long, dry grass. If allowed to spread, it would soon have given rise to winds that would have swept it still further along in every direction. Once out of control of their Chiefs, as many were known to have got, others would have followed the example. The best way of pandering to such condition was to have dealt leniently, patiently and mercifully with every transgressor. But, with the elemental forces of human fury let loose, Dinuzulu, as rebel or as loyalist, would have been unable to control or to check them; he was largely a figurehead. Nor, as has already been pointed out, were the ordinary Chiefs able to control. It, therefore, behoved the Government to deal with the situation promptly, and with the same severity that any wise man would be expected to use towards a fire threatening to destroy his house and all his belongings. That is why the ablest soldiers were employed. That is why McKenzie was placed in supreme command, and that is why he, almost in spite of himself, became the exponent of a drastic policy—the policy of necessity. The Government was manifestly under every obligation to protect the people, not less Native loyalists than members of its own and other European and Asiatic races. After all, there is such a law as that of self-preservation. That is what mainly warranted these undoubtedly severe, but unavoidable measures. And yet the troops were exceedingly well-disposed to the Zulu race as a whole. Satisfactory relations exist to-day between the Natives and the colonists, and will long continue to exist, unless petty, misguided policies be brought into practice.
The severity of the punishment during actual hostilities, or rather until such moment as it appeared certain the Rebellion had been "got under," received the fullest approval of every loyalist Native.[356] Nor was their commendation other than sincere. It was spontaneously and repeatedly, though, of course, cautiously expressed. There were, indeed, isolated actions which did not meet with such or anybody else's approval. The commission of irregularities in the circumstances depicted, under a general licence to stamp out rebellion at the earliest moment—a rebellion started by the Natives themselves—was only to be expected, just as they occur and are rightly condemned in every war.
It may be pointed out here that, on leaving Zululand, after witnessing the operations for several weeks, Major-General Stephenson expressed his satisfaction with the way in which they had been conducted, and also testified to "the gallantry displayed by the men, and to the readiness with which they fought their way through the scrub."
Since the Rebellion came to an end, Natal has made special endeavours to remove all reasonable and remediable complaints. Her efforts to improve the relations between the two races, especially by appointing a sympathetic Council for Native Affairs, as well as Native Commissioners, have met with success, so that restoration of mutual confidence and good feeling on a satisfactory basis is rapidly becoming an accomplished fact.[357]
The arrest of Dinuzulu and his subsequent removal to the Transvaal have completely put an end to the unrest that existed both before and after the disturbances. Zululand and Natal are in a more peaceful state now than they have been at any time since Dinuzulu came back from St. Helena.
It is generally allowed that, after a man has been tried and punished, he is entitled to enjoy once more all the rights of citizenship, but the circumstances connected with Dinuzulu being what they are, we cannot but consider the haste with which he was appointed one of the Presidents of the newly-formed South African Native Congress as somewhat unseemly and unwise.
(iv) Remarks concerning Native policy.
Now that there has been time for sober reflection, the one great fact that seems to emerge, after reviewing the situation in its many aspects, is the inadequacy of organic connection between the Europeans and the Natives. As it is, the needs of the people as a nation are apparently insufficiently expressed. The half-educated Natives, especially if they be those who have, or appear to have, turned their backs on the modes of life of their parents and ancestors, are the ones who succeed most in catching the eye of the European public. The masses, to whom in fact they belong, remain in the meantime practically inarticulate; they are, as Milton might have called them, but 'blind mouths.' Their wants and necessities, from their own peculiar points of view, are given expression to by no one. No one seems to have courage enough to champion their cause and to defend a system of life which, if evolution means anything whatever, must be of intrinsic value, from the mere fact that it exists after the countless generations the people have lived in the land. And yet the Natives, even the uncivilized masses, are, in the fullest sense of the words, British subjects, and, as such, entitled to at least the elementary rights of such subjects. Surely, among these rights (as with all European governments) is the ability to live in accordance with a system sanctioned probably by thousands of years of continuous usage,—the great, natural system of Africa.
Under the form of administration established for the Natives, numerous Magistrates have been appointed in various localities, whilst at least twice as many police stations have also been set up. The Police, however, were unwisely detached from the Magistrates; the unwisdom lay in the fact that the action was taken much too soon. This, in the main, with head offices in Pietermaritzburg, is the machinery for bringing the Chiefs and ordinary Native public into touch with the Government. Aided in subsidiary ways by Missionaries, teachers and other agencies, this is what has aimed at establishing a healthy organic connection between the one race and the other. Was it, is it, sufficient? So long as the great majority of Natives live under the tribal system, many of whose peculiar laws and customs have been embodied in a Code, given the force of law by Parliament, it does not seem that the link between the two people is as strong and effective as it ought to be. If the tribal system is to succeed, it should be given a chance. That chance, it would appear, should be to revive and encourage such unobjectionable and salutary forms of control as were customary under the old system. For
"Nature is made better by no mean
But Nature makes that mean."
It is absurd to suppose that Magistrates and Police, Missionaries or educationists, the whole varying in their methods as their idiosyncrasies, can so dovetail into a more or less normal system of Native life as to supply such influences, necessary under the system, which Chiefs, assisted by councils and with extensive judicial and administrative functions, were formerly able to afford. In the first place, they have not the time to give that close, expert attention to purely Native matters, social and domestic, which Chiefs and their councils were able to do. In the second, supposing them to have the requisite knowledge, which it is safe to say is very far indeed from being the case, they have not the inclination. Their inclinations are in the direction of their own racial affairs, and rightly so. Thus, the Natives experience a need, a need which no Magistrates, Policemen, Missionaries or teachers are able to supply, even though further assisted by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Native High Court, or Supreme Chief. In consequence of an insufficiently intimate supervision of a thousand and one questions of interior economy, social and domestic, grievances of all descriptions arise and exist for months and years before they are removed. Such state of affairs is by no means peculiar to Natal, one finds it prevailing throughout South Africa, and apparently wherever else in the world a white race presides over the destinies of a coloured one.
The lesson here, then, not only for Natal but the Union of South Africa, seems to be just this. If the tribal system is to exist, and there are a thousand reasons why it should, it should be permitted to nourish and comfort the people more than it does. It should be recognized as a good,—to be maintained and reinforced, although in time doomed to be supplanted by something else,—not as an evil to be suppressed by European, i.e. alien agency, at the earliest possible date.
If the proposal above referred to be gone into, it would, we believe, be found to involve Europeans and Natives living, to a great extent, in separate and clearly-defined areas (always allowing for reasonable exceptions), each with substantially their own organization and controlling machinery, and each developing along lines that accord with common sense and are, at the same time, in harmony with the law of nature. It would also be found that the peoples would be firmly linked together from the mere fact of their independent existences being formally recognized for all purposes, say, in the Constitution itself. In that way and probably in that alone is it possible for such alarming relative positions between white and black, as one sees between Negroes and Europeans in America, to be avoided in South Africa, temporarily and possibly permanently. It would be just as well, too, to bear in mind that the ratio between white and black, so far from being about seven to one, as in the United States, is about one to four.[358] Hence it is not unlikely that the letting loose of such forces as are now operating with so much harm in North America will, before long, bring on a crisis of altogether exceptional severity in South Africa. With the ever-increasing European education we are giving the people, coupled with countless opportunities of increasing their material prosperity, it follows that only lapse of time is necessary for all sorts of demands to be put forward more or less justly, and this by a race that is being compelled against their natural instincts to take on the European character. They will, of course, demand the franchise and press for admission to all grades of the civil service, the bench, and the bar; show cause why existing restrictions in regard to firearms, passes, liquor, etc., etc. shall be removed; and so forth. And so the movement of independence, once the people have fairly broken away from the simple, strong and wholesome restraints of their own systems of life, will go on increasing in volume and intensity, until visions of Hayti and Liberia begin to rise before European imagination.
Thus, the price of our precipitate destruction of Native modes of life, or rather callousness in not subserving these modes to the best of our ability, not by way of amusement or sentiment, but because imperatively necessary for the welfare of the State and the interests of the Natives themselves, is that our own character, traditions, creed, language, etc., will ultimately be undermined and displaced by those of the people. As it is, they are ever laughing at our supreme and obviously suicidal folly. We are, in fact, not competing with the coloured races at all in the way races are supposed to do, and do, in accordance with the theory of evolution, we are rather carefully and continually loading the dice against ourselves. The inevitable result of not permitting free-play to the principle of natural selection will be that, from their greatly preponderating numbers, if for no other reason, they will ultimately survive, whilst the European community will cease as such to exist. No other result apparently can flow from a wanton ignoring of, or running counter to, the immutable principles of nature. Let us but continue as we are doing, to suppress and eradicate the habits, customs, languages, traditions, ideals, etc., etc., of the people, and our ultimate expulsion or absorption by the Bantu races who, in our present ascendancy, we so much neglect, will follow as surely as day follows night. And many are already beginning to see this.
It cannot too often be called to mind that our Natives differ vastly from the Negroes in America through having social systems, creeds, traditions and ideals of their own, all many, many generations old. Why does not the State use these precious assets more than it does? Why are they wilfully allowed to die out, through disuse or being ridiculed and defamed, far more rapidly than they need? As they are congenital, for what reason did the Creator endow the people with these various propensities, if not for some eminently necessary purpose? May man with impunity run counter to and thwart such purpose? Surely no one will contend that Nature must be undone because the people are so plastic as to be capable apparently of assuming the European character in all its attractiveness and defectiveness, as if that were the greatest and final effort of social evolution. Our motive should be to act in accordance with the desires of the majority of the people, and not to impose this or that restriction or condition mainly because, in our limited vision, it appears to be right.
One cannot but see how strongly the case of Dinuzulu supports these views. It shows that the people were in favour of his being appointed, with the assistance of a council or other advisory body, to protect their interests. They knew they were acting wrongly in dealing with him in 1906, but, in the absence of any other national representative, i.e. one of their own flesh and blood, it seemed there was no other course left. Zulus look at the world's affairs in the concrete. To do so in the abstract, as so common amongst ourselves, is foreign to their nature. That is why want of organic connection between their race and that of the white man takes the form of a request for the appointment of a person to act as intermediary, one to whom they can go with their troubles, and one who would lay these before the Government for favourable consideration.
What Dinuzulu himself said about this to the Governor has been briefly noticed. He also observed: "The Natives of India are governed and treated in a correct manner, and according to the law. The Boers, who have recently been at war with the British Government, have also been settled down ... but we who were subdued ... before the Boers and these people I refer to,[359] are not treated in the same manner as they have been treated. The laws are not the same. We cannot help feeling that we Zulu people have been discriminated against.... We are people who have no representatives in the affairs of the country, no one to speak for us,[360] and the laws of the country simply come over us by surprise.... We are all of us in the country like my fingers, each one has his own authority, and does what he thinks right in his own district.... We feel that, whilst we should own obedience and allegiance to the Government ... there should yet be somebody amongst us who represents the people."[361]
When the Native Affairs Commission met the local Chiefs and headmen at Vryheid in January, 1907, the first speaker said: "I would ask the Commission this: Of whom are they making the inquiry as to what the Zulu people as a whole feel; who is that spokesman? Where is he? Where is he who is the eyes and ears of the Zulu nation, the guardian of the people?" Another Chief said: "Why is it the Governor puts such questions, as the Commission has itself put, to mere blades of grass? Where is our guardian? Where is that guardian that should have been given to us by the Governor?... The Government does not rule us with its right, but with its left, hand.... When a State is conquered, there always remains, according to our ideas, some representative or another who carries on the government of the conquered people.... The King will continue to be at a loss as to exactly what we feel, because His Majesty has failed to appoint somebody in a way that we are accustomed to to represent our interests."
Others said: "The whole Zulu people are unanimous as to the need of some person to voice their feelings." "Formerly Cetshwayo used to conduct negotiations, etc., with Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Who was in his (Cetshwayo's) place now?... Dinuzulu was their great induna, and nothing had occurred between the Natives and him which should cause them to pass by him and affiliate themselves to the Government." "They were all in a state of dispersion; sheep without a shepherd."
Although, for years, many Chiefs were opposed to being "governed" by a Paramount Chief, such as Cetshwayo was (after his restoration), it is remarkable how widespread this desire latterly became, particularly in 1905 when the poll tax was imposed. That such aspiration assumed exaggerated proportions during a time of rebellion is not to be surprised at. The universal use by insurgents of the "Usutu" war-cry, of the Usutu badge (tshokobezi), and of Dinuzulu's name, only shows the need they felt for a head. As this need existed then, is it not possible that the Rebellion was brought about largely through the need not having been seen and satisfied in one way or another?
And this need still exists and will continue to do so until adequate steps have been taken to supply it. How often has it not happened in the world's affairs that large and liberal action towards a people, so far from making foes, has transformed them into loyal and permanent allies. Let us, therefore, not blind ourselves too much to the fact that our Native races, although they may have fought us in the past, stand in as great, if not greater, need of similar consideration, though on humbler, simpler lines, than any other corporate people.
Stress has been laid on the foregoing point because the Commission omitted to face and deal with it with the directness obviously desired by the Natives. And yet that a general and permanent protector of their interests should be appointed, because, no doubt, of Ministers for Native Affairs being movable officers, was the most important of their requests.[362] It may be said to have come, although often unassociated with Dinuzulu's name, from no less than 95 per cent. of the people. The great body of Native opinion was emphatically in favour of the existing tribal system being maintained, and steps being taken to remove as far as possible the numerous abuses that had crept into it.
The position of the Native races is worthy of attention from many points of view. The dying out of many of their habits and customs, interesting and picturesque to us, but the very life-blood of the people themselves, is inevitable. With such disappearance, the social system itself has begun to decay. Many persons, indeed, have for long observed these disintegrating tendencies and proposed various religious, political, social or economic makeshifts. That is to say, that these tribes, hastening on as they are doing to the collapse of their tribal organizations, have nothing else to stem the universal undermining that is going on, always with acceleration, than the creeds, moral code, habits, customs, social and political systems of Western Civilization, that is, the equipment of a people differing essentially,—physically, morally, and intellectually. It seems to occur to no one that a State policy which resolutely and deliberately aims at maintaining the status quo ante in a sane and judicious manner, instead of assuming its downfall as inevitable, and forthwith setting about in a thousand ways to make it even more ruinously rapid and catastrophic than it would be without these reckless methods, is worthy of serious and sober consideration. Misreading the religious, political and other aspirations of a few half-educated Natives, many of the dominant European race fondly believe it is along the same road that the great inarticulate majority desire to travel. No one, of course, is infallible, ourselves among the number, but a personal experience of over forty years in the country, together with an intimate knowledge of the people, does tend to convince us that such is not the general desire,—not at present, whatever may be the case in the future,—and has only become that of the half-educated because, the various European administrations being what they have been and are, it seems to them so inevitable that nothing remains but to adopt European civilization in its entirety, and that as speedily as possible.
The doing of justice to the Natives, in the sense of eventually conferring practically every privilege which Europeans enjoy, is to blind oneself to the fact that the two races are congenitally separate. Ideal justice can be said to be possible only when meted out within the limits of a country in which the people are all of one race. Within such environment, privileges are and should be capable of extension to all. But when there are two or more separate races in a country, that is not justice which extends privileges peculiar to the dominant race to the radically-differing subject race or races. It is simply a belief, resting on no proper foundation, that justice is being done. The result of following it is gross injustice to the masses, and, later on, to the dominant race itself. The situation is manifestly governed by the idea of nationality and consanguinity. Thus, the highest justice becomes not the concession of rights and privileges of the dominant class, but a plain and constant recognition of the fact of nationality, and keeping the sense of justice well in hand, instead of allowing it to wander away to the clouds.
The spectacle of so many Natives in South Africa pressing on as they are doing to obtain higher rights and privileges than they already possess, and of forming a general Congress to give force to their demands and supposed necessities, is due to nothing else than the failure of the State to recognize the aborigines as a distinct nationality, and as, therefore, worthy of being specifically provided for in the Constitution to enable them to be managed on lines different from those of the other and widely-differing race. The misdirected energy of these 'enlightened' Natives, in the event of such provision being made, would exert itself within its proper sphere, not in agitating eternally against the Government for superior rights, but by promoting the positive welfare of the tribes or races to which they belong.
All this, we believe, was the underlying meaning of the Rebellion, and the situation will not be cured by granting the franchise, or initiating elaborate systems of land occupation as exist in the Cape Province. Fundamental experimenting of this kind may, for a season, appear to satisfy, but the day is coming when the Natives, in spite of all our education and evangelization, our concessions of the franchise and other so-called privileges, will remember that they, for the most part, are members of the Bantu family, in spite of the fact that some have already been persuaded to think, and speak, and act like Europeans,—at least, that is what is naïvely supposed by their teachers, as well as by themselves, to be the case.
As the clashing in 1906 arose apparently out of a general attempt to impose Western Civilization, we venture to say that, so far from the Rebellion having come to an end, its essential spirit is still abroad. This is not because Natal or the Union Government have not made numerous and special endeavours to remove the contributory causes of the unrest, but because the root-cause, or what a Zulu would call unomtebe, is still existing.[363] Bambata, as many Natives believe, in spite of every proof to the contrary, is still living. For them his spirit, i.e. dissatisfaction with European rule, or, to put the same thing positively, a desire to control their own affairs, not on European lines, but on those sanctioned by the collective wisdom of their own race, is certainly alive, though he may be dead. It lives, not in Natal alone, but throughout South Africa, and is fostered by the various Ethiopian or Separatist churches. Then, again, attempts are being made throughout the Union to impose Western Civilization on all the other Native tribes, be they in the Cape, Transvaal, or Orange Free State, Provinces. And so, unless radical change be effected in our State policy, it seems we may expect to witness periodical recrudescences of rebellion and on a far greater scale than in 1906. The moral is that the aborigines resent the manifold restrictions they are perpetually and systematically subjected to; these and the rigid application to their affairs of the principles of Western Civilization, by means of legislation or otherwise, as well as the thousands of opportunities afforded unscrupulous Europeans and semi-educated Natives of exploiting the people, tend to fill up their cup of bitterness. They yearn for practical sympathy and that friendly recognition of their deeper needs which ends not in mere perception. "They are not the best that might have been framed," said Solon of his laws, "but they are the best the Athenians are capable of bearing"—there is the type of statesman they would adore. The Zulus are a noble race of savages, but none the less deserving of our consideration because they are savages. The headlong collapse of such a people is a tragedy of the first magnitude. That it should be taking place before our very eyes, without reasonably adequate steps being taken by the State to resist it by providing the most natural and effective machinery for controlling it, is a crime. If this mischief be permitted to go on, it requires no prophet to predict heavy retribution, and in the near future, on those responsible. Such will probably be, not only in the forms of rebellion and civil strife, which can be quelled, but in miscegenation (unthinkable though this be at the present), complete effacement of the two races, and general degradation of the whole.
If the principal conclusion come to in these pages be correct, the Rebellion stands revealed as nothing less than a protest, and about the plainest that could have been made, against the methods employed, not only by members of the British race, but by all pioneers of Western Civilization among barbarians. The methods followed in Natal and in the rest of South Africa are but characteristic of those adopted towards lower races in other parts of the globe. The British Government is naturally most affected by this indictment, but the Governments of France and Germany, the United States, Belgium, Portugal, etc., are implicated as well. Each of them will one day have to answer for the havoc they have created and are still creating, and this primarily because of their rush after material benefit. In Mr. Benjamin Kidd's well-known work, Social Evolution, occur the words: "The lower races disappear before the higher through the effects of mere contact." In this history an attempt has been made to furnish some of the reasons why a typical 'lower race' is tending to become disintegrated. These serve to explain why and how dissolution, the antecedent of 'disappearance,' in smaller areas than South Africa, occurs, and prove that the phenomenon results not from "mere contact," as Mr. Kidd supposed, but from the restrictions, conditions and opportunities above mentioned which have invariably accompanied the inauguration of so-called civilized government among the people of lower, and especially coloured, races. The reasons, as a matter of fact, are laws; and we venture to think they will be found operating wherever, in the past, Western Civilization has been imposed on lower races, and wherever this may take place in the future.
And so this minor Rebellion turns out to be a fact charged with the highest possible significance, inasmuch as it is a concrete, analysable illustration of that strange, destructive and inexorable contact between races hitherto insufficiently studied, and, therefore, insufficiently appreciated.