FOOTNOTES:

[345] J.A.H. Murray & others, A New English Dictionary on historical principles. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

[346] Ibid.

[347] Those concerned were charged and convicted of public violence, murder and "being in arms against the Government and actively resisting constituted authority, and aiding and abetting rebels against the Government."

[348] They would, however, probably not have objected to being controlled by Dinuzulu as Paramount Chief, provided that he had been appointed by the Government, and became answerable to, and was effectively controlled by, such superior authority.

[349] Sangreid was murdered and Robbins wounded, in direct contravention of the orders issued by the Chief (Ndhlovu), who was in command of the impi. Ndhlovu was only a mile or two away when the incidents occurred.

[350] Cd. 3888, pp. 79, 80.

[351] Notwithstanding the above conclusion, we have not felt justified in altering the title of the book. Throughout South Africa and elsewhere, the rising is spoken of as a rebellion.

[352] That is, the Act of 1893, inaugurating Responsible Government.

[353] Blame for the introduction of such diseases is held by the Zulus to attach to Europeans. But for their being in the country, Natives, they say, would not have been so afflicted.

[354] This decay arose out of refusal on the part of many to conform to ancient tribal observances, habits and customs; of their detaching themselves from tribes to live under European landlords, etc.; of women refusing to render obedience to husbands, or breaking away to lead immoral lives; of the failure of boys to return to their homes, and so forth. The following has reference to European authority: detachment from European ecclesiastical control, even of long duration, to set up independent churches.

[355] For statement, showing casualties among European troops during the Rebellion, see Appendix I.

[356] One of these, a Chief, expressed the view that the youths who had rebelled would not fight again, "no, not till their grandchildren are born."

[357] In 1912, however, the Union Government abolished both the Council and three of the four Native Commissioners.

[358] At the Census of May, 1911, there were 1,276,242 Europeans, 4,019,006 Natives, and 678,146 other Coloured Races.

[359] He was evidently thinking India was conquered during the Indian Mutiny.

[360] This, of course, is largely incorrect, as the Minister for Native Affairs as well as every member of both Houses of Parliament have, for many years, voiced the interests of the Natives, inadequately though that may have been. Apart from this, the U.S.N.A., assisted by Magistrates all over the country, has continually brought to the notice of Government, wishes, suggestions and grievances of the Natives.

[361] Cd. 3888, pp. 79, 80.

[362] The Government afterwards appointed the late Mr. A.J. Shepstone, C.M.G., as Secretary for Native Affairs,—an appointment that gave great and general satisfaction.

[363] There is a saying among the Zulus, when a country, after being in disorder, is at peace once more, that it has returned to Nomtebe (the queen of white ants), that is, to its mother. This may have been true of former conditions; it cannot be true of those which exist under European rule.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

I. CASUALTIES.
(a) KILLED OR DIED

REGIMENT.RANK.NAME.CAUSE OF DEATH.DATE OF DEATH.PLACE OF DEATH.PLACE INTERRED.
N.C.Corpl.Christopher, V.J.W.Killed in action.July 5Near Hlonono Mission Station.Ladysmith.
N.M.R.Tpr.Bull, W.G.Internal obstruction.May 15Addington Hospital, Durban. Durban.
" " Clements, S.T.Broken neck.June 28Tongaat.——
" " Powell, Albert.Killed in action.June 19Otimati.Mapumulo.
Z.M.R. " Coll, Cudman Wounds received in action, Macrae's Store.July 3Thring's Post.——
N.F.A.Gunner Walker, H.S.Bullet wounds; self-inflicted.May 2Fort Yolland.Fort Yolland.
N.P.Tpr.Armstrong, G.Killed in action.February 8Near Byrnetown.Pietermaritzburg.
" " Aston, Arthur H. " "April 4Mpanza.Near Mpanza.
" Sergt.Brown, E.T.N. " "" 4 " " "
" Tpr.Greenwood, J.P. " "" 4 " " "
" Sergt.Harrison, J.C.G. " "" 4 " " "
" Sub. Insp.Hunt, S.H.K. " "February 8Near Byrnetown.Pietermaritzburg.
R.H.Corpl.Alexander, E. " "June 3Manzipambana.Nkandhla.
" Tpr.Bouck, J.L. " "" 3 " "
" " Harding, J. " "" 3 " "
" " Hawkins, J.Wounds received in action, Manzipambana." 3Nkandhla Forest. "
" " Malone, Thos.Killed in action.May 29Tate. "
" Lieut.Marsden, C.G.Wounds received in action, Mome.June 17Addington Hospital, Durban.Durban.
" Tpr.Ohlson, C.Pneumonia.July 29Grey's Hospital, Pietermaritzburg.Pietermaritzburg.
" " Robertson, S.JKilled in action.June 3Manzipambana.Nkandhla.
" " Strecker, J.Coma epilepsy.May 10Nkandhla. "
" " Walsh.Concussion of brain.May 3Dundee.Dundee.
T.M.R. " Glover, F.H.Wounds received in action, Mome.June 13Eshowe.Eshowe.
" " Knight, Robert.Killed in action.July 2Insuze, Natal.Esidumbini.
" " Maw, H.C.Wounds received in action, near Kombe.May 14Ntingwe. Ntingwe.
" Capt.McFarlane, S.C., D.S.O.Wounds received in action, Mome.June 10Eshowe.Eshowe.
" Tpr.Steyn, H.W.Wounds received in action, near Mome.June 20 " "
N.R. Lieut.Campbell, J.A.Wounds received in action, Nomangci.June 9Addington Hospital, Durban.Durban.
" Pte.McInnes, A.Heart disease.July 8Thring's Post.Stanger.
U.D.R.Tpr.Steele, H. Scott.Killed in action.May 23Mpukunyoni.Buffalo River.
Note.—Among Nongqai, N.N.H., and Native Levies, there were aboutsix killed.

(b) WOUNDED.

REGIMENT. RANK. NAME. DATE. PLACE. REMARKS.
N.N.C. Leading Seaman. Murchie, H. July 11 Ngudwini.
N.C. Tpr. Reed. July 8 Izinsimba.Severe.
N.M.R. Corpl. Errington. May 5 Bobe.
" Q.M.-Sergt.Knox, L.E. June 19 Otimati.
B.M.R. Tpr. Forder, C. June 27 Peyana.
N.D.M.R. " Scabbert. June 10 Mome.
" Lieut. Wilkins, H. May 17 Insuze, Zululand.
Z.M.R. Sergt.-Maj. King. June 10 Mome.
D.L.I. Pte. Williams. May 17 Insuze, Zululand.
N.P. Tpr. Braull. Apr. 4 Mpanza.
" " Dove. " 4 "
" " Emanuel. " 4 "
" " Ferguson, F. June 10 Mome.
" Trumpeter. Milton, C. Apr. 4 Mpanza. Dangerous.
" Tpr. Sells, A.J. May 3 White Umfolozi.
R.H. " Barnet, H.D.M. June 3 Manzipambana.
" Capt. Clerk, E.G. " 3 " Severe.
" Tpr. Flynn, F. " 3 "
" " Holmes, W.C. " 3 " Severe.
" " Hopkins, W.H.E. " 3 " Severe.
" Lieut. Male, P. " 3 "
" Tpr. Mann, J. " 3 "
" Lieut. Oswald. " 3 "
" Tpr. Swart, D.C. " 3 " Severe.
" Corpl. Woolnough. " 3 "
T.M.R. " Carlick, F. June 10Mome.
" " Hosford, F. " 10 "
" Lce.-Corp. Leigh, A.E.T. " 10 "
" " McEvoy, P. " 10 "
" Tpr. McLean, R. " 10 "
" Capt. Mitchell, J.T. July 3 Ponjwana.
" Tpr. Simcox. July 2 Insuze, Natal.
" Act. Q.M.-S. Tobin. " 2 "
U.D.R. Tpr. Braithwaite, P.May 28 Mpukunyoni.
" " Mackenzie, S. " 28 "
New Han. Reserves. " Freese, F. July 4 Near Ponjwana.
Krantzkop Reserves. Leader. van Rooyen, T.J. May 28 Mpukunyoni. Severe.
Note—Among Nongqai, N.N.H., and Native Levies, there were aboutthirty wounded.

II. HONOURS.

Officers.

K.C.M.G.

Col. (now Brigadier-General) Duncan McKenzie, C.B., C.M.G., V.D.

D.S.O

Col. H.T. Bru-de-Wold, C.M.G., V.D.
" G. Leuchars, C.M.G.

Hon. Lieut.-Col. in the Army.

Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.M.G.

Lieut.-Col. W.F. Barker, D.S.O.

Distinguished Conduct in the Field.

(Natal Government Gazette, 26th June, 1906.)

Capt. E.G. Clerk, R.H., 3rd June, Manzipambana.
Lieut. A.H.G. Blamey, N.M.R., 5th May, Bobe.

(N.G. Gazette, 3rd July, 1906.)

Inspr. O. Dimmick, N.P., 4th April, Mpanza.

Meritorious Service.

Col. Sir A. Woolls-Sampson, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Col. J. Hyslop, D.S.O., V.D.
" T. McCubbin, C.M.G., Supernumerary List.
" M.C. Rowland, Staff Officer, Transvaal.
" J.S. Wylie, D.L.I.
Major R.A. Buntine, N.M.C.
" S.G. Campbell, D.L.I.
" S. Carter, U.M.R.
" W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.
" W.H. Smith, N.M.R.
" W.A. Vanderplank, Z.M.R.
" S.B. Woollatt, N.V.C.
Capt. C.V. Hosken, Transport.
" G.A. Labistour, N.R.R.
" M.G. Pearson, N.M.C.
" A. Prior, N.S.C.
Lieut. J.S. Hedges, Z.M.R.
Chief Leader J.A. Nel, U.D.R.

WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN.

Distinguished Conduct Medal.

(N.G. Gazette, 10th September, 1907.)

Squad. Sergt.-Maj. W. Calverley, Z.M.R.
Sergt. S. Titlestad, Z.M.R.
Farrier-Sergt. C.B. Mitchell, T.M.R.
Sergt. C.W. Guest, N.P.
Tpr. W. Deeley, Z.M.R.
" W. Johnson, Z.M.R.
" G.W. Oliver, Z.M.R.
" O.L.M. Folker, N.P.

Meritorious Service Medal.

(N.G. Gazette, 10th September, 1907.)

Reg. Sergt.-Maj. J. Webber, R.H.
Sergt. T.P. Catchpole, N.C.
" E.I. Dicks, N.C.
" H.G. Le Mesurier, N.M.R.
" I.E. Sjöblom, N.M.R.
" S.J. Wadman, N.M.R.
Sergt. E.B. Brand, T.M.R.
" F.L. Malan, T.M.R.
" G.P. Bagnall, N.M.C.
" J.A. Butcher, N.S.C.
" J.F. Crawford, N.T.C.
" J.F. Pemberton, N.T.C.

Distinguished Conduct in the Field.

(N.G. Gazette, 26th June, 1906.)

Tpr. W.C. Holmes, R.H.

Good Service.

(N.G. Gazette, 10th September, 1907.)

Sergt.-Maj. P.J. Higgins, N.C.
Reg. Sergt.-Maj. G.W. Garnham, T.M.R.
Sergt.-Maj. T.C. Ogden, N.R.R.
" O.E. Powell, N.M.C.
Reg. Q.-M.-Sergt. W.C. Savage, T.M.R.
Squad. Sergt.-Maj. A. Swan, N.C.
" H. Fraser, R.H.
" S.L. Neville, T.M.R.
Col. Sergt. W.K. Edwards, N.R.
" G.C. Mulcaster, N.R.
" C.H. Smith, N.R.
" H.N. Smith, N.R.
Staff-Sergt. E.W. Marshall, N.S.C.
First-Class P.O., C.S. Kirk, N.N.C.
Sergt. J. Humphries, N.C.
" C.L. Mulcahy, N.C.
" G.L. Thompson, N.C.
" B. Wray, N.C.
" C.H. Holder, T.M.R.
" C.R. Coombes, N.R.
" R.E. Cross, N.R.
" J. Doherty, N.R.
" C. Domone, N.R.
" J. Fletcher, N.R.
" C.A.B. de Lasalle, N.R.
" W.R. Lewis, N.R.
" J. McCann, N.R.
" D.H. Nelson, N.R.
" F.H. Worby, N.R.
" J.A.A. Davidson, N.S.C.
" D. Davis, N.S.C.
" J.A. Niblett, N.S.C.
" T. Pittam, N.S.C.
" T.B. Willoughby, N.S.C.
" J. Winter, N.S.C.
Second-Class P.O., R.C. Dickinson, N.N.C.
Cpl. J.W. Peebles, T.M.R.
" P. Allen, N.R.
" D. Band, N.R.
" J. Cunninghame, N.R.
" C.L. Gillham, N.R.
" W. Johnson, N.R.
" J. Keith, N.R.
Cpl. J. Lawson, N.R.
" D.J. McCarthy, N.R.
" P. Murrow, N.R.
" E.D. Rex, N.R.
" S. Stollard, N.R.
" J. Utterton, N.R.
Lce.-Cpl. D. Stevenson, N.R.
Tpr. H. Brown, N.C.
" C.P. Francis, N.C.
" G. Leathern, N.C.
" H.A. Taylor, N.C.
" A.O. Zunckel, N.C.
" E.W. Larkan, N.M.R.
" T.J. Bentley, N.D.M.R.
" R.W. Sharpe, N.D.M.R.
" J.P. du Plessis, R.H.
" L. Rudland, R.H.
" E.F. Gatland, T.M.R.
" H.A. Oxenham, T.M.R.
Signaller J. Ball, N.R.
" W. Hay, N.R.
Pte. W.E. Adams, N.R.
" J. Boylan, N.R.
" T.J. Cellarius, N.R.
" H.J. Coulter, N.R.
" T. Cunningham, N.R.
" L. Guttenberg, N.R.
" J. Hanson, N.R.
" W. Hay, N.R.
" W. Heath, N.R.
" N. Kedian, N.R.
" T. McCall, N.R.
" J. McCook, N.R.
" D. Mitchell, N.R.
" J.H. Morrison, N.R.
" V. Pennefather, N.R.
" G. Pothecary, N.R.
" J. Scott, N.R.
" L.H. Smith, N.R.
" J. Whittick, N.R.
" H. Wiles, N.R.
" F. Wood, N.R.

APPENDIX III

III.—STRENGTH OF FORCES IN THE FIELD,

7th May, 1906.

Regiment.Number
in the Field.		Number
still available.
Natal Naval Corps100 —
Natal Carbineers596 82
Natal Mounted Rifles287 —
Border Mounted Rifles— 254
Umvoti Mounted Rifles260 —
Northern District Mounted Rifles120 —
Zululand Mounted Rifles120 —
Natal Field Artillery229[364]134[365]
Natal Royal Regiment154 22
Durban Light Infantry444 60
Natal Medical Corps63 33
Natal Veterinary Corps7 10
Natal Telegraph Corps34 7
Natal Service Corps78 14
Transport28 —
Natal Police210 —
Zululand Native Police90 —
Royston's Horse548 —
Transvaal Mounted Rifles481 —
3,849 616
Newcastle Reserves78 —
Estcourt "101 —
Dundee "68 —
Umsinga "50 —
Umvoti "88 —
Krantzkop "82 —
467 —
Note.—Conductors, drivers, leaders, scouts and servants are notincluded herein. With exception of scouts and servants, their numberswill be found in Appendix V.

IV. DISPOSITION OF FORCES ON MAY 7, 1906.

Place.Regiment.Number.Guns.Command.
{Transvaal Mounted Rifles481—}
Babanango (en route to{Royston's Horse548—}
Nkandhla){Durban Light Infantry58—}
(Colonel D. McKenzie).{Natal Field Artillery322}
{Departmental32—}
}
{Natal Police210—}
Fort Yolland{ Natal Naval Corps100—}
(Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mansel).{ Natal Field Artillery312}
{Zululand Native Police90—}Colonel D. McKenzie.
{Departmental Corps8—}
}
{Natal Mounted Rifles30—}
Eshowe{Durban Light Infantry251—}
(Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Wylie).{Departmental Corps12—}
}
Gingindhlovu{Durban Light Infantry70—}
(Lieutenant T. McCubbin).{Departmental Corps8—}
{Natal Royal Regiment50—}
Greytown{Departmental Corps6—}
(Captain J. Fraser).{Reserves88—}
}
{Natal Royal Regiment50—}
Krantzkop{Umvoti Mounted Rifles7—}
(Major H.G. Plant).{Reserves70—}
{Departmental Corps8—}
}
{Umvoti Mounted Rifles223—}
Mayouguate Kop{Natal Field Artillery402}Colonel G. Leuchars.
(Colonel G. Leuchars.){Departmental Corps25—}
}
Keate's Drift{}
(Lieutenant J.H.C. Nuss){Umvoti Mounted Rifles30—}
}
{Natal Mounted Rifles105—}
Mapumulo{ Durban Light Infantry65—}
(Lieutenant-Colonel H. Sparks).{Departmental Corps9—}
{Natal Carbineers381—}
Nkandhla{Natal Field Artillery322}
(Lieutenant-Colonel D.W. Mackay){Departmental Corps40—}
}
{Zululand Mounted Rifles120—}Lieutenant-Colonel D.W. Mackay
Ntingwe{Northern District Mounted Rifles120—}
(Major W.A. Vanderplank){Departmental Corps9—}
{Natal Carbineers215—}
{Natal Mounted Rifles152—}
Helpmakaar{Natal Field Artillery84}
(Major W. Murray-Smith).{Natal Royal Regiment54—}Major W. Murray-Smith.
{Departmental Corps30—}
{Newcastle Reserves78—}
{Estcourt "101—}
{Dundee "68—}
{Umsinga "50—}
Supply Depôts.{
Maritzburg{ Natal Service Corps12—
Durban{ " "6—
Ladysmith{ " "5—
Dundee{ " "3—
Stanger{ " "5—
Vryheid{ " "4—
4,31612

V. STATE OF GENERAL TRANSPORT ON 7TH MAY, 1906.

Distribution.Mules.Ox Waggons.Oxen.Conductors.Drivers and Leaders.
Zululand Field Force161211,9489252
Helpmakaar Field Force24518504110
Mackay's Force1136612484
Umvoti Field Force3923364356
Gigindhlovu, Eshowe, and Fort Yolland1219358249
Northern Dist. M. Rifles417268257
Mapumulo Force—8128116
Dundee Base834818
Total1142784,57626632
Note.—There were also 2 mule waggons, 12 ambulances, 4 water-carts,and 1 trolley.

VI. STRENGTH (ALL RANKS) OF ACTIVE MILITIA CALLED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE DINUZULU EXPEDITION, DECEMBER, 1907.

Unit. First Mobilization, Nov. 30. On Dec. 11. On Dec. 22.
Natal Carbineers 491 795 581
Natal Mounted Rifles 209 264 —
Umvoti Mounted Rifles 202 221 184
Border Mounted Rifles 200 204 194
Northern District Mounted Rifles — 215 —
Zululand Mounted Rifles — 140 —
1st Brigade Natal Field Artillery 177 85 —
"C" Battery, Natal Field Artillery 77 34 —
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 95 150 —
Natal Royal Regiment 184 319 —
Durban Light Infantry 349 400 —
Natal Medical Corps 55 43 43
Natal Veterinary Corps 18 11 11
Natal Service Corps 25 58 58
Natal Telegraph Corps 34 31 31
Searchlight Detachment — 8 —
Total 2,116 2,978 1,102

VII. STRENGTH OF RESERVES ACTUALLY IN THE FIELD DURING DINUZULU EXPEDITION, DECEMBER, 1907.

District. On Dec. 11. On Dec. 22.
Dundee, 1st 39 —
Umsinga 16 —
Weenen 46 46
Umvoti 90 —
Ixopo 30 —
Louwsberg 40 —
Newcastle 50 —
Estcourt 50 60
Lion's River 45 —
City, 1st 58 —
Umgeni 26 —
Newcastle, Town 26 —
Ladysmith, Town 9 —
Utrecht 150 —
Newcastle Division 46 —
Vryheid 50 —
Krantzkop — 50
Total 771 156

VIII. EXPENDITURE INCURRED BY THE NATAL GOVERNMENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE REBELLION AND DINUZULU EXPEDITION.

The manner in which monies were raised for covering the cost of the Rebellion was set forth briefly at the conclusion of Chapter XVIII. From the beginning of the Rebellion (February, 1906) to the 31st May, 1910, the total net expenditure amounted to £883,576 7s. 2d. The following is a detailed account thereof:

Militia Staff, Travelling Expenses, Clerical Assistance, etc. £2,726 6 11
Pay, Allowances, Messengers, etc. 319,980 4 3
Rations, Men and Horses 107,946 14 5
Remounts 50,159 2 4
Transport 108,737 4 6
Equipment of men and horses 89,466 0 9
Medical Supplies, Hospital and other Expenses Compensation— 4,176 19 10
Injuries 222 19 9
Horses 7,790 1 10
Property 5,822 17 0
Rebellion Losses Claims 42,611 7 9
Veterinary 2,827 9 1
Stationery, Printing, etc. 3,282 3 9
Arms and Ammunition 51,482 8 3
Lagers 1,787 6 11
Miscellaneous 3,129 1 10
Prisons 1,972 6 1
Uniform Allowance 11,309 18 0
Upkeep of Rebel Prisoners 85,524 17 1
Construction of Rebel Prisons 7,456 7 2
£908,411 17 6
Less Revenue Received for Hire of Rebel Prisoners 23,196 15 8
£885,215 1 10
Add Outstanding Liabilities 122 17 10
£885,337 19 8
Deduct Transport and Remounts utilized by transfer to Transport Service 1,761 12 9
£883,576 7 2

In addition to lump sum gratuities paid in respect of injuries received, annual allowances amounting to £5,912 4s. are paid from ordinary revenue to disabled militiamen and to widows and children of militiamen who died or were killed during the Rebellion.

Revenue benefited to the extent of approximately £38,000 on account of fines imposed on certain rebels and sale of stock captured by the troops during the operations.

IX. ZULU SONGS SUNG AT USUTU KRAAL BEFORE THE REBELLION.

I.

Ubani o za ukufel' esilungwini?
Mana, Nkosi!
U ngezwa be bubula,
Ba ya sola.

II.

Si kulu les' isizwe, e si twal' imiqiqingo,
Si hamba ne mpahla, si teng' izinkomo ngo lembu.
Ngi ya ku yi raya bo!
I za ku li qed' izwe.
I lu zwambuzwambu,
I suka pansi, ya qond' izulu.
I njenge nyoka e yadhl' isixabu sa ba mhlope.
Ba yi cupa, ya bajwa.
Ba yi dons' amalang' amabili, 'matatu;
Ba yi nquma ngo mese.
Kwa gqabuk' ilangab' esizibeni,
La ba rangula.
Kwa gqabuk' izintutu,
Za qond' izwe lonke, la vuta!
Na seMbilane,
Lapa kade beti i ya puma,
Beti i gcwel' iziziba zonke, nya!

Translations of the above appear on p. 116.

X. THE CAUSES, SUPERSTITIONS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MATABELE REBELLION, 1896.

The Matabele War of 1893 came to an end owing to the King, Lobengula, fleeing from the country after his capital, Bulawayo, had been seized and burnt by the British South Africa Company's forces. He died in January, 1894. No one, of course, was appointed to succeed him. As many of the Natives desired to continue the war—a number of the regiments not having fought at all—it is not surprising that, although a settlement was arrived at, the people did not regard themselves as having been really conquered. Still less did they look on the Company as entitled to appropriate their cattle as they proceeded to do. These, indeed, all belonged to the King in theory. The Company held that, having conquered the country and expelled the King, right of possession had reverted to themselves. The cattle thereupon began to be confiscated by way of indemnity. A large number was taken, whilst the remainder, about 90,000, were branded with the Company's brand and allowed to remain with the Natives for the time being. Seizure of smaller lots took place periodically during 1894 and 1895. Had confiscation been made immediately and universally on the conclusion of the War, far less irritation would have been caused than actually occurred. As it was, it was believed the Company intended to so impoverish the people as to reduce them to a position of slaves and paupers.

There was in Matabeleland another class of Natives known as amaHole. These were found living there by the Matabele on arrival from the south with Mzilikazi (Moselekatze) about 1836. After conquering them, the latter proceeded to make slaves of them, and this was the position when the Chartered Company, taking advantage of concessions previously acquired, entered the country in considerable numbers in 1890 to prospect and mine for gold, etc. After the war, the Company recruited some 400 Natives, chiefly from the amaHole, and formed them into a police force. The latter, remembering their former subjection, were not slow to avenge themselves on the Matabele as opportunity offered. "In days gone by you had your turn," they jeeringly said to the Matabele, "it is ours now." And opportunities presented themselves in two principal ways. First in regard to the cattle question, by the police hunting about in all directions to see who possessed any. On secretly obtaining information, they conveyed it to the authorities, showing cause why the stock should be seized. Confiscation usually followed. Secondly, in regard to the labour regulations. The Company required each Chief to furnish periodically a certain number of labourers to work on the mines, etc. The police were employed on this duty by the Native Commissioners; the manner in which they dealt with the people was frequently exasperating.

Although, towards the end of 1895, the Company waived all further right to the cattle after receipt of two-fifths of the whole (70,000), much strong dissatisfaction continued to prevail on account of the tactics that had been employed. And this was accentuated by the disease rinderpest breaking out in 1895 and sweeping off many of the cattle still possessed by Natives. A plague of locusts and a long-continued drought added still further to their troubles. Underlying the whole was the deep resentment felt by men who, under their own regime, had held high rank, but were now condemned to inferior status, with corresponding loss of influence, material perquisites and opportunities for advancement. The feeling, moreover, was still latent that the nation had never been really conquered.

It being characteristic of all Bantu races, and particularly so of those of Matabeleland, e.g. Makalanga and Matabele, to resort to diviners (izangoma) to ascertain the causes of troubles as well as the remedies, it is not surprising something of the kind should have taken place at the present juncture. Perhaps the most famous of the oracles was one reputed to inhabit a cave in the well-known Matoppo Hills. To this cave many had repaired from time to time, in connection with their private troubles, such as cases of illness or other misfortune, mysterious loss of property, and so forth. So great was the reputation that had been acquired by this particular oracle and, under so weird circumstances and in so peculiar a manner did it impart the knowledge obtained, as believed, direct from the departed spirits (known by Matabeles as amadhlozi), that it was commonly referred to as Umlimo, that is, the Deity himself. Such Umlimo—really the god of the oldest residents of the country, the Makalangas—is said "to be able to speak all languages, as well as to be possessed of a faculty of roaring like a lion, crowing like a cock, barking like a dog, etc." The truth of the matter, however, is that the oracle was an isangoma, that is, an ordinary person who, whenever it was known anyone had come to seek advice, would stealthily proceed to the cave and there, on being consulted, communicate the reply to the inquirer. This reply was given by means of ventriloquism and, as the speaker was inside the cave and invisible, the voice appeared to the inquirer (who was outside) to issue from the very bowels of the earth. The extreme ingenuity of the device will be better appreciated when it is known that the spirits of the departed are universally believed by Natives to dwell in an underworld. For a ventriloquist to practise his calling as diviner in the foregoing manner is probably not unworthy of that oracle which Socrates himself felt it necessary to consult at Delphi.

On being appealed to by Mlugulu, one of the principal men in the country, and others, as to the troubles that were afflicting the people in general, the Umlimo directly attributed them to Europeans. It was they who were the sorcerers that had caused the disasters. But for their presence, neither locusts nor rinderpest would have invaded the country. The aborigines were thereupon exhorted to rise and deliver themselves from their thraldom. A recent total eclipse of the moon was said to portend that the white man's blood was to be spilt; Lobengula himself was not dead, but about to return from the north at the head of a huge army, whilst other armies were advancing to his assistance against the Europeans from the west and east. The tremendous potency of such a 'voice' at such a time can hardly be over-estimated. The reason why most obvious precautions, e.g. blocking the main road to Mangwe (50 miles south-west of Bulawayo) were not adopted by the rebels was said to be due to the Umlimo's explicit instruction "to give the white man an opportunity of escaping from the country." Possibly this also explains why the telegraph wire between Bulawayo and Mafeking was not cut. "It certainly seems very strange," says Selous,[366] "that no attempt has ever been made to stop waggons and coaches on this road, ... nor was Government House (less than three miles from the centre of Bulawayo) burnt, the reason for this being, it is said, because the Umlimo told the people that when Bulawayo had been destroyed, and all the white men in the country killed, they would find Lobengula sitting there, ready to rule them once more; for, be it said, Government House has been built in the centre of the old kraal of Bulawayo, just where the King's house once stood."

Another man, who claimed to be a prophet of the Umlimo, so influenced people through swallowing stones, dancing on ashes, putting burning coals into his mouth, etc., as to induce an impi to take up their quarters where they were subsequently found by the troops "and there wait for the white men to attack them. They were on no account to endeavour to prevent their enemies from crossing the Umguza

The rising in Mashonaland, which began in the middle of June, 1896, was probably "brought about by the leaders of the Matabele insurrection through the instrumentality of the Umlimos or prophets ... North-west of Salisbury there lives a prophetess," between whom and the leaders of the Matabele or agents of the Umlimo messages passed during the Rebellion.

In these circumstances, one can understand the observation commonly made as to the inscrutability of the Native mind. That it is a closed book to the vast majority of Europeans is proved by the fact that no adequate preparation was made by the Government to meet a possible rising, and that only one of the colonists had predicted that a rebellion would occur.

When, with the country seething with discontent, the people learned that the great majority of the European police had been withdrawn to assist Dr. Jameson in his raid from Mafeking towards Johannesburg, and that Dr. Jameson himself, who claimed to have conquered them in 1893, as well as his entire force, had been captured by the Boers, they felt that a unique occasion had arisen, and one of which immediate advantage should be taken.

The population of Matabeleland in 1896 was: Europeans, about 4,000; Natives, about 120,000. About nineteen-twentieths of the latter rebelled, their fighting strength (independently of Mashonaland) being nearly 20,000.

The Rebellion started on the 20th March with the murder of a Native policeman. This, though evidently premature, became the signal for a simultaneous rising. European men, women and children were forthwith murdered in many outlying parts. A number of Native servants took part in the murders. It is computed that 205 persons were massacred during the rising, the great majority being killed before the end of March. Of this number, six were women and twenty children. In addition, ninety-nine were murdered in Mashonaland, chiefly about the middle of June; of these, four were women and three children. There seems to have been little or no mutilation of bodies by way of obtaining medicines, for warding off danger, obtaining ascendancy, etc.

The rebels had no settled plan, consequently community of action between the various groups was wanting. They seemed to be obsessed with the idea that supernatural aid would be derived by them in some way from the Umlimo.

A large number of Native police, especially such as had been less than a year in the force, joined the rebels, carrying off with them the Winchester repeaters with which they had been supplied. The older hands remained loyal, but were disarmed. On the other hand, the Makalanga people refrained from participating in the Rebellion. Such, indeed, was but in accordance with the neutral attitude observed by them during the War of 1893.

Hostilities did not terminate until the end of November, that is, after a campaign of about eight months. The combined forces employed in suppressing the Rebellion were 3,000 in Matabeleland and 2,200 in Mashonaland, including 1,200 Imperial troops.

The casualties among the troops were: Matabeleland—34 killed, 100 wounded; Mashonaland—7 killed, 18 wounded. The number of rebels killed is believed to have considerably exceeded that of the War, viz. 3,000.

On the conclusion of hostilities, the rebels were directed to hand in their guns and assegais. They were known to be in possession of several thousands of firearms—about 2,000 breech-loading rifles and many muzzle-loading guns. "The Matabele kept on evading [the order], promising to give up rifles one day, the next saying that in their own particular tribe there were none, and making all sorts of excuses. They were repeatedly told that, unless they came to a decision shortly and surrendered to our satisfaction, hostilities would be recommenced and they would be blockaded in the hills.... In [certain] districts they came to surrender, ... bringing in 200 or 300 rifles." As to the rest, only another hundred or so guns, with some 4,000 assegais, were given up, "each Chief professing he did not know where his men had put their [guns], and promising to bring all he could. Needless to say these promises were never fulfilled."[367]

"It is worthy of remark that whilst, in the first war, the Matabele attacked strong positions defended by artillery and Maxim guns, thereby suffering very heavy loss themselves but killing very few white men, in the present [rebellion] all the fighting has been amongst broken ground, and in country more or less covered with bush, and all the killing has been done with rifles; for, in the first war, the Natives learnt the futility of attacking fortified positions, and now only fight in the bush in skirmishing order, giving but little opportunity for the effective use of machine guns; so that, although a good many rounds have been fired from Maxims at long ranges, only a very small amount of execution has been done by them."[368]

XI. NATIVE CORPS.

(i) Natal Native Horse.

Reference was made in a note in the Introduction to the Natal Native Police organized in 1848. Since their disbandment in 1854, no other Native corps has been permanently established in Natal. In times of trouble, however, apart from the ordinary Native levies and contingents, settlements of Native Christians, such as Edendale and Driefontein, invariably offered their services to the Government. The fact that these men, a number of whom were Basutos, were mounted, added greatly to their usefulness. The first occasion of importance on which they volunteered was the Bushman Expedition of 1866. During the Langalibalele Rebellion, 1873, they again took part, under Col. A.W. Durnford,[369] several being killed in the action at Bushman's River Pass. By that time, Durnford, who arrived in Natal in June, 1873, had already begun to take an exceptional interest in the training of Natives for military purposes. Under his sympathetic control, the people evinced the keenest desire to assist the Government. The same spirit was shown by the large contingents of uneducated Natives, recruited and organized to a great extent by Durnford at the beginning of the Zulu War, not to refer to those called out on other occasions under other officers. The men of Edendale and Driefontein under Jabez Molife and Simeon Kambule[370] respectively, as well as Basutos under Chief Hlubi, served throughout the 1879 campaign, and rendered very valuable assistance. They took part in the battles of Isandhlwana, Kambule, Hlobane and Ulundi, and suffered considerable losses.

The same communities, with Hlubi's Basutos, again volunteered during the Boer War, 1899-1901. To these communities should be added that at Nyanyadu, as well as members of Chief Ncwadi's tribe. Although, in a "white man's war," allowed to serve only as scouts, drivers and leaders and in limited numbers, some 150 came from Driefontein alone, and 200 from Chief Ncwadi. Under Capt. R.C. Samuelson, N.C., a considerable section of the Drakensberg Mountains was thoroughly patrolled. A portion of the men went through the siege of Ladysmith, whilst conspicuous gallantry was displayed by individual members of the corps on several other occasions during the same war.

By 1906, the great majority of those who had served in the earlier campaigns were, of course, no longer able to turn out. They, however, strongly influenced their sons to do so in their stead, with the result that the Natal Native Horse, under Major G. Moe, U.M.R., with Samuelson as adjutant and second in command, was raised with surprising rapidity. On instructions from the Government, Samuelson, by the 2nd April, succeeded in enrolling nearly 1,000 picked men, including Chiefs and Chiefs' sons. This number was, however, reduced by the Government to 326. As only about half the men had horses, the principal difficulty experienced was in obtaining mounts for the remainder.

The corps did not take the field until the middle of May, largely owing to its having to be equipped and trained; it was consequently unable to take part, like the Nongqai, in some of the main operations and engagements.

It was found necessary, during the campaign, considerably to the disappointment of the members, to break the corps up and distribute sections about the country. To whatever command, however, they happened to be attached, the men proved to be thoroughly reliable and serviceable, and their conduct exemplary. With better training, which in common fairness should have been available in some way before the necessity for recruiting arose, they would have been even more valuable than they were.

(ii) Zululand Native Police (Nongqai).

This corps was originally formed in April, 1883, under the authority of the Imperial Government, by Colonel G. Mansel (late Chief Commissioner of Police, Natal). The 50 non-commissioned officers and men of whom the corps consisted, half of them recruited in Natal,[371] were under the command of two European officers, and were originally enrolled as bodyguard to the Resident Commissioner (the late Sir Melmoth Osborn, K.C.M.G.). They served with distinction during the disturbances of 1884. Although attacked at Maqonga, near Nkandhla, by about 2,500 Zulus—the Resident Commissioner being with them—they held their ground and drove off the enemy with considerable loss, and this in spite of warning as to their probable untrustworthiness from John Dunn, a man intimately acquainted with the country. The force was augmented in succeeding years and became almost entirely an infantry one. During the Zululand disturbances of 1888, the men again greatly distinguished themselves, notably at Ceza, Lower Umfolozi magistracy and Hlopekulu. On every occasion, though pitted against overwhelming odds, they fought steadily, effectively and with the utmost courage, without betraying at any time the least sign of breach of faith or disloyalty.

The personnel continued to increase from 250 in 1889 to 500 in 1899. During the Boer War, the numbers were again raised to 600, with 8 European officers, Inspector C.E. Fairlie taking command. The corps was then employed chiefly in and about Melmoth, in putting the place into a state of defence and escorting convoys. In September, 1904, it was suddenly disbanded by direction of the Natal Government.

During such time as the force existed, the men were disciplined, drilled and equipped to a large extent on the same lines as European troops; they were armed with Martini-Henry rifles, and lived in barracks. Each man was obliged to serve for three years, with the right of re-enlisting. Many took advantage of the right. It is estimated that, between 1883 and 1904, some 3,000 to 4,000 served in the ranks.

When the 1906 Rebellion broke out, the Government re-established the force under Fairlie. With Mansel's assistance, about 100 men were recruited, but only with the greatest difficulty, owing to their feeling sore at having been summarily disbanded in 1904. The reader will find several references in this history to the conspicuous services rendered by this really excellent body of men, notably at Bobe and Mome. They were disbanded once more in November, 1906.

The following, from a report by Colonel Mansel, will be perused with interest: "I wish to bear full testimony to the value of Zulus as soldiers. Their instincts are wholly military. When you enlist a Zulu, you have a ready-made soldier.... All you have to do is to teach him how to handle a rifle. This you can do in about three or four months. He is then as good as he will ever become. He is, as a rule, the best-tempered, most easily-managed man in the world; understands discipline by instinct; is docile, plucky, proud of himself and his corps; kindly-disposed towards his officers; full of mettle, and capable of enduring the extremes of marching and hunger.... Though often fighting against his own kith and kin, not a single case of treachery or breach of faith ever occurred."

(iii) Proposed Creation of a Permanent Native Corps.

The oft-repeated experiment of forming corps of coloured people inhabiting countries conquered by England, has apparently met with success in the main. The problem is, however, by no means an easy one to deal with, and it is generally owing to inability on the part of the rulers to formulate sound and workable schemes that failure has occasionally attended their efforts. Utilization of often excellent fighting material, as, for instance, may be found in the Zulus, is obviously a matter of importance, and any intention by a Government to establish such corps is deserving of careful consideration. But irresolution in a matter of this kind does more harm than good. Rather not make any attempt than be half-hearted or lukewarm. It has been seen that a Native police corps was formed as long ago as 1848, only to be disbanded a few years later without any reasons being given. Similar half-heartedness is observable in the foregoing account of the N.N.H. and the Z.N.P.

Any reflecting person will, we venture to think, arrive at the conclusion that a Native corps, established on a sound basis, is a wise and necessary provision, and this from several points of view. It does what nothing else can do so well, namely, proves to the people that the Government has confidence in them (as it unquestionably ought to have) and, by enabling them to share directly in the defence of the State, powerfully induces them to take a deep and abiding interest in the welfare, not only of themselves, but of the entire community, white and black. Thus the primary object in establishing a corps is not so much the intrinsic value of the fighting material recruited, as that it is an outward and visible sign to Natives in general that the rulers look on their interests as indissolubly connected with those of Europeans, which is only another way of saying that a premium is set on the promotion of patriotism, loyalty and contentment. As matters are at present in South Africa, anyone can see with half an eye that, in the absence of these corps, the respective Governments have neglected to use material that lies near at hand. The splendid record of the N.N.H. and Z.N.P., and the consistent loyalty of each in all vicissitudes, are as sure a guarantee as could be desired, that they would be loyal. If a permanently-established corps be but treated in a fair and reasonable manner, it is impossible to see what object any of its members would have for becoming mutinous or disloyal.

The martial ardour and courage of the Zulus are world-famous. Here are born soldiers, if ever there were any such. Should the Government be unable to adopt the suggestion on a large scale, it might at least try the Zulus. Many efforts have in the past been made to raise men. The labours, however, were in each case foredoomed to failure, because the authorities were not behind the movement, or, if behind it, then only half-heartedly so.

Amongst those who have interested themselves particularly in this matter is the late Commandant (Colonel H.T. Bru-de-Wold) whose views, without professing to be in any way complete, and admittedly based partly on those of his predecessors and other men, are briefly as follows: That the Government should form one or more Native regiments drawn from the different tribes of Natal and Zululand. Lads should be recruited at the age of fifteen or sixteen from the kraals of the most respectable and influential Natives in a tribe. They should then be formed into a permanent force, always to be kept in barracks. Each lad should be subject to long service, viz. 25, 30 or more years.

A Native location, similar to that of Zwartkop in the neighbourhood of Pietermaritzburg, would be suitable for the purpose. Permanent barracks should be erected in the location.

White officers, who should be married men and be most carefully selected, should reside in or near the barracks with their wives. Only those should be chosen whose pride of race is highly developed.

The Natives (non-commissioned officers and men) should be allowed to marry, and the Government might assist them in finding their lobolo. They should, however, each be limited to one wife. The location should be laid out in plots, conveniently situated, each married non-commissioned officer or man having his house, with adjoining garden for growing any desired minor articles, but the principal ration should be supplied by the Government, so that all would be dependent entirely on the Government for their food. The married men should be allowed to keep cattle for milk and to breed horses on their own account.

Any menial work, such as road-making, erecting buildings, etc., on the location should be done by hired labour, and not by the Native soldiers. The men should, however, be required to keep their respective dwelling-houses in repair. The reason for such provision is to keep up their pride as soldiers, and not demean them by putting them on the same level as ordinary labourers.

After certain periods to be determined upon, those of good character might be permitted to go on furlough, in the same way as any other Native in the service of the Government, when they would receive remuneration in addition to soldier's pay.

The officers' wives would naturally take an interest in the wives of n.c.o.'s and men, and provide, with the assistance of the State, for the education of the children. Thus the institution would, not only subject the men to strict military discipline, but enable their children to be educated and instructed in civilized ways of living. And so, in time, a separate class would be created on a small scale, the members of which might be designated "The King's Men," whilst the boys growing up in such environment would themselves become soldiers. A pride would be fostered in the men, arising out of a consciousness of being superior to the ordinary tribes. Although, at the outset, drawn from various tribes, they would gradually lose their tribal instincts and form a community of their own. Such influences would probably be more potent and productive of good than any other existing agency that could be named. But success would, it is felt, be dependent primarily on the officers.

There are many other details which might have been touched on. Attention has been drawn to the matter only because it seems wrong for the Government to refrain from identifying itself with an aspiration which is, perhaps, more deeply rooted in the people than any other. If they are ever to be trusted, why not make a beginning on some such lines as these? To go to them for assistance in time of war, and yet turn our backs on them in time of peace is not worthy of our race. A people that is prepared to shed, and has repeatedly shed, its blood for its rulers, is surely deserving of more recognition than the occasional issue of medals to a few favoured individuals.