THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA
Bragg was determined to lay siege to the city and force the Union army into surrendering by starvation. While the Union army was strongly entrenching their positions in Chattanooga, the Confederates were establishing their lines on Missionary Ridge, east of the city, and Lookout Mountain, southwest of the city. A strong picket line was placed along the river from Chattanooga Creek to a point below Williams Island, including Brown’s Ferry. Another similar line was placed from just below the city to a point near the mouth of the Chickamauga Creek. A skirmish line was thrown out about one mile in front of Missionary Ridge. A short range of hills, of which Orchard Knob was the highest, was covered by this skirmish line. These Confederate positions controlled all supply lines south of the river, which meant railroads, highway and the river itself. The Union army was soon in dire straits. The only route which was left open was to cross the river north of the city, then cross Walden’s Ridge or Signal Mountain; thence down the Sequatchie Valley to Bridgeport and Stevenson. This route was about 65 miles long and most of it was mountainous roads. The fall rains had set in and this route was almost impassable. The Union supply wagons were easy prey for the Confederate cavalry which had been dispatched north of the river to conduct raids. Wheeler captured dozens of the supply wagons, killing the horses and burning the wagons. The Union base of supplies was Nashville—160 miles distant by very rough roads. Cattle were driven all this distance in many instances to feed the hungry soldiers. By the time the cattle reached Chattanooga (if they did not die enroute), they were so poor that the Union troops often remarked that they had nothing to eat but “hard tack” and “dried beef on the hoof.” To say the Union soldiers were in destitute circumstances would be a mild way of expressing their actual condition. Half rations, then quarter rations and less. At times the soldiers only had a little raw corn to eat. Finally it was necessary to place a sentry at the horse troughs in order to keep the soldiers from taking the grain which was fed to a few choice mounts. Even then, the Union army lost between 12,000 and 15,000 of their finest horses and mules from starvation. The troops were in a starved, sickened condition, and very low in spirits. No doubt they thought they were doomed, and that no one would come to their rescue before they starved. However, in this surmise, to their great joy, they were mistaken. It had been practically a month since their defeat at Chickamauga, but let us review a little to see what was being done to relieve this besieged army. Almost immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, Gen. Grant started Gen. Sherman from Vicksburg with four divisions (Army of the Tennessee) to the assistance of Rosecrans. These re-enforcements consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions of the 15th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Generals Peter J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewing, respectively. Also the 2nd division of the 17th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith. Thirteen brigades were represented by Sherman’s re-enforcements.
Steamboat Being Warped Through “The Suck” Before the Dam at Hale’s Bar was built in the Tennessee
A detachment from the Army of the Potomac consisting of the 11th and 12th Army Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, were sent from Virginia to help lift the siege. The 11th corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. O. W. Howard. Howard had the 2nd and 3rd divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr and Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, respectively. The 12th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum, had the 1st and 2nd divisions, commanded by Brig.-Generals Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary, respectively. Twelve brigades were represented by Hooker’s re-enforcements. Hooker’s troops left Virginia on September 25th. These troops came by the B. and O. Railroad via Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville and Bridgeport. The advance of this column reached Bridgeport September 30th. They were supposed to have helped to reopen the Tennessee River the next day. This was impossible due to his supply trains not being here at that time. Rosecrans had devised a plan whereby the river supply line could be opened up. His plan was to seize Brown’s Ferry from Chattanooga, and bring Hooker forward into Lookout Valley at the same time. The execution of this plan only awaited completion of pontoon-boats for the necessary bridge. When they were ready, Wheeler made another raid north of the river, delaying the Union troops again. The date for the execution of this movement was then set for October 19th. On this date Rosecrans personally selected the site for throwing the bridge. It has been reported that Rosecrans rowed a boat himself. When he returned to his headquarters he found orders relieving him, and placing Thomas in command. On October 23rd, Gen. Grant arrived in Chattanooga. He approved of Rosecrans’ plan and ordered it executed at once. Thomas at once repeated Rosecrans’ order to Hooker, ordering him forward into Lookout Valley. Hooker’s supply trains reached him October 26th. He left Bridgeport on the 27th, reaching Brown’s Ferry the next day. In the meantime, during the night of the 26th, a part of two Union brigades marched across Moccasin Point, concealing themselves near Brown’s Ferry. About 3:00 A. M. of the 27th, there were 50 pontoon-boats placed in the Tennessee River, each carrying 30 men. These boats floated down the river under cover of darkness, rounding Moccasin Point unobserved by the Confederate pickets. By a quick crossing from the north bank to the south bank, they took the Confederates by surprise and soon captured this position. The pontoon-boats were then leashed together, forming a bridge across the river. At this time the troops which had marched to this point crossed and joined the others on the south bank.
Military Bridge, Tennessee River, 1863