THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN
Finally, on June 23, 1863, Rosecrans left Murfreesboro, moving against Bragg at Tullahoma. By exercising very clever strategy in the form of a series of flanking movements, the Confederates were forced to give up one stronghold after another. The Confederates finally crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and Caperton’s Ferry, Alabama, and moved directly into Chattanooga. The first arrival at Chattanooga was at the same hour that General Pickett made his famous charge at Gettysburg, namely near high noon on July 3rd. By this time the Union army had advanced to the western base of the Cumberland Mountain. The right of their line was at Winchester; the left at McMinnville. Rosecrans, with his headquarters at Winchester, was making preparations for another campaign for occupying Chattanooga. At this time Chattanooga was of utmost importance to both armies, and no doubt the largest prize from a military standpoint which the Army of the Cumberland ever contended for. The Confederates had destroyed the bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport to delay the pursuit of the Union Army. The Union army consisted of three regular Army Corps; the 14th, commanded by Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas; the 20th, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Alexander McCook, and the 21st, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. The Cavalry Corps was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Robert Mitchell; the Reserve Corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger. The disposition of the Union forces was as follows:
Thomas was posted at Decherd; McCook at McMinnville, and Crittenden at Winchester. Again Rosecrans was urged to renew hostilities against Bragg. The Cumberland, Raccoon and Lookout Mountain ranges and the Tennessee River were some of the giant obstacles between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. To cross these required a maximum of time and supplies as it was quite a task. There were railroads to repair; the river bridge to be rebuilt. All of this required time and labor. It was humanly impossible for Rosecrans to begin a forward movement at this time. By extending every effort possible, it was July 25th before the railroads were repaired. Another weighty consideration of Rosecrans was the necessary forage for the animals. Having knowledge that corn would not be ripe in east Tennessee and northern Alabama before the middle of August, Rosecrans insisted on waiting until that time before he launched another campaign. Officials of the War Department were eager for action on the part of Rosecrans.
On August 4th, Gen. Halleck sent a message to Rosecrans which said: “Your forces must move forward without delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River.” Since Rosecrans was not ready for the movement, he replied: “Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross the Tennessee River received. As I have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops.” To this message Gen. Halleck replied: “The orders for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily are peremptory.” This latter message did not set well with Rosecrans. He prepared his reply and after conferring with his corps commanders and receiving their assurance that they would support him, he sent the following message: Gen. Halleck: “My arrangements for beginning a continuous movement will be completed and the execution begun Monday next. We have information to show that crossing the Tennessee River between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary movement of troops for the two cases are quite different. It is necessary to have our means of crossing the river completed and our supplies provided to cross 60 miles of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally would be to push our troops into the mountains on narrow and difficult roads, destitute of pasture and forage; and short of water where they would not be able to maneuver as exigencies demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the command.”
Gen. Halleck wired him as follows: “I have communicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective has been stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reaching it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to promptly carry out the wishes of the Government you will not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not interfere.”
Rosecrans replied the same day. His message read: “Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move with all dispatch compatible with the successful execution of our work. We are pressing everything to bring up forage for our animals. The present rolling stock of the road will barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought 50 more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily.” There was no further interference from Washington.
Park Headquarters, Chickamauga Battlefield
Snodgrass House, Chickamauga Battlefield