Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

1105. Definition.—The word “charity” (_carum_, what is held dear, highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for His own sake, and others on account of God.

1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or destroy what one loves.

(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the love one has of being entertained.

1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it from him.

1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own existence;

(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind, and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the worth of the beloved object.

1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor concupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else (thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence (_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when one wishes to give him food or money).

1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company, which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus, there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus, because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the other’s virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God (John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as “Fount of life, fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. The Excellence of Charity.—Human friendship of the lower kind is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship, however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e., the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end. Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii. 3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues. Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money (false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by various titles.

(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues. This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are; otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the Last End.

(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii. 17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the sense that it supports and nourishes them.

(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).

1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil, affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”

(c) It forbids that one harm one’s own soul by thoughts or desires of wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects, rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them: “Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes them perfect and meritorious.

(a) Actual direction—that is, the intention here and now to believe, or hope, etc., out of love for God—though more perfect, is not required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) Habitual direction—that is, the mere fact that one has the habit of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope, etc, now made—does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

(c) Virtual direction—that is, the influence of an intention, once made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes, etc.—at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice, however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of charity, actual or virtual.

1121. Production of Charity.—The virtue of charity belongs to the appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph., iii. 19).

1122. The Origin of Charity.—(a) Charity is not caused by nature, nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed, is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according “to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii. 8; I Cor., xii. 2).

(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

1124. Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity, for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward (Matt., X. 42).

1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place, there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory, for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude one merited during life. Hence, those who make many—even though less fervent—acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree of reward for them hereafter.

1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life, when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II Cor., vi. 11).

1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same degree in which He is lovable—that is, infinitely; but it is clear that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17); but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life, consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just, consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just, consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God, permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes: (a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of their love (Philip., i. 13).

1131. The Decline of Charity.—(a) Actual charity can decline, in the sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded (Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical habit decrease.

1132. The Loss of Charity.—(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23). (b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

1133. The Object of Charity.—There is a threefold object of charity: (a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment” (Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid, 39).

1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St. John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world” (I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity, even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit, and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God Himself).

1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109), that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.

(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.

(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or the use of man).

1136. Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others. Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii. 1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” (Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.) to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one holds him as another self.

1137. If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e) according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has for one’s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts and graces which evoke them are participations of God’s goodness, which is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship, that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.—Should we love with charity those who are sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not restricted to loving the just.

1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32). (b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps. lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell, for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means to a spiritual awakening.

1145. Association with Sinners.—(a) It is never lawful to associate with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: “Go out from among them and be ye separate” (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance (Matt., ix. 10-13).

1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains to charity (Jer, xv. 19).

1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship. If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party, and may prove harmful.

1148. Charity towards Enemies.—Enemies can be considered in two senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with charity—that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings, enemies should be loved with charity—that is, their nature created by God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us, for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that which is not well disposed towards ourselves.

1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the natural principle: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5; Prov., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and Pharisees, who taught: “Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy.” In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: “I say to you: Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven” (Matt., v. 44, 45).

1150. The following examples of love of one’s enemies are found in the Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His enemies.

1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?

(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors for the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus makes this act of love: “I love all except Caius.” The act of love made by Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.

(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.

1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases of necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.

1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply also to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is manifested. For St. John says: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth” (I John, iii. 18).

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of charity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge (Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers offered for his neighbor sins against charity.

(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of charity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we are told: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty, give him to drink” (Prov., xxv. 21).

(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him, visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom, would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: “Do good to those that hate you” (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).

1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative, might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.

(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations, speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not even answer if Balbus addresses him.

(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples: Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents, but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and poor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.

(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity becomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring institution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he dislikes.

1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.

(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity. Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does not answer until he has spoken civilly.

(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.

(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when this is required for the protection of one’s own rights. Example: Titus goes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable when he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very cool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.

1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs of charity:

(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one’s neighbor, as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness, unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.

(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this, or does not care, no sin—or at most only a venial sin—is committed; but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct, Claudius sins seriously against charity.

1157. Refusal of Greetings.—(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or salutation (such as “Good morning”) indicates a want of charity, when such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however, when custom does not require it, Example: In Balba’s office the girls employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba never salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius’ street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on his part.

(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples: Claudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that he does not care to notice Titus.

1158. The Order of Charity.—Charity not only requires that we love God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one’s neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor (Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance with the saying: “Charity begins at home.”

(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.

1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively, when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even though the object be not more amiable in itself.

1160. The Character of our Love of God.—(a) It must be supreme objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will places God above all.

1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note: (a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.

1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the benefit of a neighbor?

(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.

(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory; one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls (Philip., i. 23, 24).

1164. The Love of the Body.—(a) One should prefer the spiritual welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal, for it has more of a claim on one.

1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a) extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help the many rather than the one.

1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places. (b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep him away from bad company.

1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety for the safety of the public.

(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person, for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life for the sake of a friend.

1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows: (a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and hence more deserving of love—for example, a saintly acquaintance may be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage, friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those nearer to self is as follows:

(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect (i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship, gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8). Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as visits) should be given.

1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the good of the better person should be preferred:

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.

(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance is more due. If one has to choose between helping one’s indigent parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one’s parents.

(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner, director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than his relatives who belong to another congregation.

(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military, religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious, etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer, and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not to his parents.

1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship, should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution), if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity, one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a) objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b) subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given are not guilty of serious sin.

1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14), third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country, all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one receives life from parents.

1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b) Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more, objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But, subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

1183. The Acts of Charity.—The principal act of the virtue of charity is love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus, benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is intimate and lasting, from its nature.

1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.—(a) From benevolence proceed gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him (Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23). (b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty, but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains to God.

1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c) entirely; (d) without measure.

1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal Source.

1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: “Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls” (I Pet., i. 9); but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to avoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.

1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary, tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its love.

1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the creature’s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b) It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves everything that pertains to God—each of the Divine Persons, all of the divine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth, charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): “Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart” (Deut., vi. 5).

1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De diligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured, but is the measure of all things.

(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of excess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and so the greater the charity, the better it is.

(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to give more to strangers than to one’s needy parents, for this act would not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time and place.

1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered, is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the friend on account of natural affection: “If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?” (Matt, v. 46).

1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self. Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than the love of God.