III
Ravaisson, in founding the new spiritual philosophy, professed certain doctrines which were a blending of Hellenism and Christianity. In the midst of thought which was dominated by positivism, naturalism or materialism, or by a shallow eclecticism, wherein religious ideas were rather held in contempt, he issued a challenge on behalf of spiritual values and ideals. Beauty, love and goodness, he declared, were divine. God himself is these things, said Ravaisson, and the divinity is “not far from any of us.” In so far as we manifest these qualities we approach the perfect personality of God himself. In the infinite, in God, will is identical with love, which itself is not distinguished from the absolutely good and the absolutely beautiful. This love can govern our wills; the love of the beautiful and the good can operate in our lives. In so far as this is so, we participate in the love and the life of God.
Boutroux agrees substantially with Ravaisson, but he lays more stress upon the free creative power of the deity as immanent. “God,” he remarks in his thesis, “is not only the creator of the world, he is also its Providence, and watches over the details as well as over the whole.”[[29]] God is thus an immanent and creative power in his world as well as the perfect being of supreme goodness and beauty. Boutroux here finds this problem of divine immanence and transcendence as important as does Blondel, and his attitude is like that of Blondel, midway between that of Ravaisson and Bergson.
[29] La Contingence des Lois de la Nature, p. 150.
Religion, Boutroux urges, must show man that the supreme ideal for him is to realise in his own nature this idea of God. There is an obligation upon man to pursue after these things-goodness, truth, beauty and love—for they are his good, they are the Good; they are, indeed, God. In them is a harmony which satisfies his whole nature, and which does not neglect or crush any aspect of character, as narrow conceptions of religion inevitably do. Boutroux insists upon the necessity for intellectual satisfaction, and opposes the “philosophy of action” in ils doctrine of “faith for faith’s sake.” At the same time he conceives Reason as a harmony, not merely a coldly logical thing. Feeling and will must be satisfied also.[[30]]
[30] Boutroux has in his volume, Science et Religion dans la Philosophie contemporaine, contributed a luminous and penetrating discussion of various religious doctrines from Comte to William James. This was published in 1908.
We have observed already how Fouillée claimed that the ethics of his idées-forces contained the gist of what was valuable in the world religions. He claims that philosophy includes under the form of rational belief or thought what the religions include as instinctive belief. In religion he sees a spontaneous type of metaphysic, while metaphysic or philosophy is a rationalised religion.
Nothing in this connection is more important than a rational and harmonious view of God. This he insists upon in his thesis and in his Sketch of the Future of a Metaphysic founded on Experience. The old idea of God was that of a monarch governing the world as a despot governs his subjects. The government of the universe may still be held to be a monarchy, but modern science is careful to assure us that it must be regarded as an absolutely constitutional monarchy. The monarch, if there be one, acts in accordance with the laws and respects the established constitution. Reason obliges us to conceive of the sovereign: experience enlightens us as to the constitution.
There can be little doubt that one of the world’s greatest books upon religion is the work of Guyau, which appeared in 1886, bearing the arresting title, L’Irreligion de l’Avenir. Its sub-title describes it as an Etude sociologique, and it is this treatment of the subject from the standpoint of sociology which is such a distinctive feature of the book. The notion of a social bond between man and the powers superior to him, but resembling him, is, claims Guyau, a point of unity in which all religions are at one. The foundation of the religious sentiment lies in sociality, and the religious man is just the man who is disposed to be sociable, not only with all living beings whom he meets, but with those whom he imaginatively creates as gods. Guyau’s thesis, briefly put, is that religion is a manifestation of life (again he insists on “Life,” as in his Ethics, as a central conception), becoming self-conscious and seeking the explanation of things by analogies drawn from human society. Religion is “sociomorphic” rather than merely anthropomorphic; it is, indeed, a universal sociological hypothesis, mythical in form.
The religious sentiment expresses a consciousness of dependence, and in addition, adds Guyau, it expresses the need of affection, tenderness and love—that is to say, the “social” side of man’s nature. In the conception of the Great Companion or Loving Father, humanity finds consolation and hope. Children and women readily turn to such an ideal, and primitive peoples, who are just like children, conceive of the deity as severe and all- powerful. To this conception moral attributes were subsequently added, as man’s own moral conscience developed, and it now issues in a doctrine of God as Love. All this development is, together with that of esthetics and ethics, a manifestation of life in its individual and more especially social manifestations.
It is the purpose of Guyau’s book not only to present a study of the evolution of religion in this manner, from a sociological point of view, but to indicate a further development of which the beginnings are already manifest—namely, a decomposition of all systems of dogmatic religion. It is primarily the decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism which he intends to indicate by the French term irréligion. The English translation of his work bears the title The Non-religion of the Future. Had Guyau been writing and living in another country it is undoubtedly true that his work would probably have been entitled The Religion of the Future. Owing to the Roman Catholic environment and the conception of religion in his own land, he was, however, obliged to abandon the use of the word religion altogether. In order to avoid misunderstanding, we must examine the sense he gives to this word, and shall see then that his title is not meant to convey the impression of being anti-religious in the widest sense, nor is it irreligious in the English meaning of that word.
Guyau considers every positive and historical religion to present three distinct and essential elements:
An attempt at a mythical and non-scientific explanation of (a) natural phenomena—e.g., intervention, miracles, efficacious prayer; (b) historical facts—e.g., incarnation of Buddha or Jesus. A system of dogmas—that is to say, symbolic ideas or imaginative beliefs—forcibly imposed upon one’s faith as absolute verities, even though they are susceptible to no scientific demonstration or philosophical justification. A cult and a system of rites or of worship, made up of more or less immutable practices which are looked upon as possessing a marvellous efficacy upon the course of things, a propitiatory virtue.[[31]]
[31] L’Irréligion de l’Avenir, p. xiii; Eng. trans., p. 10.
By these three different and really organic elements, religion is clearly marked off from philosophy. Owing to the stability of these elements religion is apt to be centuries behind science and philosophy, and consequently reconciliation is only effected by a subtle process which, while maintaining the traditional dogmas and phrases, evolves a new interpretation of them sufficiently modern to harmonise a little more with the advance in thought, but which presents a false appearance of stability and consistency, disguising the real change of meaning, of view-point and of doctrine. Of this effort we shall see the most notable instance is that of the “Modernists” or Neo-Catholics in France and Italy, and the Liberal Christians in England and America.
Guyau claims that these newer interpretations, subtle and useful as they are, and frequently the assertions of minds who desire sincerely to adapt the ancient traditions to modern needs, are in themselves hypocritical, and the Church in a sense does right to oppose them. Guyau cannot see any satisfactoriness in these compromises and adaptations which lack the clearness of the old teaching, which they in a sense betray, while they do not sufficiently satisfy the demands of modern thought.
With the decay of the dogmatic religion of Christendom which is supremely stated in the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, there must follow the non-religion of the future, which may well preserve, he points out, all that is pure in the religious sentiment and carry with it an admiration for the cosmos and for the infinite powers which are there displayed. It will be a search for, and a belief in, an ideal not only individual, but social and even cosmic, which shall pass the limits of actual reality. Hence it appears that “non-religion” or “a-religion,” which is for Guyau simply “the negation of all dogma, of all traditional and supernatural authority, of all revelation, of all miracle, of all myth, of all rite erected into a duty,” is most certainly not a synonym for irreligion or impiety, nor does it involve any contempt for the moral and metaphysical doctrines expressed by the ancient religions of the world. The non-religious man in Guyau’s sense of the term is simply the man without a religion, as he has defined it above, and he may quite well admire and sympathise with the great founders of religion, not only in that they were thinkers, metaphysicians, moralists and philanthropists, but in that they were reformers of established belief, more or less avowed enemies of religious authority and of every affirmation laid down by an ecclesiastical body in order to bind the intellectual freedom of individuals. Guyau’s remarks in this connection agree with the tone in which Renan spoke of his leaving the Church because of a feeling of respect and loyalty to its Founder. Guyau points out that there exists in the bosom of every great religion a dissolving force—namely, the very force which in the beginning served to constitute it and to establish its triumphant revolt over its predecessor. That force is the absolute right of private judgment, the free factor of the personal conscience, which no external authority can succeed, ultimately, in coercing or silencing. The Roman Church, and almost every other organised branch of the Christian religion, forgets, when faced with a spirit which will not conform, that it is precisely to this spirit that it owes its own foundation and also the best years of its existence. Guyau has little difficulty in pressing the conclusions which follow from the recognition of this vital point.
Briefly, it follows that the hope of a world-religion is an illusion, whether it be the dream of a perfect and world-wide Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, or Mohammedanism. The sole authority in religious matters, that of the individual conscience, prevents any such consummation, which, even if it could be achieved, would be mischievous. The future will display a variety of beliefs and religions, as it does now. This need not discourage us, for therein is a sign of vitality or spiritual life, of which the world-religions are examples, marred, however, by their profession of universality, an ideal which they do not and never will realise.
The notion of a Catholic Church or a great world- religion is really contrary to the duty of personal thought and reflection, which must inevitably (unless they give way to mere lazy repetition of other people’s thoughts) lead to differences. The tendency is for humanity to move away from dogmatic religion, with its pretensions to universality, catholicity, and monarchy (of which, says Guyau, the most curious type has just recently been achieved in our own day, by the Pope’s proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility), towards religious individualism and to a plurality of religions. There may, of course, be religious associations or federations, but these will be free, and will not demand the adherence to any dogma as such.
With the decay of dogmatic religion the best elements of religious life will have freer scope to develop themselves, and will grow both in intensity and in extent. “He alone is religious, in the philosophical sense of the word, who researches for, who thinks about, who loves, truth.” Such inquiry or search involves freedom, it involves conflict, but the conflict of ideas, which is perfectly compatible with toleration in a political sense, and is the essence of the spirit of the great world teachers. This is what Jesus foresaw when he remarked: “I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.” More fully, he might have put it, Guyau suggests: “I came not to bring peace into human thought, but an incessant battle of ideas; not repose, but movement and progress of spirit; not universal dogma, but liberty of belief, which is the first condition of growth.” Well might Renan remark that it was loyalty to such a spirit which caused him to break with the Church.
While attacking religious orthodoxy in this manner, Guyau is careful to point out that if religious fanaticism ls bad, anti-religious fanaticism is equally mischievous, wicked and foolish.[[32]] While the eighteenth century could only scoff at religion, the nineteenth realised the absurdity of such raillery. We have come to see that even although a belief may be irrational and even erroneous, it may still survive, and it may console multitudes whose minds would be lost on the stormy sea of life without such an anchor. While dogmatic or positive religions do exist they will do so, Guyau reminds us, for quite definite and adequate reasons, chiefly because there are people who believe them, to whom they mean something and often a great deal. These reasons certainly do diminish daily, and the number of adherents, too, but we must refrain from all that savours of anti- religious fanaticism.[[33]] He himself speaks with great respect of a Christian missionary. Are we not, he asks, both brothers and humble collaborators in the work and advance of humanity? He sees no real inconsistency between his own dislike of orthodoxy and dogma and the missionary’s work of raising the ignorant to a better life by those very dogmas. It is a case of relative advance and mental progress.
[32] He cites a curious case of anti-religious fanaticism at Marseilles in 1885, when all texts and scripture pictures were removed fromthe schools.
[33] Guyau’s book abounds in illustrations. He mentions here Huss’s approval of the sincerity of one man who brought straw from his own house to burn him. Huss admired this act of a man in whom he saw a brother in sincerity.
It is with great wealth of discussion that Guyau recounts the genesis of religions in primitive societies to indicate the sociological basis of religion. More important are his chapters on the dissolution of religions in existing societies, in which he shows the unsatisfactoriness of the dogmas of orthodox Protestantism equally with those of the Catholic Church. As mischievous as the notion of an infallible Church is that of an infallible book, literally—that is to say, foolishly-interpreted. He recognises that for a literal explanation of the Bible must be substituted, and is, indeed, being substituted, a literary explanation. Like Renan, he criticises the vulgar conception of prayer and of religious morality which promotes goodness by promise of paradise or fear of hell. He urges in this connection the futility of the effort made by Michelet, Quinet and, more especially, by Renouvier and Pillon to “Protestantise” France. While admitting a certain intellectual, moral and political superiority to it, Guyau claims that for the promotion of morality there is little use in substituting Protestantism for Catholicism. He forecasts the limitation of the power of priests and other religious teachers over the minds of young children. Protestant clergymen in England and America he considers to be no more tolerant in regard to the educational problem than the priests. Guyau urges the importance of an elementary education being free from religious propaganda. He was writing in 1886, some years after the secular education law had been carried. There is, however, more to be done, and he points out “how strange it is that a society should not do its best to form those whose function it is to form it.”[[34]] In higher education some attention should be given to the comparative study of religions. “Even from the point of view of philosophy, Buddha and Jesus are more important than Anaximander or Thales.”[[35]] It is a pity, he thinks, that there is not a little more done to acquaint the young with the ideas for which the great world-teachers, Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed, stood, instead of cramming a few additional obscure names from early national history. It would give children at least a notion that history had a wider range than their own country, a realisation of the fact that humanity was already old when Christ appeared, and that there are great religions other than Christianity, religions whose followers are not poor ignorant savages or heathen, but intelligent beings, from whom even Christians may learn much. It is thoroughly mischievous, he aptly adds, to bring up children in such a narrow mental atmosphere that the rest of their life is one long disillusionment.
[34] L’Irréligion de l’Avenir, p. 232; Eng. trans., p. 278.
[35] Ibid., p. 236; Eng. trans., p. 283.
With particular reference to his own country, Guyau criticises the religious education of women, the question of “mixed marriages,” the celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy, and the influence of religious beliefs upon the limitation or increase of the family.
After having summed up the tendency of dogmatic religion to decay, he asks if any unification of the great religions is to-day possible, or whether any new religion may be expected? The answer he gives to both these questions is negative, and he produces a wealth of very valid reasons in support of his finding. He is, of course, here using the term religion as he has himself defined it. The claim to universality by all world-religions, the insistence by each that it alone is the really best or true religion, precludes any question of unity. As well might we imagine unity between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church.
In the “non-religious” state, dogma will be replaced by individual constructions. Religion will be a free, personal affair, in which the great philosophical hypotheses (e.g., Theism and Pantheism) will be to a large extent utilised. They will, however, be regarded as such by all, as rational hypotheses, which some individuals will accept, others will reject. Certain doctrines will appeal to some, not to others. The evidence for a certain type of theism will seem adequate to some, not to others. There will be no endeavour to impose corporately or singly the acceptance of any creed upon others.
With Guyau’s conception of the future of religion or non-religion, whichever we care to call it, we may well close this survey of the religious ideas in modern France. In the Roman Church on the one hand, and, on the other, in the thought of Renan, Renouvier and Guyau, together with the multitude of thinking men and women they represent, may be seen the two tendencies—one conservative, strengthening its internal organisation and authority, in defiance of all the influences of modern thought, the other a free and personal effort, issuing in a genuine humanising of religion and freeing it from ecclesiasticism and dogma.
A word may be said here, however, with reference to the “Modernists.” The Modernist movement is a French product, the result of the interaction of modern philosophical and scientific ideas upon the teaching of the Roman Church. It has produced a philosophical religion which owes much to Ollé-Laprune and Blondel, and is in reality modern science with a veneer of religious idealism or platonism. It is a theological compromise, and has no affinities with the efforts of Lamennais. As a compromise it was really opposed to the traditions of the French, to whose love of sharp and clear thinking such general and rather vague syntheses are unacceptable. It must be admitted, however, that there is a concreteness, a nearness to reality and life, which separates it profoundly from the highly abstract theology of Germany, as seen in Ritschl and Harnack.
The Abbé Marat of the Theological School at the Sorbonne and Father Gratry of the Ecole Normale were the initiators of this movement, as far back as the Second Empire. “Modernism” was never a school of thought, philosophical or religious, and it showed itself in a freedom and life, a spirit rather than in any formula;. As Sorel’s syndicalism is an application of the Bergsonian and kindred doctrines to the left wings, and issues in a social theory of “action,” so Modernism is an attempt to apply them to the right and issues in a religion founded on action rather than theology. The writings of the Modernists are extensive, but we mention the names of the chief thinkers. There is the noted exegetist Loisy, who was dismissed in 1894 from the Catholic Institute of Paris and now holds the chair of the History of Religions at the College de France. His friend, the Abbé Bourier, maintained the doctrine, “ Where Christ is there is the Church,” with a view to insisting upon the importance of being a Christian rather than a Catholic or a Protestant.
The importance of the Catholic thinker, Blondel, both for religion and for philosophy, has already been indicated at an earlier stage in this book. His work inspires most.Modernist thought. Blondel preaches, with great wealth of philosophical and psychological argument, the great Catholic doctrine of the collaboration of God with man and of man with God. Man at one with himself realises his highest aspirations. Divine transcendence and divine immanence in man are reconciled. God and man, in this teaching, are brought together, and the stern realism of every-day life and the idealism of religion unite in a sacramental union. The supreme principle in this union Laberthonnière shows to be Love. He is at pains to make clear, however, that belief in Love as the ultimate reality is no mere sentimentality, no mere assertion of the will-to-believe. For him the intellect must play its part in the religious life and in the expression of faith. No profounder intellectual judgment exists than just the one which asserts “God is Love,” when this statement is properly apprehended and its momentous significance clearly realised. We cannot but lament, with Laberthonnière, the abuse of this proposition and its subsequent loss of both appeal and meaning through a shallow familiarity. The reiteration of great conceptions, which is the method by which the great dogmas have been handed down from generations, tends to blurr their real significance. They become stereotyped and empty of life. It is for this reason that Le Roy in Dogme et Critique (1907) insisted upon the advisability of regarding all dogmas as expressions of practical value in and for action, rather than as intellectual propositions of a purely “religious” or ecclesiastical type, belonging solely to the creeds.
To Blondel, Laberthonnière, and Le Roy can be added the names of Fonsegrive, Sertillanges, Loyson and Houtin, the last two of whom ultimately left the Church, for the Church made up its mind to crush Modernism. The Pope had intimated in 1879 that the thirteenth-century philosophy of Aquinas was to be recognised as the only official philosophy.[[36]] Finally, Modernism was condemned in a Vatican encyclical (Pascendi Dominici Gregis) in 1907, as was also the social and educational effort, Le Sillon.
[36] This led to revival of the study of the Summa Theologiæ and to the commencement of the review of Catholic philosophy, Revue Thomiste.
Such has been Rome’s last word, and it is not surprising, therefore, that France is the most ardent home of free thought upon religious matters, that the French people display a spirit which is unable to stop at Protestantism, but which heralds the religion or the non-religion of the future to which Guyau has so powerfully indicated the tendencies and has by so doing helped, in conjunction with Renan and Renouvier, to hasten its realisation.
A parallel to the “modernist” theology of the Catholic thinkers was indicated on the Protestant side by the theology of Auguste Sabatier, whose Esquisse d’une Philosophie de la Religion d’après la Psychologie et l’Histoire appeared in 1897[[37]] and of Menegoz,[[38]] whose Publications diverges sur le Fidéisme et son Application a l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel were issued in 1900. Sabatier assigns the beginning of religion to man’s trouble and distress of heart caused by his aspirations, his belief in ideals and higher values, being at variance with his actual condition. Religion arises from this conflict of real and ideal in the soul of man. This is the essence of religion which finds its expression in the life of faith rather than in the formation of beliefs which are themselves accidental and transitory, arising from environment and education, changing in form from aee to age both in the individual and the race. While LeRoy on the Catholic side, maintained that dogmas were valuable for their practical significance, Sabatier and Ménégoz claimed that all religious knowledge is symbolical. Dogmas are but symbols, which inadequately attempt to reveal their object. That object can only be grasped by “faith” as distinct from “belief”—that is to say, by an attitude in which passion, instinct and intuition blend and not by an attitude which is purely one of intellectual conviction. This doctrine of “salvation by faith independently of beliefs” has a marked relationship not only to pragmatism and the philosophy of action, but to the philosophy of intuition. A similar anti-intellectualism colours the “symbolo-fidéist” currents within Catholicism, which manifest a more extreme character. A plea voiced against all such tendencies is to be found in Bois’ book, De la Connaissance religieuse (1894), where an endeavour is made to retain a more intellectual attitude, and it again found expression in the volume by Boutroux, written as late as 1908, which deals with the religious problem in our period.
[37] It was followed after his death in 1901 by the volume Les Religions d’Authorité et la Religion de l’Esprit, 1904.
[38] This is the late Eugene Ménégoz, Professor of Theology in Paris, not Ferdinand Ménégoz, his nephew, who is also a Professor of Theology now at Strasbourg.
Quoting Boehme in the interesting conclusion to this book on Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy (1908) Boutroux sums up in the words of the old German mystic his attitude to the diversity of religious opinions. “Consider the birds in our forests, they praise God each in his own way, in diverse tones and fashions. Think you God is vexed by this diversity and desires to silence discordant voices? All the forms of being are dear to the infinite Being himself!”[[39]]
[39] It is interesting to compare with the above the sentiments expressed in Matthew Arnold’s poem, entitled Progress:
“Children of men! the unseen Power, whose eye
For ever doth accompany mankind,
Hath look’d on no religion scornfully
That men did ever find.
This survey of the general attitude adopted towards religion and the problems which it presents only serves to emphasise more clearly those tendencies which we have already denoted in previous chapters. As the discussion of progress was radically altered by the admission of the principle of freedom, and the discussion of ethics passes bevond rigid formulae to a freer conception of morality, so here in religion the insistence upon freedom and that recognition of personality which accompanies it, colours the whole religious outlook. Renan, Renouvier and Guyau, the three thinkers who have most fully discussed religion in our period, join in proclaiming the importance of the personal factor in religious belief, and in valiant opposition to that Church which is the declared enemy of freedom, they urge that in freedom of thought lies the course of all religious development in the future, for only thus can be expressed the noblest and highest aspirations of man’s spirit.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing pages have been devoted to a history of ideas rather than to the maintenance of any special thesis or particular argument. Consequently it does not remain for us to draw any definitely logical conclusions from the preceding chapters. The opportunity may be justly taken, however, of summing up the general features of the development.
Few periods in the history of human thought can rival in interest that of the second half of the nineteenth century in France. The discussion covers the principal problems with which man’s mind is occupied in modern times and presents these in a manner which is distinctly human and not merely national. This alone would give value to the study of such a period. There is, however, to be added the more striking fact that there is a complete “turning of the tide” manifested during these fifty years in the attitude to most of the problems. Beginning with an overweening confidence in science and a belief in determinism and in a destined progress, the century closed with a complete reversal of these conceptions.
Materialism and naturalism are both recognised as inadequate, a reaction sets in against positivism and culminates in the triumph of spiritualism or idealism. This idealism is free from the cruder aspects of the Kantian or Hegelian philosophy. The Thing-in-itself and the Absolute are abandoned; relativity is proclaimed in knowledge, and freedom in the world of action. Thoughts or ideas show themselves as forces operating in the evolution of history. This is maintained in opposition to the Marxian doctrine of the purely economic or materialistic determination of history. A marked tendency, however, is manifested to regard all problems from a social stand point. The dogmatic confidence in science gives way to a more philosophical attitude, while the conflict of science and religion resolves itself into a decay of dogma and the conception of a free religion.
We have indicated the problem presented by “science et conscience,” and in so far as we have laid down any thesis or argument in these pages, as distinct from an historical account of the development, that thesis has been, that the central problem in the period was that of freedom. It was to this point which the consideration of science, or rather of the sciences, led us. We have observed the importance of the sciences for philosophy, and it is clear that, so far from presenting any real hostility to philosophy, it can acclaim their autonomy and freedom, without attempting by abstract methods to absorb them into itself. They are equally a concrete part of human thought, and in a deep and real sense a manifestation of the same spirit which animates philosophy.
By recognising the sciences philosophy can avoid the fallacy of ideology on the one hand and naturalism on the other. Unlike the old eclecticism, the new thought is able to take account of science and to criticise its assertions. We have seen how this has been accomplished, and the rigidly mechanical view of the world abandoned for one into which human freedom enters as a real factor. This transforms the view of history and shows us human beings creating that history and not merely being its blind puppets. History offers no cheerful outlook for the easy-going optimist; it is not any more to be regarded as mere data for pessimistic reflections, but rather a record which prompts a feeling of responsibility. The world is not ready-made, and if there is to be progress it must be willed by us and achieved by our struggle and labour.
The doctrine of immanence upon which the modern tendency is to insist, in place of the older idea of transcendence, makes us feel, not only that we are free, but that our freedom is not in opposition to, or in spite of, the divine spirit, but is precisely an expression of divine immanence. Instead of the gloomy conception of a whole which determines itself apart from us, we feel ourselves part, and a very responsible part, of a reality which determines itself collectively and creatively by its own action, by its own ideals, which it has itself created. This freedom must extend not only to our conceptions of history but also to those of ethics and of religion.
“English philosophy ends in considering nature as an assemblage of facts; German philosophy looks upon it chiefly as a system of laws. If there is a place midway between the two nations it belongs to us Frenchmen. We applied the English ideas in the eighteenth century; we can in the nineteenth give precision to the German ideas. What we have to do is to temper, amend and complete the two spirits, one by the other, to fuse them into one, to express them in a style that shall be intelligible to everybody and thus to make of them the universal spirit.”
Such was Taine’s attitude, and it indicates clearly the precise position of French thought. We are apt to consider Taine purely as an empiricist, but we must remember that he disagreed with the radical empiricism of John Stuart Mill. His own attitude was largely that of a reaction against the vague spiritualism of the Eclectic School, especially Cousin’s eclecticism, a foreign growth on French soil, due to German influence. The purely a priori constructions of the older spiritualism could find no room, and allowed none, for the sciences. This was sufficient to doom it, and to lead naturally to a reaction of a positive kind, revolting from all a priori constructions.
It was to combat the excessive positive reaction against metaphysics that Renouvier devoted his energies, but while professing to modernise Kant and to follow out the general principles of his Critical Philosophy, Renouvier was further removed from the German thinker than he at times seems to have observed. Renouvier must undoubtedly share with Comte the honours of the century in French Philosophy. Many influences, however, prevented the general or speedy acceptance of Renouvier’s doctrines. The University was closed against him, as against Comte. He worked in isolation and his style of presentation, which is heavy and laborious, does not appeal to the esprit of the French mind. Probably, too, his countrymen’s ignorance of Kant at the time Renouvier wrote his Essais de Critique générale prevented an understanding and appreciation of the neo-critical advance on Criticism.
Renouvier commands respect, but he does not appear to be in the line of development which manifests so essentially the character of French thought. This is to be found rather in that spiritualism, which, unlike the old, does not exclude science, but welcomes it, finds a place for it, although not by any means an exclusive place. The new spiritualists did not draw their inspiration, as did Cousin, from any German source, their initial impulse is derived from a purely French thinker, Maine de Biran, who, long neglected, came to recognition in the work of Ravaisson and those subsequent thinkers of this group, right up to Bergson.
This current of thought is marked by a vitality and a concreteness which are a striking contrast to the older eclectic spiritualism. Having submitted itself to the discipline of the sciences, it is acquainted with their methods and data in a manner which enables it to oppose the dogmatism of science, and to acclaim the reality of values other than those which are purely scientific. Ignoring a priori construction, or eclectic applications of doctrines, it investigates the outer world of nature and the inner life of the spirit.
We have said that these ideas are presented, not merely from a national standpoint, but from one which is deeply human and universal. “La Science,” re-marked Pasteur, “n’a pas de patrie.” We may add that philosophy, too, owns no special fatherland. There is not in philosophy, any more than in religion, “a chosen people,” even although the Jews of old thought themselves such, and among moderns the Germans have had this conceit about their Kultur. In so far as philosophy aims at the elucidation of a true view of the universe, it thereby tends inevitably to universality. But just as a conception of internationalism, which should fail to take into account the factors of nationality, would be futile and disastrous, so a conception of the evolution of thought must likewise estimate the characteristics which nationality produces even in the philosophical field.
Such characteristics, it will be found, are not definite doctrines, for these may be transferred, as are scientific discoveries, from one nation to another, and absorbed in such a manner that they become part of the general consciousness of mankind. They are rather differences of tone and colour, form or expression, which express the vital genius of the nation. There are features which serve to distinguish French philosophy from the development which has occurred in Germany, Italy, England and America.
Modern French thought does not deliberately profess to maintain allegiance to any past traditions, for it realises that such a procedure would be inconsistent with that freedom of thought which is bound up with the spirit of philosophy. It does, however, betray certain national features, which are characteristic of the great French thinkers from Descartes, Pascal and Malebranche onwards.
One of the most remarkable points about these thinkers was their intimacy with the sciences. Descartes, while founding modern philosophy, also gave the world analytic geometry; Pascal made certain physical discoveries and was an eminent mathematician. Malebranche, too, was keenly interested in science. In the following century the Encyclopaedists displayed their wealth of scientific knowledge, and in the nineteenth century we have seen the work of Comte based on science, the ability of Cournot and Renouvier in mathematics, while men like Boutroux, Hergson and Le Roy possess a thorough acquaintance with modern science.
These facts have marked results, and distinguish French philosophy from that of Germany, where the majority of philosophers appear to haye been theological students in their youth and to have suffered from the effects of their subject for the remainder of their lives. Theological study does not produce clearness; it does not tend to cultivate a spirit of precision, but rather one of vagueness, of which much German philosophy is the product. On the other hand, mathematics is a study which demands clearness and which in turn increases the spirit of clarity and precision.
There is to be seen in our period a strong tendency to adhere to this feature of clearness. Modern French philosophy is remarkably lucid. Indeed, it is claimed that there is no notion, however profound it may be, or however based on technical research it may be, which cannot be conveyed in the language of every day. French philosophy does not invent a highly technical vocabulary in order to give itself airs in the eyes of the multitude, on the plea that obscurity is a sign of erudition and learning. On the contrary, it remembers Descartes’ intimate association of clearness with truth, remembers, too, his clear and simple French which he preferred to the scholastic Latin. It knows that to convince others of truth one must be at least clear to them and, what is equally important, one must be clear in one’s own mind first. Clarity does not mean shallowness but rather the reverse, because it is due to keen perceptive power, to a seeing further into the heart of things, involving an intimate contact with reality.
French thought has always remained true to a certain “common sense.” This is a dangerous and ambiguous term. In its true meaning it signifies the general and sane mind of man free from all that prejudice or dogma or tradition, upon which, of course, “common sense” in the popular meaning is usually based. A genuine “common sense” is merely “liberté” for the operation of that general reason which makes man what he is. It must be admitted that, owing to the fact that philosophy is taught in the lycées, the French are the best educated of any nation in philosophical ideas and have a finer general sense of that spirit of criticism and appreciation which is the essence of philosophy, than has any other modern nation. Philosophy in France is not written in order to appeal to any school or class. Not limited to an academic circle only, it makes its pronouncements to humanity and thus embodies in a real form the principles of egalité and fraternité. It makes a democratic appeal both by its clarté and its belief that la raison commune is in some degree present in every human being.
Not only was clearness a strong point in the philosophy of Descartes, but there was also an insistence upon method. Since the time of his famous Discours de la Méthode there has always been a unique value placed upon method in French thought, and this again serves to distinguish it profoundly from German philosophy, which is, in general, concerned with the conception and production of entire systems. The idea of an individual and systematic construction is an ambitious conceit which is not in harmony with the principles of liberté, egalité, fraternité. Such a view of philosophical work is not a sociable one, from a human standpoint, and tends to give rise to a spirit of authority and tradition. Apart from this aspect of it, there is a more important consideration. All those systems take one idea as their starting-point and build up an immense construction a priori. But another idea may be taken and opposed to that. There is thus an immense wastage of labour, and the individual effort is never transcended. Yet an idea is only a portion of our intelligence, and that intelligence itself is, in turn, only a portion of reality. A wider conception of philosophy must be aimed at, one in which the vue d’ensemble is not the effort of one mind, but of many, each contributing its share to a harmonious conception, systematic in a sense, but not in the German sense. Modern French thought has a dislike of system of the individualistic type; it realises that reality is too rich and complex for such a rapid construction to grasp it. It is opposed to systems, for the French mind looks upon philosophy as a manifestation of life itself—life blossoming to self-consciousness, striving ever to unfold itself more explicitly and more clearly, endeavouring to become more harmonious, more beautiful, and more noble. The real victories of philosophical thought are not indicated by the production of systems but by the discovery or creation of ideas. Often these ideas have been single and simple, but they have become veritable forces, in the life of mankind.
French thinkers prefer to work collectively at particular problems rather than at systems. Hence the aim and tone of their work is more universal and human, and being more general is apt to be more generous. This again is the expression of liberte, égalité and fraternité in a true sense. The French prefer, as it were, in their philosophical campaign for the intellectual conquest of reality diverse batteries of soixante-quinze acting with precision and alertness to the clumsy production of a “Big Bertha.” The production of ambitious systems, each professing to be the final word in the presentation of reality, has not attracted the French spirit. It looks at reality differently and prefers to deal with problems in a clear way, thereby indicating a method which may be applied to the solution of others as they present themselves. This is infinitely preferable to an ambitious unification, which can only be obtained at the sacrifice of clearness or meaning, and it arises from that keen contact with life, which keeps the mind from dwelling too much in the slough of abstraction, from which some of the German philosophers never succeed in escaping. Their pilgrimage to the Celestial City ends there, and consequently the account of their itinerary cannot be of much use to other pilgrims.
Another feature of modern French thought is the intimacy of the connection between psychology and metaphysics, and the intensive interest in psychology, which is but the imestigation of the inner life of man. While in the early beginnings of ancient Greek philosophy some time was spent in examining the outer world before man gave his attention to the world within, we find Descartes, at the beginning of modern philosophy, making his own consciousness of his own existence his starting-point. Introspection has always played a prominent part in French philosophy. Pascal was equally interested in the outer and the inner world. Through Maine de Biran this feature has come down to the new spiritualists and culminates in Bergson’s thought, in which psychological considerations hold first rank.
The social feature of modern French thought should not be omitted. In Germany subsequent thought has been coloured by the Reformation and the particular aspects of that movement. In France one may well say that subsequent thought has been marked by the Revolution. There is a theological flavour about most German philosophy, while France, a seething centre of political and social thought, has given to her philosophy a more sociological trend.
The French spirit in philosophy stands for clearness, concreteness and vitality. Consequently it presents a far greater brilliance, richness and variety than German philosophy displays.[[1]] This vitality and even exuberance, which are those of the spirit of youth manifesting a joie de vivre or an élan vital, have been very strongly marked since the year 1880, and have placed French philosophy in the van of human thought.
[1] It is, therefore to be lamented that French thought has not received the attention which it deseives. In England far more attention has been given to the nineteenth-century German philosophy, while the history of thought in France, especially in the period between Comte and Bergson, has remained in sad neglect. This can and should be speedily remedied.
It would be vain to ask whither its advance will lead. Even its own principles prevent any such forecast; its creative richness may blossom forth to-morrow in forms entirely new, for such is the characteristic of life itself, especially the life of the spirit, upon which so much stress is laid in modern French philosophy. The New Idealism lays great stress upon dynamism, voluntarism or action. Freedom and creative activity are its keynotes, and life, ever fuller and richer, is its aspiration. La Vie, of which France (and its centre, Paris) is such an expression, finds formulation in the philosophy of contemporary thinkers.[[2]]
[2] The student of comparative thought will find it both interesting and profitable to compare the work done recently in Italy by Croce and Gentile. The intellectual kinship of Croce and Bergson has frequently been pointed out, but Gentile’s work comes very close to the philosophy of action and to the whole positive-idealistic tendency of contemporary French thought. This is particularly to be seen in L’atto del pensare come atto puro (1912), and in Teoria generalo dello spirito come atto puro (1916). Professor Carr, the well-known exponent of Bergson’s philosophy, remarks in his introduction to the English edition of Gentile’s book, “We may individualise the mind as a natural thing-object person. . . . Yet our power to think the mind in this way would be impossible were not the mind with and by which we think it, itself not a thing, not a fact, but act; . . . never factum, but always fieri.” This quotation is from p. xv of the Theory of Mind as Pure Act. With one other quotation direct from Gentile we must close this reference to Italian neo-idealism. “In so far as the subject is constituted a subject by its own act it constitutes the object. . . . Mind is the transcendental activity productive of the objective world of experience” (pp. 18, 43). Compare with this our quotation from Ravaisson, given on p. 75 of this work, and the statement by Lachelier on p. 122, both essential principles of the French New Idealism.
One word of warning must be uttered against those who declare that the tendency of French thought is in the direction of anti-intellectualism. Such a declaration rests on a misunderstanding, which we have endeavoured in our pages to disclose It is based essentially upon a doctrine of Reason which belongs to the eighteenth century. The severe rationalism of that period was mischievous in that it rested upon a one-sided view of human nature, on a narrow interpretation of “Reason” which gave it only a logical and almost mathematical significance. To the Greeks, whom the French represent in the modern world, the term “NOUS” meant more than this—it meant an intelligible harmony. We would do wrong to look upon the most recent developments in France as being anti-rational, they are but a revolt against the narrow view of Reason, and they constitute an attempt to present to the modern world a conception akin to that of the Greeks. Human reason is much more than a purely logical faculty, and it is this endeavour to relate all problems to life itself with its pulsing throb, which represents the real attitude of the French mind. There is a realisation expressed throughout that thought, that life is more than logic. The clearness of geometry showed Descartes that geometry is not all-embracing. Pascal found that to the logic of geometry must be added a spirit of appreciation which is not logical in its nature, but expresses another side of man’s mind. To-day France sees that, although a philosophy must endeavour to satisfy the human intelligence, a merely intellectual satisfaction is not enough. The will and the feelings play their part, and it was the gteat fault of the eighteenth century to misunderstand this The search to-day is for a system of values and of truth in action as well as a doctrine about things in their purely theoretical aspects.
This is a serious demand, and it is one which philosophy must endeavour to appreciate Salvation will not be found in a mere dilettantism which can only express ieal indifference, nor in a dogmatism which results in bigotry and pride. Criticism is required, but not a purely destructive criticism, rather one which will offer some acceptable view of the universe. Such a view must combine true positivism or realism with a true idealism, by uniting fact and spirit, things and ideas. Its achievement can only be possible to minds possessing some creative and constructive power, yet minds who have been schooled in the college of reality. This is the task of philosophy in France and in other lands. That task consists not only in finding values and in defining them but in expressing them actively, and in endeavouring to realise them in the common life.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. Works of the Period classified under Authors. (The more important monographs are cited.) Names of philosophical journals.
II. Books on the Period.
III. Comparative Table showing contemporary German and Anglo-American Works from 1851 to 1921.
I
WORKS OF THE PERIOD CLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORS.
| BERGSON: |
Les Données immédiates de la Conscience. 1889. English Translation—Time and Free-Will. 1910. Matière et Mémoire. 1896. (E.T.[[1]] 1911.) Le Rire. 1901. (E.T. 1911.) Introduction a la Métaphysique. 1903. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. (E.T. 1913.) L’Evolution créatrice. 1907. (E.T. 1911.) L’Energie spirituelle. 1919. (E.T. 1920.) Some monographs on Bergson: Le Roy (1912), Maritain (1914) in France, Meckauer (1917) in Germany, and for the English reader Lindsay (1911), Stewart (1911), Carr (1912), Cunningham (1916), and Gunn (1920). |
| BERNARD: | Introduction a l’Etude de la Médecine expérimental. 1865. |
| BERTHELOT: | Science et Philosophie. 1886. |
| BINET: |
Magnétisme animal. 1886. Les Altérations de la Personnalité. 1892. L’Introduction à la Psychologie expérimental. 1894. (Founded the Année psychologique in 1895.) |
| BLONDEL: |
L’Action, Essai d’une Critique de la Vie et d’une Science de la Pratique. 1893. Histoire et Dogme. 1904. |
| BOIRAC: | L’Idée du Phénomène. 1894. |
| BOIS: | De la Connaissance religieuse. 1894. |
| BOURGEOIS: | Solidarité. 1896. |
| BOUTROUX (EMILE): |
De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature 1874. (E.T. 1916.) De l’Idée de Loi naturelle dans la Science et la Philosophie contemporaines. 1895. (E.T. 1914.) Questions de Morale et d’Education. 1895. (E.T. 1913.) De l’Influence de la Philosophie écossaise sur la Philosophie française. 1897. La Science et la Religion dans la Philosophie contemporaine. 1908. (E.T. 1909.) Rapport sur la Philosophie en France depuis 1867. Paper read to Third Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg in 1908. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. Nov., 1908. Etudes d’Histoire de la Philosophie. (E.T. 1912.) The Beyond that is Within. E.T. 1912. (Addresses.) |
| BROCHARD: |
De la Responsabilité morale. 1874. De l’Universalité des Notions morales. 1876. De L’Erreur. 1879. |
| BRUNSCHWICG: |
La Modalité du jugement. 1897. La Vie de l’Esprit. 1900. Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathématique. 1912. |
| BUREAU: | La Crise morale des Temps nouveau. 1907. |
| CARO: |
Le Matérialisme et la Science. 1868. Problèmes de Morale sociale. 1876. |
| COMTE: |
Cours de Philosophie positive. 6 vols. 1830-42. Discours sur l’Esprit positive. 1844. Système de Politique positive. 4 vols. 1851-4. Catéchisme positiviste. Synthèse subjective (vol. i.). 1856. Note.—The Free and Condensed Translation of Comte’s Positive Philosophy in English by Miss Martineau, appeared in two volumes in 1853. Monograph by Lévy-Bruhl. |
| COURNOT: |
Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique philosophique (2 vols.). 1851. Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales dans les Sciences et dans l’Histoire (2 vols.). 1861. Considérations sur la Marche des Idées et des Evénements dans les Temps modernes (2 vols.). 1872. Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisine: Etude sur l’Emploi des Données de la Science en Philosophie. 1875. Note.—A number of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale was devoted to Cournot in 1905. See also the Monograph by Bottinelli and his Souvenirs de Cournot. 1913. |
| COUTURAT: |
De l’Infini mathématique. Les Principes des Mathématiques. |
| CRESSON: | Le Malaise de la pensée philosophique contemporaine. 1905. |
| DAURIAC: |
Croyance et Realité. 1889. Motions de Matière et de Force. 1878. |
| DELBOS: | L’Esprit philosophique de l’Allemagne et la Pensée française. 1915. |
| DUHEM: | La Théorie physique. 1906. |
| DUNAN: | Les deux Idéalismes. 1911. |
| DURKHEIM: |
De la Division du Travail social. 1893. Les Regles de la Méthode sociologique. 1894. Le Suicide. 1897. Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse. 1912. (E. T.) |
| ESPINAS: | Societés animales. 1876. |
| EVELLlN: | La Raison pure et les Antinomies. 1907. |
| FONSEGRIVE: | Morale et Société. 1907. |
| FOUILLÉE: |
La Philosophie de Platon 2 vols. 1869. Prize for competition in 1867, on the. Theory of Ideas, offered by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. “Crowned” after publication by the Académie française. 1871. Second Edition, revised, and enlarged to four volumes. 1888-9. La Liberté et le Determinisme. 1872. (Doctorate Thesis) La Philosophie de Socrate. 2 vols 1874. Prize in 1868, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. Histoire générale de la Philosophie. 1875. New Edition revised and augmented, 1910. Extraits des grands Philosophes. 1877. L’Idée moderne du Droit en Allemagne, en Ingleterre et en France. 1878. La Science sociale contemporaine. 1880. Critique des Systèmes contemporains. 1883. La Propriété sociale et la Démocratie. 1884. L’Avenir de la Métaphysique fondée sur l’Expérience. 1889. L’Evolutionisme des Idées-forces. 1890. L’Enseignement au Point de Vue national. 1891 (E. T. 1892.) La Psychologie des Idées-forces. 2 vols. 1893. Tempérament et Caractère selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races. 1895. Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive. 1895. Le Mouvement positiviste et la Conception sociologique du Monde. 1896. Psychologie du Peuple français. 1898. Les Etudes classiques et la Démocratie. 1898. La France au Point de Vue moral. 1900. La Reforme de l’Enseignement par la Philosophie. 1901. La Conception morale et civique de L’Enseignement. Nietzsche et l’Immoralisme. 1904. Esquisse psychologique des Peuples européens. 1903. Le Moralisme de Kant et l’Amoralisme contemporain. 1905. Les Elements sociologiques de la Morale. 1905. La Morale des Idées-forces. 1907. Le Socialisme et la Sociologie réformiste. 1909. La Démocratie politique et sociale en France. 1911. La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intéllectualistes. 1912. Posthumous: Esquisse d’une Interprétation du Monde. Humanitaires et Libertaires. 1914. Equivalents philosophiques des Religions. On Fouillée, monograph by Augustin Guyau, son of J. M. Guyau. |
| GOBLOT: | Traité de Logique. 1918. |
| GOURD: |
Le Phénomène. 1888. La Philosophie de la Religion. 1911. |
| GUYAU: |
La Morale d’Epicure et ses Rapports avec les Doctrines contemporaines. 1878. “Crowned” four years before by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. La Morale anglaise contemporaine. 1879. An extension of the Prize Essay (Second Part). Vers d’un Philosophe. 1881. Problèmes de l’Esthétique contemporaine. 1884. Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction. 1885. (E.T. 1898.) L’Irréligion de l’Avenir. 1887. (E.T. 1897.) Posthumous: Education et Hérédité. (E.T. 1891.) L’Art au Point de Vue sociologique. La Genèse de l’Idée de Temps. 1890. There is a monograph on Guyau by Fouillée. |
| HAMELIN: | Essai sur les Eléments principaux de la Représentation. 1907. |
| HANNEQUIN: | Essai critique sur l’Hypothèse des Atomes. 1896. |
| IZOULET: | La Cité moderne. 1894. |
| JANET (PAUL): |
La Famille. 1855. Histoire de la Philosophie morale et politique dans L’Antiquité et dans les Temps modernes. 2 vols. 1858. Republished as Histoire de la Science politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale. 1872. La Philosophie du Bonheur. 1862. La Crise philosophique. 1865. Le Cerveau et la Pensée. 1867. Eléments de Morale. 1869. Les Problèmes du XIXe Siècle. 1872. La Morale. 1874 (E T. 1884.) Philosophie de la Révolution française. 1875. Les Causes finales. 1876. (E.T. 1878.) |
| JANET (PIERRE): |
L’Automatisme psychologique. 1889 L’Etat mental des Hystériques. 1894. Névroses et Idées-fixes. 1898. (Janet founded the Journal de Psychologie. 1904). |
| JAVARY: | L’Idée du Progrès. 1850. |
| LABERTHONNIÈRE. |
Le Dogmatisme morale. 1898. Essais de Philosophie religieuse. 1901. Le Réalisme chrétien et l’Idéalisme grec. |
| LACHELIER: |
Du Fondement de l’Induction. 1871. Psychologie et Métaphysique. 1885. Article in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, now published with the above. Etude sur le Syllogisme. 1907. Monograph by Séailles, article by Noël. |
| LACOMBE: | De l’Histoire considérée comme Science. 1894. |
| LALANDE: |
La Dissolution opposée à l’Evolution, dans les Sciences physiques et morales. 1899. Précis raisonné de Morale pratique par Questions et Réponses. 1907. |
| LAPIE: | Logique de la Volonté. 1902. |
| LE BON: |
Lois psychologiques de l’Evolution des Peuples. Les Opinions et les Croyances. 1911. Psychologie du Socialisme. 1899. Psychologie des Foules. (E.T.) La Vie des Vérités. 1914. |
| LEQUIER: | La Recherche d’une Première Vérité (Fragments posthumes). 1865. |
| LE ROY: | Dogme et Critique. 1907. |
| LIARD: |
Des Définitions géometriques et des Définitions empiriques. 1873. La Science positive et la Métaphysique. 1879. Morale et Enseignement civique. 1883. L’Enseignement supérieure en France, 1789 à 1889. 1889. |
| LOISY: | L’Evangile et l’Eglise. (E.T.) |
| MARION: | La Solidarité morale. 1880. |
| MÉNÉGOZ: | Publications diverses sur le Fidéisme et son Application à l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel. 1900. Two additional volumes later. |
| MEYERSON: | Identité et Réalité. 1907 |
| MICHELET: |
L’Amour. 1858 Le Prêtre la Femme et la Famille. 1859. La Bible de l’Humanité. 1864 |
| MILHAUD: |
Essai sur les Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude logique. 1894 Le Rationnel. 1898. |
| OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: |
La Certitude morale. 1880. Le Prix de la Vie. 1885 La Philosophie et le Temps présent. 1895. La Raison et le Rationalisme. 1906. |
| PARODI: | Le Problème morale et la Pensée contemporaine. 1910. |
| PASTEUR: | Le Budget de la Science. 1868 |
| PAULHAN: |
Phénomènes affectifs. L’Activité mentale. 1889 |
| PAYOT: | La Croyance. 1896. |
| PELLETAN: | Profession da Foi du XIXe Siècle. 1852. |
| POINCAIRÉ: |
La Science et l’Hypothèse. 1902. (E.T. 1905.) La Valeur de la Science. 1905. Science et Méthode. 1909 Dernières pensées. |
| PROUDHON: |
Qu’est-ce que la Propriété? 1840 Système des Contradictions économiques. 1846 La Philosophie du Progrès. 1851. De la Justice. 1858. |
| RAUH: |
Psychologie appliquée à la Morale et à l’Education. De la Méthode dans la Psychologie des Sentiments. Essai sur le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale. 1890. L’Expérience morale. 1903. |
| RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN (1813-1900): |
Habitude. 1838. (Thesis.) Reprinted 1894 in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. Aristote. 1837. Vol. I. Vol. II. in 1846. Development of work crowned by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques in 1833, when the author was twenty. Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle. 1867. La Philosophie de Pascal (Revue des Deux Mondes. 1887) L’Education (Revue bleue. 1887). Métaphysique et Morale (Revue des Deux Mondes. 1893). Le Testament philosophique (Revue des Deux Mondes. 1901). Cf. Boutroux on Ravaisson (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1900). Bergson : Discours à l’Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. 1904. |
| RENAN: |
Averroès et l’Averroisme. 1852. Etudes d’Histoire religieuse. 1857. Essais de Morale et de Critique. 1851). Les Origines du Christianisme. 1863-83. 8 vols., of which: Vie de Jésus. 1863. (E.T.) Questions contemporaines. 1868. La Réforme intellectual et morale. 1871. Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques. 1870. (E.T. 1883.) Drames philosophiques. Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse. 1883. (E.T. 1883.) Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoire religieuse. 1884. (E.T. 1886.) Histoire du Peuple d’Israël. 5 vols. 1887-04. (E.T. 1888-91. 3 vols.) L’Avenir de la Science. 1890. Written 1848-9. (E.T.) Feuilles détachées. 1802. For monographs on Renan: Allier: La Philosophie de Renan. 1895. Monod: Renan, Taine, Michelet. 1894. Séailles: Renan. 1894*. |
| RENOUVIER: |
Manuel de Philosophie moderne. 1842. Manuel de Philosophie ancienne. 1844. Manuel républicaine de l’Homme et du Citoyen. 1848. Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la République. 1851. Essais de Critique générale. 4 vols. 1854, 1859, 1864, 1864. (On revision these four became thirteen vols.) La Science de la Morale. 2 vols. 1869. 1er Essai, revised: Traité de Logique général et de Logique formelle. 3 vols. 1875. 2e Essai, revised: Traité de Psychologie rationnelle. 3 vols. 1875. Uchronie (L’Utopie dans l’Histoire), Esquisse historique du Développement de la Civilisation européenne, tel qu’il n’a pas été, tel qu’il aurait pu être. 1876. Petit Traité de Morale pour les Ecoles laïques. 1879. Esquisse d’une Classification systématique des Doctrines philosophiques. 2 vols. 1886. 3e Essai, revised: Les Principes de la Nature. 1892. Victor Hugo, le Poète. 1893. 4e Essai, revised: L’lntroduction à la Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire. 1896. 5e Essai, new: La Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire. 4 vols. I. and II. 1806. III. and IV. 1897. (This brought the Essais up to thirteen volumes.) La Nouvelle Monadologie. 1891). (With L. Prat.) (“Crowned” by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.) Victor Hugo, le Philosophe. 1900. Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure. 1901. Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques. 1901. Le Personnalisme, suivi d’une Etude sur la Perception externe et sur la Force 1903. Posthumous: Derniers entretiens. 1905. Doctrine de Kant. 1906. For his two journals, see under “Periodicals.” In the latest edition the complete Essais de Critique générale are only ten volumes, as follows: Logic, 2; Psychology, 2; Principles of Nature, 1; Introduction to Philosophy of History, 1; and the Philosophy of History, 4. The best monograph is that of Séailles, 1905. Renouvier’s Correspondence with the Swiss Philosopher, Sécretan, has been published; cf. also The Letters of William James. |
| REYNAUD: | Philosophie religieuse. 1858. (Third Edition.) |
| RIBOT: |
La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine. 1870. (E.T. 1873.) Hérédité, Etude psychologique. 1873. (E.T. 1875.) La Psychologie allemande contemporaine. 1879. (E.T. 1886.) Les Maladies de la Mémoire, Essai dans la Psychologie positive. 1881. (E.T. 1882.) Les Maladies de la Volonté. 1883. (E.T. 1884.) Les Maladies de la Personnalité. 1885. (E.T. 1895.) La Psychologie de l’Attention. 1889. (E.T. 1890.) La Psychologie des Sentiments. 1896. (E.T. 1897.) L’Evolution des Idées générales. 1897. (E.T. 1899.) Essai sur l’Imagination créatrice. 1900. La Logique des Sentiments. 1904. Essai sur les Passions. 1906. La Vie inconsciente et les Mouvements. |
| SABATIER (AUGUSTE): |
Esquisse d’une Philosophie de Religion d’après la Psychologie et l’Histoire. 1897. Les Religions d’Autorité et la Religion de l’Esprit. 1904. (E.T.) |
| SABATIER (PAUL): | A propos de la Séparation des Eglises de l’Etat. 1905. E.T., Robert Dell, 1906 (with Text of the Law). |
| SÉAILLES: | Affirmations de la Conscience moderne. 1903. |
| SIMON: |
La Liberté de Conscience. 1859. Dieu, Patrie, Liberté. 1883. |
| SOREL: |
Reflexions sur la Violence. 1907. (E.T 1916.) Illusions du Progrès. 1911. |
| TAINE: |
Les Philosophes français au XIXe Siecle. 1857. Essais de Critique et d’Histoire. 1858. Philosophie de l’Art. 2 vols. 1865. (E.T. 1865.) Nouveaux Essais de Critique et d’Histoire. 1865. De l’Intélligence. 2 vols. 1870. (E T. 1871.) The work Origines de la France contemporaine in 5 vols, 1876-93. Histoire de la Littérature anglaise. 5 vols. 1863. (E.T. by Van Laun. 1887.) Monographs: De Margerie: Taine. 1894. Monod: Renan, Taine, et Michelet. 1894. Barzellotti: La Philosophie de Taine. Boutmy: H. Taine. 1897. Giraud: Essai sur Taine. 1901. |
| TARDE: |
Criminalité comparée. 1898. Les Lois de l’Imitation. 1900. |
| VACHEROT: |
Histoire de l’Ecole d’Alexandrie. 1846-51. La Métaphysique et la Science. 3 vols. 1858. La Démocratie. 1860. Essais de Philosophie critique. 1864. La Religion. 1868. La Science et la Conscience. 1870. Le Nouveau Spiritualisme. 1884. Cf. Parodi on Vacherot, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1899. |
| WEBER: |
Le Rythme du Progrès. Vers le Positivisme absolu par l’Idéalisme. 1903. |
| WlLBOIS: | Devoir et Durée: Essai de Morale sociale. 1912. |
| XÉNOPOL: | Principes fondamentaux de l’Histoire. 1899. Revised and reissued in larger form in 1905 as La Théorie de l’Histoire. |
[1] This abbreviation is used throughout for “English Translation.”
PERIODICALS
“LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE,” of Renouvier and Pillon, 1872. to 1884, weekly; monthly from 1885 to 1889.
“LA CRITIQUE RELIGIEUSE,” 1878-1884 (quarterly). Renouvier.
“REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L’ÉTRANGER,” founded by Ribot in 1876.
“L’ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE.” 1867-1869. Renouvier and Pillon, refounded in 1890 by Pillon.
“REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE,” founded by Xavier Leon in 1893. “Crowned” by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, 1921.
“ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE,” founded by Beaunet and Binet, 1895.
“REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE,” founded by Peillaube, 1900.
“REVUE THOMISTE.”
“ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE.” Laberthonnière.
“ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE.” 1896-1912. Durkheim.
“JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE.” Founded 1904 by Janet and Dumas.
“BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE.” From 1901.
II
GENERAL BOOKS ON THE PERIOD.
| ALIOTTA: | The Idealistic Reaction against Science. (E.T. from Italian. 1914.) |
| BARTH: | Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. 1897. |
| BERGSON: | La Philosophie française. 1915. |
| BOUTROUX: |
Philosophie en France depuis 1867. Report to Congress of Philosophy given in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1908. La Philosophie: an Essay in the volume of collected Essays entitled: Un Demi-Siècle de la Civilisation française. 1870- 1915. Pp. 25-48. (Paris: Hachette. 1916.) |
| DWELSHAUVERS: | La Psychologie française contemporaine. 1920. |
| FAGUET: |
Dix-Neuvième Siècle. 1887. Politiques et Moralistes du XIXe Siècle. 1881. |
| FERRAZ: |
Etudes sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle. 3 vols. 1882-9. It is interesting to notice the triple division adopted by Ferraz: Socialism (under which heading he also groups Naturalism and Positivism). Traditionalism (Ultramontanism). Spiritualism (together with Liberalism). |
| FISCHER: | Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. 9 vols. |
| FOUILLÉE: |
Histoire de la Philosophie, Latest Edition, last Chapter. Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive. 1896. La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes. 1912. |
| HÖFFDING: | Modern Philosophers. (E.T. from Danish. 1915.) |
| LÉVY-BRUHL: | Modern Philosophy in France. Chicago, 1899. |
| MERZ: |
History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. 4 vols. A great work. Very comprehensive, particularly for German and British thought. |
| PARODI: |
La Philosophie contemporaine en France. 1919. An excellent treatment of the development from 1890 onwards by a French thinker. (“Crowned” by Académie.) |
| RAVAISSON: |
Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle. 1867. (Second Edition, 1889.) This has become an acknowledged classic. |
| RENOUVIER: |
Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire. (Vol. IV. latest sections.) 1897. |
| RUGGIERO: |
Modern Philosophy. 1912. (E.T. from Italian. 1921.) Gives a stimulating account of German, French, Anglo- American and Italian thought. |
| STEBBING: | Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. 1914. |
| TAINE: | Les Philosophes français du XIXe Siècle. 1857. |
| TURQUET-MILNES, G.: |
Some Modern French Writers: A Study in Bergsonism. 1921. Deals mainly with literary figures-e.g., Barres, Péguy, France, Bourget, Claudel. |
| VILLA: |
Contemporary Psychology. (E.T. from Italian. 1903.) L’Idealismo moderno. 1905. |
| WEBER: | Histoire de la Philosophie européenne. (Eighth Edition, 1914.) |
* * * * *
The article contributed by Ribot to Mind in 1877 is worthy of notice, while much light is thrown on the historical development by articles in the current periodicals cited on p. 338, especially in the Revue philosophique and the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.
IIII
COMPARATIVE TABLE
THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND AMERICA FROM 1851 TO 1921.
| FRANCE. | GERMANY. | ENGLAND AND AMERICA. | |||
| l851 | COURNOT: “Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances.” | 1851 | FECHNER: “Zend Avesta.” | 1851 | MANSEL: “Prolegomena to Logic.” |
| RENOUVIER: “Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale.” | |||||
| PROUDHON: “La Philosophie du Progrès.” | |||||
| 1852 | MOLESCHOTT: “Der Kreislauf des Lebens.” | ||||
| LOTZE: “Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele.” | |||||
| 1854 | RENOUVIER: “Essai de Critique générale”(Ier Essai). | 1854 | FERRIER: “Institutes of Metaphysic.” | ||
| COMTE completes “Systeme de Politique positive.” | |||||
| 1855 | BÜCHNER: “Kraft und Stoff.” | 1855 | BAIN: “The Senses and the Intellect.” | ||
| FECHNER: “Uber die physikalische und die philosophische Atomlehre.” | SPENCER: “Principles of Psychology.” | ||||
| CZOLBE: “Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus.” | |||||
| 1856 | COMTE: “Synthèse subjective,” vol. i. | 1856 | LOTZE: “Mikrokosmos” (1856-1864). | ||
| CZOLBE: “Die Enstehung des Selbstbewusstseins.” | |||||
| 1857 | TAINE: “Philosophes rançais du XIXe Siecle.” | 1857 | BUCKLE: “History of Civilization in England” (vol. i.). | ||
| RENAN: “Etudes d’Histoire religieuse.” | MANSEL: “The Limits of Religious Thought.” | ||||
| 1858 | VACHEROT: “La Métaphysique et la Science.” | 1858 | HAMILTON: “Lectures” (1858-1860). | ||
| 1859 | RENOUVIER: “Deuxième Essai de Critique generale.” | I859 | DARWIN: “Origin of Species.” | ||
| 1860 | FECHNER: “Elemente der Psychophysik.” | ||||
| 1861 | COURNOT: “Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idees.” | 1861 | FECHNER: “Uber die Seelenfrage.” | ||
| 1862 | HÄCKEL: “Generalle Morphologie” (1862-1866). | 1862 | SPENCER: “First Principles.” | ||
| 1863 | RENAN: “Vie de Jésus.” | 1863 | VOGT: “Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen.” | 1863 | MILL (J. S.): “Utilitarianism.” |
| FECHNER: “Die Drei Motive des Glaubens.” | |||||
| 1864 | RENOUVIER: “Troisième Essai de Critique générale”; “Quatrième Essai de Critique générale.” | ||||
| 1865 | BERNARD: “Introduction à l’Etude de la Médecine expérimentale.” | 1865 | DÜHRING: “Der Wert des Lebens.” | 1865 | HODGSON: “Time and Space.” |
| CZOLBE: “Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnis.” | MILL (J. S): “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.” | ||||
| HAMILTON: “Lectures on Metaphysics.” | |||||
| STIRLING: “Secret of Hegel.” | |||||
| 1866 | LANGE: “Geschichte des Materialismus.” | ||||
| 1867 | RAVAISSON: “Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siecle.” | 1867 | MARX: “Das Kapital.” | 1867 | BUCKLE: “History of Civilization in England” ( vol. ii.). |
| 1868 | RENAN: “Questions contemporaines.” | 1868 | LOTZE: “Geschichte der Asthetik in Deutschland.” | ||
| HÄCKEL: “Natürliche Schöpftungsgeschichte | |||||
| 1869 | RENOUVIER: “Science deU Morale.” | 1869 | HARTMANN: “Philosophic des Unbewussten.” | ||
| 1870 | TAINE: “De l’Intelligence.” | 1870 | RITSCHL: “Lehre von der Rechfertigung”(1870-1874). | ||
| 1871 | LACHELIER: “Du Fondement de l’Induction.” | ||||
| 1872 | FOUILLÉE: “La LibertcS et la Determinisme,” | 1872 | STRAUSS: “Der Alte und der neue Glaube.” | 1872 | MAURICE: “Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.” |
| JANET: “Problemes du XIXe Siecle.” | NIETZSCHE: “Die Geburt der Tragödie” | WALLACE: “Logic of Hegel.” | |||
| COURNOT: “Considerations sur la Marche des Idees.” | |||||
| 1873 | RIBOT: “IWredite.” 1873 | 1973 | SIGWART: “Logik” (1873-1878). 1873 | 1973 | STEPHEN (J. F.): “Liberty, Equality,Fraternity.” |
| 1874 | BOUTROUX: “La Contingence des Lois de la Nature.” | 1874 | LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Logik.” | 1874 | SIDGWICK: “Method of Ethics.” |
| WUNDT: “Physiologische Psychologie.” | |||||
| BRENTANO: “Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.” | |||||
| 1875 | COURNOT: “Materialisme, Vitalisme,Rationalisme.” | ||||
| RENOUVIER: Revises first and second “Essais.” | |||||
| 1876 | RENAN: “Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques.” | 1876 | FECHNER: “Vorschule der Asthetik.” | 1876 | BRADLEY: “Ethical Studies.” |
| JANET: “Les Causes finales.” | GROTE: “Moral Ideals.” | ||||
| 1877 | FLINT: “Theism.” | ||||
| 1878 | FOUILLEE: “L’Idee du Droit.” | 1878 | NIETZSCHE: “Menschliches Allzumenschhches “(1878-1880). | 1878 | HODGSON: “Philosophy of Reflection.” |
| 1879 | BROCHARD: “De l’Erreur.” | 1879 | LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Metaphysik.” | 1879 | SPENCER: “Data of Ethics.” |
| HARTMANN: “Phanomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins.” | BALFOUR: “Defence of Philosophic Doubt.” | ||||
| 1880 | AVENARIUS: “Kritik der reinen Erfahrung”(1880-1890) | 1880 | CAIRD: “Philosophy ol Religion.” | ||
| 1881 | GUYAU: “Vers d’un Philosophe.” | 1881 | NIETZSCHE: “Morgenrote.” | ||
| 1882 | NIETZSCHE: “Die frohliche Wissenschaft.” | 1882 | STEPHEN (L.): “Science of Ethics.” | ||
| 1883 | NIETZSCHE: “Also sprach Zarathustra”(1883-1891) | 1883 | GREEN: “Prolegomena to Ethics.” | ||
| DUHRING: “Der Ersatz der Religion.” | BRADLEY: “Principles of Logic.” | ||||
| WUNDT: “Logik.” | |||||
| MACH: “Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung.” | |||||
| 1885 | GUYAU: “Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction.” | 1885 | MARTINEAU: “Types o. Ethical Theory.” | ||
| LACHELIER: “Psychologic et Métaphysique.” | BOSANQUET: “Knowledge and Reality.” | ||||
| 1886 | GUYAU: “L’Irreligion de l’Avenir.” | 1886 | MACH: “Analyse der Empfindungen.” | 1886 | WARD: “Psychology” (article). |
| WUNDT: “Ethik.” | |||||
| NIETZSCHE: “Jenseits von Gut und Böse.” | |||||
| 1887 | NIETZSCHE: “Zur Genealogie der Moral.” | 1887 | SETH (Pringle-Pattison): “Hegelianism and Personality.” | ||
| 1888 | EUCKEN: “Die Einheit des Geisteslebens.” | 1888 | BOSANQUKT: “Logic.” | ||
| 1889 | BERGSON: “Les Donnees immediates de la Conscience.” | 1889 | WUNDT: “System der Philosophie.” | 1889 | MARTINEAU: “Study of Religion.” |
| FOUILLEE: “L’Avenir de la Metaphysique.” | LIPPS: “Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens.” | ALEXANDER: “Moral Order and Progress.” | |||
| JANET (Pierre): “L’Automatisme psychologique.” | |||||
| PAULHAN: “L’Activité mentale.” | |||||
| 1890 | RENAN: “L’Avenir de la Science.” | 1890 | JAMES: “Principles of Psychology.” | ||
| FOUILLÉE: “L’Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces.” | |||||
| RAUH: “Le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale” | |||||
| 1891 | SIMMEL: “Moralwissenschaft.” | ||||
| AVENARIUS: “Der menschliche Weltbegriff.” | |||||
| 1892 | RENOUVIER Revises third “Essai.” | 1892 | PEARSON: “Grammar Of Science.” | ||
| RENAN “Feuilles détachées.” | |||||
| 1893 | DURKHEIM: “De la Division du Travail social.” | 1893 | HUXLEY: “Evolution and Ethics.” | ||
| BLONDEL: “L’Action.” | CAIRD: “Evolution of Religion” | ||||
| FOUILLÉE: “Psychologie des Idées-forces.” | BRADLEY: “Appearance and Reality.” | ||||
| 1894 | MEINONG: “Werththeorie” (Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen). | 1894 | FRASER: “Philosophy of Theism” | ||
| HERTZ: “Prinzipien der Mechanik.” | |||||
| 1895 | FOUILLÉE: “Le Mouvement idéaliste.” | 1895 | BALFOUR: “Foundations of Belief.” | ||
| 1896 | BERGSON: “Matière et Mémoire” | 1896 | EUCKEN: “Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt.” | 1896 | STOUT: “Analytic Psychology.” |
| RENOUVIER: Revises fourth “Essai.” | HOBHOUSE: “Theory of Knowledge.” | ||||
| RENOUVIER: Publishes fifth “Essai” (La Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire), vols. 1 and 2. | MERZ: “History of Thought in the Nineteenth Century” (1896-1914). | ||||
| MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Dialectic.” | |||||
| 1897 | RENOUVIER: Ditto, vols. 3 and 4. | 1897 | HARTMANN: “Kategorienlehre.” | 1897 | JAMES: “The Will to Believe |
| SABATIER: “Esquisse d’une Philosophie de Religion.” | DREWS: “Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.” | ||||
| EHRENFELS: “System der Werttheorie” (1897-1898). | |||||
| 1898 | WALLACE: “Natural Theology and Ethics.” | ||||
| 1899 | RENOUVIER (and Prat): “La Nouvelle Monadologie.” | 1899 | MEINONG: “Uber gegenstände höheren Ordnung.” | 1899 | WARD: “Naturalism and Agnosticism.” |
| BOSANQUET: “Philosophical Theory of the State.” | |||||
| HODGSON: “Metaphysic of Experience.” | |||||
| 1900 | TARDE: “Les Lois de l’Imitation.” | 1900 | PETZOLDT: “Die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung.” | 1900 | ROYCE: “The World and the Individual.” |
| BRUNSCHWICG: “La Vie de l’Esprit.” | |||||
| 1901 | EUCKEN: “Das Wesen der Religion.” | ||||
| EUCKEN: “Das Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion.” | |||||
| 1902 | POINCARÉ | 1902 | COHEN: “System der Philosophie: Logik.” | 1902 | JAMES: “Varieties of Religious Experience.” |
| CLIFFORD: “Essays and Lectures.” | |||||
| 1903 | WEBER: “Vers le Positivisme absolu par l’Idéalisme.” | 1903 | BERGMANN: “System des objectiven Idealismus.” | 1903 | RUSSELL: “Principles of Mathematics.” |
| RAUH: “L’Expérience morale.” | SCHILLER: “Humanism.” | ||||
| RENOUVIER: “Le Personnalisme.” | |||||
| 1904 | COHEN: “System der Philosophie: Ethik.” | 1904 | MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Cosmology.” | ||
| 1905 | POINCARÉ: “Valeur de la Science.” | 1905 | MACH: Erkenntnis und Irrtum.” | ||
| 1906 | OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: “La Raison et le Rationalisme.” | 1906 | MEINONG: “Die Stellung der Gegenstandtheorie ein System der Wissenschaften.” | 1906 | BAILLIE: “Idealistic Construction of Experience.” |
| DUHEM: “La Théorie physique.” | BALDWIN: “Thought and Things.” | ||||
| 1907 | HAMELIN: “Les Eléments principaux de la Répresentation.” | 1907 | EUCKEN: “Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensauschauung.” | 1907 | SCHILLER: “Studies in Humanism.” |
| BERGSON: “L’Evolution créatrice.” | EUCKEN: “Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie.” | ||||
| EVELLIN: “La Raison pure et les Antinomies.” | |||||
| LALANDEL “Précis de Morale.” | |||||
| FOUILLÉE: “Morale des Idées-forces.” | |||||
| 1908 | BOUTROUX: “Science et Religion.” | 1908 | EUCKEN: “Sinn und Wertdes Lebens.” | ||
| EUCKEN: “Philosophie des Geisteslebens.” | |||||
| MÜNSTERBERG: “Philosophie der Werte.” | |||||
| 1909 | POINCARÉ: “Science et Méthode.” | 1909 | DEWEY: “Logical Theory.” | ||
| 1910 | REMKHE: “Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft” | ||||
| 1911 | DUNAN: “Les Deux Idéalismes.” | 1911 | EUCKEN: “Konnen wir noch Christen sein?” | 1911 | WARD: “Realm of Ends.” |
| 1912 | FOUILLÉE: “La Pensée.” | 1912 | COHEN: “System der Philosophie: Æsthetik.” | 1912 | BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the Individual” |
| DURKHEIM: “Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse.” | EUCKEN: “Erkennen und Leben.” | ||||
| 1913 | BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the Individual.” | ||||
| 1914 | FOUILLÉE: “Humanitaires et Libertaires.” | ||||
| 1915 | SORLEY: “Moral Values and the Idea of God.” | ||||
| 1917 | LOISY: “La Religion.” | ||||
| 1918 | GOBLOT: “Traité de Logique.” | ||||
| 1919 | BERGSON: “L’Energie spirituelle.” | ||||
| 1920 | ALEXANDER: “Space, Time and Deity.” | ||||
| 1921 | RUSSELL: “Analysis of Mind.” | ||||
| MACTAGGART: “Nature of Existence.” |