England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF ’48.

Whilst France and England had been quarrelling over the Spanish marriages, events of greater importance had been taking place in Central Europe. The Polish nationalists had planned an insurrection which was to break out simultaneously in Prussian and Austrian Poland. At Posen, the authorities obtained early intelligence of the projected rising, and were enabled to suppress it without difficulty. But in Gallicia, in February, 1846, the Austrian military commander was suddenly called upon to deal with a formidable rebellion. Colonel Benedek,[883] however, by allowing the Polish peasants to wreak their hatred upon their landlords, succeeded in dividing the forces opposed to him and in subduing one revolution by another. The free town of Cracow was the scene of severe fighting, and, after the defeat of the insurgents, was occupied by Russian troops. The measure was to be merely temporary, and the town, it was announced, would be evacuated, directly order should be restored. But, when it was evident that the Spanish marriage question had hopelessly divided France and England, the Northern Courts adopted a different attitude. On November 15, 1846, the Austrian, the Prussian and the Russian ministers in London informed Palmerston that the independent existence of Cracow was incompatible with the public tranquillity of Europe, and that, in consequence, it had been decided that the Republic should, in the future, form part of the Austrian Empire.[884] A similar communication was, at the same time, made to the French government. The Republic of Cracow having been constituted by a treaty between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on May 3, 1815, these three Powers maintained that they had a right to undo what they had done, without consultation with the other Powers which were parties to the general settlement of 1815.[885] Both France and England at once entered a formal protest. M. Guizot, having attained his object in Spain, was now bent upon re-establishing “the cordial understanding,” and would gladly have made a joint representation to the three Powers with great Britain.[886] But his hope that the annexation of Cracow would prove the means of reuniting France and England was not realized. Palmerston contented himself with directing Normanby to furnish the French government with a copy of the remonstrance which he addressed to the Court of Vienna.[887]

Metternich was not disturbed by these representations. It was out of the power of England to enforce her views, and Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were careful at once to reassure him about their veritable intentions. Public indignation had been aroused in France by the extinction of the little republic and, under the circumstances, it had been necessary to protest officially. But let the Chancellor understand, Louis Philippe informed the Austrian ambassador, that the remonstrance which M. de Flahaut had been instructed to make at Vienna was “merely talk which could hurt no one.”[888] Metternich, however, although he was thus speedily relieved from all anxiety as to the attitude which the western Powers purposed to adopt towards his proceedings in Gallicia, had much cause for uneasiness in other directions. Germany was seething with discontent, and the King of Prussia, by deciding to summon the combined Estates, was evincing a regrettable disposition to acquiesce in the popular demand for a greater measure of political rights. In Italy affairs presented a yet more alarming appearance. For the past fourteen years the Peninsula had been outwardly at peace. But Metternich’s vigilance had not been lulled to sleep by this seeming acquiescence in existing conditions. A movement, he was well aware, was in progress infinitely more dangerous than the local insurrections planned in the secrecy of the Carbonari lodges. Mazzini, by means of his society of Young Italy, and Gioberti, d’Azeglio and Balbo, by their writings, were teaching the people to dream of independence and of national unity. Hitherto Metternich, in his policy of repression, had always been able to count upon the whole-hearted support of the different Italian governments. But now the Sovereign of the most important State in the Peninsula was strongly suspected of encouraging the propagation of these new doctrines.

Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, had, as the Prince of Carignano, displayed Liberal tendencies. In the Piedmontese rebellion of 1821 his conduct had been equivocal, but, since his accession, in 1831, he had shown a firm determination to uphold the absolutist traditions of his House. Nevertheless, he now permitted both d’Azeglio and Balbo to reside unmolested within his dominions and, in spite of Metternich’s remonstrances, his police scarcely interfered with the free circulation of their subversive writings. In the summer of 1846, it was already apparent that the relations between the Courts of Turin and of Vienna were no longer upon their former friendly footing. Ostensibly a question of tariff was the only cause of dispute. In reality, however, it was Charles Albert’s increasing sympathy with the Italian national movement which was the reason of the prohibitive duty, placed by Metternich, upon the wines of Piedmont.[889] Matters were in this state when, on June 1, 1846, the Pope, Gregory XVI., died. Fifteen days later, Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, Archbishop of Imola, was elected to succeed him, and assumed the title of Pius IX.

The condition of the Papal States was deplorable. The finances were in disorder, and the government depended for its existence upon the protection of Austria and upon the presence of its Swiss auxiliary troops. The new Pope, it was hoped, would consent to the introduction of certain necessary measures of reform. The expectation that Pius IX. would not pursue the reactionary policy of his predecessor proved well founded.[890] On July 16, 1846, a month after his election, His Holiness proclaimed a general amnesty for political offences. The educated classes had eagerly absorbed the doctrines of Balbo, d’Azeglio, and Gioberti, and the Liberal tendencies manifested by the new Pope aroused an immense enthusiasm. Nor was his popularity confined to his own dominions. The quiet and unpretending priest suddenly found himself magnified into a national hero. Patriots, who had begun to look to Charles Albert as the future liberator of Italy, now placed all their hopes in Pius IX. It was not possible for him to withstand the enthusiasm which his concessions had called forth. In the spring of 1847, a modified liberty was granted to the press, and the formation of a Council of State, to be chosen by the Pope from elected provincial delegates, was decreed. Lastly, on July 5, the establishment of a civic guard was announced. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, fearful that invidious comparisons would be drawn between his methods of government and those of His Holiness, made haste to initiate similar reforms at Florence.[891]

In the opinion of Louis Philippe, the death of Gregory XVI. amounted to a public misfortune. A Liberal Pope could not but add materially to the political unrest which had suddenly affected the whole of Europe.[892] Nevertheless, neither he nor M. Guizot were as yet prepared to join with Austria in counselling the Papal government to resist the popular demand for reforms. France was at the time represented at Rome by a man of considerable ability and learning, Count Rossi, an Italian political exile and a naturalized Frenchman. In the first instance he was instructed to counsel the adoption of a strictly juste milieu policy.[893] The new Papal government should be based upon the principles of an enlightened conservatism. His Holiness would be well advised promptly to introduce certain much-needed reforms into his system of administration. Let him beware, however, of listening to those who would propose violent and ill-considered changes. Above all, let him avoid giving unnecessary offence to Austria.[894] But, after his quarrel with England over the Spanish marriages, M. Guizot decided to revise his Italian policy.

In every part of the world France and England were opposed to each other. M. Guizot’s own relations with Lord Normanby were very far from friendly. The public denial of the French minister that he had used certain words, imputed to him by the British ambassador, had been followed by a personal quarrel, which had only been arranged by the intervention of Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador.[895] At Madrid, the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced upon the young Queen were already apparent. Isabella was practically separated from her husband, and her relations with General Serrano were a cause of scandal. French and British rivalry was actively maintained by Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge of Palmerston, was deeply involved in all the intrigues of the palace.[896] At Athens, where King Otho had been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were closely identified with different political parties. In South America, a dispute between Lord Howden and Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the mediation of France and England in the war, which for some time past had been in progress between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video.[897]

M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to make approaches to Austria. The British government alone was disposed to sympathize sincerely with the Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an agreement with Metternich as to the policy to be adopted towards German, Swiss and Italian affairs, England would be isolated completely. But the negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate matter. An alliance between the government of the “Citizen King” and the Cabinet of Vienna, for the maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of 1815, was an unnatural combination which might prove fatal to its promotor. Public opinion in France was on the side of the peoples struggling for political freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the Opposition, had loudly declared that this was only the principle upon which French policy could be based. M. Guizot, therefore, considered it advisable, in his intercourse with Metternich, not to make use of the ordinary channels of communication, but to employ a secret agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to Vienna, a certain Klindworth,[898] who on several former occasions appears to have been entrusted with confidential missions by the French Foreign Office. He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French government was determined to uphold the territorial status quo, and was prepared to co-operate with Austria in opposing the introduction of any fundamental changes in the system of government of the different Italian States.[899]

M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct correspondence with Prince Metternich. But no precise agreement as to their respective policies was concluded.[900] Guizot appears to have been mainly concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the high esteem which he entertained for his perspicacity and judgment. Nor did he, on occasions, disdain to employ language which can only be described as that of fulsome adulation.[901] Metternich could not be otherwise than pleased and flattered by the advances thus made to him. He was not, however, disposed to set an undue value upon the protestations of M. Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to invade the Papal States, France would at once dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming that she had taken His Holiness under her protection. But, although no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot’s overtures at Vienna, his desire to propitiate Prince Metternich was reflected in his instructions to his agents at the different Italian Courts. By the spring of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal movement was regarded with nearly as much disapproval by the government of Louis Philippe as by the Cabinet of Vienna.

Metternich was under no illusions as to the true meaning of the events which were taking place in Italy. Above the popular expressions of joy at the reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expulsion of the foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement could be crushed, the Emperor, he perceived clearly, would have to fight to retain his Italian possessions. “Nationality,” he bade Buol warn Charles Albert, “was the new device which the revolutionists had inscribed upon their banners.”[902] Resolutely he prepared for the struggle which he saw was impending. Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he was strongly suspected of fomenting a counter-revolutionary plot at Rome, with the object of forcibly displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness, and of surrounding him with members of the reactionary party. The discovery of this conspiracy, in which the governor of Rome was involved, caused an immense excitement. No certain evidence could be procured of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair. It was significant, however, that the garrison of Ferrara received a substantial accession of strength on the very day fixed upon by the conspirators for the execution of their plans.[903] But, if Metternich’s connection with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal and national party into some ill-considered act of violence, which should furnish him with a pretext for armed intervention, admits of no doubt. Hitherto, as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara[904] had been confined to the citadel. But now the Austrians proceeded to occupy the whole town, the troops adopting a most insulting attitude towards the population, and especially towards the civic guard. But this clumsy device for bringing on a collision failed in its object. In the words of the British minister at Florence, the newly enrolled citizen soldiers “observed the most extraordinary moderation under the most contumelious treatment.”[905] The Austrian proceedings at Ferrara called forth a strong protest from His Holiness, who, at the same time requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita Vecchia for his personal protection. His Sardinian Majesty promptly complied with this demand, whereupon, the French ambassador tendered an offer of assistance on the part of his government. This proposal, however, was declined, no doubt being entertained at Rome, that France and Austria were acting together in Italian affairs.[906] Thus Metternich, by his aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in creating a bond of union between the Papal government and the Court of Turin.[907]

At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to inquire of the different Powers, which were parties to the treaties of 1815, whether they, as “the principal guardians of the political peace,”[908] intended to maintain the territorial divisions of the Italian peninsula as settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution, he told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as complete in the Roman States and in Tuscany. A revolution, he explained, was accomplished, once a government had been deprived of all power. But the real object of the party which had triumphed at Rome was to create a united Italy. The Emperor, however, while studiously respecting the independence of the sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to preserve his own Italian kingdom.[909] The British government, wrote Palmerston in reply, holds that the stipulations of treaties must everywhere be observed, and that no changes in an agreement can properly be effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers which are parties to it. But Her Majesty’s government, at the same time, is no less strongly of opinion that the right to carry out internal reforms is a right inherent to independent sovereignty.[910] A month later, on September 11, when the threatening communications made by Count Buol to the Court of Turin, and the proceedings of the military commander at Ferrara suggested that Austria might be contemplating some act of aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Papal dominions, Palmerston reverted to this subject. “The crowns of Great Britain and of Sardinia,” he warned Metternich, “had long been bound together by the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great Britain could neither forget nor repudiate claims founded upon such honourable grounds.” The Papal States were an essential element in the political independence of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of them could take place “without leading to consequences of great gravity and importance.”[911]

At the time when Palmerston was holding this language, the British government had decided upon a measure, which was afterwards the subject of much criticism. In the month of April, the Papal nuncio in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that His Holiness would experience great difficulty in carrying out his projected reforms. It was plain that no assistance would be forthcoming from the French government, and it was, in consequence, very necessary that the cause of social improvement in Italy should receive “a more active moral support from England.” If there were constitutional objections to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[912] might not some one, he suggested, in the confidence of Her Majesty’s government, be sent to Rome for the purpose of communicating with the Pope and his ministers?[913] The Russell Cabinet was strongly in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner in which the British government should extend its “moral support” was somewhat difficult to determine. Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the Lord Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to Turin, Florence and Borne. The Queen, however, raised certain objections to this plan. In an able memorandum Prince Albert pointed out that to despatch a member of the government to Italy, to encourage the rulers of the different States to adopt measures, which Austria regarded as highly dangerous to her existence as an Italian power, was “a most hostile step towards our old and natural ally.” It would be more friendly, he contended, and certainly more honest, to let it be clearly understood at Vienna that an attack upon any Italian Sovereign, who was desirous of effecting administrative reforms, would be looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to admit that, by adopting such a policy, England would be morally bound to uphold the independence of the Italian States, whereas the projected mission of Lord Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on their behalf.[914] After some further discussion and correspondence Palmerston carried his point. On September 11, his already quoted despatch was sent off to Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was supplied with his instructions and started upon his journey.

Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto was directed to hold at the different Italian Courts, his mission was necessarily regarded with extreme disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate to encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity, nor was he instructed to counsel the adoption of any measures which could be regarded as even an indirect attempt to deprive the Emperor of his Italian possessions. On the contrary, he was to insist upon the necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was to warn Charles Albert of the danger of allowing his natural irritation at the interference of Austria in his affairs to betray him into some act, which might furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attacking him. But Metternich, being determined to place an absolute check upon the development of Liberal ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that a British minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for the purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the reforms which they had already carried out, and of urging them to persevere in the same course in the future.[915]

Another task, however, had been confided to Lord Minto, besides that of counselling the Italian rulers to advance with prudence and circumspection along the path of reform. On his way to Turin he was instructed to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition of affairs had arisen. By the Federal Pact of 1815 Switzerland consisted of twenty-two sovereign and independent Cantons, each of which possessed one vote in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of the revolution of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzerland, and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions were revised in a democratic spirit. Some nine years later, however, the Conservatives, by raising the cry that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of the Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious party made no attempt, even in those Cantons where their ascendency was the most complete, to repeal the Liberal legislation of the past few years. On the contrary, in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of the Valais, the popular veto and the referendum were introduced. It was plainly the opinion of the clergy that their influence over the people would enable them to obtain, by means of these democratic institutions, the rejection of any measure of which they disapproved. In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which the population was half Protestant and half Catholic, the clerical party failed to establish its ascendency by peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made to overturn the existing government by force. But the insurrection proved unsuccessful and the eight monasteries, the inmates of which were proved to have been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed. The existence of these establishments had been guaranteed by an article of the Federal Pact, and the action of the Grand Council of Aargau, in decreeing their abolition, was, in consequence, brought before the Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the year 1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to restore four suppressed female convents; a compromise which was accepted as satisfactory by the majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this controversy, which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling, been settled, then disturbances broke out in the Valais. The clerical party in that Canton contrived, after severe fighting, to overturn the Radical government. The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had received from the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such conduct was the more inexcusable seeing that, at the time, Lucerne was the directing Canton and, therefore, the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality. The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief instigators of the affair, and throughout the greater part of Switzerland a feeling of extreme hostility arose against them. But the men in power at Lucerne were indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was regarded by the majority of their countrymen, and they, forthwith, proceeded to call in the Jesuits and to give them the complete control of all the educational establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the admitted connivance of the Radical governments of Berne, Aargau and Soleure, volunteers were being enrolled and, at the end of the year 1844, and again in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the corps francs, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having concluded an alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden, Lucerne successfully repelled these invaders. In this same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from the whole of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.

As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden, had entered into a combination, known as the League of Sarnen, with the object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened by the accession of Fribourg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in 1844, of the Valais. Early in the year 1846, the character of the league was transformed completely. From a peaceful association it was converted into a military alliance, for the purpose of upholding the right of every independent Canton to live under such laws as its legislature might enact. The Sonderbund, as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was called, was at once denounced as an infraction of Article VI. of the Federal Pact, prescribing that “no alliance, prejudicial either to the general confederacy or to the rights of other Cantons, could be formed by separate Cantons among themselves.” A motion to that effect was, accordingly, brought forward in the Federal Diet, but no decision in its favour was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva, by force and violence, the composition of the governments in several Cantons was changed and Radical Grand Councils were installed in power. Under these circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour both of the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring the illegality of the Sonderbund. The allied Catholic Cantons, however, refused to submit to this decision of the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention of resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to interfere with their independence. Thus, at the time when Lord Minto departed for the continent, all the signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.

The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland had necessarily excited the alarm of the absolute Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830 and 1840, not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French government had had, on several occasions, good cause to complain that, unchecked by the authorities, political refugees were allowed to concert their measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring States. After 1840, the internal disputes and the increasing lawlessness of the country began to attract the serious attention of all the Powers responsible for the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were agreed that, could the question of the Jesuits be arranged, the chief element of danger in the situation would be removed. The French minister consented readily to exert his influence to induce the Pope to recall them. Let it be well understood at Rome, he wrote to Rossi, on June 6, 1845, that, should a Radical government be established at Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it perfectly clear to His Holiness that “the fate of the disciples of Loyola is in the hands of the followers of Calvin.”[916] Prince Metternich was at this time instructing the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ similar arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no disposition to interfere, and all hope had soon to be abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the affair.[917] In the following year, the overthrow of the Conservative governments at Geneva and in the Canton of Vaud, and the prospect that, in the ensuing session, the Radicals would be in a majority in the Federal Diet, increased Metternich’s uneasiness. Hitherto, France had set her face resolutely against intervention in any shape or form. But, in the autumn of 1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious to assure himself of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the question of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took the opportunity of proposing that the Powers should seriously take in hand the affairs of Switzerland. M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to this suggestion, but the King, being still hopeful of re-establishing “the cordial understanding,” refused to sanction any participation in measures which might lead eventually to armed intervention.[918] In the spring of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had no intention of forgetting the affront which she had received in the matter of the Spanish marriages, and when, in consequence, M. Guizot was desirous of effecting a close understanding with Austria, French policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the exigencies of the situation.

The sympathies of Metternich and of all the absolute Courts were necessarily on the side of the Sonderbund.[919] The continental Cabinets were agreed that it would be highly dangerous, in the unsettled state of Europe, to allow the league of the Catholic and Conservative Cantons to be dissolved by their Radical neighbours. Federal unity, Metternich maintained, was clearly the object for which the democrats were striving, and it was on that account that they desired to undermine cantonal independence. But any revision of the Federal Pact would, he argued, release from their engagements the Powers which had guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Switzerland, and would justify them in intervening. Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, although fully disposed to endorse his views, dared not venture to employ French troops to fight the battle of the Jesuits. They, accordingly, insinuated that, if Austria were to take the first step, public opinion in France might be reconciled to the notion of a French intervention. This ingenuous proposal was promptly declined. Metternich had no idea of incurring the odium of invading Switzerland and of allowing France to declare that similar action on her part had been rendered necessary by the aggressiveness of Austria.[920] Thus in Swiss, as in Italian affairs, M. Guizot and Prince Metternich, notwithstanding the harmony of their sentiments, found it impossible to devise any practical plan for concerted action.

England, as a party to the settlement of 1815, had an unquestionable right to be consulted in any arrangement tending to alter the political position of Switzerland in the European system. But, owing to her geographical situation, she was less directly concerned than France, Austria or Prussia in the internal condition of the Confederation. The British government was, consequently, in a position to regard the question from a more detached and impartial standpoint. Moreover, the letters of Mr. Grote,[921] the historian of Greece, to the Spectator, supplied the English public with far better information about Swiss politics than was to be obtained in the official press of continental States. Palmerston had no intention of discussing the questions as to whether the alliance of the Catholic Cantons should be looked upon as an infraction of the Federal Pact, and as to whether the action of the Radical majority in the Diet, in decreeing the expulsion of the Jesuits, constituted a violation of cantonal sovereignty and independence. It is clear that, from an early date, he adopted the view, propounded by Mr. Grote, that, whereas the so-called Radical Cantons represented the wealth, the intelligence, the industry, the population and the progressive elements of Switzerland, the Cantons of the Sonderbund were, in every respect, the stationary and backward portions of the Republic. From these premises it followed logically that, although it might be possible for the allied Catholic Cantons to break up the Confederation, it was not in their power to guide it or to hold it together.[922] He, therefore, proposed both to Prince Metternich and M. Guizot, that they should endeavour to persuade the Catholic leaders to dissolve their alliance.[923] This solution of the difficulty, as may be supposed, was not adopted by either of the statesmen to whom it was made. On the contrary, Metternich at this time was arranging to furnish the Sonderbund with arms, and was seriously considering whether he should place the services of an Austrian general at its disposal, while M. Guizot was giving secret instructions for the despatch of warlike stores to Lucerne from the arsenal at Besançon.[924]

Lord Minto, in his conversations with M. Ochsenbein, the President of the Federal Diet, was charged to counsel forbearance and moderation. “Her Majesty’s government,” wrote Palmerston, “as the sincere and disinterested friend of Switzerland, could not but exhort all parties to abate pretensions, however just they may be thought, and to yield somewhat of rights, however valid they may be considered, rather than begin an appeal to arms, the consequences of which it would be easier to lament than to foresee.” He was not prepared to deny that the Federal Pact might stand in need of revision. It was alleged, however, that the Diet proposed “to sweep away the separate sovereignty of the several Cantons in order to blend the whole of Switzerland into one single Republic.” He must, therefore, remind the Swiss government that “the fundamental principle upon which the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, in regard to Switzerland, repose, is the separate sovereignty of the several Cantons.” Any attempt to alter the basis of the political organization of the Republic would inevitably entail civil war and foreign intervention.[925]

Yet, notwithstanding the pacific spirit in which Lord Minto’s instructions were drawn up, Palmerston has been freely accused of inciting the Radical Cantons to begin hostilities. Animosity to Louis Philippe and his principal minister, assert his detractors, was at this period the mainspring of his policy. Thus, when the French government evinced a disposition to favour the cause of the Sonderbund, Palmerston, having satisfied himself of the military superiority of the Radical Cantons, secretly urged them to attack their weaker neighbours, in the hope that the forcible dissolution of the Catholic alliance would entail the downfall of M. Guizot. This charge has been reiterated in the recently published letters of Sir Robert Morier. Mr. David Morier, Sir Robert’s father, had been for many years British minister in Switzerland. In the summer of 1847, however, being in England on leave, he was not allowed to return to his post, because, says his son, he was instinctively a peacemaker and, therefore, no longer a suitable instrument to execute the policy upon which Lord Palmerston had decided to embark.[926] But a perusal of Mr. Morier’s despatches suggests another, and an infinitely more probable, explanation of his recall. When affairs in Switzerland were beginning to assume a dangerous aspect, he is to be found expressing views with which Lord Palmerston would have heartily agreed. Writing to Lord Aberdeen, in June, 1844, on the subject of the Jesuits, Mr. Morier points out that this intrusion of a powerful foreign agency into all the concerns of the Confederation raises the question whether, “self-preservation being the first law of States, the claim of cantonal sovereignty should not be made to yield to the exigencies of the general welfare.” Again, some months later, speaking of the introduction of the Jesuits into Lucerne, he warns his chief that Lucerne “must be inscribed upon the list of Cantons with Fribourg, Schwyz and the Valais, subjected, henceforward, through their Jesuit institutions, to the influence of a foreign and anti-national power of the most dangerous tendency to the peace of the Confederation.”[927] But, during the winter of 1846, an unprovoked assault was committed upon one of his sons, Burnet Morier, by an excited Radical of Berne. The young man with commendable promptitude felled his assailant to the ground,[928] and, under these circumstances, Palmerston probably considered that the affair need not be made the subject of an official demand for reparation. Mr. Morier, however, thought otherwise, and his indignation appears to have transformed him into a strong supporter of the Sonderbund. The contrast between the sentiments, contained in his memorandum on Swiss affairs, submitted to the Foreign Office in February, 1847,[929] and those expressed in his earlier despatches, must have given Lord Palmerston food for serious reflection. Without doubt, he must have come to the conclusion that a man burning with resentment against the Radical leaders was hardly as qualified, as his son seems to have supposed, to exercise a moderating influence upon the passions of contending parties.

Lord Minto, having arrived in Switzerland, lost no time in placing himself in communication with M. Ochsenbein. The election of this person, who two years before had commanded the corps francs in their raid upon Lucerne, to the post of President of the Federal Diet, had greatly exasperated the Catholics. Lord Minto, however, reported that he found him most reasonable, and, to all appearances, sincerely desirous of discovering some means of averting an outbreak of hostilities. The Jesuits, he assured the English minister, constituted the chief obstacle to a peaceful settlement, and, could they be removed, all danger of war would disappear. Palmerston, on receiving this information, at once instructed Minto, who by that time had passed on to Italy, to use every endeavour, while at Rome, to persuade His Holiness to intervene.[930] But, meanwhile, in Switzerland the chances of maintaining the peace were hourly diminishing. Both sides were now openly preparing for war, and, on October 29, the deputies of the Catholic Cantons formally quitted the Federal Diet. On that same day Lord Palmerston made a last effort to avert a rupture. He enjoined the British chargé d’affaires at Berne to seek out M. Ochsenbein and to endeavour to prevail upon him to postpone the execution of any irrevocable measure, until the result of Lord Minto’s mission to Rome should be known. M. Ochsenbein’s only reply to this communication was hastily to convene the Diet, which forthwith decreed the dissolution of the Sonderbund by the armed forces of the Federal executive.[931]

Two days later, on November 6, the Duc de Broglie, who had recently succeeded Sainte-Aulaire, as ambassador in London, submitted a project of intervention to Lord Palmerston. Let the Powers, proposed M. Guizot, offer to mediate on the basis that the question of the Jesuits should be settled by the Pope, and that the other points in dispute should form the subject of a conference, at which each of the Cantons should be represented. In the meantime, the contending parties would be invited to suspend hostilities—a refusal to comply releasing the Powers from their engagements to the Confederation and entitling them to enforce their demands by whatever measures they might subsequently agree to adopt.[932] Palmerston’s official answer was not sent off to Paris until November 16. It was in the form of a counter-proposition. The British government, he declared, “could not go the length of thinking” that the outbreak of civil war could release the Powers from those pledges into which they had entered to maintain the neutrality of Switzerland. Furthermore, it considered that the presence of the Jesuits upon the territory of the Confederation, in opposition to the wishes of the majority of the Cantons, constituted a real grievance. Her Majesty’s government, under the circumstances, before consenting to join with France and the other Power in offering to mediate, must make two conditions. In the first place, the removal of the Jesuits, whether by a decision to be obtained from the Pope, or by an act of sovereign authority on the part of the Cantons in which the Order was established, must be the basis of any arrangement proposed by the Powers to the contending parties. Secondly, it was to be distinctly understood that a refusal by either side to accept mediation must not be made the ground for armed interference in the internal affairs of Switzerland.[933]

In Paris, at Berlin, and at Vienna, it had been intended to hold very different language to M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues. Nevertheless, M. Guizot, although stipulating for certain trifling modifications, accepted the British proposal. The assent of Prussia and of Austria was obtained, but it was given with the utmost reluctance.[934] Palmerston was, in point of fact, completely master of the situation. The condition of Germany was so unsettled, the appearance of affairs in Italy was so alarming, that Metternich could not attack the Radicals of Berne except in combination with France and, in the Swiss question, Louis Philippe and M. Guizot dared not act with the absolute Courts in opposition to the constitutional government of England.[935] Nicholas, having no direct interest in the matter, was content to adopt whatever course might commend itself to the Cabinet of Vienna. The five governments being thus agreed, an identic note was, on November 26, drawn up in London for presentation to the President of the Diet, and to the official organ of the Sonderbund by the representatives of the Powers in Switzerland. But, while ministers and diplomatists had been talking and writing, the Federal executive had acted. No sooner had the Diet, on November 4, decreed the forcible suppression of the Sonderbund than the Genevese general, Dufour, who had at his disposal an army of 100,000 men and 260 guns, was ordered to begin operations. The isolated canton of Fribourg having been easily overwhelmed, the Federal commander advanced with his whole force against Lucerne. Salis-Soglio, a Protestant of the Grisons, whose army amounted to some 80,000 troops with 74 guns, awaited him in a selected position between the Reuss and the Lake of Zug. The decisive battle was fought on November 23, Dufour’s victory was complete. On the following day, the Jesuits and the executive council having fled, Lucerne surrendered. The Valais, the last of the seven Cantons to abandon the struggle, capitulated on the 29th. Twenty-five days after the Diet had formally resolved upon its suppression, the Sonderbund ceased to exist.

In almost all accounts of these events Palmerston’s proceedings have been misrepresented. According to his detractors, he cunningly inveigled the Powers into an exchange of views with the pretended object of averting civil war in Switzerland, while in reality he was secretly urging the Federal executive to open the campaign against the Sonderbund.[936] Even Liberals, in sympathy with his policy, describe him as having deliberately protracted the negotiations in London, in order that the Radicals should be able to crush the Catholic Cantons without fear of foreign interference.[937] Palmerston, it is perfectly clear, was strongly opposed to direct intervention and, moreover, was disposed to think that an unsolicited offer on the part of the Powers to assist the Swiss to settle their internal disputes would inflame their national pride, and rather tend to aggravate, than to diminish, the gravity of the situation. It is possible, therefore, that he may to some extent have delayed the negotiations. But the alleged waste of time cannot at the most have exceeded a very few days, seeing that the French note was only submitted to him on November 9, and that his counter-proposal had been agreed to by the Powers and was ready for transmission to Switzerland on the 26th. To contend that Palmerston supposed that, by delaying the negotiations for two or three days, he would enable the Radicals to achieve their purpose, is to credit him with a knowledge of the military weakness of the Sonderbund which he most certainly did not possess. If he in any way retarded the final drafting of the proposed offer of mediation, it is infinitely more probable that he so acted in the hope that Minto’s efforts at Rome to induce the Pope to recall the Jesuits from Lucerne might prove successful and that, in consequence, the two parties might be able to settle their quarrel without an appeal to arms and without foreign interference.

Sir Robert Morier, however, asserts most positively that Palmerston “instigated Peel to perform his celebrated feat of precipitating the war of the Sonderbund.”[938] In his Mémoires M. Guizot has reproduced a letter from M. de Bois-le-Comte, the French ambassador to the Confederation, in which it is stated that, upon receipt of the news from London that the Powers intended to propose mediation, Mr. Peel sent the chaplain of the British legation to the headquarters of General Dufour to apprise him of the state of affairs and to urge him immediately to march upon Lucerne and try conclusions with the army of the Sonderbund.[939] It is evident that, if there be any foundation of truth in these stories, neither the instructions with which Lord Minto, a member of the government, was supplied, nor the official despatch of October 29, which was to be communicated to M. Ochsenbein, can have been the expression of Lord Palmerston’s real policy. His veritable intentions must have been conveyed in private letters[940] to the British chargé d’affaires at Berne, it never having been suggested that he employed any secret agent in the affair. The question as to who acted as British minister to the Confederation, at this period, is, therefore, of extreme importance. It is inconceivable that Palmerston, if he really were engaged in prosecuting the Machiavellian designs imputed to him, should not have replaced Mr. Morier by an Arthur Aston, a Henry Bulwer, or some other tried and trusted agent. But in point of fact the business of the legation, during the whole of this critical time, was left in charge of a young secretary, Mr. Peel. Now Peel was the eldest son of Sir Robert, who, to the day of his death, never forgave Palmerston for his desertion of the Tory party in 1828.[941] Is it credible that Palmerston can have entrusted the conduct of an affair of the kind, suggested by M. Guizot and Sir Robert Morier, to a comparative stranger, a young man of twenty-five, the son of his political opponent and personal enemy?

Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Palmerston’s despatch of October 29, although written with a very different object, did, in effect, precipitate the conflict between the Radical Cantons and the Sonderbund. As Mr. Peel, without doubt, rightly divined, M. Ochsenbein, notwithstanding the pacific language which he had held to Lord Minto, had no real desire to see the dispute amicably settled.[942] Federal unity was the end which he and his friends had set themselves to attain, and they were convinced that nothing but physical force would induce the Catholic and Conservative Cantons to renounce their sovereign rights. By “blood and iron” alone could the success of their policy be achieved. Hence the prospect that England intended to exert herself at Rome, in favour of Papal intervention, may have driven the Radicals of Berne to immediate action. They may have argued that, should His Holiness consent to recall the Jesuits and should the Sonderbund, in consequence, be peacefully dissolved, an excellent opportunity would be lost of reducing the Conservative Cantons to submission.

The identic note of November 26, 1847, was to have been communicated to the contending parties, on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir Stratford Canning. His instructions, however, provided that he should not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he should find that the Sonderbund had capitulated and that the war was at an end.[943] Canning, in consequence, made no offer of mediation, but remained about three weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of impressing upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency of treating the defeated Cantons with consideration, and of refraining from any measures which might furnish other Powers with a pretext for intervention. France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received the identic note on November 29, and, forthwith, despatched a copy of it both to the Federal Diet and to the leaders of the Sonderbund, notwithstanding that Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was evident that the Valais could not hold out much longer.[944] His example was followed by the ministers of Austria and Prussia. To these communications the executive at Berne, the members of which had expressed to Sir Stratford Canning their gratification at the attitude adopted by Great Britain, sent an answer couched in very decided language. The offer of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities had ceased, but because it was impossible to recognize the principle upon which the proposal was based. If the Confederation were at war with another State, it might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation, but it could not admit, under any circumstances, the claim of the Powers to treat as belligerents the Cantons of the Sonderbund. The treaties by which the Confederation had been constituted provided only for one Diet and for one Federal executive. The alliance of the seven Cantons was simply an act of rebellion which the central government had been strong enough to deal with effectually.[945]

The overthrow of the Sonderbund and the haughty reply returned by the Diet to the French, the Austrian, and the Prussian notes caused a profound sensation. The inability of the absolute Courts and of the government of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons, which had sought to resist the decrees of the majority in the Swiss Diet, was made manifest to the world. Italian nationalists, German Liberals, French reformers, acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive as a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles, at Vienna and at Berlin, there was no disposition to under-rate the gravity of the situation. Largely owing to the restraining influence of Lord Minto, central Italy still presented a certain outward appearance of tranquillity.[946] But Sicily and Naples were in open revolution, and King “Bomba,” who had, hitherto, set his face sternly against all reforms, was, in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution. Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of hostility to Austria was growing in intensity. Encouraged by Lord Minto, Sardinia, Tuscany, and the Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines of customs and to form a commercial league, after the manner of the German Zollverein.[947] The significance of this measure was clearly perceived by Metternich. On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein to acquaint Palmerston that the condition of Italy would necessitate a large increase of the Austrian army in Lombardy.[948] “You and I,” he confided to his old friend, Radetzky, “are not destined to end our days in peace. . . . It has been reserved for the present age to witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope.”[949]

The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the Catholic Cantons made it the more necessary, the German Cabinets declared, for the Powers vigilantly to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet. The conference, which it had been proposed to hold upon Swiss affairs, must, they insisted, still take place.[950] The British government, however, altogether dissented from this view. The Sonderbund no longer existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, therefore, could see no occasion for any deliberations upon the domestic affairs of the Confederation. England, in any case, he announced, must now decline to take part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the patron of Radicals and revolutionists, why should not he come forward as the champion of order and stability? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and the Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been despatched to Paris by their respective governments, found him most favourably disposed. It was very flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to his opinions and should send their emissaries to Paris to consult him. But from London he received a word of warning which made a considerable impression upon him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Duc de Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour overmuch of the deliberations at Laybach and Verona,[951] were France to take part in a conference which England had declined to attend.[952]

In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz, M. Guizot, consequently, deprecated the notion of assembling a conference. Let them for the moment, he urged, be content with formally declaring to the Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the violation of the principle of cantonal sovereignty and independence. Should their representations be unheeded, the question of active intervention could be more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had, they must not forget, his parliamentary position to consider. In the coming session, M. Thiers was preparing to assail his foreign policy with the utmost virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the difficulties of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme importance that he should remain in office.[953] A joint note, dated January 18, 1848, was, accordingly, drawn up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It was clearly inexpedient that these agents of the absolute Courts should be present in the French capital, during the heated debates to which the reply to the Address was expected to give rise. But their deliberations were to be regarded as merely suspended, not as definitely concluded. In the spring they were to return and resume their discussions. But this plan was not destined to be realized. Before the time appointed for their second meeting with M. Guizot, the storm burst and swept away the Orleans Monarchy. The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to Berlin and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought refuge in England, in company with Prince Wittgenstein, M. Guizot, and other ultra-conservative statesmen. At the news of the downfall of the redoubtable Chancellor the Milanese flew to arms. After a memorable conflict of five days’ duration, Radetzky retired upon the Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with Charles Albert, who had thrown down the gauntlet to Austria and marched to the assistance of the Lombards.

A history of Franco-British relations, during the reign of Louis Philippe, is not concerned with the internal reasons which contributed to his downfall. It is sufficient to point out that the existence of the Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing that it was in the nature of a compromise which had only been grudgingly acquiesced in by the nation. The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in the words of Lamartine, “une revolution de mépris.” All classes were thoroughly disgusted with the policy of M. Guizot and indignant at the numerous public and private scandals[954] brought to light, during the year 1847. In a constitutional State a change of government is the remedy provided for such a condition of affairs. Louis Philippe, however, was too attached to his system of personal government willingly to part with a minister, who never attempted to restrict him to the rôle of a constitutional sovereign.[955] His last Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the support of the majority of the Chamber. But the servile body of placemen, which formed the ministerial party, in no way represented the opinion of the nation. The people with one accord condemned the proceedings of the government and identified the King with the unpopular actions of his principal minister. On February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of parliamentary reform, followed by a tumult in the streets, sufficed to destroy the discredited régime.

The rupture of “the cordial understanding” with England was followed so closely by the downfall of the monarchy, as to suggest that there must have been a connection between the two events. That the quarrel with England was one of the contributory causes of the revolution is almost universally admitted. English writers have generally referred to the events of ’48 with some complacency, as the just retribution which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd an observer as Baron Stockmar appears to have been convinced that the revelations in connection with the Spanish marriages did the “Citizen King” an incalculable amount of harm in the eyes of the French people and precipitated his overthrow.[956] Now, it is clear that the Spanish marriages had one effect which took those who were responsible for them completely by surprise. M. Guizot had confidently anticipated that, whatever other consequences might flow from them, they would be acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at the expense of England. But the event completely falsified his expectations. The men, who in the question of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair, and in many other matters, had constantly accused him of truckling to England, were the first to denounce him for having sacrificed “the cordial understanding” to a purely dynastic object. It is more than probable that the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his friends was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed for purposes of party politics. But their words, none the less, made a deep impression upon the middle-classes which had hitherto steadfastly supported the régime of July. These people, says Lord Normanby, were convinced that their material interests had suffered owing to the rupture of the English alliance. The construction of railways in France had led, as in England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevitable reaction. This unexpected depreciation in the value of the shares of the new companies was not, however, ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed speculators persuaded themselves that their losses were due to the disinclination of the British public to invest in French railways, owing to the change which the Spanish marriages had wrought in the political relations of the two countries.[957]

But in so far as the revolution of ’48 is concerned, the true importance of the break-up of “the cordial understanding” consists in the policy which M. Guizot, in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is undeniable that his attitude towards the Italian national movement and in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the majority of his countrymen, and proved most injurious to the monarchy. Men perceived clearly that the only result of his unnatural alliance with the Cabinet of Vienna had been enormously to diminish French influence at Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his policy was seen to have been even more ineffectual.[958] All his efforts had been directed to the preservation of the Sonderbund. Nevertheless, the alliance of the reactionary cantons had been promptly and ignominiously dissolved, whilst his proffered mediation had been rejected with a haughty intimation that the victorious party intended to settle its affairs without his interference. It has been urged, however, in his defence that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by Lord Palmerston, whose deliberate purpose it was to thwart him on every occasion. A secret alliance, it has been said, existed between the British Foreign Minister and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that about that time some friendly messages from Palmerston were conveyed to M. Thiers by Sir John Easthope,[959] the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, which was generally regarded as Palmerston’s especial organ. In the following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir Anthony Panizzi, an Italian political exile, and the chief librarian of the British Museum, took great credit to himself for having cemented a good understanding between the two statesmen.[960] Palmerston afterwards denied absolutely that their interviews were in any way connected with a “conspiracy against M. Guizot.”[961] Greville, however, accuses him of having, during the controversy on the subject of the Spanish marriages, permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question. Greville was so ready to believe anything discreditable about Palmerston that he cannot, as a rule, be looked upon as an altogether trustworthy witness. But, at the time referred to, he was in a position to speak of his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch as he was in Paris for the express purpose of trying to re-establish “the cordial understanding” and was, moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby at the British embassy.[962] His testimony, therefore, coupled with the corroborative evidence to be found in the published letters of Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers’ very damaging criticisms of M. Guizot may have been inspired by Lord Palmerston.[963] But, had the policy of M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political opponent would have tended to strengthen, rather than to weaken, his position. The whole affair, indeed, is not of much importance. Some of Thiers’ newspaper articles may have been based upon information improperly supplied to him by the agents of Lord Palmerston, but his great speech on the Spanish marriages was not delivered until February 4, 1847,[964] when the British blue book was at the disposal of any one who might desire to purchase it.

But the more serious charge has been made that Palmerston’s whole policy, at this period, was subordinated to his desire to avenge the defeat he had sustained in the Spanish marriages.[965] His attitude in the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained. It is difficult to see how any British minister could have acted differently. Had Aberdeen been in office, it may safely be surmised that, out of consideration for Austria, he would not have advocated the despatch of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was confided to a member of Lord John Russell’s government. But, without doubt, he would have furnished his agents at the Italian Courts with instructions substantially the same as those drawn up for the guidance of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and Palmerston sought to avert civil war and foreign intervention by inducing the Pope to recall the Jesuits from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in the British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by Palmerston, not to be found in that of M. Guizot. His rapprochement with the Cabinet of Vienna obliged him to adopt towards the Liberal and national movements in progress throughout Europe the views of Prince Metternich. The precise reasons which induced him to make overtures to Austria can only be conjectured. Having shattered “the cordial understanding,”he may have thought that he must be able to show that he had substituted for the English, the Austrian, alliance. Perhaps he may have had some idea of isolating England, by means of the close relations which he proposed to establish between the government of the “Citizen King” and the absolute Courts. But, be his motives what they may, his dealings with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one of the chief reasons of the revolution of ’48.[966]

For the first time, between the years 1830 and 1848, the attempt was seriously made by the French and English governments to establish, as a primary principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close and intimate relations between the two countries. The result, on the whole, disappointed expectations. The great work of Talleyrand’s old age, the cementing of a good understanding between the Whigs and the Orleans’ Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution of July. Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war in the question of the separation of Belgium from Holland. But, on subsequent occasions, it did not prevent grave differences of opinion from arising between the two governments. The time had not yet come when “the cordial understanding” could be placed upon a firm and durable basis. The maintenance of the settlement, agreed to after the great war, was still the foundation of British policy in Europe. France, on the other hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon her by the Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-loving middle-classes the hope was fondly entertained that the man would arise who, “à grands coups de sabre,” should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give back to France her “natural frontiers.” Bonapartism was a living force by reason of the existence of this feeling. Louis Philippe and his ministers sought to allay the restlessness which it engendered by an active policy in the Mediterranean and in more distant waters. Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more than a hundred years of war and rivalry, were thus kept alive. French and British officials, whether of high rank or of low degree, continued to regard each other with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to thwart his fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless, the policy which finally broke up the alliance was not a policy which commended itself to the French people. Palmerston’s views upon European affairs, between 1846 and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments of the majority of Frenchmen than did those of M. Guizot; and his quarrel was not with the French nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.

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[INDEX]

Abd-el-Kader, Algerian chief, [358]
Abdullah Pasha, [150]
Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan of Turkey, [242]
Aberdeen, Earl of, [34], [37], [38], [116], [222], [281], [327], [331], [332], [333], [334], [339], [340], [342], [343], [344], [345], [347], [348], [349], [352], [354], [355], [356], [357], [358], [359], [360], [362], [363], [364], [365], [366], [367], [371], [372], [373], [375], [376], [377], [379], [380], [382], [385], [392], [401], [404], [421], [426], [442]
Adair, Sir Robert, [76], [79], [82], [83], [84], [100], [101], [127]
Adelaïde, Madame, sister of Louis Philippe, [9], [401]
Ahmed Pasha, [165]
Akiff-Effendi, [246]
Albani, Cardinal, [104]
Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria, [287], [365], [372], [384], [417]
Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, [19], [44]
Alexander, Tsarewitch, afterwards Alexander II., [236]
Ali Pasha, [146]
Alison, Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, [289]
Althorp, Viscount. See [Spencer, Earl]
Alvanley, Lord, [86]
Ancillon, Johann Peter, [111], [112], [136], [141]
Apponyi, Count, [66], [68], [273], [292], [295], [411]
Argüelles, Agustín, [218]
Aston, Arthur, [217], [226], [307], [339], [340], [344], [371], [432]
Atthalin, General, Baron, [27], [36], [344]
Aubigny, Captain de, [361], [365], [366]
Auckland, Earl of, [235]
Aumale, Duc d', son of Louis Philippe, [338], [373]
Avedick, Armenian dragoman, [244]
Azeglio, Marquis de, [408], [409]
Bagot, Sir Charles, [76], [113]
Balbo, Count Cesare, [408], [409]
Balmaceda, Carlist chief, [215]
Bandiera, Admiral, [290]
Barante, Baron de, [130]
Baudrand, General, [15], [81]
Beauharnais, Eugène de, [48]
[Beauvale], Lord, [17], [107], [108], [111], [112], [114], [169], [247], [250], [322]
Becker, Nikolaus, German poet, [312]
Bedford, Duke of, [297]
Belliard, General Augustin-Daniel, [21], [61], [83], [100], [101]
Benedek, Colonel Ludwig von, [406]
Berri, Duc de, [62], [350]
Bern, Duchesse de, [51], [120], [134], [197]
Bernetti, Cardinal, [104], [106], [107]
Bernstorff, Count, [24]
Berryer, Pierre-Antoine, [350]
Beshir, Emir, [152]
Bligh, British chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, [166], [168], [221]
Boghos Bey, [227]
Boigne, Comtesse de, [259]
Bois-le-Comte, French Ambassador to the Swiss Confederation, [431], [434]
Bordeaux, Duc de, [9], [62], [120], [350], [351]
Bourqueney, Baron, [241], [286], [321], [322], [323], [326]
Boutenieff, Russian Minister at Constantinople, [154], [155], [156], [157], [158], [161], [162], [223], [247]
Bravo, Gonzalez, [217]
Bresson, Comte, [49], [50], [51], [52], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [371], [374], [375], [379], [380], [383], [384], [387], [388], [390], [391], [394], [395], [397], [398], [399], [401], [411], [444]
Broglie, Duc de, [35], [39], [130], [131], [132], [135], [137], [138], [156], [160], [165], [167], [169], [177], [178], [181], [184], [188], [193], [195], [196], [197], [198], [219], [221], [222], [225], [226], [334], [428], [436]
Bruat, Admiral, [360], [361]
Brunnow, Baron, [252], [253], [254], [255], [256], [257], [258], [261], [267], [300], [319]
Bubna, Field-Marshal, [19]
Bugeaud, Marshal, Duc d'Isly, [358], [367]
Bülow, Baron, [114], [141], [263], [266], [274], [275], [276], [283]
Bulwer, Henry, Lytton, afterwards Lord Dalling, [232], [249], [250], [257], [279], [280], [295], [296], [298], [307], [333], [337], [339], [341], [370], [371], [372], [373], [374], [375], [378], [379], [380], [385], [386], [388], [390], [393], [396], [400], [411], [432], [444]
Buol, Count, [413], [415]
Burnes, Sir Alexander, [235], [236]
Cabrera, Ramon, [202], [210], [214], [215], [216]
Caillier, Captain, [242]
Calatrava, Josè Maria, [203], [205], [207]
Calomarde, Spanish statesman, [173], [174]
Campbell, Colonel, [156], [162], [226], [227], [230], [232], [233], [234], [251], [257]
Canning, George, [20], [50], [63], [144], [146], [147], [352], [403]
Canning, Sir Stratford, afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, [151], [153], [155], [174], [175], [177], [221], [433], [434]
Carini, Neapolitan Ambassador at Madrid, [374]
Carlos, Don, Pretender to the Spanish throne, [173], [174], [176], [178], [179], [182], [184], [185], [186], [187], [188], [191], [192], [193], [205], [206], [207], [209], [210], [211], [214], [342], [343], [344], [348], [369], [377], [386], [394], [403]
Carlotta, Infanta, [369]
Cartwright, Thomas, [49], [50]
Castlereagh, Viscount, afterwards Second Marquis of Londonderry, [16], [20]
Cea, Bermúdez, Spanish statesman, [174], [175], [177], [178], [336]
Chad, British minister at Berlin, [110], [112]
Charles X., King of France, [1], [4], [6], [8], [16], [20], [21], [30], [39], [43], [45]
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, [408], [409], [413], [414], [418], [437]
Charles, Archduke of Austria, [49], [336]
Charles Frederick, Archduke of Austria, [290]
Charles, of Naples, Prince, [51], [55], [57], [59], [69]
Charlotte, Princess, daughter of George IV., [69]
Chassé, General, Baron, [76], [140], [142]
Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, [26], [64], [350]
Chekib-Effendi, [263], [267], [271]
Chesney, Colonel Francis, [237]
Chlopicki, General, [44]
Chrzanowski, General Adalbert, [229], [251], [252]
Clanricarde, Marquis of, [236], [252], [319], [320]
[Clarendon], Earl of, [177], [184], [186], [192], [193], [194], [195], [196], [203], [207], [208], [210], [216], [217], [265], [266], [275], [297], [336], [396]
Cochelet, Adrien-Louis, [241], [242], [269], [272], [273]
Codrington, Admiral, Sir Edward, [146]
Coloredo, Count, [436], [437]
Concha, General, [338]
Constantine, Paulovitch, Grand Duke, [144]
Cor, dragoman to French Embassy at Constantinople, [291], [292]
Cordoba, General, [201]
Cortazar, Modesto, [216]
Coste, Jacques, [270], [310]
Cousin, Victor, [41]
Cowley, Earl, [185], [343], [345], [347], [363], [366], [371], [379], [396]
Cubières, General de, [302]
Cunningham, Marchioness of, [50]
Daine, General, [76], [83]
Darmès, regicide, [306]
Décazes, Duc, [39], [340]
Dedel, Dutch Envoy in London, [266]
Deutz, Agent of Duchesse de Bern, [197]
Diebitsch, Marshal, Count, [26], [42], [64]
Diedrichstein, Baron von, [435]
Dino, Duchesse de, [32], [199], [266]
Dost Mohammad, Amir of Kabul, [235]
Drummond-Hay, British Consul at Tangier, [360]
Duckworth, Admiral, [164]
Dufour, General, [430], [432]
Duhamel, Colonel, [157]
Dupetit-Thouars, Admiral, [351], [352], [353], [354], [355], [356], [360]
Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques, [31], [129]
Dupont, Jacques, [31], [39]
Durham, Earl of, [123], [124], [135], [224]
Easthope, Sir John, [440]
Eliot, Lord, afterwards Earl of St. Germans, [184], [185]
Ellice, Edward, [265], [297], [321]
Elphinstone, Miss Mercer, [53]
Emin Bey, [148]
Enrique, Don, Duke of Seville, [370], [379], [384], [385], [388], [389], [390], [397], [398], [403]
Escalera, General, [207]
España, Count of, [214]
Espartero, General Baldomero, [206], [207], [210], [212], [213], [214], [215], [216], [217], [307], [335], [338], [339], [340], [341], [343], [344], [346], [347], [368], [369], [371], [378], [404]
Etterhazy, Prince, [43]
Evans, Sir George de Lacy, [187], [202], [211]
Excelmans, General, afterwards Marshal, [52]
Fabvier, General, Baron, [52]
Fanshawe, Captain, [315]
Faucher, Léon, [302]
Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, [20],

[172], [173], [174], [175], [176], [177], [190], [191], [192], [403]
Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the Two Sicilies, [19]
Ferdinand II. ("Bomba,") King of the Two Sicilies, [264], [374], [435]
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King Consort of Maria II., Queen of Portugal, [190]
Ferdinand, Duke of Saxe-Coburg, [371], [379], [382], [384], [395]
Fernanda, Infanta, [372], [377], [391], [394], [395], [397], [398], [400], [401]
Fethi Ahmed Pasha, [270], [273]
Fezensac, Duc de, [209]
Flahaut, General, Comte de, [53], [54], [265], [407]
Forbes, British chargé d'affaires at Vienna, [101]
Francis II., Emperor of Austria, [17], [21], [26], [68], [166]
Francis IV., Duke of Modena, [64]
Francisco de Paula, Infante, [369], [375], [385], [393]
Francisco de Asis, Don, Duke of Cadiz, afterwards king Consort of Isabella II., Queen of Spain, [370], [379], [384], [387], [391], [395], [396], [397], [398], [401], [402], [403]
Frederick William III., King of Prussia, [17], [22], [23], [24], [26], [31], [32], [68], [167], [274]
[Frederick William] IV., King of Prussia, [166], [408]
Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia. See [Frederick William IV.]
Gallois, Captain, [105], [107]
Gendebien, Alexandra, Joseph, [48], [52]
George IV., King of Great Britain, [14], [50], [69]
Gérard, Marshal, [76], [78], [79], [80], [82], [83], [84], [85], [139], [140], [141], [142]
Gioberti, Vincenzo, [408], [409]
Glücksberg, Duc de, [340], [341], [345]
Goblet, General, [84], [100], [101], [128]
Granville, Earl of, [53], [54], [58], [59], [60], [67], [69], [72], [76], [77], [78], [79], [80], [82], [85], [95], [99], [103], [129], [131], [132], [134], [137], [160], [181], [185], [188], [193], [194], [196], [202], [205], [208], [209], [228], [234], [244], [279], [280], [303], [304], [305], [306], [307], [336]
Granville, Countess of, [63]
Gregory XVI., Pope, [409], [410], [421]
Greville, Charles, [64], [70], [265], [283], [297], [299], [302], [312], [321], [329], [441]
Grey, 2nd Earl, [39], [40], [46], [49], [51], [57], [74], [79], [80], [81], [83], [89], [92], [96], [98], [102], [116], [118], [119], [123], [134], [137], [140], [172], [183], [199], [222], [265]
Grey, 3rd Earl, [381]
Grote, George, [423], [424]
Guizot, François, [31], [35], [39], [47], [130], [132], [191], [259], [260], [261], [263], [264], [265], [266], [267], [273], [274], [275], [277], [278], [279], [282], [283], [284], [285], [286], [288], [292], [296], [297], [304], [305], [309], [312], [313], [318], [320], [321], [323], [324], [326], [329], [332], [333], [334], [337], [339], [341], [345], [347], [348], [349], [352], [353], [355], [356], [357], [359], [360], [362], [363], [364], [365], [366], [367], [370], [372], [374], [375], [376], [379], [383], [384], [386], [387], [388], [390], [391], [392], [393], [394], [398], [399], [400], [401], [402], [404], [407], [410], [411], [412], [413], [421], [422], [423], [424], [425], [428], [429], [431], [432], [434], [436], [437], [438], [439], [440], [441], [444]
Haines, Captain, [232].
Hafiz Pasha, [228], [240], [242], [243], [251], [252]
Halen, General Van, [344]
Halil Pasha, [155], [158], [159], [243], [269]
Hay, Admiral, Lord John, [201], [207], [213]
Heine, Heinrich, [63], [120], [302]
Heytesbury, Lord, [26], [27], [28], [42], [68], [87], [88], [89], [90], [110], [123], [125]
Hinüber, General, [72]
Hobson, Captain William, [351]
Hodges, Colonel, [269], [272]
Holland, Lord, [255], [266], [275], [298], [302], [321], [327]
Holland, Lady, [298]
Hosrew Pasha, [150], [243], [247], [268], [269], [272], [273]
Howard de Walden, Lord, [189], [190]
Howden, Lord, [411]
Hugon, Admiral, [226], [306]
Humann, Jean-Georges, [132]
Hume, Joseph, [281]
Hussein Pasha, [151]
Ibell, Charles, [24]
Ibrahim Pasha, [145], [146], [149], [150], [151], [152], [154], [155], [157], [158], [159], [160], [161], [219], [220], [232], [234], [240], [241], [242], [245], [247], [251], [252], [253], [268], [269], [271], [280], [283], [287], [291], [294], [295], [296], [301], [310], [311], [314], [317]
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, [174], [176], [180], [186], [204], [206], [208], [211], [213], [216], [335], [337], [338], [340], [341], [342], [343], [344], [347], [348], [368], [369], [370], [371], [374], [375], [377], [378], [379], [382], [383], [387], [388], [391], [394], [396], [397], [400], [401], [402], [403], [405], [411]
Isturiz, Francisco, Javier de, [202], [379]
Jarnac, Philippe de Bohan-Chabot, Comte de, [349], [360], [361], [362], [363], [364], [365], [366], [375], [376], [383], [384], [386], [388], [391], [392], [394], [402]
Jochmus, General, [252], [314]
Joinville, Prince de, son of Louis Philippe, [189], [244], [338], [356], [358], [359], [364], [367]
Klindworth, secret diplomatic agent, [412]
Kotchuby, Russian minister, [156]
Kotzebue, Augustus, [24]
La Fayette, Marquis de, [5], [9], [11], [35], [46]
Laffitte, Jacques, [4], [9], [39], [62], [63]
Lalande, Admiral, [243], [244], [245]
Lallemand, General, Baron, [52]
Lamarque, General, Comte, [46], [120]
Lamartine, Alphonse de, [438]
Lamb, Sir Frederick. See [Beauvale, Lord]
Lamoricière, General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de, [358], [360]
Lansdowne, Marquis of, [181], [266], [275], [302]
La Tour-Maubourg, Marie-Charles-César de Faÿ, General, Marquis de, [82], [84], [95], [98], [99], [100], [127], [139]
Lawoëstine, Colonel, Marquis de, [54], [55], [56]
Leon, General Diego, [338]
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, afterwards Leopold I., King of the Belgians, [49], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [76], [77], [79], [82], [84], [85], [91], [92], [93], [99], [100], [101], [126], [127], [139], [143], [285], [287], [300], [307], [367], [384]
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince, [371], [375], [377], [379], [385], [391], [392], [395], [402]
Lesseps, Viscomte Ferdinand de, [227], [345], [346]
Leuchtenberg, Duc Auguste de, [48], [51], [52], [54], [55], [56], [58], [60], [189]
Lieven, Prince, [42], [90], [115], [221]
Lieven, Princess, [222], [259], [265], [274]
Lobau, Marshal Mouton de, [46]
Londonderry, 3rd Marquis of, [74], [85], [223]
Louis XVIII., King of France, [6], [7], [30], [39], [62], [340]
[Louis Philippe], King of the French, [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [12], [15], [21], [22], [26], [27], [28], [30], [34], [35], [40], [45], [48], [49],

[50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [56], [57], [58], [60], [61], [62], [63], [66], [67], [69], [81], [92], [97], [100], [121], [124], [129], [130], [131], [134], [137], [144], [173], [177], [182], [185], [186], [188], [189], [190], [191], [192], [193], [195], [197], [198], [199], [201], [202], [204], [205], [207], [209], [212], [214], [220], [239], [250], [258], [264], [265], [279], [285], [287], [292], [293], [300], [305], [307], [308], [309], [311], [319], [327], [329], [331], [335], [337], [338], [339], [340], [341], [342], [343], [344], [347], [348], [350], [351], [355], [356], [357], [358], [365], [368], [369], [370], [371], [372], [374], [375], [376], [379], [382], [383], [384], [387], [388], [389], [390], [391], [392], [393], [395], [396], [397], [398], [399], [400], [401], [402], [407], [410], [413], [422], [423], [425], [429], [437], [438], [439], [443], [444]
Louise, Princesse, daughter of Louis Philippe, consort of Leopold I., King of the Belgians, [126], [392]
Loulé, Marquise de, [189]
Lushington, Doctor, [334]
Lützow, Count, [67]
Lyndhurst, Lord, [118], [119]
Lyons, Sir Edmund, [411]
Maanen, Cornelius van, [29]
Macneil, British minister at Teheran, [235]
Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey, [145], [146], [147], [150], [152], [153], [157], [159], [161], [163], [165], [169], [219], [220], [227], [228], [229], [232], [237], [238], [239], [240], [242], [246]
Maison, Marshal, Marquis, [41], [64], [66], [67], [108]
Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, [164]
Mandeville, British chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, [154], [155], [157], [158], [160]
Maria II., Queen of Portugal, [171], [173], [174], [176], [189], [190]
Maria Amalia of Saxony, 3rd wife of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, [172]
Maria Christina, 4th wife of Ferdinand VII. and Queen Regent of Spain, [172], [173], [175], [176], [177], [186], [192], [194], [195], [202], [203], [206], [207], [209], [213], [215], [216], [217], [218], [307], [335], [336], [337], [338], [339], [340], [343], [344], [346], [348], [368], [369], [370], [372], [374], [376], [378], [379], [382], [383], [384], [385], [387], [389], [392], [395], [397], [398], [399], [400], [401]
Marie Amélie, Queen of the French, Consort of Louis Philippe, [9], [51], [391]
Mareuil, French chargé d'affaires in London, [132]
Maroto, General Rafael, [211], [212], [213], [214]
Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco, [178], [180], [184], [187], [190], [192]
Matuszewic, Count, [111], [115], [169]
Mauguin, François, [49]
Maurojeni, Turkish chargé d'affaires at Vienna, [153]
Mazzini, Giuseppe, [408]
Medem, Count, [252]
Meerenhout, French consul at Tahiti, [352], [353], [354], [444]
Mehemet Ali, [145], [146], [148], [149], [150], [151], [153], [154], [155], [156], [158], [159], [161], [164], [168], [169], [170], [171], [219], [220], [224], [227], [228], [229], [230], [231], [232], [233], [234], [237], [238], [239], [240], [241], [242], [243], [245], [246], [247], [248], [249], [250], [251], [253], [255], [256], [260], [261], [262], [263], [266], [267], [268], [269], [270], [271], [272], [273], [276], [277], [278], [280], [281], [282], [284], [285], [290], [291], [294], [295], [296], [297], [299], [300], [301], [303], [305], [308], [309], [310], [312], [313], [314], [315], [316], [317], [318], [321], [322], [323], [324], [325], [326], [403]
Melbourne, Viscount, [183], [186], [205], [266], [275], [282], [283], [286], [287], [297], [298], [299], [303], [307], [309], [326]
Mendizabal, Juan Alvarez, [191], [192], [193], [194], [195], [196], [201], [202]
Mérode, Comte Félix de, [55]
Metternich, Clement Wenceslas, Prince, [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [42], [43], [49], [65], [67], [68], [101], [103], [104], [105], [107], [108], [112], [114], [121], [135], [144], [166], [167], [168], [169], [198], [204], [225], [245], [247], [254], [266], [269], [293], [300], [310], [312], [316], [319], [320], [321], [322], [324], [326], [332], [336], [342], [343], [344], [370], [393], [407], [408], [409], [411], [412], [413], [414], [415], [416], [418], [421], [422], [423], [424], [429], [435], [437], [442], [443]
Meulinäer, Dutch statesman, [82], [84], [126], [128]
Miguel, Dom, usurping King of Portugal, [171], [173], [174], [175], [176], [177], [178], [179]
Miller, Major-General, [354]
Mimaut, French consul-general at Alexandria, [227], [272]
Minto, Earl of, [417], [418], [421], [424], [425], [427], [428], [431], [432], [433], [435], [442]
Miraflores, Marquis of, [378], [396]
Mohammad, Shah of Persia, [235], [236]
Molé, Louis, Comte, [31], [35], [36], [38], [39], [48], [196], [204], [205], [207], [212], [234], [329], [336]
Moltke, Major Helmuth von, afterwards Field-Marshal, [230], [238], [251]
Montalivet, Comte de, [45]
Montpensier, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, [371], [372], [377], [383], [387], [391], [393], [394], [397], [398], [400], [401], [402]
Montrond, Comte Casimir de, [32], [58]
Morier, Burnet, [426]
Morier, David, [425], [426], [432]
Morny, Duc de, [53]
Mortemart, Duc de, [87]
Mounier, Baron, [321]
Muñagorri, Basque lawyer, [210], [212]
Muravieff, General, [154], [155], [156], [158]
Mustafa-Effendi, [153]
Namic Pasha, [153]
Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, [175], [290], [295], [301], [313], [314], [315], [316], [317], [360]
Napoleon, Prince Charles, [66]
Napoleon, Prince Louis, afterwards Napoleon III., [53], [66], [121], [285], [286]
Narvaez, General Ramon Maria, [211], [335], [346], [368], [374], [376], [378], [379], [383]
Nemours, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, [52], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [60], [61], [139], [189], [373]
Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count, [20], [22], [87], [88], [90], [110], [125], [156], [165], [166], [167], [168], [220], [221], [236], [252], [269], [365]
Neumann, Baron, [258], [263], [266], [273], [283]
Nicholas I., Tsar of Russia, [20], [26], [27], [28], [36], [44], [68], [73], [88], [90], [101], [105], [108], [109], [112], [113], [116], [123], [124], [135], [140], [146], [147], [154], [156], [157], [160], [163], [166],

[168], [220], [223], [224], [239], [241], [246], [253], [257], [319], [356], [357], [429]
Normanby, Marquis of, [391], [393], [407], [411], [416], [439], [441]
Nourri-Effendi, [242], [262], [263]
Nuñoz. See [Rianzarez, Duke of]
Nuñoz, brother of Duke of Rianzarez, [390]
Ochsenbein, Ulrich, [424], [427], [428], [429], [432], [433]
O'Donnell, General, [216], [338]
Olozaga, Salustiano de, [339]
Orange, Prince Frederick of, [29]
Orange, William, Prince of, [29], [36], [47], [48], [50], [52], [57], [70], [76], [83]
Orléans, Duc de. See [Louis Philippe], King of the French
Orleans, Duc de, eldest son of Louis Philippe, [139], [198], [204], [225], [293]
Orloff, General, Count Alexis, [108], [109], [110], [111], [112], [113], [114], [115], [116], [162], [163], [170], [254]
Osman Bey, [243]
Otho, King of Greece, [311], [411]
Otrante, Comte Athanase de, [65]
Pageot, French diplomatist, [341], [342], [343]
Palmella, Duke of, [189]
Palmerston, Viscount, [41], [42], [46], [49], [53], [58], [59], [60], [61], [66], [70], [72], [75], [76], [77], [78], [80], [81], [82], [84], [85], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91], [92], [95], [96], [98], [99], [102], [105], [106], [107], [109], [112], [113], [115], [116], [125], [128], [134], [136], [139], [141], [143], [144], [153], [156], [166], [169], [173], [177], [178], [179], [180], [181], [182], [186], [187], [189], [192], [194], [195], [196], [199], [201], [202], [204], [208], [209], [213], [217], [219], [221], [222], [223], [225], [226], [228], [229], [230], [231], [232], [233], [236], [238], [239], [240], [241], [244], [245], [246], [248], [249], [251], [253], [254], [255], [256], [257], [258], [261], [262], [263], [264], [265], [266], [267], [268], [270], [273], [274], [275], [276], [277], [278], [279], [281], [282], [284], [285], [286], [287], [288], [289], [290], [292], [296], [297], [298], [299], [302], [303], [304], [305], [307], [309], [310], [311], [312], [313], [314], [315], [320], [321], [322], [324], [325], [326], [327], [328], [330], [331], [332], [333], [336], [352], [380], [381], [382], [383], [384], [385], [386], [388], [389], [390], [391], [392], [393], [394], [395], [396], [397], [399], [400], [401], [402], [403], [404], [406], [407], [411], [415], [416], [417], [424], [425], [426], [427], [428], [429], [430], [431], [432], [433], [435], [436], [440], [441], [442], [444]
Palmerston, Lady, [382]
Panizzi, Sir Anthony, [441]
Parnell, Sir Henry, [39]
Pedro I., Emperor of Brazil, [171], [172], [173], [175], [176], [178], [189]
Peel, Sir Robert, [183], [186], [222], [281], [327], [331], [357], [360], [372], [373], [380], [381], [401], [432]
Peel, Robert, son of Sir Robert, [431], [432], [433]
Périer, Casimir, [39], [62], [63], [64], [67], [68], [72], [75], [78], [79], [81], [86], [100], [102], [103], [105], [108], [112], [118], [120], [121], [129], [130]
Périgord, Comte Edmond de, [32]
Piscatory, French minister at Athens, [411]
Pius IX., Pope, [409], [414]
Polignac, Prince Jules de, [3], [14], [15], [26], [45], [155]
Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, [352], [353], [354], [361], [365]
Ponsonby, Viscount, [50], [52], [54], [55], [56], [59], [60], [71], [72], [156], [162], [223], [224], [229], [230], [231], [232], [234], [239], [240], [243], [244], [247], [248], [269], [270], [273], [291], [303], [305], [316], [324], [325], [326], [415]
Pontois, French ambassador at Constantinople, [269], [291], [292]
Pottinger, Eldred, [235]
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles, Count, [160]
Prim, Brigadier-General, afterwards Marshal, [346]
Pritchard, George, [353], [354], [355], [356], [360], [361], [362], [363], [364], [365], [366], [367], [444]
Quesada, General, [203]
Radetzky, Field-Marshal, Count, [104], [435], [437]
Radowitz, General von, [436], [437]
Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, [235]
Rayneval, Alphonse Gérard de, [187], [195], [197]
Reeve, Henry, [281], [302], [312], [329]
Reichstadt, Duc de, son of Napoleon I., [67], [121]
Rémusat, Comte Charles de, [5], [47]
Reshid Bey, [159]
Reshid, Mustafa, Pasha, [229], [239], [240], [244], [269], [273], [291], [292]
[Rianzarez], Duke of, [369], [372], [387]
Riego, Rafael del, [179]
Rifat Bey, [288], [290], [294], [301]
Rigny, Admiral, Comte de, [178], [179]
Rives, American minister in Paris, [5]
Rodil, General, [179]
Rossi, Comte Pellegrino, [410], [421]
Roussin, Albin Reine, Admiral, Baron, [75], [158], [159], [160], [162], [168], [172], [228], [234], [241], [247], [248], [257], [272], [302]
Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, [130]
Russell, Lord John, [282], [297], [299], [303], [380], [381], [383], [392], [416], [442]
Sainte-Aulaire, Louis-Clair de Beaupoil, Marquis de, [66], [104], [193], [247], [333], [380], [428]
Saldanha, Marshal, Duke of, [189]
Salis-Soglio, Ulrich von, [430]
Salvandy, Comte de, [340], [341]
Sami Bey, [272], [273]
Samos, Prince of, [272]
Sand, Karl Ludwig, [24]
Sarim-Effendi, [227], [228], [272]
Sarsfield, General Pedro, [207]
Sartorius, Sir George, [172], [175]
Sébastiani, General, afterwards Marshal, [41], [51], [52], [54], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [63], [64], [65], [67], [69], [70], [72], [73], [77], [79], [80], [82], [85], [86], [87], [89], [94], [98], [99], [100], [132], [256], [257], [258], [259], [348]
Sébastiani, General Tiburce, [100]
Serrano, General, [411]
Sèves, Colonel. See [Soliman Pasha]
Seymour, George, [106], [107]
Simonitch, Count, [235], [236]
[Soliman] Pasha, [149], [ 291], [301]
Sotomayor, Duke of, [382]
Soult, Marshal, Duc de Dalmatie, [79], [85], [131], [132], [142], [197], [212], [240], [241], [242], [243], [246], [248], [249], [250], [252], [254], [255], [256], [257], [259], [260], [309], [356]
Southern, secretary to British legation and chargé d'affaires at Madrid, [194], [215], [337]
[Spencer], Earl, [183], [297]
Stockmar, Baron, [77], [84], [91], [92], [93], [98], [101], [115], [116], [125], [126], [127], [439]
Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, [249], [251], [264], [278], [289], [290], [301], [311], [314], [315]
Stuart de Rothesay, Lord, [34], [35], [38], [45], [48], [53]
Stürmer, Baron, [247], [316], [326]
Soliman Pasha, [149], [291], [301]
Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de, [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [36], [37],

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Taylor, Sir Brooke, [66]
Temple, Sir William, [264]
Terceira, Duke of, [176]
Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, [4], [8], [132], [197], [198], [201], [203], [204], [225], [226], [227], [260], [261], [262], [263], [264], [265], [267], [268], [269], [270], [271], [272], [273], [274], [278], [279], [280], [281], [282], [283], [284], [288], [291], [292], [294], [295], [296], [297], [298], [302], [304], [305], [306], [308], [309], [310], [311], [312], [313], [318], [328], [329], [412], [437], [439], [440], [441]
Toreno, Count, [192], [337], [343], [396]
Trapani, Count, [369], [370], [373], [374], [376], [378], [379], [384], [387], [402]
Turner, Lieutenant, [208], [210], [212]
Varennes, French chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, [154], [155], [157], [160]
Véron, Doctor Louis-Désiré, [248]
Verstolk van Soelen, Johan Gijsbert, Dutch statesman, [71], [113]
Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, [212], [285], [299], [303], [325], [348], [350], [356], [367], [368], [372], [373], [391], [392], [417]
Villèle, Jean-Baptiste de, [146]
Villiers, George. See [Clarendon, Earl of]
Vogoride, Prince Nicolae, [272]
Walewski, Comte, [284], [294], [411]
Walker, Captain, [245], [301], [314]
Wellington, Duke of, [14], [15], [28], [32], [34], [37], [41], [81], [86], [96], [116], [119], [147], [183], [185], [222], [223], [224], [281], [287], [331], [332], [357]
Werther, Baron, [31], [136], [295], [319]
Weyer, Silvain van de, [52], [91], [100], [116], [117], [128]
William I., King of the Netherlands, [29], [43], [47], [55], [70], [71], [72], [74], [75], [76], [77], [80], [91], [93], [101], [109], [110], [112], [113], [115], [122], [123], [125], [127], [133], [135], [137], [138], [141], [142], [143]
William IV., King of Great Britain, [15], [32], [39], [40], [106], [118], [134], [137], [153], [183]
Witkewitch, Captain, [235], [236]
Wittgenstein, Prince, [22], [24], [437]
Wylde, Colonel, [187], [200], [201], [210], [213]
Zumalacárregui, General, [183], [200]
Zuylen, Baron van, [125], [128]

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