England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING

Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, had held the same office in the government of the Duke of Wellington. He had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with the attitude which England was to observe towards the revolution in Belgium. His first experience of diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been sent upon a special mission to Vienna, and had been concerned in the negotiations which had resulted in the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the campaign in Germany he had accompanied the headquarters of the allied armies and had been profoundly impressed by the scenes of which he had been a witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed widely that, should complications arise, the spectacle of Leipsic after “the battle of the nations” would be ever present before the eyes of England’s Foreign Secretary.[713]

With regard to the more important questions which the Foreign Office had in hand, or with which it had recently been called upon to deal, Aberdeen was in substantial agreement with Palmerston. He approved of his policy in the Egyptian affair and endorsed his views as to the necessity of encouraging Spain to shake off the influence of France. But he was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing Franco-British relations upon their former intimate footing, and of allaying the irritation which the Treaty of July had aroused. To attain this end he was prepared to make far greater concessions than any to which Palmerston would have consented. No one was so convinced as he of the truth of the saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington, that the peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as France and England were united. It was not in their policies, but in their personal characters, that lay the real difference between Aberdeen and Palmerston. Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself the pleasure of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of an opponent’s arguments. Aberdeen, although in some respects more of a Liberal than his predecessor, had a scholar’s abhorrence, which had been intensified by his former relations with Metternich and other continental statesmen, of all movements of a revolutionary character. Palmerston was a man of coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave and studious successor.

Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord Aberdeen and of M. Guizot to bring matters to a successful conclusion, the first important transaction between the new British government and the French Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831, and again in 1833, France and England had contracted certain engagements towards each other for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. They had agreed that their cruisers should stop and overhaul any suspected vessel, whether flying the French or the British flag. Palmerston, however, had not been content with an arrangement, which limited the right of search to ships purporting to be of French or English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination with France, made representations on the subject to the other Powers and succeeded in inducing them to agree to the principle which the French and English governments had adopted. The new convention, to which all the chief European Powers were to be parties, was ready for signature at the time when it became evident that a change of government in England was about to take place. Palmerston, who had always been keenly interested in suppressing the slave trade, was particularly anxious that his name should be affixed to an international agreement which, he hoped, would prove the means of abolishing a traffic which he abhorred. M. Guizot, however, saw fit purposely to delay matters in order to deprive him of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of his reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston’s attitude towards him, he complained to Henry Bulwer, had been unfriendly. In his dispatch of November 2, 1840,[714] he had shown a total lack of consideration for the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech to his constituents at Tiverton he had made some highly offensive remarks about the manner in which the French military authorities in Algeria were carrying on their war with the Arab tribes.[715]

But, once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing Street, M. Guizot’s objections to proceeding with the slave trade convention disappeared. The necessary powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty, regulating the right of search, was signed in London. It was soon clear, however, that M. Guizot had been mistaken in supposing that the Chamber would agree to ratify the agreement into which he had entered. The opposition to slavery had never been so pronounced in France as in England, and the Treaty of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling of jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason of England’s naval preponderance, the duty of stopping suspected vessels must necessarily devolve chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended that the new treaty was but a device, by means of which England purposed to arrogate to herself the right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling that M. Guizot was forced to inform the British government that France would be unable to ratify. Popular opposition, it was thought, would diminish with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open, in the hope that France might still become a party to the treaty. But this expectation was not fulfilled, and on November 9, 1842, the definite withdrawal of France was officially communicated to Lord Aberdeen. The affair caused no little resentment and disappointment in England. Three years later, however, M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the question. By that time the relations of the two countries were upon a more friendly footing, and the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington, the commissioners of their respective governments, succeeded, in consequence, in arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of previous conventions, but provided that, in future, the right of search in African waters should be exercised by a joint Franco-British squadron.[716]

Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the question which was to occupy the chief attention of the two governments. It has been related how, in the autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to quit Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year, the Cortes had elected Espartero sole Regent of the kingdom. This solution of the difficulty was by no means acquiesced in as satisfactory by all parties. The elevation of the popular general to the head of the government was necessarily regarded as a victory for the Progressistas and, consequently, as a triumph for English diplomacy. Indeed, since the abdication of the Queen-Mother, the Moderados, as a parliamentary party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders still continued to correspond with Christina, whose house in the Rue de Courcelles in Paris soon became the centre of a vast conspiracy against the new Regent.

Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety that the Moderado chiefs, together with General Narvaez and other military rivals of Espartero, were plotting in Paris[717] to overthrow the new order of affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen’s marriage suddenly sprang into prominence. Isabella was not yet twelve years of age, but already the selection of her husband was the subject of grave deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had always considered it to be vitally important that her daughter should marry a member of one of the great reigning families. As far back as the year 1838, at a most critical period of the civil war, when it was evident that no assistance was to be expected from Louis Philippe, she had suggested to the British minister that Isabella might be affianced to an English prince. If the difficulties arising from the difference of religion should prove insurmountable, she would be satisfied with the betrothal of her daughter to a member of the House of Coburg, “on account of the excellent education which the princes of that family had received, and on account of their near connection with Her Britannic Majesty.”[718] Villiers was without instructions upon the point, but he took upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the English match could never be effected. Christina, thereupon, announced her intention of marrying her daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of Austria. It was a combination which, “she was now convinced, afforded the best means of pacifying the country.” The negotiations at Vienna, she informed him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermúdez and their success would largely depend upon the amount of support given them by the British government.[719]

Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers’ despatch, immediately conveyed to him “Her Majesty’s gracious approbation of the course which he had pursued.”[720] At the same time, he informed him that the British government could not possibly take part in M. de Cea’s negotiations at Vienna, “without in the first instance communicating thereupon with the government of France and, as the King of the French would be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was not probable that such a communication would contribute much to the accomplishment of the object.” Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This view of the case was soon borne out by the event. Metternich at once disclaimed any intention of listening to Christina’s proposals, whilst M. Molé, who, notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed, was aware of the reasons of M. de Cea’s presence at Vienna, declared to Lord Granville that “the armed intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be the consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian prince upon the throne of Spain.”[721]

The triumph of the constitutionalists and the termination of the civil war necessarily invested Isabella with an importance which she had not possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was uncertain. Once the stability of her throne seemed assured, she appeared to Louis Philippe in the light of a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the month of November, 1839, Christina’s former minister, Count Toreno, was understood to be engaged in negotiating a marriage between a son of the King of the French and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme, reported the British chargé d’affaires, had numerous supporters. But the Queen Regent had informed him privately that “she was hostile to the match and had other views for her daughter.”[722] It is probable that Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her intentions to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, after her abdication, her objections to the French marriage diminished. But, inasmuch as she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for overturning Espartero, she was necessarily compelled to conceal her real sentiments. The re-establishment of French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied a foremost place in the policy both of the King and of M. Guizot. So long, however, as Espartero and the Progressistas were in power there was little prospect that they would be enabled to bring their plans to a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances, therefore, they were disposed to regard with a friendly eye the proceedings of the military and Moderado malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly suspected that some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and Christina, in return, undertook to employ her parental influence over Isabella in favour of her marriage with the Prince de Joinville or the Duc d’Aumale.[723]

The insurrection against Espartero broke out early in October, 1841. The standard of rebellion was raised by O’Donnell at Pampeluna and by the generals commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa. But their plans, which had been so carefully matured in Paris, miscarried, and the loyal troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing their followers and in restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile, had been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in recent history. On the night of October 7, Generals Concha and Diego Leon, at the head of a band of military conspirators, penetrated into the palace with the object of carrying off the young Queen. But when they attempted to ascend the grand staircase they encountered a determined party of halberdiers. A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of musketry reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had sought refuge with her attendants. But help was soon forthcoming. The resistance of the halberdiers had enabled the national militia, which was animated by strong Liberal and Progressista sentiments, to assemble. At the appearance of the citizen soldiers the conspirators either fled or laid down their arms. Some of their leaders escaped to France, but Leon was captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of his treason, his youth, his good looks and his former distinguished services earning for him a sympathy which the circumstances of his case in no way justified.

“With respect to the share of the French government in organizing and promoting this enterprise,”wrote Lord Aberdeen, “I do not think it necessary to enter into an enquiry at present. We have received the most positive assurances that they have been entirely strangers to the undertaking. Whatever may be the value of these assurances, the attempt having happily failed, there appears to be no advantage in testifying suspicion and distrust.”[724] He, accordingly, directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade Olozaga, the Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a tone as possible in his communications with M. Guizot. The Spanish government was naturally deeply incensed at the encouragement which the conspirators had received in Paris, and their representations on the subject included a demand for the expulsion of Christina from France. This was peremptorily refused and the relations of the two countries began to assume a very disquieting appearance. In Bulwer’s opinion, were Louis Philippe to receive any encouragement from Austria or Prussia, he might not improbably embark upon a war with Spain. “Should hostilities break out,” he warned Lord Aberdeen, “Barcelona would be the French objective, on account of the effect which its capture would have on those Courts which are fearful of the democratic opinions prevailing there.”[725]

Aberdeen’s instructions to Mr. Aston, the British minister at Madrid, were of the same nature as those transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He was to warn the Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure Espartero that “the policy of Great Britain would continue to be directed towards the maintenance of the real independence of Spain and to her protection from whatever quarter she might be threatened.”[726] Meanwhile, the British government would make every effort to induce the Northern Courts formally to acknowledge the sovereignty of Isabella.[727] Whether designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord Aberdeen in this direction were frustrated by France. Owing in a great measure to his good offices, the Spanish government withdrew its demand for Christina’s expulsion.[728] Louis Philippe, thereupon, directed M. de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had been appointed ambassador at Madrid, to proceed to his post. But this measure, which seemed to foreshadow the establishment of more harmonious relations between the two countries, led to a most unfortunate complication. Salvandy, upon his arrival at Madrid, insisted upon being allowed to place his credentials in the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely declined to present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides invoked precedents in support of their attitude and pressed their arguments with the greatest warmth. Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid taking with him all the members of his embassy, with the exception of his second secretary, the Duc de Glücksberg, a son of Louis XVIII.’s favourite minister, the Duc Décazes.

It is unnecessary to discuss the various questions of diplomatic etiquette raised in this controversy. Whilst, upon the whole, inclining to the French point of view, Lord Aberdeen was of opinion that the dispute could have been amicably adjusted without great difficulty. The attitude of Mr. Aston, he considered, had not been altogether satisfactory, and he was disposed to impute blame to him for not having discovered some basis for a compromise. Not content with censuring him, he allowed M. Guizot to be furnished with a copy of the letter in which his disapproval was expressed.[729] When Salvandy was appointed to the Court of Madrid Bulwer had described him as “a man of letters, but pompous and ridiculous in manner and unlikely to acquire an influence over the young Queen of Spain.”[730] But, if it was the secret desire of Louis Philippe to provoke a quarrel with Espartero, he was perhaps the most suitable person he could have selected for the purpose. The dispute involving, as it was supposed to have done, the monarchical principle had effectually dispelled all hope that the absolute Powers would agree to renew diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid—a circumstance which Louis Philippe, in conversation with the British ambassador, affected “to deplore most deeply.”[731] So far as France was concerned, however, the Duc de Glücksberg was left at Madrid without official title, in order merely to carry on the ordinary business between the two countries.

But in all matters relating to Spanish affairs the question of Isabella’s marriage occupied the foremost place. Louis Philippe now protested that he had never for a moment entertained the idea of putting forward one of his sons as a candidate for her hand. But, after making this assertion, he invariably added that he should object to her marrying any prince who did not belong to either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon.[732] Accordingly, in February, 1842, he sent M. Pageot, who had been for several years first secretary of the French embassy at Madrid, to London, for the purpose of obtaining the accession of the British government to the principle that the husband of the Queen of Spain must be a descendant of Philip V. After leaving London Pageot was to proceed to Vienna, where he was to hold the same language to Prince Metternich.

Neither in London nor at Vienna, however, was M. Pageot able to bring his mission to a successful conclusion. Lord Aberdeen declared emphatically that England could not recognize the right of France to dispose of the hand of Isabella. The British government looked upon the matter “as an exclusively Spanish affair, which ought to be regulated solely by considerations affecting the happiness of the Queen and the welfare of her people.” At these words M. Pageot, at once, interposed with the remark that he presumed that he was now at liberty to inform his government that England would not object to her marriage with a French prince. But Aberdeen, with equal promptitude, added an important amendment to his first statement. The marriage of the Queen of Spain with a son of Louis Philippe would, he asserted, upset the balance of power, and England would always oppose any combination calculated to produce political consequences of that nature.[733] Metternich was no less emphatic in protesting against the pretensions of the King of the French to dictate on such a subject to an independent State. Nor was he less decided in declaring that the general interests of Europe would be endangered by Isabella’s marriage with a son of Louis Philippe. In his opinion the whole Spanish question might be amicably settled by the betrothal of the Queen to a son of Don Carlos, without any sacrifice of their respective rights, as in the case of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth century. This was a view of the case, however, with which the British government was unable to concur. “Prince Metternich,” wrote Aberdeen,[734] “has been misled by a fancied historical analogy. The solution, he suggests, might have been productive of good whilst the civil war was in progress and whilst Don Carlos was in possession of the northern provinces. But, now that he and his adherents have been driven from Spain as fugitives, it would be regarded with the utmost repugnance by the majority of Spaniards. A marriage of the Queen with a son of Don Carlos, although it might reconcile the personal claims of each, would inevitably bring into fierce and hostile contact the passions and opinions of their adherents.”

Pageot’s mission, therefore, had done little to advance the question of Isabella’s marriage. Meanwhile, Count Toreno, Christina’s confidential adviser in Paris, had, on several occasions, sought out Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, for the express purpose of informing him that the Queen-Mother would prefer to see her daughter married to a Coburg rather than to a Bourbon prince.[735] At the same time Espartero was known to be engaged in attempting to negotiate her marriage with the third son of the King of Bavaria. Louis Philippe, for his part, was more than ever determined to restrict her choice of a husband to the Bourbon candidates, and, in Lord Cowley’s opinion, had serious thoughts “of supporting his pretensions by an armament.”[736] It was, however, by more indirect methods that he proposed to attain his ends. All through the spring and summer of 1842 the Spanish malcontents, both in Paris and upon the frontiers, displayed renewed activity. The Carlists and the Christinos, having concluded an alliance based upon the marriage of Isabella with a son of the Pretender, openly prepared for united action against their common enemy, the Regent Espartero.[737] This compact was, doubtless, the reason of the seeming approval, given by Louis Philippe, to Metternich’s utterly impracticable plan for settling the Spanish difficulty.[738] Neither the representations of the Spanish government nor a strong protest from Lord Aberdeen[739] had any effect in inducing the French authorities to place any check upon the proceedings of the conspirators.

In November, 1842, a formidable insurrection broke out at Barcelona. The rising assumed from the outset a republican character, and, in their first conflicts with the troops, the insurgents were uniformly successful. The arrival of reinforcements, however, soon altered the aspect of affairs and enabled General Van Halen to re-establish the authority of the Regent. Once more Louis Philippe and Christina were loudly accused of having promoted the outbreak. The Queen-Mother, reported Lord Cowley, undoubtedly supplied the revolutionists with money, and General Atthalin, a close personal friend of the King and an officer of his household, had been in secret communication with the organizers of the movement. “The Spanish government,” wrote Mr. Aston, “considers that the insurrection at Barcelona has been promoted by France with the twofold object of preventing the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Great Britain and of causing the downfall of the Regent.[740] The complaints, which the Spanish chargé d’affaires was instructed to make in Paris, bore especially upon the proceedings of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps,[741] the French consul at Barcelona, who was accused of having actively assisted the insurgents. M. Guizot, however, who, according to Lord Cowley, had taken no part in these intrigues, defended the conduct of Lesseps and directed the Duc de Glücksberg to obtain a retractation of the charges brought against him from the Cabinet of Madrid.[742] The situation thus assumed a very dangerous appearance, and Lord Aberdeen intervened once more in the interests of peace. Let the Spanish government, he urged, institute a calm and dispassionate inquiry into all the facts alleged against the French consul and let no reparation be demanded of the French government, unless there be evidence of his culpability sufficient to satisfy all impartial persons.[743] This advice was accepted, and, after a thorough examination of all the circumstances of the case, a disavowal of certain of the more serious charges was inserted in the Gazette at Madrid. Nevertheless, as Lord Aberdeen pointed out, “few people could read with impartial attention the various documents without coming to the conclusion that M. de Lesseps did very considerably exceed the limits of his consular duties,” and he, therefore, ventured to express the hope that the French government “would no longer retain him in the place where his undue activity had been displayed.[744]

Under ordinary circumstances, Louis Philippe would not have hesitated to dispense with the services of a consul, who had shown sympathy with a republican insurrection. But it being his secret policy to create every kind of embarrassment for Espartero he declined to recall M. de Lesseps.[745] The refusal of the French government aroused great indignation in Spain and materially contributed to increase the difficulties which were threatening to overwhelm the Regent.[746] The popular general, the idol of the nation, was now an object of execration with all parties. His stern repression of anarchy had gained for him the hatred of the extreme democrats, whilst his ignorance of the principles of representative government had involved him in innumerable disputes with the Cortes. The only remedy which he could apply to the situation was to prorogue the Chambers and assume the powers of a military dictator. But the army was no longer his willing instrument. The senior officers, with few exceptions, held Moderado opinions, and, for the past two years, General Narvaez and other agents of Christina had been busily engaged in undermining their loyalty. In the month of June, 1843, Brigadier Prim raised the cry of “Down with Espartero,” to which his troops responded eagerly. The revolution spread rapidly. Whilst regiment after regiment deserted the cause of the Regent, Narvaez appeared before Madrid at the head of a division. After a feeble resistance on the part of the national militia the capital opened its gates. In the south meanwhile, on July 29, Espartero, having been abandoned by his troops, embarked at Cadiz on a British ship, and sought refuge in England, where he was feasted by the City of London and acclaimed by the populace.

For some weeks prior to these events the threatening aspect of affairs had been a frequent subject of discussion between Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and Lord Cowley. Both the King and his minister had but one remedy to suggest for the many ills from which Spain was suffering. Espartero, they declared, would speedily find that all his difficulties would disappear, were he to devote his whole attention to effecting the marriage of Isabella with a Bourbon. If England desired to see the dangers now threatening the Regent averted, let her join with France in urging him to adopt this policy.[747] Aberdeen, however, declined to entertain this request. The matter, he maintained, was one in which no Foreign Power had a right to interfere, whilst, “as to whether the proposed marriage would be likely to answer the expectations of those who counselled it, Her Majesty’s government did not feel called upon to express an opinion.”[748] But as the situation in Spain daily increased in gravity, Lord Cowley became persuaded that a fresh complication was to be apprehended. Should Espartero be overthrown, he warned his chief, it was greatly to be feared that the victorious party would demand the marriage of Isabella with a son of Louis Philippe. If such an alliance were to be proposed, the French nation would be flattered and might not improbably insist upon the offer being accepted, “even at the risk of war.”[749]

The downfall of Espartero and the new danger to which Cowley had drawn his attention caused Lord Aberdeen’s resolution to waver. He now proposed that France and England should unite their efforts for the purpose of restoring order in Spain. Under the circumstances this was practically an intimation that he was prepared to reconsider his often-repeated declaration that the marriage of Isabella was an exclusively Spanish affair. It was certainly interpreted in this sense by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, who accepted the offer with the utmost alacrity. It was their policy to affect the greatest confidence that, in their hour of triumph, Christina and her friends would defer to the advice of France in all matters. But in their hearts they had doubtless grave misgivings upon the subject, and they were, consequently, only too delighted to obtain the support of England to their schemes. Marshal Sébastiani was at once despatched to London to confer upon the situation.[750] He was to assure Lord Aberdeen that Louis Philippe would never allow one of his sons to marry the Queen of Spain. Personally the King would prefer that she should marry a son of Don Carlos, but he would not oppose her union with any member of either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon. Scarcely, however, had the marshal arrived in England than it was announced that Queen Victoria purposed to pay the king of the French a visit at the Château d’Eu, near le Tréport. Her Majesty was to be accompanied by her Foreign Secretary, who would thus be enabled personally to discuss matters with M. Guizot.

The Queen duly arrived at Eu, on September 2, and prolonged her stay until the 7th, as the guest of the King. In every respect the visit proved an immense success.[751] Her Majesty’s affectionate regard for Louis Philippe was destined, before long, to diminish greatly, but she appears always to have looked back with pleasure upon the days spent in company with his family at Eu.[752] Although social amenities were the feature of the visit, Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were enabled to discuss grave matters of State. Both appear to have been equally satisfied with the result of their informal conferences,[753] and their agreement upon Spanish affairs was afterwards confirmed by Aberdeen in an official despatch. “All that can at present be done,” he wrote, “is that both governments should act cordially and unreservedly together, taking for the principle of their conduct the real good of Spain, without reference to the supposed separate interests of either. . . . Her Majesty’s government are still of opinion that to the Queen and the nation should be left the selection of the Royal Consort. But they will not be found unwilling to offer such friendly counsel to the Spanish government as may aid them in coming to a sound decision. With this view, although Her Majesty’s government cannot admit that the preferable claims of any prince or family are such as to control the free choice of the Spanish government, they would be fully disposed to concur in the proposition of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and to recommend that the selection of the Queen’s Consort should be made from the descendants of Philip V. . . .”[754]

Shortly after the conclusion of the Queen’s visit to Eu, M. de Jarnac,[755] the French chargé d’affaires in London, was the guest of Lord Aberdeen at Haddo. On one occasion his host placed in his hands a letter in which he referred to the “cordial understanding,”which he now believed had been established between France and England.[756] This designation struck M. Guizot as singularly happy, and both he and Louis Philippe henceforward constantly employed it to describe the complete accord existing between the French and British governments.

An occasion quickly arose which enabled England to show that “the cordial understanding” was, so far as she was concerned, no diplomatic fiction. The Duc de Bordeaux, more commonly known by the title of Comte de Chambord which he shortly afterwards assumed, arrived in London, towards the end of November. The prince was the posthumous son of the Duc de Berri and the sole surviving male representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons. No sooner was he installed in the house, which had been taken for him in Belgrave Square, than hundreds of French legitimists flocked to London. They were for the most part members of the old noble families, but among the pilgrims was M. Berryer, the distinguished advocate and parliamentary orator. Even old Chateaubriand, who since the Revolution of July had taken no part in politics, journeyed to London to testify his devotion to the prince, whom he and his party acclaimed as Henri V. King of France and Navarre.[757] These proceedings aroused considerable excitement in France and caused Louis Philippe and his ministers some uneasiness. The French ambassador had already been instructed to urge that Queen Victoria should refuse to receive the young prince, on the ground that it was the evident intention of his adherents to give to his visit the character of a political demonstration against the House of Orleans. The Queen[758] had promptly signified her readiness to comply with this demand. It was not possible, however, to accede to a further request, made after the arrival of the Duc de Bordeaux in London, that the proceedings in Belgrave Square should be forcibly put a stop to, seeing that they in no way infringed the law of England. An intimation was, nevertheless, conveyed to His Royal Highness that Her Majesty greatly disliked these demonstrations and would, in consequence, be pleased to hear that he had decided to curtail his stay in London. This message produced the required effect. The Duc de Bordeaux, a few days later, departed from Belgrave Square, and, during the remainder of the time which he spent in England, his conduct was irreproachable.[759]

The promptitude with which the Queen and her government had responded to his wishes was very gratifying to Louis Philippe. In their Speeches from the Throne, both Sovereigns, at the opening of their respective Parliaments, alluded to “the cordial understanding” which had been established between their governments. Nevertheless, before the close of the session of 1844, the two countries were once more upon the brink of war. In the year 1839, a company had been formed at Nantes for the purpose of founding a French colony in New Zealand. The undertaking was supported by the government, which proposed annexing both islands. But, before the arrival of the French expedition, Captain Hobson proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Britannic Majesty over New Zealand, and its acquisition was duly notified in the London Gazette of October 2, 1840. The French government bowed before the accomplished fact, but prepared to seek another outlet in the Pacific. The following year, accordingly, a squadron, under the command of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, was dispatched to take possession of the Marquesas Islands, where it was proposed to establish a penal colony. Not content, however, with carrying out his instructions the admiral, upon his own responsibility, proceeded to declare a French protectorate over Tahiti, the most important of the islands of the Society group. More than fifty years before, Tahiti had been visited by the first English missionaries. Owing to their unremitting efforts, the islanders had gradually been converted to the Protestant religion and had acquired civilized habits. On two occasions the Sovereign, Queen Pomare, had offered to place herself under the protection of the British flag, but both Canning and Palmerston had declined to accede to her proposal. In August, 1842, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars anchored off the island. He came to exact reparation for the alleged ill-treatment of two French priests. He demanded a large indemnity and threatened a bombardment, unless payment were made within twenty-four hours. It was altogether out of the power of Queen Pomare to comply with these conditions. Resistance was, however, out of the question. By the advice of the French consul, M. Meerenhout, she begged to be allowed to place herself under the protection of France. It was M. Meerenhout who was supposed to have counselled the French admiral to make his descent upon the island.[760]

The admiral’s report of his proceedings at Tahiti afforded little satisfaction either to the King or to M. Guizot.[761] But to have disavowed him would have exposed them to the charge of truckling to England—an accusation which would probably have proved fatal to the existence of the government. The establishment of a French protectorate over the islands was, accordingly, published in the Moniteur of March 20, 1843. The announcement was much resented in England. It was not possible, however, for England to object to France assuming a responsibility which she herself had twice declined to undertake. Lord Aberdeen’s communications with M. Guizot on the subject were, consequently, confined to the expression of a hope that the British missionaries would not be interfered with, and that the sovereign rights of Queen Pomare would be respected. With both these requests the French government readily promised to comply.[762] But, in the meantime, affairs at Tahiti had not been progressing smoothly.

When the Queen was induced to invoke the protection of France, Mr. Pritchard, the British consul, was absent from the island on a visit to Australia. Pritchard had, for a long time past, been engaged in missionary work and in trading in the South Seas. According to his own statement, however, upon his appointment to the post of consul at Tahiti, he had severed his connection with the Methodist missionary society of which he had been a member.[763] Meerenhout, the French consul, on the other hand, was an ardent Roman Catholic, but, like his British colleague, he too combined the business of trading with his official duties.[764] Racial prejudice, sectarian zeal and trade rivalry account sufficiently for the bitter enmity which existed between the two men. The news of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars’ proceedings reached Pritchard at Sidney, and his own correspondence shows that he started upon his return journey with the intention of doing everything in his power to induce the British government “to interfere” and with the expectation of finding “many difficulties to encounter.”[765] His first act upon his arrival at Tahiti was to instigate Queen Pomare, over whom he appears to have had great influence, to write to Her Britannic Majesty. In this curious document Queen Pomare, after inviting her “sister friend” to commiserate with her in the difficulties in which she was involved with the French, begged her “to send a large ship of war” to her assistance. The circumstances under which the demand for French protection had been extorted from her were narrated, much space being devoted to the part played in the transaction by M. Meerenhout, “a very bad and troublesome man.”[766]

It was evident to Lord Aberdeen that the attitude adopted by Mr. Pritchard might at any moment produce some disagreeable incident, the danger of a chance collision being enhanced by the ill-feeling which prevailed between the French and British naval officers. He decided, therefore, to appoint Major-General Miller, upon whose prudence and judgment he could depend, consul-general of the Pacific Islands, and to place under his orders all the British consuls in the South Seas. At the same time, he sent off instructions to Mr. Pritchard enjoining him to recommend a prudent line of conduct to Queen Pomare and carefully “to avoid any expression calculated to encourage her or her chiefs to expect assistance from England.” Her Majesty’s government, whilst strongly disapproving the action of the French authorities at Tahiti and deploring the humiliations inflicted upon the Queen, “was precluded from interfering authoritatively on her behalf.”[767] But, before this despatch could reach its destination, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars reappeared at Tahiti. On this occasion he had returned to complain of some incident connected with the hoisting of a flag. After a few days spent in investigating the matter, he pronounced the islanders to be animated by a thoroughly bad spirit. On November 6, 1843, Queen Pomare was declared deposed, and Tahiti a French possession. Having issued this proclamation the admiral proceeded to land troops and to occupy the island. In his despatch to his government, explaining the reasons which had induced him to take this step, he imputed the chief blame for the unrest of the natives to Mr. Pritchard.[768]

The news of these events reached Europe in the month of February, 1844, and evoked a great outburst of indignation in England. Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were again placed in a most embarrassing situation. Should they refuse to uphold the action of the admiral, their conduct would be assailed on all sides as a cowardly betrayal of French interests at the bidding of England. On the other hand, the ratification of his act, if it should not entail war, must certainly put an end to “the cordial understanding,” the maintenance of which, for the present, was essential to the successful execution of their Spanish policy. Of these two alternatives, the second unquestionably presented the greatest disadvantages. At a Cabinet Council, on February 25, it was decided to adhere to the protectorate, but to disavow the last proceedings of Admiral Thouars and to reinstate Queen Pomare in the sovereignty of which she had been deprived.[769] A few weeks later, on April 10, Lord Aberdeen informed Mr. Pritchard that he would be transferred to the Navigator Islands. In deciding to remove him from Tahiti, the government in no way desired to express disapprobation of his past conduct, but, for the sake both of his own comfort and of the maintenance of good relations with France, it was felt to be advisable to replace him by some person who had not been connected with the transactions of the past two years.[770] This measure of precaution was, however, of no avail. A month before the despatch of these instructions Mr. Pritchard had departed from Tahiti, but under very different circumstances from those contemplated by Lord Aberdeen. The disavowal of Admiral Thouars was made the subject of a fierce attack in the Chamber upon the Soult-Guizot Cabinet. In the course of the debates, certain deputies displayed great hostility to England and indulged in much intemperate language. This ebullition of temper was not treated very seriously in England. But it was a different matter when the Prince de Joinville, who was a strong supporter of Admiral Thouars, saw fit to publish a pamphlet, in which the question of a war with Great Britain was discussed in all its bearings. Only the year before His Royal Highness had been the guest of Queen Victoria at Windsor, and the appearance of his work, entitled Note sur l’état des forces navales de la France, created a most disagreeable impression at Court, upon the government and upon all classes of the people. Louis Philippe, who had never authorized the publication of his son’s imprudent pamphlet, was genuinely distressed and did all in his power to suppress it.[771]

Public attention, however, was speedily diverted from the Prince de Joinville to the Tsar. Suddenly, on May 31, 1844, the Court was informed that Nicholas would arrive on a visit to England within the next twenty-four hours. At Ascot races and at the various festivities which were hastily arranged in his honour, his appearance excited universal curiosity. On every occasion it was plainly his intention to impress, not only the Court and high society, but all classes of the people with the sincerity of his desire to establish the most friendly relations between his empire and Great Britain.[772] To Peel, Aberdeen and Wellington, with whom he had some confidential conversations, he was at pains to contrast his respect and affection for England with the dislike and the contempt with which he regarded Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and the French nation generally. Sir Robert Peel, however, appears to have told him plainly that he and his colleagues were most desirous that, at the death of Louis Philippe, his crown should pass to his next heir in the Orleans line without disturbance or opposition. But having given emphatic expression to his hatred of the July Monarchy, Nicholas put forward a distinct proposal. Turkey was sick, very sick, upon the point of death. It would be a critical moment when the Ottoman empire should break up completely. Nevertheless, he apprehended danger only from the ambitious and aggressive spirit of the French. Let, therefore, England, Austria and Russia agree to act in concert, without reference to France, and all would be well.[773] The British ministers would not appear altogether to have rejected this proposition. But it is difficult to believe the story[774] that distinct pledges on the subject were given, and that Nicholas, in consequence, was tempted to embark upon those measures which were to result in the Crimean war. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss here whether the conferences of 1844 were in any degree responsible for the war ten years later. The Tsar’s visit had no immediate effect upon the European situation in general, or upon Franco-British relations in particular. Nothing that he had said or done during his nine days’ stay in England had in any way impaired “the cordial understanding.” He had probably a shrewd idea, however, that complications in more than one direction would, before long, greatly endanger its existence. An instinctive perception of coming trouble may have been the secret of his sudden determination to visit England.

On June 6, three days before the departure of the Tsar, Aberdeen was informed officially that French troops might not improbably be ordered to enter the territory of the Emperor of Morocco.[775] The famous Arab chieftain, Abd-el-Kader, with whom the French had been at war for a long time past, had recently sought refuge within the frontiers of the Moorish empire. On former occasions, when hard pressed, he had eluded capture in this manner. Representations had frequently been made at Fez, on the subject of the facilities which were alleged to have been afforded him for renewing the struggle. These complaints, however, had hitherto produced little or no effect, and Marshal Bugeaud, the governor of Algiers, consequently urged the adoption of stronger measures. Neither Louis Philippe nor his ministers desired to begin hostilities, but, on May 30, 1844, a French force, under General de Lamoricière, was attacked by a body of Moroccan cavalry upon the Algerian side of the frontier. The situation at once assumed a very grave character. The French consul at Tangier was instructed to proceed to Fez to demand the punishment of the Moorish commander, the expulsion of Abd-el-Kader, and the withdrawal of the troops assembled close to the French frontier. At the same time, a squadron under the Prince de Joinville was despatched to Moroccan waters[776] and preparations were made for reinforcing Marshal Bugeaud.

The news that hostilities were impending caused great dissatisfaction in England. Ministers were questioned upon the subject in both Houses and the press commented upon the affair with much acrimony. Under pretext of obtaining redress for some more or less imaginary grievance, Morocco, it was predicted, would be invaded and, without doubt, permanently occupied. The fate which had befallen the Dey of Algiers was assuredly reserved for the Emperor of Morocco. This general feeling of uneasiness and suspicion was increased by the selection of the Prince de Joinville, the author of the recent pamphlet, for the command of the squadron sent to cruise off Tangier.[777] The two governments, nevertheless, maintained their friendly communications. M. Guizot gave the most positive assurances that every effort would be made to settle the affair peacefully, and undertook that, should hostilities break out, Tangier[778] would not be bombarded nor would any portion of Morocco be appropriated. Aberdeen was not prepared to deny that the French government had grave cause for complaint. Although it had been considered necessary for the protection of British interests that a squadron should be sent to the Moroccan coast, the British fleet in those waters, he promised the French ambassador, would be numerically inferior to that of the Prince de Joinville.[779] Had he regarded it as in the smallest degree probable that his proposal would be accepted, he would, doubtless, have suggested that England should act as mediator in the quarrel. But, in spite of the fact that “the cordial understanding” had been loudly proclaimed, the idea of allowing England to interfere would have been so unpopular in France that no government could have ventured to entertain it. Under these circumstances Aberdeen could only direct Mr. Drummond Hay, the British consul at Tangier, to proceed to Fez and to endeavour to prevail upon the Emperor to acquiesce in the French demands. Notwithstanding that the Moors had a second time attacked the column of General de Lamoricière, strong hopes were entertained, at the end of July, that actual war might still be averted.

On July 30, 1844, The Times announced the startling news that Mr. Pritchard, the British consul at Tahiti, had arrived in England, after having been arrested, cast into a dungeon and finally expelled from the island by the French military authorities. In answer to a question put to him, the following night, by Sir Charles Napier in the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel declared that, if the reports which the government had received were true, “a gross outrage” had undoubtedly been perpetrated. But, when the next day M. de Jarnac spoke to Lord Aberdeen on the subject, he was authorized to inform M. Guizot that the Prime Minister could not admit that his words had been correctly reported in the morning papers.[780] The first accounts of Mr. Pritchard’s case would seem to have been somewhat inaccurate. When all the circumstances were brought to light, it was evident that the British government had just cause to complain of the treatment which he had experienced, but it was, at the same time, no less clear that his own conduct had been most injudicious. Immediately upon the proclamation of French sovereignty over Tahiti, Mr. Pritchard struck his flag and sent a protest to Admiral Thouars. From this moment he assumed so anomalous a position that it is not surprising that the French governor, Admiral Bruat, should have refused to recognize it. According to Pritchard’s own statement, he “continued to perform his functions as consul, except in corresponding with the French authorities, and continued to act as the accredited agent of Great Britain to Queen Pomare.” Furthermore, he appears to have invited the deposed Queen to take up her abode in his house, where she stayed until, “considering it not safe to remain on shore,” she decided to go on board H.M.S. Dublin, which was lying in the harbour of Papeete.[781]

The natives meanwhile were growing restless and evincing a determination to resist the imposition of foreign rule. Their hostility, in the opinion of the French officers, was to be ascribed mainly to the pernicious example set them by Mr. Pritchard. No event of importance, however, occurred until March 2, 1844, on which date, during the absence of the governor from Papeete, a French sentry was alleged to have been assaulted by a native. M. d’Aubigny, the senior officer on the spot, thereupon proclaimed martial law throughout the island and decreed the arrest of Mr. Pritchard, who was forthwith imprisoned in an underground chamber beneath the guard room of a block house. After he had been in captivity for four days and had endured much discomfort, Admiral Bruat returned to Papeete. The governor, perceiving at once that his subordinate had acted with undue precipitation, ordered the release of Mr. Pritchard and his removal to a British vessel, The Cormorant, which, on March 13, quitted the island and carried him to Valparaiso.[782]

“Never since I have been in this country,” wrote M. de Jarnac, “have I seen anything to equal the excitement which the news from Tahiti has aroused. The religious party took up the case at once. Meetings of the ‘Saints’ have been convened, violent speeches have been delivered all over the country, and pictures representing certain of the events connected with the affair have been exhibited. The papers are very violent. Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing more apprehensive daily. He is convinced that some form of satisfaction must be given. He wishes, however, to leave the initiative of proposing it to Your Excellency: but I happen to know that the plan of sending Mr. Pritchard straight back to Tahiti has been under discussion by the Cabinet.”[783] In France the excitement was scarcely less intense. The newspapers, with one accord, called loudly upon the government to stand by its officers, and to deny Great Britain any kind of reparation, even at the risk of war. The production of Charles IV. at the Opera House evoked a furious manifestation of hostility to England. Fortunately, however, the session was brought to a close on August 5, and, in the meantime, M. Guizot resolutely refused to make any statement about the affair in the Chambers.[784]

But although the prorogation afforded him some relief, M. Guizot was, nevertheless, in a position of extreme difficulty. His friends unceasingly warned him that he must resist the demands of England, or be prepared to succumb to the outburst of popular indignation which any concessions would provoke.[785] Under these circumstances he decided that complete inaction was, for the present, the safest course to adopt. “The greater the excitement,” he instructed Jarnac, “the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to cool down. For the moment we must abstain from all discussion of the subject.” Nevertheless, when interviewing Aberdeen, he would do well to bring forward those arguments which he himself was employing in his conversations with Lord Cowley. Stress should be laid upon the fact that Pritchard had ceased to act as consul. As a private individual whose presence was regarded as prejudicial to good order, the colonial authorities had a universally acknowledged right to expel him. At the same time, however, it could not be denied that “some of the proceedings which had attended his removal had been irregular. . . .”[786]

Hitherto Lord Aberdeen had studiously refrained from formulating any precise demand. But, on August 13, after a meeting of the Cabinet, he directed Cowley to give M. Guizot clearly to understand that, unless satisfaction in some shape were voluntarily offered, he must transmit “a formal and detailed statement of the grounds upon which Her Majesty’s government founded its expectations of redress.”[787] In England anger at the continued silence of the French government was rising to a dangerous pitch. On August 14, at a meeting at Exeter Hall, at which Mr. Pritchard himself was present, men, who in most international disputes would have advocated peace at any price, gave utterance to the most warlike sentiments. Two days later came the news that the answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the French ultimatum having been considered unsatisfactory, Tangier had been bombarded. “War,” wrote M. de Jarnac, “is now generally regarded as inevitable.”[788] Lord Cowley was instructed to represent that “the attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of M. Guizot that it would be respected under all circumstances, had greatly surprised the British government . . . any occupation of the coast of Morocco could not fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great Britain, and must lead to evils of great magnitude.[789]”

M. Guizot, however, adhered resolutely to his plan “of allowing time for the excitement to cool down” in England, and he still forbore to offer any satisfaction for the treatment to which Mr. Pritchard had been subjected. Both he and the King appear to have strangely underestimated the intensity of the resentment to which the Tahiti affair had given rise. “The two governments,” he informed Jarnac, “were not yet agreed in their appreciation of the facts imputed to Mr. Pritchard,” and it was, consequently, impossible for the present to discuss the nature of the reparation which might be due to him. Again, a few days later, he directed him to inform Lord Aberdeen that his despatch of the 13th would have to be deliberated upon by the Council, “many of the members of which were absent from Paris.”[790] Meanwhile, the press of both countries was busily engaged in embittering the quarrel. Some highly offensive attacks upon the private life of Mr. Pritchard appeared in the French papers, whilst The Times published letters, purporting to have been written by naval officers who had witnessed the bombardment of Tangier, in which the most insulting doubts were cast upon the seamanship of the Prince de Joinville and upon the fighting qualities of the French sailors.[791] M. Guizot, however, continued to display a lofty indifference to the popular excitement on both sides of the Channel. He was content to enjoin M. de Jarnac to impress upon Lord Aberdeen that it “would be a disgrace, were the peace of the world to be disturbed on account of Pritchard, Pomare and d’Aubigny.”[792]

But the young diplomatist in charge of the French embassy in London was, fortunately, alive to the dangers of the situation. Ever since the first arrival of the news from Tahiti, M. de Jarnac had sought to convince his government that the affair was highly serious. Nor was it only to M. Guizot that he addressed his warnings. Having been charged to deliver a letter from the King to Prince Albert, he took the opportunity, thus afforded him, of communicating his fears to Louis Philippe himself. He begged him to believe that at a recent Cabinet Council Lord Aberdeen had been the only minister to oppose a large increase of the navy. “Were it not for the confidence reposed in the wisdom of Your Majesty, the situation would resemble in many unfortunate particulars that of 1840.”[793] He daily adjured M. Guizot to reflect most seriously upon the danger of deferring any longer his reply to the British government. “People in England are discussing alliances and talk of nothing but war. M. de Nesselrode is staying at Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with politics. But it is said that he remains here in order that he may be upon the spot, should a serious disagreement arise between France and England. If that be his object, fortune may have favoured his designs in a remarkable manner.”[794]

The British Parliament was to be prorogued on September 5, and, unless an announcement could be made in the Queen’s Speech that a settlement had been arrived at, war, it was generally felt, could scarcely be avoided. Even M. Guizot began to realize that, if the peace was to be preserved, he must propose some form of reparation. On several occasions Jarnac had hinted that the British government might very possibly be satisfied, were a pecuniary indemnity to be offered to Mr. Pritchard.[795] Unquestionably, the payment of a sum of money would be regarded in France as less objectionable than most other forms of reparation. But, having proposed to the King and the Cabinet that the affair should be settled on those lines, and having obtained their assent, M. Guizot still deferred transmitting an offer of pecuniary compensation to London. In a despatch, dated August 29, a copy of which was to be given to Lord Aberdeen, he stoutly maintained the right of the authorities at Tahiti to expel Mr. Pritchard from the island. His imprisonment, however, and certain other acts of which M. d’Aubigny had been guilty, could not be defended, and that officer would, in consequence, receive in due course a notification of the censure which the government had passed upon his conduct. He could concede no more, he told Lord Cowley, and he fully intended to retire from office, if further redress were to be demanded.[796] Nevertheless, he appears privately to have informed M. de Jarnac that he was transmitting a second despatch, containing an offer of a money payment to Mr. Pritchard, which he was to communicate to Lord Aberdeen, should the British government regard the reprimand, administered to M. d’Aubigny, as an inadequate reparation. This, as he doubtless expected, was the view taken of his first despatch by the Cabinet in London. Jarnac, in consequence, lost no time in assuring Lord Aberdeen that an offer of a pecuniary indemnity would be made. Had he not taken this responsibility upon himself, he was convinced that the customary announcement that “friendly relations existed with other countries” would have been omitted from the Queen’s Speech, and “the whole of Europe would have been thrown into a state of perturbation.” On the following day, September 4, he placed in the hands of Lord Aberdeen the official offer of the French government to indemnify Mr. Pritchard by the payment of a sum of money, the amount of which was to be determined by the admirals commanding the French and British fleets in the Pacific. Aberdeen pronounced the proposed satisfaction “rather slender,” but assured him that he might now consider the matter as settled.[797] Twenty-four hours later Parliament was prorogued, and the happy termination of the Pritchard affair was announced in the Speech from the Throne. “The danger,” wrote Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians, had been “imminent.”[798]

The settlement of the Tahiti dispute was quickly followed by the welcome news that France had concluded peace with the Emperor of Morocco. Marshal Bugeaud, on August 14, had won a decisive victory over the Moors on the river Isly, whilst at sea the Prince de Joinville, after silencing the forts of Tangier, had, on August 15, destroyed the defences of Mogador. Neither the King nor M. Guizot desired to prosecute the campaign any further. They had obtained all the advantages which they could hope to derive from active hostilities. They had proved that they were not to be deterred, by the irritation which their action had called forth in England, from inflicting a severe punishment upon the Moors. The national thirst for military glory had been sufficiently appeased by the successes which had already been achieved. Under these circumstances, they were not disposed to be exacting in their conditions. Provided the Emperor would submit to the terms set forth in their original ultimatum, they would not insist upon an indemnity, but would recall their troops and forthwith suspend hostilities. The Court of Fez promptly acceded to these moderate demands, and, on September 10, 1844, a treaty of peace was signed at Tangier.

The cessation of hostilities between France and Morocco removed much of the resentment which recent events in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific had aroused in England. Notwithstanding that, at the end of August, 1844, the two countries had been upon the brink of war, Louis Philippe, early in October, was enabled to return the visit which Queen Victoria, the year before, had paid him at the Château d’Eu. During his stay in England the King was installed with much magnificence as a Knight of the Garter at Windsor, and, on every occasion on which he was seen in public, was accorded a hearty welcome by the people. Isabella’s marriage still occupied the foremost place in his thoughts. That question, however, had made but little progress, in spite of the overthrow of Espartero and of the triumph of Christina and the Moderados.

After the flight of the Regent Spain had passed under the rule of Ramon Maria Narvaez, the Captain-General of Castile, an able and unscrupulous adventurer. The Liberals, who had joined with the Moderados in encompassing the downfall of Espartero, were quickly forced to realize the magnitude of their folly. Parliamentary government was practically abolished, and any attempts to resist the authority of the dictator were mercilessly repressed. Over two hundred executions for political offences, during the space of one year, broke the spirit of the democratic party, and gave the country an outward appearance of tranquillity. The difficulty of selecting a Regent in the place of Espartero had, in the meantime, been overcome by the unconstitutional declaration of the Cortes, on November 8, 1843, that the Queen was of full age, although she had only entered upon her fourteenth year. The question having thus been settled, Christina, in the spring of 1844, left Paris and returned to Madrid, accompanied by her husband, Nuñoz, henceforward to be known as the Duke of Rianzarez.

In 1844 the eldest son of Don Carlos, the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula, and Count Trapani, the brother of the King of Naples, and of Christina herself, were, for all practical purposes, the only unmarried male descendants of Philip V. If, therefore, the principle proclaimed by Louis Philippe were to be adhered to, Isabella’s choice of a husband must be restricted to these four princes. To each one, however, there were serious objections. Although a suitable candidate in other respects, the son of Don Carlos was ineligible on political grounds.[799] The idea of her daughter’s marriage with either of the sons of Don Francisco de Paula was most distasteful to Christina. Notwithstanding that their mother, the Infanta Carlotta, was her sister, she had for a long time past looked upon her as her worst enemy. Nor had the death of this princess, early in 1844,[800] greatly diminished the animosity with which she regarded this branch of the family. But in addition to the feud which had existed for so many years between Christina and their mother, both young men for different reasons were objectionable in themselves. The appearance of the elder, Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was ridiculous and effeminate, and he, moreover, was generally believed to be impotent. Christina, however, appears to have regarded the loudly professed Liberalism of Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, as a more serious objection to his marriage with her daughter than the physical unfitness of his elder brother. The fourth candidate, Count Trapani, was an unattractive, backward youth of sixteen, whose life had hitherto been spent within the walls of a Jesuit College at Rome. The difficulties, however, in the way of his marriage with Isabella were mainly political. Metternich greatly disliked the notion of a closer connection between the absolute Court of Naples and the constitutional monarchy of Spain.[801] Furthermore, the Spanish people despised the Neapolitans, and could not fail to resent the idea of selecting the Royal Consort from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons.[802]

Count Trapani, nevertheless, was chosen by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot as the most suitable husband for Isabella. In the summer of 1844, the French agents, both at Naples and at Madrid, were instructed to further his candidature by all means in their power.[803] Christina’s feelings on the subject cannot be precisely determined. There can be little doubt, however, that she never gave the project her hearty support. Probably she realized that it was impracticable by reason of the dislike with which it was certain to be regarded by Spaniards of all classes. It is significant that one of her first acts, after her return to Madrid, was to assure Mr. Bulwer that she had no intention of submitting to the dictation of Louis Philippe, and that she still hoped to arrange the marriage of Isabella with Leopold, the son of Prince Ferdinand of Coburg.[804] Henry Bulwer had been appointed British minister at Madrid, soon after the downfall of the Regent. Aberdeen appears to have been anxious that a man, less wedded than Aston to Palmerstonian traditions, should carry out the new policy of cordially co-operating with France for the general welfare of Spain. The French government, once Espartero had been expelled, had hastened to resume normal diplomatic relations with the Court of Isabella. Accordingly, almost at the same time as Bulwer was sent to Madrid, the Comte Bresson, whose proceedings at Brussels in 1831 have been related, was transferred from Berlin to the Spanish capital as French ambassador. Far from acting harmoniously together, however, they appear to have cordially disliked each other. Bresson is described by Bulwer,[805] in his Life of Palmerston, as a person sprung from the middle classes, and “consequently vulgarly pre-occupied with his position as ambassador.” Bresson,[806] for his part, considered his English colleague as “pas élevé,” and as a man against whom he must constantly be on his guard, lest he should take some liberty with him.

At the close of the year of 1844, a further complication was added to the many difficulties which surrounded the question of the Queen’s marriage. “I believe,” wrote Lord Cowley,[807] “that Louis Philippe is thinking of the marriage of Montpensier[808] with the sister of Isabella.” The supposition was perfectly correct. It is impossible, however, to say with certainty when the King first decided to put forward his son as a candidate for the hand of the Infanta Fernanda. According to Guizot,[809] the suggestion was not made until the autumn of 1844, and it was then propounded, he alleges, for the purpose of reconciling Christina and the Spanish people to the insignificance of the Neapolitan alliance. But it was always, he asserts, made perfectly clear that the Montpensier marriage could not take place until the Queen had married and borne a child. Be that as it may, it was not considered advisable to inform Lord Aberdeen of this project. During the next few months, however, the new matrimonial scheme was the subject of many rumours, and, in the month of July, 1845, a visit of the Duke of Rianzarez to Paris was so generally believed to be connected with this affair, that it was felt that some explanation must be given to the British government.[810] M. Guizot, accordingly, informed Mr. Bulwer, who happened to be in Paris on his way to London, that he wished Lord Aberdeen to know that “King Louis Philippe and Queen Christina were desirous to settle the marriage for private and personal reasons into which the Infanta’s fortune entered.” It would not take place for some time, he assured him, and in any case not until Isabella had had children.[811]

On September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria paid a second visit to Louis Philippe at the Château d’Eu. Her Majesty, Prince Albert, Aberdeen and Peel had been considerably disturbed by the news brought by Bulwer from Paris. But on the very day of the arrival of the Royal party at Eu, both the King and M. Guizot declared to Lord Aberdeen, “in the most positive and explicit manner, that until the Queen was married and had children, they should consider the Infanta precisely as her sister, and that any marriage with a French prince would be entirely out of the question. . . . I distinctly understood,”wrote Aberdeen to Peel a few hours after he had received these assurances, “that it was not only a marriage and a child, but children that were necessary to secure the succession. I thought this was as much as we could desire at present, and that the question of a marriage with a French prince might safely be left to be considered, whenever the contingency contemplated should arrive. Many things may happen in the course of a few years.”[812]

On the very day that Queen Victoria arrived at Eu, the Duc and the Duchesse de Nemours and the Duke d’Aumale left Pampeluna, where they had been the guests of the Spanish Royal family. The real object of their visit would never appear to have transpired.[813] Bulwer, for reasons which in due course he explained to Aberdeen, was not present at Pampeluna, and delayed returning to Spain until the French princes had recrossed the frontier. The interview, he understood, had been arranged for the purpose of “pushing on the marriage with Count Trapani, a marriage most unpopular in the country.” He had, therefore, decided to stay away. By absenting himself, his government would not incur “the odium which must stigmatize all those by whom the Neapolitan match may be conceived to have been brought about.” On the other hand, should the visit of the French princes not achieve the desired result, they would be unable to impute its failure “to the intrigues of the British minister.” Upon his return to Madrid, Bulwer experienced great difficulty in obtaining any information about the state of affairs. Bresson assured him that Isabella’s health “was declared to be such as to render her marriage for the present inopportune.”[814] Christina gave him to understand that matters were still undecided. “But her language was not that of entire confidence, and she seemed divided between the wish to say nothing and the desire to say enough to prevent any subsequent charge of want of frankness.” Upon the whole, he was inclined to think that some plan was contemplated, “which it was not yet judged expedient to avow.”[815] From divers sources he learnt that the Queen-Mother, Bresson and Carini, the Neapolitan ambassador, were suspected of an intention “privately to betroth Isabella to Trapani, and to force his acceptance upon the Cortes.” Narvaez had been induced to support their unconstitutional designs, “in the belief that he would be more necessary with an unpopular, than with a popular prince.”[816]

Meanwhile, M. Bresson at Madrid and M. Guizot in Paris were greatly dissatisfied with the aspect of affairs. The King of Naples had always been reluctant to allow his brother to be put forward as a suitor for the hand of the Queen of Spain. He distrusted Louis Philippe exceedingly, he was fearful of offending the Court of Vienna, he was on bad terms with his sister Christina, and, in point of fact, had not officially acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella. Nevertheless, under the vigorous pressure brought to bear upon him from Paris, he agreed to renew diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid, and to empower his ambassador to discuss his brother’s marriage. But, having surmounted the difficulties at Naples, Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were confronted by more serious obstacles at Madrid. As time went on, the unpopularity of the Neapolitan match tended rather to increase than to diminish. So universal was the dislike to this connection that Guizot judged it prudent to warn Bresson to maintain friendly relations with Don Francisco de Paula,[817] seeing that it might be necessary before long to insist upon Isabella’s marriage with one of his sons. As the prospects of the Bourbon candidates grew less favourable the Coburg marriage, greatly to the annoyance of Louis Philippe, began to be discussed as a necessary alternative. The impending visit of Prince Leopold to his brother the King of Portugal gave rise to many rumours. There was an intrigue on foot, reported Bresson, to promote the chances of that prince, and Bulwer, he was convinced, was more or less concerned in it.[818]

Under these circumstances M. Guizot decided to direct M. de Jarnac to confer upon the situation with Lord Aberdeen. He was to intimate to him that, in fulfilment of the compact at Eu, he should now bestir himself actively on behalf of the Bourbon candidates, and make it perfectly clear to the Coburgs that no member of their family could be allowed to marry Isabella. This was more than Aberdeen was prepared to undertake. He, however, assured M. de Jarnac upon his honour that the Coburgs should receive no encouragement either from the Court or from the government, and promised him that they would be advised to abandon their supposed intention of visiting Madrid.[819] Aberdeen was at this time in receipt of Bulwer’s despatch of October 30, 1845, informing him of his suspicion that Christina and Narvaez were purposing to accomplish the Trapani marriage, in violation of the article of the constitution which prescribed that the sovereign must communicate his intention of contracting a matrimonial alliance to the Cortes. He at once replied by charging him to express to the general the sincere hope of the British government that no such plan was under consideration. “Say to him,”he wrote in conclusion, “that you are instructed to offer no opposition to the marriage of the Queen to Trapani, provided it be openly accomplished according to legal forms, still less are you authorized to espouse the cause of any other candidate.”[820]

Mere friendly neutrality, however, could be of little service to Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. A further disappointment, moreover, was in store for them. At the end of January, 1846, General Narvaez, who, as a supporter of the Neapolitan alliance, had been growing very unpopular, resigned office after a violent quarrel with his fellow-ministers.[821] When the news reached Paris that the one man who might have effected the Trapani marriage was no longer at the head of affairs, it was decided to make another, and a more direct, attempt to force the British government to take action on behalf of the Bourbon candidate. Jarnac was, accordingly, supplied with a document, which he was to read to Lord Aberdeen. This extraordinary paper, known as the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, set forth the following conclusions: “The Count Trapani is greatly compromised: 1. By the demonstration which has been made against him; 2. By the fall of General Narvaez. The sons of Don Francisco de Paula are greatly compromised: 1. By their mistaken conduct; 2. By their intimacy with the Radical party; 3. By the dislike of the Queen-Mother and of the young Queen herself to them. The sons of Don Carlos are for the time out of the question. The actual situation of the descendants of Philip V. is consequently bad. Efforts are being made to marry Prince Leopold of Coburg either to the Queen Isabella or to the Infanta Fernanda. Lisbon is the chief seat of these machinations. It is said that Prince Leopold, who is to leave Lisbon on February 24, intends to visit Madrid. Many circumstances appear to confirm the truth of this rumour. If the present state of affairs be prolonged we may find ourselves compelled, in order that our policy in Spain may not receive a check which we are determined not to suffer, to declare ourselves liberated from all engagements with regard to either marriage. Such a situation would arise, were the marriage of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince Leopold of Coburg or with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip V., to appear probable or imminent. In that case we should take immediate steps to ward off the blow by demanding the hand of either the Queen or the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. We are sincerely desirous of averting the necessity of resorting to so extreme a measure. We see only one way in which the crisis can be avoided. The English Cabinet must co-operate actively with us in promoting the claims of one of the descendants of Philip V., no matter which, and in arranging his marriage with Queen Isabella, and in preventing, in the meanwhile, the marriage of the Infanta either with Prince Leopold or with any other prince, not a descendant of Philip V.”[822]

Aberdeen appears to have listened in silence and to have made no protest against the unwarrantable assumptions contained in this document. No copy of it was given to him, nor would he seem to have asked for one.[823] Meanwhile, strange events were taking place in Spain. The Miraflores Cabinet was quickly overthrown and, on March 17, 1846, Narvaez was once more at the head of the government. His return to power was quickly followed by the promulgation of decrees restricting the liberty of the press and suspending the sittings of the Cortes.[824] Bulwer was convinced that it was decided forthwith to betroth Isabella to Trapani, regardless of public opinion and of legal forms.[825] But, if Narvaez ever contemplated a coup d’état of this nature, he soon relinquished the idea. His tenure of office was of very brief duration. On April 5 he was dismissed and ordered to quit Madrid immediately. The mystery which surrounds these sudden changes of government has never been satisfactorily unravelled. It is certain that they were connected, more or less directly, with Isabella’s marriage. At first sight it would seem as though Christina had resolved to discard Narvaez, because she perceived that he was powerless to effect the Trapani marriage. Nevertheless, this apparently obvious explanation is probably erroneous. The Queen-Mother was never really desirous that her daughter should marry her uncle, Trapani. But she wished to ruin Narvaez, whose secret aim it was to diminish the influence of the Court and of the Church.[826] It is possible, therefore, that she may have insisted upon his supporting the Neapolitan alliance in order simply to discredit him. In this crafty fashion she may have hoped to rid herself of the man who, she had once declared, “was more arrogant than Espartero.”[827]

On April 8, 1846, the following message[828] was received in Paris from M. Bresson, who, doubtless, had some person in his employ in close attendance upon Isabella. “La reine est nubile depuis deux heures.”[829] Whether or not this news was communicated to Lord Cowley by M. Guizot, it was certainly known at once at the British embassy. Christina could no longer invoke physical reasons for delaying her daughter’s marriage. But, meanwhile, the number of Bourbon candidates was rapidly diminishing. Trapani was too unpopular, and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the younger son of Don Francisco de Paula, had recently been concerned in an insurrection in Gallicia, and had been ordered to leave Spain. The only available husband for Isabella among the descendants of Philip V. was, therefore, Don Enrique’s elder brother, Don Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, whom both she and her mother disliked and despised. Christina, under these circumstances, resolved to revert to the matrimonial combination which she had constantly regarded as the best. The moment was not unfavourable for openly defying Louis Philippe. Narvaez, the minister who had always been looked upon as the chief tool of the French Court, was in disgrace, and Isturiz, his successor, was her devoted servant. She accordingly determined to propose to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg that Isabella should marry his son, Prince Leopold. After informing him of its contents, she gave the letter containing this offer to Mr. Bulwer, asking that it might be conveyed to Lisbon by his messenger. The British minister complied with her request and reported the affair to his chief.

Lord Aberdeen was seriously annoyed, and at once informed M. de Sainte-Aulaire of what had passed, assuring him that he should administer a severe rebuke to Mr. Bulwer. Bulwer, he considered, had violated his instructions, both in undertaking to transmit the offer to Lisbon and in concealing Christina’s proceedings from M. Bresson. In consequence of the strictures passed upon his conduct, Bulwer offered to resign. Aberdeen, however, in a friendly letter insisted upon his remaining at his post.[830] A few days later, on June 29, 1846, Sir Robert Peel announced that he and his colleagues had retired from office, and that Lord John Russell had undertaken to form a government. On June 25, on the very day on which their Corn Bill had been carried through the House of Lords, ministers had been defeated in the Commons by a Radical and Protectionist coalition. In the new administration the seals of the Foreign Office passed into the keeping of Lord Palmerston.

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[CHAPTER X]

THE SPANISH MARRIAGES[831]

At the close of the year 1845, when Peel had resigned office on account of the dissensions in his Cabinet on the question of the Corn Laws, Lord John Russell had in vain attempted to form a government. His failure had been due to the objections urged by Lord Grey to Palmerston’s return to the Foreign Office.[832] Peel had, in consequence, agreed to withdraw his resignation and to carry on the government. But it was soon clear that the Protectionists, if they could not prevent the passage of his Corn Bill, would certainly encompass his downfall at the first opportunity. Palmerston, under these circumstances, judged it advisable to take steps to remove the impression that his nomination as Foreign Secretary would create alarm in France and imperil “the cordial understanding.” He, accordingly, decided to visit Paris with the object of dispelling this idea. His intimate knowledge of the French language and his considerable powers of conversation, combined with the personal charm of Lady Palmerston, soon achieved the desired result. In the previous month of December, the prospect that “ce terrible Lord Palmerston” would be once again at the Foreign Office had spread dismay in ministerial circles. But, in the following spring, when he returned to England, after a few weeks’ stay in Paris, the amiable qualities and the friendly dispositions of “ce cher Lord Palmerston” were the chief topic of conversation in the political salons.[833]

Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister had been most disagreeably surprised by the disclosure of the proposal made by Christina to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. Lord Aberdeen’s straightforward conduct in the affair could not undo the fact that the Queen-Mother had deliberately, and without the knowledge of the French ambassador, opened a negotiation for the marriage of Isabella to a prince, who was not a descendant of Philip V. In pursuance of this policy the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in London, had been instructed to inquire officially in what light the British government would regard the selection of a prince, who was not a Bourbon, as the future husband of the Queen. To this question Lord Aberdeen had replied that, “should it be found that no descendant of Philip V. could safely be chosen, consistently with the happiness of the Queen or with a due regard to the tranquillity of the country, it could be no cause of displeasure to Great Britain were a prince from some other family to be selected.” He could not believe that in such a case “the enlightened Court of the Tuileries” would interfere. “But, if contrary to all reason and probability, an attempt were made to control the wishes and feelings of the Queen and the clearly understood will of her people, Spain would not only receive the warmest sympathy of Great Britain but of all Europe.”[834]

M. Guizot appears to have been even more annoyed than Louis Philippe at Christina’s proposal to the Coburgs. He is said, indeed, to have attempted to persuade the King to counteract it, by demanding the hand of Isabella for his son Montpensier. But neither Louis Philippe nor the young Duke himself were prepared to resort to so extreme a measure. The King, for the present, was content to address acrimonious complaints to Christina,[835] and to instruct M. Bresson to make a strong representation to the Spanish ministers.[836] At the same time, both he and M. Guizot decided to take steps to effect a reconciliation between the Queen-Mother and General Narvaez, whose return to power they regarded as essential to the success of their plans. Meanwhile, Jarnac spoke of Palmerston, with whom he had had his first interview on July 14, as “fairly well intentioned and rather timid.” This description of his attitude, M. Guizot admitted, was most satisfactory. “Nevertheless, between him and me,” he pointed out to his royal master, “there can be nothing more than a marriage of reason.” He purposed, therefore, so to arrange matters that he might be enabled to communicate his views directly to Lord John Russell. “It will require nice handling to speak to one about foreign affairs without offending the other. But, on occasions, we may have to do so.”[837]

Bresson appears to have expressed himself strongly in favour of abandoning the Trapani marriage. In his opinion the matter resolved itself simply into choosing one of the sons of Don Francisco. Jarnac was, accordingly, instructed to propose to Lord Palmerston that these two princes should be the objects of the joint support of France and England. “London,” wrote M. Guizot to Louis Philippe, “will certainly favour Don Enrique, on account of his intimate connection with the Progressistas. . . . Evidently Cadiz would be the best selection for the Queen, Spain, and ourselves. Nevertheless, I do not think it advisable to propose him directly.”[838] Although Christina’s overture to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg at Lisbon had been made early in June, no answer had yet been returned to it. The prudent Coburgs would seem to have regarded it as inexpedient to incur the lasting enmity of Louis Philippe, for the sake of seeing a member of their family raised to the position of King-Consort of Spain. Upon his arrival in England, at the end of June, the Duke was strongly advised in this sense both by King Leopold and by Prince Albert. He, accordingly, resolved to reject Christina’s offer, on the ground of the injury which must result to Spain from a marriage contracted in opposition to the wishes of France.[839] This decision, however, would not appear to have been communicated directly to Louis Philippe. Nevertheless, the private letters, during the months of July and August, both of Bresson and Guizot, show plainly that they were aware that the Coburgs had no intention of entertaining the Queen-Mother’s proposal.[840]

Palmerston, whilst in opposition, appears to have known nothing of the details of the Spanish marriage question. Until informed of it by Aberdeen, with whom he had a long conversation in the first days of July, he was completely ignorant of Christina’s proposal to the Coburgs.[841] From 1834 to 1841, however, he had constantly been engaged in combating the Moderados, and, upon his return to office in 1846, he at once reverted to his former policy of favouring the Progressistas. Under these circumstances, the candidature of Don Enrique, whose connection with the extreme wing of the Liberal party had been the cause of his exile and disgrace, would naturally enlist his approval and support. Nevertheless, in his first communication to Mr. Bulwer, he expressed no preference for any particular candidate. Spanish affairs, he wrote in his famous despatch of July 19, appeared to be divided into two questions—the marriage of the Queen and the condition of the country. In respect to the first, he had nothing to add to those instructions with which Bulwer had been supplied by his predecessor in office. There were three candidates in the field—Prince Leopold of Coburg and the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula—and “Her Majesty’s government could only hope that the choice might fall upon the one most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen and promote the welfare of the Spanish nation.” The greater part of the despatch, however, was concerned with the second question—the political condition of the country. On that point, although Lord Palmerston had no particular instructions to give, he had some very severe criticisms to offer. “After a struggle of now thirty-four years’ duration for constitutional freedom, Spain,” he declared, “finds herself under a system of government almost as arbitrary in practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which has existed in any former period of her history. She has indeed a Parliament, but all freedom for discussion has been overborne by force. . . . There is, indeed, by law liberty of the press, but that liberty has, by the arbitrary acts of the government, been reduced to the liberty of publishing what may be agreeable to the executive. . . . This system of violence seems, in some degree, to have survived the fall of its author[842] and not to have been as yet entirely abandoned by the more moderate men who have succeeded him in the government. . . . It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation to a grinding tyranny that Great Britain entered into the Quadruple Alliance and gave that active assistance, which contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. . . .”[843]

This despatch was not to be communicated to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, but was intended to enable Mr. Bulwer to express, “to those persons who might have the power of remedying the existing evils,” the opinions of his government upon the state of the country. But, having sent it to Madrid, Palmerston, on July 20, confidentially informed M. de Jarnac of its contents and allowed him to be supplied with a copy of it. It is plain that he must have had some reason for thus communicating to the French chargé d’affaires a despatch, replete with sentiments which could not but be otherwise than very distasteful to his government. Without doubt, he must have known that Bulwer’s instructions would be at once passed on from Paris to Madrid, and it can only, therefore, be supposed that he wished the Spanish ministers to learn in this manner exactly what he thought about them. Perhaps, also, he was not sorry that M. Guizot should have an opportunity of realizing the very low estimation in which he held his political friends, the Moderados. To the marriage question he obviously attached little importance, and his remarks upon that subject were, doubtless, drawn up far less carefully than those which had reference to the actual condition of Spain.

Louis Philippe, at this time, was somewhat disturbed by a letter from M. Bresson to M. Guizot, dated July 12, in which the ambassador gave a lengthy account of his recent proceedings at Madrid. The Queen-Mother, he reported, urged various objections to the Duke of Cadiz. “Isabella,” she declared, “had an insurmountable aversion to him and she herself had grave doubts about his virility. This last statement,” wrote M. Bresson, “took us upon very delicate ground. She adverted to his voice, his hips, and his general bodily conformation, and I replied by insisting that his rigid morality was to be ascribed solely to his consuming passion for the Queen, her daughter. Furthermore, I pointed out, that his desire to marry was inconsistent with the idea that he was incapable of fulfilling the conditions of matrimony.” Christina’s opinion upon that point was probably little influenced by arguments such as these. But, when M. Bresson took upon himself to assure her that, “in any Bourbon combination” the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier with the Infanta could be announced simultaneously with that of the Queen, she received the information with “every appearance of sincere pleasure.” Rianzarez also expressed to him his satisfaction with this arrangement, which would remove the great political objection to the Queen’s marriage with Cadiz or, even, with Trapani. Bresson, however, was of opinion that her union with the former could be effected more easily and expeditiously than with the latter, and he, accordingly, suggested that his regiment should be brought to Madrid, in order that, “by constantly seeing him, Isabella might grow accustomed to his voice and hips.”[844]

The Queens, Louis Philippe declared at once, must be given to understand clearly that Bresson had no right to promise that the two marriages would be concluded simultaneously. He was not to be moved from this decision by Guizot’s insinuation that possibly the ambassador had not gone quite so far as His Majesty imagined. On the contrary, he replied, he had very little doubt that he had committed himself even more deeply than he admitted. It was while he was in this mood that Jarnac’s copy of Palmerston’s despatch of July 19 reached Paris. A perusal of its contents caused the King a considerable amount of annoyance,[845] yet it would not appear to have weakened his determination to insist upon the disavowal of M. Bresson.[846] But the question, as to how far the despatch of July 19 was responsible for the final decision of Louis Philippe, will be discussed later on.

Although in his official instructions he had expressed no preference for any particular candidate, Palmerston soon informed Bulwer, privately, that Don Enrique was the British candidate.[847] The selection of that prince called forth no objections from M. de Jarnac. On the contrary, as late as August 16, he gave Palmerston definitely to understand that, provided he would adhere to that arrangement, France would join with him in pressing it upon the Court of Madrid.[848] Bulwer, however, was filled with dismay on learning that he was expected to support the suit of Don Enrique. He had little fault to find with him personally. He considered him manly, enterprising and ambitious, and described him as resembling in many respects Prince Louis Napoleon.[849] There was one objection to him, however, and that was an insuperable one—nothing short of a successful revolution would induce Christina to accept him. “Let me caution your Lordship again and again,” he wrote on August 4, “against appearing to listen to the counsels of the Progressistas and Don Enrique, if you wish to retain the confidence of the palace.”[850]

No sooner was Palmerston installed at the Foreign Office, than Bulwer, reverting to his former scheme, began to plead earnestly in favour of the Coburg marriage. France, he maintained, in order to carry out successfully her plans of aggrandisement in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis and Egypt must exercise a paramount influence at Madrid. It followed, therefore, that all her ambitious designs would be checkmated by the Queen’s marriage outside the Bourbon line. “The policy of maintaining good relations with France,” he was not disposed to dispute it, “was a great and wise policy. But what would happen,” he asked, “were Louis Philippe to die? In that event would not the power of a great military nation fall into the hands of three or four enterprising young men, burning for glory in their several careers? The policy of good relations with France depended,”he much feared, “upon the life of a man of seventy-four and upon the well or the ill-directed aim of an assassin.”[851] The Coburg marriage, Christina assured him, could still be arranged. Let the management of the affair be entrusted to him and he would undertake to bring it to a successful conclusion. France would oppose it vigorously, and it must, therefore, be prepared in secrecy. Indeed, he acknowledged that his plan must needs “wear the aspect of an intrigue, in order to avoid the effects of an intrigue.”[852]

Palmerston, however, was not to be diverted from his intention by these arguments. The Court, the government, and the Coburgs themselves were alike agreed that Louis Philippe’s hostility to it had rendered the Spanish proposal unacceptable. On August 22, therefore, he addressed a lengthy despatch to Bulwer, in which he laid it down as the deliberate opinion of the British government that Don Enrique was the most suitable candidate.[853] But, before this communication could reach Madrid, the affair to which it referred had been definitely settled. The French government had not failed to turn its knowledge of Palmerston’s dispatch of July 19 to account. M. Bresson, in pursuance of M. Guizot’s[854] instructions, had been busily engaged in representing it as a declaration of hostility against the Moderado government in Madrid. Nuñoz, the brother of the Duke of Rianzarez, informed Mr. Bulwer that all hope of arranging the Coburg marriage had been abandoned, that Palmerston “would listen to no other alliance but that of Don Enrique, who is looked upon by the Court as an open adversary and a disguised rebel,” and that a Progressista insurrection was being prepared in London.[855] Only a week after he had transmitted this news, the British minister, on August 29, reported that the Queen, the night before at 12 o’clock, had made up her mind in favour of Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz. Furthermore, he had to inform Lord Palmerston that the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier would take place at the same time. “I learn,” he wrote in conclusion, “that directly the Queen had signified her intention of marrying her cousin, Count Bresson formally asked the hand of the Infanta for the Duke of Montpensier, stating that he had powers to enter upon and conclude that affair.”[856]

M. Guizot, on September 1, communicated this news to Lord Normanby, the new British ambassador in Paris.[857] Palmerston, who was yachting with Her Majesty on the south coast of England, received the information of the conclusion of the double marriage in a letter from the Comte de Jarnac. Louis Philippe eluded the disagreeable task of apprising Queen Victoria that he had broken his compact, by allowing his own Queen, Marie Amélie, to convey the intelligence to her. The reply which she received was short and cold. “You will remember,” wrote Queen Victoria, “what passed between the King and myself at Eu. . . . You will, doubtless, have heard that, in order to be agreeable to your King, we declined to arrange the marriage of our cousin, Prince Leopold, with the Queen of Spain. . . . You will, therefore, easily understand that the sudden announcement of this double marriage could only cause us surprise and the keenest regret. . .”[858]

M. Guizot explained his conduct by referring to the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, of the existence of which Palmerston was now for the first time informed. In that document France had reserved to herself the right of departing from the agreement at Eu, should at any time a Coburg marriage appear “imminent or probable.” Palmerston’s inclusion of Prince Leopold among the available candidates in his despatch of July 19, combined with Christina’s overture at Lisbon, in the previous month of May, had created a situation, M. Guizot insisted, which released France from all her engagements. But, although he firmly maintained this contention and instructed M. de Jarnac to hold the same language in London, his conduct was not that of a man confident in the justice of his cause. Besides attempting to induce Lord Aberdeen to declare that, under the circumstances, a departure from the compact at Eu was permissible, he drew up a bitter attack upon Lord Palmerston and sent it to Jarnac with instructions to forward it to Lord John Russell. But in both cases he met with disappointment. Aberdeen told him frankly that he could not adopt his view of the case, and that he had no fault to find with the language or the conduct of his successor in office.[859] John Russell showed his letter to Palmerston, and informed M. de Jarnac that his colleague had his hearty approval and support.[860] Louis Philippe, meanwhile, had compiled a lengthy statement of his case and had sent it to his daughter, the Queen of the Belgians, in order that it might be placed before Queen Victoria. But neither his laboured attempts to extenuate his own conduct nor his insinuations about Lord Palmerston produced the desired effect. After a careful consideration of his letter, replied the Queen on September 27, she had failed to discover any reasons which could justify him in breaking his promise. She had arrived at this conclusion, she begged him to believe, “by the help of her own eyes,” not, as he had suggested, by the aid of those of Lord Palmerston.[861]

The protests of the Queen, however, were as ineffectual as the official remonstrances of Bulwer at Madrid and of Normanby in Paris. On October 10, 1846, the double marriage was duly solemnized at the palace, in the hall called “de Embajadores.” The British minister was not present at the ceremony, which was witnessed by a great crowd of persons. “One viva only was heard, and that not very loud, when the Infante Don Francisco descended from his carriage.”[862] Louis Philippe and M. Guizot had attained their object, but they had sacrificed “the cordial understanding.” In England, the authors of the Spanish marriages stood condemned by the Court, by the Cabinet, and by public opinion. There was no thought of an appeal to arms, but it was felt that in the future the relations of the two governments could no longer be carried on in the same spirit of close and friendly intimacy. Palmerston, founding his case upon the renunciation made at the Peace of Utrecht[863] by the Duc d’Orléans of that day, sought to induce the Powers to declare that any children, which might be born to the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta, would be excluded from succeeding to the Spanish throne. Throughout Europe, however, there were ominous signs of a recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit, and Metternich, in consequence, had strong reasons for desiring to propitiate Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. He, therefore, refused to pronounce himself and simply adopted an attitude of neutrality, taking care to point out that the trouble could never have arisen, had the legitimist principle been upheld and had Don Carlos been enthroned. Russia and Prussia, which like Austria had never acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella, followed the example of the Court of Vienna and declined to be drawn into the controversy.

Palmerston’s conduct was, unquestionably, ill-advised in thus attempting to apply to Spain, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the stipulations of diplomatic instruments framed when the conditions of Europe were very different. But, if his objections to the Infanta’s marriage, founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht, were unsuccessful, he was afforded the satisfaction of completely refuting the pleas set up by M. Guizot in justification of his actions. The argument which forms the main contention of his despatches, both of October 31, 1846 and of January 8, 1847, is unanswerable. The Memorandum of February 27, 1846, to which the French government attached so much importance was, he pointed out, unofficial and verbal. No record of it was to be found at the Foreign Office. M. de Jarnac had never mentioned it to him, “until after the event had happened for which it was now quoted as a justification.” But, “even admitting for the sake of argument that Her Majesty’s present government were to be held bound by it, how could it justify a departure from the engagement of Eu? The imminent danger, specified in that memorandum, was the likelihood that either the Queen or the Infanta should be about immediately to marry a foreign Prince, not being a descendant of Philip V. But if that likelihood had ever existed, it had at all events ceased to exist, when M. Bresson demanded the hand of the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier. Not only had it then ceased to exist, but with respect to the Queen, whose marriage was then the immediate and only subject of discussion, it had been succeeded by an impossibility; because when Count Bresson demanded the hand of the Infanta the marriage of the Queen to the Infant Don Francisco had actually been resolved upon and settled.”[864]

Both in the French Chambers and in the British Parliament the Spanish marriages were the subject of debate, at the opening of the session of 1847. The publication of the English blue-book created a profound sensation in France.[865] After reading the correspondence, no one could any longer maintain that England had encouraged the candidature of Prince Leopold of Coburg, or that Louis Philippe had been justified in breaking the agreement of Eu. Nevertheless, in spite of the light which was thus thrown upon the proceedings which led up to the marriages, the true history of the case was only imperfectly revealed. Even to-day, the real motives which actuated some of the principal actors in the affair are still largely a matter of conjecture. Palmerston[866] himself believed, and his opinion has been adopted by the majority of English writers, that a secret understanding existed between Christina and Louis Philippe. The Queen-Mother’s overture to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg has been represented as a trap craftily laid for the British government. England, it was calculated, would never resist the temptation of actively supporting the candidature of Prince Leopold, and Louis Philippe would, in consequence, be furnished with a pretext for repudiating his promises.[867] But, plausible as this explanation of Christina’s conduct may sound, it cannot stand the test of a close examination.

Had the Queen-Mother never manifested any anxiety to marry her daughter to a Coburg, until she requested Bulwer to transmit her proposal to Lisbon, her proceedings, it must be admitted, would be open to grave suspicion. But the facts of the case are very different. On at least three previous occasions, when she cannot possibly have been acting in collusion with Louis Philippe, she had declared her predilection for the Coburg match. In 1838, during the civil war, she mentioned the matter to Lord Clarendon.[868] In 1841, after her abdication, when she was living in Paris, she sent Count Toreno to Lord Cowley to inform him that she regarded a Coburg Prince as the most suitable husband for Isabella.[869] No sooner was she back at Madrid, in 1844, than she expressed herself in the same spirit to Mr. Bulwer.[870] To the very last she appears to have struggled against the dictation of the King of the French. Finding that the Coburgs were fearful of incurring the wrath of the Court of the Tuileries, she did all in her power to persuade Louis Philippe not to insist upon her daughter’s marriage with a Bourbon, “who had none of the qualities calculated to make her happy.” As late as the middle of July, 1846, she sent the Marquis of Miraflores to Paris to plead her cause with him. But the “Citizen King” was inflexible. “Royal marriages,” he reminded her, “were not like of those of private individuals.”[871] Nevertheless, she still refused to yield, and when she at last gave way and compelled the unfortunate Isabella to marry the Duke of Cadiz, it was the ill-judged intervention of Lord Palmerston which was the cause of her surrender, not the expostulations and threats of Louis Philippe.

In Spain, in 1846, the victory of one party over another meant something more than that a particular set of politicians had been temporarily replaced in office by their opponents. Disgrace, exile and even loss of liberty were the fate which generally awaited the leaders of a defeated party. Christina herself, after the triumph of the Progressistas in 1836, had had to submit to the insolent dictation of a band of mutinous sergeants and had seen her Moderado ministers forced to fly from the country. Four years later the same party, in its hour of victory, had humiliated her as a woman and as a Queen and had driven her to resign the regency. She was not by nature vindictive, but she, doubtless, regarded a Progressista with feelings very similar to those which her father or her brother entertained for a Carbonaro. It may be imagined, therefore, with what dismay she read Palmerston’s despatch of July 19. In every line of it the intention of befriending her enemies was apparent. Palmerston, it was clear to her, was declaring that Don Enrique was the only suitable husband for Isabella, simply in order to promote the fortunes of the Progressistas.

Once convinced that the Moderado régime was endangered by the hostility of Lord Palmerston, Christina determined to comply with Louis Philippe’s demands and thus obtain his protection. The Duke of Cadiz was hastily summoned to Madrid and Isabella was compelled to accept him for a husband. It is not absolutely certain whether the Queen-Mother insisted upon the simultaneous announcement of Montpensier’s marriage with her second daughter, or whether the proposal came from M. Bresson. It is highly probable, however, that she made it an indispensable condition to her acceptation of Cadiz. The fact that the Infanta was betrothed to a son of Louis Philippe would conciliate the French party and would be looked upon by people, generally, as some compensation for the extreme insignificance of the King Consort. Moreover, from her point of view there was another, and a far stronger reason, in favour of the simultaneous conclusion of the two marriages. Once the elder brother was the husband of the Queen, it would be very difficult to prevent the marriage of the younger, Don Enrique, with the Infanta.[872] That danger could be averted only by the announcement that she was betrothed to, and was shortly to marry, Montpensier.

Notwithstanding that he owed his crown to a popular revolution, Louis Philippe attached the highest importance to the natural alliances of the Bourbons. The maintenance of relations with Spain on the footing of consanguinity was, in consequence, the constant aim of his policy. In the pursuit of this object he found a ready instrument in his Foreign Minister. By upholding the principle that Isabella’s husband must be a descendant of Philip V., M. Guizot purposed to disprove the reproach of his opponents that this foreign policy was weak and subservient to England.[873] His motives are perfectly comprehensible. But the reasons which induced the King to break the compact of Eu, by consenting to allow his son’s marriage to take place at the same time as that of the Queen, have never been satisfactorily explained. Louis Philippe was very angry upon learning, on July 20, 1846, that M. Bresson, in order to overcome Christina’s repugnance to the Duke of Cadiz, had held out to her the inducement that Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta might be concluded simultaneously. Turning a deaf ear to the timid remonstrances of M. Guizot, he insisted upon the necessity of acquainting the Queen-Mother that his ambassador had greatly exceeded his instructions. His private correspondence, discovered at the Tuileries after the Revolution of ’48, makes his sentiments upon that point absolutely clear.[874] Nevertheless, in the course of the next three weeks all his scruples vanished, and he allowed M. Bresson to be furnished with the powers necessary for the conclusion of the double marriage.

According to the official French version of the affair, it was the despatch of July 19 which caused the King to change his mind. Seeing that Palmerston had placed Coburg at the head of the list of candidates, he, rightly or wrongly, conceived that the danger, specified in the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, had become “probable and imminent,” and that he was, in consequence, released from all his engagements to England. But his secret correspondence with M. Guizot completely disproves this assertion. In forwarding, on July 24, the despatch to the King, Guizot himself made no suggestion of that nature. On the contrary, he expressed the extremely judicious opinion that Palmerston was very indifferent about Coburg and was rather trying to regain his influence over the Progressistas. Louis Philippe took the same view of the case. He was greatly annoyed at the strictures passed upon his friends, the Moderados, predicted that Palmerston’s proceedings would lead to the bouleversement of Spain, but “all that,” he wrote, “makes it the more necessary that our disavowal of the simultaneous marriage plan should reach Christina at once. The more we suspect bad faith in others the more must we be careful to keep our own hands clean.”[875] The letters published in the Revue retrospective show that he adhered to these admirable sentiments for some ten days longer. There is no document, however, or trustworthy evidence to explain why, probably about August 13 or 14, he suddenly decided to adopt a totally different view of the matter. Under these circumstances it is only possible to suggest the following explanation.

Louis Philippe in the question of the Spanish marriages had a twofold object in view. To his Bourbon policy was subjoined the bourgeois policy of the père de famille, who was desirous of obtaining for his son the large fortune which was supposed to be the portion of the Infanta. Palmerston, however, was determined to prevent the accomplishment of this plan. To the well-known instructions transmitted to Bulwer, on August 22, was appended a despatch, marked separate and confidential, in which he laid down the principle that Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta “would be as objectionable, and in some respects more so, than his marriage with the Queen.”[876] It is true that the contents of this despatch were unknown to Louis Philippe and his agents, and moreover, that before it reached Bulwer’s hands the affair had been concluded. But Guizot was, undoubtedly, aware of Palmerston’s opinions on the subject. Indeed, in a letter to the King, on August 8, he expressed the fear that, although Coburg might be abandoned so far as Isabella was concerned, Palmerston would probably attempt to marry him to the Infanta. “After our first battle,”he wrote, “we shall have to fight another, and a very sharp one.”[877] Louis Philippe himself, a few days later, appears to have been disturbed by a letter which his Queen had received from Christina. The tone of it he considered unpleasant, “and it contained no mention of Montpensier’s marriage.” . . . “Our situation,” he informed Guizot, “has, in consequence, much changed for the worse.”[878]

It is evident, therefore, that on August 12, Louis Philippe was aware that danger threatened his project of marrying his son to the Infanta from two quarters. Palmerston was resolved to oppose it, and the Queen-Mother, if not actually hostile to it, was showing some reluctance to support it. But in the course of the next day or two, news would probably be received from Madrid of the effect which the despatch of July 19 had had upon Christina and her ministers. Under these circumstances, a great effort was, doubtless, made to persuade the King to give Bresson a free hand. Guizot, Madame Adelaïde,[879] and other members of his family assuredly represented to him that the present opportunity must not be allowed to escape. Christina was thoroughly frightened, and would be prepared to accept both Cadiz and Montpensier, provided only that the two marriages could take place simultaneously. Should there be either hesitation or delay, however, Palmerston would have time to mature his plans, and the Infanta and her fortune would be lost to them.

If the theory, here put forward, be correct, that it was Palmerston’s hostility to Montpensier’s projected marriage which caused Louis Philippe to break his promise to England, the question arises, whether, under the circumstances, he was not justified in regarding himself as released from his engagements. M. Thureau-Dangin[880] contends that the King, having undertaken at Eu to postpone his son’s marriage with the Infanta until the Queen should have children, had a right to expect that, in the interval, England should do nothing to facilitate her marriage with any other prince. Aberdeen, unquestionably, did not regard the matter in that light. He simply looked upon Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta as delayed for several years, until, by the birth of heirs to Isabella, it should have lost its political significance. Even then, when it should be less objectionable, he did not consider that England was bound to consent to it, and, in the meantime, as he pointed out to Peel, “many things might happen.”[881] Palmerston most certainly would have repudiated the notion that the compact of Eu debarred him from recommending the alliance of the Infanta with Leopold of Coburg. “We can admit of no parity of position,” he told Jarnac, “between a son of the King of the French and the third son of a German nobleman as closely related to the French, as to the British, Royal Family.”[882] M. Guizot, in the Memorandum of February 27, undoubtedly declared that the Bourbon principle applied equally to the Queen and the Infanta, but he clearly had not much faith in his ability to make good that contention. He was perfectly aware of Palmerston’s sentiments with respect to Montpensier’s marriage, but he never attempted to argue that, because of them, the King was released from his promise. Throughout the controversy he confined himself to asserting, what he knew to be untrue, that Palmerston’s proceedings had rendered “probable and imminent” the alliance of a Coburg prince with Queen Isabella.

In most English accounts it is taken for granted that Louis Philippe selected the Duke of Cadiz as a husband for Isabella, in order to make certain that the succession to the Spanish throne should pass to the descendants of Montpensier. But the circumstances do not warrant this assumption. Count Trapani, whose physical fitness was never called into question, was always his favourite candidate. It was only in the last resort, when, owing to the unpopularity of the Neapolitan connection, he was forced to bring forward another Bourbon, that he fell back upon Cadiz. The suspicions which existed about the virility of this young prince did not deter the King from seeking to impose him upon Isabella. He cannot, however, be fairly charged with having expressly chosen him, because he believed him to be impotent. Don Enrique and the sons of Don Carlos being for different political reasons out of the question, he had no option but to renounce his Bourbon principle, or to insist upon the Queen’s marriage with the Duke of Cadiz.

The experience of England during the eighteenth century had taught her to look with dread upon the prospect of having to struggle single-handed against the two Bourbon Powers. The lesson of 1783 was never forgotten by her statesmen. Under the Restoration, when the absolute rule of Ferdinand VII. was re-established by French bayonets, Mr. Canning, to avert the dangers of a close alliance between the Courts of Madrid and of the Tuileries, acknowledged the revolted Spanish colonies and “called in the new world to redress the balance of the old.” Palmerston was confronted by a different situation. Spain was weaker, but France had acquired Algiers and was upon terms of suspicious friendliness with Mehemet Ali. In alliance with the Pasha of Egypt in the east and with Spain in the west, she might, it was to be feared, obtain a complete control of the Mediterranean. It was, therefore, Palmerston conceived, a matter of the first importance that her influence over the Cabinet of Madrid should be destroyed. This object, in his opinion, could never be successfully attained until Spain should be endowed with Liberal institutions, and should adopt a national, not a dynastic, policy. It was with this end in view that he entered into the Quadruple Treaty, by which England engaged to assist the Christinos to expel Don Carlos from the Peninsula. Without doubt, the idea upon which his policy was based was statesmanlike; nevertheless, the methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose were deplorably unsound. The treaty of 1834 involved interference in the domestic affairs of Spain, and that in combination with the very Power the ascendancy of which over the Spanish government it was his secret object to diminish.

Any military advantages which the Christinos may have derived from the Quadruple Treaty were more than counterbalanced by the harm, which the jealous interference of France and Great Britain in her internal affairs, inflicted upon Spain. Long after the Pretender had fled and outward peace had been restored, the political settlement of the country was retarded by the rivalry and intrigues of the ambassadors and ministers of the two Powers. The marriages of 1846, and all the evils which they brought in their train, were an outcome of the policy which Palmerston had inaugurated twelve years before. But he had not been in power during the whole of this period, and, when he returned to the Foreign Office, the marriage question was already far advanced. Aberdeen was not responsible for the Quadruple Treaty, and he was sincerely desirous of putting an end to the practice of meddling with internal politics, which both the French and British agents at Madrid had adopted. Nevertheless, his weakness and irresolution in dealing with M. Guizot were the cause of much mischief. Had he adhered to his first pronouncement that England would object to any alliance which threatened to disturb the balance of power, but that, with that exception, she looked upon the Royal marriages as an exclusively Spanish affair, none of the subsequent complications could have arisen. Unfortunately, however, after the downfall of Espartero, he undertook to observe a kind of benevolent neutrality towards the principle of the French government—that Isabella’s husband must be a Bourbon. The compact of Eu and the different interpretations which were placed upon it, the pretensions set up in the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, were the consequences of the modifications introduced into his original declaration.

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[CHAPTER XI]