CHAP. XIII.
Before resuming the narrative of Clive's life, and accompanying him on his last visit to India, it will be necessary to take a general and concise view of the events which had occurred in that country during the short period of his absence. It would, indeed, be impossible, without such a review, to understand the nature of the scenes in which he became engaged, or the motives and grounds of the measures he adopted.
He was succeeded in the administration of the affairs of Bengal by Mr. Vansittart; who, as he owed his elevation to Clive, was disposed, we may conclude, to pursue the course of policy which Clive had marked out. But however easy it may be for a man of moderate talent to follow genius in a smooth and beaten track, it becomes impossible, where the road is rugged and indistinct, and where the slightest deviation leads inevitably to the widest separation from him who preceded.
This was the case with Mr. Vansittart. He had a clear perception between right and wrong, in the abstract; but his letters and minutes, soon after he was appointed governor, show that he was quite incompetent to take a comprehensive view of the great and conflicting interests committed to his charge, and still less to quell the violent passions that were in action. He found evils of much magnitude, and he conscientiously desired to remedy them; but he appears to have looked no further, and, consequently, to have often exchanged bad for worse. Volumes have been written for and against the measures he adopted: they will be here noticed only in a very cursory manner.
I have stated, in the tenth chapter, that at the period of time when Clive sailed for England, accounts had been received of the advance of the Shah-Zada towards Patna; and that Colonel Caillaud had been detached with a force to aid Ram Narrain in repelling the invasion. Alumgeer the Second had been murdered by his minister, Umad-ul-Moolk[[205]]; and the Shah-Zada[[206]], on becoming emperor, had assumed the title of Shah Alum[[207]]; nominating, at the same time, Sujah-u-Dowlah (the ruler of Oude) his vizier.
The young emperor was successful in his first action with Ram Narrain; but the latter being reinforced by Colonel Caillaud and Meeran, the invaders were, in their turn, defeated[[208]], and compelled to retire from before Patna. The Emperor, however, instead of retiring towards Benares, took the route of Moorshedabad, whither he was pursued, and obliged to retrace his steps; and, after another ineffectual attempt to take Patna, he retreated to Hindustan. The triumph of the Nabob's arms was completed by the defeat of the rebel Raja of Purneah, by Captain Knox; but, in the midst of these successes, an event occurred, which became the proximate cause of another revolution in Bengal. The Prince Meeran, who has occupied so conspicuous a part in this narrative, was killed[[209]] by lightning. This violent young man had been at once the support and dread of the less energetic Meer Jaffier. Though Meeran was sensible of the necessity of the aid of the English, he was impatient of the state of dependence and control in which the alliance with that nation had placed him; and the continual conflict of his interests and passions rendered him turbulent and dangerous. To Clive, alone, he was obedient; and a sentiment of attachment and respect for that commander appears, on many occasions, to have checked him in schemes that must have terminated fatally for himself, or his father. This prince, with all his vices and errors, was generous to his dependents and army; who, after his death, afraid of losing their arrears, surrounded the palace, and threatened the life of their sovereign, against whom many of his dependents took up arms; and, as if the misfortunes of the country were to be complete, it was visited by a predatory incursion of the Mahrattas.
Amid these scenes of war, mutiny, rebellion, and plunder, Mr. Vansittart assumed the government of Bengal.[[210]] Mr. Holwell, who had been in temporary charge, cherished the greatest prejudice against the reigning Nabob. Meer Jaffier was, according to him, the author of all these evils; and so entirely did he succeed in impressing the new governor with the same sentiments that, within two months[[211]] from Mr. Vansittart's arrival at Calcutta, a treaty was concluded with Meer Cossim Ali, son-in-law to the Nabob, the general of the army, engaging that the Nabob should invest him with full power as ruler of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; in return for which, he made over to the Company the fruitful provinces of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong.
The ostensible causes of this revolution are honestly, indeed, but not very satisfactorily, stated by the Governor himself in his narrative[[212]], and seem to have been chiefly the financial difficulties of the Company's affairs. The Nabob was to a certain extent in arrear, and other pressures were felt. "The season had now begun," says Mr. Vansittart, "when our forces were to take the field against a powerful enemy, whilst we had scarce a rupee in our treasury to enable us to put them in motion. The easy channel in which the Company's affairs ran, whilst the sums stipulated by the treaty (with Meer Jaffier) lasted, had diverted their attention from the distresses which must unavoidably fall on them, whenever that fund should be exhausted; and continuing to act on the same extensive plan in which they set out, they now found themselves surrounded by numerous difficulties, which were heightened by the particular circumstances of the country at this period, and weighed down with the very advantages which they had acquired; that is, an establishment which had lost the foundation on which it was built; a military force proportioned to their connections and influence in the country without the means of subsistence; a fortification begun upon the same extensive plan, at a vast expense; and an alliance with a power unable to support itself, and threatening to involve them in the same ruin."
Mr. Vansittart adds, that had indolence and weakness been the Nabob's only faults, destructive as they were to the welfare of the country and of the Company, he would have felt more severely the necessity of measures the tendency of which was to dissolve the engagements between him and the Company; but that in addition to this, he found a general disaffection to his government and detestation of his person and principles in all ranks of people. Even from this representation of the person principally concerned in the revolution, it is plain that the measure "of not only breaking a solemn treaty without previous warning and negotiation with the prince with whom it was contracted, but even of dethroning that prince, without attempting to remedy by some convention the temporary evils complained of, was a rash and unjustifiable measure, particularly where the change and all the articles of the new treaty were so obviously for the advantage of one of the parties only."
The Governor went to Moorshedabad in the hope of persuading Meer Jaffier to resign a power which he endeavoured to convince him he was alike unfit and unworthy to use, and to place it in the hands of Cossim Ali, who was his nearest connection, and the commander of his army. We cannot be surprised that the Nabob should indignantly repulse these attempts to render him the willing instrument of his own degradation. He refused to be associated, in any way, with the proposed arrangements for the better government of his dominions; and stipulated for nothing but permission to retire to Calcutta, that his life might be safe from that danger to which it must be exposed, if he remained at his own capital. His request was granted; and Cossim Ali was proclaimed Nabob.[[213]]
The character of this chief stood high before his elevation. Of the crime of guilty ambition, it is vain to think of clearing him; but if he afterwards committed the greatest atrocities, and if his memory has become, from his cruel deeds, an object of just abhorrence with the English, it must not be forgotten that he was stung to madness, by the conduct of individuals of that nation; that he was rashly raised to power, by men who could not support him in its exercise, and driven to extremities by others, who, in the pursuit of their own interests and political views, appear to have thought all means justifiable, that could accelerate his downfall.
There is no page in our Indian history so revolting as the four years of the weak and inefficient rule of Mr. Vansittart. He was, as an individual, virtuous and respectable, and his intentions were pure; but these personal qualities were altogether insufficient to carry him through such a scene as that in which he became involved. His apologists have imputed his failure to the want of support from his associates in power, to that spirit of cupidity and rapacity, which had been kindled by the successes of Clive, and to the hopes and intrigues of the natives, which were cherished and excited to action by those that were hostile to the Governor and his plans.
These assertions are all true, but they only serve to prove the want of that superiority of mind, that spirit of command in Mr. Vansittart, which would have enabled him to sway the minds of his own countrymen, as well as the want of that foresight which should have led him to abstain from the adoption of measures extremely questionable in themselves, and which he did not very clearly see that he could carry through. The only ground of apology for him, and that not a very sufficient one, is, that he allowed himself to be surprised in adopting the measure at all; and that even in the instrument which he employed for executing the work, he was deceived in the character of Meer Cossim, whose financial skill and ferocious energy were both equally unforeseen. The truth, however, is, that many of the acts of Mr. Vansittart's administration were less his own than those of a selfish and domineering council.
The first year of the new Nabob's reign was marked by success against his foreign enemies. Major Carnac, who now commanded the English troops in Bengal, defeated the Emperor at Gyah; and a rebellion of the chief of Beerboom and Burdwan was repressed by the aid of a detachment under Major Yorke. Major Carnac, who had obtained just reputation from his military operations, had acquired more with the natives of India by his generous treatment of M. Law, who was compelled to surrender to him, and by his humane and politic behaviour to the unfortunate emperor, whom he had defeated, but whom he afterwards waited upon and attended as one of his subjects.
The courteous behaviour of Major Carnac to the French commander excited, according to the author of the Seer Mutakhareen, equal astonishment and admiration. We cannot refrain from giving an account of the surrender and treatment of M. Law in the words of the native historian.[[214]]
"When the Emperor left the field of battle, the handful of troops that followed M. Law, discouraged by this flight, and tired of the wandering life which they had hitherto led in his service, turned about likewise and followed the Emperor. M. Law, finding himself abandoned and alone, resolved not to turn his back; he bestrode one of his guns, and remained firm in that posture, waiting for the moment of his death. This being reported to Major Carnac, he detached himself from his main, with Captain Knox and some other officers, and he advanced to the man on the gun, without taking with him either a guard or any Telingas (sepoys) at all. Being arrived near, this troop alighted from their horses, and pulling their caps from their heads, they swept the air with them, as if to make him a salam; and this salute being returned by M. Law in the same manner, some parley in their language ensued. The Major, after paying high encomiums to M. Law for his perseverance, conduct, and bravery, added these words:—'You have done every thing which could be expected from a brave man; and your name shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity by the pen of history; now loosen your sword from your loins, come amongst us, and abandon all thoughts of contending with the English.' The other answered, 'that if they would accept of his surrendering himself just as he was, he had no objection; but that as to surrendering himself with the disgrace of being without his sword, it was a shame he would never submit to; and that they might take his life if they were not satisfied with that condition.' The English commanders, admiring his firmness, consented to his surrendering himself in the manner he wished; after which the Major, with his officers, shook hands with him, in their European manner, and every sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed on both sides. At the same time the Major sent for his own palankeen, made him sit in it, and he was sent to camp. M. Law, unwilling to see, or to be seen, shut up the curtains of the palankeen for fear of being recognised by any of his friends at camp; but yet some of his acquaintances, hearing of his being arrived, went to him. The Major, who had excused him from appearing in public, informed them that they could not see him for some days, as he was too much vexed to receive any company. Ahmed Khan Koreishee, who was an impertinent talker, having come to look at him, thought to pay his court to the English by joking on the man's defeat; a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we consider the times in which we live, and the company he was accustomed to frequent; and it was in that notion of his, doubtless, that with much pertness of voice and air, he asked him this question; 'And Beeby (Lady) Law, where is she?' The Major and the officers present, shocked at the impropriety of the question, reprimanded him with a severe look and very severe expressions: 'This man,' they said, 'has fought bravely, and deserves the attention of all brave men; the impertinences which you have been offering him may be customary amongst your friends and nation, but cannot be suffered in ours, which has it for a standing rule, never to offer an injury to a vanquished foe.' Ahmed Khan, checked by this reprimand, held his tongue, and did not answer a word. He tarried about one hour more in his visit, and then went away much abashed; and, although he was a commander of importance, and one to whom much honour had been always paid, no one did speak to him any more, or made a show of standing up at his departure. This reprimand did much honour to the English; and it must be acknowledged, to the honour of those strangers, that as their conduct in war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so, on the other hand, nothing is more modest and more becoming than their behaviour to an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or in the pride of success and victory. These people seem to act entirely according to the rules observed by our ancient commanders, and our men of genius."
The Emperor of Delhi this year[[215]] invested Cossim Ali as Subadar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; the latter agreeing to pay an annual tribute of twenty-four lacs. The aid of the English was desired to fix the Emperor upon the throne of Delhi; and in return, an offer was made of the Dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; but, though the project was entertained at Calcutta, the want of funds for the expedition, and alarm at the embarrassments in which it might involve the Company, prevented its acceptance.
The consequence of the success of his arms, was a desire, on the part of the Nabob, to avail himself of it to confirm his power, and to enable not only to raise funds to discharge the heavy burdens imposed upon him as the price of his elevation, but to enrich himself. No means appeared more likely to effect these ends than the plunder of Ram Narrain, the celebrated governor of Patna. Mr. Vansittart had anticipated this desire, and had furnished Major Carnac with orders to protect a man, who had so often merited, and so often received pledges of protection from the British government. Happy would it have been for the English name and interests, had the Governor persevered in this resolution!—but deceived by the artful representations of Cossim Ali, and irritated by the opposition and remonstrances of Major Carnac, who had (as his friend Clive thought[[216]], most unnecessarily,) joined his opponents, Mr. Vansittart appointed Colonel Coote to the command of the troops at Patna, as preparatory to abandoning its ruler. But Coote, like Carnac, refused to be passive, much less to be the instrument of a measure which they both deemed a violation of pledged faith to an individual; and as such, derogatory to the honour, and injurious to the interests of the British nation. The consequence of this opposition, which, however laudable the motives, was quite indefensible in military officers, was the removal of Colonel Coote; after which Ram Narrain was seized, but no wealth was found in his possession. His imprisonment, and subsequent execution, by order of Meer Cossim Ali brought just reproach upon the English government: for nothing but direct rebellion, or the most flagrant violation of his duty, could have warranted the abandonment of one whom we had so repeatedly, and so specifically, guaranteed against the apprehended avarice and resentment of his superior's passions, which were aggravated by the protection that policy had compelled us to give to this Hindoo ruler. That the conduct of Cossim Ali was not to be anticipated, is a weak and inadmissible excuse. The faith of the British nation should not have been committed to such hands: for if there exists one ground of strength more than another to our empire in India, it is the strict maintenance of such guarantees as that which had been given to Ram Narrain. They can never be made without creating hostility in the parties whose power they limit, or to whose interests they are, or seem to be, opposed. Every artifice, and every effort, therefore, will be used to induce us to break them; and when we do so, we may be satisfied, that we lose more of real strength, by every such act, than can be gained by the most brilliant victory.
One of the chief causes of the discord which prevailed in Bengal was the exemption from duties on their private trade, claimed by the Company's civil servants, who at that period were remunerated by their trade rather than their salaries. The system of collecting customs on the transit of goods in the interior of the country prevailed all over India; and in Bengal much inconvenience was felt, and many quarrels arose, from the number of tolls and inspections to which the Company's goods were liable, in common with all others, in their transit to and from the marts of purchase and sale. To obviate these, it was arranged with the Nabobs, in explanation of the Emperor's firman, that the Company's flag and dustuck[[217]], in their boats and other conveyances, should secure their goods from search; and as their trade consisted solely of goods from foreign parts for sale in the country, or of country goods for foreign exportation, the privilege only partially interfered with the trade of the interior. While the Nabobs and their officers were in full power, any abuse of this privilege was easily checked. But when, after the accession of Meer Jaffier, the English had become all-powerful, and it was dangerous to interfere with their acts, or to question their proceedings, the Company's servants, who had still the privilege of trading on their own account, not only covered their private adventures, by passports under the Company's name, but all their servants and dependents claimed an exemption from internal duties on the same plea, and besides entered deeply into the internal trade of the country. During the vigorous administration of Clive such attempts had been rare; but when all fear of correction was lost in the increasing weakness of his successors in the government, men set no limits to their efforts to enrich themselves. The Nabob's revenue was injured, and his authority insulted, in every quarter of his dominions, by the exemptions claimed for the trade of European agents, and the respect demanded for the persons of the lowest of their servants. Against their pretensions and excesses he made the most forcible remonstrance, but in vain. Many of the persons of whom he complained were members of Council; and it was not surprising, therefore, that difficulties should occur in any attempt made by the Governor to check and reform such abuses. Cossim Ali became impatient of delay; and finding his representations produce no effect, and that the orders of the government were either evaded or disobeyed, he himself took, and authorized measures of violence, that increased the discontent and hostility of the party opposed to Mr. Vansittart; many of whom were the persons chiefly benefited by the abuses complained of, who represented him as leaving British subjects and public servants of the Company at the will and mercy of a capricious tyrant whom he had unjustly raised to the throne.
To remedy these evils, Mr. Vansittart negotiated a treaty, by which, while some advantages were left to the servants of the Company, many of the privileges they had claimed were done away. This treaty, though exceptionable in some of its clauses, might have operated well, had Mr. Vansittart's Council been disposed to listen to reason, and had Cossim Ali been more temperate. Trusting to his judicious and active administration of the customs as one of the sources out of which he was to discharge the heavy pecuniary obligations under which he had come to the English, he adopted the strictest measures for enforcing their collection. The adjudication and enforcement of all fiscal demands by the articles of the treaty had (unfortunately as affairs stood) been left to the Nabob's officers. Numerous collisions instantly ensued in all parts of the country. "In truth," says Mr. Verelst[[218]], a dispassionate observer, "it soon became a personal quarrel. Meer Cossim, in the orders issued to his officers, distinguished between the trade of his friends, and of those who opposed him, treating individuals with indecent reproach." The opponents of Mr. Vansittart, who thought their interest injured, and who now formed the majority of Council, combined in measures which soon led to an open rupture.
So excessive were the claims made by the English and their native servants, for carrying their goods free from the duties paid by the Nabob's own subjects, that the whole commerce of the country was thrown into confusion, and ruin was threatened to the Nabob's finances. As a measure of justice to his own subjects, and to prevent the daily breaches of the peace which occurred, he saw no remedy left, but to abolish all customs in his dominions. An order was accordingly issued abolishing all tolls and customs for the space of two years.
This act of the Nabob, though extorted by necessity, and so injurious to his own revenue, was loudly exclaimed against as an infringement of his engagements with the Company; and two agents[[219]] were sent to demand its annulment. But before they could adjust differences, events were brought to a crisis, principally through the impressions made upon the Nabob's mind by the conduct of the majority of the Council.[[220]]
Mr. Vansittart informs Lord Clive of his measures for regulating trade; but states his apprehensions of the result. These were but too fully verified. The Nabob, alarmed by the assembly of all the Council from the out-stations, and outraged by their seizure of some aumils (or revenue officers) for the performance of his orders, became most violent, and was rendered more so from the daily reports of the conduct of Mr. Ellis, chief of Patna, who, from the first, had been the determined opponent of his elevation. A knowledge of the disposition, and a belief of the hostile intentions of this public agent, led him to stop two boats proceeding to Patna with arms; and he added to this act of aggression a demand for the removal of Mr. Ellis, and the English detachment from Patna. This conduct was regarded as very little short of an open declaration of war; and as such, it was treated by the majority of the Council, who issued orders to Mr. Ellis, giving him the power (if he thought it right to exercise it) to anticipate the Nabob's hostile designs by seizing upon the citadel of Patna. The reins of government had fallen from the hands of Mr. Vansittart, and were guided by a selfish and sordid majority.
It was in vain that Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Warren Hastings protested against giving such discretionary power to a man known to be so violent. They too truly anticipated the result. At the very moment Cossim Ali (alarmed at having proceeded too far) released the boats, he heard of the Fort of Patna being surprised and taken by the English troops, acting under the orders of Mr. Ellis. Though it was immediately re-taken by his troops, Cossim Ali's rage, at what he deemed a treacherous commencement of hostilities, knew no bounds; and throwing away the scabbard, he became furious in his resentment against the whole English nation, and all who had adhered to them. Mr. Amyatt[[221]], one of the deputies sent to Monghyr, was murdered on his way back to Calcutta. To Ram Narrain's death was added the execution of the two Hindu Seits (or bankers), who had always been supposed attached to the English interests; and notwithstanding the entreaties and threats of the Governor, and the more direct menaces of Major Adams, commanding the British forces, he glutted his vengeance with the deliberate murder of Mr. Ellis and all the English (except one) who had been taken prisoners at Patna. Their numbers amounted to one hundred and fifty, of whom fifty were military or civil officers.
Subsequently to this act of atrocity[[222]], Cossim Ali and the German[[223]], Sumroo, (who had been the instrument of the massacre,) fled before the British troops, and found refuge in the territories of Oude. Sujah-u-Dowlah, the prince of that country, not only refused to deliver them up on the demand of the British commander, but, acting as an ally of Cossim Ali, advanced to attack the English army, then under Major Munro, from whom he received a signal defeat at Buxar. He was afterwards pursued into his own country, and again discomfited, though he had been joined by the Mahratta chief, Mulhar Row Holkar. So situated, this ruler adopted a very politic and decided course. He would not, he said, bring a stain upon his honour, by surrendering men who had sought his protection; but he commanded Cossim Ali and Sumroo to quit his dominions, and repaired to the British camp, throwing himself entirely upon the clemency of his enemy. To this he was chiefly induced by the accounts which had been received of the return of Clive, whom he could not hope to oppose, and whose resentment he hoped to disarm by unqualified submission. His conduct and character were represented in the most favourable light by Major Carnac, who earnestly recommended that he should be treated with generosity, and confirmed in his dominions. Such a measure, this sensible and liberal officer remarked, would be more beneficial to our interests and reputation, than any change we could make in this quarter of India.
The events that have been described led to the re-elevation of Meer Jaffier to the Musnud; and we must, therefore, shortly revert to the history of that prince.
Before Clive left India, Meer Jaffier had committed many acts that might have been construed into infractions of the treaty with the English, and more, that, strictly viewed, would have proved him ill suited for the high station to which he had been raised: but Clive considered that his conduct was less to be attributed to his character, which was weak and vacillating, than to the galling nature of his dependent condition; and as the relations between the Nabob of Moorshedabad and the English could not be changed, without danger to the very existence of the latter, he judged wisely, that, while Meer Jaffier abstained from hostility, however glaring his defects, any change in the head of the native government would be impolitic, and attended with consequences alike injurious to the reputation and interests of the British government.
The departure of Clive was the most serious of all misfortunes to Meer Jaffier. He required the most liberal toleration that enlarged policy could give to his measures. He had, besides, a respect for the character and a dread of the displeasure of Clive, which operated as a check upon his excesses. Mr. Holwell (the temporary successor to Clive) could not succeed to his influence over the mind of the Nabob, whose want of personal deference must have aggravated the bad impressions the new governor appears to have previously entertained of his character. But, though Mr. Holwell has laboured to prove that Meer Jaffier, subsequent to his combination with the Dutch, carried on a correspondence with the Shah-Zada hostile to the English, the fact is not clearly established; and if it were, the sound principles that regulated the conduct of Clive would have led to its being passed over. The unhappy death of Meeran, however, was the event which tended most to accelerate the revolution. It threw, as has been shown, the army and country into equal confusion; and the step taken by the Nabob of elevating his nearest connection[[224]] and most efficient military leader, Cossim Ali, to the condition before held by his son, proved the proximate cause of his ruin.
Cossim Ali's ambition was of too active a nature to render him content to await the death of his father-in-law and benefactor; and he found, in the distracted state of the Nabob's government, and in the prejudices of those intrusted with the administration of the Company's affairs in Bengal, ample grounds to proceed upon. He had also recourse to what he no doubt deemed more certain means of effecting his object. He promised (and the promise was afterwards made good[[225]]), large sums to those of the select committee who had favoured his elevation. He anxiously desired to extend his gifts to the members of the committee who were opposed to the measures of the Governor; but they rejected his offers, and made such rejection a strong ground of the sincerity of that protest[[226]] which they had entered against the proceedings of the Governor and his party on this memorable occasion.
The letter written by the secret committee of Bengal to the Court of Directors, at the period of Clive's departure for England, has been already noticed. It was, of course, deemed most contumacious; and as a mark of their displeasure, the Court dismissed from their service the four civil councillors.[[227]] Three of those dismissed were zealous supporters of Mr. Vansittart; and their removal threw the power into the hands of a majority, whose violence, in their opposition to him and Cossim Ali, led to measures which precipitated the rupture with the latter, and all the horrid acts by which it was attended.
On the breaking out of the war, the restoration of Meer Jaffier was urged by the majority of the Council; and when the excesses of Cossim Ali put an end to all hopes of a settlement with him, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hastings, who were at first opposed to the measure, concurred in it. The re-elevation was attended with few changes. He confirmed the concessions[[228]] made by Cossim Ali, and restored the advantages of trade to the English which that prince had taken from them. Meer Jaffier survived his restoration to power but a short period; and that was disturbed by mutinies in his army, and by the intrigues and corruption of his court. He imputed all his misfortunes to the absence of Clive; and he anxiously desired to protract his existence till the arrival of one, whom, notwithstanding all their disputes and differences, he appears throughout to have considered as his only true friend. The gratification of his wish was denied him. He died a few months before Clive's arrival[[229]]; but the warm and often-expressed sentiments of Meer Jaffier, on this point, show that he was neither destitute of good feeling nor discernment. The sincerity of his attachment was proved by the last act of his life, which was to leave a legacy to his friend. The amount and destination of this bequest shall be hereafter mentioned.
On the death of Meer Jaffier, doubts arose as to his successor. The first claimant was Nujum-ud-Dowla, a youth of twenty, and son of the deceased; and the second, his grandson (the son of Meeran), who was only six years of age. After some deliberation, the decision was in favour of the former.
By the treaty[[230]] concluded with this prince, the military defence of the country entirely devolved upon the English; the Nabob agreeing to keep no more troops than were necessary for purposes of parade. The most remarkable feature of this arrangement was, the agreement of the young Nabob to appoint, with the advice and concurrence of the English government, a Naib Subah (or vicegerent), to conduct the civil administration of his country. At the time when Meer Jaffier was restored, the choice of his minister was, of course, considered as being of the greatest importance. While at Calcutta, he proposed to appoint to that office Nundcomar[[231]], a Hindu of the worst character. To this Mr. Vansittart strongly objected, recommending Mahommed Reza Khan, a Mahommedan noble of talent and of reputed integrity, but who was opposed (probably for those very qualifications) by the intriguing and corrupt faction which had long governed the court of Moorshedabad. The Nabob soon after left Calcutta, when Nundcomar followed; and, in spite of Mr. Vansittart's remonstrances, being supported by the majority in Council opposed to the Governor, he was intrusted with the direction of the Nabob's affairs. Mr. Vansittart had left Bengal before the death of Meer Jaffier; on which event, by the treaty that followed, Mahommed Reza Khan (then at Dacca) was elevated to the rank of Naib Subah to his successor, Nujum-ud-Dowla.[[232]]
Mr. Vansittart, or rather his council, has been reproached[[233]] (as Clive was) for making Nabobs, without any reference or respect for the legitimate authority of the Emperor of Delhi, or his Vizier, Sujah-u-Dowla. But however politic it might have been to have gained the sanction of such authorities after the measure was adopted, a previous application would have been the height of folly and of weakness. Whatever latitude of interference, or right of approbation, had been given to the Emperor or his minister, would assuredly have been exercised for venal and ambitious purposes; and the embarrassments, that must ever attend such proceedings, would have been multiplied tenfold. Sujah-u-Dowla, it is true, upbraided the English with their conduct in this particular. He accused them of casting down and putting up Nabobs at their pleasure; but this was to gain opinion, and afford a pretext for the hostilities he meditated against their power. The very chief who made this accusation was the proclaimed minister and servant of the Emperor; but he yielded him neither obedience, nor a participation in the revenues of the wide and rich territories of Oude. Names and forms, as connected with the different relations of authority in the empire of India, continued to be observed, and were so far of importance; but, as connected with the substance of power, they had been, for a long period, wholly neglected; and though we may agree with the historical antiquary, who judges from the principles of times long past, and looks only to the theory of Indian government, that the English were wrong, yet, if we take a dispassionate and comprehensive view of the actual condition of India, we must, I conceive, not only deem them defensible upon this point, but pronounce that, under the circumstances in which they were placed, it was quite impracticable for the local authorities at Calcutta to pursue any other line, without sacrificing the interests committed to their care, and greatly increasing the anarchy and bloodshed in the country, regarding the administration of which the disputes existed.[[234]]
The changes that took place at Madras during Clive's absence from India have little relation to these Memoirs, as that presidency continued, during his second administration, almost unconnected with Bengal. Suffice it, therefore, to say, that the power of the English Nabob (as he was termed), Mahommed Ali Khan, was fully established[[235]]; the strong fortress of Vellore was besieged, and taken from Mortiz Ali Khan, and part of the Carnatic was assigned, as a jaghire, to the Company.
Another event occurred during this period[[236]], which created a great sensation. The gallant Mahommed Esoof, who had so greatly distinguished himself in the early campaigns of Lawrence and Clive, had been continued in the management of Madura and Tinnevelly, which he had been the chief instrument of reducing to order. He was, in this situation, subject to the Nabob, to whom, and those around him, he was not long in becoming an object of jealousy and hatred. The defalcation of revenue from exhausted countries, and the haughty replies made by a proud soldier to reproaches, added to the preparations he made to guard against the designs of those he justly deemed his enemies, furnished ample pretexts for accusing him of malversation and rebellion. The Company's troops were combined with those of the Nabob for his reduction; which was not, however, effected, without great waste of blood and treasure, and at last accomplished by an act of treachery. A Frenchman in his service, of the name of Marchand, betrayed him; and he was put to death by the Nabob, Mahommed Ali. This gallant soldier, no doubt, became a rebel to the prince he served; but he may be deemed, in some respects, the victim of those disputes for power which ran so high, at this period, between the English and the Nabob. Mr. Pigot, according to Mahommed Ali, forced Mahommed Esoof upon him as the manager of the countries of Madura and Tinnevelly; and by his support and countenance encouraged him in acts of contumacy and disobedience. Educated as the Vellore Subadar had been, and knowing that the real power was vested in the English, he appears to have looked exclusively to them, and to have paid little attention to one he considered as having no more than a nominal authority. But the departure for England of his friend Mr. Pigot, and the succession of Mr. Palk, whose policy conceded to the Nabob the real dominion of his country, left Mahommed Esoof without hope; and, in the desperate struggle he made for his life, the former faithful soldier of the English not only corresponded with their enemies, the French, against whom he had so often and so gallantly fought, but declared himself the subject, and displayed in his fort and country the banners, of that nation. This last act of his life has not deprived his memory of the honours that belong to it, as the bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India.
Mr. Palk, formerly clergyman at Fort Saint David, who had risen, by his moderation, good sense, and experience, to different offices of government, was, when Clive returned to India, Governor of Madras. His appointment to this station induced his friend and near connection, General Lawrence, to quit his retreat, and revisit, as commander of the troops, the scene of his former fame.
At Calcutta, Mr. Spencer from Bombay had succeeded to Mr. Vansittart. He was governor at the time of the elevation of Nujum-ud-Dowla, and participated in the money[[237]] that was distributed on that occasion. These presents have been justly arraigned, as furnishing powerful motives to the Company's servants for making revolutions by which they were enriched; and it is one of the heaviest charges against Clive, that his example was the origin of this baneful practice. The fact is not disputed; but it happened in this case, as in most others, where small men attempt to imitate great, that they reach only the defects, and fail in every other part.
The princely presents which Clive merited and received were the rewards of great services rendered to the parties by whom they were given, and in which his first efforts were prompted by considerations that were decidedly uninfluenced by sordid motives. Add to this, that whatever he undertook prospered, and that all the individuals whom he elevated he preserved, not only from their native enemies, but from the still more galling encroachments and rapacity of the Company's servants. By such acts he won the good opinion of all ranks in India. From the King to the peasant the name of Clive inspired sentiments of respect and confidence.
What a contrast was presented by his successors in power! Money for themselves was, in every engagement, one of the stipulations, and appeared, though in some cases it might not have been, the leading motive of their measures. All their measures failed: every one connected with them was ruined. The character for good faith, which at Clive's departure stood so high, was lost. No one trusted the word of an Englishman. Many of those who engaged in these scenes were able and virtuous; but there was no leading genius among them. The jealousy and party spirit that pervaded the government at home multiplied checks and cherished insubordination in those abroad; till nothing was heard but accusations and recriminations.
The army, both European and native, had fallen into a very insubordinate and mutinous state. The officers evinced this spirit on almost every occasion where they deemed their personal interests affected; and many of the privates deserted to the native powers. A most serious mutiny occurred at the period when Major Munro took the command of the army[[238]] at Patna. A battalion of sepoys left camp to join the enemy: they were intercepted by a body of troops, and twenty-four of the ringleaders were brought before a native court-martial, and sentenced to death. They were all executed; and we are informed by an officer who was present, that an incident occurred on this occasion, which not only created a great sensation at the moment, but left a lasting impression on the native soldiers of Bengal, being truly characteristic of their proud and dauntless spirit.
When the orders were given to tie four of these men to the guns, from which they were to be blown, four grenadiers stept out and demanded the priority of suffering, as "a right," they said, "which belonged to men who had always been first in the post of danger." The calm manner in which this request was made, and the anxiety that it should be granted, excited great sympathy in all who beheld it. The officer[[239]] on whose authority this fact is stated, and who was an eye-witness of the scene, observes; "I belonged on this occasion to a detachment of marines. They were hardened fellows, and some of them had been of the execution party that shot Admiral Byng; yet they could not refrain from tears at the fate and conduct of these gallant grenadier sepoys."
When a strong sense of imminent danger, and a fear of total ruin to the affairs of the Company and of the English nation in Bengal, excited universal attention and alarm, all eyes were naturally turned on Clive, as the only human being who could restore the reputation and interests of this nation in India. He was in consequence, as has been stated, called upon to proceed once more to that country, and he had courage to obey the call, though convinced that the scene presented difficulties which were almost insurmountable, and that he would have to perform duties that were personally invidious, and calculated not only to interrupt but to destroy all his prospects of future enjoyment.
There can be no doubt that Clive, in consenting, under such circumstances, to return to India, was chiefly, if not solely, actuated by an honourable ambition, and by an ardent desire to promote the interests and glory of his country. His first stipulation, however, was, that his stay should be limited to a very short period; and he pledged himself (and the pledge, as will be shown hereafter, was nobly redeemed) not to enrich himself one farthing by any pay or emoluments he might receive from the high station to which he was nominated.
Though Clive had been restrained by many considerations, as well as by the rapidity of events, from taking personally any decided part in the disputes in Bengal, he had not been an unconcerned observer of those scenes. Each party had addressed him with an equal solicitude that he should approve and support them; but we do not meet in his private correspondence with any full expression of his sentiments. He regretted, it appears from his letters, the removal of Meer Jaffier from the throne; but uninformed of the minute circumstances that had produced that measure, he did not withdraw his confidence in the wisdom of the administration of one, whom he so highly valued as Mr. Vansittart, till he saw him depart step by step from all those maxims of policy he had laid down as the rules of his own conduct, both in regard to native princes and other men of rank and consequence in India.
The opposition of his views to those of his successor, as well as his own difficulties, are clearly expressed in a letter he wrote to the Court of Directors immediately before his embarkation.
"In obedience to your commands," Lord Clive observes[[240]], "I now transmit the purport of what I had the honour to represent to you by word of mouth at the last Court of Directors, with some other particulars which slipped my memory at that time.
"Having taken into consideration your letter sent me by the Secretary, as also the request of the General Court of Proprietors, I think myself bound in honour to accept the charge of your affairs in Bengal, provided you will co-operate with, and assist me in such a manner that I may be able to answer the expectations and intentions of the General Court.
"As an individual, I can have no temptation to undertake this arduous task, and nothing but the desire I have to be useful to my country, and to manifest my gratitude to this Company, could make me embark in this service, attended as it is with so many inconveniences to myself and my family. I cannot avoid acknowledging that I quit my native country with some degree of regret and diffidence, on leaving behind me (as I certainly do) a very divided and distracted Direction, at a time, too, when unanimity is more than ever requisite for the carrying into execution such plans as are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the Company.
"I shall now enter into a short discussion of your political, commercial, and military affairs in Bengal. Without searching into the causes of the unhappy revolution in favour of Cossim Ali Khan, I shall only remark, that if the same plan of politics had been pursued, after he was placed upon the throne, as that which I had observed towards his predecessor, he might with great ease have remained there to this day, without having it in his power to injure either himself or the Company in the manner he has lately done. Indeed, Mr. Vansittart's ideas in politics have differed so widely from mine, that either the one or the other must have been totally in the wrong. Soon after Cossim Ali Khan was raised to his new dignity, he was suffered to retire to a very great distance from his capital, that our influence might be felt and dreaded as little as possible by him:—he was suffered to dismiss all those old officers who had any connection with, or dependence upon us; and, what was the worst of all, our faithful friend and ally, Ram Narrain, the Nabob of Patna, was given up; the doctrine of the Subadar's independency was adopted, and every method was put in practice to confirm him in it. We need seek for no other causes of the war, for it is now some time that things have been carried to such lengths abroad, that either the princes of the country must, in a great measure, be dependent on us, or we totally so on them.[[241]] That the public and continued disapprobation of Cossim Ali Khan's advancement to the government, expressed by the gentlemen of Calcutta, increased the Nabob's jealousy, is most true; and that it was the duty of every one, after the revolution was once effected, to concur heartily in every measure to support it, cannot be denied. It is likewise true, that the encroachments made upon the Nabob's prescriptive rights by the Governor and Council, and the rest of the servants trading in the articles of salt, beetle, and tobacco, together with the power given by Mr. Vansittart to subject our gomastahs (or agents) to the jurisdiction and inspection of the country government, all concurred to hasten and bring on the late troubles; but still the groundwork of the whole was the Nabob's independency. It is impossible to rely on the moderation and justice of Mussulmen. Strict and impartial justice should ever be observed; but let that justice come from ourselves. The trade, therefore, of salt, betle, and tobacco having been one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored to the Nabob, and your servants absolutely forbid to trade in them. This will be striking at the root of the evil. The prohibition of dustucks to your junior servants will, I hope, tend to restore that economy which is so necessary in your service. Indeed, if some method be not thought of, and your Council do not heartily co-operate with your Governor to prevent the sudden acquisition of fortunes, which has taken place of late, the Company's affairs must greatly suffer. What power it may be proper to vest me with, to remedy those great and growing evils, will merit your serious consideration. As a means to alleviate in some measure the dissatisfaction that such restrictions upon the commercial advantages of your servants may occasion in them, it is my full intention not to engage in any kind of trade myself; so that they will divide amongst them what used to be the Governor's portion of commercial advantages, which was always very considerable."
Clive then proceeds to offer some observations upon the state of the Company's military affairs in Bengal; and suggests the necessity of keeping up an European force of four, or, at least, three thousand men.[[242]] While he pays a just tribute to the high character of the Indian army, and to the honour they had gained by their gallant exploits, he laments the want of due obedience and subordination, so essential to the interests of the service. To remedy this (which was rendered more necessary by the removal of the King's troops at this time), he recommends an immediate increase of field officers; and points out to the Court the different individuals, who, from their character and services, had the strongest claims upon their notice.
"I would recommend," he observes, "the appointing three field officers to every battalion, a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major; and the officers I would choose to command the battalions should be Majors Carnac, Richard Smith, and Preston. You have already done justice to Major Carnac's character by reinstating him in the command of your forces in Bengal, and by acknowledging his services in the most public manner. This gentleman will, I flatter myself, stand as high in your esteem as Brigadier General Caillaud; and will, I hope, have the same rank and appointments. The military merits of the other two gentlemen you are likewise well acquainted with, having both received from the Court marks of approbation for their distinguished services. To command your artillery I would recommend Sir Robert Barker, whose abilities in that department have been exceeded by no officer that ever was in your service. Your sepoys are already commanded by Major Knox, whose merits I could wish to have rewarded with a lieutenant-colonel's commission. Your horse, when raised, should be commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, or major.
"I have very strong reasons to wish this idea of regimenting your troops may take place; for without such a subordination I shall not be able to enforce your orders for the reduction of your military expenses, which have been a constant dead-weight, and have swallowed up your revenues. I could wish, that whatever emoluments are unavoidable may fall to those few who, having been long, are high in your service, whether civil or military. Thus will the expense be scarce felt by the Company, in comparison to what it is at present, when, for want of due subordination, every one thinks himself entitled to every advantage; and the juniors in your service be excited to exert themselves, from a certain knowledge that application and abilities only can restore them to their native country with fortunes honourably acquired."
In concluding the subject of military affairs, Clive submits to the consideration of the Court his ideas and opinions on the proper mode of levying troops in England. The method pursued at this period he considered to be, in many respects, objectionable. In order that due attention might be paid to the selection of recruits, and to insure, at all times, a proper supply of efficient men, to meet any unexpected demands that might arise in cases of sudden emergency, he suggests, that the Company should apply to his Majesty for permission to maintain two battalions, of five hundred men each, in England, with a proper proportion of officers; and, as a reward to the important services of Colonel Coote and Colonel Forde, he recommends that these two officers should be nominated to command them.
Clive appears to have referred much of the spirit of opposition that arose in Bengal to the jealousy among the public servants of that presidency of appointments, which they deemed supersessions, of civilians from Madras and Bombay, to be governors of Bengal.
"The heart-burnings and disputes," he observes, "which seem to have spread and overrun your settlement of Calcutta, arose, I must fear, originally, from your appointment of Mr. Vansittart to the government of Bengal from another settlement; although his promotion was the effect of my recommendation. The appointment, therefore, of Mr. Spencer, from Bombay, can only tend to inflame these dissensions, and to destroy all those advantages which the Company only can expect from harmony and unanimity amongst their servants abroad. The resignation of Messrs. Verelst, Cartier, and many others of the senior servants, which must be the consequence of Mr. Spencer's appointment, will deprive me of those very gentlemen on whose assistance I depend for re-establishing your affairs in Bengal."
The following letter from Clive relates to the same subjects, and contains too many sound observations and wise reflections upon the actual state of the affairs of India at this period to be omitted. Though the Court of Directors did not comply with the wish of Clive, that he should have the power (since vested in Indian governors) of acting, when occasion demanded, upon his own responsibility, they did what was almost tantamount,—they vested the power required in a select committee[[243]], composed of persons from whom he had no opposition to apprehend, and who were competent to all acts of administration, independent of the other members of Council.
"I shall not enter," Clive observes, "into the motives which caused the deposition of Meer Jaffier, nor into the fundamental cause of the present war with Cossim Ali Khan. It is sufficient to say, that these two events have lost us all the confidence of the natives. To restore this, ought to be our principal object; and the best means will, in my opinion, be by establishing a moderation in the advantages which may be reserved for the Company, or allotted to individuals in their service.
"If ideas of conquest were to be the rule of our conduct, I foresee that we should, by necessity, be led from acquisition to acquisition, until we had the whole empire up in arms against us; and whilst we lay under the great disadvantage of fighting without a single ally, (for who could wish us well?) the natives, left without European allies, would find, in their own resources, means of carrying on war against us in a much more soldierly manner than they ever thought of when their reliance on European allies encouraged their natural indolence. The last battle fought against Cossim Ali Khan is a proof of this assertion, for never did the troops of India fight so well.
"Nothing, therefore, but extreme necessity, ought to induce us to extend our ideas of territorial acquisitions beyond the amount of those ceded by Cossim Ali Khan, in his treaty with Vansittart. This necessity can only arise from finding that nobody will trust us; and that the people of the country are determined to try their strength with us to the utmost.
"But by this system of moderation it is not intended that the Nabob should be left entirely independent of us. The moment he fancies himself in this situation he will look upon us as enemies who have taken too much from him, and whom it will be necessary, either to reduce to our ancient state of mere merchants, or to extirpate. This, therefore, was the error of Mr. Vansittart's conduct: he advised the Nabob to regulate his treasury, save money, to form and discipline an excellent army, and to pay them well and regularly, contrary to the practice of all the princes of India. By following this advice punctually, Cossim Ali, in two years, thought himself in a condition to bid us defiance, and was near being so.
"It ought, therefore, to be our plan to convince the Nabob that our troops are his best, his only support against foreign enemies; and that our friendship will be his best support against the plots and revolutions of his own officers. Necessitated, by the extent of his dominions, to repose large governments and great trusts in particular men, jealousies will be perpetually subsisting. On the nice and disinterested management of these will depend our importance. The principal officers must be convinced that we will protect them from any capricious violences of their sovereign; and, on the other hand, the Nabob must be convinced, that we will give them up to his just resentment the moment their ambition alone leads them to strike at him.
"To carry this balance with an even hand, the strictest integrity will be necessary in every one who shall have a vote in your councils abroad. I found myself every day assaulted by large offers of presents, from the principal men of the province, not to support the Nabob in resolutions contrary to their interests; and from the Nabob, to sacrifice them to his capricious resentments.
"But even this conduct alone will not be sufficient to keep us from giving umbrage. During Mr. Vansittart's government, all your servants thought themselves entitled to take large shares in the monopolies of salt, beetle, and tobacco, the three articles, next to grain, of greatest consumption in the empire. The odium of seeing such monopolies in the hands of foreigners need not be insisted on; but this is not the only inconvenience: it is productive of another, equally, if not more prejudicial to the Company's interests; it enables many of your servants to obtain, very suddenly, fortunes greater than those which in former times were thought a sufficient reward for a long continuance in your service. Hence these gentlemen, thus suddenly enriched, think of nothing but of returning to enjoy their fortunes in England, and leave your affairs in the hands of young men, whose sanguine expectations are inflamed by the examples of those who have just left them.
"This, therefore, will be the greatest difficulty which I shall have to encounter; to persuade, or, if necessary, to oblige your servants to be content with advantages much inferior to those which, by the prescription of some years, they may think themselves entitled to. Yet if this is not done, your affairs can never be settled on a judicious and permanent plan. My fortunes, my family, and the other advantages I may be possessed of, will naturally make me wish to accomplish my intentions for the Company's service abroad as soon as possible, that I may return to my native country, which, it cannot be imagined, that I quit without some regrets; but if I should meet in your councils abroad men whom private interest may render averse to my maxims, I shall, perhaps, instead of settling your affairs as may be expected from me, find myself harassed and over-ruled in every measure by a majority against me in council.
"It therefore rests with the Court of Directors to consider, seriously, whether they should not intrust me with a dispensing power in the civil and political affairs; so that whensoever I may think proper to take any resolution entirely upon myself that resolution is to take place. The French Company gave Mr. Godeheu sole and absolute control over all their settlements to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, at a time when their affairs were not in a worse condition than ours are at present. In India we ourselves have had examples of supervisors. I myself was intrusted with great powers by the gentlemen of Madras, when I went down to Bengal against Suraj-u-Dowlah: the use which I made of these powers will, I hope, justify my opinion, that I may, without danger, be intrusted with an authority so highly necessary at present. The occasions of exerting it will rarely happen, but will certainly happen at times, when all may be lost for want of it. Moderation, I will venture to say, was always a part of my character in political concerns; and as a means to induce the gentlemen abroad to contract their views of private advantage within the bounds essentially necessary to the interests of the Company, the first step I shall take will be, to give up to them every commercial advantage, as I did during my last residence in Bengal. I need not mention that these advantages are, to a Governor, great, and adequate to his station.
"To prevent dissensions, I am willing to receive a military commission inferior to General Lawrence's; but that gentleman has received from the Court of Directors so very extensive a power over all their forces in India, that the presidency, at which he resides, is, in fact, little less than the residence of a Governor-general over all your settlements in India. If ever the appointment of such an officer as Governor-general should become necessary, it is evident that he ought to be established in Bengal, as the greatest weight of your civil, commercial, political, and military affairs will always be in that province. It cannot, therefore, be expected that I should be subject to have any part of the military forces allotted for that province recalled or withheld from me at the will of an officer in another part of India; or that even the presence of that officer in Bengal should, in any way, interfere with my military authority in that province. It will likewise be necessary (at least until affairs in Bengal are restored to perfect tranquillity) that whatever troops, treasures, or other consignments may be destined from England to that presidency, shall not, as usual, be stopped and employed by any of the other presidencies at which they may chance to arrive in their passage towards the Ganges."
Such was the prospect, and such were the anticipations, with which Clive proceeded to India. The task was arduous, but his mind was resolved on its full performance; and the next chapter will show that his efforts were more than sufficient to surmount the obstacles that were opposed to his success, although they proved even greater than he had apprehended.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 13
[205]. More commonly called Ghazee-u-Deen.
[206]. Prince Royal.
[207]. Shah Alum signifies "King of the World."
[208]. 22d February, 1760.
[209]. 2d July, 1760.
[210]. August, 1760.
[211]. This treaty was concluded on the 27th September.
[212]. Vol. I. p. 98.
[213]. A curious and minute account of the progressive steps taken in effecting this revolution is given in a letter to Clive (dated the 3d December, 1760,) from Mr. Lushington, who held the situation of linguist to the army, and who was an eye-witness of the incidents he describes. After detailing Mr. Vansittart's visit to Moorshedabad accompanied by a hundred and eighty Europeans, six hundred sepoys, and four pieces of cannon, that force might be used in case Meer Jaffier should refuse to comply with his demands, and mentioning that he had delivered to the Nabob three letters explanatory of his intentions, to which he waited a final answer, Mr. Lushington proceeds:—"We waited all the next day; but no answer coming, the Governor thought it proper not to lose any time, and therefore ordered Colonel Caillaud to go by water with his detachment, so early that he might surround the palace at daybreak; sending at the same time a letter, acquainting the Nabob that he had sent the Colonel to settle those affairs which he had conferred with him about, and to which he had promised to give an answer, but none was brought. The Nabob sent word to the Colonel he would give no answer until the troops returned to Moraudbaug, as he never expected such treatment from the English. Some few conferences were afterwards held by Mr. Hastings and myself with several of the Nabob's ministers; but as nothing could be agreed on I was sent back to Moraudbaug, to give an account of our proceedings to the Governor, and to have his final order whether we should storm the palace in case the Nabob refused to comply. He answered he wished not to spill the blood of a man whom he raised to such dignities, but that the affair must be finished before sunset. With this I returned; and found, to my great surprise, Cossim Ali Khan's standards, and the nobits[[c]] beating in his name. Colonel Caillaud now told me that the Nabob had sent out the seals to his son-in-law, and offered to resign the government if the English would be security for his life. This was immediately agreed to, and a meeting was held between the Colonel and the Nabob, who made the following speech, as well as I can remember:—'The English placed me on the musnud; you may depose me if you please. You have thought proper to break your engagements. I would not mine. Had I such designs I could have raised twenty thousand men, and fought you if I pleased. My son, the Chuta Nabob (Meeran), forewarned me of all this. I desire you will either send me to Sabut Jung (Lord Clive), for he will do me justice, or let me go to Mecca; if not, let me go to Calcutta; for I will not stay in this place. You will, I suppose, let me have my women and children; therefore, let me have budgerows and be carried immediately to Moraudbaug.' The Governor saw him soon after this, and he made much the same speech to him, adding, he could be nowhere safe but under the English protection."
That Mr. Lushington did not concur very cordially in the measures described, may be inferred from his concluding observations. "The Company," he observes, "are to receive the countries of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, for this service. I, therefore, should be glad to know how this Nabob will be any more able to pay his people than the old man, after having given away a third part of his revenues."
[c]. Large drums.
[214]. Seer Mutakhareen, vol. ii. p. 164.
[215]. 1761.
[216]. In a letter to Major Carnac, dated the 7th of May, 1762, Clive observes, "Although I am convinced of the goodness of your heart and intentions, yet there is a warmth and fire in your disposition which often carries you beyond the rules of prudence; and, whatever your friends in India may say of the letter you sent the Board, I wish you never had wrote it, for it gives room to such designing men as Sulivan to do you more prejudice than you can imagine."
The same sentiments had been previously expressed by Clive, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, 3d of February, 1762. "I am most heartily concerned," he says, "that Carnac has been induced to take part with your enemies in the Council. He has an excellent heart, and a very good understanding; but the warmth of his temper in this instance has got the better of both."
[217]. Dustuck, a permit, exempting goods from the payment of duties.
[218]. Verelst's View, p. 47.
[219]. Mr. Hall and Mr. Amyatt.
[220]. "The question is," Mr. Vansittart observes, in a letter to Clive, dated the 25th of February, 1763, "whether the salt, beetle-nut, and tobacco trade shall be carried on with the Company's dustuck, or pay duties to the country government, and go with their dustuck. I am of the latter opinion, and assured the Nabob I would not grant dustucks for these articles, but that myself and any other English gentlemen who had a mind to trade in them, should pay the government's duties and take out their dustuck. This, and some rules I proposed for restraining the overgrown power of the English gomastahs employed in carrying on this trade, and giving the officers of the government their due authority, were disapproved by the rest of the Council; and it was resolved to call down the members from the subordinates to make the necessary regulations upon these points at a full board. * * * * Where the abuses will end I know not; for where the Nabob's officers have the power and the courage to oppose and prevent the unlawful attempts of our gomastahs, they are not contented with that, but, in their turn, oppress and injure in a most extravagant and insufferable manner, so that it is a difficult matter to keep a proper balance; and I shall be obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of giving Mr. Sulivan your sentiments on the subject."
A very different view of this subject is taken by Major Carnac. In a letter to Clive, dated the 26th of February, 1763, he observes: "Mr. Vansittart's interview with the Nabob, instead of removing our grievances, has occasioned their being exceedingly multiplied and carried beyond sufferance. He, in conjunction with Mr. Hastings, without consulting the rest of the Board, established a set of regulations, whereby a duty of 9 per cent. is laid upon all articles of inland trade without exception; and the disputes of our gomastahs and others in our employ are subjected to the decisions of the Nabob's officers. These concessions are so evidently shameful and disadvantageous to us, that it is not to be conceived they could ever have been submitted to, except by persons who were bought into them; and, indeed, it is confidently asserted, and generally believed, that Mr. Vansittart got seven lacs by his visit to Mongyr. The members of the Council, then at Calcutta, passed a severe minute of censure upon the President's procedure, and summoned the absent members, in order to devise a speedy and effectual remedy for the complaints received from every quarter. They have been some time assembled, and have absolutely forbid the regulations being complied with, and have issued out orders to repel by force any insults that shall in future be offered, or obstructions to our trade. It is, indeed, high time," he adds, "to overset the ruinous system which Mr. Vansittart has so industriously endeavoured to establish: by a strange contradiction, he deposes one Nabob under pretence of mal-administration, and then asserts the successor to be independent, and master of his own actions, and uses all possible means to render him so, and to increase his power. We have so sensibly felt the ill use made thereof by Cossim Ali Khan, that the man must be wilfully blind who does not see the necessity of immediately checking his career, and the consequences that must result from his being suffered to run on." From these observations, it may safely be concluded, that the gallant Major was a better soldier than statesman.
[221]. The following letter, dated the 15th of June, 1763, which we find entered in the copy book of Mr. Amyatt, was meant to report to Mr. Vansittart the failure of his mission. The original never reached its destination. "I am favoured with yours of the 8th and 9th instant. We waited on the Nabob, and delivered him your letter: he was highly incensed, and expressed great contempt for us and our forces, and told us he expected nothing else than a war; that we might go and remain at our tents till we received the Council's orders, and then signify the same to him by writing—which he supposed would be much the same as your letters to him; if so, he should dismiss us, but expected Mr. Hay to remain a hostage till those prisoners we had of his were released. The stopping our arms is not equal to the seizing his aumils, he says; and our troops being in his pay, they shall not remain at Patna; and peace or war depended on their removal, which he found would not be the case. All my endeavours to establish a friendship and confidence have been in vain; nor can I convince him we did not intend breaking with him, or to disgrace him by being obliged to seize his aumils, but necessitated so to do. He seemed inclined to quarrel, or rather resolved we shall have no influence, or free intercourse, or trade through his country, but what he pleases. I have had a very disagreeable time with him, and shall be heartily glad when free from this embassy, which I have, to the utmost of my power, endeavoured to conclude, in bringing about a lasting peace and friendship, and reconcile the Nabob to every body; but to no purpose, nor can it be effected."
[222]. 1763.
[223]. A well-informed friend of the author remarks, that he was not a German, but a Frenchman or Swiss, of the name of Sombre, which, perhaps, had been his nom-de-guerre when in the French service.
[224]. Cossim Ali was his son-in-law.
[225]. Mr. Vansittart, in his communications with the Nabob, rejected this present previous to the treaty, as it might appear the price of its stipulations: but he intimated, at the same time, that there would be no objection to such present after the obligations of the treaty were fulfilled. The following is a list of the presents acknowledged to have been received on this occasion:—
| Mr. Vansittart | rupees 500,000 | £58,333 |
| Mr. Sumner | 240,000 | 28,000 |
| Mr. Holwell | 270,000 | 30,937 |
| Mr. M'Guire | 180,000 | 20,625 |
| Mr. Smyth | 134,000 | 15,354 |
| Major Yorke | 134,000 | 15,354 |
| General Caillaud | 200,000 | 22,916 |
| Mr. M'Guire | 75,000 | 8,750 |
| ———— | ||
| £200,269 | ||
| ———— |
Vide Parl. Reports, vol. iii. p. 311.
[226]. This protest, which is in the form of a letter, is dated the 11th of March, 1762.—Vide Parl. Rep., vol. iii. p. 252.
[227]. Messrs. Holwell, Pleydell, Sumner, and M'Guire.
[228]. The provinces of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong.
[229]. February 6, 1765.
[230]. February, 1765.
[231]. This man has been before mentioned. He was justly objectionable to the British government on account of the various intrigues and treasons in which he had been detected; and was imprisoned at Calcutta for his correspondence with its enemies during the reign of Cossim Ali.
[232]. Vide Mill's British India, vol. iii. p. 318.
[233]. There is some confusion in Mr. Mill's account of this transaction (vol. iii. p. 330.), from that accurate historian having overlooked the fact, that the appointment of Nujum-ud-Dowla was managed by Mr. Spencer and his council, Mr. Vansittart having previously set out for Europe.—See 3d Report of Committee of 1773, p. 21.; and Scott's Hist. of Bengal, vol. ii. pp. 439-447.
[234]. An exception must be made of the deposition of Meer Jaffier: Suraj-u-Dowla, and Cossim Ali respectively forfeited their authority in consequence of their unsuccessful attempts to destroy the power of the English.
[235]. 1763.
[236]. 1764.
[237]. Vide Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 312.
[238]. 1764.
[239]. Captain Williams' Memoir of the Bengal Native Army.
[240]. This letter is dated 27th April, 1764.
[241]. Clive's clear and practical mind here puts the question on its real basis. There is no other alternative.
[242]. "For the good of the Company," Clive observes in the letter already quoted, "I would propose that you should always have, in Bengal, four, or at least three, thousand Europeans; to consist of three battalions of seven hundred each; four companies of artillery of one hundred each; and five hundred light horse."
[243]. This select committee was composed of Lord Clive, General Carnac, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Sumner, and Mr. Sykes. The two latter accompanied Lord Clive from England.