EXCURSUS VI
THE DIVISION OF RECEIPTS AMONGST THE ALLIES
The Allied Governments took advantage of the Spa meeting (July 1920) to settle amongst themselves a Reparation question which had given much trouble in Paris and had been left unsolved[85]—namely, the proportions in which the Reparation receipts are to be divided between the various Allied claimants.[86] The Treaty provides that the receipts from Germany will be divided by the Allies “in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity and of the rights of each.” The failure, described by M. Tardieu, to reach an agreement in Paris, rendered the tense of this provision inaccurate, but at Spa it was settled as follows:
| France | 52 | per cent. | ||
| British Empire[87] | 22 | ” | ||
| Italy | 10 | ” | ||
| Belgium | 8 | ” | ||
| Japan and Portugal | ¾ | of 1 per cent each; | ||
the remaining 6½ per cent being reserved for the Serbo–Croat–Slovene State and for Greece, Rumania, and other Powers not signatories of the Spa Agreement.[88]
This settlement represented some concession on the part of Great Britain, whose proportionate claim was greatly increased by the inclusion of pensions beyond what it would have been on the basis of Reparation proper; and the proportion claimed by Mr. Lloyd George in Paris was probably nearer the truth (namely that the French and British shares should be in the proportion 5 to 3). I estimate that France 45 per cent, British Empire 33 per cent, Italy 10 per cent, Belgium 6 per cent, and the rest 6 per cent would have been more exactly in accordance with the claims of each under the Treaty. In view of all the facts, however, the Spa division may be held to have done substantial justice on the whole.
At the same time the priority to Belgium to the extent of $500,000,000 was confirmed; and it was agreed that the loans made to Belgium during the war by the other Allies, for which Germany is liable under Article 232[89] of the Treaty, should be dealt with out of the moneys next received. These loans, including interest, will amount by the end of 1921 to something in the neighborhood of $1,500,000,000, of which $550,000,000 will be due to Great Britain, $500,000,000 to France, and $450,000,000 to the United States.
Under the Spa Agreement, therefore, sums received from Germany in cash, and credits in respect of deliveries in kind were to be applied to the discharge of her obligations in the following order:
1. The cost of the Armies of Occupation, estimated at $750,000,000 up to May 1, 1921.
2. Advances to Germany for food purchases under the Spa Agreement, say $90,000,000.
3. Belgian priority of $500,000,000.
4. Repayment of Allied advances to Belgium, say $1,500,000,000.
This amounts to about $2,850,000,000 altogether, of which I estimate that about $750,000,000 is due to France, $850,000,000 to Great Britain, $550,000,000 to Belgium, and $700,000,000 to the United States.
Very few people, I think, have appreciated how large a sum is due to the United States under the strict letter of the Agreement. Since France has already received almost two–thirds of her share as above, whilst Belgium has had about one–third, Great Britain less than one–third, and the United States nothing, it follows that, even on the most favorable hypothesis as to Germanyʼs impending payments, comparatively small sums are strictly due to France in the near future.
The Financial Agreement of August 13, 1921, was aimed at modifying the harshness of these priority provisions towards France.[90] The details of this Agreement have not yet been published, but it is said to make a somewhat different provision from that contemplated at Spa for the repayment of Allied war advances to Belgium.
The reception of this Agreement by the French public was a good illustration of the effect of keeping people in the dark. The effect of the Spa Agreement had never been understood in France, with the result that the August Financial Agreement, which much improved Franceʼs position, was believed to interfere seriously with her existing rights. M. Doumer never had the pluck to tell his public the truth, although, if he had, it would have been clear that, in signing the Agreement provisionally, he was acting in the interests of his country.
The mention of the United States invites attention to the anomalous position of that country under the Peace Treaty. Her failure to ratify the Treaty forfeits none of her rights under it, either in respect of her share of the costs of the Army of Occupation (which, however, is offset to a small extent by the German ships she has retained), or in respect of the repayment of her war advances to Belgium.[91] It follows that the United States is entitled, on the strict letter, to a considerable part of the cash receipts from Germany in the near future.
There is, however, a possible offset to these claims which has been mentioned already (p. 78) but must not be overlooked here. Under the Treaty, private German property in an Allied country is, in the case of countries adopting the Clearing House Scheme, applied in the first instance to debts owing from German nationals to the nationals of the Allied country in question, and the balance, if any, is retained for Reparation. What is to happen in the case of similar German assets in the United States is still undetermined. The surplus assets, the value of which may be about $300,000,000,[92] will be retained, until Congress determines otherwise, by the Enemy Property Custodian. There have been negotiations from time to time for a loan in favor of Germany on the security of these assets, but the legal position has rendered progress impossible. At any rate this important German asset is still under American control.