FOOTNOTES:
[60] A fairly adequate account of this controversy during the Peace Conference can be pieced together from the following passages: Baruch, Making of Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, pp. 45–55; Lamont, What really happened at Paris, pp. 262–265; Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty, pp. 294–309.
[61] For these figures see Tardieu, op. cit., p. 305.
[62] It is of these passages that M. Clemenceau wrote as follows in his preface to M. Tardieuʼs book: “Fort en thème dʼéconomiste, M. Keynes (qui ne fut pas seul, dans la Conférence, à professer cette opinion) combat, sans aucun ménagement, ‘lʼabus des exigences des Alliés’ (lisez: ‘de la France’) et de ses négociateurs.... Ces reproches et tant dʼautres dʼune violence brutale, dont je nʼaurais rien dit, si lʼauteur, à tous risques, nʼeût cru servir sa cause en les livrant à la publicité, font assez clairement voir jusquʼoù certains esprits sʼétaient montés.” (In the English edition, M. Tardieu has caused the words fort en thème dʼéconomiste to be translated by the words “with some knowledge of economics but neither imagination nor character”—which seems rather a free rendering.)
[63] At about the same date, the German Indemnity Commission (Reichsentschädigungskommission) estimated the cost at 7228 million gold marks, also on the basis of pre–war prices; that is to say, at about one–seventh of M. Duboisʼ estimate.
[64] The details of this claim, so far as they have been published, are given in Appendix No. 3. The above figure comprises the items for Industrial Damages, Damage to Houses, Furniture and Fittings, Unbuilt–on Land, State Property, and Public Works.
[65] See M. Loucheurʼs speech in the French Chamber, May 20, 1921.
[66] For this rate to be justified the exchange value of the franc in New York must rise to about 11 cents.
[67] M. Loucheurʼs statement to the French Chamber implied that the rate of conversion was applicable to material damage as well as to pensions, and I have assumed this in what follows; but precise official information is lacking.
[68] The figures of damage done, given by M. Briand, are generally speaking rather lower than those given ten months earlier (in June 1920) in a report by M. Tardieu in his capacity as President of the Comité des Régions Dévastées. But the difference is not very material. For purposes of comparison, I give M. Tardieuʼs figures below together with those of the amount of reconstruction completed at that earlier date:
| Destroyed. | Repaired. | |||
| Houses totally destroyed | 319,269 | 2,000 | ||
| Houses partially destroyed | 313,675 | 182,000 | ||
| Railway lines | 5,534 | kilos. | 4,042 | kilos. |
| Canals | 1,596 | ” | 784 | ” |
| Roads | 39,000 | ” | 7,548 | ” |
| Bridges, embankments, etc. | 4,785 | ” | 3,424 | ” |
| Destroyed. | Cleared from shells. | Leveled. | Plowed. | |
| Arable land (hectares) | 3,200,000 | 2,900,000 | 1,700,000 | 1,150,000 |
| Destroyed. | Reconstructed and working. | Under reconstruction. | |
| Factories and works | 11,500 | 3,540 | 3,812 |
A much earlier estimate is that made by M. Dubois for the Budget Commission of the French Chamber and published as Parliamentary Paper No. 5432 of the Session of 1918.
[69] A more recent estimate (namely, for July 1, 1921) has been given, presumably from official sources, by M. Fournier–Sarlovèze, Deputy for the Oise. The following are some of his figures:
Inhabited Houses
| At the Armistice: | Totally destroyed | 289,147 |
| Badly injured | 164,317 | |
| Partially injured | 258,419 | |
| By July 1921: | Entirely rebuilt | 118,863 |
| Temporarily repaired | 182,694 |
Public Buildings
| Churches. | Municipal Buildings. | Schools. | Post Offices. | Hospitals. | |
| Destroyed | 1,407 | 1,415 | 2,243 | 171 | 30 |
| Damaged | 2,079 | 2,154 | 3,153 | 271 | 197 |
| Restored | 1,214 | 322 | 720 | 53 | 28 |
| Temporarily patched up | 1,097 | 931 | 2,093 | 196 | 128 |
Cultivated Land
| Acres. | ||
| At the Armistice: | Totally destroyed | 4,653,516 |
| By July 1921: | Leveled | 4,067,408 |
| Plowed | 3,528,950 | |
Live Stock
| 1914. | Nov. 1918. | July 1921. | |
| Cattle | 890,084 | 57,500 | 478,000 |
| Horses, donkeys, and mules | 412,730 | 32,600 | 235,400 |
| Sheep and goats | 958,308 | 69,100 | 276,700 |
| Pigs | 357,003 | 25,000 | 169,000 |
[70] Even if we assumed that every house which had been injured at all was totally destroyed, the figure would work out at about $7,000.
[71] M. Brenier, who has spent much time criticizing me, quotes with approval (The Times, January 24, 1921) a French architect as estimating the cost of reconstruction at an average of $2,500 per house, and quotes also, without dissent, a German estimate that the pre–war average was $1,200. He also states, in the same article, that the number of houses destroyed was 304,191 and the number damaged 290,425, or 594,616 in all. Having pointed out the importance of not overlooking sentiment in these questions, he then multiplies $2,500, not by the number of houses but by the number of the population, and arrives at an answer of $3,750,000,000. What is one to reply to sentimental multiplication? What is the courteous retort to controversy on these lines? (His other figures are clearly such a mass of misprints, muddled arithmetic, confusion between hectares and acres and the like, that, whilst an attack could easily make a devastated area of them, it would be unfair to base any serious criticism on this well–intentioned farrago. As a writer on these topics, M. Brenier is about of the caliber of M. Raphaël–Georges Lévy.)
[72] M. Tardieu states that, on account of the subsequent rise in prices, M. Loucheurʼs estimate has proved, in terms of paper francs, to be inadequate. But this is allowed for by my having converted paper francs into dollars at the par of exchange.
[73] The Lens coal mines, which were the object of most complete destruction, comprised 29 pits, and had, in 1913, 16,000 workmen with an output of 4 million tons.
[74] I take these figures from M. Tardieu, who argues, most illuminatingly, in alternate chapters, according to his thesis for the time being, that reconstruction has hardly begun, and that it is nearly finished.
[75] Francs are here converted at 2.20 to the gold mark and the £ sterling at the ratio of 1:20.
[76] This is exactly the figure of the estimate which I gave in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (p. 160). But I there added: “I feel much more confidence in the approximate accuracy of the total figure than its division between the different claimants.” This proviso was necessary, as I had over–estimated the claims of France and under–estimated those of the British Empire and of Italy.
[77] “Elle avait été le résultat dʼun compromis assez pénible entre la délégué français, lʼhonorable M. Dubois, et le représentant anglais, Sir John Bradbury, depuis lors démissionnaire, qui voulait sʼen tenir au chiffre de cent quatre milliards et qui avait défendu la thèse du gouvernement britannique avec une habileté passionnée.”
[78] The chief question of legitimate controversy in this connection was that of the rate of exchange for converting paper francs into gold marks.
[79] Made up of about £5,500,000 advanced by Great Britain, 772,000,000 francs by France, 96,000,000 francs by Belgium, 147,000,000 lire by Italy, and 56,000,000 francs by Luxembourg.
[80] The German authorities have published a somewhat higher figure. According to a memorandum submitted to the Reichstag in September 1921 by their Finance Minister, the costs of the Armies of Occupation and the Rhine Provinces Commission up to the end of March 1921 were mks. 3,936,954,542 (gold), in respect of expenditure met in the first instance by the occupying Powers, and subsequently recoverable from Germany, plus mks. 7,313,911,829 (paper), in respect of expenditure directly met by the German authorities.
[81] I do not vouch for the accuracy of these figures, which are rough estimates of my own on the basis of incomplete published information.
[82] On the other hand Great Britainʼs view was adopted as to the valuation of shipping.
[83] In view of the political difficulties in which this Agreement involved M. Briandʼs Cabinet, the matter was apparently adjusted by Great Britain and Belgium receiving their quotas as above, “subject to adjustment of the final settlement” of the questions dealt with in the Agreement. The net result on September 30, 1921, was that, including the above sum, Great Britain had been repaid £5,445,000 in respect of the Spa coal advances, and had also received, or was in course of collecting, about £43,000,000 towards the expenses of the Army of Occupation (approximately £50,000,000). Thus, as the result of three yearsʼ Reparations, Great Britainʼs costs of collection had been about £7,000,000 more than her receipts.
[84] To value these ships at what they fetched during the slump, yet to value Germanyʼs liability for submarine destruction at what the ships cost to replace during the boom, appears to be unjust. My estimate (in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 174) of the value of the ships to be delivered was $600,000,000.
[85] M. Tardieu (The Truth about the Treaty, pp. 346–348) has given an account of the abortive discussion of this question at the Peace Conference. The French obtained at Spa a ratio very slightly more favorable to themselves than that which they had claimed and Mr. Lloyd George had rejected at Paris.
[86] For a summary of the text of this Agreement see Appendix No. 1.
[87] At the conference of Dominion Prime Ministers in July 1921 this share was further divided as follows between the constituent portions of the Empire:
| United Kingdom | 86.85 | New Zealand | 1.75 | ||
| Minor colonies | .80 | South Africa | .60 | ||
| Canada | 4.35 | Newfoundland | .10 | ||
| Australia | 4.35 | India | 1.20 |
[88] The Spa Agreement also made provision that half the receipts from Bulgaria and from the constituent parts of the former Austro–Hungarian Empire should be divided in the above proportions, and that, of the other half, 40 per cent should go to Italy and 60 per cent to Greece, Rumania, and Jugoslavia.
[89] “Germany undertakes ... to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allies and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum on such sums.” The priority for this repayment arranged at Spa is a little different from the procedure contemplated in the Treaty, which provided for repayment not later than May 1, 1926.
[90] See above, p. 135.
[91] Article 1 of the Treaty of Peace between Germany and the United States, signed on August 25, 1921, and since ratified, expressly stipulates that Germany undertakes to accord to the United States all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, and advantages specified in the joint resolution of Congress of July 2, 1921, “Including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States under the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.”
[92] According to a statement published in Washington in August 1921 the Custodian had in his hands German property to the value of $314,179,463.