The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916

by John Rushworth Jellicoe

III.—The Night Action

The situation, which had never been at all clear to me owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, appeared to be as follows:

We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands.

I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. He had been turning on interior lines throughout. We had altered course gradually during the action from south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146 degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to damage, might be to the northward.

The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action between the heavy ships.

It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it.

In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer force throughout the night. No senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights and the best arrangements for the control of the searchlights and the gunfire at night.

It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights nor their control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very important factor for firing at night) had also only just been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships.

But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the result of night actions between heavy ships must always be very largely a matter of chance, as there is little opportunity for skill on either side. Such an action must be fought at very close range, the decision depending on the course of events in the first few minutes. It is, therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general grounds. The greater efficiency of German searchlights at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such an action.

The question then remained as to the course to be steered. The first desideratum was to keep the British Fleet between the enemy and his bases, so as to be in a position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight was rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet for the night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling after dark; and it was also necessary to place our destroyers in a position where the chances of their coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking the enemy’s capital ships during the night. The Grand Fleet was formed at the time in practically a single line, steering approximately west-south-west. I considered that a southerly course would meet the situation and would enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, if I put the destroyers astern, they would fulfil three conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the night (which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy); secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum.

Accordingly, at 9 P.M., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter course by divisions to south, informing the Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the columns one mile apart. This had the effect of placing the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:

1 mile 1 mile 1 mile
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2nd 4th 1st 5th
Battle Squadrons.

My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other during the night, and that therefore they would not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy.

As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 P.M. a signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader Abdiel (Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay a mine-field in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship, over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during the night viâ the Horn Reef. The Abdiel carried out this operation unobserved in the same successful manner as numerous other similar operations had been undertaken by this most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one of our submarines, stationed near the Horn Reef, which reported on return to her base having heard several underwater explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 A.M. on June 1st, it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.

At 10 P.M. the position of the Iron Duke was Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, and the order of the Fleet from west to east was:

Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron); Cruiser Squadrons;

Battle Fleet;

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron;

4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;

11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.

Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward for the night a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron at the rear of our Battle line. This was reported to me shortly after 9 P.M., but immediately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy had been driven off to the north-west.

At 10.4 P.M. Commodore Hawkesley, in the Castor, commanding the destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, sighted three or more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards which he took to be enemy battle cruisers. If the German report is to be believed, the ships were light cruisers and included the Hamburg and Elbing. The enemy at once opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the Castor was hit, and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, making it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which the Castor was leading. The damage to the Castor was slight. The Castor, Magic, and Marne fired torpedoes at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a violent detonation, following on the discharge of the torpedoes, had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers near the Castor.

At 0.15 A.M. the Castor sighted a German destroyer on her starboard bow and opened fire with all guns at point-blank range. She was not seen again.

At 10.20 P.M. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with four light cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group. The enemy again opened fire with great rapidity and accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading ships, the Southampton and Dublin, at very short range. Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 minutes’ engagement and there were fairly heavy casualties; three fires which broke out on board the Southampton were promptly extinguished by fine work on the part of the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had been much cut up by shell fire.

The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but fierce engagement, and it is probable that the German light cruiser Frauenlob, whose loss was admitted by the enemy, was sunk during this action, which took place in that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and the German 4th Scouting Group.

At 11.30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers steering a south-easterly course. Again the vessels sighted opened fire immediately, and the flotilla leader Tipperary, commanded by Captain Wintour, the leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire and set on fire forward; the Broke, leader of the 2nd half Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rendering her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram the destroyer Sparrowhawk, with the result that it became necessary to abandon the latter destroyer on the following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Trelawny), next astern of the Tipperary, fired torpedoes at a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared to be hit and in a sinking condition, and the Spitfire then collided with a German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried off some 29 feet of her skin plating.

The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement, while steering to the south-eastward, came into contact at midnight with the enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron, and one ship (probably the Pommern) was torpedoed and sunk either by the Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Marsden) or Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Coles) or Garland (Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). A heavy and accurate fire was opened by the enemy and the destroyer Fortune (Lieutenant-Commander F. G. Terry) was sunk.

The flotilla was again in action a little later with some enemy battleships, and the Ardent attacked, and fired a torpedo, but the result could not be observed as a very heavy fire was concentrated on the Ardent, which sank with colours flying after a very gallant night’s work. It is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden and one man were the only survivors, being picked up by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five hours in the water.

The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of the 1st Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was somewhat astern of the remainder of the Fleet during the night, owing to the Marlborough not being able to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions for this speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also more than five miles astern of the main portion of the Battle Fleet. At 11.30 P.M. also this flotilla was obliged for some little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with certainty. The result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably some ten miles to the north-eastward of the 1st Battle Squadron by midnight. The incident was a fortunate one since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of the enemy’s battle squadrons.

At 1.45 A.M. Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in the Faulknor, sighted on the starboard bow this battle squadron, consisting of six ships steering south-east. The leading ships were thought to belong to the “Kaiser” class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots to draw ahead, with the intention of turning to attack on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the enemy’s course), in order to give an opportunity of getting into close range. This attack was carried out at 2 A.M. at a range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their torpedoes at the second and third ships in the line. Some took effect on the third battleship in the line, the explosion being so violent and the flame reaching to such a height that it appeared to those in our destroyers that the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the magazine and destroyed the ship.

Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the enemy light cruisers, which were in company with the battle squadron. The destroyer Mænad (Commander J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the north-westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had been anticipated that the attack would have been made with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tubes were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion held on the south-easterly course and, turning later than the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned again to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at 2.25 A.M. fired two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth ship in the line at a range between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, one of which took effect. In this case, too, the flame of the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her were visible.

It is of interest to note that at the time of the first attack on this squadron six battleships were visible. After the first attack only five were seen by Captain Stirling, and twenty-five minutes later five were sighted by the Mænad, and after the Mænad’s attack only four were visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships was sunk was considered at the time to be very strong, particularly as the reports from the Mænad and from Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently, and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original number in the battle squadron, and five as the number remaining after his attack.

When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle squadron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal was, unfortunately, not received by any ship, owing, presumably, to the strong interference caused by German wireless signalling at the time.

The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas took station astern the Battle Fleet in company with the Champion (Captain Farie), leader of the 13th Flotilla; the Fearless, leader of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the destroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the Champion during the night, and the flotillas became somewhat scattered.

At 12.30 A.M. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to the Petard and Turbulent. She rammed the Turbulent and opened a heavy fire on both the Turbulent and Petard; the Turbulent sank and the Petard was damaged.

At 2.35 A.M. the destroyer Moresby, of the 13th Flotilla, sighted four battleships of the “Deutschland” class, and attacked, firing one torpedo; an explosion was subsequently heard.

It was impossible to state with certainty which of our destroyers were actually successful in their attacks. The enemy, of course, denied that any marked success was obtained by our attacks, but information obtained after the action made it certain that at least four battleships of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes, in addition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship Pommern, which was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the light cruiser Rostock.

Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot be attributed to particular destroyers, the work of the flotillas as a whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas, was characterised by the splendid dash, skill and gallantry for which our destroyers had been conspicuous throughout the War. They were most ably led and achieved magnificent work under very difficult conditions.

There is no doubt at all that the German organisation for night action was of a remarkably high standard. In the first place, the use of star shell, at that time unfamiliar to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and, secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful (much more so than ours), but their method of controlling them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of their secondary armament.

The increased offensive power given by these devices did not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting great damage on the enemy during their night attacks, although they led to the loss of some valuable destroyers and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer work and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and other splendid officers perished with their gallant crews. Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to be exceedingly proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both during the day action of May 31st and during the night following that action.

Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals during the night, and, curiously enough, the under-water explosions, four or five in number, were quite clearly recorded on a barograph in the Malaya, a ship well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There is little doubt that these records showed the explosion of our torpedoes against enemy ships.

From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark that our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired with great frequency by the enemy, and they produced a very brilliant illumination, leaving the enemy ships in complete darkness and not revealing their positions.

At 11 P.M. the light cruiser Active, astern of the 2nd Battle Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, and shortly afterwards saw searchlights switched on and a heavy fire opened against this vessel by a ship, or ships, on her starboard quarter. She appeared to be heavily hit and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been the Black Prince, which had apparently lost touch with our fleet during the day action.

Shortly after this incident the Active passed over some submerged object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent examination showed that some 15 feet of her bilge keel had been torn away. It was not conceivable that the object struck could have been submerged wreckage from any ship which had taken part in the action, no fighting having taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed possible that the Active had struck an enemy submarine. At 11.30 P.M. the Colossus also passed over some submerged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to both starboard propeller blades. Again there is doubt as to what the obstruction could have been; it was certainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in action.

At 2 A.M. on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney informed me that the Marlborough could not maintain the Fleet speed of 17 knots any longer, on account of the stress on the bulkheads, and that she had been obliged to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship to proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light cruiser Fearless alongside the Marlborough, and was transferred in her, with his Staff, to the Revenge, the Fearless being then detached to escort the Marlborough.

Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed by our ships during the operations.

The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 P.M., the time of opening fire, and 6.17 P.M. the time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the turn to the southward at 9 P.M.

The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period covered by the night action—9 P.M. to 2 A.M.

At 2.47 A.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered course to north and formed single line ahead in the order—2nd Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 A.M. and took station ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron.

The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on May 31st, being only some three or four miles, and I considered it desirable under these conditions, and in view of the fact that I was not in touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger of submarine attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, having dropped astern during the night owing to the reduction in speed of the Marlborough and the change of flag from the Marlborough to the Revenge. Partly on account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose facilities for computing their positions under these conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M., the destroyers did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron, was not in company until the evening.

The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields in the early morning on the way to their ports. The presence of a Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 A.M., made it certain that our position at that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daylight.

At 3 A.M. the destroyer Sparrowhawk, which was lying disabled in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light cruiser two miles to the eastward, steaming slowly to the northward. After being in sight for about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, bows first. The Sparrowhawk was subsequently sighted by the Marksman and others of our destroyers, and, being too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was sunk by the Marksman.

Shortly after 3.30 A.M. the report of gunfire to the westward was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was engaging a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle Fleet. Course was altered “by divisions” to west at 3.44 A.M., as it seemed that the presence of the airship might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea Fleet. At 3.50 A.M. a Zeppelin was in sight from the Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back again to north and fire opened on the airship, which, however, was too high for the fire to be effective. She disappeared to the eastward. She was sighted subsequently at intervals.

At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the front and to reduce the risk of submarine attack. At 4.25 A.M. the cruiser Dublin reported by wireless that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two destroyers, and she gave her position.

At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate the cruiser reported by the Dublin, whilst the Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of the enemy’s battle cruisers which was thought to be in a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making for a German port. At 4.45 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 A.M. the Commodore of the flotillas (Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers, reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N., Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at 18 knots, and at 6.15 A.M. altered course to south. At 6 A.M., not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until 7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the Battle Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 A.M. and to north at 8 A.M.

The Dublin was sighted at 7.55 A.M. and reported having lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat destroyers she had reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated that the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming fast.

At 8.15 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 6.10 E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at 8.52 A.M. to a south-west course.

Between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. a considerable amount of wreckage was passed, and the bodies of dead German bluejackets were seen in the water. The wreckage of the destroyer Ardent was also passed. Drifting mines in considerable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon of the 1st June, and there were one or two reports of submarines being sighted. At 10 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine screen.

At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 P.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long. 6.11 E.

It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields en route to their bases. It had been evident since the early morning, from the definite information obtained by our directional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to port. All our own injured vessels were also en route for their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the movement of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the forenoon of June 1st.

The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been kept in port by Admiralty orders on May 31st, and was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when I was informed that it was being sent out to join me and to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 A.M. I instructed Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to screen the Marlborough to her base; he informed me at 2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the Marlborough. At 10.40 A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not require the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to strengthen the Marlborough’s escort and told him that I did not need his ships. They would have been of great use at daylight in June 1st had they been on the scene at that time, and it is needless to add how much I should have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew well the extreme efficiency and the fine fighting spirit of this force which, under its gallant and distinguished commodore, had rendered such splendid service throughout the War.

The Marlborough reported at 11 A.M. that a torpedo had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber at 8 A.M.

The Warrior, which had been taken in tow by the sea-plane carrier Engadine, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 3.54 E. at 8 A.M. on the 1st June, but the crew was taken off by the Engadine and the ship abandoned later in the day, as the weather had become bad and it was evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of rescue was very smartly carried out, the Engadine being skilfully placed alongside the Warrior in a considerable sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson, and the large number of wounded transferred to her. The reports as to the condition of the Warrior were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain afloat, and later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore I detached the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to search for her. The search continued until the evening of June 23rd, no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a report received subsequently from the Captain of the Warrior that her condition was such that she must have sunk shortly after having been abandoned. During the search for the Warrior, one of the cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. Later evidence showed, however, that the submarine was one of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This was one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines being mistaken for an enemy, attacked by our own ships, and considered to be sunk. The difficulty of ascertaining definitely the result of an engagement with a submarine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the War to refrain from publishing any figures giving the results of engagements with submarines.

Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the destroyer Broke, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was directed to search for that vessel also, assisted by two light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely in the Tyne, having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach port were the Acasta, towed by the Nonsuch, and the Onslow, towed by the Defender.

The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, and was reported ready for sea at four hours’ notice at 9.45 P.M. on that date.

Note.—In the diagrams embodied in this chapter there are some slight departures from those which accompanied my original despatch to the Admiralty.

That despatch was sent in under constant pressure for its early receipt and at a time when I, in common with my Staff, was very fully occupied with the arrangements connected with the repair of damaged ships, the constructive alterations which the action had shown to be necessary in our ships, and the various committees which I had formed to report on different subjects in the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able to give the personal attention to the reports which later opportunities have afforded me, and such slight modifications as I have made are due to a closer study of these reports, and of the signals received during May 31st.

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One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to send to the King on the morning of June 3rd a message of humble duty, respectful and heartfelt wishes on His Majesty’s birthday.

The following reply was received from His Majesty, and communicated to the Fleet:

“I am deeply touched by the message which you have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men, many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their country’s cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Sea Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by the misty weather to evade the full consequences of an encounter they have always professed to desire, but for which when the opportunity arrived they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy immediately after the opening of the general engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency of the fleets under your command.

“George R. I.”

The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious message, and I added in my telegram to His Majesty that it was “a matter of the greatest gratification to all ranks to receive such an expression of Your Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our gallant comrades.”

CHAPTER XV
REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

There has been some discussion on the tactics of the Jutland Battle, and no doubt there will be more. I have endeavoured to give the facts, so that future discussions may take place with adequate knowledge.

It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have seen expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with the object of enticing the enemy out to attack the weaker portion in order to provide the opportunity for a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy which had been frequently carried out on previous occasions.

Many surmises have been made as to the object with which the High Sea Fleet put to sea on this occasion. The view which I have always held is that the frequent light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the Skagerrak during the spring of 1916, may have induced the German Commander-in-Chief to send out a force with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet. If confirmation of this were needed it is supplied in the German account of the battle, in which it is stated that “there was no reason for supposing that any enemy forces were about, much less the entire British Fleet.”

Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of the whole strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally to the fresh problems which the advent of new weapons had introduced. When I took command of the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that of how to counter a destroyer attack in a day action. It had excited more attention in the two or three years before the War than any other question of tactics, much attention was devoted to it during the War, and for that reason it is desirable to discuss it fully.

It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what were then known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions between Battle Fleets as an exercise), that destroyer attacks were actually carried out in the British Navy on a large scale.

During that year manœuvres took place between the 3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleets, commanded by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, and the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase of the manœuvres of that year included some Battle Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,” during which attacks by considerable forces of destroyers were carried out. Before this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place without destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented the matter from being made the subject of thorough practical experiment on such a scale as to give reliable guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into greater prominence.

The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further light on the question, as no Fleet action took place in which destroyers were engaged; and the subsequent Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as I recollect, include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged. During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres most of the destroyer attacks on the “Red” Fleet were made from towards the rear of the “Blue” battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge from them.

To turn from manœuvre experience; during the years 1911–14, covering the period of Sir George Callaghan’s command of the Home Fleets, destroyer attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that were constantly being carried out, and officers were impressed with the supreme importance of the whole matter.

This was the position when I took over the command of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter immediately engaged my attention. The “counter” which had usually been favoured by flag officers commanding Fleets up to the date named, had been the obvious one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo craft on those of the enemy, as the latter advanced to attack. It was difficult to forecast how far such a “counter” would be successful in preventing the destroyers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the distance the torpedo could be relied upon to run with accuracy, and on its speed, both constantly increasing figures.

The great number of destroyers possessed by the enemy, the largely increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty which our light cruisers and flotillas might experience in reaching a favourable position for meeting and disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter could discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low visibility, when a destroyer attack could be instantly and effectively launched before such a “counter” could take place, made it essential to consider other means for dealing with the situation.

Some German documents which came into our possession early in the War proved the importance which the enemy attached to this form of attack, and emphasised the gravity of the question.

It was, of course, fully realised that the question had two sides, and that if our own Battle Fleet was open to this form of attack, that of the enemy was equally so, but as against this there were important considerations to which it was necessary to devote attention.

The first was that the element of chance enters very largely into torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla of destroyers attacking a Battle Fleet at long range does so with the idea that a certain percentage of the torpedoes fired will take effect on the ships, the remainder passing between the ships.

Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards having a speed of 30 knots an hour, or, in other words, of 50 feet per second, is not comparable to a projectile from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 yards of say 2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course of the target have been determined with considerable accuracy, the torpedo will not hit. Let us assume that the target ship X at position A is steaming at 15 knots, and that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is discharged on a line at right angles to the course of the target at a distance of 8,000 yards (see [diagram]). The target ship will advance 4,000 yards along the line A B whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the line C D. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.

It will be seen that if the course of the target ship has been misjudged very slightly, or had been altered during the passage from A to B, the torpedo will pass ahead or astern of it. In that case it might hit instead a ship Z ahead or one Y astern of X.

There are no means available on board a destroyer for determining with any real accuracy either the speed or the course of a ship at a distance of four or five miles. Hence the difficulty, and the reason why torpedoes are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in expectation that one of the ships in the line will be hit.

The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the enemy, and the chances of achieving this object are naturally proportional to the target presented by a ship as compared with the space between adjacent ships.

In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked “beam on,” the chances of a hit for torpedoes which reach the British line may be assessed roughly at seven to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 feet, and the distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus giving a total length of ships of 4,800 feet, and the total of the interval between them as 6,300 feet.

A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, and at long ranges one may calculate the chances of hits on the above reasoning at between three and four per destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are correctly fired at such a range as to ensure that they reach the British battle line, and provided that the British ships can take no effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.[O]

[O] Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up to the year 1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun armament than their enemies.

It has been said that the element of chance is a large factor in torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. By this it is meant that skill is not a factor that can produce a decisive effect when dealing with torpedoes, as in the case of guns dealing with guns. It is true that skilful manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, if sufficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly judged. When experience at the Jutland Battle showed that under favourable weather conditions the track of German torpedoes was visible for some distance, great care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches so that future use could be made of the fact.

Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that our enemy was almost certain to possess a very considerable superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely to be present during a Fleet action. This was a question which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the then First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed it on more than one occasion when the destroyer building programme was being considered.

Our fears were realised, particularly during the first two years of the War.

The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect at different periods is shown in the following table, so far as it is known to me:—

Date	British destroyers with the Grand Fleet, including Flotilla Leaders[P]	German destroyers probably attached to the High Sea Fleet	Additional German destroyers, less than 12 years old, that could join the High Sea Fleet at Germany’s selected moment
August 4th, 1914	42	88	20
October 1st, 1914	42	88	20
January 1st, 1915	42	88	30
April 1st, 1915	58	88	—
July 1st, 1915	65	88	—
October 1st, 1915	65	88	—
January 1st, 1916	66	88	50
April 1st, 1916	74	88	—
May 31st, 1916	80	88	70[Q]

[P] The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the figures in column 2, since I never expected that it would be able to concentrate with the Grand Fleet.

[Q] No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in destroyers.

Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at the end of May, 1916, 70 were available to go to sea on May 30th (an unusually large proportion). There happened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight destroyers belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied the battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which 47 were with the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had 88, a far larger proportion to each ship.

This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans arose from three causes:

(a) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer force at Harwich, the presence of which force during a Fleet action was very improbable, owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected moment and not at ours, and to the difficulty of concentration under such circumstances.

(b) The necessity of utilising a large number of our destroyers for patrol purposes in the Straits of Dover and elsewhere.

(c) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers in the years before the War to meet the many needs that only this class of vessel could fulfil, particularly as the enemy developed his submarine warfare against merchant-ships.

The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following years up to 1912–13, included provision for twenty destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in the Estimates, there was never sufficient money to meet all the Admiralty’s needs. It was intimated that one or other of the requirements had to give way at a time when the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and as the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary than the destroyers, the number of the latter class of vessel was reduced.

Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole War, the conditions would probably have been even worse had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacrificed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard desired by the Admiralty.

A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity for not leaving anything to chance in a Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster befall it or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be eliminated.

The situation was in many respects different from that with which our Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. In those days disaster could only come about by reason of bad strategy or tactics owing to our enemy being in overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably decided by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried weapon.

During the recent War two entirely new features of the greatest importance were introduced. First, the torpedo could be fired at very long range, up to 15,000 yards, either from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter range from submarines, and the mine had been developed; the invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be known when they were being employed.

The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious when dealing with the attack of under-water weapons than with gun attack are the greater damage which one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it is usually different; a ship which is being heavily hit can—if her own offensive powers will not save her by crushing the fire of the enemy—so manœuvre as to derange temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein lies the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing with the underwater weapon.

These considerations led me to introduce measures for dealing with destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet other than the counter of attack by our light craft on the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a turn on the part of the ships, either towards the torpedoes or away from them.

In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so that they would present as small a target as possible to the torpedo, and incidentally that the space between the ships should be correspondingly large. The matter is very technical, and presents many interesting features, one of which may be illustrated by an example:

Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships to steer direct for the attacking destroyers if the moment at which the torpedoes are fired can be ascertained.

This course, although applicable to one attack, leads to difficulties in the case of successive attacks, since further turns towards will bring the battle line within effective range of torpedoes fired from the enemy’s battleships; occasions will arise when this risk must be accepted.

The accompanying diagram shows that the van and centre squadrons are not so well safeguarded by a turn towards the attacking destroyers as is the rear squadron, for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire torpedoes from C (a threatening position to the van) and the van squadron turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will steer along the line A B.

If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron instead of the van squadron as supposed, and their objective is the twentieth ship in the line, they will run along the line C D, i.e., directly at the fourth ship in the line.

The target presented is, however, small, and the chances of a flotilla attacking the rear squadron when in a favourable position for attacking the van are not great.

The important point in the case of a turn towards is, however, the necessity for ascertaining the moment of discharge of the torpedoes.

In the second case, that of turning away, the object is to place the ships at such a distance from the attacking destroyers that the torpedoes will not cross their tracks, but if this object is not achieved the ships are in a good position for avoiding the torpedoes if their tracks are visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the range of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.

It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or other of the manœuvres should destroyer attacks take place under conditions which prevented an effective “counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres were arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn by divisions of four ships would delay the completion of the manœuvre to too great an extent.

The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great deal in the way of discussion and instructions on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this connection were dealt with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the supreme importance both of making early torpedo attacks on the enemy’s line and of immediately countering such attacks, and it was pointed out that an early attack by our own destroyers would not only tend to stop an enemy attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best position to meet a hostile attack.

The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers were so fixed that they should be in the best positions to effect these two objects, such positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet; in order to provide against a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas, according to the numbers available, and a light cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear.

The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our experience and thought led to the same conclusion, namely, that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks, would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for this belief, and some of them were as follows:

1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, they had immediately retired towards their bases.

2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious. They might be enumerated thus:

(a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the following fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates, to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the following fleet.

(b) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine trap.

(c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere with the observation of gunfire by the following fleet.

(d) Considerations of moral effect will force the stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into the hands of the enemy.

We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these tactics that in all the many exercises carried out by the Fleet during the War, it was the invariable rule to indicate beforehand an assumed position of Heligoland, and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always deployed his Fleet in the direction of Heligoland and adopted retiring tactics. The difficulties resulting from the employment of these retiring tactics and the best method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, the subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the senior officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently discussed and worked out on the tactical board.

The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if retiring tactics are employed in conjunction with a free and skilful use of under-water weapons.

When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, 1916, these thoughts were in my mind, and were no doubt present in the minds of all Flag officers in the British Fleet. It has been mentioned that the circumstances of the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, and the deployment of our own Fleet took place under these conditions. Even so, however, the course on deployment (that is, south-east by east) was to a certain extent governed by the idea of getting between the enemy and his base on the supposition that he would be making towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef Channel.

The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a commanding position on the bow of the enemy caused the enemy to make a large turn to starboard, largely because this squadron—Rear-Admiral Hood’s—was mistaken for the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that at about 5.45 P.M. “dim shapes of enemy battleships are discerned in a north-easterly direction.” These shapes were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The German account states that their battle cruisers turned away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle Fleet the chance of placing itself between the enemy and his base. Advantage was taken of this opportunity, and the enemy was then forced to pursue his retiring tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed in a position of tactical disadvantage owing to the British Fleet working round on a wide circle outside the enemy.

A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets will show this at once.[R] The course of the British Fleet on deployment was south-east by east. Successive turns to starboard brought the course through south by west to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13 points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards apart, the German Fleet moving on the inner of these two circles.

[R] Cf. diagram in the pocket at the end.

The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans erroneously thought was in favour of the British Battle Fleet, but which was always with the enemy, was accentuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually brought farther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet, placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in regard to torpedo attack. This advantage was increased by the low visibility, which rendered it difficult to see flotillas approaching to attack until they were at fairly short range.

When the first attack by German destroyers took place and the first of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be approaching on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the Iron Duke, and had reached a distance of 9,000 yards or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour to get to the van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the movement of our battle cruisers across the bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their movement, and it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers could prevent the attack from developing.

The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined with sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards” and therefore the Battle Fleet was “turned away,” in subdivisions.

Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally with the destroyer attack the enemy made a very large turn-away from our Fleet, and thus opened the range much farther, disappearing entirely from view even from our rear; this process was repeated on each occasion of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was, therefore, continually refusing action.

It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the whole line of battle away for this attack, or whether the leading squadron could not have held the original course. Such a movement was provided for in the Battle Orders, but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the Iron Duke, the leading ship of the centre battle squadron, and therefore the leading Battle Squadron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or rear squadron; indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to attack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was also not at the time clear of the van of the centre squadron, as the turns that had been made had prevented line ahead being re-formed, and the Iron Duke’s Division could not turn unless the division ahead also turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led me to make the signal general to the Battle Fleet.

According to the reports of the captains of the ships of the Battle Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed the line of our Battle Fleet during the 7.10 P.M. destroyer attack alone, in spite of the turn. The large majority of these were observed by the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have crossed the line ahead of the Iron Duke, and at least six crossed the track of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was moving out to attack the enemy’s flotilla.

In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger of the torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being forgotten or minimised by ships that are in the van, owing to failure to realise how dangerous the torpedo fire of ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to vessels a long way in rear, although they themselves are quite immune from this danger.

The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable decentralisation of command, and great stress was laid on this point in the general instructions for “Battle Tactics.” The opening paragraphs of this section of the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It was pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would control the movements of the whole Battle Fleet before and on deployment (except in the extreme case of very low visibility rendering it necessary for the Flag officer of a wing division to take immediate action), he could not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel and other smoke made both vision and communication difficult. The necessity for wide decentralisation of command was then pointed out, combined with a close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which Flag officers should generally conform.

The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since Trafalgar if we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese War, and advantage was naturally taken of the experience to make some changes in the Battle Orders; but there were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, therefore, no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief of the Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement, “This is all going according to expectation.” We did, however, obtain confirmation of our views as to the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted by the German fleet.

The principal changes that were made in the Battle Orders were in the direction of laying still further emphasis on the discretionary power which was vested in Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the difficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland, which the Commander-in-Chief would experience in controlling the movements of the whole Fleet in the heat of action; also in defining still further the different movements that might be adopted to deal with torpedo attacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships or from destroyers.

A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo attacks in action had been prepared by my Staff during the spring of 1916, and a memorandum, with diagrams, had been written showing the various situations that might arise and the effect of the different counter-movements in each case. It is of interest to note that this memorandum was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not actually been issued.

The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in the memorandum before it was finally issued to the Fleet.

The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and the “counter” measures adopted have been dealt with at considerable length, since this form of attack and its “counter” have been much discussed in the Service since 1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely to continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject of much future experiment.

The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but it was not this turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy. That difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until 8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy.

The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line in ordinary circumstances.

As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion.

The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser Lutzow and the light cruiser Rostock, besides omitting to mention that the Seydlitz had to be beached to prevent her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the Seydlitz would undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own Warrior did, had the action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further fighting for several months. The case was very different with the British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November, 1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval matters, stated in the Berliner Tageblatt of November 18th that “our Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be, the last one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so openly.”

But a victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to examine the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August 19th, 1916—undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show that it was still capable of going to sea—the High Sea Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on August 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet flushed with victory and belonging to a country which was being strangled by the sea blockade.

Again, in the German account of the “victory” it is remarked that “as the dawn coloured the eastern sky on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake and attack theirs.”

What are the facts? We know now that as the sun rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were escaping via the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef, steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for home behind the shelter of the German minefields. And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear and searching the waters to the westward and northward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained the search during the forenoon of June 1st, and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet late in the morning, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 A.M., and on several occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate them! One is forced to the conclusion that this victorious fleet did not consider itself capable of engaging only twelve British battleships.

I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. From the second in command, Sir Cecil Burney, to the youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the Chester, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his squadron—or, in my absence, the Fleet—with marked skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer who had made a special study of tactics; Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir Robert Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best—were all officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but the Fleet, had absolute confidence.

In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed a leader who throughout his Service career had shown fighting qualities of the highest order, and he had imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit.

The Flag officers second in command of squadrons had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was confident that they would handle their divisions as well in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be the case.

The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyer flotillas had invariably fulfilled every expectation that I had formed of them. I had always admired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels had endured the conditions under which their work was so frequently performed.

Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Madden (my righthand man throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its chief members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag officers, and with captains who had on countless occasions shown their skill, I was indeed in a fortunate position.

To the above advantages I must add those obtained by the magnificence of the personnel of the lower ranks. The officers and ships’ companies were as keen as any Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait had never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers and men were day after day striving to perfect the fighting efficiency of their ships, and well had they succeeded. The engine room staffs had demonstrated early in the War that they would respond magnificently to any demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it on the occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and moral of the Fleet never stood higher than at the time of the Battle of Jutland, and because of that spirit I knew that the Fleet under my command was the most formidable fighting machine in the world.

Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with proper restraint. Whenever and wherever there was opportunity, officers and men displayed courage and self-sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable instances which proved that the personnel of the present Navy has nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers. The dead died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved with marvellous fortitude. Forty-four years passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith in, and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, but they surpassed all my expectations, and so long as that spirit endures, this country will be fortunate, and with adequate forces will be safe.

It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum issued to the Fleet after the Jutland Battle:

Iron Duke,
June 4th, 1916.

H.F. 0022 349.

MEMORANDUM.

I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, Officers and Men of the Grand Fleet my very high appreciation of the manner in which the ships were fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.

2. At this stage, when full information is not available, it is not possible to enter into details, but quite sufficient is already known to enable me to state definitely that the glorious traditions handed down to us by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily upheld.

3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory which I know was expected by all ranks, which is necessary for the safety of the Empire and which will yet be ours.

4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most gallant comrades, but, although it is very difficult to obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses, I have no doubt that we shall find that they are certainly not less than our own. Sufficient information has already been received for me to make that statement with confidence.

I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information on this point at an early date, but do not wish to delay the issue of this expression of my keen appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my confidence in future complete victory.

5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me with the greatest admiration.

I am more proud than ever to have the honour of commanding a fleet manned by such officers and men.

J. R. JELLICOE.
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.

The Flag Officers, Commodores
and Officers in command of
H.M. ships of the Grand Fleet.

My official despatch on the battle to the Board of Admiralty was forwarded on June 19th, and the following letter was afterwards promulgated to the Grand Fleet:—

Admiralty,
July 4th, 1916.

Sir,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.

2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle; the ships of every class were handled with skill and determination; their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff; while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous.

3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been well fulfilled.

4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
W. Graham Greene.

CHAPTER XVI
THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL

The ships which had received damage in the Jutland Battle had to be repaired without delay. The great majority of the repairs were completed during June or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair, the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations which experience gained in the action had shown to be desirable. The Marlborough was the only large ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, although the work upon her was handicapped to some extent by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser Chester was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a great many alterations were carried out. The principal points affecting matériel to which attention was directed were:

(a) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent the flash of cordite charges, ignited by the explosion of a shell in a turret or in positions between the turret and the magazine, being communicated to the magazine itself. It was probable that the loss of one, if not two, of our battle cruisers was due to this cause, after the armour had been pierced.

(b) Better measures were required to prevent the charges of small guns from being ignited by bursting shell, and to localise any fires due to this cause, in the case of guns of the secondary battery in large ships, and the main armament in small ships.

(c) Increased deck armour protection in large ships had been shown to be desirable in order that shell or fragments of shell might not reach the magazines. This need was particularly felt in all our earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, since their side armour was not carried to the upper deck level. The long range at which most modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent large angle of descent of the projectiles made our ships very vulnerable in this respect.

(d) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing projectile with an improved fuze was also revealed.

(e) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines and drenching exposed cartridges had to be made.

Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet to deal with all questions of this nature, as well as the important matter of possible developments in the fire-control system with a view to improving the methods of correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled” with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great gunnery knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were of immense assistance, and he was most ably seconded by the numerous highly skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers and in the ships of the fleet.

The action taken in connection with these matters was prompt, with the gratifying result that before I relinquished the command of the Fleet, the great majority of the heavy ships had been provided with additional deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work was carried out while the ships were at their usual notice for steam, much of it being actually done at Scapa Flow by the dockyard artificers berthed there on board the Victorious: the work carried out by these artificers and by the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with most commendable rapidity.

Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, as First Sea Lord, and under the immediate direction of Captain Dreyer, then Director of Naval Ordnance, a new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for guns of 12-inch calibre and above, which certainly doubled their offensive power.

The investigation into the possibility of further development in fire-correction methods, a subject to which constant attention had been given throughout the War, was at first carried out by two independent committees. Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee, composed of the most experienced and most successful gunnery officers in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as the result, drawn up and passed for adoption in the Fleet; these had already produced a most convincing and most satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of fire before I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no exaggeration to say that the average time taken to find the gun range of the enemy with these new methods was about one half of that previously required.

Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. The majority had been installed in the Fleet before the great increases in the range of opening effective fire had come about, as the result of experience during the War. Our most modern ships at Jutland were provided with range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of the ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet long. During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply range-finders up to 25 and 30 feet in length; a series of experiments with stereoscopic range-finders was also instituted in the same year. It had become known that the Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be stated, in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that the developments introduced in the fire-control arrangements of the Grand Fleet after the Battle of Jutland did not affect the instruments already in use, which fully met our requirements, but the methods of using those instruments and particularly the system of correction of fire.

On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and Cruiser Squadrons were re-organised as follows:—

Battle Cruiser Squadron

Lion (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron:
Princess Royal (Flag), New Zealand, Tiger.

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron:
Australia (Flag), Indomitable, Inflexible.

Cruiser Squadrons

2nd Cruiser Squadron:
Minotaur (Flag), Duke of Edinburgh, Cochrane, Shannon, Achilles, Donegal.

3rd Cruiser Squadron:
Antrim, Roxburgh, Devonshire.

On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived at Scapa en route to Archangel. In the morning he crossed from Thurso in the Oak, and came on board the Iron Duke on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me, and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. Before lunch we went round the ship. The officers and men naturally greeted him with much respect, and he can have had no doubt of the admiration in which he was held. During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming trip, and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it as a real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed, had been very great, adding that he had felt that he could not have gone on without this break, which he welcomed very much. He was not, however, very sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned the difficulty which he experienced in dealing with questions discussed in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by most soldiers and sailors, whose training does not fit them to state or to argue a case, and who frequently find great difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, accustomed to carry out their ideas without having first to bring conviction to the minds of men who, although possessing great general knowledge and administrative experience, have naturally but little acquaintance with naval and military affairs which in themselves form a lifelong study.

After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland action, and Lord Kitchener evinced much interest in the tactics and the general story of the action.

Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the idea that he was working to a time-table, and that he felt that he had not a day to lose. He mentioned three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed astonishment at the programme which he had planned to carry out in the restricted period. He was most anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip and asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest time in which the passage could be made.

During the day the weather at Scapa, which had been bad in the morning, gradually became worse, and by the afternoon it was blowing a gale from the north-eastward. It had been originally intended that the Hampshire should take the route which passed up the eastern side of the Orkneys, following the channel ordinarily searched by mine-sweeping vessels as a routine measure; but as the north-easterly gale was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping was out of the question, and it was also obvious that the escorting destroyers could not face the sea at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, and finally decided that the Hampshire should pass close in shore, and not take the alternative route passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision were:—

(a) With a north-easterly wind there would be less sea and, therefore, more chance of the destroyers being able to keep up with the Hampshire.

(b) It was practically impossible that this route could have been mined by any surface mine-layer owing to the dark period in Northern latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, during which no ship could expect to approach the shore for mine-laying without having first been sighted.

(c) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, and was, therefore, under frequent observation.

At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines had been confined to water well to the southward of the Firth of Forth, presumably because of their small radius of action. Danger from this source was, therefore, considered to be very remote.

Finally the weather itself was a protection against submarine attack which was at that time more to be feared than the danger from submarine laid mines. Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not been practicable for three or four days owing to the weather conditions.

At about 4 P.M. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board the Hampshire, accompanied by his Staff comprising Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. Donaldson, Colonel FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr. Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant McPherson, Cameron Highlanders. The Hampshire sailed at 5.30 P.M. escorted by two destroyers. Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16 knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers back if they could not maintain the Hampshire’s speed. Experience had proved that high speed was a valuable protection against submarines.

At about 7 P.M. Captain Savill, commanding the Hampshire, ordered the two destroyers back to Scapa, as they were unable to face the heavy seas at the speed of the Hampshire. Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M. the Hampshire struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore, between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head; she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The incident was witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands that the cruiser was in difficulties. He at once ordered out patrol vessels and informed me, with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene immediately.

The evidence of the few survivors of the Hampshire showed that Lord Kitchener was below when the ship was mined, and that an officer escorted him on deck. Captain Savill was heard to give directions from the bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and his Staff, and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently on deck, but was not seen after the ship sank. The weather conditions prevented any boats being hoisted out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the ship sank.

The scene of the disaster was searched during the night by destroyers and patrol craft, but the only survivors were twelve men who drifted ashore on a Carley raft, although many bodies were picked up by the searching vessels, and many drifted ashore.

The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.

At the time of the disaster the Hampshire was steaming at 13½ knots, the wind being north-north-west, with a force of 50 miles an hour. The cold water and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which was north-east at 4 P.M. at Scapa, had become north-north-west by the time the Hampshire was outside, and there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the Orkneys, as had been anticipated.

The hours that passed after the receipt of the report of the Hampshire being in difficulties were most anxious ones. In spite of the fact that the destroyers had been sent back, it seemed almost incredible that the wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow were not so bad as to indicate so extremely heavy a sea off the Brough of Birsay; and even when it was reported that the Hampshire had sunk (a report which took some time to come through), there was hope that, at any rate, Lord Kitchener and his mission would be saved by boat. As the hours passed and no news was received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the certainty that this great man, who had served his country so faithfully and well in its greatest emergency, had met his death when under the care of the Navy, the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord Kitchener had inspired the Service with confidence and trust. The Navy had frequently worked under him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been one of the outstanding figures in the European War on the side of the Entente. Everyone in the Grand Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had fallen upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the feelings of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, on whom lay the main responsibility for his safe passage to Archangel, so far as such safety could be ensured.

I have often wondered since that fatal day whether anything could have been done that was not done, but short of postponing the departure of the Hampshire altogether, until weather conditions admitted of a channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could have been done. Such a decision would have resulted in two or three days’ delay in starting, and would never have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover, with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy mine-laying possibilities, I did not consider the delay necessary as I should not have hesitated, if need had arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same night and by the same route as that traversed by the Hampshire.

My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. There was, at first, doubt in the minds of some people as to whether the loss of the Hampshire was due to a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were set at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken as soon as the weather admitted. They resulted in the discovery of moored mines of the type laid in southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines being easily distinguishable from those laid by surface vessels.

During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly patrolling the route to Archangel to protect shipping against possible enemy raiders, as the traffic was very heavy at this period. The Donegal, Antrim, Devonshire and Roxburgh were the vessels employed. They visited the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Stadlandet, en route to and from patrol, with a view to intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.

The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla were employed in watching the waters in the Kattegat and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. A regular submarine patrol was also begun off the Horn Reef, and was continued up to the time of my relinquishing command of the Fleet. At first two, and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol, which was of great utility in giving information of the movements of the few enemy surface vessels that ever ventured so far from their base, and also proved of use for attacking enemy submarines. At the commencement, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with that of the German submarines, by reason of their bad wireless equipment, which admitted of a range of some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were attached to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly the absolute necessity of effecting an improvement in this particular, stating that I was quite prepared to sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this be necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install efficient wireless apparatus in the only class of vessel that could carry out a watching patrol in the vicinity of German bases. Eventually arrangements were made to provide them with a wireless installation which gave a range of 300 to 400 miles.

When our submarines had been equipped in this way we were at once able to establish an efficient chain of outposts off the Horn Reef by the Grand Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the northward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the result that in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult for the enemy to put to sea unobserved and unreported. The comparative inefficiency of the wireless installation in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had to face during the first two years of War. It should be added that while patrolling in the Kattegat, submarine G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside territorial waters, the German steamship Ems, on passage from Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The crew were rescued.

The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the month, other than the usual patrols, were as follows:—

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth on the 14th for the Naze, thence steered up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and returned to Rosyth.

The Comus and Constance left Scapa on the 25th, swept down the Norwegian coast and returned on the 27th.

The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried out a similar sweep from Rosyth between the 29th June and July 1st.

On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine mine-layer were laid by E 41 in the German Bight.

His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with a visit on the 14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in the Oak, at 5 P.M., being escorted by the destroyers of the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round the Fleet in the Oak, His Majesty proceeded on board the Iron Duke, where he spent the night. On the following day the King visited all the flagships, on board of which a large percentage of officers and men from the various squadrons were assembled, and left for Thurso in the Oak at 5 P.M., proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, honouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a visit.

His Majesty addressed a representative gathering of officers and men from the ships at Scapa, who had been assembled on board the Iron Duke on the morning of the 15th in the following terms:—

“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand Fleet, you have waited for nearly two years with most exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and engaging the enemy’s fleet.

“I can well understand how trying has been this period, and how great must have been the relief when you knew on May 31st that the enemy had been sighted.

“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching darkness prevented that complete result which you all expected, but you did all that was possible in the circumstances. You drove the enemy into his harbours, and inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet another page to the glorious traditions of the British Navy.

“You could not do more, and for your splendid work I thank you.”

The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during June, gave as the figures:—

No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. sent in, 20; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or en route to a given patrol, 8; No. on special service, 1.

A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during the month—especially in the latter half—and this interfered somewhat with the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. A very dense fog prevailed in the Pentland Firth on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally from the northward, were prevalent during the first portion of the month, and a northerly gale occurred on the 5th.

No large Fleet movements took place during June, as it was known that the greater part of the High Sea Fleet was under repair as the result of the Jutland action.

During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged in one cruise, namely, from the 17th to the 20th. The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, the Campania, with sea-planes, and destroyer flotillas left Scapa between noon and 1.30 P.M. on the 17th, and proceeded to the northward and eastward of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of carrying out a series of battle exercises on the 18th and 19th; they were based on the experience gained of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. Some of the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise, and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during the forenoon of the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships approached the Pentland Firth, making entry somewhat difficult.

Cruiser movements during the month comprised:—

(a) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by Grand Fleet Cruisers to protect trade against raiders.

(b) The establishment on the 7th of a regular patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an area well to the northward of the Shetlands, this patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and armed boarding-steamer which had been previously placed there.

(c) Extensive dispositions were made on the 9th to intercept a German raider reported from neutral quarters, as about to leave for the Atlantic. These dispositions included a close patrol by two light cruiser squadrons and eight destroyers from Rosyth of an area 80 to 100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which it was expected the enemy would pass; a further patrol by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and six destroyers was established farther north to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; two cruisers were ordered to patrol north of the Shetlands, local patrol vessels being between these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island Channel.[S]

(d) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left Rosyth on the 12th and swept up the Norwegian coast and back, returning on the 15th.

(e) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six destroyers repeated the sweep, returning on the 20th.

(f) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth and swept to the southward in the direction of the Horn Reef from a position near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having sighted anything.

(g) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated the sweep of the Norwegian coast on the 24th.

(h) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded to a position to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to the Naze on the look out for enemy raiders or Zeppelins, reports having been received of the frequent presence of Zeppelins on this line; the force turned to the northward from the Naze and swept along the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding thence to Scapa. The sweep was again uneventful.

[S] The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy vessels being sighted; the report was probably incorrect.

The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla were active during the month in the Kattegat and patrolling off the Horn Reef. They reported on the 20th that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft were visible.

The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported during the month were:

The mine-sweeping sloop Rosemary of the Southern Force was torpedoed on the 4th, but was towed into the Humber.

The light cruiser Galatea was missed by a torpedo on the 12th, in Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.

The armed boarding-steamer Duke of Cornwall was missed by two torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged in boarding a ship south-east of the Pentland Skerries.

The light cruiser Yarmouth was missed by a torpedo on the 26th.

Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were sunk by the gunfire of four enemy submarines, on the 11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 E., their guns being entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which the submarines are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers of the Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the regrettable loss of the three trawlers, was a great and well deserved tribute paid by the enemy to the work of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, and had proved a great annoyance to the German submarines.

Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines on the 7th, to the eastward of the Pentland Firth; on the 12th, two divisions of destroyers were sent from Scapa to attack the submarine that had fired at the Duke of Cornwall, the Musketeer dropping a depth charge close to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought considerably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes from Scapa were sent after a submarine reported by the armed boarding steamer Dundee as sighted 10 miles east-south-east of the Pentland Skerries, but she was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of destroyers again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, but failed to do so.

Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered by the sweeping trawlers in the southern channel in the Moray Firth on the 26th, and were swept up by trawlers and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.

The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed:

No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. sent in, 23; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 10; No. on special service, 0.

The armed merchant-steamer Arlanza, after temporary repairs at Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July for refit.

The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist being experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd, 24th and 25th.

During the month of August the principal cruiser movements, apart from those in connection with the Battle Fleet, were as follows:

(a) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an area well to the northward of the Shetlands was continued.

(b) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol seaward of the Fleet bases was maintained.

(c) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route was continued.

(d) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows:

On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning on the 3rd, having sighted nothing of interest; on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers from Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 N., Long. 5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, without result. On the 12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Scapa and proceeded towards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of 10 British merchant-ships which had been brought out of the Baltic. These vessels were escorted across the North Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy arrived safely on the 14th.

On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers Dundee and King Orry, which had been disguised as merchant-ships, left Scapa for operations off the Norwegian coast. It was hoped that they would be able to close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better chance of capturing them than any vessel having the appearance of a warship. The Dundee operated between Udsire and Lister, and the King Orry off Stadlandet, both being localities in which ships were in the habit of leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser Constance and two destroyers were sent to support the Dundee, keeping well to seaward of her, as that ship was operating in waters in which enemy warships might be found. The operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying a cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being sent in.

On the 30th the Abdiel left Scapa to lay mines in the vicinity of the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation successfully, and without being observed, on the night of the 31st–1st.

The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat and in the vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. The submarines, returning on the 17th, reported having been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to operate against this vessel, but met with no success.

Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: The light cruiser Cleopatra, of the Harwich force, which was mined on the 4th near the Thornton Ridge off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be repaired; the destroyer Lassoo, also of the Harwich force, was sunk by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship off the Dutch coast on the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer Duke of Albany was sunk by a submarine on the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander G. N. Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes, and an airship were sent out from Scapa at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of her, although the armed boarding-steamer Duke of Clarence which had stood by the Duke of Albany and rescued the survivors reported that she had passed over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser Blonde went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland Firth, in thick weather on the 10th, but was lightened and towed off on the 11th, having sustained considerable injuries; the battleships Warspite and Valiant collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the 24th, whilst, respectively, returning from and proceeding to the night firing area, both ships being considerably damaged, with the result that they had to be docked.

On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by an enemy submarine, and the departure of the Marlborough from the Tyne was thereby delayed; the coincidence that mines were frequently laid in this neighbourhood when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs, led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that locality. On the 4th or 5th August a considerable number of mines of the submarine type were also laid in the War channel in the White Sea by enemy vessels.

On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the Nore in tow of tugs for Archangel, en route by the canal system for service in the Baltic. These submarines performed very useful work in those waters during the year 1917.

The increase in mine-laying by German submarines gave rise to anxiety that the movements of the Grand Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields near the bases at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was strengthened during July by withdrawing a certain number of trawlers from patrol duty in order to form a mine-sweeping flotilla; during the latter half of 1916 the Grand Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty comprised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as well as two flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in addition one flotilla of paddle mine-sweepers was based on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These flotillas were all additional to the small local sweeping force of trawlers at the various fleet bases.

On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an unusually large number of submarines in the North Sea—a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before the Jutland Battle—had suggested the possibility of movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared desirable. The Iron Duke, after leaving Scapa Flow, proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet screened by two destroyers to communicate with the Royalist, and at 7.55 P.M., as the ships were about to communicate, a submarine on the starboard bow, about 250 yards off, fired a torpedo, which passed close astern of the screening destroyer Onslaught on that bow. Only one torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking the Iron Duke, which was proceeding at high speed, and zigzagging, and, therefore, fired at the Onslaught instead. Communication between the Iron Duke and Royalist was deferred until after dark in consequence of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.

The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid the submarine, and passed her without further incident, and the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at daylight on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,” steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a position 30 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 A.M. on the 19th the Nottingham, one of the light cruiser screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst zigzagging at 20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the torpedoes struck the port side almost simultaneously. The first report indicated that she had been hit by mines or torpedoes, and, until it was clear that a mine-field did not exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this locality, and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this became clear the southward course of the Fleet was shaped to pass to the eastward of the submarine. Meanwhile the Dublin cruised at high speed in the vicinity of the Nottingham for the purpose of keeping the submarine down so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 A.M. the Nottingham was hit by a third torpedo, and it became evident that she could not float much longer. Her boats were lowered, and the majority of the ship’s company placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 A.M., just as the destroyers Penn and Oracle, which had been sent to her assistance, arrived on the scene. These two destroyers picked up all the survivors, except Captain Miller, one officer, and several men who remained on board until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter from the Dublin. Several torpedoes were fired at the Dublin and the two destroyers during their work of rescue, but all fortunately missed.

From 8.24 A.M. onwards Zeppelins were frequently in sight from both the Battle Fleet, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, but they kept at too long a range for our fire to be effective. The Galatea sighted the first airship at 8.24 A.M., and the second was seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 A.M.; at 10 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, reported himself in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He stated later that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received from the patrol trawler Ramexo that she had two Zeppelins in sight in Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E. It was evident that a very large force of airships was out. A total of at least ten was identified by our directional wireless stations and they appeared to stretch right across the North Sea.

At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at 9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the signal appeared incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N., Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional wireless stations also led me to consider that a ship of the High Sea Fleet was in the position named at 5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 A.M. On the return of E 23 to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked the battle cruiser Derfflinger unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M. on the 20th. At 5 A.M., in spite of the strong enemy destroyer screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed, and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, and the captain of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent action of the captain of E 23 in the face of great opposition, was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our submarine service.

On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his objective the bombardment would be carried out either shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In the possible alternative of the movement being designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the cruiser Minotaur at 1.23 P.M., and by the light cruiser Boadicea at 1.38 P.M.; both these ships were in the vicinity of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary to avoid the submarines; this caused some slight delay in the southward movement.

The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the submarines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and the submarines.

The Active, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was directed to join the Battle Fleet.

At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 P.M. in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 P.M. was in Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the same course after 12.30 P.M. as it had steered between 5.30 A.M. and 12.30 P.M., which would take them to Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the assumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that would be ahead of the Iron Duke on deployment, of two ships on one, leaving the Iron Duke to deal with one ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable that we should be to the eastward, although farther north. Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the northward, where he would have found himself between the Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, however, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander-in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this assumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschelling, so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich force.

It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines already sighted made it probable that the trap was extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action.

It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight by 4 P.M., and if he had turned for home, it would be impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a visual signal out at 3.5 P.M. to Sir David Beatty to the effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was in sight by 4 P.M.

At 3.20 P.M., however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the submarines was correct.

At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received information from our directional wireless stations that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45 P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 P.M., when in Lat. 54.40 N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the course to pass up the searched channel so as to avoid mines.

At 4.52 P.M. the Falmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard bow after she had been hit. The Chester, stationed astern of the Falmouth, proceeded at full speed to zigzag in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine submerged and preventing further attack. Another torpedo was fired at the Falmouth at 5.14 P.M., but missed.

At 5.20 P.M. the destroyers Pasley, Pelican, and Negro, detached to assist the Falmouth, arrived on the scene and the Falmouth, under their escort, proceeded towards the coast under her own steam, the Chester then leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.

At 6.55 P.M. the Pelican sighted a periscope, tried to ram the submarine, but missed. She then dropped six depth charges and reported that the submarine came to the surface almost immediately, and then appeared to sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, and four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen the Falmouth, which was proceeding at five knots. The ship eventually reached the vicinity of Flamborough Head safely, and was there again hit by two more torpedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, and was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers until 8 P.M. on the 20th, when she sank in Lat. 54 N., Long. 0.2 W.

At 2.30 P.M. on the 20th, the destroyer Porpoise reported having rammed a submarine that had attacked the Falmouth.

To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. From 3.10 P.M. onwards frequent reports were received of submarines being sighted. The Phaeton, Dublin (twice), and Southampton all reported submarines in sight between 3.10 and 4.52 P.M., the time at which the Falmouth was torpedoed. At 6 P.M. Sir David Beatty reported that there was a German submarine screen of several boats extending north-east for some 25 miles from Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 P.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s force of heavy ships steering east, accompanied by two Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving the position of the Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved to be unfavourable, and at 7.30 P.M. the Commodore reported that he had abandoned the pursuit; he returned with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 P.M. reports received from our directional stations showed that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 P.M., giving clear evidence that the enemy was returning to his base.

During the passage up the searched channel a number of submarines were sighted and frequent, and in some cases, large alterations of course were necessary to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, the locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. Reports of submarines being seen were received between 4 P.M. and dark, from the Galatea, Phaeton, Bellona, Dublin, Southampton, Lion, Royal Sovereign (two submarines), Queen Elizabeth, and Inflexible, the last ship reporting that two torpedoes had been fired at her at 7.50 P.M., and that both had passed close astern; at this time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in company.

Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by the Chatham, Galatea, and Lion, and the trawlers Sea Ranger and Ramexo; the last-named reported having sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and having scored two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.

During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached to Rosyth, and the Battle Fleet continued to the northward. Reports of submarines being sighted to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at 5 A.M. and 3.30 P.M. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was therefore taken well to the northward to avoid them, and approached the Pentland Firth from a north-easterly direction, arriving without incident between 6.30 and 8 P.M.

The experience of August 19th showed that light cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed unscreened by destroyers, ran considerable danger from enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, which we could afford to run earlier in the War, were now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in future light cruisers should be screened by at least one destroyer per ship; the number of destroyers available for the Grand Fleet did not at the time admit of this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, destroyers could be allotted to most of the light cruisers in the advanced line, provided there were not many absent from the Fleet carrying out extraneous services.

The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the 19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the Admiralty.

During the month of August the weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed:

No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; No. sent in, 35; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or en route to or from patrols, 10; No. on special service, 0.

The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was foggy and misty during a great part of the month. Much mist or fog was experienced from the 1st to the 6th, the 10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.

During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised at Scapa Flow in carrying out attacks on ships under way, and the destroyer flotillas were similarly practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet divisions being exercised in countering such attacks by turning movements. These exercises were continued for the remainder of the year, and much experience was obtained from them as to the different methods of dealing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet action.

CHAPTER XVII
THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY

Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November, 1917.

But before coming to that development something must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet.

During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by the Talisman to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same locality.

On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea en route, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the 4th.

On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.

On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, Campania, and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa.

Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being shifted for that reason.

On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.

On the same date the yacht Conqueror II., the patrol trawler Sarah Alice, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters.

Early on the 30th the Lion, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.

During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.

The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship the Lucia, with two attendant destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100.

On the 21st the new battle cruiser Repulse, heavily armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection of this ship was about equal to that of the Australia and New Zealand, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to the Lion, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given to the Australia and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore, forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck protection of both the Repulse and her sister ship, the Renown. These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers.

On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most valuable refitting base.

The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during September were:

No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.

The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in the number of ships intercepted.

The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable.

In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack was successful. The Fearless, now a submarine parent ship, and three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters. The Fearless, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before the ice began to form.

On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning on the 4th.

On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for examination, but were found to be in order.

On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together. The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the value of air-craft before the War.

On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th.

On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather.

On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of interest.

On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted.

On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.

During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag officers.

On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the patrol.

On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the Kildonan Castle, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the neighbourhood.

On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy vessels.

On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November 3rd.

During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn Reef.

The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:—

No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.

Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or mist.

On November 1st I left the Iron Duke at Cromarty and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing, of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their construction.

So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in the country to provide against the consequences of successful action by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour and matériel; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers confronting us would be successfully combated.

[T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building.

I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and assistance in connection with matters concerning the development and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were responsible for this result.

I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers could act more effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt we could not face, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant shipping.

It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would not risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea and in the right position at the right moment.

The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping.

I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th.

On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th.

On the 3rd the Botha, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to their bases. On the same day the Faulknor and six destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces.

At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in their capital ships.

On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on their expected tracks.

From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th.

On the 18th the Otway, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the Norwegian steamship Older, which was found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine. The Otway recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.

During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:—

No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.

The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad, and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships intercepted.

Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th.

On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises were carried out.

Shortly before the Iron Duke slipped from her buoy, and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to fill in war time.

I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth.

I then followed the Fleet to sea in the Iron Duke, and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the Iron Duke to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th.

I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment. He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters.

Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to come.

I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take, that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the Iron Duke (a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the Iron Duke with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well.

“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have tried their patience to the breaking-point.

“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.

“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have turned that experience to good account.

“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages, whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.

“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!

“J. R. Jellicoe,
“Admiral.”

Appendix I
BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH

Iron Duke,
18th June, 1916.

No. 1395 H.F. 0022.
The Secretary
of the Admiralty,

Sir,—

Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.

3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as follows:

(a) Those in company with me:

Iron Duke—Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).

Marlborough—Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E. Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).

Colossus—Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).

Hercules—Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.

Neptune—Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.

Collingwood—Captain James C. Ley.

Revenge—Captain Edward B. Kiddle.

Agincourt—Captain Henry M. Doughty.

St. Vincent—Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.

Bellona—Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.

King George V.—Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).

Orion—Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).

Centurion—Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.

Conqueror—Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.

Erin—Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.

Thunderer—Captain James A. Fergusson.

Monarch—Captain George H. Borrett.

Ajax—Captain George H. Baird.

Boadicea—Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.

Benbow—Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).

Superb—Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).

Canada—Captain William C. M. Nicholson.

Bellerophon—Captain Edward F. Bruen.

Temeraire—Captain Edwin V. Underhill.

Vanguard—Captain James D. Dick.

Royal Oak—Captain Crawford Maclachlan.

Blanche—Captain John M. Casement.

Minotaur—Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).

Hampshire—Captain Herbert J. Savill.

Cochrane—Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.

Shannon—Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.

Defence—Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).

Duke of Edinburgh—Captain Henry Blackett.

Black Prince—Captain Thomas P. Bonham.

Warrior—Captain Vincent B. Molteno.

Invincible—Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).

Indomitable—Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

Inflexible—Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.

Calliope—Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.

Caroline—Captain H. Ralph Crooke.

Comus—Captain Alan G. Hotham.

Constance—Captain Cyril S. Townsend.

Royalist—Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.

Canterbury—Captain Percy M. R. Royds.

Chester—Captain Robert N. Lawson.

Active—Captain Percy Withers.

Castor—Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.

Tipperary—Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.

Broke—Commander Walter L. Allen.

Shark—Commander Loftus W. Jones.

Acasta—Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.

Spitfire—Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.

Sparrowhawk—Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.

Achates—Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.

Ambuscade—Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.

Ardent—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.

Fortune—Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.

Porpoise—Commander Hugh D. Colville.

Unity—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.

Garland—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.

Christopher—Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.

Contest—Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.

Owl—Commander Robert G. Hamond.

Hardy—Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.

Midge—Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.

Ophelia—Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.

Kempenfelt—Commander Harold E. Sulivan.

Ossory—Commander Harold V. Dundas.

Martial—Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.

Magic—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.

Minion—Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.

Mystic—Commander Claude F. Allsup.

Mons—Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.

Mandate—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.

Michael—Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.

Marne—Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.

Milbrook—Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.

Manners—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.

Moon—Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.

Mounsey—Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.

Morning Star—Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.

Faulknor—Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.

Marksman—Commander Norton A. Sulivan.

Obedient—Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.

Mindful—Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.

Marvel—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.

Onslaught—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.

Mænad—Commander John P. Champion.

Narwhal—Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.

Nessus—Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.

Noble—Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.

Opal—Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.

Nonsuch—Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.

Menace—Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.

Munster—Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.

Mary Rose—Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.

Mischief—Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.

Oak—Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.

Abdiel—Commander Berwick Curtis.

(b) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:

Lion—Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.

Princess Royal—Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).

Tiger—Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.

Queen Mary—Captain Cecil I. Prowse.

New Zealand—Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).

Indefatigable—Captain Charles F. Sowerby.

Southampton—Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.

Nottingham—Captain Charles B. Miller.

Birmingham—Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.

Dublin—Captain Albert C. Scott.

Galatea—Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.

Inconstant—Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.

Phaeton—Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.

Cordelia—Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.

Falmouth—Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).

Birkenhead—Captain Edward Reeves.

Gloucester—Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.

Yarmouth—Captain Thomas D. Pratt.

“Barham”—Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).

Warspite—Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.

Valiant—Captain Maurice Woollcombe.

Malaya—Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.

Champion—Captain (D.) James U. Farie.

Nestor—Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.

Nomad—Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.

Narborough—Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.

Obdurate—Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.

Petard—Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.

Pelican—Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.

Nerissa—Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.

Onslow—Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.

Moresby—Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.

Nicator—Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.

Fearless—Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.

Acheron—Commander Charles G. Ramsey.

Ariel—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.

Attack—Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.

Hydra—Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.

Badger—Commander G. A. Fremantle.

Goshawk—Commander Dashwood F. Moir.

Defender—Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.

Lizard—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.

Lapwing—Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.

Lydiard—Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.

Liberty—Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.

Landrail—Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.

Laurel—Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.

Moorsom—Commander John C. Hodgson.

Morris—Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.

Turbulent—Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.

Termagent—Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.

Engadine—Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.

4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.

5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photograph taken from Malaya during the action indicates this fact very clearly.

During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting qualities of the personnel.

6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene:

“At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from Galatea indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.

“At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.

“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great value.

“From a report from Galatea at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered Engadine to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in Engadine about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

“At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

“At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

“Shortly after 4 P.M. Indefatigable, after a violent explosion, fell out of the line, turned over and sank.

“At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer Landrail of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of Lydiard and Landrail undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer submarine attack. Nottingham also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, Nestor, Nomad, Nicator, Narborough, Pelican, Petard, Obdurate, Nerissa, with Moorsom and Morris of 10th Flotilla, Turbulent and Termagent of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

“Nestor, Nomad and Nicator, gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of Nestor, pressed home their attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. Nomad was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently Nestor and Nicator altered course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, Nestor was badly hit and swung to starboard, Nicator altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. Nicator made good her escape and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. Nestor remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. Moorsom also carried out an attack on the enemy’s battle fleet.

“Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent and Termagent also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while Nerissa states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.

“From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

“At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in Queen Mary; she was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her officers and men were subsequently picked up by Laurel.

“At 4.38 P.M. Southampton reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. Southampton with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. Southampton’s reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in Barham, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

“At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet. Fearless with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. Champion with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation and was corroborated by Princess Royal and Tiger. Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 P.M. Onslow and Moresby, who had been detached to assist Engadine with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of Lion. At 5.10 P.M. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th ship in the line. Moresby then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champion. In corroboration of this, Fearless reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of Queen Mary and Indefatigable.

“At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide Indomitable’s report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class.

“At about 6.5 P.M. Onslow, being on the engaged bow of Lion, sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. Onslow at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. Onslow then closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused Onslow to stop.

“At 7.15 P.M. Defender, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed Onslow and took her in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June, when Onslow was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of Onslow, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of Defender, for special recognition. Onslow was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows:

“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the Derfflinger to attack her. The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.’”