TO M. DE VERGENNES.~{1}
New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.
The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope, reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.
The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.
According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circumstances.
With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form any settled plan of campaign.
The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it, perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France, and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these, without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very important, is now absolutely necessary.
The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,—but that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us to make use of it.
From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits, have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants, who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours, because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement, and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and a naval superiority must be the two principal objects of the next campaign.
It would take us too long to examine the faults that have been committed, and the efforts that the states may still endeavour to make: we must return to the former point, that, under present circumstances, money is requisite to derive any advantage from the American resources; that the means which have been substituted for funds are almost completely worn out; that those to which we are at present reduced, do not fulfil the proposed end, and are opposed to the ideas which induced the nation to commence the revolution; that, consequently, we require money to restore to the army that degree of activity without which it cannot operate in an efficacious manner. Clothes, arms, ammunition, are comprised in the same article, and Colonel Laurens carries with him a copy of the former list, from which some deductions have been made. I will content myself with saying, that nothing of any importance has been sent us, that it is necessary to clothe the American army, that it requires arms, and, to be enabled to besiege places, a great augmentation of powder. As these expenses relate to the pecuniary succours, and are those which will strike most forcibly individuals, both of the army and nation, I think it important that the government should prepare them with promptness, and send them in a secure manner.
If it should appear strange, sir, to call that completion of the army a great effort, I would beg to observe, that hunger, cold, nudity, and labour, the certainty of receiving no pay, clothes, or necessary food, being the prospects held out to the American soldier, they must be but little inviting to citizens who are, generally speaking, accustomed to live at home with some degree of comfort; and the English having had sufficient time to think of all the naval points, the attacks of next year will be anything rather than surprises, and our forces must increase in proportion to their precautions. I could have wished that there had been some French troops, and my confidence in the decrease of prejudice has been even greater than that of congress, General Washington, or your minister at that time. The advance-guard of the Count de Rochambeau, although inactive itself from want of ships, by its presence alone has rendered an essential service to America: if it had not arrived, the campaign would have been a ruinous one. When I consider the present state of feeling, my opinion, as I have had the honour of telling you before, would be to send hither, for the expedition of New York, a division of about ten thousand Frenchmen.
In our conference at Hartford, sir, the calculations were of course made, not according to the fortifications actually existing, but according to those they might intend erecting. The answers General Washington thought proper to make to the questions put by the Count de Rochambeau, have been long since carried to you by the Amazon. A proposal to ask for a corps of fifteen thousand Frenchmen could only be acceptable to the commander-in-chief. But if that surplus were to lessen the sum of money by means with which fifteen thousand regular troops, ten thousand militia, and a southern army should be put into motion; if it were to lessen the number of ships that would enable us to act in all places, and with a decided superiority;—I must again repeat, that pecuniary succours and a naval superiority are the two most essential points; that the same quantity of money would, put into action here, double that number of American soldiers; and that, without ships, a few thousand men more would be but of little use to us.
The admirable discipline of the French corps, in addition to the honour it confers on M. de Rochambeau and the soldiers under his command, fulfils a still more important aim, by impressing on the minds of the Americans the highest idea of our nation.
The wisdom of the government, in placing that corps under the orders of General Washington, allows me only to repeat how essential it is that his authority should be complete, and without any sort of restriction. The talents, prudence, delicacy, and knowledge of country, which are all united in him in the greatest degree of perfection, are qualities of which one only would suffice to ensure the rigid observance of the instructions which I bear; and the longer I remain here, the more frilly am I convinced that each of them is equally necessary to the harmony and success of the whole affair.
We have had, lately, sir, an important mutiny, of which Colonel Laurens will give you the details.~{2} A corps of Pennsylvanian troops, almost wholly composed of strangers, and stationed at Morristown (Jersey), unanimously rose against their officers, and, under the direction of one of their sergeants, marched on to Princetown. The civil authorities repaired thither, to afford them the justice they demanded. To be in want of food and clothes, to serve for more than a year without pay, some of them, indeed, having been forced to serve a whole year beyond their engagement, are evils to which no army would submit. It is singular enough that those mutineers should have hung up the envoys of General Clinton. The greatest part of the soldiers are disbanded, but they are to re-enter the service, and to join the recruits in different regiments of the state. I am not less positive as to the number of men we shall have in our continental army. Some troops belonging to the Jerseys, seduced by example, and being those next to the Pennsylvanians, which were composed of the greatest number of foreigners, wished to take the same method of obtaining justice; but General Washington, having taken the management of this affair in his own hands, sent forward a detachment; the mutineers submitted, and their chiefs were punished. It is impossible to pass too high encomiums upon the New England troops, almost all national ones, whose cause was at bottom the same, and who, in spite of their nudity, crossed heavy snows to march against the mutineers. This proves, sir, that human patience may have some limits, but that soldier citizens will endure far more than strangers. These events furnish another argument for the necessity of obtaining money.
I flatter myself, sir, that the government, conscious that the ensuing campaign may be a decisive one, will occupy itself seriously of rendering it favourable to us. The taking of New York would destroy the power of the English on this continent, and a short continuation of naval superiority would secure to us the easy conquest of all the other parts of the United States. As to the taking of New York, which it would be rash to consider easy, but absurd to respect the town as if it were a fortified one, it is, I believe, well authenticated, and General Washington has no doubt upon the subject, that with the means proposed in my letter, we should obtain possession of it in the course of the summer.
It is, I believe, important to turn, as far as possible, the enemy's attention towards Canada.
When General Washington gave Colonel Laurens his opinion respecting military affairs and the operations of the campaign, he also put down in writing some ideas on our present situation, and communicated to me that letter, which contains the substance of several of his conversations with me. I take the liberty of requesting the king's minister, to ask to see that letter. Our situation is not painted in flattering colours; but the general speaks from the sad experience of our embarrassments, and I agree with him, sir, that it is indispensable for us to obtain some pecuniary succours, and a decided naval superiority.
You must certainly have learnt, sir, that the defeat of Ferguson, and some other successes of ours, having disarranged the plans of Lord Cornwallis, General Leslie re-embarked to form the junction by water, and that he has since arrived at Charlestown. Arnold, became an English general, and honoured by the confidence of that nation, is at this moment at the head of a British detachment. Having landed in Virginia, he took possession of Richmond for some hours, and destroyed some public and private property: he must now have retired into a safe harbour, or has, perhaps, joined some other expedition. At the very moment when the English fancied that we were in the most awkward situation from the mutiny of some troops, General Washington sent a detachment on the left side of the Hudson, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, supported by General Parsons, which surprised, at Westchester, a corps of three hundred men under Colonel Delancey, wounded several, killed thirty, took sixty prisoners, burnt all the barracks and provisions, and retired, after having destroyed a bridge of communication with the Island of New York.
The general is soon to pass some days with the French troops at Rhode Island, and I shall accompany him on that journey.
I have the honour to be, sir, with equal affection and respect, &c. &c:
New Windsor, February 4th, 1781.
By a letter from M. de Rochambeau, sir, we learn that the English squadron in Gardiner's Bay has suffered severely from a gale of wind. A seventy-four, it is said, has run on shore; the London, of ninety guns, is dismasted, and M. Destouches~{3} was preparing to take advantage of this event. But you will receive more circumstantial, and perhaps more certain details, by letters from Rhode Island, and we are also ourselves expecting some, to fix more positively our own ideas and hopes. General Knox, commander of our artillery, a man of great merit and extreme probity, has just reported to the general the result of a mission which had been given him in the New England States. The spirit of patriotism and the zeal he found,—the exertions they are making to levy troops, either for the whole duration of the war, or for (what amounts, I trust, to the same thing) the period of three years, surpass our most sanguine hopes; and as they have twenty regiments in the continental service, I can only urge, in a still more positive manner, what I have already had the honour in writing to you.
Endnotes:
1. This letter was written in ciphers. It is inserted here exactly as it was first deciphered at the archives of foreign affairs. To avoid repetitions, we have not inserted the answers of the minister; these were written in a tone of confidence and friendship, and accord almost on every point with the ideas of M. de Lafayette, which were, in a measure, adopted by the cabinet of Versailles for the approaching campaign.
2. The revolt of the Pennsylvanian line is of the 2nd of January. It was appeased ten days afterwards, and imitated, the 20th of the same month, by the New Jersey troops.—(See the Letters of Washington at that period, and the Appendix, No. x. vol. vii.)
3. M. Destouches had replaced in the command of the frigates M. de Ternay, deceased the 15th December, after a short illness.