FOOTNOTES:
[25] One Marine, Corporal Robert J. Arrota, using a PRC-41 UHF radio which put him in direct contact with the attack pilots, personally controlled over 200 air strikes without the aid of a Tactical Air Controller (Airborne); his peers gave him the title of "The Mightiest Corporal In The World."
[26] Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, whose battalion held the rock quarry perimeter, later commented that his troops patrolled out to 1,200 meters. The units at the base never went that far until the siege was lifted.
[27] The men of Company I used the same methods to cool the mortar tubes that they used during the attack against 861 on 21 January.
[28] The defenders later reported knocking out at least one and probably two tanks with rocket launchers.
[29] The 26th Marines FSCC had prepared extensive defensive fire plans for the Lang Vei Camp. In the early stages of the attack, the camp commander did not request artillery and later asked for only a few concentrations. He never asked for the entire schedule to be put into effect.
[30] Documents taken off a dead NVA officer later in the battle indicated that the enemy hoped that the attack on Lang Vei would draw the Marines out of Khe Sanh so he could destroy the relief column.
[31] In November 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, on direction of the regimental commander, had sent a rifle company to determine possible direct routes through the jungle. The company commander, Captain John N. Raymond, reported that his unit, avoiding well-used trails to preclude ambush, had made the trip in about 19 hours.
[32] On the return trip to the KSCB, Captain Richards flew over the outskirts of Khe Sanh Village. A NVA soldier suddenly stepped out of one hut and sprayed the low-flying chopper with a burst from his AK-47 assault rifle. The rounds ripped out part of Richards' instrument panel and one bullet zinged about two inches in front of his nose before passing through the top of the cockpit. A Marine gunner on the CH-46 quickly cut down the North Vietnamese but the damage had already been done. Even though he was shaken by the experience, the pilot nursed his crippled bird back to the base and landed safely. Once on the ground, he quickly switched helicopters and returned to Lang Vei for another evacuation mission. For his actions during the day, Captain Richards was later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.
[33] The weather during February was bad for operations but not particularly uncomfortable. The mean temperature was 71 degrees, the average humidity was 92 percent, and an average weekly rainfall was .04 inches. The wind was out of the east with an average velocity of 6 miles per hour.
[34] Organizationally, the USAF C-130s belonged to the 315th Air Division but that unit did not operate in Vietnam. Five to seven aircraft from each of the 315th's squadrons were on temporary duty in Vietnam and were under the operational control of the 834th Air Division. The 315th Air Commando Wing and its C-123s were organizationally part of the 834th.
[35] One NVA gun crew came in too close for its own good. The 1/26 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, dispatched a platoon from Company D to attack this position which was off the northeastern end of the airstrip. While the 81mm mortars of 1/26 provided support, the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Daniel L. McGravey, and his men aggressively assaulted the position. During a brisk fire fight, they killed several North Vietnamese, captured the antiaircraft weapon, and took the gunner prisoner.
[36] If a pilot made his approach from the west, which was not often the case, he had to taxi all the way back down the runway to the loading ramp.
[37] V-ring is a term used on the rifle range to describe the bull's-eye of a target.
[38] Disparities in official records make it difficult to determine the exact tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh by air. The USAF Historical Division Liaison Office states that, of the 14,356 tons delivered during the siege, Air Force planes were responsible for 12,430 tons (8,120 tons by paradrop, LAPES and GPES; 4,310 by aircraft landing at the field). On the other hand, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records show that Marine helicopters alone carried 4,661 tons of cargo. About three-fourths of the helicopter tonnage, however, was lifted directly from Dong Ha to the hill outposts and thus did not pass through the main base at Khe Sanh. Neither total includes the contributions made by Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152; the records of that unit only indicate the tonnage transported throughout the whole of I Corps and do not break it down to the amount delivered to individual bases such as Khe Sanh.
[39] This resulted in another fiery crash on 6 March when a C-123 was shot down while on approach to the field and all aboard (43 USMC, 1 USN, and 4 USAF) were killed.
[40] Having the ambulatory cases serve as stretcher bearers was standard operating procedure on 881S. These men stayed on the chopper and did not have to make the return trip to their trenches under fire. When uninjured Marines served in this capacity there was the added danger that the helicopter would take off before they could debark and they would end up at Khe Sanh. In one instance after the siege was lifted, Captain Dabney spent a day at the combat base because he did not get off a medevac chopper fast enough.
[41] During the course of the battle, 881S became a small graveyard for helicopters; at least five were downed on or around the hill. Consequently, Company I gained a reputation among chopper crews which lasted long after the siege was over. When the 3d Battalion later departed Khe Sanh, Company I eventually moved to Hill 55 near Da Nang. One afternoon, while evacuating a wounded Marine, a CH-46 developed engine trouble and the pilot decided to shut down for repairs. Another flight was sent to pick up the wounded man and as the lead pilot approached he came up over the radio and asked his wingman where the landing zone was. The wingman replied: "Just look for the downed chopper, India [Company I] always marks their zones that way."
[42] For comparison as many as 16 helicopters were utilized up to four times in one day during the Super Gaggle without a loss. Prior to the conception of this technique, as many as three choppers were shot down in one day around Khe Sanh.
[43] There is an interesting possibility as to why the mortars in the Horseshoe were never silenced. Fourteen years earlier, at Dien Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese used an ingenious method to protect their heavier siege mortars from air attacks and they may well have repeated it at Khe Sanh. The mortar crews selected a site on the slope of a hill, figured the elevation and deflection necessary to hit one specific target, and then dug a small tunnel at that precise angle into the side of the hill. The mortar was emplaced at the bottom of the tunnel with connecting caves which housed the gunners. When fired, the mortar rounds traveled up the shaft, sometimes as far as 50 feet before reaching the surface. The foliage was cleared away from the mouth of the tunnel so that the rounds did not hit the overhanging branches and detonate prematurely. Mortars emplaced in this manner were, of course, limited to only one target and, as far as the gunners in the Horseshoe were concerned, that target was 881S. When the siege was later broken and Marine units began to maneuver in the terrain surrounding the hill mass, they were never taken under fire by the 120mm mortars even though they did receive fire from smaller caliber weapons. Hill 881S, however, continued to be hit periodically by the 120mms.
[44] Of all the jettisoned loads, those containing water were the most spectacular. On one occasion, a CH-46 carrying plastic containers of water was forced to release the net about 200 feet above the ground. The containers broke open in midair and the contents cascaded on the hill below. The Company E, 2/26, commander, Captain Breeding, later recalled that it produced one of the prettiest waterfalls he'd ever seen.
[45] It is no exaggeration to say that MAG-36 helicopters played a decisive role in the battle. The maintenance of the hill outposts was imperative if Khe Sanh was to be held, and these units depended on the helicopters for survival.
[46] During one period of extremely bad weather, the platoon from A/1/26 which held positions on Hill 950 went without resupply for nine days and the water shortage became a major problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson authorized the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Maxie R. Williams, to send a squad out to a small stream which was about two hours march from the perimeter. In addition to finding water, the Marines surprised a group of North Vietnamese and killed nine of the enemy. One Marine was also killed.
[47] Bad weather occasionally precluded the immediate evacuation of casualties from the hill outposts.