I. 1st Battalion
The history of the 1st Battalion for June and July, 1915, is without any very striking incident, though abounding in what only a year before would have been considered as such. On the 10th June, for instance, the huts near Poperinghe, in which the men were resting, were heavily shelled and Lieut. W. F. Taylor and 10 men killed and 5 more wounded; whilst on the 19th of the same month, when in trenches in the salient east of Ypres, the battalion was badly bombarded with gas shells, while more gas was pumped from the enemy’s lines, necessitating the wearing of gas helmets for four hours and causing the death of 5 and injury of 19 men. Then 2 more were killed on the following day and 4 wounded and 5 gassed. Between this date and the end of the month 10 more died and 39 were wounded. On the 2nd July Corpl. John Dormer of A Company, who had covered himself with glory as a scout, paid the last penalty. And so the weary business went on.
Sir John French’s despatches contain the following remarks:—
“Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet. Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the 2nd Army at Hooge, on the Menin road, early on 30th July. Most of the infantry occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning liquid than by the actual damage inflicted.
“Gallant endeavours were made by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches. These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches was consolidated a short distance further back.
“Attacks made by the enemy at the same time west of Bellewaarde Lake were repulsed.
“On the 9th August these losses were brilliantly regained, owing to a successful attack carried out by the 6th Division. This attack was very well executed and resulted in the recapture, with small casualties, not only of the whole of the lost trenches, but an addition of four hundred yards of German trench north of the Menin road.”
In connection with this incident mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Congreve, V.C., commanding the 6th Division, addressed the 1st Buffs on the 5th August: it was necessary, he pointed out, to retake the trenches previously lost at Hooge. It was a case either of going forward or going backward, owing to the nature of the ground. The commander of the 2nd Army had selected the 6th Division for the task because it was the best one in his command. He would not minimize the difficulties of the job, but the battalion would remember their past record and the fact that the eyes of Kent were upon them. He concluded by wishing the battalion a successful issue and a safe return.
Imperial War Museum
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ROAD NEAR HOOGE
Consequent on this a brigade order was issued on the 8th August, of which the following are extracts, and it may be as well to explain here that all over the fighting front the soldiers had given names to the different trenches in order to distinguish them, and that these names, which were often those of London streets, but sometimes of a comic nature, became officially recognized and used.
“The brigade will attack the enemy’s position at Hooge from the crater to Q.20 inclusive.
“The York and Lancaster will attack on the left and the K.S.L.I. on the right.
“1st Buffs’ 2 machine guns in southern branch of Oxford Street at end east. D Company and 2 machine guns in F.2.
“A Company and 1 machine gun to dig themselves in in line eighty yards in rear of Headquarters’ trench.
“B Company and Headquarters to occupy position end of Oxford Street by 1.15 B and D.
“All companies to be in position 12.30 a.m., 9th.
“The 1st Leicesters will be in support in the ramparts of Menin Gate, Ypres.
“The right attack is allotted to the 18th Brigade, and the 17th Brigade will be in divisional reserve.
“The K.S.L.I. can call on C Company The Buffs for support, if necessary, and the Y. and L. on D Company.
“Should the enemy drive us back and follow on, these two companies must counter-attack at once without hesitation.”
The battalion took its places at 6.30 p.m. on the 8th. A Company, so as to be ready to occupy the positions vacated by C and D should they be called upon to move up, and B Company remaining as battalion reserve. At 2.45 a.m. on the 9th the British bombardment opened and a terrific fire was brought to bear on the hostile lines. The infantry attack followed about 3.10, the assailants having already crept up close to the enemy’s lines, and the brave men from Yorkshire and Shropshire suffered pretty heavily, but were completely successful. D Company of the Buffs was called up to help by the York and Lancaster Regiment. The K.S.L.I. had rushed into the crater with great rapidity and found much hand-to-hand fighting to do when they got there. The telephone lines were soon useless, being cut to pieces by the incessant fire. In the small hours of the 10th August the Buffs were ordered to relieve both the York and Lancasters and the Shropshires. D Company, therefore, advanced obliquely to its right flank and took over the crater and half the recaptured line which belonged to its brigade, the remainder being occupied by A Company, under Captain Gould, who placed one platoon in support of both these advanced companies at H.12. C Company remained where it was and B, with Battalion Headquarters, came up to a ruined farm, a tactical point in the neighbourhood. Heavy shelling occurred during the night, but the expected German counter-attack did not eventuate. A and D Companies found great difficulty in getting into touch with friends on either flank. It is true that some troops of the neighbouring 18th Brigade had, during the previous day, got into the crater and stables, but these were themselves now adrift from their units.
Four machine guns had been placed at intervals along the whole front, and these, to judge by German prisoners’ letters, had a discouraging effect on the projected enemy counter-attack, but nevertheless the position occupied by the two forward Buff companies was very far from being a satisfactory or pleasant one: the trenches and crater were full of dead and wounded, chiefly German, but with many English, too, and this fact impeded free movement; shell fire was heavy and continuous, and the Heavy artillery enfilade fire from the direction of Hill 60 was in particular very annoying and dangerous; while the supply of bombs, food and water was precarious and difficult owing to the lack of proper communication trenches to the rear. The want of water was particularly felt, and made worse by the fact that the men were within easy sight and distance of the Bellewaarde Lake.
The night of the 10th/11th was a very busy one. Every kind of work was urgent and of great importance. The removal of the wounded was no easy task, and great praise was due to Captain Jones, the Buffs’ Medical Officer, who did wonders. Indeed, this officer was remarkable for his coolness and gallantry, and continued his business, though wounded twice himself, in a manner which has become a sort of tradition amongst our army doctors. He was admirably backed by the regimental stretcher-bearers. There were dead to be buried everywhere; there was no doubt in anyone’s mind of the urgency of this. Communications in rear were organized, the trenches were improved, and many other matters made this night a busy one. The night was, moreover, by no means peaceful. The German bombers were persistent and dangerous on the left of A Company, but a somewhat serious bomb attack just before midnight in this quarter was repelled by Captain Gould, though not without loss. D Company was also being heavily bombarded by high explosive and shrapnel, and Captain R. W. Homan was struck on the head and fatally wounded. He had exposed himself with great gallantry in organizing the defence, and his death was much felt. The 11th August passed like the previous day and was a strenuous one. There was abnormally heavy shelling. The parapets were destroyed both in A and D Companies’ portions of the line, and one shell, landing where the supporting platoon lay, demolished the telephone dug-out and destroyed the operators, but not the instrument. Pte. Wilson came forward and continued to work this, the nearest telephone to the firing line, and as from here all messages had to be carried, Corpl. Foote of A Company greatly distinguished himself at this task. D Company was under a most accurate fire this day, but was materially aided by the French artillery.
About 10 p.m. a violent bomb attack took place on the left of A Company, both from a small side trench on the left of ours, which was still in the enemy’s hands, and from Germans who had crawled out from their retained line in rear. These latter were made to suffer somewhat severely. 2nd Lieut. Ferguson led a counter-attack under somewhat critical circumstances and was twice wounded. However, the enemy’s attempt was repulsed, and at 11.30 a relief of the battalion was successfully accomplished under company arrangements, superintended by the commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel Finch Hatton, aided by Captain Lucas (second-in-command) and Lieut. Birrell (adjutant). The battalion retired to the ramparts of Ypres by the Menin Gate, having lost since the 5th of the month 25 killed, 162 wounded and 5 missing.
At this period not only the Buffs, but the 16th Brigade generally, were suffering badly from the lack of senior and experienced officers. A considerable period of routine work was now the fate of the battalion. As a rule, billets in or about Poperinghe alternated with trench duty, generally at La Brique. This trench duty continued to take its toll of casualties and was not without its deeds of daring, notably the rescue and bringing in of the body of Captain Colville of the Shropshire Light Infantry, who was killed in front of Forward Cottage near La Brique on the 21st September, 1915, for which act Lieut. Clouting and C.S.M. Baker received the M.C. and D.C.M. respectively.