II. Loos
In order to understand the parts taken in the battle of Loos by the 2nd, 6th and 8th Battalions of the Buffs, it would be well to have a general idea of why the battle was fought. Turning, therefore, to Sir John French’s despatches we find that after a serious consultation with General Joffre and a full discussion of the military situation it was arranged that the Allies should make a combined attack from certain points of their line during the last week in September.
Very many brave soldiers died in the prolonged and desperate struggle which followed, and which is known as the battle of Loos, though it was in reality a series of bloody combats. It still remains a question whether the British sacrifices there made were worth the results obtained.
The reinforcements the British had recently received enabled our Commander-in-Chief to comply with several requests that the French had made as to taking over additional portions of their line.
“In fulfilment of the rôle assigned to it in these operations, our army attacked the enemy on the morning of the 25th September. The main attack was delivered by the 1st and 4th Corps between the La Bassee Canal on the north and the village of Grenay on the south; at the same time the 5th Corps making a subsidiary attack on Bellewaarde Farm to the east of Ypres in order to hold the enemy to his ground; other attacks with a similar object were made by the 3rd and Indian Corps north of the canal and along the whole front of the second army.
“In co-operation with the French 10th Army on the right, the 1st and 4th Corps went up to the attack. A strong reserve was kept in hand owing to the great length of front to be assailed, and the general commanding the Second Army was directed to draw back the 28th Division to Bailleul and hold it in readiness to meet unexpected eventualities.
“Opposite the front of the main line of attack the distance between the enemy’s trenches and our own varied from about one hundred to five hundred yards. The country over which the advance took place is open and overgrown with long grass and self-sown crops. From the canal southwards our trenches and those of the enemy ran roughly parallel upon an almost imperceptible rise to the south-west. From the Vermelles-Hulluch road southward the advantage of height is on the enemy’s side as far as the Bethune-Lens road. There the two lines of trenches cross a spur in which the rise culminates, and thence the command lies on the side of the British trenches.
“To the east of the intersection of spur and trenches and a short mile away stands Loos (which is about twenty-eight miles south of Ypres). Less than a mile further south-east is Hill 70, which is the summit of the gentle rise in the ground.
“Other notable tactical points on our front were:—
“Fosse 8 (a thousand yards south of Auchy) which is a coal mine with a high and strongly defended slag heap.
“The Hohenzollern redoubt. A strong work thrust out nearly five hundred yards in front of the German lines, and close to our own. It is connected with their front line by three communication trenches abutting into the defences of Fosse 8.
“Cite St. Elie. A strongly defended mining village lying fifteen hundred yards south of Haisnes.
“The Quarries lying half-way to the German trenches west of the Cite St. Elie.
“Hulluch. A village strung out along a small stream lying less than half a mile south-east of Cite St. Elie and three thousand yards north-east of Loos.
“Puits 14 Bis. Half a mile north of Hill 70; another coal mine possessing great possibilities for defence when taken in conjunction with a strong redoubt situated on the north-east side of Hill 70.”
The attack was admirably delivered, and it is noteworthy that a complete division of the new armies took a distinguished part in it. This was the 47th, a Scottish unit. Loos and Hill 70 were gained, and altogether the first day was a success and caused Field-Marshal French’s apprehension that a dangerous gap might occur between ourselves and the French to be considerably modified. He now ordered the Guards Division up from Nœux les Mines and the 28th to move south from Bailleul. At nightfall, after a heavy day’s fighting and numerous German counter-attacks, the line ran from the Double Crassier south of Loos by the western part of Hill 70 to the western exit of Hulluch, thence by the quarries and western end of Cite St. Elie, east of Fosse 8, back to the original line.
Our hold on Fosse 8, backed as it was by the strong defences and guns of Auchy, was distinctly precarious.
In the course of the night of 25th/26th September the enemy delivered a series of heavy counter-attacks along our new front, and near the Quarries they were more or less successful, though repulsed elsewhere.
On the 26th the 7th Division retook the Quarries, but attacks on Hulluch and on the redoubt on the east side of Hill 70 were anticipated by the enemy, who organized a very strong offensive from that direction. These attacks drove on the advanced troops of the 21st and 24th Divisions (in the latter of which the 8th Buffs were serving) which were then moving forward to attack. Sir John French adds these words: “Reports regarding this portion of the action are very conflicting, and it is not possible to form an entirely just appreciation of what occurred on this part of the field.”
During the 29th and 30th September and the early days of October, fighting was almost continuous along the northern part of the new line, particularly about the Hohenzollern Redoubt and neighbouring trenches, to which the enemy evidently attached great value. His attacks, however, almost invariably broke down with very heavy loss under the accurate fire of our infantry and artillery. Nevertheless, the enemy recaptured part of the Hohenzollern Redoubt on the 3rd October. There was particularly severe fighting in this direction on the 8th and 9th, the hostile attack being repulsed with enormous loss. The Commander-in-Chief reports in his despatches that we attacked about noon on the 13th October, with troops of the 11th and 4th Corps, against Fosse No. 8, the Quarries and the German trenches on the Lens-La Bassee road. The objective of the 12th Division (in which were serving the 6th Buffs) was the Quarries.
The day began with an artillery bombardment of the objectives in which the French assisted. Shortly before the attack was launched at 2 p.m. smoke was turned on all along our front, and under cover of this smoke the attack was started. At the same time the heavy artillery lifted to further objectives, while the enemy’s front trench system was subjected to shrapnel fire. At 2.45 the 4th Corps reported having captured 1,200 yards of trenches on the Lens-La Bassee road, but as the left battalion of the corps had failed, the Corps Commander did not consider it practicable to undertake any further offensive towards Hulluch. The information received during the remainder of the day was very conflicting, though it was known that one battalion of the 12th Division had gained the south-west edge of the Quarries. In the course of the next two days the whole attack died down without attaining the objective aimed at, and the situation on that part of the line remained much the same for some considerable time.