Friday, January 8.
Jeremiah Crabb, from Maryland, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.
Indian Trading Houses.
The House went into Committee of the Whole, Mr. Muhlenberg in the chair, on the bill to establish trading houses for the Indian tribes.
Mr. Dayton objected to the bill, so far as it empowers those who are to sell the goods to the Indians, to procure or purchase the goods. He considered the uniting these powers in the same persons as highly exceptionable and liable to great abuse. He moved to strike out the words "procure or."
Mr. Parker said that the objection was misapplied, for subsequent clauses placed the business under the special direction of the President of the United States. He should not, however, object to striking out the words. His view in rising was merely to justify the committee who reported the bill, as they had supposed that sufficient guards were provided.
Mr. Giles did not think the reason given for retaining the words sufficient. The President cannot be supposed to have such cognizance of every part of this business as will enable him to secure the public, or Indians, from imposition. He was for increasing the checks against abuse.
The motion for striking out was agreed to.
In the third section, Mr. Sedgwick objected to the words "laying aside all view of gain by the trade." They might operate disadvantageously to the people of the United States, if Government should enter into this trade on a principle that would preclude all private adventures in the same line by citizens. The words were expunged.
Mr. Parker presented a substitute. It relates to compensation of agents and clerks to be employed. The sum of —— dollars was to be appropriated. The substitute was adopted by the committee.
In the seventh section, Mr. Sedgwick moved an amendment, providing for the forfeiture of licenses in case of contravening the provisions of the law. This motion was withdrawn in order to introduce the provision elsewhere.
Mr. Milledge moved to strike out the whole of this seventh section. It appeared to him to involve provisions which would be proper in another law, but in this bill blended two different subjects.
Mr. Sedgwick considered the provisions in this section referring to certain rules for regulating the public trade with the Indians, as proper, since similar rules would be made in regulating the trade of individuals with Indians. On this ground he was for retaining the section.
It was moved to modify the section by confining the provisions to "the agents or clerks," specially employed by the United States. This amendment was agreed to.
On the motion of Mr. Sedgwick, the last clause of the seventh section, relative to the oath or affirmation, was expunged.
The committee then rose; the Chairman reported the bill with the amendments, which were taken up, and agreed to by the House, with one verbal amendment.
Mr. Swift expressed his disapprobation of the bill. He thought the object unattainable to any important extent. He disapproved of public bodies being concerned in trade. It is always managed better by individuals. Great loss and dilapidation are the consequence; nor is it possible to guard against frauds and abuses. The public have no money to spare. It is the opinion of the Committee of Ways and Means, that additional taxes will be necessary for the public service. We must not tax our constituents for the sake of trading with the Indians. He hoped not. Mr. S. concluded by a motion for striking out the first section.
Mr. Parker supported the principle of the bill; he wished a fair experiment to be made. The plan is founded on humanity and benevolence. It has been recommended by the President from year to year. Mr. P., on this subject, had been in sentiment with him. It was well-known he had never lightly advocated a disbursement of public money; on this occasion, it would be a saving of public money. It will cost much less to conciliate the good opinion of the Indians than to pay men for destroying them.
Mr. Hillhouse was in favor of an experiment. Much had been anticipated from the plan; a beginning had been made, and he thought it best to try it for such a length of time as would afford a fair experiment of what could be done.
Mr. Swanwick said he was in favor of the principles of the bill, were it merely as a change from our usual system of Indian affairs. We have hitherto pursued war at an expense of a million and a half of dollars nearly annually; let us now try the fruits of commerce, that beneficent power which cements and civilizes so many nations; barbarous till they became acquainted with its influence. To encourage us, indeed, a fact has come to our knowledge on the investigation of the case of Randall. Gentlemen will remember his assertions to them, and the deed read in the House, in which so much was stated of the influence of the Canada traders over the Indians: well, let us try to balance or countervail this influence; but it has been observed, our private citizens will do this sufficiently in the way of their private trade. In general I am friendly to let commerce take its own level without Governmental interference; but the little influence our traders have yet obtained, shows plainly enough defective capital or a defective extent of trade; both are to be apprehended. So many objects of speculation offer in this country, that individuals may not pay sufficient attention to this branch, in which they have so powerful a British interest to contend with. Government, alone, can do this in the infancy of the commerce. Let the experiment be made; we can lose little by it; we may gain a great deal. It has been observed, that this act has been rejected in three different sessions of Congress already; and this is argued as a proof of its want of merit; but this has been the fate in England of the navigation act; it was hundreds of years struggling to get into existence, but was not the less acceptable when at last it succeeded. Perhaps we may find this bill, on experience, none the worse for the difficulties, which, as an untried step, it has hitherto had to encounter: it is recommended by general reasoning; let us try it; we can only repeal it if we find it does not answer the sanguine expectations entertained of it.
Mr. Macon[64] was opposed to the bill. He thought the circumstance of the business having been so long in agitation, was a reason why it should be longer considered. The reason for delay was certainly not weakened by that. The business was highly improper for Government to embark in.
Mr. Murray had but one idea to suggest, as it was unnecessary to go over the general policy, which had been amply stated by other gentlemen. There appeared to him two objects; first, the securing the Indian friendship by a supply of their wants; second, the supplanting the British traders in their influence over the tribes whose hostilities might embarrass us. To the last object, therefore, the meditated mode of supply by public agency was peculiarly well adapted. The Indians are now supplied by a great company long established, very wealthy, and possessing this influence, in which we must supplant them. We are to consider whether, if private individuals are left to be the only competitors with the Canada company, this influence and this trade will be transferred agreeably to sound policy. He thought they would not. Small capitalists, and adventurers young in this trade, would certainly prove unequal to a competition with so well established and rich a company as the Canada company. It was no uncommon thing for great companies, when they were apprehensive of what they would call interlopers, to crush all competition by making a voluntary sacrifice of a few thousand pounds sterling. By underselling, on a large scale, for a time, and even a certain loss, they secured themselves in future from competition. This great company can afford to pay this price for the perpetuity of this trade and influence. In order to meet the capital of this company, we must not trust to individual small capitalists. By a sum appropriated by Government to the object, however large the capital in competition in Canada, the Government will be able to beat down the trade of this company and place it in American hands; and in a few years after the competition has ceased, the Government may then withdraw its agency, and leave it to private capitals, to which the field will then have been rendered easy.
The motion of Mr. Swift was negatived; and the bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.
Wednesday, January 19.
Appropriations for 1796.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill making appropriations for the support of Government in the year 1796.
Mr. Williams, agreeably to notice given on a former day, moved to strike out all that gross sum appropriated for the officers of the Mint.[65]
Mr. W. Smith said that a great proportion of the sum was for salaries established by law. They must be paid, till the law is repealed. If the gentleman means to suspend the whole appropriation bill till an inquiry is gone through with respect to the Mint, the bill may be delayed for two months, and the consequence be the greatest embarrassment in Government.
Mr. Jeremiah Smith had never been much in favor of the Mint, nor had experience increased his good opinion of it. But passing this appropriation bill would not prevent a full investigation of this subject hereafter. He was for deferring any proceeding about the Mint till the select committee made their report. He opposed the motion.
Mr. Sedgwick thought that the course which the gentleman is pursuing had never been adopted before. It is incorrect to discuss the merits of the Mint in passing this bill. We might as well take up the salary of the Chief Justice, or any other article in the bill, as the Mint. We never should have done, at this rate. We are now only to vote for the bill, as agreeable to the laws already made. Mr. Sedgwick said that if the gentleman from New York (Mr. Williams) would bring forward any proposition for the regulation, or even the abolition of the establishment of the Mint, if it could be proved productive of public benefit, he, with every other gentleman, would give him their aid to effect the object; but that now, he conceived, it could not regularly be brought forward. He thought an appropriation bill should be conformed exactly to the state of the public engagements, and that where establishments had been formed and salaries provided, the amount of them should be the principle of calculating the amount of appropriations; and that the House ought not, by withholding appropriations, to break in upon and destroy establishments formed by the whole Legislature. That these observations had hitherto been sanctioned by the practice on this subject. He observed, that if the House was to investigate, in the discussion of an appropriation bill, the amount of salaries and the legal establishments of Government, the public service would be dangerously destroyed. He remarked, that it was to be observed that no appropriation was made, for any purpose, since the commencement of the year.
Mr. Gallatin felt alarmed at the principle advanced by Mr. Sedgwick, for, if admitted, it might be applied in future on some other and important occasion. The motion made by the member from New York ought not, perhaps, to be adopted; but there was certainly a discretionary power in the House to appropriate or not to appropriate for any object whatever, whether that object was authorized by law or not. It was a power which, however inexpedient on the present occasion, was vested in this House for the purpose of checking the other branches of Government whenever necessary. That such a right was reserved by this body, appeared from their making only yearly appropriations for the support of the Civil List and of the Military Establishment. Had they meant to give up the right, they would have such appropriations permanent. There was one instance in which this House had thought it proper to abandon the right. In order to strengthen public credit, they had consented that the payment of interest on the debt should not depend on their sole will, and they had rendered the appropriation for that object not a yearly, but a permanent one. Whenever that was not the case, and the right had been reserved, it was contradictory to suppose that the House were bound to do a certain act, at the same time that they were exercising the discretionary power of voting upon it.
Mr. Sedgwick said that he certainly had no intention to have given occasion to the observations which had been made; but, as the general principle which he had laid down had been denied, and as it had some relation, either intimate or remote, to the subject before the committee, he would take the liberty to repeat the principle, and say a few words in support of it.
The principle, then, which he had assumed, was, that when legal establishments were made, it was the duty of the Legislature to make appropriations conformably to the public engagements; and that neither branch had a right to withhold its assent. He observed that the whole Legislature, and not a part, were competent to form contracts, and to establish and alter compensations and salaries. The Legislature, and not either branch of it, had the power of expressing the public will, and pledging the public faith; that when a salary is ascertained, the public faith is pledged that it shall be paid, according to the stipulation; and that, therefore, the public credit is involved in making the necessary appropriations, without which it could not be paid. He asked, if, in such a case, it was competent to the House rightfully to withhold the means necessary for the performance of the public engagement?
He said he had always supposed that the power of the House, in the case of appropriations, did not give a power to yield or withhold assent on such a subject. He believed, in every such instance, the exercise of discretion was restrained. To illustrate his ideas, he could mention a similar instance. The constitution had declared that the President should receive a stated compensation for his services, to be ascertained by law, which could neither be diminished nor enlarged during the term for which he should have been elected. Here was a duty imposed on the Legislature, with the performance of which they could not, they had no power to dispense. Yet, after the compensation was stated, no payment could be made in consequence of appropriating. He asked, if, in this case, when the public will was expressed, the engagement and the national faith pledged, the Legislature could of right withhold the necessary appropriation? The same observations might, he said, be applied to every instance where public contracts were formed. The public faith was pledged, the necessary appropriation must be made to prevent a violation of it; and if withheld, such violation might justly be charged on the Legislature.
Mr. Nicholas was for the resolution. It had been urged that the House were to pass the appropriation bill as a matter of course. He thought otherwise. The House, in enacting a law, were entitled to consider all its consequences.
Mr. Giles adverted to a fact stated by Mr. Williams, viz: that the cents are issued from the Mint at a cheaper rate than the price of the copper itself; so that, if a person chooses to melt down a pound weight of cents into a lump of copper, and takes this lump back again to the Mint, he will receive more money for it than what it was worth in cents. Thus the whole expense of workmanship is cast away. Mr. Giles described the ridiculous and wasteful effects to be looked for from such a way of coining money.
The amendment of Mr. Williams was agreed to by a very large majority.
Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out some of the subsequent clauses, for payments to mechanics, for stationery, &c.
Mr. Isaac Smith wanted to know if it was meant to stop the whole operations of the Mint.
Mr. Page objected to dispersing the workmen, who could not easily be collected again; at least it would require an immense expense to re-assemble them. It has been stated, in the course of this discussion, that every cent coined in the Mint has cost the public TEN; but if the workmen are to be dispersed, and if at any future time assembled again, the cents may come to cost A HUNDRED CENTS apiece. Mr. P. recited various reasons for hoping that the business of the Mint will in future be conducted with more expedition, economy, and success. He stated the immense benefit arising to the country from the plenty of copper money, and especially to the poorer classes of people. A Mint was of more consequence than gentlemen seemed to think it was. He said that private mints were reported to be setting up. He wished to refer the amendment of his colleague from Virginia to the third reading of the bill. By that time the House would be better informed.
Mr. Nicholas did not wish to abolish, but merely to suspend the operations of the Mint till nearer the end of the session. This amendment was negatived.
The committee rose, the Chairman reported, and the House took up the bill as reported.
The House adhered to the amendment of the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. Livingston next moved that the whole appropriation for the Mint should be struck out.
Mr. Murray said, that had the gentleman from New York moved for delay, for the purpose of introducing a motion to repeal the law which rendered this appropriation necessary, he would not have troubled the House with a single remark; but his motion to strike out an appropriation for the purpose of bringing the policy of the law itself into discussion, contained a principle in his mind so repugnant to the great Legislative duties of the House that he would oppose it. The object of the appropriation is not a temporary one, but a part of the machinery of our Government, under the express authority of the constitution by law. The doctrine now contended for by the gentlemen from New York and Pennsylvania (Mr. Livingston and Mr. Gallatin) was that this House have a discretionary power of appropriating or not. To this doctrine, taken in the extent which he conceived they contended for, he could not give his support. On the contrary, he thought that in all cases where an appropriation flowed from a law to make good a contract, or to erect a permanent organ in the Government, and from any law whose object was permanent, the true doctrine was, that it was the duty of the House to vote an appropriation. A law is the will of a nation. The same powers only that formed it can repeal it. If it be a constitutional act, no power can lawfully obstruct its operation or its existence. But attending to the doctrine maintained to-day, it would follow, that though this House had not the power of repealing a law made by all the branches of Government, it may obstruct its operations and render it a dead letter; though it cannot repeal, it may do what shall amount to a repeal, which is the assumption of a power almost equal to that of exclusive legislation. He thought he saw in this an evil of great extent, and an anarchy of theoretic principles. It appeared to him that though we originate money bills, we had no right to refuse an appropriation to existing laws that either secured a debt or any contract, or that related to objects permanent by the law that created or acknowledged them, as long as the law itself remained unrepealed. We had but a share of Legislative power. Where a law relative to such objects as he had alluded to existed, from which an appropriation followed, till the law ceased by repeal or by other constitutional means, it was obligatory upon us as well as upon our constituents, and the only powers we could exercise of a discretionary sort resolved themselves either into this mode of making good the appropriation, or of voting for its repeal. The other branches would then judge of the propriety of our proceeding; but till they who assisted in its enacting, judged with us the necessity of doing it away, a duty resulted that we should give it the energy intended by its enaction.
Mr. Dayton conceived the question brought under discussion of too delicate a nature to be decided at the present time. He, however, expressed it as his opinion that the power of making appropriations was intended and ought to be a check on establishments.
Mr. Nicholas conceived the House bound to weigh the merits of every law when an appropriation was to be passed to carry it into effect, and no appropriations should obtain the sanction of the House, unless they were convinced of the propriety of the law.
Mr. Giles said he did not expect to hear a doctrine so novel broached in the House as that advanced by the member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick.) He had declared that he conceived the House could exercise no discretionary power when about to pass an appropriation bill.
Mr. Sedgwick rose to explain. The principle he advocated was, that when a law was made pledging the public faith, the House had no discretion to withhold, or not, an appropriation; at least as long as common honesty was more than a name.
Mr. Giles said that if this doctrine was admitted in its full latitude, the House would become a mere office for the registering of edicts. He contended that the House had a right, by withholding appropriations, to put an end to an institution without the concurrence of the Senate. He would not say that the present was a case that called for the exercise of that right, but they had in all cases of this nature a right to exercise their discretion.
Mr. Murray considered the laws of the land as depending upon two other branches of the Government besides this House, and conceived it highly improper in the House to attempt to obstruct them by withholding necessary appropriations. What would be the effect of a contrary doctrine? It must contain the seeds of governmental anarchy. While a law remained in force it was the duty of the House to do what was needful to carry it into operation. He made some allusion to the British House of Commons, who, by privilege, contend for the right of withholding supplies to be a check on the patronage of the Crown. But such a principle, he contended, could not apply here; our Government could not proceed if it were admitted. As long as a law exists, it is the duty of the House to make the needful appropriations. The whole wisdom of the Government is not in this House. The same power is required to repeal laws as to make them. It is true the constitution has given to the House the more immediate command of the purse-strings; but they were under an obligation to open them when necessity required. There is a constitutional way of repealing laws; but the House has no right to obstruct their operation while in force. A member from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) he observed, appeared on a former occasion to coincide with his opinions on this subject; for he argued that the House was bound to pass such an appropriation, as a law existed giving the salary to the officer which it was meant to provide for.
Mr. Gallatin said, in answer, that his observation had simply been, that the Committee of Ways and Means, and not the House, conceived itself bound to report an appropriation for an item established by law; but he never doubted the power of the House to pass, or not, an appropriation. In such cases the line of duty must remain to be drawn by opinion. With what degree of consistency can the House be called on for a vote if, as some members contend, they cannot have an opinion? Why are they called upon to say, yea or nay, if they are obliged to say yea?
Mr. Murray conceded that a member might say yea or nay, but his duty must in cases of this nature clearly point to one of the two; for he could not mistake the black and white marks in the court of conscience. He has the physical power to say yea or nay; but if he does his duty he must say yea. The contrary principle would go to this, that the House had a right to refuse an appropriation to pay a just debt.
Mr. Gallatin observed, in reply, that each member will be the sole judge whether it was or was not his duty to say yea, or the contrary. The constitution, he said, declared that no money should be drawn from the Treasury but by appropriations made by law: this did not look as if the voting of appropriations was intended to be merely a matter of form. In the second place, the constitution declares, that no appropriation for the support of an armed force shall be made for more than two years. Thus, though a Military Establishment may be formed by enlistments for three or more years, yet the constitution provides that the question shall be submitted to the House every two years; and this surely is not as a matter of form; but in order, at such short periods, by voting on an appropriation bill, to determine whether such an establishment should exist longer or not. He conceived the power which he advocated as residing in the House of great consequence, and to be used on important occasions only.
Mr. Nicholas, who had risen at the same time with Mr. Gallatin, and had given way to him, observed, that when he first rose, he was going to read the clause of the constitution which the member last up had referred to. As to the black and white marks the member from Maryland spoke of, they were differently placed in different persons; in matters of opinion men will differ; but the constitution is a guide not to be departed from. The power of appropriation was vested by that instrument chiefly in the House, and no power on earth would prevent his exercising his discretion when that power was to be put in activity.
Mr. Giles observed, that the member from Maryland had got into the doctrine of checks, and seemed to think that if the House exercised its constitutional check it would produce governmental anarchy.
Mr. Murray explained. He had alluded to the mode of getting rid of an establishment by refusing appropriations to carry it into effect. The constitutional mode of procuring the repeal of the law should always be had recourse to; but he insisted that the House could not, as they were bound by their duty, obstruct a law in force by refusing an appropriation.
Mr. Giles conceived that the checks provided by the constitution might be used by each of the powers of government to their full extent, limited in every particular case only by their own discretion. If the harmony of the branches was to be made an argument to prevent the exercise of checks, what, he asked, became of the checks provided by the constitution? Each branch of the government (if he understood what was meant by constitutional checks) was to exercise its own opinions and use its discretions within constitutional limits, without a reference to the opinions of other branches. He next adverted to the powers of appropriation, which he contended were in a greater degree vested in the immediate representatives of the people, to be a wholesome check. In case of an army establishment, for example, suppose the President or Senate were to refuse their assent to the repeal of a law establishing it? Will it be said that the clause of the constitution empowering the House to make a biennial appropriation for the object, does not vest in them a discretionary power in such instances of overturning the establishment by its own will? for it cannot be kept up without an appropriation. Is the House to be told that, for the sake of harmony, they must give up their own powers and opinions? He maintained that, in cases of appropriations, they had a discretionary power, to be exercised, as in all cases, discretionarily. Was one branch to be judges of discretion for another? No; each should judge for itself.
Mr. Murray said, it was known to every one that an appropriation for the support of a military establishment could not be made for a longer term than two years; but that case was widely different from the present. It was known that, by the constitution, a military appropriation cannot exist more than two years; but the doctrine he supported was in cases of debt or obligation under a law; and, in such cases, he still contended that, though the House had the physical power to refuse an appropriation to satisfy a claim thus founded, they had not the right.
Here the debate was interrupted by a motion for adjournment; which was carried, and the House adjourned.