Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Thursday, January 29.

Aaron Kitchell, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the State of New Jersey, in the room of Abraham Clark, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House; the oath to support the Constitution of the United States being first administered to him by Mr. Speaker, according to law.

Thomas Person and others.[59]

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. Cobb in the chair, to resume the consideration of the claims of Thomas Person and others, to certain lands lying on the frontier of the State of North Carolina, and ceded by the Commissioners of the United States to the Indians.

Mr. Gillespie took up the subject in the same stage in which it stood before he spoke the preceding day. He said, let us examine the conduct of other States. Did not New York dispose of lands within her chartered limits, and from the sales become wealthy, as she has large sums in the funds? The State of Virginia took advantage of the purchase of Henderson and Company, for that part now called Kentucky, although they now exclaim that the purchase was unlawful; yet, unlawful as it was, it has extinguished the Indian title to those lands. Now, if the purchase of Henderson and Company had this effect on the north-east side of Walker's line, which divides Kentucky from the South-west Territory, is it not just that it should have the same effect on the south-west side, when made by the same persons, on the self-same day? And surely the rights of North Carolina must be at least equal to those of Kentucky, in every thing except that of power. But is Congress going to legislate by strength of arm? I hope not. It has been admitted, by some who have spoken on the subject, that the citizens of North Carolina have a right of redress by law, and by others, against her own Legislature. To the first of these I ask, against whom is the suit to commence? Are our citizens, thus bereft of their property, to be compelled to litigate suits at law for property taken for public use, and for which they have a just claim against the United States; or have they not an equal right to compensation for that which the United States, by their agent, took from them, as other citizens are entitled to, for property piratically taken on the high seas, by the robbers of Britain? And do we, in the last case, say to these unfortunate sufferers, commence suits against those who have injured you? No. Government has taken the litigation in hand, at her own cost. Let her do so with the citizens of North Carolina. Or, will the Government of the United States support the claim of the injured against her own Executive? Will they do it against the State of North Carolina? They cannot; and from what has been said in this matter, it is plain that, as the Government of the United States has converted the property of the citizens of North Carolina to the uses of her Government, compensation ought to be made out of the public purse, as the contrary would, on her part, destroy that bond of union between her, as the sovereign power of the United States, and her citizens, and as not only bound to govern with justice, but also to protect them from all manner of injury, as well domestic as foreign. Mr. G. apologized, that he was without authority in the House, but would pledge his reputation that what he should advance, if not verbatim, should be in substance with the author quoted:

"It is admitted by many, that the sovereign authority possesses a power, under the laws of eminent domain, to alienate the property of the subject, for the benefit of the Commonwealth, by impending public necessity against private injury." But, without doubt, they "that have lost or sacrificed their property to the public safety in such extremity, ought to have satisfaction made, as far as possible, by the Commonwealth. Any thing short of this would destroy the reciprocity between the sovereign and subject."—Puffendorf, b. 8, c. 5, § 7.

But can public necessity be urged in the present case to justify this kind of political robbery? I answer, no. If the Indians are to be kept in peace by bribes, why not, in this, as in other similar cases, by presents and pecuniary rewards? Is it not an indignity to the United States to purchase peace from an Indian nation, at the expense of a part of her citizens, whose resources at best were scanty, and are, by this and other speculations, almost annihilated? Surely it is. And, let me add, is it not an invariable axiom with all authors on Government,

"That all sacrifices of property made by individuals for the public benefit or accommodation, should or ought to be paid out of the public revenue, and that one should not bear more of the burden than another."—Burlamaqui, b. 8, c. 5, § 27, 28.

Is it not, then, obvious to all, who will reflect on this subject, that compensation is due to these individuals, whose property has been wrested from them for Government purposes? The same author observes, in the 38th section of the same chapter:

"That as no subject can assume any part of the sovereign power without the consent of the whole, neither can any sovereign authority deprive the subject of his right and property, nor substitute another sovereign over him without his consent."

The public is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law in this and similar cases. The Legislature can, and frequently does interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by stripping the individual of his property in an arbitrary manner. No. But by giving him full and ample indemnification for the injury sustained; for there must be an end of all social commerce between man and man, unless private possessions be secured from unjust invasions. Thus, the protection of a State, in every precedent to be found in books that treat of the fundamental laws of civil society, or in the resolutions and acts of the British Parliament, means restitution, indemnity, or compensation. Grotius, when treating of the right of the sovereign authority to give up or take the property of the subject, calls it "restitution, satisfaction;" Burlamaqui, "indemnity, and indemnifying the subject for the injury sustained;" and Vattel, "recompense out of the public money." It is farther observed, that cases of this kind operate, like property thrown into the sea to save the ship, by making an estimate of the loss, and causing an equal average on the property saved, which each owner is bound to pay. So that, from the fullest conviction, I am of opinion the citizens of North Carolina are entitled to the relief reported by the select committee, and that strict justice requires we should comply with it; for, as I have said, in nothing is the Government of the United States more concerned, in a superlative degree, than in doing strict justice to her citizens, as of the last importance in preserving the affections of the people to the Government. Vacancies in our departments, civil, judicial, or military, may be supplied as well, but to restore the confidence of a people borne down with oppression, exceeds comprehension. It is like attempting to return from the grave—is without precedent, and is vain labor indeed. At different epochs it has shook the foundations of monarchies, and caused tyrants to tremble and atone for their crimes with their lives; and, as I said at an early stage of the debate, if usurpers, tyrants, and despots have been compelled to do justice by this undeniable law of nature, shall the Government of the United States, founded on the pure principles of Democracy, be less just? Surely not. Have we received a power to exercise in wantonly oppressing those who gave it? God forbid! Therefore, let it ever be impressed on our minds, that justice exalteth a nation. The House, I hope, will pardon my detaining them, at a time when every moment is precious. But the duty I owe to my injured constituents forbids silence, and will, I hope, be a sufficient apology. I shall, therefore, submit to the judgment of the House, not doubting but justice will be done.

Mr. Nicholas was satisfied that the purchasers of the lands had a claim either against the United States or the State of North Carolina. Much had been said about the Indian right; but the Indians never had been fit to occupy these lands. It could never have been the design of nature that these people should be termed the possessors of land which they were incapable to enjoy. He was, upon the whole, on the side of the claimants, though he enumerated some of the difficulties that would attend an attempt to please all parties.

Mr. W. Smith had found much difficulty in forming his opinion upon this question. He had at first been somewhat disposed against the claimants, but at last, after full deliberation, he was convinced of the justice of giving them redress. He requested the particular attention and candor of the House. The United States were, in this case, made a judge in their own cause, and therefore it became more their duty to examine every part of the subject with the more accuracy. Mr. S. then began a distinct detail of the circumstances in the present dispute. Previous to the year 1776, North Carolina was a British Colony, and the British Crown considered itself as entitled to bestow grants of territory. In that year, North Carolina became a sovereign State, and consequently she conceived herself as succeeding to the right of the British Crown, and as having a right to bestow grants in the same way as the Kings of Great Britain had done. This claim was asserted in her general Declaration of Rights, and it was incorporated into her constitution. When North Carolina entered into the Union, all the Legislative rights of the State were preserved, and, by a necessary inference, her title to the lands comprehended in her original charter. In 1783, the State opened an office to sell the absolute right of such lands as had not been disposed of. In 1789, North Carolina ceded the right of jurisdiction to the United States, but she reserved her own Legislative rights, and consequently her right to sell the lands within her own territory; and in disposing of the lands in question, the State did not intend merely to sell the right of pre-emption from the Indians, but the absolute title to the lands. Mr. S. read a part of the constitution of North Carolina, in order to explain what degree of legislation the State had conceded to the Federal Government, and what part she reserved to herself; and he was clearly of opinion, that the disposal of the lands had been reserved. In 1783 the State offered these lands for sale. In 1786, the Commissioners of the United States assigned a great part of them to the Indians. In 1788, the Legislature of North Carolina declared that they would support the purchasers. The grand question now is, did the State, by acceding to the confederation, give up her right of legislation? She gave up her right to make Indian treaties, but reserved that of legislation, because, as above observed, it formed a part of her constitution, which was understood to continue unviolated. These lands were bought with certificates, which it was alleged, on the other side, would purchase nothing else. If the certificates would purchase nothing else, it was proper at least that they should have been restored to their first owners, who might have subscribed them to a part of the public debt of the United States. They were certainly entitled either to their land or their certificates. These certificates, which were paid into the Treasury of North Carolina, were those of the United States. If the owners had only a pre-emption right, Mr. S. insisted that the certificates should be returned.

Mr. Sedgwick said, that this was quite a new fact to him, and if it was as stated, there was no necessity for Legislative interference at all. The State of North Carolina had only to come forward and subscribe them to the Treasury.

Mr. W. Smith explained, that when delivered into the Treasury of North Carolina, they had been cancelled. After this they were again ordered to be made current by the subscriptions of the officers of the State, and in that shape they were offered to the Commissioners of Loans, who refused to accept them. The exact amount of the certificates could still be ascertained, as well as the names of the persons to whom they belonged. They had been cancelled, but not destroyed.

Mr. Boudinot imagined that Mr. Smith had furnished a new and forcible argument against his own cause. This claim of North Carolina to sell the lands was wrong, and this doctrine had been the cause of all the disputes in which the Federal Government has been engaged. The Crown of Britain had never pretended to any right of this kind, nor ever thought it had a title to any lands till they were first purchased from the Indians. The question before the committee was, have the United States taken away any claim which the purchasers of these lands had? And the answer is, that the United States have not. The State of North Carolina only had a right to sell the privilege of pre-emption. This was the only right which the purchasers obtained, and this right they still possess. As to the certificates, they were not those of the United States, but those of North Carolina. They were not Continental certificates, and for that reason Continental officers would not accept them; but North Carolina has since brought these certificates into her account against the General Government. The commissioners, in 1786, had done a very great service to North Carolina, by settling a line of boundary, and putting an end to the Indian war. He thought that the best way would be for the claimants to apply to the Executive, and agree among themselves to extinguish, by an interference of that kind, the Indian right. This would be much better than for the House to involve itself in the purchase of an immense tract of land, at an expense of seven or eight hundred thousand dollars, (or how much more, Mr. B. could not tell,) when there was so much occasion for the money to pay the national debt. He again declared that he should think it the best way to obtain the good offices of the Executive in extinguishing the Indian right. The Six Nations possessed part of the territory of Pennsylvania. This State also may apply to the General Government for redress, if North Carolina were to get payment for these lands. The State of New York may do so, for the same reasons as North Carolina. This would be involving the Government in an endless labyrinth. He was as unwilling as any gentleman in the House to interfere with the rights of the Legislature of North Carolina. But he did not wish to see the House going blindfold into the business. The United States have too much land already.

Mr. Kittera.—The certificates must have been given in by North Carolina to the United States. She denied the right of the commissioners, in 1786, to make Indian treaties, but now that right is given up. He agreed with Mr. Boudinot as to his observations on Pennsylvania. Georgia also, he said, had about sixty millions of acres within her chartered limits. The business would never have an end, if the General Government was to interfere in all these cases.

Mr. Scott.—Has not this Government a right to restrain every wild-goose excursion into the woods? If it has not, the Union must fall prostrate at the feet of every wild speculator. Pennsylvania, at a great expense, made preparations for an establishment at Presqu'Isle. The ground had been bought at a great expense from the United States. Yet for the sake of general peace, the settlement had been stopped.

Mr. McDowell denied that the two cases corresponded, for the lands at Presqu'Isle had not been given to the Six Nations.

Mr. Boudinot differed from the last speaker. He did not think that any thing farther had been done against the interest of North Carolina than against that of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Blount denied that the Indians ever occupied the lands in question, or were fit to occupy them, in any proper sense of the word. To walk across a country, and to shoot in it, was different from an occupation. But, besides, the Creeks and Cherokees were not the only tribes who had hunted there. It had been said yesterday that these lands gave rise to speculation. Mr. B. wished that it had done so, for in that case the certificates would all have been paid by this time. There was no difficulty in funding Southern certificates, when once they got into the hands of Northern speculators. Mr. B. thought himself entitled to receive back from the United States the money which he had paid into the Treasury of North Carolina for these lands.

Mr. Murray requested the favor of any gentleman to inform him, whether the lands in question were possessed and occupied, in the more civilized sense of the terms, by the white people? He believed they were not. Had they been in peaceable possession, living on, and cultivating the lands, that circumstance would form a very interesting motive in his mind in favor of the indemnity that was asked. But, in fact, they never were possessed of any right but that which North Carolina could give them—the pre-emption right; that right they now possessed as fully as they did at the time of the cession to the United States. [Mr. Carnes rose, and informed him, that many white people who had begun farms were driven off their lands, and reduced to great distress by the proceedings of the commissioners.] Mr. M. said, an argument struck him of some weight—that if the claim be gratified, the claimants will be in a better situation now than they would have been if the cession had not been made; for North Carolina could not have given them absolute possession but by force of arms. This she would not have a right to do, under this Confederation, nor under the constitution, as no one State can make war. But the claimants can ask nothing more of the United States than they could have had accomplished for them by the State of North Carolina. A new doctrine, resulting from the Revolution, must be admitted as a ground of reasoning, when Indian, unconquered territory, is before us. The Provinces had power, as individual bodies—which States, as such, have not—the right of making war, and gaining possession of Indian territory by conquest. So it was, that a province could, from its own separate resources, make war on Indians, and pay individually the expense. But when the great contest for independence came on, all the States were, in fact, principal confederated bodies, long before they signed the paper of confederation. The doctrine, which suited such a body of States, was, that whatever might be gained by the joint efforts and expense of all, should be the property of all, jointly; and he thought that every principle of sound justice warranted him in applying the doctrine, so far as to say, that whatever might be the chartered limits of each province, while dependent, yet the moment of the joint contest was that in which the true limits of a State were, as far as property in land went, confined to that boundary which was really located, occupied, and peaceably holden within the limits. To say that the State had a right more positive than the pre-emptive one, to lands actually occupied and defended by hostile tribes of Indians within the chartered limits, admits a principle, that, if put into action, tended necessarily to violate the great principle of the Confederation, and of the present constitution, which divests the individual States of the right to make war; as the State to make good any sales she might make within the hostile territory, would be obliged to make war on the tribes to dispossess them. The lands in question were in this situation. They were occupied by Indian tribes, and were never in possession of North Carolina. The gentleman from that State seems to doubt the occupancy of the tribes. Mr. M. believed we would violate principles of justice were we to borrow the principle of occupancy from books, and apply it to Indian society. The Indian tribes held certain tracts of land. As to the mode in which they thought it most rational to use the land, it was nothing against their right to say its exercise differed from our mode. He understood they made a hunting ground of the land in dispute. They had a right to use it as such, and their mode of use was no argument against their right. All that could be, or was proved to belong to North Carolina, was the colonial right to qualified sovereignty, called the pre-emption right. This was all she could grant, and this was all that the claimants could take from her. They had that now; and as he could not see the propriety of making their situation better than if the cession had not been made, so he could not agree to the resolution for giving them indemnity. Perhaps his ideas on the subject might be fashioned by local circumstances, belonging as he did to a State which had no share in those rich funds which the large frontier States possessed, he thought, very unjustly, in immense tracts of back lands. He felt it a duty to narrow all claims like the present as much as possible. Connecticut, Rhode Island, Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, were all in the same situation. They had no back lands, and were divested of the share they were justly entitled to in the back lands, which now bring immense funds of wealth into the land offices of those States which possess them.

Mr. Heister wished to have that part of the law read which relates to the species of certificates referred to in the debate; this was accordingly done. Mr. H. said that he had not enough of evidence before him to give a vote. He therefore wished that the committee might rise.

Mr. Macon said, that, according to Mr. Boudinot, it was the doctrine of North Carolina in 1783, that the State possessed aright to the unappropriated lands. If that was their doctrine then, nothing had since happened which could make it cease to be so now. The Crown of Britain had transferred the absolute property of lands, without inquiring for permission from the Indians. This evidence went strongly to prove that North Carolina had the same title. The case of Presqu'Isle did not apply, for Pennsylvania was raising troops to make that settlement, and no State can, by the constitution, raise troops of itself. He wished the committee not to rise till they had determined the question.

Mr. Carnes had foreseen that the claim before the committee would be opposed upon various grounds: but he considered none of them as well founded. Grants were first made by North Carolina to individuals, of lands within her chartered boundary. The cession made to, and accepted by the United States, conditioned to secure the interest of individuals. A treaty was thereafter ordered to be held by the United States with the Indians, and by that treaty, lands formerly granted, were relinquished to them. The commissioners of North Carolina protested in form. The people turned out, had paid ten pounds the hundred acres, for their lands, and they were entitled to compensation from North Carolina, or from the United States. It had been said that North Carolina had no right but that of pre-emption. This Mr. C. denied. North Carolina had a right to all the lands within her boundary; and there was an express agreement reserving those lands to individuals. Why did the United States contract with the State, if she had no right? The Indians never could have been considered an independent nation, else there would be compensation in imperio. He mentioned the case of the Tallissee Country containing four million of acres. By a treaty made in 1785, between the State of Georgia and the Creeks, this land was ceded to Georgia. By a second treaty at New York, this very country was relinquished to the Indians, and of course the bona fide right of the State wrested from them. If a decision could be had on this case before a judicial tribunal, it would not require a moment's hesitation to determine in favor of the State, and that the treaty was a nullity. It had been alleged that the right of pre-emption was the only right in possession of the States, that is, a title to purchase of the holders of the property, in exclusion of all other States, or individuals thereof or the particular State. Mr. C. contended that the fee-simple of all the soil within the chartered limits belonged to the State. As to the boundaries, the definitive treaty of peace settles them beyond contradiction. As to the proprietors of these lands being in no worse condition now than before the cession back to the Indians, the people were ploughing the lands, when driven from them, and will any gentleman say that this is not injuring people? As to the State of North Carolina having no particular claim to the land now beyond the Indian line, he would put a case within the chapter of possibilities. Suppose that all the Indians were driven over the Mississippi to-morrow, to whom would the lands which they now possess belong? The particular States to be sure, within whose range they lay. The gentlemen who advocate for morality, and who talk of treating the Indians with humanity, are the very men who have uniformly countenanced the raising of troops, and augmenting the force on our north-western frontiers. How can they reconcile their conduct? The Indians to the South are to be treated with humanity, and those to the North are to be butchered, that the United States may enjoy their property.

Mr. Boudinot said, that the charter from Britain extended to the South Sea, but such a stretch of territory was not really claimed by Britain. He read several of the old laws of North Carolina, to prove that the Indian right of soil had always been acknowledged.

Mr. Blount had never thought of quoting this book, which he now did, to show that the British Government had authorized conquest. He did not know of one purchase made in Carolina. It was all conquest, and so were nine-tenths of all the lands held by the white people in America.

Mr. McDowell.—Those lands which are the subject of debate, and which a number of gentlemen have contended, that North Carolina had not a right to grant to her citizens, have been proved to be within the chartered limits as granted by Charles II., and which limits, sovereignty and jurisdiction were guaranteed to the State by the Articles of Confederation.

After this, and within the year 1783, the Legislature passed a law for opening an office to receive entries of lands in the district of country now called the territory south of the Ohio, for the redemption of special and other certificates; and after a number of the surveys were made, and the grants issued, the Government of the United States ordered a treaty to be held with the Cherokee Indians at Holston, in the year 1785, and the commissioners agreed to give up a large quantity of lands before stated to the Indians; but, previous to articles being signed, Colonel Blount, who was the agent for North Carolina, entered his protest in behalf of the State, that some of the articles about to be entered into between the commissioners, on the part of the United States, and the Cherokee Indians, would infringe on the Legislative rights of the State of North Carolina, and the Legislature of the State also protested against the proceedings.

I must here remark, that the then Government of the United States, agreeably to the Articles of Confederation, could not legally make use of the property of the State for any purpose without their consent.

This continued to be the situation of this business, till after Congress requested a cession of those lands, with the sovereignty thereof, which now form the territory south of the Ohio, which was complied with under certain reservations, to continue claims, and the situations of the claimants as good as though this cession had not been made, which was a complete acknowledgment of the right of North Carolina, on the part of the United States, but in my opinion placed them in the same situation that the State would have been in, had the cession not taken place.

Since the adoption of the present Government, another treaty was ordered to be held with the Indians, and the lands were given up to the Indians. Here the Executive right to make such treaty may be questioned, and I believe rightly too; for it would be an extraordinary power for them to make use of the property of individuals, without their consent, or making any compensation, and apply it to national purposes. Great difficulties would be involved were a remedy to be attempted in a judicial way against the Government. I do therefore think either that policy or interest, on the part of the United States, would point out a compliance, in part, with the report on the table, for it will not place the United States in any worse situation than they would have been in, had the lands not been entered. Had that been the case, those certificates would have been in the hands of individuals, a debt against the Government, but on their being subscribed now, to the amount actually paid on their relinquishing their claim, you would then have the land, which will be valuable at a period far distant.

Some gentlemen appear to be alarmed at the sum; but if the principle is a just or fair one, the sum ought not to be an objection. I will here state further, to remove the alarms of those gentlemen, that the sum will fall far short of the statement made by Mr. Jefferson, as a great deduction is to be taken from that; but I can further assert, that a great number of the claimants would not relinquish their claim to said lands to subscribe; it would generally be such as are in indigent circumstances. And here I cannot help making some reply to the objections stated by several members, who have alleged that North Carolina had acted wrong in selling these lands before they had extinguished the Indian claim, and that the claimants were in no worse situation than they would have been had the cession not have taken place. I am not a little surprised to find, that gentlemen cannot see the distinction, for had the cession and treaty at Holston taken place, they were at liberty to settle the lands, and North Carolina was bound to protect them; but since the treaty had been made, the land is not only given up as stated, but it is made criminal to cross the boundary. Mr. Dexter has stated that North Carolina has acted unjustly and wrong in making sale of those lands before she had extinguished the Indian claims.

Here I shall repeat what I stated before in answer to what the gentleman has said: That the Indian claims to said lands were, in part, extinguished by Henderson's purchase, and part by conquest, and that a considerable part of the lands, that no nation of Indians could establish a claim to, had been claimed by different tribes as territory grounds, but had not been inhabited by any tribe within the memory, or any account that can be traced, and for as great a length of time the different tribes had been at war with each other about the right of hunting on said land. But so far as it relates to the right of North Carolina, I believe no member has a right to call it in question at this time. The gentleman's arguments would have been more applicable at the time the cession act was under consideration; and as to what the member said about the principle and precedent it would fix, I will only call the attention of that gentleman and the committee, to the conduct of the Government of the United States. Have they not pushed conquests into the Indian country north-west of the Ohio? Are they not continuing to do so, and is it not in contemplation to sell large quantities of lands in that country, that have never been purchased? If so, the precedent which the gentleman fears so much is already established. But here I beg leave to call the attention of the committee, in the most serious manner, to the number of citizens concerned, perhaps near twenty thousand. A great number of them are men who turned out in support of the American Independence, who fought, who bled, and furnished their property freely to the support of the cause. For this service they received certificates, which they wished to realize by entering said lands, and flattered themselves with sitting down on those lands, and in the latter part of life making themselves and families happy. Their hopes were soon blasted. After the act of last session, the Treaty of Holston took place, which gave their property to a savage and cruel enemy, to quiet the minds of an enemy who not only were opposed to us through the war with Britain, but ever since have been imbruing their hands in the blood of innocent women and children. What will be the feelings of the claimants, who have acted as I have stated, when they find that their request, which to be sure is a modest one, and which is only to be reimbursed for sums actually paid, is refused? Should this be the decision, I leave you to draw the conclusion. Should they proceed to settle those lands in opposition to the treaty, I should not be much surprised. But the report on your table goes too far, as to damage and a future preference, which I am not in favor of; therefore the resolutions in the latter part of the report I hope will be stricken out.

On the same question, Mr. Gillespie made the subsequent remarks: he observed a disposition in the House to call the question; he then said that the situation in which he stood required that he should say something in support of the resolution under consideration, as it had been stated as a new and singular case, from which he took the liberty to dissent, as every writer on the law and usage of nations, held it as an invariable axiom, that all sacrifices of property made by individuals for public uses, ought to be paid out of the public purse. He stated the treaty between England, France, and Spain, in 1763, and the case of the loyalists in 1783, and as the hour of adjournment had arrived, concluded with a motion for the committee to rise and report progress.

The question was then put, Shall the committee now rise and report progress? This was negatived. The resolutions in the report were successively put, and lost.

The committee then rose; the Chairman reported progress, and the House adjourned.