Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

Tuesday, June 16.

Department of Foreign Affairs.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for establishing an executive department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.

The first clause, after recapitulating the title of the officer and his duties, had these words: "To be removable from office by the President of the United States."

Mr. White.—The constitution gives the President the power of nominating, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointing to office. As I conceive the power of appointing and dismissing to be united in their natures, and a principle that never was called in question in any Government, I am averse to that part of the clause which subjects the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to be removed at the will of the President. In the constitution, special provision is made for the removal of the judges; that I acknowledge to be a deviation from my principle; but as it is a constitutional provision, it is to be admitted. In all cases not otherwise provided for in the constitution, I take it, that the principle I have laid down is the governing one. Now the constitution has associated the Senate with the President in appointing the heads of departments. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the head of a department; for the words of the law declare, that there shall be a department established, at the head of which shall be an officer to be so denominated. If, then, the Senate are associated with the President in the appointment, they ought also to be associated in the dismission from office. Upon the justness of this construction, I take the liberty of reviving the motion made in the Committee of the Whole, for striking out these words: "to be removable from office by the President of the United States."

Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina.)—The gentleman has anticipated me in his motion; I am clearly in sentiment with him that the words ought to go out. It is in the recollection of the committee, that when the subject was last before us, this power was excepted to; and although the words were then allowed to stand, it was generally understood that it should be further debated. I then was opposed to giving this power to the President, and am still of opinion that we ought not to make this declaration, even if he has the power by the constitution.

I would premise that one of these two ideas is just: either that the constitution has given the President the power of removal, and therefore it is nugatory to make the declaration here; or it has not given the power to him, and therefore it is improper to make an attempt to confer it upon him. If it is not given to him by the constitution, but belongs conjointly to the President and Senate, we have no right to deprive the Senate of their constitutional prerogative; and it has been the opinion of sensible men that the power was lodged in this manner. A publication of no inconsiderable eminence in the class of political writings on the constitution, has advanced this sentiment. The author, or authors, (for I have understood it to be the production of two gentlemen of great information,) of the work published under the signature of Publius, has these words:

"It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government, as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station has given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that the discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the Government."

Here this author lays it down, that there can be no doubt of the power of the Senate in the business of removal. Let this be as it may, I am clear that the President alone has not the power. Examine the constitution; the powers of the several branches of Government are there defined; the President has particular powers assigned him; the Judiciary have in like manner powers assigned them; but you will find no such power as removing from office given to the President. I call upon gentlemen to show me where it is said that the President shall remove from office. I know they cannot do it. Now, I infer from this, that, as the constitution has not given the President the power of removability, it meant that he should not have that power; and this inference is supported by that clause in the constitution which provides that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and on conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Here is a particular mode described for removing; and if there is no other mode directed, I contend that the constitution contemplated only this mode.

I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in the President which may hereafter be greatly abused; for we are not always to expect a Chief Magistrate in whom such entire confidence can be placed as in the present. Perhaps gentlemen are so much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues of the present President, as not to be able to see into futurity. The framers of the constitution did not confine their views to the first person who was looked up to to fill the Presidential chair. If they had, they might have omitted those checks and guards with which the powers of the Executive are surrounded. They knew, from the course of human events, that they could not expect to be so highly favored of heaven as to have the blessing of his administration more than seven or fourteen years; after which, they supposed a man might get into power, who, it was possible, might misbehave. We ought to follow their example, and contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from office. His will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by which an office is to be held, and of consequence you render the officer the mere state-dependant, the abject slave of a person who may be disposed to abuse the confidence his fellow-citizens have placed in him.

Mr. Huntington.—I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well observed that the constitution was silent respecting the removal, otherwise than by impeachment. I would likewise add, that it mentions no other cause of removal than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of infirmity or incapacity. Indeed, it appears hard to me, that after an officer has become old in an honorable service, he should be impeached for this infirmity. The constitution, I think, must be the only rule to guide us on this occasion; as it is silent with respect to the removal, Congress ought to say nothing about it, because it implies that we have a right to bestow it, and I believe this power is not to be found among the enumerated powers delegated by the constitution to Congress.

Mr. Sedgwick.—I wish the words to be struck out, because I conceive them to be unnecessary in this place. I do conceive, Mr. Speaker, that this officer will be the mere creature of the law; and that very little need be said to prove to you that of necessity this ought to be the case. I apprehend, likewise, that it requires but a small share of abilities to point out certain causes for which a person ought to be removed from office, without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance; and the nature of things demands that it should be so. Suppose, sir, a man becomes insane by the visitation of God, and is likely to ruin our affairs, are the hands of Government to be confined from warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office, not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment, is the error not to be corrected? Suppose he acquires vicious habits, an incurable indolence, or total neglect of the duties of his office, which forebode mischief to the public welfare, is there no way to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures which he pursues, (and this he may do without committing any positive offence against the law,) must he preserve his office in despite of the public will? Suppose him grasping at his own aggrandizement, and the elevation of his connections, by every means short of the treason defined by the constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of defence, by alienating the affections of your allies, and promoting the spirit of discord; is there no way suddenly to seize the worthless wretch, and hurl him from the pinnacle of power? Must the tardy, tedious, desultory road, by way of impeachment, be travelled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government? Sir, the nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of this constitution, require that this thing should be otherwise. Well, sir, this is admitted by gentlemen; but they say the Senate is to be united with the President in the exercise of this power. I hope, sir, that is not the case; because it would involve us in the most serious difficulty. Suppose a discovery of any of those events which I have just enumerated were to take place when the Senate is not in session, how is the remedy to be applied? This is a serious consideration, and the evil could be avoided no other way than by the Senate's sitting always. Surely no gentleman of this House contemplates the necessity of incurring such an expense. I am sure it will be very objectionable to our constituents; and yet this must be done, or the public interest be endangered by keeping an unworthy officer in place until that body shall be assembled from the extremes of the Union. It has been said that there is a danger of this power being abused if exercised by one man. Certainly the danger is as great with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the continent, with different impressions and opinions. It appears to me that such a body is more likely to misuse this power than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the Presidential chair. As the nature of the Government requires the power of removal, I think it is to be exercised in this way by a hand capable of exerting itself with effect, and, the power must be conferred upon the President by the constitution, as the executive officer of the Government.

Mr. Madison.—If the construction of the constitution is to be left to its natural course with respect to the executive powers of this Government, I own that the insertion of this sentiment in law may not be of material importance, though, if it is nothing more than a mere declaration of a clear grant made by the constitution, it can do no harm; but if it relates to a doubtful part of the constitution, I suppose an exposition of the constitution may come with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other department of the Government. If the power naturally belongs to the Government, and the constitution is undecided as to the body which is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own merits.

I am clearly of opinion with the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that we ought in this, and every other case, to adhere to the constitution, so far as it will serve as a guide to us, and that we ought not to be swayed in our decisions by the splendor of the character of the present Chief Magistrate, but to consider it with respect to the merit of men who, in the ordinary course of things, may be supposed to fill the chair. I believe the power here declared is a high one, and, in some respects, a dangerous one; but, in order to come to a right decision on this point, we must consider both sides of the question: the possible abuses which may spring from the single will of the First Magistrate, and the abuse which may spring from the combined will of the Executive and the Senatorial disqualification.

When we consider that the First Magistrate is to be appointed at present by the suffrages of three millions of people, and in all human probability in a few years' time by double that number, it is not to be presumed that a vicious or bad character will be selected. If the Government of any country on the face of the earth was ever effectually guarded against the election of ambitious or designing characters to the first office of the State, I think it may with truth be said to be the case under the constitution of the United States. With all the infirmities incident to a popular election, corrected by the particular mode of conducting it, as directed under the present system, I think we may fairly calculate that the instances will be very rare in which an unworthy man will receive that mark of the public confidence which is required to designate the President of the United States. Where the people are disposed to give so great an elevation to one of their fellow-citizens, I own that I am not afraid to place my confidence in him, especially when I know he is impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor before the Senate, at all times; and that, at all events, he is impeachable before the community at large every four years, and liable to be displaced if his conduct shall have given umbrage during the time he has been in office. Under these circumstances, although the trust is a high one, and in some degree, perhaps, a dangerous one, I am not sure but it will be safer here than placed where some gentlemen suppose it ought to be.

Mr. Vining.—I hoped, Mr. Chairman, after the discussion this subject had received on a former occasion, that it would have been unnecessary to re-examine it. The arguments against the clause are reiterated: but, I trust, without a chance of success. They were fully answered before; and I expect the impressions made at that time are not already effaced. The House, as well as the Committee of the Whole, have determined that those words shall be inserted in the bill; the special committee could therefore do no less than place them where they are; a deference is due to the decision of the House.

The House has determined to make a declaration of their construction of the constitution. I am perfectly in sentiment with the majority on this occasion; and contend, that if this power is not in the President, it is not vested in any body whatever. It cannot be within the legislative power of the Senate, because it is of an adverse nature; it cannot be within the executive power of the Senate, because they possess none but what is expressly granted by the constitution. If gentlemen will point out where the constitution confers this power upon the Senate, I will read my recantation, and subscribe to the justness of their doctrine.

I am not satisfied that removability shall be acquired only by impeachment. Were the advocates of this doctrine aware of its consequences, when they advanced it? The Senate has the sole power of trying impeachments; the President is here out of the question. If no officer can be constitutionally removed but by impeachment, it applies to subordinate officers as well as heads of departments. For the constitution only gives power to Congress to establish officers by law, and vests the appointment in the President. If these officers are not removable but by impeachment, what is to become of our affairs, when any of the accidents occur which were enumerated by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick)? Are we to take the circuitous route of impeachment? The dilatory and inefficient process by that mode, will not apply the remedy to the evil till it is too late to be of advantage. Experience has fixed an eternal stigma upon the system of impeachment; witness the case I mentioned, the other day, of Warren Hastings before the British Lords; what delays and uncertainty with the forms of trial, details of evidence, arguments of counsel, and deliberate decision! I ask gentlemen, can there be a greater evil than this in any Government? Why, then, will gentlemen advocate a doctrine so obnoxious to the principles of the constitution, when a more favorable construction is at hand?

Mr. White.—Mention has been made of impeachments, as the only mode of removing an officer. I will explain my ideas on this point, in order that the committee may be masters of my particular objections to the clause. I consider impeachments necessary to be employed in cases respecting an officer who is appointed during good behavior. Thus the judges can only be removed by impeachment. The President and Vice President hold their offices for the terms mentioned in the constitution, not liable to be removed from office in any other way. These circumstances are a deviation from my general principle; but have nevertheless a proper ground to be supported on. The electors who appoint the President, cannot assemble to exercise the authority which would naturally be in them. With respect to the judges, it is found necessary for the proper and uncorrupt administration of justice, and the security of freedom, to have them independent in their stations, so that they be not removable at pleasure. To them, therefore, the doctrine of impeachment is peculiarly applicable. It may properly be extended further, in cases where the President is desirous of retaining an officer who ought not to be retained. This House has the power of controlling him, and may impeach the officer before the Senate. In either of these three cases impeachments are necessary.

Mr. Boudinot.—This is a question, Mr. Speaker, that requires full consideration, and ought only to be settled on the most candid discussion. It certainly involves the right of the Senate to a very important power. At present, I am so impressed with the importance of the subject, that I dare not absolutely decide on any principle, although I am firmly persuaded we ought to retain the clause in the bill; and, so far as it has been examined, I agree that it is a legislative construction of the constitution, necessary to be settled for the direction of your officers. But if it is a deviation from the constitution, or in the least degree an infringement upon the authority of the other branch of the Legislature, I shall most decidedly be against it. But I think it will appear, on a full consideration of this business, that we can do no otherwise than agree to this construction, in order to preserve to each department the full exercise of its powers, and to give this House security for the proper conduct of the officers who are to execute the laws.

Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina.)—I have attended to the arguments of the gentlemen who oppose the motion for striking out, and I apprehend that their reasoning is not perfectly consistent. The construction of some gentlemen is, that the power of removal is given to the President by the constitution. Others are of opinion that the constitution is silent; and therefore the House ought to give it. To oppose these adverse arguments, I must return to my strong ground on which my opponents dare not venture. I state again, that if the constitution has given the power, it is unnecessary to give it here; or if it has not given it, we have no right to confer it, because it is not within the enumerated powers delegated to Congress.

Gentlemen have said that it is proper to give a legislative construction of the constitution. I differ with them on this point. I think it an infringement of the powers of the Judiciary. It is said, we ought not to blend the legislative, executive, or judiciary powers, further than is done by the constitution; and yet the advocates for preserving each department pure and untouched by the others, call upon this House to exercise the powers of the judges in expounding the constitution. What authority has this House to explain the law? But if it has this privilege, the Senate is also invested with it as part of the Legislature; and, in exercising it on the present question, we shall be likely to differ. If the constitution is silent, and gentlemen admit this, it is possible the Senate may view it with a favorable eye to their own right, and reject the bill on account of this clause. A great deal of mischief has arisen in the several States, by the Legislatures undertaking to decide constitutional questions. Sir, it is the duty of the Legislature to make laws; your judges are to expound them.

Mr. Gerry.—Some gentlemen consider this as a question of policy; but to me it appears a question of constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined on that point alone. The best arguments I have heard urged on this occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison.) He says the constitution has vested the executive power in the President; and that he has a right to exercise it under the qualifications therein made. He lays it down as a maxim, that the constitution vesting in the President the executive power, naturally vests him with the power of appointment and removal. Now I would be glad to know from that gentleman by what means we are to decide this question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn from the practice of the individual States? The direct contrary is established. In many cases the Executives are not in particular vested with the power of appointment; and do they exercise that power by virtue of their office? It will be found that other branches of the Government make appointments. How then can gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and removal are incident to the Executive Department of Government? To me it appears at best but problematical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. As we have no certainty on either of these points, I think we must consider it as established by the constitution.

It appears very clear to me, that however this power may be distributed by the constitution, the House of Representatives have nothing to do with it. Why then should we interfere in the business? Are we afraid that the President and Senate are not sufficiently informed to know their respective duties? Our interposition argues that they want judgment, and are not able to adjust their powers without the wisdom of this House to assist them; to say the least on this point, it must be deemed indelicate for us to intermeddle with them. If the fact is, as we seem to suspect, that they do not understand the constitution, let it go before the proper tribunal; the judges are the constitutional umpires on such questions. Why, let me ask gentlemen, shall we commit an infraction of the constitution for fear the Senate or President should not comply with its directions?

Mr. Ames.—When this question was agitated at a former period, I took no part in the debate. I believe it was then proposed, without any idea or intention of drawing on a lengthy discussion, and to me it appeared to be well understood and settled by the House; but since it has been reiterated and contested again, I feel it my bounden duty to deliver the reasons for voting in the manner I then did, and shall now do. Mr. Chairman, I look upon every question which touches the constitution as serious and important, and therefore worthy of the fullest discussion, and the most solemn decision. I believe, on the present occasion, we may come to something near certainty, by attending to the leading principles of the constitution. In order that the good purposes of a Federal Government should be answered, it was necessary to delegate considerable powers; and the principle upon which the grant was made, intended to give sufficient power to do all possible good, but to restrain the rulers from doing mischief.

The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others. When the objects are widely stretched out, or greatly diversified, meandering through such an extent of territory as that the United States possess, a minister cannot see with his own eyes every transaction, or feel with his hands the minutiæ that pass through his department. He must therefore have assistants. But in order that he may be responsible to his country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment cease to exist. There are officers under the constitution who hold their office by a different tenure—your judges are appointed during good behavior; and from the delicacy and peculiar nature of their trust, it is right it should be so, in order that they may be independent and impartial in administering justice between the Government and its citizens. But the removability of the one class, or immovability of the other, is founded on the same principle, the security of the people against the abuse of power. Does any gentleman imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an estate? Or does the Legislature establish them for the convenience of an individual? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into effect the purposes for which the constitution was intended.

The executive powers are delegated to the President, with a view to have a responsible officer to superintend, control, inspect, and check the officers necessarily employed in administering the laws. The only bond between him and those he employs, is the confidence he has in their integrity and talents; when that confidence ceases, the principal ought to have power to remove those whom he can no longer trust with safety. If an officer shall be guilty of neglect or infidelity, there can be no doubt but he ought to be removed; yet there may be numerous causes for removal which do not amount to a crime. He may propose to do a mischief; but I believe the mere intention would not be cause of impeachment. He may lose the confidence of the people upon suspicion, in which case it would be improper to retain him in service; he ought to be removed at any time, when, instead of doing the greatest possible good, he is likely to do an injury to the public interest by being continued in the administration.

I presume gentlemen will generally admit that officers ought to be removed when they become obnoxious; but the question is, how shall this power be exercised? It will not, I apprehend, be contended, that all officers hold their offices during good behavior. If this be the case, it is a most singular Government. I believe there is not another in the universe that bears the least semblance to it in this particular; such a principle, I take it, is contrary to the nature of things. But the manner how to remove is the question. If the officer misbehaves, he can be removed by impeachment; but in this case is impeachment the only mode of removal? It would be found very inconvenient to have a man continued in office after being impeached, and when all confidence in him was suspended or lost. Would not the end of impeachment be defeated by this means? If Mr. Hastings, who was mentioned by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Vining) preserved his command in India, could he not defeat the impeachment now pending in Great Britain? If that doctrine obtains in America, we shall find impeachments come too late; while we are preparing the process, the mischief will be perpetrated, and the offender will escape. I apprehend it will be as frequently necessary to prevent crimes as to punish them; and it may often happen that the only prevention is by removal. The superintending power possessed by the President, will perhaps enable him to discover a base intention before it is ripe for execution. It may happen that the Treasurer may be disposed to betray the public chest to the enemy, and so injure the Government beyond the possibility of reparation; should the President be restrained from removing so dangerous an officer, until the slow formality of an impeachment was complied with, when the nature of the case rendered the application of a sudden and decisive remedy indispensable?

But it will, I say, be admitted, that an officer may be removed. The question then is, by whom? Some gentlemen say by the President alone; and others, by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate. By the advocates of the latter mode, it is alleged, that the constitution is in the way of the power of removal being by the President alone. If this is absolutely the case, there is an end to all further inquiry. But before we suffer this to be considered as an insuperable impediment, we ought to be clear that the constitution prohibits him the exercise of what, on a first view, appears to be a power incident to the executive branch of the Government. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) has made so many observations to evince the constitutionality of the clause, that it is unnecessary to go over the ground again. I shall therefore confine myself to answer only some remarks made by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith.) The powers of the President are defined in the constitution; but it is said, that he is not expressly authorized to remove from office. If the constitution is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves that it cannot be exercised by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident to Government; but not being distributed by the constitution, it will come before the Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be supplied by law.

Mr. Livermore.—I am for striking out this clause, Mr. Chairman, upon the principles of the constitution, from which we are not at liberty to deviate. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick,) calls the Minister of Foreign Affairs the creature of the law, and that very properly; because the law establishes the office, and has the power of creating him in what shape the Legislature pleases. This being the case, we have a right to create the office under such limitations and restrictions as we think proper, provided we can obtain the consent of the Senate; but it is very improper to draw as a conclusion, from having the power of giving birth to a creature, that we should therefore bring forth a monster, merely to show we had such power. I call that creature a monster that has not the proper limbs and features of its species. I think the creature we are forming is unnatural in its proportions. It has been often said, that the constitution declares the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint this officer. This, to be sure, is very true, and so is the conclusion which an honorable gentleman (Mr. White) from Virginia drew from it, that an officer must be discharged in the way he was appointed.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, this question depends upon a just construction of a short clause in the constitution. "The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States." Here is no difference with respect to the power of the President to make treaties and appoint officers, only it requires in the one case a larger majority to concur than in the other. I will not by any means suppose that gentlemen mean, when they argue in favor of removal by the President alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to the repeal of treaties; because, if they do, there will be little occasion for us to sit here. But let me ask these gentlemen, as there is no real or imaginary distinction between the appointment of ambassadors and ministers, or Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, whether they mean that the President should have the power of recalling or discarding ambassadors and military officers, for the words in the constitution are "all other officers," as well as he can remove your Secretary of Foreign Affairs. To be sure, they cannot extend it to the judges; because they are secured under a subsequent article, which declares they shall hold their offices during good behavior; they have an inheritance which they cannot be divested of, but on conviction of some crime. But I presume gentlemen mean to apply it to all those who have not an inheritance in their offices. In this case, it takes the whole power of the President and Senate to create an officer, but half the power can uncreate him. Surely a law passed by the whole Legislature cannot be repealed by one branch of it; so I conceive, in the case of appointments, it requires the same force to supersede an officer as to put him in office.

I acknowledge, that the clause relative to impeachment is for the benefit of the people; it is intended to enable their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice who is screened by the President; but I do not conceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that it by any means excludes the usual ways of superseding officers. It is said in the constitution, that the House shall have the power of choosing their own officers. We have chosen a clerk, and, I am satisfied, a very capable one; but will any gentleman contend we may not discharge him and choose another and another as often as we see cause? And so it is in every other instance; where they have the power to make, they have likewise the power to unmake. It will be said by gentlemen, that the power to make does not imply the power of unmaking; but I believe they will find very few exceptions in the United States.

Mr. Sherman.—I wish, Mr. Chairman, that the words may be left out of the bill, without giving up the question either way as to the propriety of the measure. Many of the honorable gentlemen who advocate this clause have labored to show that the President has, constitutionally, the power of removal. If this be a well-founded opinion, they ought not to let the words remain in the bill, because they are of such a nature as to imply that he had not the power before it was granted him by the law.

If gentlemen would consent to make a general law, declaring the proper mode of removal, I think we should acquire a greater degree of unanimity, which, on this occasion, must be better than carrying the question against a large minority.

The call for the question being now very general, it was put, shall the words "to be removable by the President," be struck out?

It was determined in the negative; being yeas 20, nays 34.

Wednesday, June 24.

Department of Foreign Affairs.

The engrossed bill "for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," was read the third time.

Mr. Sumter.—This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to the liberties of the people, that I cannot consent to let it pass without expressing my detestation of the principle it contains. I do it in this public manner, in order to fulfil what I think to be my duty to my country, and to discharge myself of any concern in a matter that I do not approve.

Mr. Page discovered the fate of the bill; he knew it must pass, but, nevertheless, he would decidedly give it his negative, and he hoped the respectable minority which he had the honor of voting with hitherto on the question of removability, would unite with him firmly in their opposition; and in order to record to their constituents the sentiments they maintained, he moved to take the question by the yeas and nays.

One-fifth of the members present joined in requiring the yeas and nays; whereupon they were taken, and are,

Yeas.—Messrs. Ames, Benson, Boudinot, Brown, Burke, Cadwalader, Carroll, Clymer, Contee, Fitzsimons, Gilman, Goodhue, Griffin, Hartley, Heister, Huger, Lawrence, Lee, Madison, Moore, Muhlenberg, Schureman, Scott, Sedgwick, Seney, Sinnickson, Sylvester, Trumbull, and Vining.—29.

Nays.—Messrs. Coles, Gerry, Grout, Hathorn, Huntington, Jackson, Leonard, Livermore, Matthews, Page, Parker, Partridge, Van Rensselaer, Sherman, Smith, of Maryland, Smith, of South Carolina, Stone, Sturgis, Sumter, Thatcher, Tucker, and White.—22.

So the question was determined in the affirmative, and the clerk directed to carry the bill to the Senate, and desire their concurrence.

Department of War.

The House then went into a committee on the bill for establishing the Department of War. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.

Mr. Benson proposed, with respect to the Secretary's being removable by the President, a similar amendment to that which had been obtained in the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary to load this bill with any words on that subject; he conceived the gentleman ought to be satisfied with having had the principle established in the other bill.

Mr. Page was of the same opinion, but further thought it argued a doubt, even in the mind of the majority, of the truth of their principles, and they wanted, by repetition, to force that upon the mind which was not impressed by right reason. The question on the amendment was taken without further debate, and carried in the affirmative, twenty-four to twenty-two.

Some other small alterations being made, the committee rose, and reported the bill as amended; which being partly considered, the House adjourned.