Thursday, June 25.
Department of War.
The House resumed the consideration of the amendments reported by the Committee of the Whole to the bill for establishing the War Department; which being agreed to, the bill was ordered to be engrossed.
Treasury Department.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for establishing the Treasury Department, Mr. Trumbull in the chair. The second clause being under consideration,
Mr. Page objected to the words making it the duty of the Secretary to "digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit;" observing that it might be well enough to enjoin upon him the duty of making out and preparing estimates; but to go any further would be a dangerous innovation upon the constitutional privilege of this House; it would create an undue influence within these walls, because members might be led, by the deference commonly paid to men of abilities, who give an opinion in a case they have thoroughly studied, to support the minister's plan, even against their own judgment. Nor would the mischief stop here; it would establish a precedent which might be extended, until we admitted all the ministers of the Government on the floor, to explain and support the plans they have digested and reported: thus laying a foundation for an aristocracy or a detestable monarchy.
Mr. Tucker.—The objection made by the gentleman near me is, undoubtedly, well founded. I think it proper to strike out all the words alluded to, because the following are sufficient to answer every valuable purpose, namely, "to prepare and report estimates of the public revenue and public expenditures." If we authorize him to prepare and report plans, it will create an interference of the executive with the legislative powers; it will abridge the particular privilege of this House; for the constitution expressly declares, that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. How can the business originate in this House, if we have it reported to us by the Minister of Finance? All the information that can be required, may be called for, without adopting a clause that may undermine the authority of this House, and the security of the people. The constitution has pointed out the proper method of communication between the executive and legislative departments; it is made the duty of the President to give, from time to time, information to Congress of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. If revenue plans are to be prepared and reported to Congress, here is the proper person to do it; he is responsible to the people for what he recommends, and will be more cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of responsibility is attached. Under this clause, you give the Secretary of the Treasury a right to obtrude upon you plans, not only undigested, but even improper to be taken up.
I hope the House is not already weary of executing and sustaining the powers vested in them by the constitution; and yet it would argue that we thought ourselves less adequate to determine than any individual what burthens our constituents are equal to bear. This is not answering the high expectations that were formed of our exertions for the general good, or of our vigilance in guarding our own and the people's rights. In short, Mr. Chairman, I can never agree to have money bills originated and forced upon this House by a man destitute of legislative authority, while the constitution gives such power solely to the House of Representatives; for this reason, I cheerfully second the motion for striking out the words.
Mr. Benson.—If the proposed amendment prevail, the bill will be nearly nugatory. The most important service that can be rendered by a gentleman who is at the head of the Department of Finance, is that of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue, and supporting public credit; and, for my part, I shall despair of ever seeing your revenue improved, or the national credit supported, unless the business is submitted into the hands of an able individual. I thought this subject was well understood, from the debate on the original motion. It was then insisted upon by an honorable gentleman, Mr. Gerry, who opposed the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury, that his important duties ought to be "to consider of the means of improving the revenue, and introducing economy into the expenditures, and to recommend general systems of revenue." Now, what more than this is required by the clause?
For my part, I am at a loss to see how the privilege of the House is infringed. Can any of the Secretary's plans be called bills? Will they be reported in such a form even? But admitting they were, they do not become bills, unless they are sanctioned by the House; much less is the danger that they will pass into laws without full examination by both Houses and the President. From this view of the subject, so far is the clause from appearing dangerous, that I believe it discovers itself to be not only perfectly safe, but essentially necessary; and without it is retained, the great object of the bill will be defeated.
Mr. Goodhue.—We certainly carry our dignity to the extreme, when we refuse to receive information from any but ourselves. It must be admitted, that the Secretary of the Treasury will, from the nature of his office, be better acquainted with the subject of improving the revenue or curtailing expense, than any other person; if he is thus capable of affording useful information, shall we reckon it hazardous to receive it? For my part, when I want to attain a particular object, I never shut my ears against information likely to enable me to secure it.
Mr. Page.—I can never consent to establish, by law, this interference of an executive officer in business of legislation; it may be well enough in an absolute monarchy, for a minister to come to a Parliament with his plans in his hands, and order them to be enregistered or enacted; but this practice does not obtain even in a limited monarchy like Britain. The minister there, who introduces his plans, must be a member of the House of Commons. The man would be treated with indignation, who should attempt in that country to bring his schemes before Parliament in any other way. Now, why we, in the free republic of the United States, should introduce such a novelty in legislation, I am at a loss to conceive. The constitution expressly delegates to us the business of the revenue; our constituents have confidence in us, because they suppose us acquainted with their circumstances; they expect, in consequence of this knowledge, we will not attempt to load them with injudicious or oppressive taxes; but they have no such security, if we are blindly to follow perhaps an unskilful minister. It does not answer me, Mr. Chairman, to say the House has a right of deliberating and deciding upon these plans, because we may be told, if you prune away this part or that part of the system, you destroy its efficiency. Therefore we must act with caution; we must either take or reject the whole; but if we reject the whole, sir, we are to depend upon ourselves for a substitute. How are we to form one? For my part, I should not despair, that the united wisdom of this House could procure one; but if we are to do this in the second instance, why cannot we attempt it in the first? I have no objection to our calling upon this or any other officer for information; but it is certainly improper to have him authorized by law to intrude upon us whatever he may think proper. I presume, sir, it is not supposed by the worthy gentleman from New York (Mr. Benson) that we shall be at a loss to conceive what information would be useful or proper for us to require, that we must have this officer to present us with what he chooses. When the President requires an opinion of him, the constitution demands him to give it; so under the law, let him send his opinion in here when it is asked for. If any further power is given him, it will come to this at last: we, like the Parliament of Paris, shall meet to register what he dictates. Either these reports of the Secretary are to have weight, or they are not; if they are to have weight, the House acts under a foreign influence, which is altogether improper and impolitic; if they are to have no weight, we impose a useless duty upon the officer, and such as is no mark of our wisdom.
Mr. Ames hoped the subject might be treated with candor and liberality; he supposed the objections were made on those principles, and therefore required a serious answer. The worthy gentleman who first expressed his aversion to the clause seemed to be apprehensive that the power of reporting plans by the Secretary would be improper, because it appeared to him to interfere with the legislative duty of the House, which the House ought not to relinquish.
Whenever it is a question, Mr. Speaker, said he, whether this House ought, or ought not, to establish offices to exercise a part of the power of either branch of the Government, there are two points which I take into consideration, in order to lead my mind to a just decision; first, whether the proposed disposition is useful; and, second, whether it can be safely guarded from abuse. Now I take it, sir, that the House by their order for bringing in a bill to establish the Treasury Department in this way, have determined the point of utility; or, have they erred in adopting that opinion, I will slightly make an inquiry, How does it tend to general utility? The Secretary is presumed to acquire the best knowledge of the subject of finance of any member of the community. Now, if this House is to act on the best knowledge of circumstances, it seems to follow logically that the House must obtain evidence from that officer; the best way of doing this will be publicly from the officer himself, by making it his duty to furnish us with it. It will not be denied, sir, that this officer will be better acquainted with his business than other people can be. It lies within his department to have a comprehensive view of the state of the public revenues and expenditures. He will, by his superintending power over the collection, be able to discover abuses, if any, in that department, and to form the most eligible plan to remedy or prevent the evil. From his information respecting money transactions, he may be able to point out the best mode for supporting the public credit; indeed, these seem to me to be the great objects of his appointment.
Mr. Livermore.—I shall vote for striking out the clause, because I conceive it essentially necessary so to do. The power of originating money bills within these walls, I look upon as a sacred deposit which we may neither violate nor divest ourselves of, although at first view it may appear of little importance who shall form a plan for the improvement of the revenue. Although every information tending to effect this great object may be gratefully received by this House, yet it behoves us to consider to what this clause may lead, and where it may terminate. Might it not, by construction, be said that the Secretary of the Treasury has the sole right of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue? This construction may appear a little extraordinary, but it is not more so than some constructions heretofore put upon other words; but however extraordinary it may be, it may take place, and I think the best way to avoid it, will be to leave out the words altogether. It is certainly improper that any person, not expressly intrusted by our constituents with the privilege of taking their money, should direct the quantum and the manner in which to take it.
Mr. Sedgwick.—If the principle prevails for curtailing this part of the Secretary's duty, we shall lose the advantages which the proposed system was intended to acquire. The improvement and management of the revenue is a subject that must be investigated by a man of abilities and indefatigable industry, if we mean to have our business advantageously done. If honorable gentlemen will for a moment consider the peculiar circumstances of this country, the means of information attainable by the individual members of this House, and compare them with the object they have to pursue, they will plainly perceive the necessity of calling to their aid the advantages resulting from an establishment like the one contemplated in the bill; if they weigh these circumstances carefully, their objections, I trust, will vanish.
Mr. Boudinot.—A proper jealousy for the liberty of the people is commendable in those who are appointed and sworn to be its faithful guardians; but when this spirit is carried so far as to lose sight of its object, and instead of leading to avoid, urges on to the precipice of ruin, we ought to be careful how we receive its impressions. So far is the present measure from being injurious to liberty, that it is consistent with the true interest and prosperity of the community. Are gentlemen apprehensive we shall be led by this officer to adopt plans we should otherwise reject? For my part, I have a better opinion of the penetration of the representation of the people than to dread any such visionary phantom.
Let us consider whether this power is essentially necessary to the Government. I take it to be conceded by the gentlemen, that it is absolutely so. They say they are willing to receive the information because it may be serviceable, but do not choose to have it communicated in this way. If the Secretary of the Treasury is the proper person to give the information, I can see no other mode of obtaining it that would be so useful. Do gentlemen mean that he shall give it piecemeal, by way of question and answer? This will tend more to mislead than to inform us. If we would judge upon any subject, it would be better to have it in one clear and complete view, than to inspect it by detachments; we should lose the great whole in the minutiæ, and, instead of a system, should present our constituents with a structure composed of discordant parts, counteracting and defeating the operation of each other's properties.
Mr. Hartley rose to express his sentiments, as he did on every occasion, with diffidence in his own abilities; but he looked upon the clause as both unsafe and inconsistent with the constitution. He thought the gentleman last up proved too much by his arguments; he proved that the House of Representatives was, in fact, unnecessary and useless; that one person could be a better judge of the means to improve and manage the revenue, and support the national credit, than the whole body of Congress. This kind of doctrine, Mr. Chairman, is indelicate in a republic, and strikes at the root of all legislation founded upon the great democratic principle of representation. It is true, mistakes, and very injurious ones, have been made on the subject of finance by some State Legislatures; but I would rather submit to this evil, than, by my voice, establish tenets subversive of the liberties of my country.
Notwithstanding what I have said, I am clearly of opinion it is necessary and useful to take measures for obtaining other information than what members can acquire in their characters as citizens; therefore, I am in favor of the present bill; but I think these words too strong. If it was modified so as to oblige him to have his plans ready for this House when they are asked for, I should be satisfied; but to establish a legal right in an officer to obtrude his sentiments perpetually on this body is disagreeable, and it is dangerous, inasmuch as the right is conveyed in words of doubtful import, and conveying powers exclusively vested by the constitution in this House.
Mr. Gerry expressed himself in favor of the object of the clause; that was, to get all the information possible for the purpose of improving the revenue, because he thought this information would be much required, if he judged from the load of public debt, and the present inability of the people to contribute largely towards its reduction.
He could not help observing, however, the great degree of importance they were giving this, and the other executive officers. If the doctrine of having prime and great ministers of state was once well established, he did not doubt but we should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other insignia of court favor and patronage. He wished gentlemen were aware of what consequences these things lead to, that they might exert a greater degree of caution.
The practice of Parliament in Britain is first to determine the sum they will grant, and then refer the subject to a Committee of Ways and Means: this might be a proper mode to be pursued in this House.
Do gentlemen, said he, consider the importance of the power they give the officer by the clause? Is it not part of our legislative authority? And does not the constitution expressly declare that the House solely shall exercise the power of originating revenue bills? Now, what is meant by reporting plans? It surely includes the idea of originating money bills, that is, a bill for improving the revenue, or, in other words, for bringing revenue into the treasury. For if he is to report plans, they ought to be reported in a proper form, and complete. This is giving an indirect voice in legislative business to an executive officer. If this be not the meaning of the clause, let gentlemen say what is, and to what extent it shall go; but if my construction is true, we are giving up the most essential privilege vested in us by the constitution. But what does this signify? The officer is responsible, and we are secure. This responsibility is made an argument in favor of every extension of power. I should be glad to understand the term. Gentlemen say the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for the information he gives the House—in what manner does this responsibility act? Suppose he reports a plan for improving the revenue, by a tax which he thinks judicious, and one that will be agreeable to the people of the United States; but he happens to be deceived in his opinion, that his tax is obnoxious, and excites a popular clamor against the minister—what is the advantage of his responsibility? Nothing. Few men deserve punishment for the error of opinion; all that could be done would be to repeal the law, and be more cautious in future in depending implicitly on the judgment of a man who had led us into an impolitic measure. Suppose the revenue should fall short of his estimate, is he responsible for the balance? This will be carrying the idea further than any Government hitherto has done. What then is the officer to be responsible for, which should induce the House to vest in him such extraordinary powers?
Mr. Lawrence.—I do not see consequences so dangerous as some gentlemen seem to apprehend; nor did they appear to them, I believe, when the subject was last under consideration. I recollect, Mr. Chairman, that some difficulty was made about establishing this office, because it was feared we could not find men of sufficient abilities to fill it. The duties were then properly deemed of a high and important nature, and enumerated as those proposed in the bill. It was supposed by an honorable gentleman, that the powers here expressed might be lodged in a board, because an individual was incompetent to undertake the whole. But now we have the wonderful sagacity of discovering, that if an individual is appointed, he will have capacity to form plans for improving the revenue in such an advantageous manner, as to supersede the necessity of having the representatives of the people consulted on the business: he will not only perform the usual duties of a Treasury Board, but be adequate to all purposes of legislation. I appeal to the gentleman for his usual candor on this occasion, which will assure us that he has wire-drawn his arguments.
Mr. Madison.—After hearing and weighing the various observations of gentlemen, I am at a loss to see where the danger lies. These are precisely the words used by the former Congress, on two occasions, one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which established the Revenue Board. The same power was also annexed to the office of Superintendent of Finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience or danger was experienced from the regulation; perhaps, if the power had been more fully and frequently exercised, it might have contributed more to the public good.
There is a small probability, though it is but small, that an officer may derive a weight from this circumstance, and have some degree of influence upon the deliberations of the Legislature; but compare the danger likely to result from this clause, with the danger and inconvenience of not having well-formed and digested plans, and we shall find infinitely more to apprehend. Inconsistent, unproductive, and expensive schemes, will be more injurious to our constituents than the undue influence which the well-digested plans of a well-informed officer can have. From a bad administration of the Government, more detriment will arise than from any other source. The want of information has occasioned much inconvenience and unnecessary burthens under some of the State Governments. Let it be our care to avoid those rocks and shoals in our political voyage, which have injured, and nearly proved fatal to, many of our cotemporary navigators.
A gentleman has asked, what is meant by responsibility? I will answer him. There will be responsibility in point of reputation, at least a responsibility to the public opinion with respect to his abilities; and supposing there is no personal responsibility, yet we know that men of talents and ability take as much care for the preservation of their reputation as any other species of property of which they are possessed. If a superior degree of wisdom is expected to be displayed by them, they take pains to give proofs that they possess it in the most unequivocal manner; this of itself will ensure us no small degree of exertion.
With respect to originating money bills, the House has the sole right to do it; but if the power of reporting plans can be construed to imply the power of originating revenue bills, the constitution is inconsistent with itself, in giving the President authority to recommend such measures as he may think expedient or necessary; but the construction is too unnatural to require further investigation.
I have admitted there is a small probability of a small inconvenience, but I do not think it any more an argument against the clause, than it would be an argument against having windows in a house, that it is possible the wind and the rain may get in through the crevices.
Mr. Stone was not afraid of giving the officer the power of reporting plans, because he was sure Congress would, in every case, decide upon their own judgment. A future Congress would not pay such a deference, even to their predecessors, as to follow in their footsteps, unless they were convinced of the good policy of their measures. He thought if the House wanted to make use of the information acquired by the Secretary, they ought to give him notice of their intention; consequently, something of this kind was proper in the bill.
Mr. Sherman thought the principle held up by the clause, was absolutely necessary to be received. It was of such a nature as to force itself upon them; therefore it was in vain to attempt to elude it by subterfuge. It was owing to the great abilities of a financier, that France had been able to make the exertions we were witnesses of a few years ago, without embarrassing the nation. This able man, after considerably improving the national revenue, was displaced; but such was the importance of the officer, that he has been restored again.
Mr. Baldwin.—I do not see what we are guarding against by striking out the words, unless gentlemen mean to go so far as to introduce a prohibitory clause, and declare that the Secretary of the Treasury shall be restrained from digesting or preparing plans for the improvement of the revenue. If there is any evil in having him attend to this branch of the business, I cannot see how to avoid it. Suppose the officer is a bad man, and there are others like him in this House, (for this must be what the gentlemen are afraid of;) and suppose he has prepared a scheme for peculation, which he hopes to get adopted by making dupes of the honest part; how are you to hinder it from being brought forward? Cannot his friends introduce it as their own, by making and seconding a motion for that purpose? Will you restrain him from having access to the members out of doors? And cannot he infuse his dangerous and specious arguments and information into them as well in the closet, as by a public and official communication? But, Mr. Chairman, can this House, or if it can, will it prevent any of their constituents from bringing before them plans for the relief of grievances or oppressions? Every individual of the community can bring business before us by petition, memorial, or remonstrance, provided it be done in a decent manner. How then do you propose to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury?
I think the clause is very well as it stands, and shall therefore be against the amendment.
Mr. Page's motion for striking out the clause being put and negatived:
The question on Mr. Fitzsimon's motion to amend the bill, by striking out the word report, and inserting prepare, was taken and carried by a great majority.
After which the House adjourned.