Wednesday, August 5.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for allowing compensation to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, and to the officers of both Houses, Mr. Boudinot in the chair.
Mr. Goodhue moved to strike out six dollars, as the pay of each member per diem.
Mr. Carroll inquired, if it was not out of order for the committee to alter principles, after they had been settled by the House.
Mr. Page wanted to know whether the gentleman meant to increase or diminish the sum, for he presumed it was not intended to be left a blank altogether; but he hoped the House would do neither. It had been settled, after mature deliberation, at six dollars; the House certainly thought that sum enough, and if it was more, that it would be too much; he was satisfied with this determination, and would adhere to it. Perhaps the gentleman meant to strike out the six dollars, in order to make a discrimination between the members of this House and the Senate; if so, he had better move to increase the compensation of the Senators, and here he would second him, because he thought their services required more.
He would once more mention his fears relative to a small sum. He dreaded the abuse of economy, and was suspicious that a parsimonious provision would throw the Government into the hands of bad men, by which the people might lose every thing they now held dear. He thought few would serve for a smaller sum than he would, and he was confident the allowance was as moderate as any man could expect. Gentlemen who come a great distance are put to considerable expense, and their domestic arrangements destroyed: instead of laying up money by their attendance here, it was almost certain they would spend part of their private estates.
If it is meant that the republic should be provided with good and wholesome laws, a proper provision should be made to bring into the councils of the Union such men as are qualified to secure them well; it is not to be expected that the spirit of patriotism will lead a man into the perpetual habit of making such exertions and sacrifices as are too often necessary in the hour of danger. No man ought to be called into the services of his country, and receive less than will defray the expenses he incurs by performing his duty. If he does, the public affairs, in the time of tranquillity, will get exclusively into the hands of nabobs and aspiring men, who will lay the foundation of aristocracy, and reduce their equals to the capacity of menial servants or slaves.
Mr. Sedgwick seconded the motion for striking out. He had endeavored to view this subject impartially, uninfluenced by any local considerations or circumstances; and under these impressions, he was led to believe, from all the information he had received, whether from abroad, or from an examination in his own mind, of the effects it would produce, that it would be expedient to establish the compensation at a lower sum. He really did not see any solid ground for the apprehensions which his worthy friend from Virginia (Mr. Page) had discovered. He had heard it often said, that if salaries and allowances to public officers were small, you would not be able to command the services of good men; but it was contradicted by the fact. He would instance the late appointments, and ask gentlemen whether they conceived better men could have been procured, if the compensation had been doubled? If it was fair to reason by experience and analogy, he should conclude there would be no difficulty in procuring good and respectable men, to serve in this House, at a less rate than six dollars per day. He had never yet observed that men of small property shrunk from the expense of serving in the councils of their country.
He thought the practice of the States was opposed to so high a compensation; many of the State Legislatures allowed their members a dollar and ten shillings a day, and yet they were served by good men.
He had been informed that it was thought by men of sense and intelligence, that although six dollars might not be too great an allowance for the services of the members of this House, yet, considering the present circumstances of the people, it would be good policy to reduce the same. He inclined to this opinion himself.
Impressed with these ideas, and knowing that it was generally the opinion of the people, that six dollars was more than a moderate compensation to the members of this House, he should support the motion for striking out with a view to reduce the sum.
Mr. Vining said, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Carroll) had taken the subject up in a proper point of view, by inquiring into the point of order. He begged gentlemen to consider the manner in which the subject had been discussed already—twice in the House, and twice in committee; every decision had been the same; why should the point so often determined be again agitated? It is contrary to all parliamentary proceeding, and the House will never know when principles are settled.
He was certain that six dollars was but a moderate compensation, if a member is to reside at the metropolis of the United States. He would admit that they could live for less, in some more central part of the country; but the gentlemen from the eastward should recollect that a small allowance would be an argument for removing Congress from this city, and when that time arrived, he should consent to a lower sum, but not till then.
Mr. Fitzsimons did not expect to hear the subject discussed again; he thought it unnecessary, because he believed every gentleman would decide more upon his own feelings than upon the arguments that could be adduced; he would, however, just remind the committee, that six dollars was about the average of what the members from the several States had under the late confederation.
Mr. Sedgwick.—According to the observation made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, it will be deemed insolent to reason on this subject: what I offered before, I brought forward with candor; but shall we be precluded from debate, because a subject has been once discussed? Sir, when I moved, some days ago, to reduce the pay of the members to five dollars, I was rather indifferent about it; but since then, I have been so well convinced of the necessity there is for such a measure, that I cannot decline pressing it once more upon the committee.
Mr. Stone thought the public mind would not be much influenced by the trifling difference between five and six dollars. They pay greater regard to the decisions of the House, on more important subjects. The gentleman from Massachusetts says his correspondents inform him, that the public mind is agitated on this subject; if we are to judge what is the state of the public mind from what our friends say, I should be apt to think the public mind quite unconcerned on the present question; for among all my correspondents, not one has deigned to notice it.
The question was now taken on striking out, and there appeared sixteen in favor of it, and thirty-five against it; so the motion passed in the negative.
Mr. Madison renewed the motion for making a difference in the pay of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, which was also lost.
Mr. Goodhue moved to strike out twelve dollars, the pay assigned the Speaker, and insert ten.
Mr. Page hoped his motion would share the fate of the two last; he was certain that twelve dollars was not more than a compensation for the Speaker's services; three times the sum would not induce him to accept such a situation.
Mr. Burke was against the motion, because he thought that twelve dollars was not a reward for the Speaker's labor. The Speaker of the House of Commons in England has an annual salary of £8000 sterling.
Mr. Carroll thought the Chair of the House of Representatives was one of the most important and dignified offices under the Government, and as such ought to be provided for.
This motion was lost by a great majority.
The committee rose and reported progress.
Thursday, August 6.
Compensation of Members.
The House then again went into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for allowing a compensation to the members of Congress; and after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported the bill as amended: then the House proceeded to consider the same.
Mr. Thatcher moved to insert five dollars instead of six, as the pay of the members.
Mr. Partridge observed, that money was more valuable now than it had been some years past; if, therefore, six dollars was the average of what the delegates received heretofore, five dollars was now equal to that sum. In short, he was convinced that six dollars was too much, and in justice to his constituents, and his own conscience, he would vote against it, and perpetuate his vote by calling the yeas and nays upon the question.
Mr. Gerry.—I was not present when this subject was last before the House, therefore I cannot say what was understood on this point; but I have seen some account of the debate in the papers, from which I am led to believe, that gentlemen view this matter in a very narrow point of light. It appears to me a question, in which one's popularity is more concerned than any thing else. Gentlemen perhaps suppose that by voting for five instead of six dollars, they will establish such a character for economy and patriotism as will redound to their honor; but I can easily conceive, that men of knowledge and sentiment, yes, our constituents in general, will discover, in a glaring light, the ruinous consequences of such a measure in a very short period. The difference of pay, as it now stands in the bill, and what my colleague has moved for, is one dollar a day, and on this important question the yeas and nays are to be called. For my part, I shall deliver my sentiments freely; I am willing to leave the question to the people to decide; I care not about the pay, and I can assure them I never wish to have a seat in this House again: but I wish to guard against the subversion of the public liberty—against the introduction of pensions—against exposing the Legislature to corruption.
I would have gentlemen consider the principles upon which they are to pay the President, their Judges and themselves; the constitution says, the members of this House and the Senate shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. The President shall receive, at stated times, a compensation for his services, neither to be increased nor diminished; the Judges shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, not to be diminished during their continuance in office; hence it appears that the provision for the three branches is to be made on the same principle, namely a compensation for their services. Now, though it is certainly a little embarrassing that we should have to estimate the value of our own services, yet we are bound to do it, and that upon a fixed principle. It has been said, that the Parliament of Britain receive no pay. This may be the case, but if they examine back, they will find that pay, of a mark per day, was regularly established for them. If we consider the difference of the value of money two or three centuries ago, we shall find this no inconsiderable allowance. But the policy of the British ministry has been, of late, to extend the influence of the Crown; the pay of members has dropped into disuse; but every one knows by what means a majority in Parliament is obtained and secured. Now, such is the extent of these means, that I venture to say, two important members of the House of Commons receive more per annum than the whole compensation given to the members of both Houses of Congress. I leave it to the world to judge, whether the people are likely to be better served by men who receive their wages of the Monarch, and who own themselves the servants of the Crown, or by those who are immediately paid by and dependent upon themselves. While Britain had funds enough to support this plan, they did tolerably well; but when the evil extended itself, and they feared they could no longer continue it without having recourse to other means, they bethought themselves of unconstitutional ones; they were desirous of obtaining a revenue out of this country, and placing upon our establishment men whom they could not provide for at home. This cause lost them America, and this cause will lose them every dependency, where they attempt to play the like game.
From this view, the importance of an independent Legislature may be seen. Will gentlemen then say, that to gratify a thoughtless regard for economy, they will risk the most invaluable part of the Government? If gentlemen say it is justice to their constituents, I am willing to appeal to their tribunal; let them know the reason upon which we act, and I will abide by their determination; but I am against being influenced by an apprehension that the people will disapprove our conduct. I am not afraid of being left out, even if it were thought a disgrace to be left out. I would risk that disgrace rather than agree to an establishment which I am convinced would end in the ruin of the liberties of my fellow-citizens. It would give my heart more satisfaction to fall the victim of popular resentment, than to establish my popularity at the expense of their dearest interest.
As I mentioned before, the principle upon which we fix our own pay must go through the other branches of the Government. Your President ought to be retrenched to 16 or 18,000 dollars; your judges must be kept poor; and I leave gentlemen to consider the happy consequences arising from a dependent and corrupt Judiciary. Your Legislature may be corrupt, and your Executive aspiring; but a firm, independent Judiciary will stop the course of devastation, at least it will shield individuals from rapine and injustice; but remove this security, and tyranny and oppression will rush forward as a flood, and overwhelm the country.
It has been said, that the proposed compensation bears no proportion to the pay of the members of the State Legislatures; let me ask, do members of the State Legislatures forego their business? Do they leave their State and relinquish their occupations? Does the lawyer neglect his client? Does the merchant forego his commerce, or the farmer his agriculture? No, sir, the short period they are in session, and the opportunity of being in the vicinity affords them of going home, even during their sitting, enables them to pursue their other avocations, while performing their duties in the Legislature. But are not gentlemen who come from the most distant parts of the Union, compelled to relinquish every thing to attend here? The representation from the States is so small, that a member can be ill spared at any time; his absence must give him pain, when even that absence is necessary, but cannot be often allowed. In short, I would have the allowance such, as to secure the services of men of abilities in every rank of life; or if that cannot be obtained, I would have all that part of the bill struck out, which relates to a compensation for the services of the members of this House.
Mr. Page said, if gentlemen were satisfied that five dollars per day was enough to compensate them and defray their expenses, because they resided in a part of the Union where every thing was to be procured so much cheaper, they might receive that sum and leave the residue in the Treasury; by this means they would demonstrate their love of economy and disinterestedness.
Mr. Vining thought gentlemen who were satisfied with four or five dollars, might move to amend the clause, so as to make it read "not exceeding six dollars per day," and then they might charge as much less as they deemed prudent.
Mr. Boudinot said, that whatever measures he supported, he did it upon principle, not from a desire of acquiring popularity; he was satisfied that six dollars per day was not extravagant compensation, but considering the situation of the country, and the delicacy of their own situation, he would vote for five dollars, and he thought it sufficient to secure men of ability. He asked the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Gerry) if he expected the paltry consideration of getting a dollar a day more, was to induce men of abilities and integrity to come forward and render their country their services?
He admitted that many gentlemen would find it difficult to bear all their expenses with five dollars a day; but the compensation could not be on a principle of discrimination, and therefore the House could not make particular provision for such gentlemen. Others might think a less sum sufficient, but no discrimination could here take place; it was therefore necessary to accommodate, and upon this principle he hoped the House would agree to five dollars per day; nor would this be any variation from the principle established by the committee who reported the bill. They had taken the pay of the delegates to the late Congress, and struck an average, which was found to be about five dollars and a half; they had reported six, but from the principles he had before mentioned, he thought it better to agree to five.
Mr. Gerry.—The gentleman from Jersey, who was last up, says he does not think six dollars per day more than sufficient; but that he will, from a principle of delicacy, vote for five. I am as great a friend to delicacy as any man, but I would not sacrifice essentials to a false delicacy. It seems, from such sentiments, as if we were afraid to administer a constitution which we are bound to administer. How are those sentiments reconcilable to the oath we have taken? The constitution requires that we shall, by law, compensate the services of the members of both Houses.
It has been said, that money is now more valuable than it was a few years since. I admit the fact, sir, but four dollars per day was better under the old plan of Government than six or eight under this, because a delegate was then engaged for the whole year, but now he is to attend at intervals. Some members were continued several years successively, and consequently found it more advantageous. But this mode of reasoning is fallacious; the question ought to be determined upon its own merits. But if gentlemen are for sacrificing justice and propriety to delicacy, or any other motive, let them come forward and agree to what I mentioned before; let them strike out all that relates to their own compensation; they are called upon by their own arguments to do this.
Mr. Sedgwick did not rise to speak to the question, but merely to reply to some observations that have fallen from the gentlemen who opposed the present motion, particularly his colleague. The want of candor and liberality might render gentlemen unpleasant in their situation; but the consequences arising from such causes, were often still more unpleasant. His colleague had insinuated, in a pointed manner, that the gentlemen who were in favor of a reduction, were actuated by motives not only improper and unworthy of a man of character, but such as appeared base to his mind. It was said, that those who proposed this reduction, did it merely to court popularity. Whether the gentleman, his colleague, who brought forward the motion to-day, sacrificed more at that shrine than his colleague who had opposed it, he left to those to determine who noticed their conduct; but he believed they could never be charged with such meanness. For his own part, if he had sacrificed in this way, as his conduct had always been consistent with his sentiments, it must have been known, and his character would long ere this have been blasted in the manner it would have justly deserved. If he had done it heretofore, he hoped the stigma would not be affixed upon him, for a conduct founded upon the solid and substantial reasons he had advanced when the subject was last before the House.
Mr. Boudinot.—The gentleman from Massachusetts makes me say, that six dollars a day is not too much. I said it was not extravagant, but more than I thought was proper upon due consideration of the circumstances of this country. This is still my opinion, and upon it I shall ground my vote. I believe no gentleman in this House regards his popularity, when set in competition with his duty; my conduct has ever been open, and I leave the world to judge from that what are my principles. I shall therefore take no further notice of what has been said on that subject, but conclude with wishing, for the honor of the House, and the dignity of the gentlemen, that all our debates may be conducted with candor and moderation.
Mr. Ames wished the call for the yeas and nays was withdrawn; because he thought they lost their usefulness by a too frequent use. He was in favor of the motion, but he did not wish to have his name entered on the minutes on that account.
Mr. Partridge said, it was well known he never courted popularity; he never sought a seat in this House, or any other public body; but he insisted upon his right, as a member, to call for the yeas and nays, when he thought the public interest might be benefited by it; however, as the bill was not to be finished to-day, he would waive that call.
The question was taken on Mr. Goodhue's motion, and passed in the negative, by a large majority.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed, and the House adjourned.
Thursday, August 13.
Amendments to the Constitution.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. Boudinot in the chair, and took the amendments under consideration. The first article ran thus: "In the introductory paragraph of the constitution, before the words 'We the people,' add 'Government being intended for the benefit of the people, and the rightful establishment thereof being derived from their authority alone.'"
Mr. Sherman.—I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is not the proper mode of amending the constitution. We ought not to interweave our propositions into the work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric. We might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron, and clay, as to incorporate such heterogeneous articles; the one contradictory to the other. Its absurdity will be discovered by comparing it with a law. Would any legislature endeavor to introduce into a former act a subsequent amendment, and let them stand so connected? When an alteration is made in an act, it is done by way of supplement; the latter act always repealing the former in every specified case of difference.
Besides this, sir, it is questionable whether we have the right to propose amendments in this way. The constitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire. But the amendments will be the act of the State Governments. Again, all the authority we possess is derived from that instrument; if we mean to destroy the whole, and establish a new constitution, we remove the basis on which we mean to build. For these reasons, I will move to strike out that paragraph and substitute another.
The paragraph proposed was to the following effect:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the following articles he proposed as amendments to the constitution, and when ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures shall become valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the same.
Under this title, the amendments might come in nearly as stated in the report, only varying the phraseology so as to accommodate them to a supplementary form.
Mr. Madison.—Form, sir, is always of less importance than the substance; but on this occasion, I admit that form is of some consequence, and it will be well for the House to pursue that which, upon reflection, shall appear to be the most eligible. Now it appears to me, that there is a neatness and propriety in incorporating the amendments into the constitution itself; in that case the system will remain uniform and entire; it will certainly be more simple, when the amendments are interwoven into those parts to which they naturally belong, than it will if they consist of separate and distinct parts. We shall then be able to determine its meaning without references or comparison; whereas, if they are supplementary, its meaning can only be ascertained by a comparison of the two instruments, which will be a very considerable embarrassment. It will be difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument the amendments particularly refer; they will create unfavorable comparisons; whereas, if they are placed upon the footing here proposed, they will stand upon as good foundation as the original work.
Nor is it so uncommon a thing as gentlemen suppose; systematic men frequently take up the whole law, and, with its amendments and alterations, reduce it into one act. I am not, however, very solicitous about the form, provided the business is but well completed.
Mr. Smith did not think the amendment proposed by the honorable gentleman from Connecticut was compatible with the constitution, which declared, that the amendments recommended by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, should be part of this constitution; in which case it would form one complete system; but according to the idea of the amendment, the instrument is to have five or six suits of improvements. Such a mode seems more calculated to embarrass the people than any thing else, while nothing in his opinion was a juster cause of complaint than the difficulties of knowing the law, arising from legislative obscurities that might easily be avoided. He said, that it had certainly been the custom in several of the State Governments, to amend their laws by way of supplement. But South Carolina had been an instance of the contrary practice, in revising the old code; instead of making acts in addition to acts, which is always attended with perplexity, she has incorporated them, and brought them forward as a complete system, repealing the old. This is what he understood was intended to be done by the committee; the present copy of the constitution was to be done away, and a new one substituted in its stead.
Mr. Livermore was clearly of opinion, that whatever amendments were made to the constitution, they ought to stand separate from the original instrument. We have no right, said he, to alter a clause, any otherwise than by a new proposition. We have well-established precedents for such a mode of procedure in the practice of the British Parliament, and the State Legislatures throughout America. I do not mean, however, to assert that there has been no instance of a repeal of the whole law on enacting another; but this has generally taken place on account of the complexity of the original, with its supplements. Were we a mere legislative body, no doubt it might be warrantable in us to pursue a similar method; but it is questionable whether it is possible for us, consistent with the oath we have taken, to attempt a repeal of the constitution of the United States, by making a new one to substitute in its place; the reason of this is grounded on a very simple consideration. It is by virtue of the present constitution, I presume, that we attempt to make another; now, if we proceed to the repeal of this, I cannot see upon what authority we shall erect another; if we destroy the base, the superstructure falls of course. At some future day it may be asked upon what authority we proceeded to raise and appropriate public moneys. We suppose we do it in virtue of the present constitution; but it may be doubted whether we have a right to exercise any of its authorities while it is suspended, as it will certainly be from the time that two-thirds of both Houses have agreed to submit it to the State Legislatures; so that, unless we mean to destroy the whole constitution, we ought to be careful how we attempt to amend it in the way proposed by the committee. From hence, I presume it will be more prudent to adopt the mode proposed by the gentleman from Connecticut, than it will be to risk the destruction of the whole by proposing amendments in the manner recommended by the committee.
Mr. Vining disliked a supplementary form, and said it was a bad reason to urge the practice of former ages, when there was a more convenient method of doing the business at hand. He had seen an act entitled an act to amend a supplement to an act entitled an act for altering part of an act entitled an act for certain purposes therein mentioned. If gentlemen were disposed to run into such jargon in amending and altering the constitution, he could not help it; but he trusted they would adopt a plainness and simplicity of style on this and every other occasion, which should be easily understood. If the mode proposed by the gentleman from Connecticut was adopted, the system would be distorted, and, like a careless written letter, have more attached to it in a postscript than was contained in the original composition.
The constitution being a great and important work, ought all to be brought into one view, and made as intelligible as possible.
Mr. Clymer was of opinion with the gentleman from Connecticut, that the amendments ought not to be incorporated in the body of the work, which he hoped would remain a monument to justify those who made it; by a comparison, the world would discover the perfection of the original, and the superfluity of the amendments. He made this distinction, because he did not conceive any of the amendments essential, but as they were solicited by his fellow-citizens, and for that reason they were acquiesced in by others; he therefore wished the motion for throwing them into a supplementary form might be carried.
Mr. Stone.—It is not a matter of much consequence, with respect to the preservation of the original instrument, whether the amendments are incorporated or made distinct; because the records will always show the original form in which it stood. But in my opinion, we ought to mark its progress with truth in every step we take. If the amendments are incorporated in the body of the work, it will appear, unless we refer to the archives of Congress, that George Washington, and the other worthy characters who composed the convention, signed an instrument which they never had in contemplation. The one to which he affixed his signature purports to be adopted by the unanimous consent of the delegates from every State there assembled. Now if we incorporate these amendments, we must undoubtedly go further, and say that the constitution so formed was defective, and had need of alteration; we therefore purpose to repeal the old and substitute a new one in its place. From this consideration alone, I think we ought not to pursue the line of conduct drawn for us by the committee. This perhaps is not the last amendment the constitution may receive; we ought therefore to be careful how we set a precedent which, in dangerous and turbulent times, may unhinge the whole.
Mr. Livermore.—The mode adopted by the committee might be very proper, provided Congress had the forming of a constitution in contemplation; then they, or an individual member, might propose to strike out a clause and insert another, as is done with respect to article 3, section 2. But certainly no gentleman acquainted with legislative business would pretend to alter and amend, in this manner, a law already passed. He was convinced it could not be done properly in any other way than by the one proposed by the gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Gerry asked, if the mode could make any possible difference, provided the sanction was the same; or whether it would operate differently in any one instance? If it will not, we are disputing about form, and the question will turn on the expediency. Now one gentleman tells you, that he is so attached to this instrument, that he is unwilling to lose any part of it; therefore, to gratify him, we may throw it into a supplementary form. But let me ask, will not this as effectually destroy some parts, as if the correction had been made by way of incorporation? or will posterity have a more favorable opinion of the original, because it has been amended by distinct acts? For my part, I cannot see what advantage can accrue from adopting the motion of the honorable gentleman from Connecticut, unless it be to give every one the trouble of erasing out of his copy of the constitution certain words and sentences, and inserting others. But, perhaps, in our great veneration for the original composition, we may go further, and pass an act to prohibit these interpolations, as it may injure the text.
It is said that the present form of the amendments is contrary to the 5th article. I will not undertake to define the extent of the word amendment, as it stands in the fifth article; but I suppose if we proposed to change the division of the powers given to the three branches of the Government, and that proposition is accepted and ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures, it will become as valid, to all intents and purposes, as any part of the constitution; but if it is the opinion of gentlemen that the original is to be kept sacred, amendments will be of no use, and had better be omitted; whereas, on the other hand, if they are to be received as equal in authority we shall have five or six constitutions, perhaps differing in material points from each other, but all equally valid; so that they may require a man of science to determine what is or is not the constitution. This will certainly be attended with great inconvenience, as the several States are bound not to make laws contradictory thereto, and all officers are sworn to support it, without knowing precisely what it is.
Mr. Stone asked the gentleman last up, how he meant to have the amendments incorporated? Was it intended to have the constitution republished, and the alterations inserted in their proper places? He did not see how it was practicable to propose amendments, without making out a new constitution, in the manner brought forward by the committee.
Mr. Lawrence could not conceive how gentlemen meant to engraft the amendments into the constitution. The original one, executed by the convention at Philadelphia, was lodged in the archives of the late Congress; it was impossible for this House to take, and correct, and interpolate that without making it speak a different language: this would be supposing several things which never were contemplated. But what would become of the acts of Congress? They will certainly be vitiated, unless they are provided for by an additional clause in the constitution.
Mr. Benson said, that this question had been agitated in the select committee, and determined in favor of the form in which it was reported; he believed this decision was founded in a great degree upon the recommendation of the State conventions, which had proposed amendments in this very form. This pointed out the mode most agreeable to the people of America, and therefore the one most eligible for Congress to pursue; it will likewise be the most convenient way. Suppose the amendments ratified by the several States; Congress may order a number of copies to be printed, into which the alterations will be inserted, and the work stand perfect and entire.
Mr. Madison.—The gentleman last up has left me but one remark to add, and that is, if we adopt the amendment, we shall so far unhinge the business, as to occasion alterations in every article and clause of the report.
Mr. Hartley hoped the committee would not agree to the alteration, because it would perplex the business. He wished the propositions to be simple and entire, that the State Legislatures might decide without hesitation, and every man know what was the ground on which he rested his political welfare. Besides, the consequent changes which the motion would induce, were such as, he feared, would take up some days, if not weeks; and the time of the House was too precious to be squandered away in discussing mere matter of form.
Mr. Jackson.—I do not like to differ with gentlemen about form; but as so much has been said, I wish to give my opinion; it is this: that the original constitution ought to remain inviolate, and not be patched up, from time to time, with various stuffs resembling Joseph's coat of many colors.
Some gentlemen talk of repealing the present constitution, and adopting an improved one. If we have this power, we may go on from year to year, making new ones; and in this way, we shall render the basis of the superstructure the most fluctuating thing imaginable, and the people will never know what the constitution is. As for the alteration proposed by the committee, to prefix before "We the people" certain dogmas, I cannot agree to it; the words, as they now stand, speak as much as it is possible to speak; it is a practical recognition of the right of the people to ordain and establish Governments, and is more expressive than any other mere paper declaration.
But why will gentlemen contend for incorporating amendments into the constitution? They say, that it is necessary for the people to have the whole before them in one view. Have they precedent for this assertion? Look at the constitution of Great Britain; is that all contained in one instrument? It is well known, that magna charta was extorted by the barons from King John some centuries ago. Has that been altered since by the incorporation of amendments? Or does it speak the same language now, as it did at the time it was obtained? Sir, it is not altered a tittle from its original form. Yet there have been many amendments and improvements in the constitution of Britain since that period. In the subsequent reign of his son, the great charters were confirmed with some supplemental acts. Is the habeas corpus act, or the statute De Tallagio non concedendo incorporated in magna charta? And yet there is not an Englishman but would spill the last drop of his blood in their defence; it is these, with some other acts of Parliament and magna charta, that form the basis of English liberty. We have seen amendments to their constitution during the present reign, by establishing the independence of the judges, who are hereafter to be appointed during good behavior; formerly they were at the pleasure of the Crown. But was this done by striking out and inserting other words in the great charter? No, sir, the constitution is composed of many distinct acts; but an Englishman would be ashamed to own that, on this account, he could not ascertain his own privileges or the authority of the Government.
The constitution of the Union has been ratified and established by the people; let their act remain inviolable; if any thing we can do has a tendency to improve it, let it be done, but without mutilating and defacing the original.
Mr. Sherman.—If I had looked upon this question as mere matter of form, I should not have brought it forward or troubled the committee with such a lengthy discussion. But, sir, I contend that amendments made in the way proposed by the committee are void. No gentleman ever knew an addition and alteration introduced into an existing law, and that any part of such law was left in force; but if it was improved or altered by a supplemental act, the original retained all its validity and importance, in every case where the two were not incompatible. But if these observations alone should be thought insufficient to support my motion, I would desire gentlemen to consider the authorities upon which the two constitutions are to stand. The original was established by the people at large, by conventions chosen by them for the express purpose. The preamble to the constitution declares the act: but will it be a truth in ratifying the next constitution, which is to be done perhaps by the State Legislatures, and not conventions chosen for the purpose? Will gentlemen say it is "We the people" in this case? Certainly they cannot; for, by the present constitution, we, nor all the Legislatures in the Union together, do not possess the power of repealing it. All that is granted us by the 5th article is, that whenever we shall think it necessary, we may propose amendments to the constitution; not that we may propose to repeal the old, and substitute a new one.
Gentlemen say, it would be convenient to have it in one instrument, that people might see the whole at once; for my part, I view no difficulty on this point. The amendments reported are a declaration of rights; the people are secure in them, whether we declare them or not; the last amendment but one provides that the three branches of Government shall each exercise its own rights. This is well secured already; and, in short, I do not see that they lessen the force of any article in the constitution; if so, there can be little more difficulty in comprehending them whether they are combined in one, or stand distinct instruments.
Mr. Smith read extracts from the amendments proposed by several of the State conventions at the time they ratified the constitution, from which, he said, it appeared that they were generally of opinion that the phraseology of the constitution ought to be altered; nor would this mode of proceeding repeal any part of the constitution but such as it touched, the remainder will be in force during the time of considering it and ever after.
As to the observations made by the honorable gentleman from Georgia, respecting the amendments made to the constitution of Great Britain, they did not apply; the cases were nothing like similar, and, consequently, could not be drawn into precedent. The constitution of Britain is neither the magna charta of John, nor the habeas corpus act, nor all the charters put together; it is what the Parliament wills. It is true, there are rights granted to the subject that cannot be resumed; but the constitution, or form of government, may be altered by the authority of Parliament, whose power is absolute without control.
Mr. Sherman.—The gentlemen who oppose the motion say we contend for matter of form; they think it nothing more. Now we say we contend for substance, and therefore cannot agree to amendments in this way. If they are so desirous of having the business completed, they had better sacrifice what they consider but a matter of indifference to gentlemen, to go more unanimously along with them in altering the constitution.
The question on Mr. Sherman's motion was now put and lost.[29]