Friday, February 10.
Naval Policy: Purchase of a Site for a Navy Yard.
The next resolution which came under consideration, was that proposing the purchase of a site for a navy yard.
Mr. Parker doubted, from the spirit which seemed to be shown on this occasion, that this resolution would not pass.
Mr. W. Smith hoped this would be agreed to. Whatever gentlemen may now think or determine on, it was probable we should at some time become a naval power; and even with the most distant prospect of that, it would show economy to prepare for it. He said it never could be too soon to begin the business, and the most effectual method of procuring live oak, and preserving it, was to take the earliest means to obtain, and secure it, when obtained, for seasonable use. He read an extract from the Secretary of War's report in support of the plan.
Mr. Coit said he was alarmed at the expense of this business. He saw in the report the salaries of two persons already at Norfolk and Portsmouth, for taking care of the timber, at 500 dollars each, 1,000 dollars. If they were to pay at this rate for overlooking the timber for one ship, what might they expect would be the expense of a navy yard?
Mr. Parker said, the persons to whom these salaries were paid, took care of the timber at Norfolk and Portsmouth. It was necessary that some person should look after it, or it should be disposed of; but, in case the present resolution was agreed to, there would be no occasion in future to pay these persons, as all the timber and other materials would be stored in the navy yard. He said he had received an estimate from the War Office of the expense which would be likely to attend the establishment of a navy yard. The expense of 100 acres of land, and all the necessary buildings, was estimated at 37,210 dollars.
Mr. Nicholas said, after having squandered so much money in getting timber for these vessels, he thought some change of habit should take place before they embarked largely in this matter. They had given twice or thrice as much as the timber was worth, yet they were now called upon to go on in the same course. It was not a time for going into this business. If such a thing was even proper, two or three years could make but little difference, and there could be little doubt but every thing could then be bought at half price. This, however, was not his principal objection. It was this: he did not want to see any such establishment; a navy would never do any real good to this country, but would increase the unhappiness of it. It would require large sums of money to support it; its benefits were doubtful, and it might be of very mischievous consequence to the nation.
Mr. Swanwick said he entirely agreed with the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) that there was a necessity for some change of habit; they appeared to be getting that change at present, and whatever their habits were at present, he supposed they would come right at last. Whatever might be their opinion of the necessity of a naval force, the European nations, he believed, would convince them of the necessity of it, if they only gave them time enough.
It was an extraordinary thing to look at the progress of economy in that House with respect to these frigates. In the first place, six frigates were necessary; they were afterwards reduced to three, and because an officer was appointed to take care of the timber left on hand, a gentleman from Connecticut wondered that $500 should be so employed. A motion had been made to confine the Executive to finish the hulls of the ships only. This would have been a strange economy. Indeed, such attempts were made at economy on this business as were never introduced upon any other. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) had observed there was no use for ships at all. If the House were of that opinion, such a resolution had better at once be come to; but the strange sort of hesitating conduct which was adopted, exceeded all that he had heard of in legislation.
Had gentlemen who declared these vessels to be of no use, contemplated the situation of this country; that it depended wholly upon commerce for revenue; that that commerce was now put in jeopardy, and that no substitute had been found for the revenue thence arising? And would not all this hesitation, whenever the subject of a navy came under consideration, tempt European nations to continue their unjust depredations upon our property at sea? It certainly would.
But even gentlemen who wished to confine themselves merely to the finishing of the vessels at present, would not surely think it improper for them to establish a navy yard, and to secure timber for future use. Did those gentlemen consider what it was to deprive the country of a rich mine of ship timber? If they hesitated on this subject, they surely did not.
What had been said by the gentleman from Maryland on the subject of Algiers, was very just; and the want of a navy power would have a similar effect upon all our negotiations, as foreign nations would rise or fall in their demands, according to our power at sea. The money thrown away upon Algiers to purchase peace, would have been much better employed in building ships; for if we had a few ships, that power would not have committed the depredations upon us which she had done. And whether the money was paid to Algiers or expended in building ships, it was in both cases for the same purpose, viz: the protection of commerce. But there was this great difference between the two expenditures. In the one case, the dollars were shipped off to a foreign country, and in the other, they were paid to our own citizens. The iron used was from our own mines; the guns from our own manufactories; the hemp, and every other material, were of our own growth and manufacture, so that the money went into the hands of our artisans, manufacturers, and farmers. And, therefore, though the frigates had cost a great deal of money, it was some modification of the expense to consider that the money was gone into the pockets of our own citizens. But, he asked if the loss we sustained for the want of a naval power could be estimated? He said it could not. We not only lost our property, but our seamen, and they were not only lost to us, but were probably in the service of those countries which were committing depredations upon us. The loss of property might be recovered; but a hardy race of seamen once lost, could not be recovered.
What an affecting spectacle had we the other day of sixty of these unfortunate men returning from Algerine slavery? They were received into the arms of their country with all the sympathy which the occasion called for; but could gentlemen help feeling, at the same time, for the impotence of our Government, when they recollected that the liberty of these men had been purchased at a very high price from a petty despot? And shall we continue to go on thus, and encourage the Barbary powers to enslave our seamen by showing so great a reluctance to enter upon any measure which might afford a defence against their depredations?
Mr. Murray believed it would be a very prudent measure to secure the ship-timber in question; for if we did not, it was probable some foreign nation would get possession of it. He did not know whether the laws of Georgia would permit foreigners to purchase the land upon which this timber grew; but if they would not, it would be no difficult thing to get possession of it through the medium of an individual. If this country were to become a maritime power, and no one who considered the subject for a moment could doubt it, this was too rich a mine to be neglected. What had been said about adopting the Chinese policy, might serve to amuse them; but when they looked at the commerce of the country, it was impossible they should not see the necessity of a naval force to protect that commerce against the depredations of any nation who chose to attack it. Indeed, it was come to this, they must either provide for the protection of commerce, or deny the utility of it, and give it up altogether.
But the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) was afraid if these frigates were sent out to sea, they would involve us in a war. What! said he, can it be supposed that three frigates would give us that ridiculous kind of spirit which would induce us at any rate to go to war? This would be a species of insanity which he did not think it was probable we should fall into. No: these vessels would serve to protect our coasts, and preserve our commerce from attacks, at least, within a small distance from our own ports. How far they might serve to render us of some importance in the eyes of foreign nations, he could not tell; but he believed that three frigates would have a greater effect in this respect with us, than ten to Sweden, Denmark, or Holland. We lie, said he, near the high road of commerce to the West Indies, and these three frigates, backed by national wealth, would show a disposition to become a maritime power, and would have their effect upon European nations.
Besides, Mr. M. said, these vessels would be the foundation of a future Navy. He was for shaping our means of defence to the means of offence employed against us by other nations; for until the European nations became wise enough to cease from war, it was necessary to provide means of defence against their attacks. He should, therefore, always give his support to every means of national defence. He wished our nation to stand upon a respectable footing as a nation, since the most magnanimous conduct was no security against the attacks of foreign powers. He should, therefore, be in favor of a naval yard, and of providing ship-timber for future use.
Mr. Harper said, the two resolutions respecting a naval yard and a provision for timber should come under consideration together; because, if no provision was made for purchasing timber, a naval yard would be of no use.
This question, he said, was capable of being considered under two points of view: the one whether the measure was proper; the other, if the measure was proper, whether it would not be better postponed for the present. Both of these points required a considerable degree of attention. There was a variety of considerations on both sides of the question, and it remained for them to determine for the best.
Was it proper for this country, he asked, to turn its attention towards marine strength? Did not our situation, and the circumstances in which we stand, compel us to turn our attention to this object? He thought they did, and for one or two reasons which he would submit to the consideration of the committee.
It appeared to him out of the question that any kind of commerce should be continued without some ships-of-war to protect it. This was the dilemma in which we were placed. It was said by some gentlemen that this dilemma might be avoided, by suffering commerce to go on unprotected, and subject it to all risks; and that even then, there would be sufficient benefit arising from it, to induce its continuance. This he did not believe. If persons engaged in commerce could have no dependence upon the protection of Government, a very few years, perhaps a few months more, might convince them that the business could not and ought not to be continued.
The present Government, he said, had only been in existence eight years, and for nearly four of them commerce had been subject to every kind of depredation. The usual calculation with respect to Europe was, that during every ten years, it would be subject to war, and that these wars would have a duration of from six to eight years, in the course of which our property and citizens would be subject to the same violations and injuries which they had for the last four years experienced, if no provision was made, by a naval power, to prevent it.
Brought to this dilemma, said he, which side will you take? Will you give up commerce, or build a Navy to protect it? Besides, he said, a great part of our citizens who had been trained up in commerce from their infancy, could not be driven from that kind of employment to which they had always been accustomed. They could not be induced, like the Chinese, to stay at home; they would be engaged in commerce, their favorite pursuit. If they, then, were compelled to protect commerce, he asked if there was any other way of doing it than by a Navy? He believed not. Treaties afford a feeble and very inadequate protection; they were broken whenever it suited the interest of a nation to break them. Letters of marque might afford some protection; but this would operate as a heavier tax upon the people than even the support of the Navy. The money which a merchant expended in this way would eventually come upon the people in the price which they would be obliged to pay for their merchandise, and the means would be very inadequate to protection.
In China and the East Indies, Mr. H. said, the inhabitants could shut themselves up within their own territory, and avoid any intercourse with foreign nations. In countries so far removed from Europe, as to prevent any one nation from making a monopoly, of its trade, this policy might exist. But could America lay up her ships, and say she would open her ports to all nations? No; that very instant you give up your trade to that nation which has the greatest power at sea; for she will immediately block up your ports, and oblige you to trade with them only. In order, therefore, to trade with all nations, we must be the carriers of our own produce, for other nations would not leave us at liberty to do so. The strongest power would say to the others, you shall not trade with these people, you shall do so and so, or we will go to war with you. You must, therefore, said he, protect your own trade.
Will these resolutions, then, said he, if adopted, tend to this point? He believed they would. To provide a dock-yard, and to take care of a supply of timber suitable for the purpose of ship-building, were very essential steps. Much expense, he said, would be saved in carrying on the building of several ships together in one yard, instead of having them scattered in different parts of the Union. Timber might also be laid up to season in this yard, so as always to be ready for use; for, he believed that much of the delay which had attended the building of the ships now on the stocks, had been owing to the difficulty which had attended the procuring of proper timber. Besides, Mr. H. said, its being known to foreign nations, that you had provided a dock-yard, would have some weight; it would at least have the appearance of an intention of building a Navy.
With respect to the purchasing of land clothed with live oak timber, he thought it a very desirable measure. It was well known that this timber was confined to a few spots—a few sea islands on the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, and some small strips along the seashore; and in each of these places there were only a few trees of a sufficient size for building large ships. The land upon which these trees grew, since the cultivation of cotton had been introduced into those parts, was become valuable land for that purpose. This induced the people to cut down the timber and burn it, for the sake of getting the land, and there was no way of arresting this practice, but by securing the land; and being of so good a quality, when the trees were cut down, it would probably sell for a greater price than was originally given for it.
Mr. Gallatin saw no connection between the two resolutions, which the gentleman who had just sat down thought it necessary to connect together. The last resolution proposed the purchase of land clothed with live oak; the present proposed the appropriation of a sum of money for purchasing the site of a naval yard, &c., as a foundation for a Navy. The last went only to the securing of timber for the building of a Navy, if at any day it should be thought necessary; he believed he should vote for the last, but certainly against the first.
They had been told that no commerce could exist without protection, and that that protection must be a Navy; from whence it would follow, that if a Navy was necessary to protect commerce, it must be a Navy competent to vie with the navies of other nations. He would here ask, how gentlemen drew their conclusion, that commerce could not exist without the protection of a Navy. He wished they would show from the example of any nation in Europe, or from our own example, that commerce and navies had gone hand in hand. There was no nation, except Great Britain, said he, whose Navy had any connection with commerce. No nation, except England and Holland, had more to do with commerce than this country, and yet we had no Navy; and though for the four last years this commerce had been subject to continual depredations, it was not exceeded by any nation, except the two he had named. And if they looked to Europe, they would find there was no connection between navies and commerce. Russia and Sweden had considerable navies, but little commerce; whilst Holland, whose Navy was by no means large, ranked next to England with respect to commerce. Hamburg, he said, was one of the first commercial States in Europe, yet she had no Navy. Navies, he said, were the instruments of power, more calculated to annoy the trade of other nations than to protect that of the nation to which they belong.
But there was another position which he should take in opposition to gentlemen who supported the creation of a Navy, viz: that however useful or desirable a Navy might be, this country was not equal to the support of one. We might have two or three frigates indeed, but, when he said we could not support a Navy, he meant to say we could not support such a Navy as should claim respect, in the sense which those gentlemen spoke of it; such as being an object of terror to foreign nations. If they calculated what the three frigates had cost, considered the scanty manner in which this country was peopled, our inability to raise any very large revenue, and the high price of labor, the truth of this assertion would appear evident.
Again, if such a Navy were created, how was it to be manned? He wished gentlemen to point out any mode in which a Navy could be manned in this country without having recourse to the abominable practice of impressment. If the nations of Europe found it impossible to man their fleets without having recourse to these violent means, he believed it would be impossible, without breaking down those barriers which secured the liberty of every citizen, to man a Navy in this country.
Perhaps he might be asked, if we were, then, to be left without protection? He thought there were means of protection which arose from our peculiar situation, and that we ought not to borrow institutions from other nations for which we were not fit. If our commerce had increased, notwithstanding its want of protection; if we had a greater number of seamen than any other nation, except England, this, he thought, pointed out the way in which commerce ought to be protected. The fact was, that our only mode of warfare against European nations at sea, was by putting our seamen on board privateers, and covering the sea with them; these would annoy their trade, and distress them more than any other mode of defence we could adopt.[10]