Thursday, January 18.
The Speaker laid before the House a communication from the Secretary of War, enclosing an estimate of the appropriations necessary for holding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians, which was in substance as follows:
| For three commissioners, ninety days, at eight dollars per day | $2,160 |
| Incidental expenses of do. | 360 |
| Secretary, at four dollars per day | 360 |
| Rations of two thousand Indians | 15,000 |
| Presents to the Indians | 5,000 |
| Stores for the commissioners | 2,000 |
| Incidental expenses | 1,200 |
| ——— | |
| 25,880 | |
| ====== |
This statement was referred to the Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the former Message of the President on this subject.
Persons Imprisoned for Debt.
The following Message, with the papers to which they refer, was received from the President of the United States:
Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:
A representation has been made to me, by the Judge of the Pennsylvania district of the United States, of certain inconveniences and disagreeable circumstances, which have occurred in the execution of the law passed on the 28th day of May, 1786, entitled "An act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt," as well as of certain doubts which have been raised concerning its construction; this representation, together with a report of the Attorney General on the same subject, I now transmit to Congress, for their consideration, that if any amendments or explanations of that law may be thought advisable, they may be adopted.
JOHN ADAMS.
United States, January 18, 1798.
This Message, with the papers accompanying it, was referred to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report on the petition of William Bell.
Diplomatic Intercourse Bill.
Mr. Nicholas inquired with what sums the blanks in the bill were to be filled.
Mr. Harper said he proposed to fill the first with $40,000, and the last with $28,650.
Mr. Nicholas conceived this to be a good time for the House to attempt to bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government, and continued down till the year 1796; and to prevent in future the probable increase which he apprehended from the recent examples, he thought it necessary to take a view of this subject, not only from the increase of expense, but from a variety of other considerations. It is not the manner in which a Government is constituted which makes its operations easy and certain. But the execution of the powers of the Government itself is no more to be considered than the nature of its formation; for I do believe there is a tendency in all Governments like ours to produce a union and consolidation of all its parts into the Executive department; and that the limitation and connection of the parts with each other, as settled in the constitution, would be destroyed by the influence I have mentioned, unless there is a constant operation on the part of the Legislature to resist this overwhelming power. I think we have the most convincing proofs that a representative Government can be made most oppressive and burdensome, and yet preserve all the forms which are given to it by a constitution; and the Legislature shall appear to act upon its own discretion, whilst that discretion shall have ceased to exist. Where the Executive has an influence over the Legislature, and the Government is a representative one, the Executive is capable of carrying its views into effect in a manner superior to what can be accomplished even in the most despotic monarchy; the mischief will be carried farther in the former case than in the latter, because the people will be more inclined to submit to the decisions of a Government of its own choosing than to one which rules them by hereditary right; monarchs cannot carry their oppressions so far, without resistance, as republics. Under this general view of the subject, he conceived it to be the duty of the Legislature to guard cautiously its own independence, and to limit, as far as consistent with the general welfare, the influence of Executive patronage.
He conceived that this extension of influence of one branch of the Government over another was strictly guarded by the constitution, which was framed on the principle of checks and balances—of departments acting and controlling each other; but he was sorry to see the idea of patronage drawn into a closer compass than it had formerly been, as it increased the evil. He was sorry for it, because it tended to manifest a circumstance which had been sought to be concealed. Every insinuation that there was a division between the Government and the people had been repelled as an insidious and malignant design; but the Administration, by acting on a new principle, which he was too well assured was the fact, had established the idea that there was a division between it and a considerable portion of the people. The evidence of this fact had been long shown, and he feared the operation of circumstances of this nature on the public mind.
He gave it as his opinion on our foreign intercourse, that the United States would be benefited by having no Ministers at all. He did not think that we could be benefited by any sort of compact these foreign agents could form for us, for we only bound ourselves by any treaty we entered into, as we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures. It might be thought necessary to make commercial arrangements with some European powers; but, he asked, if they had the force to make a foreign country conform to its engagements? No gentleman would say that they had; therefore such regulations only tended to entangle ourselves, without rendering commerce any efficient aid. He would, therefore, leave our commerce to seek its own markets totally disembarrassed. All the protection we could furnish it with, consisted in officers of another grade than those mentioned in this bill: Consuls who should reside in the seaports, and not Ministers Plenipotentiary residing in the interior.
He did not intend by the motion he was about to make, that the whole diplomatic establishment should be destroyed at this time, but merely to reduce it to what it had been before the late increase. With this view he proposed to alter the bill so as to direct that there should be appropriated $9,000 for a Minister Plenipotentiary at London, and $9,000 more for another near the French Republic, and that the President be left at liberty to reduce the Ministers Plenipotentiary at Berlin, Madrid, and Lisbon, to Ministers resident, which would diminish their salaries one-half—a resident Minister being of a lower grade has only $4,500 per annum. He then went into a detail of the proceedings of the first Congress, in order to show that it was admitted on all sides by that body, that the constitution vested the power of specifying and limiting the salaries of foreign Ministers and Consuls; he read the speeches of Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Sherman, Mr. W. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Huntington, and several others, from the Congressional Register, by which it appeared, that there was but one opinion on their powers under the Constitution; and showed from hence, that the only reason why the House did not undertake to enumerate and fix the salaries of foreign Ministers in detail, arose merely from the want of information as to the places where they should be fixed, and the sum necessary to cover their expenses. As his construction corresponded with that of the gentleman who fixed the principles upon which the Government was put in motion, he was encouraged to expect his motion would succeed, seeing that the House had now had sufficient experience to enable them to say what were the regulations proper to be made.
Mr. Harper supposed it would be remembered by all those gentlemen who had attended to the business of Congress for several years past, that the doctrine of the gentleman from Virginia was by no means new. The subject of foreign intercourse was never taken up, without that gentleman, or some other who agreed with him in sentiment, advancing these opinions; they never failed to speak of the danger to be apprehended from Executive influence, from its power to appoint foreign Ministers; that foreign intercourse was unnecessary; that our public affairs abroad were not to be attended to, and that commerce ought to be given up, or left to shift for itself. Nor was this a doctrine confined to this country, or this age. Whenever a set of gentlemen in any country found their views opposed by the measures of Government, they became vexed, and attributed the proceedings of those who differed from them in opinion to any motive rather than the public good. The desire of Executive favor, or Executive offices, was an usual charge, and it was at this day well understood. It would also be remembered, that whenever the subject of foreign intercourse had been discussed, though these objections had been constantly made to it, they had been as constantly disregarded by the Congress of the United States. The good sense of the country had weighed these objections in the balance, and declared them wanting; and he trusted the same fate would now meet them as heretofore.
In aid of the $40,000 per annum, originally granted for this purpose, Mr. H. said, various supplementary appropriations had been made. First, a sum of $20,000, then a sum of $23,000, and, in March last, $17,000, and, in addition to this, $14,000 for a particular appointment. The House had, therefore, not only deemed it expedient to continue the original act, but to make additional appropriations from year to year. He thought the good sense of the country had never been more firmly shown than on this subject. But now a new course was to be taken, and all former proceedings declared to have been wrong. But it was said this country had no need of foreign ministers, and that commerce might be left to itself. He did not believe the House would think so. Did not the United States trade with all the nations of the earth? How, then, was it possible to do without accredited agents to attend to our concerns in foreign countries? Were we to give up our commerce? There were gentlemen, he knew, who would answer, Yes. They would tell the House, commerce was a bad thing, and that it rather ought to be outlawed than protected. But was this the sense of the country? Was it the sense of that House? Would they discard the property of that class of citizens who depended upon it for their support and their wealth? Or would they be ready to forfeit the revenue arising from it? Mr. H. said he had often heard of the dangerous nature of foreign intercourse; but it was the discovery of a few men who believed that every thing which had been done by this Government had been radically wrong. He trusted, however, the House would adhere to what it had so frequently sanctioned, and that the proposed amendment would not be agreed to.
Mr. Gallatin believed that there were a number of people in the United States—people otherwise enlightened, and who, upon all common subjects, possessed sound understandings—who were fully convinced that there was a faction existing within the United States, and even within the walls of that House, who wished to demolish the Government; and he further believed that this opinion was supported by such declarations as had been made by the gentleman from Connecticut. He should be sorry that such a belief should be considered as dangerous to the safety of the community. Nor could he consider the determination of the Executive to employ only such persons as are of the same political opinions with themselves, as of such a nature as to produce fatal consequences, and that Government, on that account, was unworthy of confidence. He believed that such a line of conduct must flow from the present state of parties in America, divided as the people were upon many important occasions. To say, therefore, that the Executive employed persons of consonant political opinions to its own, was not to say the Government did not deserve confidence. But if the committee turned their attention to the amendment proposed, it only went to declare that ministers to London and Paris should not have a salary of more than $9,000 a year; and that ministers to other parts of Europe should not have more than $4,500. In support of this amendment, it was said that this was the ground upon which this Government first fixed the business of foreign intercourse. He believed this statement correct. Until the year 1796, there was no minister plenipotentiary except at Paris and London; at other places there were no higher grades than ministers resident. Hence the committee might be led to argue the propriety of bringing back our foreign political intercourse to what it was before that period. He said foreign political intercourse; because he thought the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Harper) had blended two subjects together, viz: foreign commercial intercourse, and foreign political intercourse. He did not believe it was the opinion of any gentleman in that House that commerce ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended to. He believed it was well understood that our commerce in foreign countries was attended to by our consuls and not by our ministers plenipotentiary; and consuls would exist if we had no ministers at all. Therefore, all that gentleman's arguments, which tended to show that the amendment would affect our commercial intercourse, had no foundation whatever.
Returning to the question of foreign political intercourse: Was it proper to bring it back to what it was eighteen months ago? And, before he proceeded further, he would observe that, though the gentleman from South Carolina had been tolerably correct in his statements of the business, he was mistaken in one point, in which he would set him right. He had stated that the first additional appropriation was $20,000; but this sum was not appropriated for foreign intercourse, but for defraying the expense of the suits of our merchants in London. On the first of January, 1796, there remained a balance of unexpended appropriation for this object, of $30,000. To that day no extraordinary appropriation had been made; the whole allowance was $40,000 a year, which was found to be more than sufficient. On the 28th of May, 1796, an estimate was sent by the President of the United States, stating the sums already appropriated for foreign intercourse, and that $23,500 were yet wanting, in order to change the establishment which had till that day existed, by sending Ministers Plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of Ministers Resident. This estimate, he just stated, was received on the 28th of May, and the law received the signature of the President on the first of June, so that it could not have received a very full discussion (being passed just as the session was about to close) and he thought there was good reason for examining the thing again. The next appropriation was made in the second session of the fourth Congress. In that session, he allowed, the additional appropriation was passed after full discussion. It was made upon an estimate stating $17,900 wanted; and, during last session, an appropriation was made for a Minister to Berlin, of $13,500.
The committee had been told that it would evince great versatility if they were all at once to change what had already been done. But it must be recollected, than when the change in the system was first made, it underwent little discussion; and he would venture to say, that our business abroad was as well done from the year 1786 to 1796, as it had been done since. As the question was whether a larger or a smaller sum of money should be appropriated, he would call upon gentlemen in favor of the larger sum, to show what benefit was derived from Madrid and Lisbon by the change; what necessity there was for a Minister at Berlin, and what good was to be derived from giving a larger salary than $4,500. The gentleman from Connecticut had said, why send a Minister Plenipotentiary to London or Paris, any more than the other Courts? This was done at first, and the mover, he supposed, wished not to innovate upon the law as originally passed.
But they were told it was improper, upon this floor, to say any thing about patronage, and that all arguments of that kind are well understood, and are by no means novel in their nature; that such complaints are made under all forms of Government by discontented people out of office. To say that these complaints are well understood, was the same as to say that the ground upon which they complained was also well understood: it was to acknowledge, that persons who were in the favor of the Executive had some advantages which persons in the other party desired or envied. To admit of one position, was to admit of the other. But, if no particular advantage was to be derived from Governmental patronage, then the cause of jealousy, according to this doctrine, must cease.
Our Government, he said, was in its child-hood; and if this patronage had any existence, it could not of course be as yet alarming. But he desired gentlemen to look at all Governments where this power was placed in the Executive, and see if the greatest evil of the Government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist in the Government which was constituted most similarly to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, the Government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect? He did not, however, speak against the power itself; it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The constitution had placed it in the Executive power. If the same power had been placed in the Legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the Executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the Executive; and though it was right to keep grants of money within proper bounds, in order to prevent the abuse of power, yet it was proper to grant all that was necessary.
Mr. G. concluded, by saying, that if he thought it was proper that our political intercourse should be extended, he should not support the amendment; but as the conviction was strong upon his mind that our foreign political intercourse had at least been as expensive as it ought to be; that it was owing, in a great degree, to our political intercourse with foreign nations, that our present critical situation was produced; that this intercourse produced more evil than good to us; that he wished to bring the business back to the state in which it stood in 1796. If the wisdom of future Legislatures shall think proper to abolish the establishment of foreign political intercourse altogether, it must be left to them to decide. He himself thought it would be going too far to do so at present. He believed, situated as we were, it was necessary to have some political intercourse; but he believed it would be best, by degrees, to decline it altogether.
Mr. Sitgreaves.—The constitution and laws of the country had made certain offices necessary, and left it to the Executive to fill them as he pleased; and was it for that House to attempt to control this discretion? If it were executed to the injury of the people, the constitution had pointed out the remedy to be by impeachment. But where was the crime, the offence, or the impropriety, of the conduct ascribed to the Executive, if it had been adopted? Would gentlemen say that the Executive ought to appoint persons to office who professed an opinion contrary to its own? Did gentlemen suppose that there was such a want of integrity in this department of Government, that it adopted a political opinion which it did not believe to be right? And, if it were believed to act from principle, would it be prudent or right to admit to a participation in the execution of the important duties of Government persons whose sentiments were not in unison with those of the Executive, and who could only create discord and confusion, where nothing but harmony and union ought to prevail? If the Executive acted upon just principles, it would endeavor to give singleness of design to its operations, and it could only do this by admitting persons into the Government who thought with it. This would be a right, prudent, and honorable conduct; and where it had been deviated from (as he had before observed), Government had received an awful lesson for its future conduct.
The question whether that House had the power to interfere with the Executive authority, by withholding appropriations, had been fully discussed in a former Congress, and the opinion of the country was not now to be fixed on this subject. For that part of the House who thought the constitution had not vested them with the authority of controlling the Executive, it was sufficient to say that the Executive had thought it necessary to introduce the change in the diplomatic department, which was complained of, and that they felt themselves bound to carry his determination into effect; but those who think that the House of Representatives may control the Executive in this respect, will of course act accordingly.
Mr. Baldwin said he perceived there was a real difference of opinion between the gentleman last up and himself. The gentleman supposed the diplomatic establishment was fixed by the Executive, and the Legislature had nothing to do with it but to provide the money. Every person must see, even from a cursory view of the constitution, that this was designed to be a Government of departments, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to be kept distinct as far as possible. It was the business of the Legislature to establish offices by law; it was the business of the Executive to fill those offices. It would appear, from tracing back the law, now proposed to be continued, that it originated in this manner. He had not been notified of the subject as being likely to be called up to-day, and was not prepared to be as particular as he could wish as to facts. He had endeavored to refresh his recollection since it had been under discussion, and he found that it originated from the Speech of the President, at the opening of the second session of the first Congress, in which he said, "that the interests of the United States required that our intercourse with other nations should be facilitated by such provisions as will enable me to fulfil my duty in that respect; and to this end, that the compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed, should, according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by law." This part of the Speech was referred to a committee, and from that originated this law. Want of information, at that early time in the Government, prevented their being as particular as they wished. They fixed a sum to each grade, and a sum beyond which the whole amount should not extend; limited the law to a short period, that it might be open to be corrected by experience. The present motion, if he had understood it, proposed now to be a little more particular in the establishment, by fixing the sum for particular places—to do the very thing then recommended by the President. The same has always been the intention of every succeeding Congress, which was the reason why they continued it only for short periods, leaving it open to such amendments as should be suggested by experience. These ideas of the offices being first to be established by law, appeared not only to be the sense of the former President, and of each succeeding Congress, as he had stated, but appeared also to be the opinion of the present President. At the last session he thought that a higher grade of office was necessary at Algiers: this he stated in a message to Congress—that as there were great expenditures of money on that coast, he thought it necessary that an establishment should be made which would enable him to appoint a very confidential person, on whom the other officers there should be dependent, and who should control their proceedings and expenditures. Congress concurred in this opinion, passed a law for the establishment of the office, and then the Executive appointed the officer. For these reasons he considered the question within their proper powers, and fairly open to their deliberation.
At the close of the revolutionary war, the disposition of forming many treaties, and having extensive diplomatic connections with European powers, was carried even further than it has been since. It was among their first national acts, and discovered marks of youth and inexperience; a few years convinced them that they had gone too far, that this country had little to expect from treaties, and much to lose, and that many diplomatic connections were more frequently the cause of perplexity and embarrassment, than of any national advantage. The Congress under the articles of confederation were extricating themselves from that policy as fast as possible; as these expired in course, they were careful not to renew them. For several of the last years of that Congress he well recollected that clusters of candidates for these appointments, supported by powerful interests and connections, were uniformly resisted; and, if he mistook not, when this Government came into operation, this country had but one Minister in Europe. The conviction on this subject was so strong, and experience had so fully settled it as the true policy, that it remained immoveable for some time after organizing the present Government. All appropriations for foreign Ministers were refused at the first session, as far as he recollected. At the second session it was urged, in the Speech of the President, as before stated, and enforced by more particular explanations to individuals, as designed to be for temporary purposes, respecting the Northern forts and the property that was withheld. Under these explanations a law passed, as before explained. It was true, this policy had been of late, in some measure, departed from. He thought experience had already been useful to them in this course also, and ought to administer caution to them in seeking to intermingle in European politics. Ambassadors and Ministers cannot be entirely indifferent to the characters and events with which they are constantly surrounded; the share they take is very apt to be exchanged between the countries to which they belong. He did not wish to be too particular on that point; he was persuaded facts enough presented themselves to the recollection of every member, to confirm his remark. It might be said that on this also we have an awful lesson. If evil had been experienced from this cause, he hoped it would operate as a reason to endeavor to diminish it. He thought it not unreasonable for the House to interpose their restraining power as to granting money, and the more particular establishment of the officers, and thus aid the other departments of the Government in bringing back, by degrees, this part of our policy to its former principles, so well sanctioned by experience. Whether the present motion was well timed, or whether it was best to give it another short limitation, before we went into a definite establishment, was another question, on which he was willing to hear more remarks. Informed as he was at present, he should vote for the motion, and thought they might make some amendments to the former bill, already suggested by experience, and which would be useful.
The committee rose, and had leave to sit again.