Friday, April 11.
Exclusion of Military and Naval Officers from Civil Employment.
The bill to prohibit officers of the Army and Navy of the United States from holding or exercising any civil office, was read a third time.
Mr. Gregg said he never found himself involved in greater difficulty. He was in favor of the principle involved in the bill, and yet he could not vote for its passage. He believed that it was a correct principle that civil and military offices should be kept distinct, and he wished the constitution had prohibited the union. In relation to the individual on whom it was mentioned yesterday this law was to operate, he was satisfied it would be best if he could be removed from one of the offices he held; and if such a course had been pursued, he should have been in favor of destroying the office of brigadier-general to get rid of the officer. The effect of this resolution would be to take from a man an office which he held under the constitution. This power they did not possess. The only constitutional way to effect the object was to destroy the office. He would agree likewise to amend the constitution, so as to declare the union of civil and military office incompatible, or to a law providing that after a certain time no person should hold two such offices; and he should, if practicable, be for doing away the office of Governor of Louisiana, because he believed the person holding that office was, by his course of proceedings, producing a disturbance in the Territory. But although he entertained a favorable opinion of the principle of the bill, and would wish to remove that gentleman from one of the offices he held, yet he must vote against the bill, as it went to the unconstitutional removal of an officer.
Mr. Smilie thought the passage of this bill involved a principle of a very serious nature. As to the abstract principle involved in the bill, he did not dispute its correctness, or that it ought to have been a part of the constitution. But the question was, whether they had a right by a legislative act, to prejudice any other branch of the Government. They were not in his opinion warranted in travelling out of their own sphere to remove existing evils. There was but one way in which the constitution provided for the removal of a public officer. It says “the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” Here was the true and only sphere in which the House could move. If the constitution did not give the right of removal in any other way, it did not exist; and if they undertook by a legislative act to remove a man constitutionally appointed, who would pretend to say what mischief might not result from it? For these reasons he should vote against the bill.
Mr. Quincy said it appeared to him that one of the arguments urged by gentlemen against this bill was fallacious—that which considered it an invasion of the rights of the Executive. This argument went on the assumption that the President would necessarily sign the bill sent to him, which might or might not be the fact. If he accedes to it, the argument of gentlemen falls to the ground; and if it shall be returned, it will then be time enough to discuss the constitutional principle. With regard to the general expediency of passing such a bill, the strongest arguments would be found in favor of it on the page of history. If history proved any thing, it was that the condition of those was most degraded who lived under the colonial governments of Republics. This was amply proved by the annals of the Carthaginian and Roman Republics. The territory under contemplation was a kind of colonial government, and might in the course of time be a powerful engine in the hands of the Executive. He wished, therefore, for a separation of the civil and military powers which might arise under it.
Mr. Smilie said if the question was what was most convenient or best, he should have no difficulty in agreeing with the gentleman from Massachusetts. But it rested on higher ground—on what was constitutional. If he had a right to make the constitution, he would have no hesitation in separating the civil and military powers. But he could not forget the occurrences which had taken place in the State he had the honor to represent in part. In that State there had been but a single branch of the Legislature without any Executive veto on the passage of the laws. He had seen that Government destroyed by sweeping away the Executive power before the irresistible authority of the Legislature, and he had seen the people obliged, from this circumstance, to give up that constitution and frame a new one. The measure under consideration was of the same kind. The constitutional powers of the Executive ought not to be encroached upon, unless the object was to produce confusion. He had seen the effects of such measures, and deprecated them. You may, said Mr. S., abolish the office, and the officer falls with it; but in no other way, while the office continues, can you remove the officer except by impeachment. Shall we, then, in order to get rid of a man who may not have done right (and as for myself I am ready to answer I have no affection for the man) go into a new scene, the length of which we cannot foresee? This principle once established may lead to any thing; it may lead to a destruction of the powers of the Executive altogether. I am as tenacious of the powers of the Legislature as any man, but I believe the powers of the Executive to be equally necessary. Indeed, I think there is more danger to be apprehended from the overwhelming power of the Legislature, than from the powers of the Executive. For the Legislature is so powerful that there can be little danger of the Executive encroaching upon it.
Mr. Eppes.—If I took the same view of the operation of this law with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I should certainly give it my negative. As, however, I voted for the resolution on which it is founded, and consider the law in conformity with the resolution, I will assign, in a few words, the reasons which will govern my vote.
We have been told that all the departments of Government are independent of each other. No man denies the correctness of this principle. Let us not interfere with the constitutional rights of the other departments, nor abandon our own. The Executive has by the constitution the right of nominating for office any citizen of the United States, whether an officer of the Army and Navy, or not. This being a constitutional right, he certainly cannot be deprived of it by law; the right remains, and may be exercised if the law passes; the law merely severs the civil and military offices, and leaves the military officer to decide whether he will vacate his military command by holding or accepting a civil office; the Executive will have the same right to appoint—the individual will have the same right to accept the civil office as heretofore, but the acceptance vacates his command in the Army or Navy. If, then, the Executive right to appoint, and the right of the officer to accept, remains after the passage of this law, how can gentlemen contend that the constitutional right of appointment is narrowed? All the difficulty on the present occasion arises from the law being made to bear on the constitutional right of appointment. It is intended to operate only on offices in the Army or Navy which are created by law, to the tenure of which we may annex such conditions as the public good may require. Under the constitution we have a right to prescribe rules for the government of the Army or Navy. In passing this law we add a new clause to the articles of war, viz: That an officer of the Army or Navy shall not hold or accept a civil office. Do gentlemen really suppose that we have no right to make this rule? If we can say that an officer shall not get drunk, that he shall have short hair, a coat of a certain form; that he shall not absent himself from his duty; or if we can in fact annex any other condition calculated to ensure to the public his services, why may we not declare by law that he shall not hold or accept a civil office, he shall forfeit his military command? The public welfare is the basis of the rules for the government of the Army and Navy; we have a right to prescribe such rules as the public good requires, and it is our duty to establish such as will ensure to us the services of our military officers in that station to which they are appointed.
But we are told we are about to remove from office a civil officer by law. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has read the clause of the constitution which provides for the removal of civil officers by impeachment. This law is not to operate on civil but on military officers; civil officers, it is true, are removed by impeachment—military officers by such forms as we think proper to prescribe by law; the operation of this law will be precisely the same with any other new rule prescribed for the government of the Army or Navy. Suppose we were to pass a law that any officer found drunk after the 1st of July next shall forfeit his office—his having been drunk before would not subject him to the penalty of the law—but his being drunk after the first of July next would deprive him of his office. Apply this to the case of a civil officer. An officer of the Army or Navy having accepted a civil office, or holding a civil office, does not at present vacate his military office; the reason is obvious—there is no law against it. If, however, after the first of July next, he accepts or continues to hold a civil office, he forfeits his military command under the new article of war which this law establishes. The law severs the two offices, declares them incompatible with each other, and leaves the individual free to make his election. As to the general principle that the civil and military ought to be separate and distinct, I have no doubt. If the principle is correct, the law ought to extend to all cases, not only such as may hereafter arise, but to those which at present exist.
Mr. Stanford supported, and Messrs. Findlay and Sloan opposed the bill; when the question was taken by yeas and nays on the passage of the bill—yeas 64, nays 34, as follows:
Yeas.—Willis Alston, Isaac Anderson, Burwell Bassett, George M. Bedinger, Silas Betton, John Blake, jr., Thomas Blount, William Butler, Levi Casey, John Claiborne, Christopher Clark, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Dawson, Elias Earle, Peter Early, James Elliot, Caleb Ellis, William Ely, John W. Eppes, James M. Garnett, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Seth Hastings, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Michael Leib, Matthew Lyon, Duncan McFarland, Robert Marion, Josiah Masters, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas Newton, jr., Gideon Olin, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, Jacob Richards, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Martin G. Schuneman, John Cotton Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Thomas Spalding, Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Philip R. Thompson, Thomas W. Thompson, Uri Tracy, Abram Trigg, Robert Whitehill, David R. Williams, Alexander Wilson, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.
Nays.—David Bard, Joseph Barker, Barnabas Bidwell, John Chandler, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Ezra Darby, Ebenezer Elmer, William Findlay, John Fowler, Andrew Gregg, Isaiah L. Green, James Kelly, William McCreery, Jeremiah Nelson, Timothy Pitkin, jr., John Pugh, John Rea of Tennessee, John Russell, Peter Sailly, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Henry Southard, Joseph Stanton, David Thomas, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, Eliphalet Wickes, Marmaduke Williams, and Nathan Williams.