Monday, January 7, 1805.
District of Columbia.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on a motion “to recede to the States of Virginia and Maryland, the jurisdiction of such parts of the Territory of Columbia as are without the limits of the city of Washington.”
Mr. Stanford said it was his wish to make a few observations on the resolution now before the Committee, for the retrocession of that part of the District of Columbia which had been ceded to the United States by the State of Virginia, in support of the vote he should give—expecting that what was said on the first, would be generally applicable to the last resolution also. He begged leave, however, in the first place, to suggest that, in bringing forward the motion, he had not had any the least intention to take any step that should go to a removal of the government. He trusted no gentleman of the committee would entertain such an opinion of his views. Had such been his intention he would have preferred a direct motion to that effect.
As then both the resolutions together made but a single object—that of ceding back again to the respective States of Virginia and Maryland all the District of Columbia, except the city of Washington—he should, in the course of the discussion, consider it more incumbent on those adverse to the measure to show the original wisdom and utility of the provision in the constitution, than on its friends. It would be enough for them to show its present evil tendency, and that it was an encumbrance no way necessary or useful to the General Government.
Upon a former occasion some question had arisen, and might yet lie in the way of some gentlemen, whether Congress, having once accepted the cessions of the States, had now the power of recession. On that head he had not, himself, ever found reason to doubt. By the third section and fourth article of the constitution, “Congress has power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States;” and besides, the eighth section of the first article, which assigns to Congress the exclusive legislation over this district, in all cases whatsoever, does not appear to come short of such a power. Like authority is also given, in the same paragraph of the constitution, over all places purchased by the consent of the State in which the same shall be, “for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.” Congress, thus possessing the right of disposal, had exercised that right by an act passed two sessions ago, authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to convey to the Salem Turnpike and Chelsea Bridge Companies a part of the navy yard at Boston. With it, will any one contend that jurisdiction did not also pass to the State of Massachusetts, whence it had been obtained? It certainly would by every fair and bona fide view of the circumstances. If, for instance, murder should be committed on that part of the turnpike which was formerly a part of the navy yard, could it be contended that such murder was not punishable by the laws of Massachusetts; that the General Government was the only competent authority to punish? He hoped otherwise. A like discretionary power of cession was also exercised when Congress anticipated the ordinance, and transferred the jurisdiction to the people of the North-western Territory, which now forms the State of Ohio. It would be remembered that, at the time of the transfer, the United States held the exclusive jurisdiction of that territory.
But, said Mr. S., over and above the consideration that the District of Columbia is in no way necessary, and every way expensive, to the General Government—in fact, a kind of governmental nuisance that ought to be removed—there was another objection, still more serious with him, the people of the district were the merest subjects in their condition. If they held rights, they were not apparent to him in the constitution. He believed all they held were those of courtesy. In the constitution no immunity, no privilege, no political right, had been, in so many words, reserved to them. They had been specifically given away, consigned to the ideal convenience of the General Government, without a single specific reservation. This was not the case as to the people of the States. If he were told the people were content, and did not wish a change, that with him was a good reason why the motion should at once prevail. If twenty, or twenty-five thousand people had already become willing subjects, without wishing any share or control in their own affairs, such an example ought no longer to remain under our system of government, and he trusted would not. He concluded by expressing a hope that the resolutions might be adopted.
Mr. Smilie rose in reply. He disclaimed any intention hostile to Washington remaining the seat of Government, and denied that the recession would have any influence upon it. Having elucidated the constitutionality of the measure, he exhibited in strong colors the degraded situation of the people of the district, and the dangers which might hereafter arise from a continuance of it.
Mr. Dennis.—Mr. Chairman: As a resolution analogous in all its leading features to those now under consideration, was submitted to the consideration of a former Congress, by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Bacon,) and as that resolution was put at rest by a very decisive majority, I had not expected that its ghost would have risen up at so early a day to haunt the people of Columbia, or to interrupt the deliberations of this body. That the gentleman who has offered these resolutions has acted from the best lights of his own understanding, and has believed the object intended to be thereby effectuated is both within the pale of our constitutional authority, and politically expedient, it is not for me to question. To me, however, they appear unconstitutional and politically inexpedient, and I will moreover add, cruel, unjust, and tyrannical, in their operation on the people of this district.
In order to ascertain the extent of our power on the subject, we must resort to the eighth section of the first article of the constitution. Here we find that, amongst other powers therein enumerated, it is declared as follows: “That Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the General Government,” &c. This clause contemplates, first, a place to be acquired, lying at the time within the jurisdiction of some of the States, but which was to be put out of their control and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Government. This was to be done in order that a permanent seat might be established, which should not be liable to be changed by legislative caprice; and in order that the jurisdiction over the place in which its operations were to be conducted might be, like the Government itself, the property of the whole people of the Union, and free from the influence of any one of its component parts.
This appears to be as much a part of the constitution, that you should always have this federal district, as that there should be a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary Department.
2d. It points out the manner in which this district shall be acquired, and the agents who are to be instrumental in the acquisition. The convention, on behalf of the people of the United States, who are the principals, appoint Congress the attorney in fact to receive the conveyance, and constitute the Legislatures of the States from whom the cession or conveyance is to be made similar agents to make it. The several agents have performed their respective offices, the district has been acquired in conformity with the authority given, the right to the property vested in the American people, and possession held of it by us, for their benefit for whose use it was acquired. All the power which was given as to the acquisition of the territory has been exhausted, and no other power remains but that of exercising over it exclusive legislation. To explain and illustrate this subject to the most ordinary capacity, let me compare the transaction to a case in common life. If I give a man a power of attorney to purchase for me a tract of land, in a particular district of country, of a specified quantity of acres, leaving it to him to make the location, and he accordingly make a purchase, and I consent to the act, receive the conveyance, and take possession of it, can my agent afterwards make another choice, divest me of my right, and reconvey the property without my consent? No man will answer this question affirmatively; and yet it is clear there is a perfect similitude between the cases, and that Congress are agents acting in this case under a limited authority and confined in the exercise thereof to a specific object. That Congress are special agents, and not vested with a general power over every possible case, is manifest from the whole tenor of the constitution; and I will lay down in this instance a rule which has been generally recognized as the standard, by which to test the extent of constitutional authority in any given case. It is, that Congress can exercise no power on any subject but what is expressly delegated and specifically enumerated in the constitution, or necessary and incidental to the execution of the specified powers. What is their power in the present instance? To accept a cession and exercise over it exclusive legislation. Can you infer from hence a power of retrocession? To do so is at war with the amendment of the constitution, which declares that all powers not given to the General Government are retained by the States or the people respectively. Was not the power confined to the acceptance of the district directed to be procured for a specific purpose, and when so acquired, to continue an object over which Congress, as a permanent body, might always have it in their power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction? Can you then claim the power of reconveying the district and receiving one as often as your caprice may dictate, or of divesting your successors of the same control over this district which we may exercise ourselves? The power is not expressly delegated, nor is it a necessary power to carry into effect any power given; for it will not be contended, but we may exercise all our powers and perform all our duties, and still retain the jurisdiction over the district.
This district has been completely severed from Maryland and Virginia, and has been erected into two counties by the name of Washington and Alexandria, and forms, at this time, no more a part of the territorial limits of Maryland and Virginia, than of New Hampshire or Georgia; and you may by the same authority that you propose to reannex them to those States, unite them to Delaware or Jersey, and put the people, many of whom never were citizens of Maryland or Virginia, under the jurisdiction of the Emperor of Hayti.
But, Mr. Chairman, are the people of the territory unworthy of a moment’s consideration, and will their remonstrances against the measure be altogether disregarded? Let us take a retrospective view of the circumstances under which they were seduced from their parent State, and the manner in which they consented to dissever the civil and political bonds by which they were formerly connected. What induced them to alienate their native allegiance, and with a generous confidence to submit themselves to your authority? First, the constitution held out a pledge and formed the basis of the contract, involving a promise, that if the people living in the district of country which should be fixed upon for the seat of Government, would give up the rights possessed under the government of the States to which they belonged, they should for ever remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. By the act of Congress accepting the cession, the territory received is declared to be the place fixed on for the permanent seat of the Government, and the States ceded for ever the jurisdiction of the persons and soil within the same to Congress, for the purpose of exercising therein exclusive legislation. Finally, you assume the government, establish your own systems, and annul those of the States. Confiding in the premises, they gave up the control of their persons, and some of them divided with you their property. They came to you with one consent, and hailed your arrival here as the most fortunate epoch in the annals of their country—and now, will you set them adrift without deigning to listen to their prayers?
This being the seat of Government, where all the representatives of the nation are collected, and who, from the responsibility which they owe to their respective constituents and to the whole people of the United States, are under every moral and political tie to do justice, and to protect the rights and interests of the people here; here every citizen of the district has access to every member, and he may personally communicate his wants, his wishes, and solicit his particular patronage of his interest; and instead of being confined, like a district of country in the remote parts of the Union, to a single member, who may not possess the talents to explain its interests to the legislative body, the citizen of this place may make a selection out of the whole of the members to whom he may choose to confide his application. Like the seat of Government in all other places, without having any actual representation, this district will have more than its equal share of influence, and its weight will always be felt more sensibly in the Legislative Councils of the nation than the remote parts of the Union. Our theoretical philosophers, however, not only contend that in order to make these people free and happy, we must force liberty upon them, whether they will have it or not, but that even with respect to the conveniency or inconveniency of being governed by this body and the States of Maryland and Virginia, they are incapable of judging for themselves.
But is there no conveniency resulting to them from having all their concerns brought within the narrow limits of ten miles square? Is there no conveniency in having their own courts of justice at their very doors, instead of travelling to Richmond and Annapolis? It is an old-fashioned idea perhaps, but it is one which very generally prevails, even at the present day, that to bring justice home to every man’s door, is a great political and civil blessing; and in this respect the people of this place enjoy an advantage which is unknown to any other people in the world.
The great advantages contemplated as likely to result from being represented in the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, and the powers of self-government which it is supposed may result from the measure, are merely ideal. What weight will the district on the Virginia side of the Potomac have in the large body of the Legislature of that State, when they will only form a part of the county of Fairfax, and have a share in choosing two members to the Assembly? The same question might be asked in relation to the district of country formerly comprehended in the counties of Prince George and Montgomery, in Maryland. They would be regarded with a jealous eye; a sort of aliens, who were forced, contrary to their remonstrance, to submit to their respective jurisdictions.
Mr. Early.—Mr. Chairman, the resolutions which we are now called upon to decide, possess a high degree of importance, not only from their object, and the consequences likely to result, but also from certain principles which have been contended for, as applying themselves to the subject. In the outset of the discussion we are met with objections upon constitutional principles against our right. We have been told by the people of this district, that we cannot recede the territory of which they are inhabitants without their consent; and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Dennis) has told us to-day that the proposed recession cannot be made without the consent of the people of the whole United States.
It is certainly desirable that all questions of this nature should receive a solution from the principles and practice of our own governments, without having a resort to foreign sources. But much I fear that the condition of the District of Columbia is one of a nature so peculiar to itself, that no such solution can be found. For it is impossible to conceive that the principles of a government whose essence is right, should be found to apply to the situation of a people stripped of all right.
The proposition that the consent of the people of this district is necessary to give validity to an act of Congress, having for its object a recession of the territory, carries with it the resolution of itself. It proves too much. The same reason by which they maintain this proposition, would go to prove that their consent was necessary to give validity to any act of legislation over them. That Congress possess the power of exclusive legislation over them, cannot be denied. We exercise, and we are authorized so to do, a power over all their rights of life, liberty, and property. And there cannot be presented to my mind a greater absurdity than to say the consent of the people of Columbia is necessary to any act in relation to them, when they are stripped of all rights of self-government.
Mr. Eppes, with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) considered the question of receding the Territory of Columbia as entirely separate and distinct from a question to remove the seat of Government. He did not understand the particular connection between the two questions. He believed that the seat of Government would be as permanently fixed here if the jurisdiction of Congress extended only over the soil covered by its public buildings, as if it embraced any given number of square miles. All that the National Legislature wants here is accommodation. Assembled at this place for purposes of general legislation, the exercise of a local sovereignty over a few square miles is neither beneficial to the nation nor interesting to Congress. The right of legislating for persons around us, whose local interests we do not feel or understand, cannot attach to this spot the Representatives of the nation: the exercise of this power by Congress cannot attach to this spot the nation itself. The public convenience and interest fixed our Government within this territory; the public convenience and interest can alone continue it here. The permanent seat of our Government depends, not on the extent of our powers over the country around us, but on the will of the nation. Whatever might be the feelings of other gentlemen on this subject, he had no hesitation in declaring, that, although he was in favor of receding the Territory of Columbia, he should never feel himself authorized, as a Representative of Virginia, to vote for a removal of the seat of Government.
The committee now rose, reported progress, and had leave to sit again.