Tuesday, January 8.
The District of Columbia.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on a motion of the twenty-ninth of November last “to recede to the States of Virginia and Maryland the jurisdiction of such parts of the Territory of Columbia as are without the limits of the city of Washington.”
Mr. Southard.—Mr. Chairman, I should have contented myself with giving a silent vote on this question, had it not been for the strong impressions on my mind that more is intended than expressed in the resolutions now on the table. It is not two years since two resolutions were introduced to this House similar to those now under consideration, with this distinction, that they went to include the city of Washington with the other parts of the district in the transfer to the States of Virginia and Maryland.
I believe it to be the object of some members not only to recede the branches of the district contained in these resolutions, but likewise the city. If the doctrine so strongly contended for, that Congress has a right to transfer or recede, be once established—take the first step, and you may as easily take the second. I have no desire to call in question the sincerity of the mover of these resolutions, nor of many who support them; yet there are others who wish a recession of the whole territory.
This subject involves two questions: First, whether Congress has a constitutional power to make a retrocession of this district to the States of Virginia and Maryland; and secondly, whether it be good policy. As to the first, Mr. S. said, he had strong doubts on his mind, as to the rightful power of Congress to recede or transfer.
The members of the convention who framed the Constitution of the United States looked forward to a day when it would become necessary to fix a place which should become the permanent seat of the Government. By reference to the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, we see it clearly expressed that Congress shall have power “to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States.”
This article, with all others contained in that instrument, after publication for the consideration of the people of the United States, was adopted, and became a part of the constitution. In pursuance of this object, Congress, on the 16th of July, 1790, passed an act, entitled “the cession act,” in the words following, to wit:
“That a district of territory, not exceeding ten miles square, to be located as hereafter directed, on the river Potomac, at some place between the mouths of the Eastern branch and Conococheague, be, and the same is hereby accepted for the permanent seat of the Government of the United States.”
Congress accepted a cession of ten miles square for the express purpose, and on the express condition of exercising exclusive legislation and jurisdiction, and this, too, agreeably to the spirit and meaning of the constitution and law, thus forming a compact which Congress has no right to violate. All the States in their Legislative capacity, and the people of the United States, including the inhabitants of this territory, are bound by this compact, which compact is as strong as the constitution itself.
Mr. Findlay observed that, after what his colleague (Mr. Smilie) and others had said in favor of the resolutions for a retrocession of the territory, exclusive of the city, he had not expected to hear any objection to the resolutions on arguments derived from the constitution; the resolutions for receding the territory to the States who had made the original cession might, he thought, have been fairly combated, on the ground of expediency; on this ground only did the resolutions before the committee rest. He gave the credit, however, to the gentlemen opposed to the resolutions, for their ingenuity in taking the most tenable ground, though not directly involved in the question, but he acknowledged it was indirectly connected with it. If we had not a right to retrocede, the Representatives of the United States undoubtedly might decline to exercise jurisdiction, for whatever the rights of the people were, the Legislature must be free to act or not to act. If this is not the case, it could not be a sovereign Legislature; Congress itself, in this case, would act by compulsion.
He said that, though a member of the ratifying convention of Pennsylvania, and of the Legislature of that State, and of Congress since that time, he did not remember ever to have heard it suggested that Congress was not vested with the same discretion in this case as in others, expressed in similar terms. He had, indeed, of late, heard several members say that Congress was obliged to establish a permanent seat, &c., but, in taking a review of the constitution, he found no such expressions. The word permanent was not in that instrument, nor any other expression that made it the duty of Congress to establish a permanent seat, more than to establish a permanent excise, direct tax, or bankrupt law. The word permanent, however, he found in an act of Congress, but certainly not authorized by the constitution; and this present Congress had equal power to make a retrocession as that Congress had to accept. He said it was not necessary to prove to the members of this committee that laws, in their nature, were not permanent, but changeable with circumstances, and that Congress had by the constitution equal powers with any other Congress. That, from the express words of the constitution investing this power in Congress, and from its analogy to the investiture of other powers, no argument could be drawn against the resolutions; that every argument of that kind he had heard was not taken from the words of the constitution, but from constructions given to it which he conceived the words would not bear, and which would have a ruinous effect applied to other powers expressed in similar words. That he did not consider himself bound by what other gentlemen fancied the constitution meant or intended, but by what it said.
Mr. F. said it had been frequently asked what more difficulty there was in legislating for ten miles square, than for the city alone. In answer to this, he asked those members to recollect how many applications had been made, how many laws have been passed, how many days have been occupied in legislating for other parts of the district than the city. He would ask what the people would lose by being receded to the States to which they formerly belonged, and what they gain by the members of Congress, who have no common interest with them, nor even acquaintance with them or their peculiar circumstances, and liable to be imposed on by every one with whom they converse, legislating for them? He said that it had not been made to appear that the people would suffer any loss by agreeing to the resolutions, and that, as it was indubitably evident that the public would gain advantage, he hoped they would be agreed to. He had early observed that there were nearly as many interfering interests in this ten miles square, as in the whole United States; the members of the committee would recollect that several of the most tedious debates, accompanied with the greatest irritation, that had taken place this session, arose from such subjects.
Mr. Boyd said, that, although some gentlemen had left the constitutionality of the proposed measure out of the question, he was not satisfied any more on that point than he was of its expediency. The constitution was to him the polar star by which his course through the sea of politics would be regulated. The constitution had been formed by a convention composed of delegates from the several States of the Union, and was afterwards adopted by State conventions, on behalf of themselves and the people. He had been a member of his State Legislature, when they passed a law ceding a part of their territory, well knowing that if Congress did accept it, by the constitution, they must and would exercise exclusive legislation over such district. He was well aware at that time of the consequence of accepting a district of territory not exceeding ten miles square, as laid down in the section so often alluded to; and he did believe that that consequence would be, that Congress must exercise exclusive legislation whenever they accepted the ceded district. The idea of recession was not taken up at that time. The States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, made offers of cession under the terms of the constitution. A partial cession was accepted by Congress from Maryland and Virginia. If a new disposition is to be made of this district, he did not see why Congress might not convey it to any of those States which had proffered to comply with the constitutional suggestion, and receive from the same another territory in lieu thereof. This statement he made merely to show the absurdity of recession, as it had presented itself to his mind.
Mr. Nelson meant to lay his opinion before the committee, because it appeared to be the habit of members to assign reasons for voting, without expecting to make any impression upon others. He considered the present question of the greatest magnitude to the United States generally; and of peculiar importance to his immediate constituents. He thought he should be able to show, to the satisfaction of every member present, that the removal of the seat of Government, which would be the consequence of recession, was not only inexpedient, but also unconstitutional. If he was successful in making out his point, that it was unconstitutional, he presumed the question of expediency need not be argued; the measure would be set at rest, and not a member would be found to give it his support. But, if he should prove unfortunate in this respect, which however appeared to his mind as true as that two and two make four, he might have reference to the question of expediency.
Previous to an inquiry into the constitutionality of the proposed project, he would just observe that constitutions themselves were things of recent date. Before the American Revolution the word itself was never fully understood. Lexicographers who attempted to define it never could agree. There was no practice whereupon to try its meaning. No power on earth had a constitution before the American States. True, England has long boasted of possessing a constitution, and so satisfied were her statesmen and politicians of the reality of this imaginary being, that they have extolled it to the skies. The glorious Constitution of England, her pride, and the envy of the world! Fine words truly; but where is the thing itself to be found? Is it reduced to writing? No. Who has seen it? No man. Is it known to any man? If it be, no two agree as to what the boasted Constitution of Britain is. How different, how honorably different, is the American Constitution! With us it is reduced to writing. It is in every man’s hand; it is known to the whole world, and every citizen agrees in its true and legitimate meaning. He would take this opportunity of expressing his voice, and of holding up his hand in resisting the doctrine of construction and inference formerly set up, whereby the tenor and effect of that invaluable instrument was likely to be changed. He knew that artful and ingenious men might twist and turn, and make it, like the word republican, to mean any thing or nothing, as best suited their nefarious designs. But this declaration and these attacks upon the body of that sacred work, were introduced by insinuating and artful lawyers, aided by the villany of judges, and accepted by men employed in the administration of our public and most important national affairs.
He saw nothing to justify the present motion. Gentlemen had attempted to show, not only its policy, but also its constitutionality. He, however, could not discover any words on that paper that warranted the project in the most remote degree; perhaps it had escaped his search; but he rather suspected gentlemen relied more upon an inference than on either the letter or spirit of the instrument itself. But he here would repeat, that no man was authorized to infer or construe, from the constitution, any other thing than what the plain sense of plain words would justify.
Mr. Elmer said he agreed with the gentleman from Maryland who had just now been up, that the question before the committee is an important and weighty one; but it seems that it is not of itself sufficiently weighty for that gentleman’s shoulders, for he has loaded it with much extraneous matter. Had the gentleman proved to my satisfaction either of the positions which he promised to demonstrate, I would not have troubled the committee with any remarks on the subject, but would have joined him in voting against the resolutions on the table. But, unfortunately for me, I have, by everything that has been said, become more convinced of the constitutionality and expediency of carrying the resolutions into effect.
Mr. R. Griswold said the object of the present motion was, he supposed, to make a permanent recession of the two parts of this district, one to Virginia, and the other to Maryland, retaining the city of Washington. If this was really the object, there could be no doubt but it went to operate a change of the seat of Government. This he would endeavor, in as few words as possible, to demonstrate. The eighth section of the first article authorizes Congress to assume the exclusive legislation over a district not exceeding ten miles square, &c. The States of Maryland and Virginia ceded a district of ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, and Congress accepted a part from each State, making one district, to become the seat of Government of the United States. From this statement, it is apparent that the territory, or district, of Columbia is the seat of Government, and not the city of Washington. If, then, you recede the territory, you recede the seat of Government, although you reserve the city of Washington. He asked, then, whether this did not substantially go to remove the seat of Government? After you have receded two parts of the district, can a district be said to remain? If it does not remain, your seat of Government is gone, and gentlemen are justified in connecting the idea of removal with that of recession. Indeed, he felt surprised at the declarations made by gentlemen on this floor, that the recession had no connection with removal, and if they thought it had, they would abandon the measure; yet, nevertheless, they give the resolutions their warmest support.
He was not prepared to say that Congress had no right to exercise the powers of recession and removal; but he did not think they were prepared to act upon those questions at the present day. He, however, acknowledged, that events might arise to make a removal necessary, but nothing of the kind had yet occurred. There were some inconveniences in residing here, but the members knew them, and they are lessening every day. If, however, gentlemen are not satisfied with the accommodation, and think that a justifiable ground for removal, they will vote for the motion, if they can get over the constitutional objections, which had considerable weight on his mind.
It was very clear to him, that the convention which framed the constitution intended and designed to establish a permanent seat of Government; that the constitution fully and effectually provides for that object. The circumstances which gave rise to the measure are too recent, and must be too fresh in the minds of the members of this committee, to render it necessary or useful for him to detail them at this time. Now, whether the convention accomplished the object they had in view, the constitution would decide; and whether the object had been accomplished by the cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, the laws will decide. But whether it is wise or expedient to destroy a work on which so much wisdom, time, and money had been expended, the gentlemen forming this committee will decide.
There were doubts entertained of the constitutionality of the measure of retrocession, and if gentlemen doubted, it would be much safer not to act on the subject than to risk the breach of the solemn obligations they had entered into at that table. He thought the weight of the argument on the expediency preponderated on the side he had advocated; and, from the most candid view of the subject, he was inclined to recommend the rejection of the resolutions; at all events, he should give them his decided negative.
Mr. Clark.—The question before the committee is truly of considerable importance, not only as it respects the constitutionality but the policy of the measure. He was sorry he had not the talents requisite for a full and complete investigation of so great a subject. Bred to an occupation purely professional, he had been led more to the study of detail and practice, than to abstract theories; hence it was, that, engaged in that laborious pursuit, he had no time and less opportunity of studying the diversified objects of political science. Thus circumstanced, he approached this question with extreme diffidence and cautious circumspection; the infraction of the constitution was to him a source of alarm, and however great the object or brilliant the achievement, he stood appalled at the prostration of that constitution he had always held in an estimation that approached to reverence.
But, on reflection, he was convinced that Congress were not about to violate their oaths, as had been insinuated, by the adoption of the present motion. He considered them in the exercise of a legitimate authority, and he would endeavor, in a brief manner, to examine whether they had not complete constitutional power to make a retrocession. If he was capable of demonstrating this point, he trusted he need not go further. But, it was necessary he should, in order to ascertain whether the present was the proper time, and the resolutions the correct mode? In doing this he had no prejudice to gratify or caprice to indulge; a stranger to the place, a stranger to the people, he had no motive to action but the unbiased result of his own opinion.
He should not, however, look into the constitution for sections wherefrom to draw a constructive power on this head; he was not one of those that collected power from implication, and if the authority is not expressly given, he would not assume it. The eighth section of the first article gives to Congress the power of exercising the sole and exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.
What is the appropriate meaning of the word “exclusive” as here used? It implies more than the debarring and shutting out all other possible powers of legislation, and, when taken in connection with the after, and immediately following words of the paragraph, it vests the absolute and uncontrollable power in Congress, free from any restriction; there is no possible case in which it cannot legislate. The constitution declares Congress shall legislate in all cases whatsoever. But gentlemen say there is a case in which Congress cannot legislate. Aware of this absurdity, a distinction is attempted to be drawn between legislating for inhabitants of the district and for the district itself. But if it be established, as I think it has been, that Congress is here omnipotent, if you will allow me the expression, the conclusion in both cases (admitting the distinction, which can by no means be done) is the same; in one case, the retrocession will mean nothing more than a cessation from legislation, accompanied with a desire that it may be resumed by the States; in the other, it will be a complete transfer of the district. In this sense it must be considered; the very words go the whole of this length. It is given to Congress, and not to the people; it is a complete investiture, boundless and indefeasible; and this is a full answer to the argument of gentlemen that the power is held in trust and not absolute.
As to the expediency of retrocession, he would add a few words. When he took a view of this mighty ten miles square, he saw nothing pleasant—nothing political—to commend. He spoke of the inhabitants, whenever he had occasion to allude to them, with pity and compassion; and he most devoutly wished to see them placed, as Americans, in a condition more congenial to his own feelings, and the feelings of every true lover of civil and political freedom. The question in this point of view will be, Is it proper for Congress at this time to recede the parts of the district contemplated by the resolutions?
He should allude to the expense, in order to give an answer to that question—an expense enormous, indeed, yet every day increasing, and one which threatened to defeat every calculation made to ascertain its amount. The time of Congress is occupied day after day in trifling Legislative provisions for this or that particular spot, so inconsiderable in size or commercial importance as scarcely to furnish a speck in the map of the United States. But laying this circumstance out of sight, he would ask, Was Congress competent to legislate for the inhabitants of the district? He had hoped when he first came to Washington that they were, but experience had convinced him that they were not equal to the task. One day they received petitions to make certain provisions for the benefit of the people of the district, and Congress, with the best intentions and dispositions, went into the inquiry. After some progress made therein, a counter-petition is presented, and the House is suspended between two or more jarring interests. How much better, then, would it be to let these people have recourse to those Governments which understand their real views, and can adopt measures to ameliorate their condition! Congress is composed of materials too heterogeneous ever to do this with any tolerable satisfaction.
Mr. Sloan.—My friend from Maryland (Mr. Nelson) has observed that it is customary for members to express their sentiments on subjects under discussion in the House—not that he expected to make one proselyte by his observations. I perfectly agree with him that there is no reason to believe that he has, for this plain reason: he has not adduced a single fact in support of his argument; but, after exploding all conclusions drawn from implication or construction, drew his own from nothing else.
But, Mr. Chairman, under sanction of the aforesaid custom, and also from a sense of duty, I beg the attention of this committee to some brief observations on this important subject. I consider it as altogether improper, unfair, and unjust to blend a subject under discussion with others not even contemplated, and to endeavor to influence the minds of members with predictions of certain events, yet in the womb of futurity, that may or may not come to pass. The end contemplated by the present resolutions is neither the removal of the seat of Government, nor to prevent Congress from exercising exclusive jurisdiction over any territory, but to reduce the present quantum. But, say the opposers of these resolutions, the proposed retrocession of a part of the territory is intended as an opening wedge, preparatory to a total retrocession and removal of the seat of Government.
Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend to a foreknowledge of any member’s thoughts before they are articulated in words; those who have this foreknowledge have a great advantage over other members who have it not; but I am free to declare that my opinion is quite the reverse—believing that the retrocession of that part of the territory contemplated by the resolutions now under consideration, would have a tendency to continue the seat of Government in this place.
But it has been asserted that we have no right to make the proposed retrocession, and from the dictatorial style of the resolutions of the town of Alexandria, and the positive assertions that we have heard on this floor that it was unconstitutional, oppressive, and tyrannical, I expected from the usual accuracy and correctness of the member who made those assertions, (Mr. Dennis,) that he was in possession of documents to substantiate the fact; but, to my surprise, instead of such documents, he has adduced and principally relied on the constitution, in which there is not a single imperative sentence obligatory on Congress, either to receive a cession, or, when received, to continue exclusive jurisdiction over one foot of territory—the plain and unequivocal language of the constitution leaving it perfectly optional whether to receive, and, if received, whether to retain jurisdiction or not. Hence, I conceive that no legislative body can be justly charged with tyranny or oppression for altering or (if from experience it becomes necessary) disannulling their own acts—a contra-opinion I consider as altogether uncongenial to improvement, genuine liberty, and the inherent rights of man, and as such, I hope will ever be exploded in these United States.