The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2

by United States. Constitutional Convention; James Madison

III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives and a Senate; each of which shall in all cases have a negative on the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December in every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several States comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first formation, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner hereinafter described, consist of sixty-five Members, of whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more States may be united; as new States will be erected within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to the provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by writs of election from the executive authority of the State, in the representation from which they shall happen.

V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third part of the members may be chosen every second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other officers.

VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it.

Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the –— article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected: and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any such office for one year afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they shall be chosen.

Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be, "Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Congress assembled."

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills, except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his objections, be sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within seven days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law.

VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States;

To coin money;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices;

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United States;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to declare the punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying taxes) which number shall, within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such manner as the said Legislature shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members present in each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility.

VIII

The acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of the citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.

IX

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial and application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive authority of the other State in Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their agents, before the House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the matter in question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the several States; and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy; provided a majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records for the security of the parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administered by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward."

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they respect such lands, shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.

X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His stile shall be, "The President of the United States of America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during his continuance in office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation, "I –— solemnly swear, (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States of America." He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.

XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of Nobility.

XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of a delay, until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted.

XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State.

XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the Public debt which shall be then subsisting.

XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.

XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a convention for that purpose.

XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this Constitution.

XXI

The ratification of the Conventions of –— States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress Assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions of –— States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President of the United States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to examine the Report; which passed in the negative—

N. H. no. Mas. no. C^t no. P^a ay. M^d ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.

The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.

---

Tuesday August 7. [17] In Convention

[ [17] Although the secrecy of the proceedings was guarded carefully, the reason of the long adjournment was generally known outside of the Convention.

"The Convention adjourned about three weeks ago and appointed a Committee consisting of M^r Rutlege, M^r Randolph, M^r Wilson, M^r Elsworth, & M^r Gorham to draw into form the measures which had been agreed upon–they reassembled last Monday sen'night to receive the report–I suppose we shall have the result of this great business in a few weeks more."–Edward Carrington to Monroe, August 7, 1787.

Monroe MSS.

Cf. King's account of the debate confirming the accuracy of Madison's report (King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 617).

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,

M^r Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This was strongly opposed by M^r Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware Mary^d & Virg^a only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of balloting for appointments.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert "legislative acts" instead of "all cases."

M^r Williamson 2^ds him.

M^r Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he hoped would take place.

M^r Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Mas^ts in the election of officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States. The only objection ag^st a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

M^r Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concern^g the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of M^r Gov^r Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will therefore be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative should be restrained to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two Houses.

M^r Gov^r Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent, being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought were not laws.

M^r Madison moved to strike out the words each of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the respective powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent article.

Gen^l Pinkney 2^ded the motion.

On question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by M^r Gov^r Morris

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to M^r M's motion to strike out &c.–—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Madison wished to know the reasons of the Com^e for fixing by y^e Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a meeting every year. The public business might not require it.

M^r Pinkney concurred with M^r Madison.

M^r Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England States the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconvenience had resulted. He thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department.

M^r Elseworth was ag^st striking out the words. The Legislature will not know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

M^r Wilson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.

M^r King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Nat^l Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue. When these should be once settled alterations would be rarely necessary & easily made.

M^r Madison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it w^d be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as had been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly ag^st fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature might be called together by the public exigencies & finish their Session but a short time before the annual period. In this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly & without the least necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be required; but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers, which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.

M^r Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be changeable–frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

M^r Randolph was ag^st fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the words following–"unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out Dec^r & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, he preferred May to Dec^r because the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov^t in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.

M^r Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.

M^r Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with agriculture.

M^r Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that the times of their elections with which the election of the Nat^l Representatives would no doubt be made to coincide, would suit better with Dec^r than May. And it was advisable to render our innovations as little incommodious as possible.

On the question for "May" instead of "Dec^r"

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Read moved to insert after the word "Senate," the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute Negative to the Executive–He considered this as so essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the Motion.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was ag^d to nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Rep^s & a Senate. The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1^st Monday in Dec^r unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words "qualifications of Electors," in order that some other provision might be substituted which w^d restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.

M^r Fitzsimons 2^ded the motion.

M^r Williamson was opposed to it.

M^r Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat^l Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Gov^r & Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection ag^st the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Nat^l Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.

M^r Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the Nat^l Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders. What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.

M^r Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.

M^r Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence ag^st the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.

M^r Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burthens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them. Taxation & representation ought to go together.

M^r Gov^r Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier ag^st aristocracy?–He was as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation & Representation." The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merch^ts. &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.

M^r Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either combine, under the influence of their common situation: in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England has been misconceived (by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted. [18]

[ [18] "Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August 7^th.:

"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Gov^ts, all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of representation in the General Government. But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men cannot be justly bound by laws in making which they have no part. Persons & property being both essential objects of Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov^ts the right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other constitutional modifications, favouring the influence of property in the Government. But the U. S. have not reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the Class with, and the Class without property, have the operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle,–which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective basis of it and controuls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem."–Madison's Note.

---

"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7^th.] day of [August].

"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention of 1787, on the [7^th.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker's more full & matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time the example of Virginia.

"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by other popular Gov^ts and is not without examples in our own, particularly in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

"In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits; that industry from which property results, & that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate use, but in its posthumous destination to objects of choice and of kindred affection.

"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property & of persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the former be so in case of a universal & equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property?

"As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights common to those without property, they may be the more restrained from infringing, as well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter. It is nevertheless certain, that there are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor; in which property may oppress liberty; and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary that the poor should have a defence against the danger.

"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property. Bodies of men are not less swayed by interest than individuals, and are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other motives felt by individuals. Hence the liability of the rights of property, and of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed in the injustice: Hence agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the cancelling or evading of debts, and other violations of contracts. We must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience. Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals if two had an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third? Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality will not be increased; nor any further security against injustice be obtained, than what may result from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.

"In all Gov^ts there is a power which is capable of oppressive exercise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility in the Gov^t towards the people. In popular Governments the danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing a majority, and a want of responsibility in the majority to the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and organization of its powers, which at the same time that they secure the dependence of the Gov^t on the will of the nation, provides better guards than are found in any other popular Gov^t against interested combinations of a Majority against the rights of a Minority.

"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual distribution of property particularly the landed property; and in the universal hope of acquiring property. This latter peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their situation to that of the old world, where no anticipated change in this respect, can generally inspire a like sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or the heirs or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not be very near when such will cease to make up a Majority of the community. But they cannot always so continue. With every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a populousness not greater than that of England or France will reduce the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority shall be without landed or other equivalent property and without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure the rights of property ag^st the danger from an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a danger in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this dependence results in some from the relations between Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the last source; from the connection between the great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers employed by them. Nor will accumulations of Capital for a certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals and associations may not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the opportunities may be diminished, and the permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of our laws.

"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a natural offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division of every people is into the owners of the soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may be said to belong to the former. If each landholder has an exclusive property in his share, the Body of Landholders have an exclusive property in the whole. As the Soil becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view of the subject derives force from the principle of natural law, which vests in individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with which he has incorporated his labour & improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others derived from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the highways & other parcels left open for common use, as well as in the national edifices and monuments; from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the Gov^t, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the landed property without the consent of the proprietors. Some barrier ag^st the invasion of their rights would not be out of place in a just and provident System of Gov^t. The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all Gov^ts where peculiar privileges or interests held by a part were to be secured ag^st violation, and in the various associations where pecuniary or other property forms the stake. In the former case a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege to be defended. In the latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals have been with acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their respective interests in the Common Stock.

"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of Gov^t as would give security to the part of the Society having most at stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications present themselves.

"1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle of free Gov^t that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them. And the violation w^d be more strikingly unjust as the law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle ag^st the public authority; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.

"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This arrangement which w^d give a mutual defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it w^d not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The temptation also to encroach tho' in a certain degree mutual, w^d be felt more strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the State into two Classes, with distinct & independ^t Organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.

"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property in electing the other Branch. This w^d give a defensive power to holders of property, and to the class also without property when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a participation in the Public Councils. If the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of representation, they w^d have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of property as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Institutions. And if no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight sh^d be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders should be the majority.

"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t such as prevails generally in the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature, and an extension of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.

"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the Gov^t, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the rights of the minor party.

"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to obey, & in chusing the Magistrates who are to administer them, and if the only alternative be between an equal & universal right of suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t and a confinement of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better that those having the greater interest at stake namely that of property & persons both, should be deprived of half their share in the Gov^t than, that those having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived of the whole."–Madison's Note.

Doc^r Franklin. It is of great consequence that we sh^d not depress the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliam^t subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.

M^r Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virg^a as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.

M^r Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by M^r Gov^r Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the end of the III article

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not pres^t.

Adjourned

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Wednesday Aug^st 8. In Convention

Art: IV. sect. 1.–M^r Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.

M^r Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency from allowing such as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in Phil^a, N. York & Boston where the Merchants & Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in England was not accurately stated yesterday (by M^r Madison). The Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown influence & corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who are not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The people have been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America, and will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.

M^r Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people at large including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make their choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.

On the question for agreeing to Art: IV–Sect, 1 it pass^d nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. taken up.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be inserted.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.

M^r Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident" and insert "inhabitant," as less liable to misconstruction.

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes had been raised in Virg^a concerning the meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives which were determined more according to the affection or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.

M^r Wilson preferred "inhabitant."

M^r Gov^r Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident–It is improper as in the 1^st branch, the people at large, not the States, are represented.

M^r Rutlidge urged & moved, that a residence of 7 years sh^d be required in the State Wherein the Member sh^d be elected. An emigrant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.

M^r Read reminded him that we were now forming a Nat^l Gov^t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.

M^r Wilson. enforced the same consideration.

M^r Madison suggested the case of new States in the West, which could have perhaps no representation on that plan.

M^r Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among the States than existed under the old federal system. It would interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term "residence."

M^r Elseworth thought seven years of residence was by far too long a term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to three years.

M^r Dickinson proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident for –— years." This would render the meaning less indeterminate.

M^r Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat of the Gen^l Government.

M^r Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in such cases be presumed.

M^r Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the plan that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all the local knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their own State. This is the practice in the boroughs of England.

On the question for postponing in order to consider M^r Dickinsons motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident"–ag^d to nem. con.

M^r Elseworth & Col. Mason move to insert "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

M^r Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a good eno' term. He was ag^st requiring any period of previous residence. New residents if elected will be most zealous to conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye.

M^r Butler & M^r Rutlidge moved "three years" instead of "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

On the question for 3 years,

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question for "1 year"

N. H. no.–Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. as amended in manner preceding, was agreed to nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 3. taken up.

Gen^l Pinkney & M^r Pinkney moved that the number of Representatives allotted to S. Carol^a be "six." On the question,

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Delaware ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The 3. Sect of Art: IV, was then agreed to.

Art: IV. Sect. 4. taken up.

M^r Williamson moved to strike out "according to the provisions hereinafter made" and to insert the words "according to the rule hereafter to be provided for direct taxation."–See Art. VII. Sect. 3.

On the question for agreeing to M^r Williamson's amendment

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant to have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission of Slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, & he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to strengthen the Gen^l Gov^t and to mark a full confidence in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited–exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the great objects of the Gen^l System? 1. defence ag^st foreign invasion. 2. ag^st internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U. S. be bound to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the Gen^l Gov^a to defend their Masters? There was so much inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some accommodation w^d have taken place on this subject; that at least a time w^d have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never could agree to let them be imported without limitation & then be represented in the Nat^l Legislature. Indeed he could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice, that he was not sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At all events, either slaves should not be represented, or exports should be taxable.

M^r Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of representation having been settled after much difficulty & deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point in another place of the Report.

M^r Madison objected to 1 for every 40.000 inhabitants as a perpetual rule. The future increase of population if the Union sh^d be permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.

M^r Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the Gov^t will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?

M^r Elseworth. If the Gov^t should continue so long, alterations may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.

M^r Sherman & M^r Madison moved to insert the words "not exceeding," before the words "1 for every 40.000." which was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert "free" before the word inhabitants. Much he said would depend on this point. He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the Middle States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the prosperity & happiness of the people, with the misery & poverty which overspread the barren wastes of V^a Mary^d & the other States having slaves. Travel thro' y^e whole Continent & you behold the prospect continually varying with the appearance & disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave y^e E. States & enter N. York, the effects of the institution become visible, passing thro' the Jerseys & entering P^a every criterion of superior improvement witnesses the change. Proceed southw^dly. & every step you take thro' y^e great regions of slaves presents a desert increasing, with y^e increasing [word is illegible] proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property included? The Houses in this city (Philad^a) are worth more than all the wretched Slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Gov^t instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of P^a or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add that Domestic slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of Aristocracy. And What is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the defence of the S. States; for their defence ag^st those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign Attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports: both of which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern inhabitants; for the bohae tea used by a Northern freeman, will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty of defence; nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of having their votes in the Nat^l Gov^t increased in proportion, and are at the same time to have their exports & their slaves exempt from all contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the Gen^l Gov^t can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it through the medium of exports imports & excises. For What then are all the sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.

M^r Dayton 2^ded the motion. He did it he said that his sentiments on the subject might appear whatever might be the fate of the amendment.

M^r Sherman, did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the ratio of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of the Southⁿ States who were in fact to be represented according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only included in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea of the matter.

M^r Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more burthensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.

M^r Wilson, thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object of it.

Question On motion to insert "free" before "inhabitants,"

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the suggestion of M^r Dickinson the words, "provided that each State shall have one representative at least,"–were added nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to con. nem.

Art. IV. Sect. 5. taken up.

M^r Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Gov^t. If the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money bills.

M^r Ghorum. was ag^st allowing the Senate to originate; but only to amend.

M^r Gov^r Morris. It is particularly proper that the Senate sh^d have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.

Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the Section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part. The duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to that duration. On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the smallness of the number, it was an argument against adding this to the other great powers vested in that body. His idea of an Aristocracy was that it was the govern^t of the few over the many. An aristocratic body, like the screw in mechanics, work^g its way by slow degrees, and holding fast whatever it gains, should ever be suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse strings should never be put into its hands.

M^r Mercer, considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate ideal & of no consequence.

M^r Butler was for adhering to the principle which had been settled.

M^r Wilson was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the compromise.

M^r Elseworth did not think the clause of any consequence, but as it was thought of consequence by some members from the larger States, he was willing it should stand.

M^r Madison was for striking it out; considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Gov^t and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses.

On the question for striking out "Sect. 5, Art. IV".

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adj^d.

---

Thursday, Aug^st 9. in Convention

Art: IV. Sect. 6. M^r Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction at the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the vote.

M^r Williamson said he had formed a like intention.

M^r Wilson, gave notice that he sh^d move to reconsider the vote, requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates for the House of Representatives.

Art. IV. Sec. 6. & 7. Agreed to nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 1. taken up.

M^r Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative department wrong; so it was still more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative department.

M^r Randolph thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a time.

M^r Elseworth. It is only said that the Executive may supply vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the power will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from a State vacancies may be of great moment.

M^r Williamson. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives"

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives," the following words "unless other provision shall be made by the Legislature" (of the State).

M^r Elseworth. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.

Question on M^r Williamson's motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out the words after "vacancies," & insert the words "happening by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise, may be supplied by the Legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the Legislature."

M^r Gov^r Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any office by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator ag^st his consent, to deprive the U. S. of his services.

The motion of M^r Madison was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Randolph called for division of the Section, so as to leave a distinct question on the last words "each member shall have one vote." He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning money bills. If that section should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation in the Senate.

M^r Strong concurred in M^r Randolph's ideas on this point.

M^r Read did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being re-instated.

M^r Wilson–M^r Elseworth & M^r Madison urged that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the Nat^l Legislature had some relation to money.

Doc^r Franklin, considered the two clauses, the originating of money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially connected by the compromise which had been agreed to.

Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing this point. When the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought it could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice of the people.

M^r Williamson. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to the other House: and he was surprised to see the smaller States forsaking the condition on which they had received their equality.

Question on the section 1. down to the last sentence

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a [19] no. Del. ay. M^d ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. div^d. Geo. ay.

[ [19] "In the printed Journal Pennsylvania ay."–Madison's Note.

M^r Randolph moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one vote," be postponed.

It was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the sanction as to originating money bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of the Constitution should ensue, it w^d still be proper that the members should vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence allowing to each State 2 members w^d have been more proper.

M^r Mason, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per capita in any event. But as there might be other modes proposed, he saw no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two members, and yet may have unequal votes. He said that unless the exclusive originating of money bills should be restored to the House of Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy but duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the Senate.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in the Senate, and induce them ag^st their judgments, to concur in restoring the section concerning money bills. He would declare in his turn that as he saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered the section relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would adhere to the section establishing the equality at all events.

M^r Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was that two of those States (P^a & V^a) had uniformly voted ag^st it without reference to any other part of the system.

M^r Randolph, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under consideration was connected with that relating to Money bills, and might possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the latter. That the postponement was therefore not improper.

Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote,"

N. H. div^d. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The words were then agreed to as part of the section.

M^r Randolph then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. Art. IV. as to which he had already given such notice.

Art. V. Sect. 2^d taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert after the words, "immediately after," the following "they shall be assembled in consequence of," which was agreed to nem. con. as was then the whole sect. 2.

Art: V. Sect. 3. taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils. M^r Pinkney 2^d him.

M^r Elseworth, was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.

M^r Pinkney. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.

Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate, to natives.

M^r Madison was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction however in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper, unnecessary; because the Nat^l Legisl^re is to have the right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence or conditions of enjoying different privileges of Citizenship: Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the power of the Nat^l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will discourage the most desirable class of people from emigrating to the U. S. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability & reputation to our Gov^ts great numbers of respectable Europeans; men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations though they s^d not covet the public honors. He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to do so: nor that foreign powers would make use of strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & watchfulness in the public.

M^r Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Gov^t so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits opinions & attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.

Doc^r Franklin was not against a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with which we have been lately at war, we have now & had during the war, a great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses of Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course of the Revolution, that many strangers served us faithfully, and that many natives took part ag^st their Country. When foreigners after looking about for some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our confidence & affection.

M^r Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but he could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate in the public honours. He reminded the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under this description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed System. He would go as far as seven years, but no further.

M^r Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion would give to the System & the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement & mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination now proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.

M^r Gov^r Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible. What is the language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expence of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives & daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings; but would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every Society from a great nation down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World as they called themselves, He owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all Governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: an Englishman, he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that The Legislatures will not chuse foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them, proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress.

Question on the motion of M^r Gov^r Morris to insert 14 in place of 4 years

N.H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N.J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On 13 years, moved by M^r Gov^r Morris

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On 10 years moved by Gen^l Pinkney

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

D^r Franklin reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that the persons in question w^d be actually chosen into the Legislature.

M^r Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power.

M^r Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of Represent^s who will be chosen by the people.

M^r Randolph will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven if M^r Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.

On a question for 9 years

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. div^d. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 3. as amended agreed to nem. con.

Sect. 4. agreed to nem. con.

Article VI. Sect. 1. taken up.

M^r Madison & M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "each House" & to insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the Legislatures to regulate the times & places &c. in the election of Senators being involved in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.

Division of the question being called, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning &c."

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutlidge moved to strike out the remaining part viz but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States. The States they contended could & must be relied on in such cases.

M^r Ghorum. It would be as improper take this power from the Nat^l Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves—

M^r Madison. [20] The necessity of a Gen^l Gov^t supposes that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expence of their local conveniency or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, sh^d all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these & many other points would depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the Nat^l Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power to the Nat^l Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1. of a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legislatures; Surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the Gen^l Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legislatures.

[ [20] Madison wrote to Jefferson, July 18:

"I have taken lengthy notes of everything that has yet passed, and mean to go on with the drudgery, if no indisposition obliges me to discontinue it. It is not possible to form any judgment of the future duration of the Session. I am led by sundry circumstances to guess that the residue of the work will not be very quickly despatched. The public mind is very impatient for ye event, and various reports are circulating which tend to inflame curiosity. I do not learn however that any discontent is expressed at the concealment; and have little doubt that the people will be as ready to receive as we shall be able to propose, a Government that will secure their liberties & happiness."–Mad. MSS.

M^r King. If this power be not given to the Nat^l Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this scheme of erecting the Gen^l Gov^t on the authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections.

M^r Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures. The motion of M^r P. & M^r R. did not prevail.

The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State."

On the motion of M^r Read the word "their" was struck out, & "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions concerning them" the clause then reading–"but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U. S." This was meant to give the Nat^l Legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.

Adjourned.

---

Friday Aug^st 10. in Convention

Art. VI. Sect. 2. taken up.

M^r Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Nat^l Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Nat^l Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property; and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen & Citizen but also where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of the Nat^l Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a cleared unincumbered Estate to the amount of –— in the case of the President &c &c.

M^r Rutlidge seconded the motion, observing that the Committee had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory by making them low.

M^r Elseworth. The different circumstances of different parts of the U. S. and the probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may be accommodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.

Doct^r Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to this Country.

The Motion of M^r Pinkney was rejected by so general a no, that the States were not called.

M^r Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Gov^t and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction ag^st another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.

M^r Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.

M^r Williamson. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own body.

M^r Madison observed that the British Parliam^t possessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.

Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. [21] no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

[ [21] In the printed Journal Delaware did not vote–Madison's Note.

M^r Rutlidge was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature–He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the State Legislatures.

M^r Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would probably never be fixed by the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2^d

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On motion of M^r Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as to restore 3 in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification for being elected into the House of Represent^s.

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration; all the States being ay. except Mass^ts. & Georgia.

Art: VI. Sect. 3. taken up.

M^r Ghorum contended that less than a majority in each House should be made a Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in business, and great inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.

M^r Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and endanger the Governm^t. Examples of secession have already happened in some of the States. He was for leaving it to the Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite number is small & no inconveniency has been experienced.

Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearying their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number; But he had also known good produced by an apprehension, of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia. He thought the Constitution as now moulded was founded on sound principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the same time he wished to guard ag^st abuses as much as possible. If the Legislature should be able to reduce the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be governed by a Juncto–A majority of the number which had been agreed on, was so few that he feared it would be made an objection ag^st the plan.

M^r King admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to the Central States; but he was of opinion that the public inconveniency on the other side was more to be dreaded.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the H. of Rep^s & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and will be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they will generally attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence, the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events in the States may have been of little consequence. In the national Councils they may be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular part of the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure.

M^r Mercer 2^ded the motion.

M^r King said he had just prepared a motion which instead of fixing the numbers proposed by M^r Gov^r Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest numbers, leaving the Legislature at liberty to increase them or not. He thought the future increase of members would render a majority of the whole extremely cumbersome.

M^r Mercer agreed to substitute M^r King's motion in place of M^r Morris's.

M^r Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that a very inconvenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency of secessions may be guarded ag^st by giving to each House an authority to require the attendance of absent members.

M^r Wilson concurred in the sentiments of M^r Elseworth.

M^r Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions than merely fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as 17 w^d be a majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by possibility be carried in the H. of Rep^s by 2 large States, and in the Senate by the same States with the aid of two small ones.–He proposed that the number for a quorum in the H. of Rep^s should not exceed 50, nor be less than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion to the Legislature.

M^r King. As the quorum could not be altered with^t the concurrence of the President by less than 2/3 of each House, he thought there could be no danger in trusting the Legislature.

M^r Carrol. This would be no security ag^st a continuance of the quorums at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.

On question on M^r King's motion "that not less than 33 in the H. of Rep^s nor less than 14 in the Senate sh^d constitute a Quorum which may be increased by a law, on additions of the members in either House.

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Randolph & M^r Madison moved to add to the end of Art. VI. Sect. 3, "and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner & under such penalties as each House may provide." Agreed to by all except Pen^a which was divided.

Art. VI. Sect. 3. agreed to as amended nem. con.

Sect. 4. Sect. 5.

}

Agreed to nem. con.

Sect. 4. Sect. 5.

}

Agreed to nem. con.

M^r Madison observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect. 6.) was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that, "with the concurrence of 2/3," might be inserted between may & expel.

M^r Randolph & M^r Mason approved the idea.

M^r Gov^r Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.

M^r Carrol thought that the concurrence of 2/3 at least ought to be required.

On the question requiring 2/3 in cases of expelling a member.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a div^d. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 7. taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all any individual ought to be authorized to call for them; and moved an amendment to that effect.–The small States may otherwise be under a disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a concurrence of 1/5.

M^r Randolph 2^ded y^e motion.

M^r Sherman had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether. They never have done any good, and have done much mischief. They are not proper as the reasons governing the voter never appear along with them.

M^r Elseworth was of the same opinion.

Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood, it was a middle way between two extremes.

M^r Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it in Mass^ts. 1 in stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 in misleading the people who never know the reasons determing the votes.

The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was disag^d to nem. con.

M^r Carrol. & M^r Randolph moved to strike out the words, "each House" and to insert the words, "the House of Representatives" in Sect. 7. Art. 6. and to add to the section the words "and any member of the Senate shall be at liberty to enter his dissent."

M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r Wilson observed that if the minority were to have a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a right to complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.

Question on M^r Carrol's motion to allow a member to enter his dissent

N. H. no. Mass. no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gerry moved to strike out the words "when it shall be acting in its legislative capacity" in order to extend the provision to the Senate when exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy" after the words "publish them."—(It was thought by others that provision should be made with respect to these when that part came under consideration which proposed to vest those additional authorities in the Senate.)

On this question for striking out the words "when acting in its legislative capacity"

N. H. div^d. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

---

Saturday Aug^st 11 in Convention

M^r Madison & M^r Rutlidge moved "that each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, & shall publish the same from time to time; except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy."

M^r Mercer. This implies that other powers than legislative will be given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.

M^r Madison & M^r R's motion was disag^d to by all the States except Virg^a.

M^r Gerry & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words "publish them" the following "except such as relate to treaties & military operations." Their object was to give each House a discretion in such cases.–On this question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Elseworth. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time. The people will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.

M^r Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper. The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be easily misled.

M^r Mason thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature.

M^r Sherman thought the Legislature might be trusted in this case if in any.

Question on 1^st part of the section down to "publish them" inclusive: Agreed to nem. con.

Question on the words to follow, to wit "except such parts thereof as may in their Judgment require secrecy."

N. H. div^d. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The remaining part as to yeas & nays,–agreed to nem. con.

Art VI. Sect. 8. taken up.

M^r King remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses to adjourn to a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The mutability of place had dishonored the federal Gov^t and would require as strong a cure as we could devise. He thought a law at least should be made necessary to a removal of the Seat of Gov^t.

M^r Madison viewed the subject in the same light, and joined with M^r King in a motion requiring a law.

Mr. Govern^r Morris proposed the additional alteration by inserting the words, "during the Session" &c.

M^r Spaight. This will fix the seat of Gov^t at N. Y. The present Congress will convene them there in the first instance, and they will never be able to remove, especially if the Presid^t should be [a] Northern Man.

M^r Gov^r Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with all Gov^t.

M^r Madison supposed that a central place for the seat of Gov^t was so just and w^d be so much insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that though a law should be made requisite for the purpose, it could & would be obtained. The necessity of a central residence of the Gov^t w^d be much greater under the new than old Gov^t. The members of the new Gov^t w^d be more numerous. They would be taken more from the interior parts of the States; they w^d not like members of y^e present Cong^s come so often from the distant States by water. As the powers & objects of the new Gov^t would be far greater y^e heretofore, more private individuals w^d have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that the Gov^t should be in that position from which it could contemplate with the most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, every part of the nation. These considerations he supposed would extort a removal even if a law were made necessary. But in order to quiet suspicions both within & without doors, it might not be amiss to authorize the 2 Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first meeting to the most proper place, and to require thereafter, the sanction of a law to their removal.

The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form: "the Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place at which their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall afterwards, during the session of the House of Rep^s without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn to any other place than such as shall have been fixt by law."

M^r Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the Presid^t check the will of the 2 Houses on this subject at all.

M^r Williamson supported the ideas of M^r Spaight.

M^r Carrol was actuated by the same apprehensions.

M^r Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses at their first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree.

After some further expressions from others denoting an apprehension that the seat of Gov^t might be continued at an improper place if a law should be made necessary to a removal, and the motion above stated with another for recommitting the section had been negatived, the section was left in the shape in which it was reported as to this point. The words, "during the session of the Legislature" were prefixed to the 8^th section–and the last sentence "But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the –— article" struck out. The 8^th section as amended was then agreed to.

M^r Randolph moved according to notice to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 5. concerning money bills which had been struck out. He argued 1. that he had not wished for this privilege whilst a proportional Representation in the Senate was in contemplation, but since an equality had been fixed in that house, the large States would require this compensation at least. 2. that it would make the plan more acceptable to the people, because they will consider the Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will expect that the usual guards ag^st its influence be provided according to the example in G. Britain. 3. the privilege will give some advantage to the House of Rep^s if it extends to the originating only–but still more if it restrains the Senate from amend^g. 4. he called on the smaller States to concur in the measure, as the condition by which alone the compromise had entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified that he should propose instead of the original section, a clause specifying that the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to repel y^e objection ag^st the extent of the words, "raising money," which might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the inconveniences urged ag^st a restriction of the Senate to a simple affirmation or negative.

M^r Williamson 2^ded the motion.

M^r Pinkney was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked to have the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered it a mere waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it. He said that notwithstanding what had been said as to the compromise, he always considered this section as making no part of it. The rule of Representation in the 1^st branch was the true condition of that in the 2^d branch.–Several others spoke for & ag^st the reconsideration, but without going into the merits.–On the Question to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. [22] ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. div^d. Geo. ay.–Monday was then assigned—

[ [22] In the printed Journal N. Jersey–no.–Madison's Note.

Adj^d. [23]

[ [23] The next day being Sunday, Madison wrote to his father:

"Philad^a Aug^st 12, 1787.

"Hon^d Sir

"I wrote to you lately inclosing a few newspapers. I now send a few more, not because they are interesting but because they may supply the want of intelligence that might be more so. The Convention reassembled at the time my last mentioned that they had adjourned to. It is not possible yet to determine the period to which the Session will be spun out. It must be some weeks from this date at least, and possibly may be computed by months. Eleven states are on the ground, and have generally been so since the second or third week of the Session. Rhode Island is one of the absent States. She has never yet appointed deputies. N. H. till of late was the other. That State is now represented. But just before the arrival of her deputies, those of N. York left us.–We have till within a few days had very cool weather. It is now pleasant, after a fine rain. Our acc^ts from Virg^a give us but an imperfect idea of the prospects with you. In particular places the drouth we hear has been dreadful. Gen^l Washington's neighbourhood is among the most suffering of them. I wish to know how your neighbourhood is off. But my chief anxiety is to hear that your health is re-established. The hope that this may procure me that information is the principal motive for writing it, having as you will readily see not been led to it by any thing worth communicating. With my love to my mother & the rest of the family I remain Dear Sir

"Y^r aff^t son."
(Mad. MSS.)

Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, August 11, showing the solicitude of federalist members of Congress:

"... The President has been requested to write to the states unrepresented, pressing upon them the objects which require the attendance of their delegations, & urging them to come forward, amongst the objects is that of the report of the convention, which, it is supposed, is now in the State of parturition–this bantling must receive the blessing of Congress this session, or, I fear, it will expire before the new one will assemble; every experiment has its critical stages which must be taken as they occur, or the whole will fail–the peoples expectations are rising with the progress of this work, but will desert it, should it remain long with Congress–permit me to suggest one idea as to the mode of obtaining the accession of the States to the new plan of government–let the convention appoint one day, say the 1^st of May, upon which a convention appointed by the people shall be held in each state, for the purpose of accepting or rejecting in toto, the project–supposing an act of the ordinary legislatures to be equally authentic, which would not be true, yet many reasons present themselves in favor of–special conventions–many men would be admitted who are excluded from the legislatures–the business would be taken up unclogged with any other–and it would effectually call the attention of all the people to the object as seriously affecting them. All the States being in convention at the same time, opportunities of speculating upon the views of each other would be cut off–the project should be decided upon without an attempt to alter it–you have doubtless found it difficult to reconcile the different opinions in your body–will it not be impossible then, to reconcile those which will arise amongst numerous assemblies in the different states? It is possible there never may be a general consent to the project as it goes out; but it is absolutely certain there will never be an agreement in amendments. It is the lot of but few to be able to discern the remote principles upon which their happiness & prosperity essentially depend—."—(Mad. MSS.)

---

Monday, Aug^st 13. In Convention

Art. IV. Sect. 2. reconsidered—

M^r Wilson & M^r Randolph moved to strike out "7 years" and insert "4 years," as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Rep^s. M^r Wilson said it was very proper the electors should govern themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary & improper that the Constitution should chain them down to it.

M^r Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might be confined to Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attachments will be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be made instruments for their purposes. Every one knows the vast sums laid out in Europe for secret services. He was not singular in these ideas. A great many of the most influential men in Mass^ts reasoned in the same manner.

M^r Williamson moved to insert 9 years instead of seven. He wished this Country to acquire as fast as possible national habits. Wealthy emigrants do more harm by their luxurious examples, than good, by the money, they bring with them.

Col. Hamilton was in general ag^st embarrassing the Gov^t with minute restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that had been suggested. On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here where they will be on a level with the first Citizens. He moved that the section be so altered as to require merely citizenship & inhabitancy. The right of determining the rule of naturalization will then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will answer every purpose.

M^r Madison seconded the motion. He wished to maintain the character of liberality which had been professed in all the Constitutions & publications of America. He wished to invite foreigners of merit & republican principles among us. America was indebted to emigration for her settlement & Prosperity. That part of America which had encouraged them most had advanced most rapidly in population, agriculture & the arts. There was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign predilections might obtain appointments but it was by no means probable that it would happen in any dangerous degree. For the same reason that they would be attached to their native Country, our own people w^d prefer natives of this Country to them. Experience proved this to be the case. Instances were rare of a foreigner being elected by the people within any short space after his coming among us. If bribery was to be practised by foreign powers, it would not be attempted among the electors but among the elected, and among natives having full Confidence of the people not among strangers who would be regarded with a jealous eye.

M^r Wilson cited Pennsylv^a as a proof of the advantage of encouraging emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest (except Georgia) settlem^t on the Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in population & prosperity. He remarked that almost all the Gen^l officers of the Pen^a line of the late army were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit. Three of her deputies to the Convention (M^r R. Morris, M^r Fitzsimons & himself) were also not natives. He had no objection to Col. Hamilton's motion & would withdraw the one made by himself.

M^r Butler was strenuous ag^st admitting foreigners into our public Councils.

Question on Col. Hamilton's Motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. Md. ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Question on M^r Williamson's motion to insert 9 years instead of seven.

N. H. ay. Mass^ts no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Wilson renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7; & on question

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to add to the end of the section (Art IV. S. 2) a proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights of any person now a Citizen.

M^r Mercer 2^ded the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and on the faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on a level in all respects with natives.

M^r Rutlidge. It might as well be said that all qualifications are disfranchisem^ts and that to require the age of 25 years was a disfranchisement. The policy of the precaution was as great with regard to foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be naturalized in future.

M^r Sherman. The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The Individual States alone have done this. The former therefore are at liberty to make any discriminations they may judge requisite.

M^r Ghorum. When foreigners are naturalized it w^d seem as if they stand on an equal footing with natives. He doubted then the propriety of giving a retrospective force to the restriction.

M^r Madison animadverted on the peculiarity of the doctrine of M^r Sherman. It was a subtilty by which every national engagement might be evaded. By parity of reason, Whenever our public debts, or foreign treaties become inconvenient nothing more would be necessary to relieve us from them, than to new model the Constitution. It was said that the U. S. as such have not pledged their faith to the naturalized foreigners, & therefore are not bound. Be it so, & that the States alone are bound. Who are to form the New Constitution by which the condition of that class of citizens is to be made worse than the other class? Are not the States y^e Agents? Will they not be the members of it? Did they not appoint this Convention? Are not they to ratify its proceedings? Will not the new Constitution be their Act? If the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged to any description of people will not the makers of it, will not the States, be the violaters? To justify the doctrine it must be said that the States can get rid of their obligation by revising the Constitution, though they could not do it by repealing the law under which foreigners held their privileges. He considered this a matter of real importance. It would expose us to the reproaches of all those who should be affected by it, reproaches which w^d soon be echoed from the other side of the Atlantic; and would unnecessarily enlist among the Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body of Citizens: We should moreover reduce every State to the dilemma of rejecting it or of violating the faith pledged to a part of its Citizens.

M^r Gov^r Morris considered the case of persons under 25 years, as very different from that of foreigners. No faith could be pleaded by the former in bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever been given that persons under that age should be in all cases on a level with those above it. But with regard to foreigners among us, the faith had been pledged that they should enjoy the privileges of Citizens. If the restriction as to age had been confined to natives, & had left foreigners under 25 years, eligible in this case, the discrimination w^d have been an equal injustice on the other side.

M^r Pinkney remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the terms of naturalization in different parts of America; and contended that the U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such an occasion as the present. It was a sort of recurrence to first principles.

Col. Mason was struck not like (Mr. Madison) with the peculiarity, but the propriety of the doctrine of M^r Sherman. The States have formed different qualifications themselves, for enjoying different rights of citizenship. Greater caution w^d be necessary in the outset of the Gov^t than afterwards. All the great objects w^d then be provided for. Every thing would be then set in motion. If persons among us attached to G. B. should work themselves into our Councils, a turn might be given to our affairs & particularly to our Commercial regulations which might have pernicious consequences. The Great Houses of British Merchants will spare no pains to insinuate the instruments of their views into the Gov^t.

M^r Wilson read the clause in the Constitution of Pen^a giving to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of Citizens. Combined it with the article of Confederation making the Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pen^a was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints which her failure would authorize: He observed likewise that the Princes & States of Europe would avail themselves of such breach of faith to deter their subjects from emigration to the U. S.

M^r Mercer enforced the same idea of a breach of faith.

M^r Baldwin could not enter into the force of the arguments ag^st extending the disqualification to foreigners now Citizens. The discrimination of the place of birth, was not more objectionable than that of age which all had concurred in the propriety of.

Question on the proviso of M^r Gov^r Morris in favor of foreigners now Citizens

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d ay. V^t ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Carrol moved to insert "5 years" instead of "seven" in Sect. 2^d Art: IV

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a div^d. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The Section (Art IV. Sec. 2.) as formerly amended was then agreed to nem. con.

M^r Wilson moved that (in Art: V. Sect. 3.) 9 years be reduced to seven, which was disag^d to and the 3^d section (Art. V.) confirmed by the following vote.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sec. 5. being reconsidered.

M^r Randolph moved that the clause be altered so as to read–"Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the same shall originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be so amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of levying it, or the object of its appropriation."–He would not repeat his reasons, but barely remind the members from the smaller States of the compromise by which the larger States were entitled to this privilege.

Col. Mason. This amendment removes all the objections urged ag^st the section as it stood at first. By specifying purposes of revenue, it obviated the objection that the section extended to all bills under which money might incidentally arise. By authorizing amendments in the Senate it got rid of the objections that the Senate could not correct errors of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House of Rep^s the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills. These objections being removed, the arguments in favor of the proposed restraint on the Senate ought to have their full force. 1. the Senate did not represent the people, but the States in their political character. It was improper therefore that it should tax the people. The reason was the same ag^st their doing it; as it had been ag^st Cong^s doing it. Nor was it in any respect necessary in order to cure the evils of our Republican system. He admitted that notwithstanding the superiority of the Republican form over every other, it had its evils. The chief ones, were the danger of the majority oppressing the minority, and the mischievous influence of demagogues. The Gen^l Government of itself will cure them. As the States will not concur at the same time in their unjust & oppressive plans, the General Gov^t will be able to check & defeat them, whether they result from the wickedness of the majority, or from the misguidance of demagogues. Again, the Senate is not like the H. of Rep^s chosen frequently and obliged to return frequently among the people. They are to be chosen by the Sts for 6 years, will probably settle themselves at the seat of Gov^t will pursue schemes for their own aggrandisement–will be able by weary^g out the H. of Rep^s and taking advantage of their impatience at the close of a long Session, to extort measures for that purpose. If they should be paid as he expected would be yet determined & wished to be so, out of the Nat^l Treasury, they will particularly extort an increase of their wages. A bare negative was a very different thing from that of originating bills. The practice in Engl^d was in point. The House of Lords does not represent nor tax the people, because not elected by the people. If the Senate can originate, they will in the recess of the Legislative Sessions, hatch their mischievous projects, for their own purposes, and have their money bills ready cut & dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the H. of Rep^s. He compared the case to Poyning's law–and signified that the House of Rep^s might be rendered by degrees like the Parliament of Paris, the mere depository of the decrees of the Senate. As to the compromise so much had passed on that subject that he would say nothing about it. He did not mean by what he had said to oppose the permanency of the Senate. On the contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of it–nor to allowing it a negative, though the Senate was not by its present constitution entitled to it. But in all events he would contend that the purse-strings should be in the hands of the Representatives of the people.

M^r Wilson was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes granted to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time he wished not to multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean to enlarge on a subject which had been so much canvassed, but would remark that as an insuperable objection ag^st the proposed restriction of money bills to the H. of Rep^s that it would be a source of perpetual contentions where there was no mediator to decide them. The Presid^t here could not like the Executive Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation, or dissolution. This restriction had been found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitution had established it. The House of Rep^s will insert other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberate liberty of the Senate. He stated the case of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry, who were to be impeached before the Lords, was condemned; the Com̃ons thus extorting a premature judgm^t without any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of Lords being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the authority of a law, a protest on their Journals ag^st its being drawn into precedent. If there was anything like Poynings law in the present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of originating in the H. of Rep^s and so far he was ag^st it. He should be equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate. With regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of Rep^s the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any objection to the Senate's preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that purpose and would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of the Gen^l Government. All of them are connected with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of Represent^s would exclude the Senate from originating any important bills whatever—

M^r Gerry considered this as a part of the plan that would be much scrutinized. Taxation & representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses. In short the acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating money bills.

M^r Govern^r Morris. All the arguments suppose the right to originate & to tax, to be exclusively vested in the Senate.–The effects commented on may be produced by a Negative only in the Senate. They can tire out the other House, and extort their concurrence in favorite measures, as well by withholding their negative, as by adhering to a bill introduced by themselves.

M^r Madison thought If the substitute offered by M^r Randolph for the original section is to be adopted it would be proper to allow the Senate at least so to amend as to diminish the sums to be raised. Why should they be restrained from checking the extravagance of the other House? One of the greatest evils incident to Republican Gov^t was the spirit of contention & faction. The proposed substitute, which in some respects lessened the objections ag^st the section, had a contrary effect with respect to this particular. It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes between the two houses. The word revenue was ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in the regulation of trade, the object would be twofold. The raising of revenue would be one of them. How could it be determined which was the primary or predominant one; or whether it was necessary that revenue sh^d be the sole object, in exclusion even of other incidental effects. When the Contest was first opened with G. B. their power to regulate trade was admitted. Their power to raise revenue rejected. An accurate investigation of the subject afterwards proved that no line could be drawn between the two cases. The words amend or alter form an equal source of doubt & altercation. When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate to the House of Rep^s, it will be called an origination under the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous matter under that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the degree of connection between the matter & object of the bill and the alteration or amendment offered to it. Can there be a more fruitful source of dispute, or a kind of dispute more difficult to be settled? His apprehensions on this point were not conjectural. Disputes had actually flowed from this source in Virg^a where the Senate can originate no bill. The words, "so as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised," were liable to the same objections. In levying indirect taxes, which it seemed to be understood were to form the principal revenue of the new Gov^t the sum to be raised, would be increased or diminished by a variety of collateral circumstances influencing the consumption, in general, the consumption of foreign or of domestic articles–of this or that particular species of articles and even by the mode of collection which may be closely connected with the productiveness of a tax.–The friends of the section had argued its necessity from the permanency of the Senate. He could not see how this argum^t applied. The Senate was not more permanent now than in the form it bore in the original propositions of M^r Randolph and at the time when no objection whatever was hinted ag^st its originating money bills. Or if in consequence of a loss of the present question, a proportional vote in the Senate should be reinstated as has been urged as the indemnification the permanency of the Senate will remain the same.–If the right to originate be vested exclusively in the House of Rep^s either the Senate must yield ag^st its judgment to that House, in which case the Utility of the check will be lost–or the Senate will be inflexible & the H. of Rep^s must adapt its money bill to the views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will be of no avail.–As to the Compromise of which so much had been said, he would make a single observation. There were 5 States which had opposed the equality of votes in the Senate, viz, Mass^ts. Penn^a Virg^a N. Carolina & South Carol^a. As a compensation for the sacrifice extorted from them on this head, the exclusive origination of money bills in the other House had been tendered. Of the five States a majority viz. Penn^a Virg^a & S. Carol^a have uniformly voted ag^st the proposed compensation, on its own merits, as rendering the plan of Gov^t still more objectionable. Mass^ts has been divided. N. Carolina alone has set a value on the compensation, and voted on that principle. What obligation then can the small States be under to concur ag^st their judgments in reinstating the section?

M^r Dickenson. Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has given a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say: whether from the respect with which this privilege inspired the other branches of Gov^t to the H. of Com̃ons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could not be doubted–Shall we oppose to this long experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves, on this subject. As to disputes, they could not be avoided any way. If both Houses should originate, each would have a different bill to which it would be attached, and for which it would contend.–He observed that all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the H. of Repres^s and these prejudices sh^d never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the watchword; the Shiboleth among its adversaries. Eight States have inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive right of originating money bills in favor of the popular branch of the Legislature. Most of them however allowed the other branch to amend. This he thought would be proper for us to do.

M^r Randolph regarded this point as of such consequence, that as he valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption of it. We had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their immediate representatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them.–The Executive will have more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Rep^s Allow the Senate to originate in this Case, & that influence will be sure to mix itself in their deliberations & plans. The Declaration of War he conceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men only, but rather in the other House. In the other House ought to be placed the origination of the means of war. As to Commercial regulations which may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restraining the definition to bills, for the mere or sole, purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Rep^s and should therefore have less to do with money matters. His principal object however was to prevent popular objections against the plan, and to secure its adoption.

M^r Rutlidge. The friends of this motion are not consistent in their reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long experience of G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years; and yet they themselves propose to depart from it. The H. of Com̃ons not only have the exclusive right of originating, but the Lords are not allowed to alter or amend a money bill. Will not the people say that this restriction is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot but see that it is of no real consequence; and will be more likely to be displeased with it as an attempt to bubble them, than to impute it to a watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he would prefer giving the exclusive right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at all. The Senate being more conversant in business, and having more leisure, will digest the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect, till examined & approved by the H. of Rep^s there can be no possible danger. These clauses in the Constitutions of the States had been put in through a blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina, where the Senate can originate or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose; and produces the very bad one of continually dividing & heating the two houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment of the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink at the encroachment; if it be displeasing, then the Constitution is appealed to. Every Session is distracted by altercations on this subject. The practice now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make formal amendments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations which will procure the bill their assent.

M^r Carrol. The most ingenious men in Mary^d are puzzled to define the case of money bills, or explain the Constitution on that point, tho it seemed to be worded with all possible plainness & precision. It is a source of continual difficulty & squabble between the two houses.

M^r McHenry [24] mentioned an instance of extraordinary subterfuge, to get rid of the apparent force of the Constitution.

[ [24] "Mr. McHenry was bred a physician, but he afterwards turned Soldier and acted as Aid to Gen^l Washington and the Marquis de la Fayette. He is a Man of Specious talents, with nothing of genious to improve them. As a politician there is nothing remarkable in him, nor has he any of the graces of the Orator. He is however, a very respectable young Gentleman, and deserves the honor which his country has bestowed on him. Mr. McHenry is about 32 years of age."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.

On Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive originating of Money bills in the H. of Rep^s

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. Virg^a ay. M^r Blair & M^r M. no. M^r R, Col. Mason and Gen^l Washington [25] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

[ [25] He disapproved & till now voted ag^st the exclusive privilege, he gave up his judgment he said because it was not of very material weight with him & was made an essential point with others who if disappointed, might be less cordial in other points of real weight.–Madison's Note.

Question on Originating by H. of Rep^s & amending by Senate, as reported Art IV. Sect. 5.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a [26] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

[ [26] In the printed Journ Virg^a–no.–Madison's Note.

Question on the last clause of Sect. 5, Art: IV–viz "No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Rep^s. It passed in the negative—

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Adj^d.

---

Tuesday Aug. 14 [27]. In Convention

[ [27] General Henry Knox wrote to Washington from New York under date of August 14th:

"Influenced by motives of delicacy I have hitherto forborne the pleasure my dear Sir of writing to you since my return from Philadelphia.

"I have been apprehensive that the stages of the business of the convention, might leak out, and be made an ill use of, by some people. I have therefore been anxious that you should escape the possibility of imputation. But as the subjects seem now to be brought to a point, I take the liberty to indulge myself in communicating with you.

"Although I frankly confess that the existence of the State governments is an insuperable evil in a national point of view, yet I do not well see how in this stage of the business they could be annihilated–and perhaps while they continue the frame of government could not with propriety be much higher toned than the one proposed. It is so infinitely preferable to the present constitution, and gives such a bias to a proper line of conduct in future that I think all men anxious for a national government should zealously embrace it.

"The education, genius, and habits of men on this continent are so various even at this moment, and of consequence their views of the same subject so different, that I am satisfied with the result of the convention, although it is short of my wishes and of my judgment.

"But when I find men of the purest intentions concur in embracing a system which on the highest deliberation, seems to be the best which can be obtained, under present circumstances, I am convinced of the propriety of its being strenuously supported by all those who have wished for a national republic of higher and more durable powers.

"I am persuaded that the address of the convention to accompany their proposition will be couched in the most persuasive terms.

"I feel anxious that there should be the fullest representation in Congress, in order that the propositions should receive their warmest concurrence and strongest impulse...."–Wash. MSS.

Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.

M^r Pinkney argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was degrading to them, and the more improper as their election into the Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section in order to take up the following proposition viz–"the members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any of others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind–and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."

Gen^s Mifflin [28] 2^ded the motion.

[ [28] "General Mifflin is well known for the activity of his mind, and the brilliancy of his parts. He is well-informed and a graceful Speaker. The General is about 40 years of age and a very handsome man."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 328.

Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil–for compleating that Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In the present state of American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary & depraved ambition.

M^r Mercer. It is a first principle in political science, that whenever the rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective Governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for themselves from the many. The Governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain. They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability & uncertainty to their other evils.–Governm^ts can only be maintained by force or influence. The Executive has not force, deprive him of influence by rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority. The Aristocratic part will not even let him in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must & will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive ought to have a Council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be between the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be between the Aristocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the people ag^st those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the U. States.

M^r Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of Mass^ts passed before the Act of Cong^s recommending the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the 5^th art: of Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the members of Cong^s a capacity to hold offices under the Government. This he said was repealed in consequence of the Act of Cong^s with which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified manner. The Sense of the State however was Still the same. He could not think with M^r Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers & Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent among us, & that source of influence be shut up. If the Senate were to appoint Ambassadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the House of Rep^s will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated by such mercenary views we had better chuse a single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one Gentleman (M^r Mercer) our Government it seems is to be a Gov^t of plunder. In that case it certainly would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be employed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this System. It will be examined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye. The people who have been so lately in arms ag^st G. B. for their liberties, will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing at present under our Governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed. If great powers should be given to the Senate we shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently constituted from Cong^s. 1. there will be but 2 deputies from each State, in Cong^s there may be 7. and are generally 5.—2. they are chosen for six years, those of Congress annually. 3. they are not subject to recall; those of Cong^s are. 4. In Congress 9 States are necessary for all great purposes, here 8 persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the H. of Rep^s as well as of the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one year after the expiration of their terms.–If it should be thought that this will injure the Legislature by keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve in other offices it may be required as a qualification for other offices, that the Candidate shall have served a certain time in the Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and you form a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power: you stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking Lords who dare not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms, and though the Civil authority "be intrenched in parchment to the teeth" they will cut their way to it. He was ag^st rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible agⁿ after having vacated their Seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can they be properly abridged of it.

M^r Williamson; introduced his opposition to the motion by referring to the question concerning "money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its Ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to insist upon it as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was said on the other side was that the restriction was not convenient. We have now got a House of Lords which is to originate money-bills.–To avoid another inconveniency, we are to have a whole Legislature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the Constitution has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the present Section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not be traced up to office hunting.

M^r Sherman. The Constitution sh^d lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the Country grows more populous and as the means of education are more diffused.

M^r Pinkney. No State has rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible into the Legislature. It cannot be supposed then that the motion will be offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions should be revised he believed restrictions of this sort w^d be rather diminished than multiplied.

M^r Wilson could not approve of the section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question what he should say to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose the people of Penn^a had not good sense enough to receive a good Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would remark in addition to the objections urged ag^st it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the Nat^l Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Nat^l offices, & by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Govern^t and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withhold from it the prospect of those rewards, which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Penn^a which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of Gov^t.

M^r Elsworth did not think the mere postponement of the reward would be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2 years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of qualifying themselves for other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services of the ablest men in the Legislature, although whilst members they should be ineligible to Public offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged, when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.

M^r Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our private capacities to support & enforce it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves for the purpose.–It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States. It is The men whom it will bring into the Govern^t and interest in maintaining it that is to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must do the business. All Gov^t must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France–but 200,000 janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence then must be substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done, if the members of the Legislature should be ineligible to offices of State; whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most influential men to stay at home, & prefer appointments within their respective States.

M^r Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by M^r Elseworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify themselves–or say to their Constituents, we served you before only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and have^g answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.

M^r Gov^r Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen the most capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our liberties?

On question for postponing in order to take up M^r Pinkney's motion, it was lost,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert, after "office," except offices in the army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.

M^r Broom 2^ds him.

M^r Randolph had been & should continue uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence & corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him, but those which related to the case of war, and a co-existing incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by M^r Gov^r Morris.

M^r Butler & M^r Pinkney urged a general postponem^t of 9. Sect. Art. VI. till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of State to be chosen out of that body.–A general postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 10. taken up–"that members be paid by their respective States."

M^r Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject he had been satisfied that too much dependence on the States would be produced by this mode of payment. He moved to strike it out and insert that they should "be paid out of the Treasury of the U. S. an allowance not exceeding ([blank]) dollars per day or the present value thereof."

M^r Gov^r Morris, remarked that if the members were to be paid by the States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant States, which would be unjust as the Legislature, was to be a national Assembly. He moved that the payment be out of the Nat^l Treasury; leaving the quantum to the discretion of the Nat^l Legislature. There could be no reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.

M^r Butler contended for payment by the States; particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that they will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on them for their support.

M^r Langdon was ag^st payment by the States. There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige the distant States to bear the expence of their members in travelling to and from the Seat of Gov^t.

M^r Madison. If the H. of Rep^s is to be chosen biennially–and the Senate to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures which are chosen annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the Gen^l Gov^t the want of which was a principal evil in the State Gov^ts. His fear was that the organization of the Gov^t supposing the Senate to be really independ^t for six years, would not effect our purpose. It was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two of the State Gov^ts which separately had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed on the model of that of Maryl^d. The Revisionary check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a union of these provisions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the Government was indeed a circumstance which he thought would be favorable as he had on several occasions undertaken to show. He was however for fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by the Nat^l Legisl^re in the payment of themselves.

M^r Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation of M^r Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legislatures may turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such things have been practised.

Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it now stands makes the House of Represent^s also dependent on the State Legislatures: so that both houses will be made the instruments of the politics of the States whatever they may be.

M^r Broom could see no danger in trusting the Gen^l Legislature with the payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this power, and no complaint had been made of it.

M^r Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own wages too high; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not serve unless they were at the same time rich. He thought the best plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be paid out of the Nat^l Treas^y and let the States make such additions as they might judge fit. He moved that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments to be added by the States.

M^r Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this clause in the Report. The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat; especially as the members of the former are eligible to State offices. The States can now say: if you do not comply with our wishes, we will starve you; if you do we will reward you. The new Gov^t in this form was nothing more than a second edition of Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps with very few amendments—

M^r Dickenson took it for granted that all were convinced of the necessity of making the Gen^l Gov^t independent of the prejudices, passions, and improper views of the State Legislatures. The contrary of This was effected by the section as it stands. On the other hand there were objections ag^st taking a permanent standard as wheat which had been suggested on a former occasion, as well as against leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Nat^l Legislature. He proposed that an Act should be passed every 12 years by the Nat^l Legisl^re settling the quantum of their wages. If the Gen^l Gov^t should be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in this Room.

M^r Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature with authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an unlimited discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps not insuperable objections. He thought changes in the value of money, provided for by his motion in the words, "or the present value thereof."

M^r L. Martin. As the Senate is to represent the States, the members of it ought to be paid by the States.

M^r Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then not to be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out of the Nat^l Treasury,

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

M^r Elseworth moved that the pay be fixed at 5 doll^rs or the present value thereof per day during their attendance & for every thirty miles in travelling to & from Congress.

M^r Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make additions.

On question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Dickenson proposed that the wages of the members of both houses s^d be required to be the same.

M^r Broome seconded him.

M^r Ghorum. this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be detained longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families, and in time of war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in the States are allowed more, than those of the other house.

M^r Dickenson withdrew his motion.

It was moved & agreed to amend the section by adding–"to be ascertained by law."

The section (Art. VI. Sect. 10) as amended, agreed to nem. con.

Adj^d.

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